MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY.



Frederick Denison Maurice

Engraved by C. H. Jeens from a drawing by S. Laurence.

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MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY.

BY

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VOL. I.

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY AND THE FIRST TO THE THIRTEENTH CENTURIES.

NEW EDITION, WITH PREFACE.

London:
MACMILLAN AND CO.,
AND NEW YORK.
1890.

DEDICATION.

TO

THE FRIEND

Who has been my fellow-worker in writing these volumes; whose hints and corrections have been of greater worth to me than those of all other critics; whose sympathy has been more to me than that of the largest circle of readers could have been; who has cheered me with the hope that a few may hereafter be the better for the lessons which we have learnt together respecting the lives of men and the ways of God.

January 2, 1862.

CONTENTS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

CONTENTS OF FIRST SIX CENTURIES.

CONTENTS OF MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

PREFACE TO THE NEW EDITION.

DIALOGUE WITH AN UNDERGRADUATE.

Undergraduate. I see that a New Edition of your *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy* is announced. May I ask if it will be more adapted to the use of those of us who are preparing for an examination in the moral sciences, here or elsewhere, than the earlier one?

Writer. No, my dear A.; it will not be at all more useful to you. I have fortunately been prevented from making the alterations which an observation of its manifold defects might have tempted me to make. I should probably have rewritten it, as I have done once already, and should not have added a single reader to the two or three who have been rash enough to spend their eyes upon it. But if I had had leisure and opportunity for reforming it, I should not have introduced one question which would be likely to be put by a judicious examiner, or one answer which a pupil could turn to any account.

U. If I had supposed that your book was intended for scholars, rather than students, I should not have troubled you with this inquiry. Certain words which I had heard you drop, and, if I do not mistake, a passage which a friend quoted from the volume itself, had led me to the other conclusion.

W. It was a perfectly right one. I have written

exclusively for students—not at all for scholars. I did not expect one professional philosopher would glance, or more than glance, at my Manual. Every page of it has brought you, and such as you, to my mind. It has reminded me of what I was thinking or dreaming at your age. It has led me to ask myself whether I could do anything to help you in thinking, to deliver you from ugly dreams.

U. Thinkers and dreamers, you suppose, will not care for examinations?

W. They ought to care very much for any help, such as an examination might afford, in testing what is in them, and in connecting their minds with the minds which have lived, struggled, and suffered before them. A list of well-chosen books, which have made their power felt in different generations, interpreted by the lips of living men, may be a great deliverance to them from vague and desultory reading, as well as from the habit of winding and unwinding endless webs out of their own intellects and fancies. To be examined—searched out, that we may know what we know and do not know—what in us is of mere chaff, what is wheat, which, after passing through various processes, may nourish many besides ourselves,—that must be a blessing! No doubt, it is the work of seniors to consider how they may practise the sifting most effectually; but you may do much of it for yourselves. You ask each other a hundred questions for one that you are asked in the schools; and if it is with you as it was in my time, those which you ask are quite as difficult.

U. May I venture to tell you why very few of us will turn to your book when they are troubled with *these* questions?

W. Pray, speak frankly. I hope my age is not to deprive me of the blessing of hearing the truth.

U. In the short preface you prefixed to your book.

when it first appeared in a complete form, you say it will be evident to every reader of your volumes that you have felt as a theologian, thought as a theologian, written as a theologian; that all other subjects in your mind are connected with theology, and are subordinate to it.

W. Such an announcement, you think, from your knowledge of the young men with whom you generally associate, will be accepted by them as clear evidence that I belong to the twelfth century, not to the nineteenth. To connect theology with philosophy at all, they will say is foolish; to give it supremacy, insane.

U. Some of my friends will no doubt use that language; but they are not all of one class. I am happy to number among them some devout men, who would thoroughly subscribe to your doctrine, that all studies should bow to theology. I am not sure that they will not turn with greater dislike than the others from their own sentiment, when it takes the form which you have given it.

W. What form?

U. So far as I can gather from this preface—I do not pretend to further acquaintance with the book—you assume a kind of Divine guidance, even for the philosophers of heathen lands.

W. Not a *kind* of Divine guidance—an actual Divine guidance. Will that opinion scandalize the friends of whom you speak?

U. I can think of none which will scandalize them so much. They dislike even such expressions as those which they find in books of divinity about the light of nature.

W. I dislike them also.

U. They say that men who are without a revelation must be always in error.

W. That is also my opinion. And as I think these philosophers were not always in error, but had glimpses of precious truths, I believe they were not without a revelation.

U. Such truths, which they reduce to an almost infinitesimal magnitude, they account for by supposing communications with Jewish prophets; certain fragments of their doctrine, they say, may have reached heathen sages.

W. Have they considered *why* they desire to build history upon such possibilities? Have they reflected that they are denying the teaching of the prophets in order to exalt them?

U. How can that be?

W. The prophets assume that God reveals Himself. They assume that only certain men, or certain sentences out of a book, can reveal Him.

U. Since you adopt the premises of the religious school as to the necessity of a revelation, though you dissent from their conclusion, you can have no sympathy with those who say that freedom is essential to philosophical inquiry, and that all freedom is quenched if we assume a Divine ruler, who is calling men to account for the conclusions at which they arrive. If men suffer for an erroneous belief, they say it is a pretence, a mockery, to exercise their thoughts.

W. I demur to their last assertion. To their claim for the most perfect liberty of thought I heartily assent. I think men do suffer—suffer tremendously—from the belief in a ruler who enslaves their minds. I think they gain proportionately by the belief in a ruler who sets them free.

U. It is that kind of theology which you would associate with philosophy.

W. If I were to introduce any other kind, I must begin

by stating my reasons for dissenting from the theology of the Old and New Testament—from that which my country has received for more than a thousand years. Since I do not dissent from it, but feel more heartily in accord with it every day, I must acknowledge that the God whom I worship is a Deliverer, a God of Salvation, as the Jewish lawgiver and the prophets called Him.

U. A deliverer of one nation out of bondage to another. Is He not recognized by Jews as the enemy of all nations but their own?

W. Lawgivers and prophets said that He whom they knew as the Deliverer, whom they were to worship by no other name than that, was the Lord of the whole earth. Christians have affirmed that His promise to Jews was only fulfilled when He was shown to be the Father of all the families of the earth.

U. But they have not affirmed that He is the deliverer of men's *thoughts*, the author of *mental* freedom.

W. A Father of spirits—one who seeks men to worship Him in spirit and in truth—must, I should say, be emphatically a deliverer in that sense; not of bodies first, but first of that which is within the body.

U. But if the truth of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures is implied in this theology, must not you begin by producing evidence of their truth?

W. It does not seem to me that I am under any such necessity. Whilst I repeat the Paternoster I may be supposed to hold the belief which it expresses. So long as I hold it I must regard mankind in the light of it. When I find men occupied with a number of strange thoughts and questionings about the universe and themselves, and their relations to each other,—about their origin and their final destiny,—when I observe how easily they lose all care for such investigations through the

intoxication of animal pleasure or the thirst of gold,—when I perceive how these questionings are stifled by the terror of some death-power, which demands their worship on the plea that at any moment it may crush them to atoms,—when I observe how cowardly and base, how incapable of fellowship with each other they become, if this superstition takes full possession of them,—can it seem wonderful to me that the Father of their spirits (since I start from the belief that they have one) should have awakened them to ask, and seek, and knock for answers, which without this asking, seeking, and knocking, could not, by their very nature, be granted to them? A multitude of things they could have if they only opened their eyes and ears. Certain things some of them could have if they would fight to exclude others from the possession of them. But those which are most precious, and perhaps also the nearest to them, the eye could not see, nor the ear hear, nor could any one by swords or contracts be excluded from the enjoyment of them. I am not, you perceive, arguing for my right to repeat the Paternoster; I am only saying that if on any ground I claim that right, this appears to me a reasonable inference from it.

U. The Paternoster is taught to the most uncultured, even to little children. To connect it with the problems of philosophy seems a little paradoxical.

W. If the problems of philosophy did not concern human beings, the uncultured and children,—if they only concerned the lettered men who may be able to state them, and suggest solutions of them, I should feel the paradox as much as you do. And will you let me tell you that this conception of philosophy is the peril which I most dread for you and for myself. Seats of learning often tend to increase it, yet they should also afford the protection against it. The notion grows naturally in all of us that the books which we read contain the mysteries whereof they discourse. We talk of Platonism, Aristotelianism, Benthamism, as if Plato, Aristotle, and Bentham had not endeavoured to explain facts as they best could, but had given us some verbal substitutes for the facts. Yet these eminent teachers—and I may add all of those whom the university specially recommends to your study—are most zealous to remove this impression, to save us from this delusion. Plato exhibits his master to us balancing and comparing different theories with which his pupils were occupied, that he might bring to light the thoughts which were stirring in themselves, and so turn them from windy speculations to living convictions. Aristotle is always appealing to common experience—is impatient of anything which seems to him fantastic and cloudy. Cicero's habits of forensic business—his necessity, as a statesman, of arriving at some actual decision—counteracts the scepticism of the academician. Descartes sweeps away the dust of libraries which had accumulated over him, that he may find his way home to himself. Locke is almost to affectation a man of the world—never weary of scoffing at what seem to him the pedantries of the schools. Butler asserts the presence of a conscience only because it forces itself upon him as one of the facts of his existence. Bentham can tolerate nothing but utility as the measure of worth, because every other standard strikes him as inapplicable to the business of the legislator and politician. Kant spends his time in marking out the limitations which the intellect of man cannot transgress, and then insists that it does and must transgress them, rather than want a basis for practical morality. So that all your teachers agree in submitting their doctrines to the same test. If they are not good

for the people, if they are not available for man as man, they are false, be they as compact and plausible as they may.

U. You say that there is one principle which men of such dissimilar opinions have in common. Is there not another? Would any of them, with the exception of Butler, have discovered the slightest connection between the child's prayer of which you spoke and their doctrines?

W. You need not except Butler. None of them has drawn so sharply as he has done the distinction between that which is natural and that which is revealed. None, therefore, may so fairly be produced as an authority against my position,—that, if we have a Father of Spirits, it is He who has been the discoverer to them both of their needs and of any truth which satisfies their needs.

U. Is it not a bold act in a theologian to give up the man whom we have been taught to consider the great champion of theology in both its departments?

W. I have such reverence for Butler, and such confidence in his sincerity, that I am sure he never dreamed of being patron of any cause. Whatever was true, he thought, could defend itself; he desired only, that any mists in men's eyes which hindered them from recognizing it should be cleared away. If one of these mists is the doctrine of the "two departments" which established itself in his age, and has descended upon ours, he would welcome those as the truest disciples who should try to scatter it.

U. You think there is no sense in the division between natural and revealed religion?

W. I think the sense which Butler gave to "natural religion," when he connected it with St. Paul's words about the law which is written in all men's hearts, would

have been far more fully vindicated if he had agreed with St. Paul, that God reveals His law to men in their consciences, leading each man to accuse and excuse his own acts and those of his fellows. By following an apostle, he would also have justified his deference to what he called revealed religion—*i. e.*, the religion taught in the Bible.

U. You reject, then, the notion that men discover moral laws as they discover physical laws?

W. Discovery and revelation are, it strikes me, more nearly synonymous words than any which we can find in our language. I may call that which is withdrawn a cover or a veil; what is the difference?

U. Then why not apply the same rule to both subjects?

W. Why not?

U. What! admit the discovery of a fixed star, or of any geological or mathematical principle to be a revelation?

W. It seems to me that every man to whom such a discovery has been made feels that to be the right and simple description of it. He cannot boast that he is the author of it. That which he acknowledges was not called into existence by his acknowledgment. It was always there. He has been shown that it was always there. He can only tell the world something which had been hidden from it, and which it has a right to know.

U. And you would say that such discoveries or revelations are bestowed upon men by Him whom they are taught to call their Father?

W. If that name is not a fiction, I cannot imagine who else should bestow them.

U. But what if the most advanced physical science should utterly discredit this account of man's origin? What if it should trace his origin to any reptile, rather than to a Father in heaven? You must begin with encountering this discovery, which is yet thought by many to

be *the* discovery of our time,—that which will one day be as completely accepted as the law of gravitation is now.

W. I am quite unfit to judge what the most advanced physical science has accomplished, or is likely to accomplish. I have as little right to speak of the history as of the prophecy. But if it has been shown to any careful and laborious observer that man has a close affinity with the lower creatures—that the germs of what is found in him may be found in them—that neither the specialities of our bodily frame, nor even the structure of what we describe as our mind, warrants us in disclaiming this alliance,—I should imagine he may have brought to light a truth which is precious, as all truth must be, whether we can trace the use and application of it or not, but which may have an obvious use and application in correcting conceits that we are apt to form about our independent and separate excellence, in reminding us how many tendencies we have which may put us on the level of all brutal natures, or below their level; and, again, how many links they have to us which, if we do not neglect them, we may use for their improvement and elevation. I have myself little hope that we shall become fully aware of our relation to One who is above us, if, through any cowardly self-glorification, we shrink from confessing these baser affinities. The more thoroughly we accept of the facts which attest our humiliation, the more overwhelming will be the force of the facts which attest the glory of our human parentage. If Mr. Darwin has added new strength to the one kind of evidence—whether he has or not, as I told you before, I have no right to affirm, or even to guess—I can have no doubt whence the discoveries have come which have rewarded his search, or by whom that search has been

prompted. I perceive that in his last book he speaks with much reverence of the moral elevation which the belief of a one omnipotent ruler of the universe is likely to produce in those who cherish it. I am afraid that in me such a belief would cause more depression than elevation. Mere omnipotence is crushing. Whereas any one whose heart confesses that every step in the apprehension of nature, or man, or the Archetype of man, is due to the education of a loving parent, must be sure that no diligence such as that of Mr. Darwin in studying the meanest insect or flower can be wasted; but will also be sure that the processes in the student himself—the springs of his zeal and patience—must have a far deeper interest, must carry us into another region altogether.

U. But the origin of man,—Is that from beneath, or from above?

W. It has been our wont to speak of him as formed in the image of God, and yet as made out of the dust of the earth. I think those who have used the words have been aware—if not at the same moment, yet at certain moments in their lives—of both the facts to which the words point, and have been trying to learn how they are compatible. I fancy you and I have no harder or more important task set us than to work out that problem.

U. You think the word "Origin" may be used indifferently to express either of these facts?

W. I think those who have steadfastly adopted it to express the one will unawares suggest the other to us. For instance, Mr. Darwin has perceived various likenesses in dogs and other creatures to what men have described as a conscience or moral sense. The likenesses are indisputable; but if they are likenesses, what is the original? The pattern, by the very hypothesis, must be in the higher creature. Mr. Darwin would not only be unable to give

that which he has detected in the dog a name—he would have no perception or dream of its nature—if he had not found it first in himself and his fellows.

U. But if our manners have been produced by civilization, they must have undergone many changes. Would it not be well to look for them in their simplest elements, that we may be able to trace the effect of various circumstances in moulding them into the shapes in which they present themselves to us?

W. Yes!—If you could ascertain what have been the steps of our human education by resorting to comparative anatomy or physiology, that study would indeed have a new claim on our regard. But it must, I suspect, be content with the claims which it has already. We cannot arrive at any satisfactory account of the formation of human manners by gradually reducing them to the level of canine or feline manners. Such a method recommends itself by its novelty. When tried, we should find ourselves driven ignominiously back upon the more ancient methods, however imperfect they may be. And, after all, we could not arrive at the simple standard which you desire. For Mr. Darwin admits that the separate animal does not exhibit these traces of morality. It also must be brought into society—it must undergo processes analogous to those of our civilization—before its kindness, its shame, its discernment of difference in acts make themselves manifest even to the keenest observer.

U. You think, then, that your particular studies will gain nothing—though you trust they will lose nothing—by these investigations?

W. I hope that they may gain much. The Newtonian doctrine, with which Mr. Huxley teaches us to compare the Darwinian, was a wonderful blessing to men, inasmuch as it shook their notion that the planet which contained

what most concerned them was the centre of the universe. The moral results of that shaking, and of the belief which followed it, have been incalculable. I do not think we have yet more than begun to take account of them. But there was this disadvantage accompanying the blessing—one which has often led the student of humanity to undervalue it. When the Earth took its subordinate position in the universe, it seemed as if man too had been degraded. We began to talk affectedly and dishonestly of ourselves as mere "atoms in the infinite regions of space," whilst each man knew that he did not count himself an atom at all; that he did not reckon sun and stars at a higher rate than his own personal being. Great contradictions, enormous falsities, were engendered by this mode of speaking and thinking. It seems to me that the students of physics are themselves to supply the counteraction of them. Let them say what they will about the origin of man: it is about *his* origin that all their faculties are chiefly exercised. Whatever may have been his starting-point, here he is. Show what atoms he comes from, if you will, or if you can, let any creature you like have been his progenitor, still "the diapason closes full on him." More than ever it becomes necessary to look into his actual history; out of whatever egg he has issued, we must try to acquaint ourselves, not so much with the process of his incubation, as with the kind of creature he has become since the shell was broken, and he has acquired a distinct existence.

U. You are not afraid that the doubts which have been raised about Species, and the alterations to which Species have been subject, should affect your lessons about mankind?

W. Not at all afraid, seeing that the belief that we belong to a kind does not become weaker but stronger, as

the inquiries of men about themselves become more earnest and practical, and as the specially human virtues are in more lively exercise. Kindness and Gentleness cease where there is no sense of a Kind or a Gens. They grow with the growth of that sense. But to arrive at a full apprehension of the kind, many notions of species which belong to Logic rather than life may need to be rudely tested. In fact, the history of philosophy is a continual record of efforts to disengage the real from the nominal, and yet to assert the worth of Names.

U. However that may be, the doctrine which we learnt in our nurseries about creation must be given up.

W. What doctrine was that?

U. We were told that all things were created at a certain time. Divines used to say within a few days. Geology made that opinion impossible. But the whole conception seems to be shattered by this new teaching about endless generations and reproductions.

W. Perhaps I quite misunderstand the new teaching. But the oldest is that the Word of God put life into all creatures, bidding them grow and multiply. According to the Scriptures, this creative power is never wearied and exhausted, but is new every morning. These are, or ought to be, our nursery lessons. If we divines have grafted upon them any conception of a dead universe which was called into existence, and has had no renewing life-giving power in it, the more completely such conceptions are exposed the better, for they have arisen from an implicit Atheism, and are likely to produce an explicit one.

U. But we are told that all things were created after their kind.

W. Just so; and as I was saying a minute ago, all human inquiries—I suppose all natural inquiries—seem

leading us more and more to the demand,—What is this kind? We may not take it for granted that the answer has been found. But we may take it for granted that there is one which it is worth any pains to search for. If a law of kind is that by which and under which we live, is not the breach of that law—the sinking of a creature into utter separation—death?

U. That word suggests all those frightful facts of destruction—the stronger races crushing the weaker—for which modern science finds some consolation. But how can they be reconciled with the theory about the source of death, which has prevailed in Christendom? how with that doctrine of the Divine benevolence, which you seem to assume as the foundation of your treatise? Forgive me for asking such questions of a clergyman. We keep them to ourselves as long as we can, but they are sometimes too torturing for suppression.

W. He must be a strange clergyman who does not desire to hear them; or who has not suffered—does not suffer—from these and more terrible questionings in himself. That account of death which I gave just now has been to me a great relief from some of these racking thoughts. A creature sinking into itself dies; so long as it is associated with a kind, it lives. I hold, as Christians generally hold, that man is capable of that which we cannot impute to other creatures,—that he is capable of choosing to desert the law of his kind, of choosing to sink into himself. I hold that a man cannot look upon his death as he looks upon that of other creatures, for this reason,—though inevitable, he must connect it with choice; he must accept it as a sentence of the law upon his choice. But his death may interpret the death of creatures which have not choice, it may show us what theirs signifies. The destruction of animals may be a

ghastly unintelligible fact, till it is brought into connection with this fact, which looks at first more ghastly and unintelligible still; that may be the first key to the solution of it. I entirely agree with you that the hypothesis of a benevolent ruler of nature or of men is wholly inadequate to solve the problem. The death which is the result of a choice that such a ruler must have bestowed—the death which looks as if it were the result of His mere decree—equally staggers us—equally confronts the assumed benignity. No vision of such benignity, if it dawned on me through ever so great a multitude of beautiful adaptations of means to what might possibly be the end of an Almighty designer, could meet the pressure of misery which becomes so immeasurably deeper in the historical period than in all the cycles that preceded it.

U. I am thankful that you do not evade the objection, but set it in a stronger light than I had done.

W. One is tempted to evade objections when one is arguing a case for plaintiff or defendant. The objections here concern my life as much as yours. They face me if I ascend to Heaven or go down to Hell,—whither can I flee from them?

U. You began by speaking of the Paternoster.

W. Yes; in that I can take refuge. If we have received the awful gift or trust of a will from one who formed mankind in his image, and whose will is that we should be raised out of the death which we bring on ourselves by choosing to be members of a lower kind, or of no kind; if He has restored us to our proper life and inheritance, and has any method of educating us to the understanding and enjoyment of it; I may hope that He will vanquish death and establish life through all the animate or inanimate creation; that the struggles of the races have not ended

merely in victories of the strong over the weak, but in the selection of those instruments that were best fitted to uphold the order of the universe, to overthrow the realm of chaos and old night.

U. You adopt the phrase which the new school has consecrated.

W. Only you see in a very old sense, with an addition which shows how awkward I am in pronouncing the shibboleth.

U. You mean that yours is a supernatural, not a natural selection. I must confess I do not like your adjective so well as Mr. Darwin's. One suggests to me a mere arbitrary preference of particular persons or races; the other explains, in some degree, how the preference was merited.

W. Every race which has done any work in the world has believed that some supernatural power selected it from the rest. Then it has begun to rejoice in the selection as natural: it had such virtue, such wisdom, such inherent superiority to all others! What has happened with races has happened with individual men. There has been in the greatest of them a sense of a calling or destiny, of a supernatural selection. Afterwards the selection has seemed to them most natural. Who had such a right to it as they? No doubt there was danger in the first opinion. "We are the favourites of some one who can heap blessings upon us—curses upon our foes." All temptations to ambition and insolence lie in that notion. But the ambition and insolence reach their climax when it gives place to the other. The man who stands simply on his own power to stand—what mischiefs are there not lurking in him—what a downfall awaits him! How quickly the hero with that confidence in himself becomes the tyrant; how soon he may become the slave of slaves.

U. Upon that showing it would be safer that no race and no man recognized either the supernatural or the natural selection.

W. Or else that those who feel the first most strongly should confess that their selection is for the sake of the whole race, and of all persons—that the selector is one who desires all the families of the earth to be blessed.

U. By recurring to the language of the Jewish Scriptures, you intimate that theirs is the only selection which you count valid.

W. On the contrary, as I endeavoured to explain when I began this conversation, the principle on which I have written my book is this: that the conquest over any brutality, the formation of any wholesome manners, the establishment of any political life, among Hindoos, Chinese, Persians, Greeks, bore witness to the same selector who called the Jews to be a family and a nation; who gave them laws; who inspired their prophets. Believing that the Jew was taught from the first that his calling was for mankind—believing that his downfall was the consequence of his denying that vocation—I can interpret the triumphs and the overthrows of other races by the principle which is elucidated in his. The truth which they did not believe has proved itself; they have existed for other ages and countries, and not for themselves; their decay—I dare not say their extinction—has been for the good of the universe, and therefore for their own.

U. The enthusiasts for Hellenic culture in our day speak very scornfully of that Semitic calling which you seem to connect with it.

W. Of course; if they condescended to notice me they would pronounce me a Philistine or a barbarian. I do not complain of their enthusiasm; the more they have of that

the better: the scorn which accompanies it, I think, weakens as well as narrows it. My own conviction is, that while they reject what they call the Semitic culture, they can do no justice to the Hellenic; that this in their hands will be made into a restraint upon modern growth, not as it has been, and ought to be, a great instrument in promoting and directing it.

U. How can we do more justice to the Greeks by accepting the monotheistic denunciations of all which gave worth to their arts, their letters, even to their philosophy?

W. I think I can do more justice to every Greek fable than those who denounce the Hebrews can.

U. What! To the gods and goddesses?

W. To one who accepts the teaching of the old Hebrew, —"*In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. In Him was life, and His life was the light of men*"—every conception that men have formed of a Divine Wisdom who was illuminating them, whatever shape it may have taken, with whatever local or material accidents it may have been clothed, must be profoundly interesting, not for its falsehoods, but for its truth. The study of the divided forms under which the light has broken in upon the human heart and intellect—of the efforts of the senses to draw it down into themselves—of the corruptions which have darkened it—will be pursued by one who takes this clue with him, reverently, in sympathy and in fear. The fear will deepen the sympathy; for he will find his own experiences and temptations anticipated on a great scale, even as he will find the later experiences of the world shadowed forth in different partial societies and personal biographies. And the reverence will grow with the fear and the sympathy; for he will be compelled

at every moment to say—"Surely God was in this place, and in this time, and I knew it not."

U. The confession of a God of Light or wisdom—even of Muses that inspire song—may receive this interpretation. But the stories of relations among the gods, or of gods with men, you would be bound—starting from the Jewish creed—indignantly to reject.

W. Saul the Pharisee, wrapped in his proud contemptuous monotheism, would of course have treated every Greek whom he met at Tarsus as a blind idolater for feeling that there could be—that there must be—relations between men and their divine Rulers, and that those relations must have their ground in some still deeper relation. Paul, the Hebrew Apostle to the Gentiles, wishing to churches composed of both races blessing from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ, will have revolted much more than in his earlier days from all that was foul and corrupt in the stories of the kinsmanship of celestials among themselves or with mortals, but will have seen in them the witness of the truth which was dearest to him, which most expounded the meaning of his own oracles, which was most needful to bind all the generations of man in one. The belief in a Father of spirits; in a Son in whom men were formed to be a kind; in a Spirit by whom they are brought to know their fellowship with each other;—here was that perfect unity, that burning charity, in the fire of which the hard dogma of a not-plural deity was consumed away.

U. And this theology, you think, has survived all the shocks of philosophy, and has lasted even to our days.

W. The shocks of philosophy have, it seems to me, been its strength. The real wounds which have tested its vitality have been those which it has received from its professors and champions.

U. That may be so. But you set before us a number of contradictory opinions about morals—about the mind of man—about the logic which is to guide us in our study of evidence—about the ends and conditions of political society. Must it not be a shock to us to feel that these opinions in general ignore your Christian theology, if they do not directly contradict it; and that whenever little bits of compliment to it are thrown in, they have manifestly nothing to do with the substance of the discourse: are only intended for our edification, or to satisfy the public sense of propriety?

W. I regret the bits of compliment; I cannot regret the variety of opinions to which you refer. I cannot regret that those who put them forward have had no bias in favour of Christian theology—have often had a strong bias against it. The university, I hold, has acted wisely, and has shown its faith in the principles upon which it is founded—in encouraging you to study manfully the inquiries of men in all directions, starting from all points. If you do study them manfully—if you do connect them with your own thoughts, your own acts, your own selves,—I have no fear that you will be led to ask for some other guide than you can find in them, or in any books, or in us who comment upon them. And when you ask for such a guide, you will know that you have one.

U. I have always been afraid to fancy that I had some spiritual direction which could set me above my teachers, or save me from the ordinary trouble of reading or thinking.

W. Hold fast that fear. But if you are ever at a loss to discover the sense of your visible teachers,—if you catch yourself despairing of the effort to read and think, or turning that effort to little profit—your sensible and excellent resolution may suggest the very craving which I deem so desirable.

U. And with that aid you suppose we may come to some clear determination as to which of the opposing schools that you tempt us to compare we should embrace, which we should eschew?

W. With such aid I venture to think that you will be made aware how much you can gain from each of the schools; what lessons each is appointed to give you in the hard work of fighting and living.

U. You would have us become eclectics?

W. No, my friend; anything but that. Picking and choosing an opinion here, there, and everywhere, is not for the man who is learning to fight and live: it is for those who are compounding a grand system.

U. Then I am at a loss to know how you would have me proceed. Butler tells me I have a conscience; Paley tells me practically that I have none. Descartes sends me away from my senses to look for myself. Locke tells me I can know nothing except through my senses. Adam Smith builds the universe upon sympathy. Bentham laughs sympathy to scorn, and glorifies utility as the only standard. These are but specimens of the perplexities among which you throw us. And Logic, which is to deliver us out of them, what a tangled web that weaves for us! Are we to follow Mr. Mill or Sir William Hamilton? What is that strange vision of a higher Logic —a Logic of Logic, which our Hegelian friends sometimes conjure up before us?

W. Well! I would not willingly have been spared one of these conflicts, for they have forced me to observe what conflicts there are in myself. Butler and Paley did not invent the questions about a conscience; they do not exist in a volume of sermons at the Rolls or of lectures on moral philosophy. If thou hast not a conscience, Butler will not give it thee. If thou hast one, Paley cannot take it

away. They can only, between them, set thee upon considering what it is or is not. Thou hast senses which Locke did not endow thee with; thou thinkest and thou actest, whether Descartes tells thee so or not. What signifies it that Bentham laughs at sympathy, if there are sympathies between thee and the members of thy kind? How canst thou feel otherwise than grateful to Bentham for showing thee that there is a something called happiness which men are striving after, and that it may be a general, not a mere separate happiness? If he can see nothing above or beneath but utility, was it not his function to speak of that? For ages men were torn in pieces by disputes about Logic. Is it not well to be reminded, when we are inclined to look back with scorn on the battles of our forefathers, that we cannot escape them, though we may, perhaps, have some advantages in discovering a way to peace? As to political questions, are you not proposing to live in England? do you not expect to be immersed in the actual business of the world? When you plunge into it, you will have no time to feel your way to principles: you will hear only of compromises. May you not learn here, at least so much as this, that there are principles which cannot be identified with the dogmas of parties; that they must lie beneath these dogmas and give them all their virtue?

U. You appear to warn us against negatives, yet you do not, I apprehend, incline much to the philosophy which is called positive.

W. Not in so far as it is not positive; not in so far as it pronounces all wisdom to be obsolete, but that which it claims for our century.

U. You admit that the Positivist has some right to regard the kind of lore which he esteems most, as our heritage, as that to which our age has a special call to devote itself?

W. I am not sure that I know what this wisdom is. You would not say that it was *not* theological, *not* metaphysical lore. It is something very positive, I suppose.

U. Mathematics, biology, social order, morality;—the catalogue is sufficiently large.

W. Very large. Even if we confined ourselves to the two first—even if we never wandered beyond physics—history tells me what hard work it must be to hinder theology and metaphysics from mingling with these.

U. So the Positivists say. It has been hard work, and the work is not yet accomplished. It is their calling to complete it.

W. Calling, my dear friend, is a theological word. It has come down from the theological period. We must begin by expelling it.

U. I do not know whether it is a word of theirs or not. But I suppose they would have no objection to say that humanity calls them to execute this task.

W. A *vox humana*, no doubt, any one must be which reaches the ears of men. And a voice which commands every one to seek the good of others more than his own, must be very human indeed. It can be no metaphysical abstraction: it must be living and personal, otherwise it can have no "positive" result.

U. You allow that idea of morality to be a grand one.

W. Very grand; because I believe it has been realized, and so has become a power for us—not a mere idea. The positivists have been working diligently to cure us of idealism—to make us resolute in our demand for facts. Let us profit by their lessons.

U. One of their lessons, which numbers who have no sympathy with them are labouring to inculcate, strikes fatally at the principle which you have announced as the fundamental one of your history. They say that we can

know nothing of the Infinite. So speaking, they are at one not only with Mr. Mill, but with his opponent, Sir William Hamilton. The belief that all our knowledge is relative, is proclaimed as common to nearly all our schools. I have heard that very able divines have availed themselves of it in their conflicts with Rationalists. I suppose they would say that the Scripture which affirms that God's thoughts are not as our thoughts—that by searching we cannot find Him out—was on their side.

W. Probably. They would not add—would they—that if His thoughts *were* as our thoughts, He would be more able to guide our thoughts; or that, if we could search out His wisdom, He would be better able to search us out?

U. I suppose not.

W. They would not say, then, that One who was limited—finite—say in Justice, in Mercy, in Charity, would by reason of that limitation be more able to hold up a standard of justice, mercy, charity, to men?

U. I cannot tell what the divines might say. I suppose the Positivists and the other defenders of the Relativity of Knowledge would deny that there is any absolute Standard of Justice, Mercy, Charity, or any which it is possible for us to conceive of.

W. I understand them to mean that. And what I desire to know, especially of the divines, is, whether they suppose such virtue to lie in the diminution of any excellence, of anything which they think desirable, so that this diminution actually constitutes its suitableness to us? Suppose, for instance, some eminent person had laid it down that men ought to care for others more than for themselves, would any deduction from that rule, any lower exhibition of it, make it more acceptable to them, more apprehensible by human beings, more fit to hold its place in a positive Code of Morality?

U. A rule is different from a living person.

W. How different, no one feels more strongly than I do. But is the rule less stringent, less absolute, than the living person? Has it more capacity of making itself understood than he would have? Is his capacity of doing that limited, because he is assumed to be not finite?

U. There is a confusion somewhere—I cannot see where. There is a wonderful consensus of opposing opinions in favour of the relativity of knowledge. The scientific men are as strong in their denunciation of the opposite theory as Scotch psychologists and English divines. Cousin, they say, has been confuted. Hegel is scarcely understood out of Germany; and there they dispute over his corpse, whether he was an orthodox Lutheran or an Atheist.

W. Without entering into that conflict, or troubling French or Germans about our controversies, I may perhaps be able to point out one cause of our perplexity. It has been explained by much abler men; * but I may try to connect it with our conversation, and with the interpretation of my own method in this Manual. Whilst I use the word Infinite, as if it were a mere negative of finite, the opinion of Sir W. Hamilton need not be established by proof; it may be assumed as an axiom. There can be no answer to it. For a finite creature to grasp at the Infinite, how monstrous! The word passes from one to another; each sees the absurdity from his own point of view. Each is eager to make use of it against his neighbour. It is a famous weapon for the philosopher against the theologian. As they fight, like Hamlet and Laertes, rapiers are changed, and the theologian strikes with it

* Most admirably in the "Essays, Literary and Theological," of R. H. Hutton, Esq.

presumptuous speculators who dare to judge of that which is above reason by the reason. But what if the finite is itself the negative? What if the Infinite expresses the fulness of that whereof the other is the contraction? When you consider the two words, you feel and know that it is so; though all your cleverest arguments have rested upon the contrary hypothesis. Still, that is only a hint towards a solution of the difficulty, far enough from the solution itself. To find that, we divines must begin with a confession. We have treated theology as if it meant a discourse or system about God. We have given up the old rendering of the name. We have not understood by it what he whom Christendom has called *The Theologian* understood by it; God speaking to men by a Word—"*in whom is the Light of Men*," and "*who took flesh and dwelt among Men.*" That first kind of theology must rise from the finite to the Infinite, and can only escape from the contradiction which that scaling the heavens on giant hills involves, by investing some power, which is not God, with the right to decree what men shall think about Him. The other theology involves no such necessity. It supposes the Infinite to be goodness and wisdom—to be at the ground of all finite goodness and wisdom—and to be guiding men by various processes, in various regions and ages, into the apprehension of that which by their constitution they were created to apprehend. The history of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy is, as I think, the History of this Education. If at one time, and in one place, men may have been busy with demanding for some principle in nature to which they could refer themselves; if in another place, and at another time, they have been busy with inquiries about the words in which they communicate with each other; if they have been profoundly metaphysical, like

the Hindoos; if they have been antiquarians, like the Chinese; if they have been asking after the good, or the beautiful, or the useful; if they have been buried in outward facts; if they have been seeking for the meaning and ground of these facts; if they have been examining or forming sacred polities; if they have been diving into the abysses of their own being,—the historian is not to turn away with indifference or pity from any of their speculations, any of their doubts. He is to assure himself that there is something deeper in them all than he knows. He is to be certain that he has no right to change their order, that he cannot estimate them by the measures of his time, or of any school in which he may have learned his own lessons. There has been a wisdom at work through all the changes of human history which can alone explain his own experience—can alone make him profit by the thoughts of those among whom he dwells.

U. But these must have a mightier influence upon him than any records of the past?

W. Perhaps so. I could not wish it otherwise. The living man is more than the book. And yet, as I look back upon those whom even such a book as this brings to my memory, I can understand how much of their power lay in the interest which they took in the past; how much their human affection helped to quicken that, how much they helped me and many more to feel that the past and the present are the seed of the future. I was invited to write this Manual by an illustrious English divine well known in this University, whose earliest conflicts were with the divines of Germany, who belonged to our high church school, whose kindness, as I can testify, was never wanting to those who had the least claim upon it for any personal reason, or for their adherence to his opinions. I was permitted to dedicate the first portion of it to an

illustrious German diplomatist, philosopher, and theologian, who, beginning as a poor scholar, rising to be the associate and comrade of princes—devoting himself in his last years to the translation of the Bible for his people—retained in all changes of circumstance the dignity of a man and the heart of a little child. The second portion bore the name of a Scotchman, a professor in a northern college, who was only known to a small circle by his spoken words and a few books, but who left on all his friends an impression of profound thought, of rare insight into the meaning of what he read, and into the minds of those who surrounded him, of a power to distinguish and to record the convictions of other ages and of his own. I should not dare to associate names so revered with my book to win any credit for it; since they read very little of it, and may not have approved what they read. But they come back to me when I remember how often I have been tempted to seek a home for my spirit in some particular opinion or system of opinions, and by what gracious influences I have been shown that the fine palace would have been a prison house. I may therefore speak of them to you, though they may have no associations with your memories, when I am striving to show you that your Seniors have not been wrong in setting before you teachers of different schools and various modes of thinking. I am sure that they will all afford you help, if you feel that you need help, for study and for action. For I am sure that the promise of a Spirit who shall guide us into all truth is not a mockery.

U. I have always supposed that that meant all religious truth.

W. When I know what irreligious truth is—or when I find any region of study or of life in which I am not

tempted to be false, I may accept the limitation. Till then I shall rejoice to believe that words spoken by Him who is Truth may be taken simply and applied to all our necessities.*

* The Rev. Hugh James Rose, Baron de Bunsen, and Professor Scott of Owens' College, are the persons to whom I have referred in the last passage of this Dialogue. It is scarcely necessary to remark that the late Dean of St. Paul's was the most able and accomplished of the writers who endeavoured to confute Rationalism by the lessons of Sir William Hamilton respecting the Unconditioned. When I used words which would be certain to suggest his name, I knew not how soon the Church was to be deprived of one of its distinguished ornaments. As I had the misfortune, many years ago, in a book long forgotten, to enter into controversy with Dean Mansel, I am anxious to express my regret for any language that I may have used in the course of it, which, though nowise injurious to his reputation, may have given pain to some of his friends. His immeasurable superiority to me as a disputant deepens my conviction that the principle which I maintained against him was sound and true—one which even his ability and learning could not shake.

June, 1871.

INTRODUCTION.

I.

Philosophy. PHILOSOPHY means literally the love of Wisdom. It is the love of a hidden treasure. Therefore it comes to mean a *search* after Wisdom.

II.

Physical Philosophy. That this hidden treasure is not something which can be seen or handled, weighed or measured, all have confessed. Yet it may be sought among the things that are seen and handled, weighed and measured, or, to use a more general expression still, among the things that are produced and grow—among *Physical* things.

III.

Metaphysical Philosophy. The philosopher asks whether Wisdom is in these things; whether it is of the same kind with them; or whether it is of a different kind, whether it is fixed, constant, unproduced? He who seeks for an object which is not of the same kind with the things around him is called a *Metaphysical* philosopher.

IV.

Moral Philosophy.

But how has he learned to dream of an object different in kind from these things? Is *he* different from them? How comes he to desire this Wisdom, this hidden treasure? Must it not have more to do with him than with them? If he knew himself, the ways, habits, manners, which belong to his race, might he not be nearer to the object which he seeks? These ways, habits, manners, occupy the *Moral* philosopher.

V.

Design of this Treatise.

It is the purpose of the present sketch to indicate how men have been led into these inquiries, how in different countries and ages they have been pursued, what have been the issues of them.

VI.

Subjects—how connected in it.

Moral inquiries are suggested by our daily acts, our ordinary speech, our necessary relations. Metaphysical inquiries are suggested by the discovery of powers in ourselves which we do not find in other creatures. The former therefore concern us most, and in a history will present themselves first to our notice. But we shall find that they cannot be separated. Of physical inquiries, so far as they have been entered upon merely for the sake of ascertaining the order and constitution of the world around us, nothing will be reported. So far as they have been suggested by the desire to find Wisdom, they are too much involved in moral inquiries, they are too evidently presumed in the word *metaphysical* to be passed over. The philosopher seeks for Wisdom everywhere that he may know where it is not.

VII.

Limitation of the subject.

All nations have been engaged in this search for Wisdom, those most actively which have left most records of themselves in the History of the World. Buildings, poems, pictures, mechanical arts, above all polities, have indicated the direction which different periods, countries, individuals have taken in the pursuit. But the name "Philosopher" has been generally and rightly confined to one who has engaged deliberately in the search, and has traced out a method in it. Such a man interprets the less conscious striving of his contemporaries.

VIII.

Not a history of opinions and systems, but of investigation.

It would, however, be a fatal mistake to make even the most rapid and superficial sketch of philosophical investigations merely a record of the conclusions at which different Schools have arrived. These conclusions are in general premature efforts to terminate the search for Wisdom, to confine the results of it within a few meagre propositions. To trace the thoughts which were working in the minds of those who founded Schools, to discover how they were affected by their characters, teachers, disciples, opponents, personal and political conflicts, to watch the processes by which they were expanded, completed, narrowed, is a far more interesting work, and one which falls far more properly within the province of the historian of philosophy. Those who busy themselves with the speculations and contradictions of Schools are likely to begin with extravagant expectations and to end in despondency. Earnest sympathising meditations upon the actual efforts of men to discover the secret of their life, and the ends for which they live, contain equal encouragements to humility and to hope.

IX.

Division of the subject.

This sketch will consist of two parts. It will treat of the Philosophy before and after the coming of Christ. The subjects considered in the first part will be—1st. The Hebrew Philosophy; 2nd. The Hindoo; 3rd. The Chinese; 4th. The Persian; 5th. The Greek; 6th. The Roman; 7th. The Græco-Hebraic or Alexandrian. In the second part the subjects will be—1. The Philosophy of the first six centuries; 2. The Philosophy of the Middle Ages; 3. The Philosophy of the centuries from the thirteenth to our own time.

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

THE HEBREWS.

SECTION I.

GROUNDS OF HEBREW PHILOSOPHY.

Whether the Hebrew Scriptures recognise the idea of philosophy.

1. THE Hebrew Scriptures are commonly passed over by the historian of philosophy. Yet the book of Job describes philosophy in particularly exact language. "Where is wisdom found, and where is the place of understanding?" this is said to be *the* inquiry in which man is more interested than in finding the veins of silver or in bringing the gold out of the earth. The book of Proverbs sets forth the search for wisdom as its subject and purpose. Man is to dig for it as for hid treasure. Such language is scarcely consistent with an opinion which has been eagerly maintained by persons holding the most opposite views respecting these books; that they assume all knowledge to be communicated from above, and therefore not to be an object for the search or investigation of man. This opinion, however, could not have been entertained so generally if there had been no facts or reasons to justify it. The writers of the book of Job and of the book of Proverbs presume the existence of a revelation, nay, ground their feeling of the possibility and the duty of a search for wisdom upon it. Evidently, then, this revelation must have a different meaning in their minds from that which it bears in the minds of many moderns. To know what sense it does bear, we must refer to those books which profess to record how God made himself known to man. In these we shall find not Hebrew philosophy itself, but the grounds and elements of it.

Genesis. First principles.

2. The book of Genesis opens with the creation of the World, or Order, in which we are dwelling. Modern geological discoveries and speculations have done much to remove a veil which had been thrown over the meaning of this record, and to bring forth the all-important principle, that the sacred historian is

speaking of the world in its relation to MAN. The whole after history is incoherent and unintelligible if this principle is forgotten; if the words "God made Man in his own likeness," are not taken as the key to it; if the course of the visible world is not contemplated as secondary and subordinate to the relation between God and our race.

What they involve.

The elements of human history.

3. These data once assumed, it becomes not a strange exceptional fact that the unseen Being should reveal or unveil himself to Man, but the law and condition of man's being. That He after whose image the creature is made should not have given him the capacity for beholding his own archetype, that He should refuse him the power of being what he was made to be, this would be the contradiction. Accordingly it is taken throughout these Scriptures as a contradiction. God is everywhere said to be speaking to man; man is intended to hear. God places the first man in a garden, calls forth in him the power by which he names the creatures, provides him with a helpmate, creates the marriage bond. He submits to a lower creature, denies the authority of the invisible Lord, wishes to hide himself from His presence. He is awakened to own that presence, and to feel that he has transgressed. He is driven from the garden: he is to eat his bread by the sweat of his brow; but this labour is to teach him that he is not dependent upon the earth which he is to till and subdue; that he is dependent upon an invisible Ruler. The first murder is committed in the world: God asks Cain for his brother. His great punishment is that he goes out from the presence of God. His descendants are described as building cities and inventing mechanical arts. Another race, of which Seth is the head, is said to be called by the name of the Lord. The first is an irregular, disorderly condition. The second confesses itself to be under the Divine government. Though nothing is recorded of it but the succession of its families, it is treated as being in the state intended for man at this stage of his growth. General violence and confusion afterwards overspread the earth. A flood is sent to punish the wickedness of those who dwell upon it: the race is preserved in one of the Seth family. A covenant of God with man is the foundation of the restored world. The sons of Noah are meant to people the earth according to their tongues, in their nations, in their families. A portion of them seeks to set at naught this purpose, and to build a tower on the plain of Shinar, that they may not be scattered abroad on the face of the earth. God, we are told, confounded the rebellious scheme. They left off to build that tower. But a mighty hunter established the kingdoms of Babel and of Nineveh. The Babel kingdom is throughout Scripture treated as the form of godless society.

The ground of human knowledge and life.

4. A Divine education, then, is assumed as the regular basis of human life and human fellowship. God teaches man what he is. Man knows what he is; he fulfils his appointed task just so far as he receives this instruction. The instruction proceeds from an invisible Being, and is addressed to something else in man than that which connects him with the visible world. He is always ready to forget God, to bow down before visible things. So far as he does this, he becomes a slave and an animal. So far as he does this, the society in which he lives becomes corrupt and untenable.

The education of Abraham.

5. Abram is called out by God from his father's house to go into a strange land. This calling is the foundation of his life. The Lord of all is speaking to him; he heeds the voice and obeys it. That Lord makes him know that He is one in whom he may trust. He believes in Him as a righteous Being. His faith is counted to him for righteousness; he acknowledges the Being in whose likeness he is made; he becomes like Him. His outward life is of the most commonplace kind. He is simply a shepherd, with many flocks and herds, dwelling in tents, surrounded by people who dwell in cities with whom he does not mix but with whom he has frequent dealings. Once he goes forth at the head of his servants to rescue a kinsman who had taken up his abode in the city of Sodom. As he returns, he finds a priest of the most high God in Salem, to whom he gives a tenth of his spoil. He goes into Egypt: it is already an organized nation; a Pharaoh is reigning there. He loses his faith in God, and tells a lie to save himself: it almost costs him his wife. All his discipline is of the same practical kind. He finds that God overthrows cities which have become hateful and given up to beastly crimes: he is taught to intercede for the righteous in these cities. He is sure that the Judge of all the earth will not slay them with the wicked. He must do right. Abraham is living under the promise that in him and his seed all the families of the earth are to be blessed: but he has no seed. A child is born to him by a bondwoman living in his house. Thus he hopes the promise will be fulfilled: but he is told that the child of his own wife must be his heir. She is barren: yet he believes. He waits long. When the child has been born, and is growing up, he is called to sacrifice it. He gives himself to God; is ready to do what is commanded. Another offering is provided, and Abraham is blessed for his trust. Thus the whole history, so far as he individually is concerned, is the history of a man taught to know himself by knowing in whom he has to believe. He has nothing whatever to distinguish him from his kind: he learns that which he has in common with all human beings: he learns the relations in which human beings stand to the world about them and to their Creator.

The education of the chosen family.

6. But such a history cannot be merely an individual one. That he may know what he is, Abraham is taught what it is to be a master, a husband, a father. The discipline which has most to do with himself has to do with him in these characters. It is in his position as the head of a family, the founder of a race, that God speaks to him. Thus he is educated to feel his connection with the past and the future. Hebrew history is grounded upon the belief that God made a covenant with the patriarchs and with their seed after them. They are circumcised: they are taught that they are separated and set apart by the Lord of all. The sign shows that what they are separated from is something in themselves. Their own flesh is cut off. The Hebrew has the same tendency to forget God as other men. Other men, again, are treated as subjects of Divine teaching as well as the chosen race. God speaks to Abimelech and to Pharaoh. The sign of the covenant itself is shared with the descendants of Ishmael. The patriarchs are shown to have all the evils of their neighbours, to have some which belong peculiarly to them from their sense of having peculiar privileges. Jacob is more deceitful and treacherous than Esau; he who prizes his birthright than he who despises it. The one tries to get the rights of an heir of the covenant by trick; the other thinks nothing of that inheritance, but much of the loss of corn and wine which he believes are entailed upon it. Both are disappointed: the deceiver becomes a wanderer; but in his wandering learns that God is with him, though he knew it not, and that there is a ladder between earth and heaven. He has put himself under a Divine education; it does not leave him till it has punished him for his falsehood. The more frank and open-hearted hunter has his reward: he does not lose what he feared to lose; he misses only that which he never cared for.

Joseph and his brethren

7. The rest of the book of Genesis is in harmony with these portions of it. The heads of the Jewish nation, the circumcised sons of Jacob, commit the crimes which might be looked for in a set of wild shepherds and settlers. Their sins are especially family sins. The one who feels what it is to be in covenant with a righteous being is taught to understand his privilege by being an exile and a prisoner. He learns that God is with him, keeping him from evil, giving him wisdom. He believes that He cares for Pharaoh and Egypt, and is their Ruler and Teacher as well as his. He becomes an instructor to a king. But it is still with his family relations that the historian is chiefly occupied; he cares more to tell how he behaved to his brethren, and was made known to them, than how he bought up the lands of the people of Egypt. The consciences and hearts of human beings have testified that he is right; that such records do concern us more, and are really more wonderful than the

other: they belong to humanity, to morality: they set forth the family relations of human beings as the first stage of their spiritual history; that out of which all the other stages must gradually develope themselves.

The family becoming a nation.

8. The book of Exodus exhibits the Jewish people still as a collection of families: they have multiplied in Egypt, are regarded as a dangerous body of aliens, are reduced into slavery. The book gives the history of their deliverance from this condition. God sees the affliction of the people, and hears their cry; He remembers his covenant, and calls a man out of one of their tribes to be their deliverer. Egypt is presented to us as a nation abounding in wise men: they practise magic and soothsaying: they are the advisers of the king. Moses is brought up in the court of the king, and is learned in this wisdom. While he is still young, he feels for his countrymen, tries to deliver them, and smites an Egyptian. He becomes an exile in the land of Midian. There, as he is keeping his father-in-law's flock at the back of the desert, the Lord God speaks to him, and tells him that He is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But He makes known to Moses another name—"Say to the Israelites that the I AM hath sent thee to them." In this name he speaks to his countrymen; in this name he commands Pharaoh to let the people go. "The Lord God of the Hebrews" had sent him with that message. Pharaoh asks "Who is the Lord God?" and increases the people's burdens. The river is smitten; flies, lice, locusts attack the Egyptians; the magicians mimic the plagues. At last they and the people confess that a real hand is stretched out upon them. The first-born are destroyed. The slaves go out with a high hand. A memorial feast is appointed them, which they are to keep from generation to generation; a witness that the Lord was the protector of their households, and that He brought them out of the house of bondage.

The new revelation what it signified.

9. In this stage of the history, the principles are evidently the same as in the first. The invisible Lord is still the great speaker and actor in it. Men are recognised as in their right state when they hear His voice and confess His acting. It is still the rule and not the exception that he should reveal himself. But the new revelation is evidently of a deeper kind than the former. The Egyptian priests and magicians had all kinds of thoughts and speculations about God; they had all plans of representing Him and propitiating Him. Hence superstitions, tricks, exaltation of men for their skill in these tricks, worship of the visible things in which they had discovered tokens of power, instruments of utility, causes of fear. The Lord of all comes forth declaring Himself as the true Being; Himself the

teacher of wisdom to man, the ruler of the things to which he is doing homage. He makes the power felt which He is continually exercising. The plagues were signal startling specimens of judgments which He had exhibited before, and would exhibit again in that land. They are remarkable chiefly for this, that the reason of them is explained. Natural agents are shown to obey a moral law: a righteous Being sends them; they are to punish the oppressor, and deliver the oppressed.

Hebrew polity.

10. On this foundation the polity of the Israelites stands. The name of God is the ground of it: He is the deliverer of the people; He calls out the leader who guides them through the wilderness; He gives them bread each morning, and causes the water to flow from the rock for them. He goes before them by night and by day; He casts the horse and the rider into the deep. He is the judge between man and man, the Teacher of their judges. He gives the law, He appoints the priest and the sacrifice; He orders the host, and goes with it to battle. He is the head of the tribes; He appoints the bounds of their habitation. The commonest arrangements have their sanction from His name. He inspires the artificer with his power of doing cunning works; He himself dwells in the tabernacle, and meets the worshipper at the mercy-seat.

How distinguished from the Egyptian.

11. The covenant of God is at the root of the national as it was of the family society. There was for the most part no novelty in the mere Jewish institutions. A law, a priesthood, sacrifices, temples, existed in Egypt. The Jew did not bring these social forms with him, he found them established in the land to which he and his countrymen went as a band of shepherds. They might have been cast aside as mere portions of an idolatrous system. In that case, the Israelites would have retained a set of family or pastoral institutions after they had grown into the dimensions of a people; in other words, they would have become an Arab horde. Had Moses stolen the tenet of the unity of God from the Egyptian sages, and published it to his countrymen as a witness that they were no longer a degraded caste, and that they might worship the one God of nature instead of the multitudinous gods of their oppressors, this would have been their fate. If, after taking this course, he had, in accommodation to their prejudices, pretended that he had a mission from an actual, living Being, who had authorized him to establish a system in all its essentials like the Egyptian, with a hard, lazy tenet of the Divine unity appended to it, he would have framed the most incongruous scheme of falsehood ever palmed upon the world; his name ought to be held accursed as that of the wickedest of all liars and blasphemers. Before we pronounce that sentence upon him, we should hear his own account of the matter. He does not boast that he proclaimed any tenet about the unity of God at all. He says that the I AM, the living God, sent him to be the guide and deliverer of his countrymen. The Egyptians believed in a hidden god. He said that hidden God had come forth to declare himself. The Egyptians thought that he had delegated to a set of priests the power to interpret His mind. He said God was ever living and acting. The priest was the witness of his presence, and of His relation to men. The Egyptian held that sacrifices were the means of converting the Divine will to man's will. He said they were confessions of man's revolt from God's will, and could never be bribes to the Divine Being, who had himself appointed their kind and their amount. The Egyptian spoke of laws which were either irreversible or to be changed at the will of the monarch. He spoke of laws as the utterance of an unseen and eternal King, which no man could set aside, which were ever proceeding from the mouth of God himself, enforced by thunders and lightnings, declaring to each Israelite that he was in the presence of God, warning him of tendencies which were hateful in God's eyes, and would destroy him. The Egyptian had statutes provided for the particular emergencies of the land, which must be enforced by some religious machinery. The law of Moses assumes that the Lord of all, who does not think it beneath Him to care for the growth of trees and the fall of sparrows, directed the arrangements which were suitable to an agricultural people dwelling on the shores of the Mediterranean. The Egyptians had temples where they worshipped beings whom they conceived of from the different phenomena of Nature in the places where these temples stood. Moses affirmed that God does not float in the air, or dwell in the hills, or in the clouds; but that there, where it pleased him to dwell, might His glory be felt, there might the worshipper converse with him.

Whether this description of the polity be true or not, it is at least consistent. It does not set aside Egyptian institutions or Egyptian faith; it justifies them by inverting them. They were grounded upon man's conceptions of God; the Israelite's upon God's declaration of Himself to man. The one assumes the nation to be a society which must be upheld, which can only be upheld, by Divine sanction,—which must, therefore, forge these sanctions; the other assumes the nation to be established by the living and true God himself, to be the witness of His truth and permanence, to be bound to a perpetual protest and war against every attempt to confound Him with visible objects.

The office of the nation.

12. This, according to the Hebrew economy, is the one great characteristic function of the nation. It grows out of the family; it is grounded on the family covenant; it must preserve

the family distinctions; its lands must be apportioned to the different tribes; its memorial feasts must be connected with the life of the household; in battle every man must encamp by the standard of the house of his fathers. But the nation is not a mere collection of families. It is a witness of a perpetual battle that is going on between order and disorder, right and wrong, the invisible God who is the Lord of man, and the visible things which are claiming lordship over him. The Israelite, the covenant servant of God, is to take part in this fight; he is to go forth as God's instrument in putting down corruption and oppression. When he has a commission to destroy, he is to destroy. He is to hold the sacrifice of individual life a cheap thing for the sake of asserting the right and the truth, which men have violated. Idolatry he looks upon as the cause of all strife and degradation. He is to hate it with a perfect hatred.

The signs of national life. Song.

13. This new stage in the life of the Israelites is the commencement of Song and of Written Law. The first is the expression of thanksgiving for deliverance from the visible oppressor. It proclaims the Lord as a deliverer and a man of war. It is poured forth by an individual man who feels that he is the member of a nation, and who becomes its spokesman. Though he speaks the praises of God, he feels that he is inspired by God. The flame of the song, like that of the sacrifice, has been first kindled by Him to whom it ascends.

The Code.

The Code is precisely the opposite of the Song. It comes from the lips of the Lord; it is simply His utterance. It carries with it no inspiration. It takes each man apart, and makes him feel that he alone is spoken to, though a crowd surrounds him. Yet it too comes forth from a Deliverer; it is the sign of a new and greatly-advanced stage of education. The discipline of experience has not passed away, but distinct formal precepts have been added to it. The memorial stones or pillars have given place to the written letter. The finger of God has permanently set down the decrees which his people are to keep.

Its authority.

They are *decrees*. The whole force of the code, as a code, consists in its coming forth from Him who has a right to command, who has given the sea its bounds, and has determined what man is to be. The right of the Lawgiver to say—So it shall be—is the foundation of every precept. But then it must be remembered that He who claims this right first revealed Himself to the Israelite as his Deliverer and Friend, as the enemy of oppression and wrong, as One who does not act from self-will. A law wanting in either of these conditions the Hebrew Scriptures teach us to consider a contradiction. If law is the creature of self-will, its meaning and its sanction perish in the very attempt to enforce it. For law to proceed from

those to whom it is addressed, is equally at variance with the idea of these books. They assume that there is a righteous Will in the universe, and that that Will can utter itself, and has uttered itself.

The Code national.

But the code is addressed to the covenant people. It is strictly national. How, then, have the Ten Commandments been felt to be the moral institute of the tribes of modern Europe, differing as they do in all external respects from the Jewish? It is not too much anticipating a future part of this sketch, to say that this has only happened in so far as the inhabitants of modern Europe have felt themselves to belong to distinct nations, and have recognised the essential grounds of the Jewish polity, the covenant, calling, actual government of an unseen Lord, as applying to themselves in their national character. Not as members of a more extensive society, but precisely as united in particular local societies, have they felt the obligations and the virtue of this code. Anything which has weakened their national feeling, or absorbed it, has weakened the authority of the Ten Commandments. Hence the distinction between these Commandments and the mere statutes of the Jewish people has strongly commended itself to the conscience of these nations, not because they have denied the latter to have a Divine origin, but because they have felt that the same Wisdom which adapted a certain class of commands to the peculiarities of one locality and age, must intend a different one for another. The Ten Commandments they have recognised as possessing nothing of this limitation.

Distinction of moral and positive precepts.

The distinction of positive and essentially moral commands, which some have sought to introduce into this subject, does not therefore seem to concern us here. We may have many occasions for noticing it hereafter, but into the question of a code it cannot enter. Every part of a Law must, *ex vi termini*, be positive; that is, it must be laid down. But what is laid down may concern the inhabitants of a particular district as such, or may concern them as human beings. This is a distinction to the perception of which the subjects of the Jewish economy were especially awakened. To the Commandments which were spoken on Sinai there were added no more. All the subsequent legislation, though referred to the same Authority, is separated from these. All the subsequent history was a witness to the Jew that in the setting up of any god besides the Unseen Deliverer, in the fancy that there could be any likeness of Him in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth; in the loss of awe for His Name; in the loss of the distinction between Work and Rest as the ground of man's life, and as having its archetype in the Divine Being, and as

worked by Him into the tissue of the existence of His own people; in the loss of reverence for parents, for life, for marriage, for property, for character, and in the covetous feeling which is at the root of these evils—lay the sources of political disunion and crime, the loss of all personal dignity and manliness.

Property.

Property, it will be seen, was carefully guarded by this code. *One* of its provisions refers to this subject. It cannot be pretended that this law *exists* for the sake of protecting individual possession, though it may truly be affirmed that the reverence for property was a sign of this second stage of Jewish education. With the earlier tent life of the patriarchs it had comparatively little to do. We see the commencement of it in the disputes between the herdsmen of Lot and Abraham in the arrangements about wells, in the purchase of burying-grounds. It comes out clearly in the assignment of portions to the sons of Jacob. But as yet there are within the limits of the chosen people no distinct rules to protect it. It is connected with the distinct protesting character of the nation itself, with the distinct sense of individuality which was awakened in its members.

The universal element in the nation.

But mixed with the family and national institutions, was the hint of something more large than either family or nation. The Levite tribe was exempt from the ordinary regulations of property. It represented the whole people, and represented each family; while it bore witness that the relation in which the Israelites stood to the I AM, could not be satisfactorily expressed without breaking through the forms and limitations of a local commonwealth. In fact, all these institutions, while they taught Israelites to prize boundaries and land-marks,—while they strengthened their attachment to place and their reverence for it, were perpetually reminding every one who devoutly submitted to them, and meditated on them, that he had that in him which did not belong to space or to time, to which only a Being above all such restraints could speak, which only the knowledge of such a Being could satisfy.

The Jewish a moral and metaphysical history.

14. Whatever other characteristics this history may have, or may want, no one will deny that it is a moral and metaphysical history, according to the definition which has already been given of those terms. It is moral, in that, from the first to last, it refers directly to man, to the habits, ways, constitution of the human race, as distinct from every other race. It is metaphysical, inasmuch as it asserts that man himself is distinct from physical things; that though he has that in him which is under the law of growth and decay, he has that also which connects him with what is fixed, constant, permanent, with a living personal Being, who is above the laws of nature, and who Himself imposed them.

Not the history of a philosophy or of a religion.

15. But though a moral and metaphysical history, we have admitted already that it is no history of a philosophy, of thoughts about wisdom, or of a search after it. Another remark must be made here. If this is no history of a Philosophy, it is also no history of a Religion, in the sense which we commonly give to that word. It is not the history of men's thoughts about God, or desires after God, or affections towards Him. It professes to be a history of God's unveiling of Himself to man. If it is not that it is nothing, it is false from beginning to end.

To make it the history of the speculations of a certain tribe about God, we must deny the very root of any speculations which that tribe ever had, for this root is the belief that they could not think of Him, unless He had first thought of them; that they could not speak of Him, unless He were speaking to them. A class of modern teachers assume that God is made in the image of man, is formed after his conceptions; and then insist that a nation must have had this conviction, which acted and lived upon the opposite one. Let every people be allowed to speak its own word, to tell us what it means. We who think the Hebrews spoke a true word—meant the true thing, only claim for them what we would claim for all,—the right of interpreting themselves.

The religious books of the Hebrews.

16. We have denied that the history of the Hebrews is the history of a religion or a philosophy. But we fully admit that there are Hebrew books which, in the ordinary sense of the word, are to be called religious, just as we contend that there are some which, in the ordinary sense of the word, are to be called philosophical. When the Jewish Rabbinical schools assigned the name of "holy writings" to one part of these books, and of "histories" to another, they expressed their feeling that there are some of them which especially embody the aspirations of the human spirit after a Divine person, just as there are those which set forth the acts of that Divine person towards men. The book of Psalms is the chief of the holy writings. The tendency in later times has been to give it this character too strictly and exclusively,—to overlook the historical and political features of the Psalms, which are so conspicuous to all plain readers, and to regard them simply as utterances of individual sorrow, or trust, or thankfulness, or rapture. By doing so, we destroy the meaning of the writer; we do not separate his religious feelings from their surrounding elements, but give them a new character altogether. The Psalmist is not a recluse brooding over his own feelings and experiences. He is a man learning, under the heavy pressure of life, in the battle-field, on the judgment-seat, through the cruelty of persecutors, the fellowship of outlaws, the rebellion of sons, his personal

The Psalms.

transgressions, to know his own feebleness, the necessity of Divine succour, the mysterious relations in which he stands to the Lord and to his fellow-men. As a king, the Lord of all had revealed himself to the Israelites,—a king reigning from generation to generation, in whose government lay the only freedom, safety, hope of his subjects. Great changes had taken place in the outward condition of the Israelite; he was no more *merely* under the invisible Lord who had spoken His laws upon Sinai. A king went forth in the sight of the Host as its leader; was confessed to be the chief of the people's strength. The difficulty was to connect these two truths together; to prevent the visible king from interfering with the homage which was due to the Invisible, to make him the witness of God, instead of a rival and a rebel. Saul had been made king, because the people disbelieved that God was an actual king. The whole of David's strange history, as a shepherd-boy, a hero, an exile, a king ruling, and a king deposed, reigning righteously, and falling into acts of rebellion and injustice, testified that the temporal sovereign was nothing but the representative, an imperfect type of One whose throne was for ever and ever. The twofold conviction that the unseen kingdom is the ground of every other, that it is the true substantial kingdom, and that man is intended to be the image of God in his royalty, is implied in all the utterances of the book of Psalms, gives them their strength, their unity, their variety, makes them as human as they are national.

The Unseen King and the visible king.

Trust in God is the life-spring of every prayer and song, trust in Him as the Lord God of Israel, who will do what He has promised, who will show the Jewish calling not to be a vain calling, who will fully manifest Himself to men as their Ruler, and will prove the falsehood of all the attempts of men to make Him in their likeness, and the truth of His assertion, that He has made men in His likeness. It is a long fight between the true God and the false gods, the true image, and the false image; the struggle is desperate in that land, in every land, in each man's heart. At times, all hopes of a successful issue seem over; "the faithful fail from among the children of men," false gods and false men have their own way. God seems to have left the world to lies, to misery, to atheism. But out of the depth of despair comes hope. The Lord shall arise, and man shall not always have the upper hand; He will defend the cause of the poor and the fatherless, and see that those in necessity have right. Let the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing as they will, He will set His king upon His holy hill of Zion, a king who shall reign as long as the sun and moon endureth, and who shall set peace and righteousness on the earth. Throughout these Psalms, all those elements of Hebrew life

The inward and outward battle.

and revelation to which we have referred, the feast, the law, the tribe, the tabernacle, the priests, the sacrifices, above all, the battle-field against idolatry, present themselves to us in connection with all the inmost thoughts and longings of the writers. But the ingenuity of modern criticism has discovered that some of these Psalms must be the work of men who had attained a higher degree of cultivation than was compatible with the reverence for the Mosaic institutions, or with the religious system which surrounded them. One who could introduce the Lord, saying, "Thinkest thou that I will eat bull's flesh, or drink the blood of goats;" or when lamenting his crime, could say, "Thou desirest no sacrifice, else would I give it Thee, but thou delightest not in burnt offering," must, we are told, have been impressed with convictions which the old and orthodox Hebrew would have regarded with horror. The conclusion of the 51st Psalm, "Build Thou the walls of Jerusalem, then shalt Thou be pleased with burnt offering, and whole burnt offering, then shall they offer young bullocks upon Thy altar," is consequently set down as a priestly interpolation wholly inconsistent with the tenor of the prayer. If our previous remarks are true, there is no greater proof of the earnestness with which the Psalmist had meditated on the Mosaic institution of sacrifice, and on the difference between his own country and all others, than these passages. The very lesson which one who devoutly obeyed the Mosaic directions about sacrifice would have learnt from them, was precisely this, that they were expressions of the surrender of the heart to Him, from whom it had gone astray; not gifts by which the heart might hope to bring the Divine Lord to tolerate its wrong doings. It was a lesson which every humble and contrite man would have learnt, that sacrifices would be precious in God's eyes as witnesses of a reconciled spirit, of a restored nation. But we readily admit that there is a truth indicated in these rude attempts to destroy the unity of compositions in which the consciences and hearts of all ages have recognized a correspondence with their own deepest feelings and intuitions. If the Mosaic economy were really part of a Divine education, it should be able to show how it has done its work; it should be able to say, "the men who have been under this training are not what they would have been without it, those who have had the longest experience of it see the furthest, the children who keep this Law are wiser than their forefathers." The book of Psalms, we readily admit, has that in it which does not belong to the patriarchal or legal period of Jewish history. By claiming the privileges of the children of Abraham, by meditating on the Law night and day, by the divine discipline of toil, and strife, and sorrow, which the records of their fathers

The Psalms in conformity with the Mosaic Law.

explained to them, an insight and apprehension were cultivated in them, which could not have belonged to the earlier time. They saw more into the meaning and heart of institutions; they saw how the principle implied in them rose above the accident and the rule: they learnt to protest against those who sacrificed their spirit for the sake of preserving their letter, and in doing so, lost both; they saw how what was essentially and eternally human was drawn out by that which was formally and exclusively national; they found how an absolute, unchangeable morality lay beneath the relative morality of the patriarchal family, the positive morality of decrees and statutes.

They draw out the sense and principle of it.

SECTION II.

HEBREW PHILOSOPHY.

1. No one will say that the book of Proverbs is not characteristically different from the book of Psalms. All feel the distinction. The programmes of the books themselves recognize and express it. When we say that the Proverbs is a philosophical book, we do but follow the definition which the writer gives of it. "To know wisdom and instruction, to perceive the words of understanding, to receive the instruction of wisdom, justice, judgment, and equity, to give subtlety to the simple, to the young man knowledge and discretion."

The characteristics of the book of Proverbs.

This is not a preparation for a book of passionate devotion, for a book uttering the groans of a man in deep trouble, or the confidence with which he flies to a place of refuge. It leads us to expect just what we find, a book of observation, reflection, experiment. It has, however, much which is in common with the book, to which it is in form and purpose so unlike. Both, as distinguished from the histories, set forth the seekings and strivings of man's spirit; both assume that this seeking or striving has been awakened in the man, and that the direction of his search has been given him. The man seeks righteousness because the righteous Being has first sought him. He seeks wisdom, because the wise Being has first sought him. He is to know wisdom and equity, just as he is to be righteous and know righteousness, because God has made him in His image.

2. That the Divine revelation was designed to awaken, and would awaken, this kind of craving as much as the other, is implied in the first statement of it. The Jewish history is no mere exhibition of a gracious and benignant character, though it is that in the highest sense. The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy, by revealing Himself as such, leads men to feel their own want of mercy, quickness to anger, unwillingness to forgive, is a wrong, the departure from a standard to which they are meant to be conformed. As these qualities are brought out practically, their nature becomes gradually more intelligible, the sense of rebellion against them more vivid. But such an exhibition of them presumes a certain method of government, a fitting of means to ends; what we call *judgment*. The unseen King must administer the world upon a plan. There must be in Him that

Its connection with the history.

which arranges, devises, orders. And that which is in Him is in His creature. He is able to perceive it, to trace it out, because he has that which corresponds to it. There is an eye in him which meets the light, takes it in, sees objects by it.

Solomon, the wise king.

3. The king, so Solomon felt, has that calling which demands this wisdom; he asked it, and it was granted. His life became the type of wisdom to the Hebrew, the great key to his words. Such it has been felt in all ages to be. Within him were the strongest tendencies to sensuality, the fullest sympathy with all outward things and feeling of their attraction, an assurance that the world is meant to be ruled and examined by man. All possible motives to that visible worship or idolatry which the law condemned were in him in their fullest, liveliest power. But within him, too, was the sense of a relation to Him of whom the law and the convenant testified, to the invisible Being, to the absolute and perfect King, to Him of whom every king, by his own personal authority, and by the permanence of his dynasty, gave testimony. Such a Being was the only Protector to whom he could look up against the powers that were conspiring to rob him of his strength, to make him a slave. Such a Being only could teach him how to judge and to govern, how to know the boundaries of order and disorder, of justice and iniquity; how to make the things about him his instruments, how to distinguish their uses and properties. The Temple which he built expressed his belief that the buildings and treasures of the world, which were the objects and instruments of idolatry, were to be consecrated to the unseen Being, and to be witnesses of Him. The book of Proverbs, which he wrote, expresses his feeling of the relation in which man stands to the world and to his Maker.

Wisdom human, not physical.

4. Solomon, it is said, knew all plants, from the hyssop on the wall to the cedar of Lebanon. He was a student of natural things. But the Proverbs contain none of this lore. They assume that Wisdom is not to be found in them, earnestly as the wise man may contemplate them, greatly as he may delight in them. Wisdom has to do first of all with man; he is to seek it that he may be able to rule others and rule himself. He is to seek it to deliver him from the strange woman, from the harlot Sense, which is always dragging him down into death. He is to seek it that he may know the path of life.

The two voices.

5. And if he seeks he must find. For as sure as that tempting voice is ever beckoning him to follow it, and choose its ways, so surely is there another voice crying aloud in the places of concourse, speaking to the heart within, promising him riches and honour, durable riches and righteousness. Wisdom seeks to enter into the heart, to draw the soul after it. When it does

enter in, when it is fully entertained, it becomes sweet and pleasant. But first it applies sharp corrections, bitter medicines. The man who will follow this guide must not be weary of discipline.

Not a new discovery.

6. This distinction of two powers or principles, which are drawing men in two different directions, was evidently implied in the Divine covenant and the Divine law. Without it we could not interpret the calling of Abraham and his family; still less the national faith and the national protest against idolatry. Even some of the most apparently external arrangements of the Mosaic institutions, such as the permission of certain meats and the denunciation of certain others, the seemingly arbitrary division of clean and unclean beasts, had been cultivating in the mind of the Israelite the feeling that there was an upward and a downward path, to one of which he had a natural inclination, into the other of which a Divine hand was leading him. The author of the book of Proverbs does but draw out the sense and purpose of these ordinances, does but recognize an essential and eternal law as lying beneath them. The whole life of man he represents as being nothing else but an expression and exhibition of this conflict. Every act he commits is done in obedience to one or other of the influences which is every moment acting upon him. Every act confirms him in obedience to one or the other.

The seducer personal.

7. But these words—influences, principles, powers, are they adequate for our purpose? We have spoken of the "harlot Sense." Solomon, with far more practical truth as well as poetical power, speaks of her as "the strange woman." He can tolerate no abstraction. It is an actual enchantress which speaks to each unhappy youth. That which is the best individual language is also the best general language; there is no way of describing the temptations of the race but by describing the temptations of the particular heart. He does not arrive at a notion of what is human by heaping together a number of experiences; in each one he finds that which belongs to all.

Wisdom personal.

8. If that which seduces a man away from his proper state must be described personally, how is it with Wisdom? Is *that* merely an abstraction? Is that not something to be embraced, possessed, loved? Is that not a reality, not a person? If not, how can its attractions be measured against those of the other? Can we follow a dream, a shadow, as we do that which we feel and know to be substantial? If Sense comes before us as a woman, Wisdom, so Solomon takes for granted, can be nothing *less* fair, *less* attractive. To use the feminine pronoun in one case, and not in the other, would make the meaning false in both. Wisdom must have an intense loveliness, an intense cap-

tivating power, to those who have once come within the circle of its influence; and, of course, it would be contradicting the whole doctrine of the book to fancy that this loveliness was in any sense the creature of him who beholds it, and is enamoured of it. It offers itself to him, overcomes his reluctance, draws him after it. Instead of exalting his understanding into a creator, he is bidden above all things not to lean on it, not to trust to it. If he does, Wisdom disowns him; he is a fool.

Wisdom divine.

9. But what is this Wisdom? The question has become a more and more awful one at each step. Solomon had declared at the outset that he who does not begin with the fear of the Lord has no hope of attaining it. That fear must have been strongly in the mind of the writer, mixed with a strange boldness, when he proceeds gradually to see Wisdom, the counsellor of man as the counsellor of God, "by whom," here on earth, "kings reign and princes decree justice, but who was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was." "When there were no depths," thus Wisdom speaks, "I was brought forth, when there no fountains, abounding with water, before the mountains were settled, before the hills was I brought forth; when as yet He had not made the earth, nor the fields, nor the highest part of the dust of the world. When He prepared the heavens I was there, when He set a compass upon the face of the deep, when He established the clouds above, when He strengthened the fountains of the deep, when He gave to the sea his decree that the waters should not pass His commandment, when he appointed the foundations of the earth, then was I by Him as one brought up with him, and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before Him, rejoicing in the habitable parts of His earth, and my delights were with the sons of men." This is the very essence of Hebrew philosophy. It has been gradually unfolding itself out of the previous revelations; here it finds its full expression. In this grand assertion of one who is the sharer of God's mind, of one who was before the universe, in whom the whole order of creation originated, but of one who regards man as above all this creation, who has been from the first his guide and teacher, in whom he attains the satisfaction of his highest desires, by whom he is delivered from subjection to the world around him, lies the foundation of all the most minute practical teaching respecting the duties of the king and of the shopkeeper. The Divine order of the world is at the same time the true human order. The king is set upon his throne to exhibit it in acts of protection and acts of punishment; the just balances exhibit it as well. All confusion comes from men forgetting their places in this order, ceasing to acknowledge the power which is guiding them and keeping them in it, yielding

to the power which is seeking to put out the inward eye that alone can discern it.

The form of the Proverbs.

10. The antithetical form in which the book of Proverbs is conceived evidently belongs to its essence. The main idea which goes through every part of it could not have been brought out in any other way. It is also a very important circumstance that the book is addressed by a father to his child. It is didactic and affectionate; it gives the results of experience, not the processes of it. In both these respects it is distinguished from the other great book of Hebrew Philosophy, *Ecclesiastes, or the Preacher.*

Ecclesiastes Wisdom sought through disappointments.

11. This book is the record of personal experiences, of struggles, disappointments, partial conclusions. It is the story of a man walking in a labyrinth, trying one passage after another, and always baffled, always forced into some new path which ends as hopelessly. The labyrinth, however, is not one of speculation merely or chiefly. It is the actual maze and puzzle of human life which he is seeking to penetrate; the actual contradictions which a man must meet with who does not shut his eyes to them. And though each conclusion seems to be one in which nothing is concluded, it is not so in fact. Something is ascertained by each experiment. Riches, all earthly enjoyments, all works, toils, vocations, are found out to have a positive good in them. The wise man whose eyes are in his head is found to be better than all others. Though there is an excuse for thinking that the old days were better than our own, it turns out not to be wise to inquire about this. There is a comfort under the oppressions which take place in cities and provinces. And yet vanity and vexation of spirit is written upon all things. It is a fact, and must not be disguised. Wisdom itself seems to be under the same curse with other things; all the mere experiences of the seeker after it, of the wise man, are sadder, more oppressive, than those of other men. But his sadness and his oppression, his disappointments, his falls, are themselves chief parts of his schooling. He is learning to acquiesce in the fact, the discovery of which is at first so painful, that that which is crooked cannot be made straight, and that that which is wanting cannot be numbered. He has been trying to *make* an order, and has gradually learnt to perceive one. He has looked upon himself as the centre of the universe, and, in spite of all the skill and wisdom and piety which he combined with that false conception, it did cause him to find weariness everywhere. He confesses God to be the centre; and then, "though the silver cord be loosed, and the golden bowl be broken, though the pitcher be broken at the fountain, and the wheel broken at the cistern," the spirit can find rest; it returns after all its

speculations and trials to Him who made it, it learns to behold itself in Him, and Him in all things.

The book of Job.

12. It is a very difficult question whether the book of Job should be reckoned among these philosophical books, and if it should, to what time it belongs. On this last question critics have been always very fluctuating, and it seems to be not much nearer a settlement now than in former days. The weight of modern opinion is perhaps in favour of assigning it to a comparatively late period. But the arguments in support of its extreme antiquity still seem decisive to a great many. In a treatise like the present, it would be absurd to enter into the reasons for either opinion, though the result is by no means uninteresting to the student of philosophy. If it does belong to the age of Abraham or Moses, it would prove that the deepest and most conscious agonies of the human spirit were experienced, and might be set forth, at a time in which, judging from the book of Genesis, more than from any other document, we are wont to think that faith would be exhibited chiefly in practical life, and that the divinest utterances would take the form of simple history. Assuredly it is not impossible that there should have been such thoughts working in men's minds in the first ages. If we could be assured that there were, it would be like the revelation of a new and wonderful country where we least expect to find it, a discovery which reasonable persons would gladly obtain at the sacrifice of any theory. On the other hand, if it must be referred to the age of Solomon, or even to the Chaldaic period, it cannot lose that profound reality which belongs to it as the history of an actual human struggle, or be tortured by any devices of criticism into a mere book of speculation. Let it have been written where, and when, and by whom it will, it must remain for all human beings what the peasants of our land and of every land feel it to be, the divine record of what one felt who was of the same flesh and blood with themselves, who was plunged in the deepest sorrows which they can suffer, and had to work his way, not unhelped or unguided, though with all human friends and counsellors striving against him, into health and peace. When we attribute this kind of interest to the book, and suppose that such minds are sharers in it, we may seem to have settled the question whether it belongs to the strictly religious or the strictly philosophical portion of the Hebrew writings. But this would be a rash conclusion. We have tried to show that the Proverbs and Ecclesiastes are in the truest sense human books, that they are essentially practical, and concern the life of every one. The intense suffering of Job makes it no doubt his first concern to find out whether there is a gracious and loving Being ruling

Age in which it was written.

Its personal reality.

over the world or no, whether his misery is to be traced to such a source, or must come from somewhere else. In his agony he pours out words like the east wind; he seems at times to deny the goodness of his Maker, he continually contradicts himself. His pious, well-instructed friends, have a set of authorized, beautiful, eloquent phrases to confute him with; they can appeal to the judgment of their elders, to whom they are mere children; they are shocked at his irreverent expressions; they wonder that he is not afraid of affronting the Being who has laid him low and might raise him again. Job tells them that he has heard a thousand such things, he has them all by heart. But God is actually smiting him. At such a time fine speeches are of no avail. He must know what his anguish means. It is everything to him to believe in a righteous God, he has nothing to hope in, if that hope be taken from him; therefore he cannot be content till he sees how He is righteous, how He can be so while he is afflicting him,—a man who feels and knows inwardly that he has tried to be right and to do right, and has clung and clings still to Him whose rod is laid so heavily upon him.

Its philosophy.

So far this wonderful history would seem more fit to be classed with the Psalms than with the Proverbs. But when God answers Job out of the whirlwind, it is especially with a view of His *wisdom* that He lays him prostrate. He had asserted in his inmost heart, and generally with his lips, the *righteousness* of God, he had justified Him as his three friends had not done, however they seemed to do it; but he had taken no measure of the wisdom of Him who had made Orion and the Pleiades in the heavens, and the horse to paw the valley, and the ostrich to lay her eggs and forget her young ones, and the leviathan to take his pastime in the great waters. He had thought he could judge of the means by which the All-wise would accomplish His righteous ends, why he appointed suffering for man, how He maintains the conflict with evil, how He will bring it to an issue. A revelation not of the power or sovereignty, but of the infinite wisdom of God, was his humiliation; this was his cure. In dust and ashes he sees the Being of whom he has heard by the hearing of the ear, actually exercising His gracious and mysterious dominion. He abhors himself; then he is raised to a new and nobler life. At this point surely the book of Job asserts its right to a place with the books of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, among these which set forth the search after wisdom; the methods by which it pleases God to guide a man in that search, and the reward of it.

End of the book.

SECTION III.

THE PROPHETS.

The nation and the individual.

1. THE book of Job has sometimes been considered a history of the Jewish nation rather than of an individual. One cannot wonder that such an hypothesis should have been entertained by intelligent readers; or that it should have encountered a vehement resistance. The prosperity, misery, restoration of a nation, are surely to be read in that book. Yet one who has suffered will never be persuaded that he is not reading of his own struggles,—of struggles which have passed in the heart of an actual person.

The Jewish prophets teach us to reconcile the two opinions. They feel in their own hearts the miseries of their nation, and of every nation. They enable us to feel that the experiences of the particular man and of the body politic are not different, but essentially the same. The Jew has to fight the battles of his country in his soul; his study of its present condition, its past history, its coming fortunes, is not something distinct from the experiences of his own life. He understands what he sees without, by what is passing within. He does not know himself except as he is an Israelite.

The prophet and the philosopher.

2. The writings of the prophets cannot be reckoned strictly among the philosophical writings of the Hebrews. The prophet is not primarily and characteristically a seeker, but a preacher. He comes to denounce existing evils, and foretell evils which are approaching, as one who has received light and can impart it. Nevertheless, any view of Hebrew philosophy must be imperfect which does not include him. Mixed with his announcements and denunciations, there are continual exhibitions of the speaker's own difficulties and confusions. If he has been brought into the sunshine, he has had a long preparation of darkness and twilight. His public teaching can never be separated from the school in which he has been brought up, or from the Temple in which he has seen his most glorious visions.

The prophetical order.

3. Every Hebrew teacher was a prophet. Moses, the guide and lawgiver, claims that character. A Jew would scarcely have been justified in refusing it to Abraham. For it was far from necessary that the prophet should leave written records of his thoughts. He might even bear his testimony as the father of the nation did, by acts rather than words. Still there was

evidently a time when the prophet became a more distinct, substantial element of Hebrew society,—when the name began to be the designation of a class or Order. This time is fixed in the Sacred Record at the point of transition between the age of the Judges and the age of the Kings. It is connected with a general shaking in the most sacred of the Mosaic institutions. It is never hinted in the Scripture Books that the priest, because he had "holiness to the Lord" inscribed on his forehead, was less prone to evil than other men. The very first High-priest, the brother of Moses, was the leader and tool of the people in setting up an Egyptian idol. But now certain members of the priestly family became utter reprobates, and the High-priest did not restrain them. The people abhorred the offerings of the Lord. Then a boy, who was dedicated to the service of the Temple, as he slept in a chamber near it, heard a voice calling him. He thought it was the priest's voice; he found it was the Lord's. He was appointed to tell the priest of his sins, and of the approaching fall of his house. THE WORD OF GOD had spoken to Samuel; he let none of his words fall. It was known that there was a prophet in Israel.

Samuel: his office.

The elders of the people believed that there was a charm in the tabernacle to save them from their enemies; they took it with them to battle; it fell into the hands of the Philistines. Samuel became a judge and a deliverer. He restored law and order to the people, defined boundaries, executed justice between man and man. His sons did not walk in his ways. The people craved a leader of their hosts: Samuel told them of the Invisible King who was in the midst of them. He anointed the visible king; he testified to him of his self-will, and foretold his ruin. He anointed the man after God's own heart.

The prophetical school.

4. Here we have clearly pointed out to us the essential qualities of the prophetical office. Hence we may understand what a school of the prophets was. The ground of their mission lay where Samuel's lay; they were taught that the WORD OF GOD was speaking to them; to heed this voice, to follow it in whatever it enjoined. In the school they were trained to study the law of God, to meditate upon it, to consider the past history of their people, how God had dealt with their fathers, what the meaning of their calling as Israelites was. But this was just that they might know how He was dealing with them *then*. They were not less under His government and guidance than their fathers. They were not reading of the acts of One who had been, but of One who was then and would be evermore. The LIVING GOD was the only name by which they could speak of Him or think of Him. Their countrymen forgot Him; they thought that He lived only in the past, not in the present. The

whole economy of priesthood, sacrifices, tabernacle, had become a dead machinery, instead of the assurance of His permanent and continual presence. The prophet was to be trained in the belief of that presence, to act upon it, to live upon it, to tell priests and kings and people that their acts were lies, their whole lives lies, except while they recognised this as the ground of them.

Jews generally partakers of this divine teaching.

5. This was the true Jewish education. We have no reason to suppose that prophets only were trained in these schools; they might train their countrymen in them. And they could only train them in the same lore. They could but tell them, as they do tell them in all their written discourses, that though they may have no special call to be teachers or prophets, yet that the Word of God was speaking to them, was warning them against their evil tendencies, was guiding them to be right and true, and that they could only lead safe and honest lives by following this guidance.

The false prophet.

6. Oftentimes those who claimed the special office of prophet were those who heeded this teaching least. And for this very reason: they did not look upon it as the teaching of a righteous, wise Being, to the *whole* nation. They valued themselves upon their special gifts; they thought it was a wonderful thing to be able to speak words in God's name. They did not submit to be schooled before they poured forth their utterances; they never learnt to distinguish between the whispers and suggestions of the harlot Sense—of the vain, self-exalting spirit—and the lesson of Him who came to humble, and sift, and purify. Therefore these men became a set of traders in prophecy. They spoke a lie out of their own hearts, and said "The Lord hath said;" now making the heart of the righteous sad, now speaking peace when there was no peace; the base, selfish flatterers of kings, inventors of tricks, patrons of idolatry; the cunning or impudent deceivers of a people which loved to be deceived. These men converted prophecy into divination: they made guesses as to coming events from what they saw, or caught up at second-hand the utterances of departed seers. It was nothing terrible with them to speak of the judgments of God, because they really did not believe in them or in Him. They were words which might be sported with to frighten their enemies or please their disciples,—words which came out of hollow, hypocritical, atheistical hearts, and which tended more than all others to make the people hollow, hypocritical, and atheistical.

The true prophet.

7. Against these false brethren of their own order, more than even against the heartless priest, the godless king, did the true prophet testify by his words and his acts. It was no part of

his vocation to pass himself off for something else than he was,—to hide from himself, or even from others, the conflicts which he had with the evil in him, the difficulty which he had to separate the precious from the vile, the reluctance with which he often obeyed the Divine voice. It was not in pride of spirit that he claimed Divine inspiration. His temptation was to deny it; to boast that he had something of his own; to pretend that he could be anything, or do anything, except as he was submitting to the government of One higher than himself. He is not a person who seeks credit for himself by declaring what is to come. It is with the present he is mainly busy. It is God as a present God that he is bringing in all ways—by signs, by discourses, by songs—before the consciences of the presumptuous or cowardly king or prophet. It is God as a present God of whom he witnesses to the heart of the crushed and oppressed Israelite. The future is all contained in the past and the present. God is, and therefore He will manifest Himself. He reigns; and the unrighteous rulers, Jews or heathens, shall know that he reigns. Their want of faith shall not hinder the accomplishment of His purposes. Tyranny and disorder shall not always prevent men from knowing what His gracious dominion is. Kings who were set up to testify of His rule may utterly misunderstand their vocation, priests may forget Him and become idolaters, prophets may utter lies in His name, the whole people may misunderstand why it has been called out; but a perfect King shall reign in righteousness, the true Priest and Prophet of the World shall appear. There shall be mysterious sufferings mixed with mysterious exaltation. At last God will confound all the false images of Him, and manifest His true image to man. Israel may go into captivity—may become the lowest of the nations, heathens may be God's ministers for punishing it; but the promise will still prove itself true,—in Abraham and in his seed shall all the families of the earth be blessed.

Relation of the Wisdom in the book of Proverbs to the Word in the Prophets.

8. It would be the duty of an historian of Hebrew philosophy to notice these remarkable records, if it were only to show how entirely the popular teaching of the Hebrew corresponds with that which appears in the specially philosophical books; how entirely *esoterical* that teaching is in the highest and best sense of the word, when by esoterical we mean that which concerns the inner man,—his highest, most mysterious relations; how entirely *exoterical*, if by exoterical we mean that which is proclaimed to all men,—that which concerns states and governments, and the most outward circumstances of man's life. But it is especially necessary to point out how this popular teaching, connected as it was with the deepest personal meditation and

experience, fills up a gap in the merely philosophical teaching, and removes a difficulty which might otherwise cause us great confusion. We have seen that Wisdom, in the book of Proverbs, is spoken of as a person, but as a female. Everybody must feel that the passages which were quoted from that book would have been artistically less beautiful, less perfect, if this form of language had not been adopted. But artistical beauty in all cases rests upon some substantial ground of truth. We could not feel the propriety of such expressions if they did not correspond to something in our hearts which required them, and would suffer if others were substituted for them. Wisdom, when regarded *primarily* as an object of our search and love, even though it is intimated to us that we have been first sought for and loved, does come before us in this feminine shape. But the prophet who speaks in God's name says at once "The Word of God came to me, saying." We feel sure that he is under the same teaching with Solomon; that he means the same antagonist to the harlot Sense, the same Divine Counsellor, the same person who was with the Lord as one brought up with Him before the earth was formed, or the heavens brought forth, and whose delights were with the sons of men. Yet we are sure that this is no female voice; it is He who speaks, who commands men and judges men, the Ruler and King of their inmost hearts and spirits. Of such an One the prophets are testifying in every speech of theirs. They could not believe in a human king, or priest, or prophet; they could not believe that man was made in the image of God, if they did not acknowledge such an One. Because they do believe in Him they are confident that God will be completely declared to men, that His image will be seen in a man. That prospect carries us beyond the region of the Hebrew philosophy as we find it in the Proverbs; but it furnishes the complement to that philosophy. By reflecting upon it we shall perhaps understand better what that philosophy is, and what all philosophy is; wherein consists its deep, essential truth, and its necessary limitation.

Transition from the Hebrew to Gentile philosophy.

9. From the last remark our readers may gather that it is not only for the sake of Hebrew philosophy that we have noticed these prophets, especially this leading characteristic of them. It is impossible to read them simply and not to feel that they looked upon that Being who was speaking to them in their hearts as the real Lord of all men. In their comments upon the state of the world at the time in which they were living, they go far beyond the limits of Palestine. In proportion as they discover all heathen evils in their own countrymen, they discover, and rejoice in the discovery, that there is a bond of spiritual connection between them and all people. It was impossible for them to believe that there could be any government, or order, or desire of light or wisdom, in any human creatures, which did not proceed from the Source of order, and government, and light, and wisdom. Resistance to the Divine teaching they looked upon as the sin of their own land, and of all lands. Their hopes of future blessings to their own people, and to all people, rested upon the assurance that He who was then speaking secretly would be proclaimed openly.

Different ways of considering their relation to each other.

10. In entering upon the philosophy of the other nations of the earth, we have the choice of four methods. It is more honest to state at the outset which we shall adopt, that our readers may be upon their guard against any effort we may make to strain facts into accordance with it.

i. Either, first, we may assume that the Hebrews, like all other people, were merely following their own instincts and impulses in the search after wisdom, and were not guided to it, as they pretended to be, by a Divine Teacher;

ii. Or, secondly, we may determine that we will make out a connection between the Scriptures, or the writers of them, and the different philosophers of Hindostan, of Persia, or of Greece, believing it to be impossible that they could have obtained light in any other way;

iii. Or, thirdly, we may determine that these philosophers never had any light,—that they were merely following delusions, and propagating them;

iv. Or, fourthly, we may assume that doctrine which seems to us to be asserted throughout every part of the Scriptures, and to be especially elucidated and enforced by the prophets,—that all men really have had a Divine Teacher, whether they have followed His guiding or not.

This doctrine we believe to be true. It adds unspeakably to the interest and wonder of those records which we have been considering. It makes us deeply anxious that we may not misrepresent those of which we are about to give an account.

CHAPTER II.

EGYPTIANS, PHŒNICIANS, ASSYRIANS.

How far the historian of philosophical inquiries is concerned with these countries.

1. THREE countries are especially connected with Jewish history—Egypt, Phœnicia, Chaldæa. Each of these countries has left memorials of itself: those of the first are becoming even more interesting to this time than to any former time; the last is only beginning to discover its treasures to European enterprise. None of the three can be said in strictness to have produced any philosophers; but they have indirectly influenced the philosophy of other nations, in a manner too important to be overlooked. A few words on this subject seem a necessary sequel to the chapter on the Hebrews.

Egyptian wise men.

2. The wise men, magicians, or soothsayers, of whom we read in the book of Exodus, were no doubt students of nature. They had observed something of its powers and mysteries, some of the influences which it exercises over man, some of the means which he possesses of directing its influences to advantage or to mischief. There can be no doubt that they believed such knowledge to have been communicated by some Divine power. We are not disposed to question their opinion. If they referred any observations which they might make respecting the course of the year, or the cultivation of the earth, to a celestial Teacher, they spoke, it seems to us, far more humbly, more truly, more in accordance with the spirit of the Hebrew books, than the Romanised Jew Josephus, who, in his foolish patriotism, or his desire to make his countrymen respectable in the eyes of their masters, pretends that Abraham, or Joseph, or Moses, instructed the Egyptians in astronomy. It is almost needless to say that no hint is given by the Hebrew legislator that his ancestors imparted any such wisdom, or possessed it; what he had himself must, if we believe the New Testament commentator upon his words, have been received first from the Egyptians, though his Divine Teacher, purging his mind from the idolatries and confusions with which their physical doctrines were surrounded, enabled him to give *man* his true place in creation. The Hebrew history does assert that Joseph, instructed by the Invisible King, communicated skill and foresight to Pharaoh. Acquaintance with the mechanical arts, and with all the powers of nature which are necessary to the invention of them, it never claims for Jews—it implicitly concedes to their tyrants.

Their physical science not borrowed from the Hebrews.

Great memorials of Egyptian wisdom: small results of it.

3. Here we discover the main characteristic difference between the development of the two people. Modern science may be allowed to claim for Egypt a long series of dynasties, clear indications of an organised hierarchy, of a civil order, with very great and probably very early achievements in stone and masonry. But the moral philosopher must ask, why all these great powers bore so little fruit for the world? How was their growth stunted and deformed? Why is it that unbounded skill and research have to be expended after all these generations, only to prove that the oldest nation in the world had a substantive existence in it?

Cause of the difference.

4. The answer to this question seems to us to be this—if it be the wrong one, our inquiries respecting other nations will contradict it:—The Egyptian knowledge of the phenomena of the universe, and of its powers, was not balanced and sustained by any knowledge of the powers and destinies of man. Those who became acquainted with the things about them, could not but feel that they, the observers, were in some way superior to that which they observed. It is clear that they had that conviction, that they were even oppressed by it. But the objects which they saw, the facts which were revealed to them, soon became all in all. They nearly lost themselves in the things; their higher culture only helped to make the people the helpless servants of them. What he could tell of his discoveries, made his countrymen idolaters; what he reserved, made him feel his difference from them, and led him to affect new airs of superiority, to devise new arts for the purpose of keeping up the difference and the sense of it. Thus the sagacious man from being a true observer, passed into a diviner; thus he became the enslaver of those whom he should have emancipated, each new invention being, as it were, the creation of a new god. Such magicians are the great corrupters of kings, teaching them to rule by craft and not by righteousness, giving them animals for subjects, not human beings. The healthy, patriarchal faith of the Hebrew boy infused a new life into the mind of a Pharoah, taught him the difference between true judgment of the future, and cunning conjectures respecting it, introduced another element into Egyptian society, or rather made the elements that were already in it sound and coherent. But the government and the faith of the people ran again into their old rut; the soothsayers and magicians turned their physical knowledge to the service of false hood and tyranny; the Pharoahs built their treasure-cities to their own glory, by the help of Jews. Then came the vindication of moral order, and the assertion of man as cared for by God, from the lips and the rod of Moses.

Effect of premature acquaintance with physics on the wise man, and on his countrymen

5. These indications respecting the Egyptian mind, from what-

The contradictions of Egyptian life.

ever period of its history we suppose them to have been taken, are a clue to interpret the later as well as the earlier stages of it. Why its forms of idolatry should have been so various, so dependent upon local position; why its priests should seem to have possessed such stores of secret information, and why its people should have been so degraded; why Greeks should have listened to the teachers at Memphis with so much wonder, and yet should have felt so little sympathy with them; why the forms of their sculpture should be so gross and animal, and yet should imply so much reflection, and should suggest so many thoughts—may not be difficult to understand, if we patiently consider what must have been the effect of men being crushed and overwhelmed by natural images and impressions before they had any inner life with which to sustain them. And hence we may understand what form the moral and metaphysical philosophy of the Egyptian must have taken, when he was stirred up to ask questions concerning himself, as well as concerning the things around him. To grope for a meaning in these things; to discover what relation there is between animal forms and man, what there is in their acts which shows forth and typifies his acts; this was the slow, painful, upward process by which the Egyptian must have sought to disengage himself from the degrading objects to which he had submitted, and to emerge into clearness and freedom. In all such efforts, if we could have any clear record of them, we should be bound to take the greatest interest, and to recognize the guidance of a Divine hand. Facts which are notorious give us a full right to believe that the intellect of the Egyptian was especially exercised in discovering the symbols of Nature, in detecting the higher and human meanings which lay beneath them. In this way the atmosphere exercised an influence over both Jews and Greeks, which we shall have to consider hereafter; still more strikingly over some of the teachers of the Christian church. But these moral inquiries had no power to leaven the polity of Egypt or to reach the heart of its people. They can only have been the struggles of a set of sages to escape from the webs which sages had first spun for themselves and their land. The history of Hindoo philosophy will furnish us with more clearly-ascertained evidences of this kind of conflict. However certain we may be that it must have taken place in Egypt, we should have to resort to mere idle conjecture if we endeavoured to trace the course of it there.

Struggles for emancipation from idolatry.

Study of symbols.

Influence of Egypt upon Greeks, Jews, and Christians.

Phœnicia. Commerce not in itself favourable to philosophy.

6. We are so much in the habit of connecting the idea of commerce with human progress, that it may seem strange we have so little to report of the nation which had Tyre for its capital. The Phœnicians must no doubt have gathered many

observations together in the course of their long voyages; but they were observations for others to reflect upon rather than themselves. Their own genius seems to have been exclusively active. However important an element in human life the love of variety, the eagerness for new objects, may be, there must something of silence and repose mingle with it before men can steadily ask themselves "What is wisdom?" or can care for an answer. A Phœnician colony in Africa could produce a Hannibal; a contemplative sage could hardly be looked for either in the mother or daughter city. The temper of the Phœnician, however, joined with other more stable qualities to form the mind of the Greek. *He* was to prove that the sea, which is the symbol and witness to man of his freedom, does not merely tempt him to seek for the outward and visible treasures which so commonly enslave it. But before Phœnicia had added anything to the traditions or the studies of the West, it had been brought into contact with the Hebrew kingdom. It was not a Joseph—a fugitive shepherd-boy—who represented the Jewish life to Hiram and his successors. Solomon showed them that the divine polity which he administered, though it had its beginning in the tent life of the patriarchs, and seemed in its legal stage devised for tillers of the ground, could expand to meet and sustain the conditions and temptations of a mercantile people; because a deeper wisdom than that which earth or ocean supplies had laid the foundation of it, and was still upholding it.

Difference between the wisdom of Egypt and Chaldæa.

7. In Chaldæa, as the Hebrew Scriptures present it to us, we meet again with wise men such as we heard of in Egypt; but here they are especially spoken of as astrologers. The study of the heavenly bodies prevailed no doubt among the priests of Thebes and Memphis: the first systematic observations respecting the course of the year may be rightly ascribed to them. On this knowledge their claims to superior intellect respecting human events will in part have rested. Because they knew more of nature than others, they will have been able to divine what would probably happen to the fields or the crops. It is another step indicating a different order of thought and feeling to connect the stars *directly* with human life, and to believe that the course of the one is influenced or regulated by that of the other.

Astrology.

8. Wide plains, still and beautiful nights, are favourable to the development of such a faith: perhaps only in such circumstances has it ever taken deep root. For in such circumstances we meet with a hunting rather than an agricultural people, with men whose speculations turn more upon the success of their efforts to procure food for themselves, than upon the chances that the earth will produce it for them. Physical knowledge in

The hunting stage of society.

this condition of society is not to be looked for. Tyranny, the rule of a man claiming dominion over the beasts of the field and over the creatures of his own race by the same right, will have here an earlier commencement. The Babel polity, spoken of in Scripture, is of this character; its founder is said to have been a mighty hunter before the Lord. In such a polity the human form will be more reverenced, the forms and symbols of nature far less; a difference which every one will be conscious of who compares the sculptures recently brought from Nineveh with the Egyptian remains. In these very early and remarkable efforts of art, we perceive a reverence for animals, not in proportion to their usefulness to man, but to the strength of their talons or the quickness of their flight. The forms of such creatures combine with the human countenance to express the notion of that which is Divine. Not that they will have sufficed for this purpose; the earlier Sabæan worship will have continued side by side with these images of man's power and dominion. But this worship will itself have been moulded by the character of the people who adopted it. The stars among this race of conquerors will have become dynasts or rulers over man's life. Subjects feeling themselves at a hopeless difference from their sovereigns, regarding them as beings of another kind, will have had no difficulty in looking upon these cold and distant, and brilliant orbs, as the Kings of kings and Lords of lords. The wise men who hoped for something better from the world than that which they saw, will have asked these witnesses of calmness and order when a brighter day should come, when the world should be ruled with less of fantasy and caprice. The passion for knowing the future will have become indissolubly connected with the contemplation of the stars. A scheme of relations between them and the dwellers upon earth will have been wrought out. Guilty monarchs will have been perplexed with signs in the heavens; they will eagerly have fled to the science of the astrologers for relief. In general they will have converted them into the ministers of their purposes, the props of their authority.

Assyrian art.

Its relation to the Sabæan worship.

9. These hints will not be useless with a view to the subsequent history. They are closely connected with that which has gone before. For the Hebrew books represent the prophets in Babylon as bearing witness especially against astrological divination, by declaring that the unseen King and Lord of their land did reveal the future through the present and the past, that all events are connected by a moral law, that the hopes for a more righteous government of the earth were not vain and deceitful hopes, that the crises and revolutions of empires are pre-ordained, and that they are all tending to the satisfaction of the questions, What is wisdom? Where is it to be found?

The Jewish prophets in Babylon.

CHAPTER III.

HINDOO PHILOSOPHY.

SECTION I.

THE PHILOSOPHY LATENT IN THE RELIGION.

1. Pyramids, tombs, statues with inscriptions, deciphered or to be deciphered, contain all that we know from internal evidence of Egyptian and Chaldaic wisdom. In Hindostan we come again into the world of books; we find ourselves among a literary people, literary by profession. It is not a literature which explains a history, but one which is the substitute for a history. We know almost nothing of what the Hindoo has done, very much of what he has thought.

Hindostan a land of books.

2. For an accurate knowledge of the Hindoo Vedas, the English scholar must still wait. Till of late years, even the most accomplished Sanscrit scholars have shrunk from the task of translating them. The great beauty of their style and language we must take for granted, on the authority of those who are competent to speak of it, and whose judgment cannot be wholly distorted by the love of a favourite pursuit. But the specimens which we possess are sufficient to acquaint us with their general design and character. They are invocations. Different powers of air, or earth, or fire, are implored for aid in different emergencies. It is assumed that these powers are related to man and can attend to his cries. It is even hoped that they may have fellowship with him, that they may come and share his food and his wine. The worshipper has no doubt that they will be pleased with his offerings, that they may be influenced by his sacrifices.

The Vedas.

Invocations.

3. Here then we find ourselves at once in a sacerdotal region. The priest who ascribes the method of the invocation, the nature of the sacrifice, who presents the one or the other, is the leading man of the community. The orders and ranks of priests will evidently be defined first. By the offices which they perform all others will be measured. It is evident also that at this stage of Hindoo life, the objects of worship must have been various, determined by the influences which different powers in nature exert over man, the influences of these powers being defined and arranged by the priest.

Signs of a sacerdotal society.

4. But there is a feeling of communion between the worshipper and the beings whom he is addressing, which distinguishes this Hindoo adoration from the mere physical idolatry

Characteristics of Hindoo worship.

Fellowship with the gods.

of the Egyptians. The Hindoo from the first seems to seek friendship with his divinities, not merely help from them. And presently we discover that the help which he seeks is not only in feeding his cattle, or subduing his enemies; that the friendship of the wine-cup will not satisfy his notions of intercourse with the Divinity. He invokes a Purifier, he desires purification for himself. His ceremonies and sacrifices, though they may have other subordinate ends, seem gradually to point more and more to this end.

Search for purification.

The purifier.

5. As they do so, *one* Being gradually seems to dawn upon him, through the different objects which have been distracting his attention. The name Agni comes out more and more conspicuously amidst the forms which the Vedas seek to propitiate. You feel that he is becoming the special object of Brahminical service, that very soon he may supplant all the other objects, and may be confessed as *that* Being which all the rest were bringing into light. *Such* a unity we believe is latent in these early books, strictly polytheistic as they are; a unity, it will be perceived, which seems to be the result of the worshipper's experiments and discoveries; at all events, which reveals itself to him in the course of his thoughts and devotion, in strange contrast to all that variety which yet he is obliged to acknowledge as real, and which he had taught others as well as himself to look upon as divine.

The esoterical belief.

Grounds of it.

6. Here begins that distinction between the sacerdotal and the popular faith of the Hindoos, which has often been attributed to wilful imposture, which has no doubt been upheld by imposture, but which may have had a less culpable origin. The wish for purification implies the sense of something in ourselves which does not belong to this earth, which may be separated from it. As the man asks himself what this is, he discovers with wonder that the very effort of putting the question suggests the answer. He thinks; thinks of all the things that are about him. Surely his thought makes him superior to them. If he can become a purely thinking being he is not any longer one of them. He has gained that which he wants. But who can make him such a thinking being? The God whom he calls upon must be himself a being of this kind. He must be *the* thinker. He must be close to the thinking man, his patron, his friend, his fellow-worker. Where can the union with him stop? Not till they become identical; not till the man actually sinks into the God, and is lost.

The wonder of thinking.

Brahm the thinker.

7. Accordingly, in the next stage of Hindooism, Agni has become Brahm. A priest-god has come out clearly before us. It is impossible to give him any other name. He is emphatically the God of the priest, as distinguished from other men. He is the priest himself, raised and transfigured. It

is the great effort and privilege of the priest to be absorbed in him.

The priest a philosopher

8. But has not the priest himself become changed during the process? Is he any longer the director of invocations and orderer of sacrifices? Has he not become the thinker, the intellectual man, whose business it is to use all those powers which the vulgar man has not, or has never cultivated? The priest is the philosopher, the seeker after wisdom which is hidden from other men. More than ever he must keep himself aloof from them, must distinguish himself from those who pursue the ordinary crafts and occupations of the world. He who merely acts, if he be the greatest of heroes or warriors, must be far beneath the thinker. The thinker must preserve sacred the privileges with which he has been endued; he must transmit them to an order of successors.

How he justifies his priestly office.

9. In such a scheme, what place is there for his old occupation? What is to be the end of sacrifices and offerings, if thinking is to be the all in all? There may be several answers to the question besides the vulgarest and wickedest of all (to which the Brahmin had a continual tendency), that such a religion is needful for the fool, but not for the wise man. 1st. By concentrating divinity in Brahm, the universe was not deprived of its sacredness. Every part of nature was a thought of Brahm's. The cow, the elephant, the flower, were all some portions of him. There was no wrong then in paying homage to these; it might be considered a part of the service of Brahm. 2nd. There is something inexpressibly awful to a mind at all devout in that nearness in which it felt itself to Brahm, in the confusion between the worshipper and the object of his worship. Solemn invocations, habitual pronouncing of the name Om or Light, services of purification, might surely not be undesirable to keep the priest-student in mind that he was calling upon some being, and was not merely adoring himself, or an image thrown from himself. 3rd. If the storms and convulsions of nature showed that there were dark thoughts in Brahm, there might be need of sacrifice or propitiation to remove these, even though the direct worship of dark beings might not yet have become a part of the mythology, or might be denounced by those who adhered to the purer conception of it. Still there were contradictions latent in the attempt to reconcile the philosophical and the sacerdotal position of the Brahmin, which were certain to make themselves evident in his subsequent history, and which were quite as likely to produce conflicts of opinion in his own schools as any popular resistance.

All things thoughts or parts of Brahm.

Attempt to distinguish the worshipper from the god.

Propitiation.

SECTION II.

THE PHILOSOPHY DEVELOPED—THE BHAGAVAD GITA.

The Brahminical caste and the other castes.

1. Another great problem, or series of problems, also of the highest interest, occupied the Brahmin. Contemplation was the business of his tribe. Still something was to be done. He was himself obliged to act; the other castes existed for the sake of action. How were action and contemplation related to each other? In what way was the relation between the Brahmin and the other tribes to be kept up if they had a different worship from him, if they were aiming at a wholly distinct object? What circumstances forced this question upon the mind of the Hindoo, we have no means of ascertaining. That it did, at some time or other, become a very substantive and practical part of his reflections, and gave a colour and shape to all his philosophy, we know from that remarkable poem (its unity and completeness entitle it to the name, though it is, in fact, only the episode of a much longer poem), the Bhagavad Gita. The date of this production is still a subject of debate among scholars. The late accomplished Latin translator of it, A. W. Schlegel, unfortunately never completed his promised essay on the subject; but he has very clearly intimated his opinion, which seems to have been formed after much reflection on its poetical structure and spirit, as well as upon its language, that it has a right to take precedence of all the efforts of Greek speculation. A much earlier origin than this remark would imply has been claimed for it by Hindoos. We cannot deny that a much later one, which would make it subsequent to the Christian era, and within a moderate distance of the numerous commentaries which were written upon it in the twelfth or thirteenth centuries after Christ, has been imagined by some authorities. However strong our inclination, on general and abstract ground, in favour of Schlegel's opinion, it must, of course, yield at once to any strong external evidence. But even if the question should be ultimately settled in that way which would exclude the Bhagavad Gita from the records of the old world, we should still feel that a document which is admitted to contain the very essence of Brahminical philosophy, and which sets forth, in a most lively manner, questions which must have agitated the Hindoo mind at all periods, cannot be an unfit subject for this sketch. We shall endeavour, therefore, to give an abstract of it, believing that it will lead our readers into the heart of the subject, and may save them from many pages of wearisome and unprofitable discourse.

Contemplation and action.

The Bhagavad Gita.

Its probable date.

Contains the essence of Brahminism.

Arjoon and Kreeshna.

2. The scene opens on a field of battle. The Kooroos and the Pandoos, kindred tribes, are about to engage in a deadly war. Arjoon is one of the heroes of the Pandoos; he is standing in a chariot drawn by white horses. Near him is the divine Kreeshna, of whom at present we must only say that he is the mysterious counsellor of the prince. What his offices and nature are, he himself will tell us by and by.

Arjoon perplexed.

Arjoon is looking on with dismay and horror upon a battle, in which there were uncles, tutors, cousins, sons, brothers, and bosom friends on both sides. He thinks there can be no happiness for him hereafter if he should be the murderer of people of his own race. Such a crime is likely to destroy the virtue of the whole family or tribe; hell is threatened by the Sankar both to those who fall and those who survive. The chief sits down in the chariot between the two armies, and casts away his bow and arrows.

Kreeshna's lesson on the soul.

3. This divine adviser reproves him for his weakness. It is his duty to fight. "Tell me what I shall do," cries the young man. "I am confounded between *two* duties. I am overcome with the dread of sin. I see nothing to appease my grief, though I were to rule the earth or the hosts of heaven." Then Kreeshna instructs him in the nature of the soul. Arjoon may go to the fight, for the soul neither killeth nor is killed. You cannot say of it, it hath been, it is about to be, or is to be hereafter. It is a thing without birth; it is ancient, constant, and eternal. As a man throweth away old garments and putteth on new, so the soul, having quitted its old mortal frames, entereth into others which are new. The weapon divideth it not, the fire burneth it not, the water corrupteth it not, the wind drieth it not away. It is indivisible, inconsumable, incorruptible; it is universal, permanent, immoveable. The former state of being is unknown; the middle state is evident; the future state is not to be discovered. The duty of thy tribe is to fight; a soldier of the Kshatree tribe has no higher.

Its eternity.

Its migrations.

Reward and punishment.

4. The belief of the soul's immortality is thus connected with the practice of life. But is not that dread which Arjoon had of the future consequences of his action a reasonable one? Kreeshna intimates to him that it is not. The people who held out that kind of notion of reward and punishment looked for transient enjoyment in heaven, not for eternal absorption. The Veds, which seem to encourage it, are adapted to men in a threefold condition. Turn to spiritual things, be firm in the higher path, and you will be free from care and trouble about the future as well as the present. Consider the deed, and not the event: let not the motive for action be the hope of reward. Yet let not thy life be spent in inaction. Perform thy duty,

Indifference to consequences.

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Indifference to consequences.

abandon all thought of the consequence; seek an asylum in wisdom alone. Men who are endued with true wisdom are unmindful of good or evil in this world. They who have abandoned all thought of the fruit which is produced from their actions are freed from the chains of birth, and go to the regions of eternal happiness.

The wise man.

5. Arjoon wishes to know something more of the Moonee, or thoroughly wise man. Kreeshna answers, "The wisdom of that man is established, who, like the tortoise, can draw in all his members, and restrain them from their wonted purposes. The tumultuous senses hurry away by force the heart even of him who striveth to restrain them. The inspired man, trusting in me, may quell them and be happy. Such a one walketh in the night when all things go to rest; he sleepeth in the day, the time when all things wake. A man trusting in the Supreme, goeth not astray; at the hour of death he shall mix with the incorporeal nature of Brahm."

His character.

His blessedness.

How man is led into evil.

6. The subject of the relation of action to thought still disturbs Arjoon's mind, and gives occasion for another lecture from Kreeshna. In the course of it, Arjoon asks how man is led to commit offences; it seems as if, contrary to his wishes, he was compelled by some secret force. "It is the enemy, lust or passion," replies the teacher, "insatiable and full of sin, by which this world is covered as the flame by the smoke, as the sword by rust, or as the fœtus by its membrane. This inveterate foe, in the shape of desire, raging like fire, and hard to be appeased, obscures the understanding of the wise man. This destroyer of wisdom and knowledge must be subdued. It is possible; for though the organs are great, the mind is greater; the Resolution is greater than the mind, and there is One greater than that. When thou hast resolved what is superior to the resolution, and fixed thyself by thyself, then determine to abandon inclination or desire, thy great enemy."

Inclination.

Resolution.

Who is above man's resolution.

7. There is a deep mystery in the last sentence. Who is this that is superior to the resolution in man? All the discipline seems to depend on this question. Kreeshna says that he taught it to one and another in former days, that it was handed down to the Rajarshees, and lost. But how is this, asks Arjoon, when thou, Kreeshna, hast come later into life than some of those to whom thou hast imparted this secret? "Both I and thou," answers Kreeshna, "have passed many births; mine are known to me, but thou knowest not of thine. Although I am not in my nature subject to birth or decay, yet as I have command over my own nature, I am made evident by my power. When there is a decline of virtue in the world, I make myself manifest; I appear from age to age for the preservation

His past and present existence.

of the just, the destruction of the wicked, and the re-establishment of virtue." Two kinds of worship are pointed out: those who acknowledge Kreeshna, do not when they quit their mortal frames enter into another, but enter into him. On the other hand, there are those who seek success for their works in this life; they worship the Devatas (demons or angels). The true Kreeshna worshipper sees rest in action, and action in rest; he performs all duties, yet he, as it were, does nothing; he seeks no reward—he is pleased with whatever he may by chance obtain; he is freed from the bonds of action,—the same in prosperity and adversity. God is attained by him who maketh God only the object of his works. There are various modes of worship, all purifying; but the worship of spiritual wisdom is far better than the worshipping with offerings of things. In wisdom is to be found every work. Seek this wisdom with prostrations, with questions, and with attention; then thou wilt not again fall into folly, thou wilt behold all nature in me. Although thou wert the greatest of offenders, thou shalt be able to cross the gulf of sin with the bark of wisdom. There is not anything to be compared in this world with wisdom and purity. He who is perfected by practice, in due time findeth it in his own soul. He who has faith finds wisdom. The ignorant, and the man whose spirit is full of doubt, is lost. Those, continues the teacher, whose understandings are in the Deity, whose souls are in him, whose asylum is in him, are by wisdom purified from their offences, and go whence they shall never return. The learned behold him alike in the reverent Brahmin perfected in knowledge, in the ox, in the elephant, in the dog, and in him who eateth of the flesh of dogs. Those whose minds are fixed on this equality, gain eternity even in this world.

His worshippers.

Methods of purification.

The service of wisdom.

Faith.

The Deity in visible things.

8. The next lecture on the subject of the exercises of the soul works out the same idea in a number of forms. To the Yogi, or devout man, it is said gold, iron, and stones are the same; he is the same with those who love and those who hate, in the company of saints or sinners. He delighteth in his own soul; he is in God, and free from sin; he believes in unity, and worships me present in all things, and dwelleth in me altogether, even on this earth. In the course of this conversation, Arjoon asks, "Whither, O Kreeshna, doth the man go after death, who, although he be endued with faith, hath not obtained perfection in his devotion: because his unsubdued mind wandered from the discipline, does he come to nothing?" Kreeshna answers, "No man who hath done good goeth unto an evil place: a man whose devotions have been broken off by death, having enjoyed for many years the reward of his virtues in the region above, is at length born again in some holy family; he is endued with the

The Yogi or perfect man.

What becomes of the imperfect man.

same degree of application that he held in his former body, and he begins again to labour for perfection."

Kreeshna the life and essence of all things, and the principle of their destruction.

9. But after all, who is Kreeshna? The question has already been awakened in Arjoon's mind: he has arrived at the stage of discipline when it may be answered. I, says the teacher, am the creation and the dissolution of the whole universe. There is not anything greater than I; all things hang on me, even as precious gems upon a string; I am moisture in the water, light in the sun and moon, invocation in the Veds, sound in the firmament, sweet-smelling savour in the earth, glory in the source of light. I am life in all things, and zeal in the zealous. I am the eternal seed of nature; I am the understanding of the wise, the glory of the proud, the strength of the strong; free from lust and anger. There is a supernatural influence which bewilders the wicked, the foolish, and the low-minded, and hinders them from coming to me. I am not in these, though they proceed from me. Many seek me, but the wise man is constantly engaged in my service; I esteem the wise man as myself, for his spirit dependeth upon me alone. Those who worship the Devatas go to them; those who worship me alone, go to me.

The Divine unity.

The ignorant who are unacquainted with my supreme nature, which is superior to all things, believe me, who am invisible, to exist in the visible forms in which they see me. I know all the beings that have been, that are, that shall be; but there is not one amongst them that knoweth me. Those who trust in me know Brahm, the supreme and incorruptible; they know the emanations from which natural things are generated; they know the destroying nature. In this body I am the teacher of worship. He who thinks constantly of me will find me. He who finds me returns not again to mortal birth. The universe exists, dissolves, is reproduced; there is an incorruptible abode which is my mansion. The supreme Being is obtained by him who worshippeth no other gods; in him is included all nature. By him all things are spread abroad. I, continues Kreeshna, am

Kreeshna in relation to human beings.

the sacrifice; I am the worship, I am the spices, I am the fire, I am the victim, I am the father and mother of this world; I am the road of the good, the comforter, the creator, the witness, the asylum, and the friend. They who serve other gods with a firm belief, in doing so involuntarily worship me. I am the same to all mankind. They who serve me in adoration are in me. If one whose ways are ever so evil serve me alone, he becometh of a virtuous spirit, and obtaineth eternal happiness. Even women, and the tribes of Visya and Soodra, shall go the supreme journey if they take sanctuary with me; how much more my holy servants the Brahmins and the Rajarshees! Consider this world as a finite and joyless place, and serve me.

Ardour of the disciple.

10. Arjoon begins to regard his teacher with wonder and adoration. He is taught that reason, knowledge, clear judgment, patience, truth, humility, meekness, birth, death, fear, courage, zeal, renown, and infamy, all come from him. He is

The outward forms of Kreeshna.

the soul which standeth in the bodies of all beings; he is the chief of all warriors, floods, animals; the Himmalaya among mountains, the Ganges among rivers; the science in science, the spring among seasons, gaming amongst frauds, the rod and policy among rulers. "Amongst the secret I am silence, amongst the wise I am wisdom."

Kreeshna's divine nature.

11. All these are the forms of Kreeshna. Arjoon aspires to see his never-failing spirit. A mysterious revelation is granted. The pupil is overwhelmed with rapture and terror. He sees all creation pr eding from Kreeshna — swallowed up in him. With this vision is mingled one of the army by which he is surrounded. As troops of insects, with increasing speed, seek their own destruction in the flaming fire; as the rapid streams of flowing rivers roll on to meet the ocean's bed,—so these heroes of the human race are rushing on towards the flaming mouth of the Divine Being. The whole world is filled with His grandeur. Kreeshna is the stroyer as well as the creator! Not one of these warriors s Arjoon is to live. They are already destroyed by the Divine wer. Let him put forth his hand and be the immediate agen of our death. On to the battle!

Reverence and fellowship.

12. But Arjoon's terror increases. He bows down before him whom he had called Kreeshna and friend. I was ignorant, he says, of thy greatness; I was blinded by my affection and presumption; I have trifled with thee; I crave thy forgiveness. Thou art the Father of all things, animate and inanimate; the sage instructor of the wh worthy to be adored. Bear with me as a father with his son, a friend with a friend, a lover with his beloved. I am pleased to behold things never before seen, but my mind is in awful fear. He is bidden not to be disturbed, nor to let his faculties be confounded. The god assumes his benignant human shape: Arjoon is at peace.

Kreeshna in his human form.

13. After this wonderful discovery of himself, and some discourse upon the method in which he is to be served in his visible and invisible nature, Kreeshna proceeds to answer some of his pupil's more difficult questions. First, what is Kshetra, or body? It consists of the five elements (earth, water, fire, air,

The nature of body.

and æther), consciousness, understanding, spirit, the eleven organs, the powers of the five senses, love and hatred, pleasure and pain, sensibility and firmness. Secondly, what is Wisdom?

Wisdom.

It is freedom from self-esteem, hypocrisy, and injustice; patience, rectitude, respect for masters and teachers, exemption from

attachment and affection to children, wife, and home; evenness of temper upon the arrival of every event, whether longed for or not; freedom from pride, worship paid to Kreeshna alone, love of solitude, constant study of the superior spirit. Thirdly, what is Gnea, or the object of Wisdom? It is that which hath no beginning and is supreme, which can neither be called being nor not being; it is all hands and feet; it is all faces, heads, and eyes; it is all ear; it sitteth in the midst of the world; without organs, it is the reflected light of every faculty of the organs; connected with nothing, it containeth all things; without quality, it partaketh of every quality. It is the inside and outside, the moveable and immoveable of all nature. It standeth at a distance, yet it is present; it is undivided, yet in all things it standeth divided. It is the ruler of all things; it is the light in light, and it is declared to be free from darkness.

The object of wisdom.

14. There are two other principles which Kreeshna declares to be without beginning: Prakreetee and Pooroosh. The former would seem to be the mere instrument or agent in man; the other, the directing power in him. All things, animate and inanimate, are declared to be produced from the union of *Kshetra* and *Kshetra-gna*. I, says Kreeshna, am the Kshetra-gna in every mortal frame,—the living power which directs it.

The instrumental and directing faculties.

15. From Prakreetee, or nature, three Goon, or qualities, proceed: the truth quality, the passionate quality, the dark quality. The Satwa-goon, or truth quality, leads to wisdom; the Raja-goon, or passionate quality, to ambition and covetousness; the Tama-goon, or dark quality, to madness, distraction, and ignorance. Those who are ruled by the first mount on high; the second stay in the middle; the last sink below. But the soul must rise above all these qualities into a Being who is superior to them, before he can drink of the water of immortality. How this ascent is to be obtained,—how a man is to rise above the particular Pooroosh, or soul, into the Poorooshottama, or supreme soul,—is the next subject of Kreeshna's teaching; of which we need not speak, as it has been anticipated in several of the previous lectures.

The three qualities.

16. An important subject still remains to be discussed. The belief of the three different qualities evidently presumes the existence of a different destiny for the creatures which are endued with them. This principle is now distinctly affirmed. The Divine destiny is for absorption into the Divine nature; the evil destiny confines the soul to mortal birth. Those who are born under the influence of the evil destiny know not what it is to proceed in virtue, or recede in vice. They say the world is without beginning and without end,—without an Eeswar, or Divine light; that all things are conceived by the junction of

Destiny.

the sexes. These men say that the gratification of their sensual appetites is the supreme good; they say, "This to-day hath been acquired by me, and this I shall have also; I am powerful, I am happy, I am rich; I am endued with precedence among men. Where is there another like me? I will make presents at the feast, and be merry." Such men are self-conceited, stubborn, and ever in pursuit of wealth and pride. They worship nominally and hypocritically. They place their trust in pride and power; they hate me in themselves and others; wherefore I cast them down into the wombs of evil spirits and unclean beasts. They go from birth to birth; at length, not finding me, they go into the most infernal regions. There are three ways to these: lust, anger, and avarice. Avoiding these gates of sin, thou wilt go the journey of the Most High.

The sensual man. His course and end.

17. Distinction of qualities leads to a distinction in the kinds of faith or worship. All worship; but the nature and object of the worship are determined by their different qualities. The worship which is directed by Divine precept, without the desire of reward, and with an attentive mind, is of the Satwa-goon. That which is performed irregularly, without regard to the precepts of the law, without the distribution of bread, without the usual invocations, without gifts to the Brahmins at the conclusion, and without faith, is of the Raja-goon. That which is performed with a view to the fruit, and with hypocrisy, is of the Tama-goon. Whatever is performed without faith—whether it be sacrifices, deeds of charity, or mortification of the flesh—is called Asat, and is not for this world nor that which is above. These same qualities exhibit themselves in works. He who has the Satwa-goon forsakes the fruit of action, but not action itself. He who has the Raja-goon forsakes the work because it is painful; he who has the Tama-goon neglects action through folly and distraction of mind. So of Wisdom: the wisdom of the Satwa-goon sees one infinite principle in nature; the wisdom of the Raja-goon sees manifold principles prevailing in nature; the wisdom of the Tama-goon sees only self-interest in all things. So of Pleasure: the pleasure which a man enjoys from his labour, and wherein he finds the ends of his pains, that which in the beginning is as poison, and in the end is as the water of life, is of the Satwa-goon: this arises from the consent of the understanding. The pleasure which arises from the mere meeting of the organs with their objects, which in the beginning is as sweet as the water of life, and in the end is a poison, is of the Raja-goon. The pleasure, which in the beginning and end, tends to stupify the soul, is of the Tama-goon. There is not anything, Kreeshna declares, in heaven or earth which is free from the influence of these three qualities.

The true orderly worship.

The irregular worship.

The formal or false worship.

The three kinds of action.

The tribes.

18. Upon these qualities depend the respective duties of the four tribes of Brahmin, Kshatree, Visya, and Soodra. The natural duties of the Brahmin are peace, self-restraint, zeal, purity, patience, rectitude, learning, theology. The natural duties of the Kshatree are bravery, glory, rectitude, not to fly from the field, generosity, princely conduct. The natural duty of the Visya is to cultivate the lands, tend the cattle, and buy and sell. The natural duty of the Soodra is servitude. A man who is contented with his own particular lot and duty obtaineth perfection; for he offers his own works to that Being from whom the principles of all beings proceed. The duty of a man's own calling is far preferable to the duty of another, let it be ever so well pursued. A man's own calling, with all its faults, ought not to be forsaken. With thy heart place all thy works in me; by so doing thou shalt surmount every difficulty. But if through pride, thou wilt not listen to my words, thou wilt undoubtedly be lost. From a confidence in thyself, thou mayest think thou wilt not fight. This is a fallacious determination, for the principles of thy nature will impel thee; thou wilt do that through necessity, which thou seekest through ignorance to avoid.

Their distinct vocations.

Duty of following them.

19. This conclusion, though perfectly in accordance with the commencement of the story, and giving it a unity, may seem inconsistent with what has been said of the special glory of the Brahmin. But Kreeshna adds, "Eeswar resideth in the bosom of every mortal being, revolving with his supernatural power the universal wheel of time. Take sanctuary with him upon all occasions, oh! offspring of Bahrat; by his divine pleasure thou shalt obtain supreme happiness, and an eternal abode."

Eeswar, the indweller.

The leading thought of the poem.

20. It would have been easy to select sentences from this poem, and from a number of other Hindoo books, and out of them to construct a scheme of Hindoo philosophy. But such a scheme would not at all have represented the actual thoughts and conflicts in the minds of those to whom it would be attributed. We might form a high or a low notion of this remarkable people, or of their teachers; but we should know nothing of one or the other. The occasion of the poem, its scenery, the method in which the thoughts work themselves out, are at least as important for this purpose as the results to which Arjoon or Kreeshna, or the narrator of the story, arrives. The final moral, in which the Kshatree tribe is shown to have its own work and dignity, which are not incompatible with the superior glory of the Brahmin, evidently goes through the poem. To it all the dramatic interest, and all the speculations are linked. The darkness in Arjoon's mind arises from his

fancying that the work which belongs to the priest also belongs to the warrior; or that there is no escape from this conclusion but in supposing that there is a different standard for each to recognise, a different object for each to pursue, a different God for each to adore. Such an opinion had, no doubt, been taught in the Brahminical schools, and seemed a natural inference from the idea of Brahminism. The author of the poem evidently felt how opposed it was to that which he regarded as pure Brahminism; how it must force the Brahmin himself to acknowledge a number of different objects, while his business was to search for unity; how it must lead to a hopeless division of the castes, which should be bound together in obedience to that which was most refined and spiritual. Evidently, then, the book is the work of a reformer who wished to make the Brahminical tribe conscious of its own vocation, as the guide, and not the tyrant, of the rest. In the effort for this object, he brings out the highest form of Hindooism,—a form of it which never had been nor could be realised, but by which we may understand its lower and vulgarer manifestations far better than by contemplating them alone.

Unbelief in the Veds not implied in the poem.

21. The difference of this form from that which we find in the Veds, has led many to conclude that the poem is throughout a protest, though a hidden one, against the scheme of belief which is embodied in them. But there seems no sufficient reason to doubt that the author is sincere in the respect which he professes for them, and that he believed that he was drawing out the sense which was latent in them. Nor, perhaps, was he wholly wrong in that opinion. Though the writers of the Veds would have been absolutely unable to follow him in a single step of his philosophical speculations; though there is no reason to doubt that they did mean to ask Indra, and the other gods whom they invoked, to come and drink with them,—yet their cries for communion and friendship with the gods, and for purification, grounded as they are upon religious aspirations of the creature, not upon a revelation of the Creator, do contain implicitly those ideas which are developed in the Bhagavad Gita. In one respect the writer of the poem seems to return from the more exclusive Brahminism to the earlier teaching of the Vedas. Kreeshna, not Brahm, is his hero. Now it is true that Kreeshna *is* Brahm, and claims the name for himself: but he presents himself first to us in a human shape; he comes forth as the warrior, not merely as the thinker. This difference is involved in the whole conception of the poem. The sudden manifestation of his spiritual and divine glory which overwhelms Arjoon, does not swallow up his human form, or hinder him from appearing in it again. However great the difficulty, the Hindoo

Kreeshna and Brahm.

philosopher perceives that, in some way or other, this union must be realised,—that there can be no sufficient teacher of man's spirit in whom both these conditions do not meet.

The soul the ultimate object of this philosophy.

22. But, deep and sincere as the acknowledgment of such a teacher is, the soul of man is still the ultimate object in this poem, as much as in the more narrow, merely meditative religion. In one and the other it is equally true that the soul or spiritual part of man is always unawares becoming the God, even while there is the strongest effort to escape from this identification,—a really earnest struggle of the man to sink in awe, to confess One mightier than himself, to become nothing in his presence. What is his presence? Where is it? Here the Hindoo becomes lost; he sees images of himself everywhere—he is sure that there is something which is not the image of himself. To discover what it is, is worth the toil and sorrow of a life; to know it must be the great reward hereafter. But while that difficult problem is solving itself,—while he is devising the means which are best for attaining the complete fruition,—Earth is going on with her processes of growth, decay, and destruction; the man himself is born, has to live, fight, and die. There is nothing to connect himself or Nature with God, unless he worships himself or Nature, and makes the God comprehend both. This, consequently, is the result—the downward result—to which everything in Hindoo life and society always has been tending.

Consequences.

The Hebrew and the Hindoo.

23. The Hebrew was prohibited from connecting God with anything in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth. He was taught to look up to the Lord as his God, the God of his fathers, the King of his land, the Creator of things, the Lawgiver of himself. He was taught to wage war with all the tendencies to worship natural gods, which he found in himself, which he saw in others. He was taught to acknowledge the Lord as the ever-present guide, and ruler, and teacher of his whole nation; every Jew being in the covenant; priests, lawgivers, prophets, being God's ministers to them.

The relation between them.

This is what is called their narrow, exclusive faith. But out of it, as we have seen, there grew a philosophy, the recognition of a Divine teacher of man, of a wisdom which is to be the object of his search and love. The Hindoo starts from the discovery to which the Hebrew had been led by such a long and painful discipline. He is conscious of a mysterious Teacher near him, of one working upon his spirit, of one who is at the same time ruler over nature. But his search begins from himself, and, in spite of his conviction that it ought not to be so, it ends in himself. The purification of his individual soul becomes practically the highest end he can pursue or conceive of; he must make it his aim; he must separate from society, to which nevertheless he feels bound, that he may pursue it. The more he learns about himself, the more he discovers that he must get rid of himself; yet he is always pursued by that demon. To sink and be lost is his only hope,—to sink in Brahm. But is Brahm anything save a projection from himself? To sink in him, does it mean the same as to be nothing?

The contrast between them.

Worth and interest of the Hindoo philosophy to a believer in the Hebrew records.

24. Reflections such as these, upon which the whole condition of Hindoo society for thousands of years is the commentary, might suggest some doubts to those who think that the acknowledgment of wisdom received is unfavourable to the search after it; that the soul of man is most likely to be free when it is working out its freedom for itself, or under the guidance of a set of wise men. But we who do acknowledge the Hebrew principle, who have that vantage-ground for contemplating the history of the universe, are not obliged to rest in this merely negative conclusion. We are bound to look upon the whole course of human thought as directed by a wisdom above man's—by One who, as the Apostle speaks, "orders the times before appointed and the bounds of men's habitations, that they may seek Him, if haply they may feel after Him and find Him." To one holding this faith, the seekings of the Bhagavad Gita, and of the whole Hindoo world, must be of profoundest interest. He must perceive, indeed, that they were baffled continually; but he makes the discovery with sympathy, not exultation,—with the certainty that they were struggling with questions which belong to him and to the whole universe; to which he too has to seek an answer, and cannot rest till he finds one. And far from seeing only contradictions either in the method of the search or the result of it, he will have continually to be humbled by perceiving how much has been made known to these inquirers; what glimpses of light they have caught, what visions of good have cheered their dreary path, what strength has been given them for thought, for suffering, even at times for manly action. If he feels even a wish to deny or to explain away this fact, he will suspect himself of a secret atheism—of having studied the Hebrew books to no profit.

Spirit in which it should be studied.

Its relation to the after history.

25. These remarks belong especially, but not exclusively, to the subject we are now considering. For modern inquiries have made it clear that the Sanscrit is the source of most of the European languages. We have, therefore, a right to expect that the habit of thought and feeling in the Sanscrit books may be traced, under different modifications, in the nations of which we shall have hereafter to speak. We may find, in fact, that these Hindoo books are the commencement of a course of inquiry which we shall have to trace in many windings through Greek

and through modern philosophy. The spirit of man, which in the Hebrew books has been presented to us under a Divine discipline and education, will henceforth be seen asking a multitude of questions respecting itself, its destiny, its relations to the visible and invisible world, feeling after some object near it which might be its guide or helper in the search, losing that object again and again, questioning earth and heaven to tell whither it is gone, how it may be recovered. Whether this Indo-Germanic course of inquiries ever meets at any point that Semitic teaching of which we have been hearing; whether the unity which is revealed to the Hebrew is to explain or contradict the unity which is sought for by the Brahmin, our future history may show. But in the meantime we may remark, that the problems which we shall meet with among Ionian, Eleatic, Platonic philosophers, will be far less perplexing to us if we have listened attentively to the dialogue between Arjoon and Kreeshna.

SECTION III.

THE PHILOSOPHER SEPARATING HIMSELF FROM THE PRIEST.

1. Any allusion to the formal schools of Hindoo philosophy will belong more properly to the second part of this sketch. But there is one great Eastern revolution, assigned by most authorities to the fifth or sixth century B.C., which stands in the closest connection with the history of philosophy. Indeed, the few glimpses which we possess concerning the external facts of a conflict that has led to the most surprising results, would be absolutely unintelligible to us if we were not helped by some previous knowledge of Hindoo speculations.

The Buddhist school.

2. The Buddhist is constantly spoken of in Hindoo books as if he were the member of a philosophical sect. *We* know him as the professor of a religion which is received by nearly a third of the inhabitants of the globe. To reconcile two such opposite descriptions, we must recollect the remarks which have been made upon the apparently unsociable characters which are united in the Brahmin, and upon the nature of Brahm himself. The priest is the man who uses his soul or intellect, in distinction from the mass of men, who use only their senses. Brahm is *the* Intellect or Buddha. That there should be a sect of Brahmins who dwelt upon the idea of an intelligence in man, till they began to suspect that their own pretension to an exclusive monopoly of it was, in fact, a denial of Brahm's presence, might easily have been conjectured; that these same persons should exalt the meditative part of religion above the sacrificial would be most likely from the specimen of the same feeling we have discovered in the Bhagavad Gita. But there was a period

very memorable and critical, it would seem, in the history of mankind generally, connected with the appearance of reformers and legislators in various countries, perhaps marking the commencement of European society and civilization, when Brahminism was shaken to its centre in Hindostan, and when the worship of the One Intelligence was proclaimed aloud as incompatible with the pretensions of an hereditary caste.

The Buddhist revolution

3. Not the original Hindoo *doctrine*, as some have affirmed, in plain contradiction both to the letter and spirit of the Veds, but certainly the idea which lay hid in that doctrine, and ever and anon had threatened to break loose from it, did now become the inspiring idea of whole countries. The philosophy, disentangling itself from the old faith, became itself a faith. Buddhism is the most surprising effort of the human intellect to assert its own supremacy of which there ever has been, or perhaps ever will be, any record. European sages in the last century, and in the present, have cried out, "When will philosophy break loose from the fetters which priests have imposed upon it?" Philosophy in Asia performed that task two thousand years ago. It threw off a yoke which was become quite intolerable; it affirmed that man's soul is capable of unlimited expansion; it claimed for that soul the homage due to a divinity: it made no mere idle boast of power; it actually won the allegiance of multitudes.

The inward meaning of Buddhism.

Its different aspects.

4. Is the result one on which the lover of wisdom, or of his kind, can delight to dwell? All possible forms in which the intellect can express its belief in itself and in its own powers have been discovered and tried. The Buddhist worships sometimes the pure, absolute unity; sometimes he sees a soul above his own soul, *himself* transfigured; sometimes he adores men who have done great works on earth, the one Buddha distributed in numerous Buddhas. Now he denies all symbols, now every thing is symbolical. He is the purest of theists, he is the most complete of atheists. He can conceive nothing too vast for human wisdom, he sees it all gathered up in an infant. He is always flying from himself, he can find nothing but images of himself. The philosophy which began by emancipating itself from religion has created for itself a religion,—one especially narrow, artificial, material. Those who would not be priests or have priests practise all priestly impostures, are slavishly priest-ridden. The adored intellect makes no progress, the seeker after wisdom finds no resource but in identifying the search with the object, and confessing that he finds nothing. Can this be the process destined for the emancipation of mankind?

Its outward clothing.

Its final results.

CHAPTER IV.

CHINESE PHILOSOPHY.

Sympathy of the European philosophers of the eighteenth century with Khoung-fou-tseu.

1. THOUGH we have said that the Buddhist revolution was an effort of philosophers to free themselves from the shackles of an hereditary faith, we are quite aware that it is not to an experiment of this kind that the teachers of the last century would have turned as an encouragement and an example to themselves. Mysticism, which belonged as much to the revolters from the Brahminical system as to that system itself, inspired them with nothing but contempt. But the Eastern world supplied them with another object, on which they could bestow the most fervent and unbounded admiration. They found in Khoung-fou-tseu all that they missed in these sages of India, with an entire absence of that which was offensive in them. They heard of a man who, six centuries B.C., considered the outward economy of an empire a worthier object of study than all hidden and abstracted lore, who prized maxims of life and conduct more than all doctrines respecting the Divinity, who had actually anticipated some of the most modern propositions respecting the governor and the governed. This man they found was not a mere name for a set of opinions: he had a distinct, marked personality; and his words and acts had not been limited to a narrow circle, or to one or two centuries. He had left an impression of himself upon the most populous empire in the world. After two thousand years his authority is still sacred among the people, the mandarins, the emperors of China; his influence is felt in every portion of that vast and complicated society.

Reasons which justified it.

Chinese history, past and present, expounded by him.

2. Such a fact as this is worthy of all attention. Great as is the contrast between China and Hindostan—though that contrast can hardly be expressed more accurately than by saying that in India all history is a philosophy, and that in China all philosophy is a history—yet it is equally true of each people that its search after wisdom is the only satisfactory key to the events which have befallen it. The difficulty of understanding the long line of dynasties which preceded the birth of Khoung-fou-tseu, though his words and acts compel us to believe in them, is a sufficient proof of this fact. We confess the antiquity of the empire, because it is needful as an explanation of the reform which he worked in it.

The old Chinese faith must be learnt in a great measure from him.

3. This being the case, we are excused from dwelling as much upon the old faith of China as we were forced to do on that of India. This faith we are obliged to examine in a great measure with the eyes of Khoung-fou-tseu: he collected and remodelled

the books which contain it. He may have omitted much which seemed to him immaterial for the education of his country, and yet which, to a modern critic, might be of great use. At the same time we are not disposed to question the general accuracy of the conception which this teacher formed of the old institutions and the old creed of his country. There are abundant proofs of the fidelity with which he studied them, of the earnest desire which he had to preserve them. No one aspired less to the reputation of an innovator; his main object was to remove innovations: yet this desire was balanced by a profound reverence for that which was established. Nothing was to be brought back for the mere purpose of bringing it back. Order was not to be sacrificed even for the hope of redressing an evil.

His dislike of innovation.

The Chinese utterly unmystical.

4. Khoung-fou-tseu could not have produced the effect which he has produced upon the empire of China,—could not be recognised in the character in which he has been recognised for so many ages,—if his mind had not been the very highest type of the Chinese mind; that in which we may read what it was aiming at both before and after he appeared to enlighten it. We may therefore acquiesce without difficulty in the opinion, that the Chinese religion was from the first of a much less high and mysterious quality than that of almost any people upon the earth; that the belief of the eternal as distinct from, and opposed to, the temporal, which we have found so characteristic of the Hindoo, existed very dimly and imperfectly in it, and was supplied only by a reverence for the past; that the sense of connexion or communion with any invisible powers, though not absent, must have been weak and slightly developed; that the emperor must have been regarded always as the highest utterer of the divine mind; that the priest must have been chiefly valued as a minister of the ceremonial of the court; that rites and ceremonies must have had a substantive value in this land independent of all significance, which they have scarcely ever possessed elsewhere; that there was united with this tendency one which to some may seem incompatible with it—an attachment to whatever is useful and practical; that the Chinese must have entertained a profound respect for family relationships; that the relationship of father and son, however, will have so overshadowed all the rest, that they will have been regarded merely as different forms of it, or as to be sacrificed for the sake of it; that implicit obedience to authority will have been *the* virtue which every institution existed to enforce, which was to be their only preserver. If we suppose the reverence for the shades of ancestors, for the person of the emperor, for the dignity of the father, to have been joined with something of a Sabæan worship, with some astrology and speculation about the future, we shall perhaps

The ancient takes the place of the eternal.

The emperor

The father

Obedience the sum of virtues.

The worship

arrive at a tolerably near conception of China as it may have existed under the old emperors, to whom the sage continually refers with admiration and regret.

A society built upon customs.

5. These were habits of mind which may have been represented more or less perfectly in the characters of particular sovereigns, and which had embodied themselves in the forms of Chinese society. A tyrant might, of course, derange the whole economy of such a world. A state of things which rested merely on custom, and was upheld by observances, might quickly pass into utter confusion. "The dynasty of Yu," says the Book of Verses, "might be compared to the Most High while it retained the affection of the people: we learn by its decline how hard it is to preserve the command of heaven." These words must be illustrated hereafter: we quote them now merely to show where

Khoung-fou-tseu the reformer.

is the starting-point of the Confucian philosophy. The wisdom at which it aims is that which shall be effectual for the removal of a decayed condition of society, and the restoration of the

His wise man essentially political.

principles that are implied in it. We hear almost as much of the studious or meditative man in the Chinese books as in the Brahminical. Quite as earnestly as the Brahmins, and perhaps much more honestly than they, Khoung-fou-tseu speaks of the superiority of thought and study to all animal pleasures, to the pursuit of wealth, to the possession of offices. Yet no one is less of a Moonee. He began as a man of affairs—a Chinese official. The affairs of the empire were his study all his life through: he trained his disciples to take part in them. Education he looked upon as the one necessary means to good government; but all education was to be for the sake of government. To ascertain the ends of government, and the means of accomplishing those ends, was the one function of the sage.

The Lun-yu: discourses of Khoung-fou-tseu.

6. Before we come to the doctrines of Khoung-fou-tseu on this subject, and show how morals and metaphysics were combined in his political science, we must try to give our readers some conception of the man himself. The third of the Chinese classical books, called the Lun-yu, or Philosophical Dialogues, is that which will be most helpful for this purpose. We have there the recorded sayings of the man, which bear far more internal evidence of genuineness than those which are commonly attributed to the founders of the Greek schools. We have also the testimonies of affectionate disciples respecting him, which, if they are not wholly to be trusted, at least give us different impressions of his character, out of which we may form one for ourselves.

Fancied resemblance between

7. M. Pauthier, the recent French translator of the classical books of China, to whom we are under the greatest obligations for bringing the treasures of the past within the reach of our

ignorance, and whose enthusiasm for his subject is a warrant, in addition to his general European reputation, that he has really vanquished the difficulties of it, has somewhat rashly suggested a comparison between the dialogues in the Lun-yu and those in which Socrates is the hero. He is candid enough to add, that the resemblance is chiefly to the sayings which Xenophon has attributed to his master, and that it is not easy to detect the artistical beauty and form of the Platonic dialogues in their Chinese counterpart. He even admits that there is a certain monotony in the utterances of Khoung-fou-tseu, though he adds, "even this monotony has something of the serenity and the majesty of a moral instruction, which is bringing successively under our eyes the different sides of human nature contemplated from a higher ground." Though, for ourselves, we might be glad to exchange a little of this serenity and majesty for the hearty and humorous sympathy of the Greek with all that is passing around him, we are quite willing to accept it as a characteristic of another order of genius belonging to the east rather than the west, and entitled to its own meed of respect. And it is scarcely just to Khoung-fou-tseu to speak of him simply as looking down upon his fellow-men: there are indications in his deeds and words of fellow-feeling and real humbleness of mind. The dogma which attributes such qualities in all cases to men who have exercised a great influence over their kind, whether true or not, is certainly not contradicted in this instance.

Khoung-fou tseu and Socrates.

The contrast between them exhibits the opposition of the east and west.

Modesty of Khoung-fou-tseu.

8. That our readers may not be unacquainted with the form, such as it is, of this Chinese book, through our desire to cull choice sentences that fell from the lips of Khoung-fou-tseu, we will give the substance of one or two of the chapters which seem best to explain his character and manner of thinking:—

"The philosopher said, I illustrate and comment upon the old books, but I do not compose new ones. I have faith in the Ancients, I love them; I have the highest honour for our Lao-pang" [a sage of the Chang dynasty].

Love for the past.

"The philosopher said, To meditate in silence and to recall to one's memory the objects of one's meditations; to devote oneself to study, and not to be discouraged; to instruct men, and not to suffer oneself to be cast down: how shall I attain to the possession of these virtues?"

Ideal of a great man.

"The philosopher said, Virtue is not cultivated; study is not pursued manfully; if the principles of justice and equity are professed they are not followed; the wicked and the perverse will not be corrected: that is the cause of my sorrow."

Lamentations over the age.

"The philosopher said, If a man does not make any effort to develope his own mind, I shall not develope it for him; if a man does not choose to make use of his faculty of speech (for the

Necessity of self-education.

purpose of making himself intelligible), I shall not penetrate the sense of his expressions; if, after having enabled him to know one angle of a square, he does not discover the measure of the other three, I do not volunteer the demonstration"

The philosopher an official when it is possible.

"The philosopher, interrupting Yeu-youan, said to him, If we are employed in public functions, then we fulfil our duty; if we are dismissed, we have the repose of a private life. You and I are the only persons who act thus."

Mere courage no virtue.

"Tseu-leu said, 'If you were leading three bodies of troops of 12,500 men each, which of us would you take for a lieutenant?' The philosopher answered, 'The man who with his own hands would engage us in a combat with a tiger,—who, without any motive, would wish to ford a river,—who would throw away his life without reason and without remorse,—I certainly would *not* take for my lieutenant. I should want a man who would maintain a steady vigilance in the direction of affairs, who is capable of forming plans and of executing them.'"

Riches better than mere respectability.

"The philosopher said, To get riches in a fair way, I would certainly engage in a low occupation if it was necessary; if the means were not fair, I would rather apply myself to that which I delight in."

Love of music.

"The philosopher being in the kingdom of Tshi, heard the music which is called Tchao: he was so affected by it, that, for three months, he did not know the taste of his food. He said, 'I do not fancy that, since the composition of that music, that point of perfection has been once attained.'"

How his disciples found out the mind of their master.

"Yeo-yeou said, 'Will our master help the Prince of Wei?' Tseu-koung said, 'I will question him upon that point.' He went into the apartment of the master, and said, 'What think you of Pe-i and of Chou-tsi?' The philosopher said, 'These men were true sages of the old world.' He added, 'Did not they experience any regrets?' 'No; they sought to acquire the virtue of humanity, and they obtained that virtue; why should they have had any regret?' Tseu-koung went back and said, 'Our master will not assist the Prince of Wei.'"

The wise man independent of externals.

"The philosopher said, To feed upon a little rice, to drink water, to have nothing but one's bent arm to lean upon, is a state which has its own satisfaction. To get riches and honour by unfair means seems to me like a cloud driven along by the wind."

Study of books.

"The philosopher said, If it was granted to me to add a number of years to my life, I would ask fifty to study the Y-king, that I might render myself free from great faults."

Khoung's account of himself.

Ye-hong questioned Tseu-leu about Khoung-fou-tseu. Tseu-leu did not answer him. "The philosopher said, Why have not you answered him? Khoung is a man who in his eagerness to

acquire knowledge often forgets to take nourishment; who in the joy which he feels at having acquired it, forgets the pains which it has cost him; and who does not disturb himself at the approach of old age. Now you know about him."

"The philosopher said, I was not born endowed with knowledge; I am a man who loved the ancients, and made all exertions to acquire their information."

What subjects he avoided.

"The philosopher never spoke in his conversation either of extraordinary things, or of civil troubles, or about spirits."

The two teachers.

"The philosopher said, If three of us were travelling together, I should necessarily find two instructors; I should choose the good man for imitation, and the bad man for correction."

"The philosopher said, Heaven has planted virtue in me, what then can Hoan-teu do to me?"

No esoterical doctrine.

"Do you fancy, my disciples, that I have any doctrines that I conceal from you? I have none. I have done nothing that I have not communicated to you, O my disciples!"

"The philosopher said, I cannot hope to see a holy man; all I can do is to see a wise one." [The exact difference of the two will be explained hereafter.]

"The philosopher said, I cannot hope to see a man truly virtuous; all I can do is to hope to see a man constant and settled in his views."

"To want everything, and to act as if one had abundance of possessions; to be empty, and to show oneself full; to be little, and to show oneself great—is a part very difficult to support steadily."

Action must be the fruit of reflection.

"The philosopher said, How is it that there are men who act without knowing what they do? I should not wish to behave myself so."

"We must hear the advice of many people, choose what is good in their counsels, and follow it: see much, and reflect maturely on what one has seen; that is the second step in knowledge."

The exclusives of his school reproved.

"The inhabitants of Heou-hing were hard to teach; one of their young men had come to visit the disciples of the philosopher. They doubted whether they should receive him among them. The philosopher said, I have admitted him to come among us, I have not admitted him to go away. Whence comes this opposition on your parts? This man has purified himself, has renewed himself in order to enter my school. Praise him for having gone so far; I am not responsible for his past or future actions."

Humanity near to us.

"The philosopher said, Is humanity so far off from us? I wish to possess humanity, and humanity comes to me."

Observation of the rites: Khoung's ignorance.

"The judge of the kingdom of Tchin asked, if Tchou-king understood the rites. Khoung-fou-tseu answered, He does under-

stand the rites. Khoung-fou-tseu having withdrawn, the judge said to On-maki, I have been told that a great man never yielded assent to the faults of others; however, a great man has done it now. The prince has married with a woman of the family On, of the same name as his own, and he has called her On-meng-tsew. A prince ought to know rites and customs. He, why does not he know them? On-maki told the philosopher; who cried, What a happy man Khoung-fou-tseu is! if he commits a fault, men are sure to know it."

What a sage may boast of.

"The philosopher said, In literature I am not equal to other men. If I think of a man who unites holiness to the virtue of humanity, how could I dare to compare myself to him? All that I know is, that I force myself to practise these virtues, and to teach them to others, without being disheartened."

Khoung-fou-tseu's devotion.

"The philosopher being very sick, Tseu-leu besought him to permit his disciples to address prayers for him to the spirits and the genii. The philosopher said, Is that the proper thing to do? Tseu-leu answered respectfully, It is the proper thing. It is said in the book called Leni, Address your prayers to the spirits and the genii above and below. The philosopher said, The prayer of Khoung-fou-tseu is constant."

Disobedience the greatest of crimes.

"The philosopher said, If a man is given to luxury he is not submissive. If he is too parsimonious, he is vile and abject. However, baseness is better than disobedience."

The highest example of virtue.

"The philosopher said, Tai-pe might be called sovereignly virtuous. I know not how anything could be added to his virtue; thrice he refused the empire, and the people saw nothing admirable in his conduct."

How virtues became mischievous.

"The philosopher said, If deference and respect towards others are not regulated by rules or by education, they are mere gratifications of our own fancy. If circumspection or vigilance are not regulated by education, they are only other names for extravagant cowardice. If manly courage is not regulated by education, it means only insubordination. If rectitude is not regulated by education, it brings the greatest confusion after it."

What a ruler can or cannot do.

"The philosopher said, We may force the people to *follow* the precepts of justice and reason; we cannot force it to *comprehend* them."

How a man is kept in the right course.

"He said, He who has an unshaken faith in truth, and who loves study passionately, preserves the principles of virtue, which are the consequences of this faith and love, to his death."

The good and evil state.

"If a state is governed by the principles of reason, poverty and misery are a cause of shame. If a state is not governed by the principles of reason, riches and honour are the subjects of shame"

The qualities of a great man.

"The philosopher said, I see no defect in Yu; he was sober in eating and drinking, and devoutly pious towards the spirits and the genii. His ordinary clothing was poor and mean; but how beautiful and glorious his robes were at the ceremonies! He inhabited a humble dwelling; but he directed all his energies to the making of trenches and cutting canals for the conveyance of waters."

9. Some of these sentences, which follow each other nearly in the order we have given them, require illustration from other passages.

Apparent contradiction in Khoung-fou-tseu's faith explained.

In the last sentence Yu is commended for his devotion to the spirits and genii, yet Khoung-fou-tseu seems on his sick-bed scarcely to have acknowledged their existence, or at least to have shown no faith in their power of helping him. This apparent contradiction is perfectly intelligible, if we consider the third chapter of this book. "Some one having asked, what was the sense of the grand royal sacrifice, the philosopher said, I do not know. He who did know this sense would find everything under Heaven clear and manifest for him. He would find no more difficulty in knowing everything than in putting his finger in the palm of his hand." Again, "when the philosopher entered into the great temple, he informed himself minutely about everything there. One who observed him cried out, Who will say now that the son of the man of Tsien knows the rites and ceremonies? see how carefully he has looked at each thing. The philosopher hearing these words, answered, I do so in conformity with the rites." Again, "Tseu-kang wished to abolish the sacrifice of the sheep which was offered on the first day of the twelfth moon. The philosopher said, Tse, you are only engaged about the sacrifice of the sheep, I am only concerned about the ceremony."

His feeling about the unknown.

His reverence for the prescribed order.

By reflecting on these passages, we may arrive at some judgment of the religious feelings of Khoung-fou-tseu generally. There appeared to him a mystery in the sacrifice which he could not penetrate; he was far from wishing to deny it, he would not for the world abolish the expression of it; but what it meant, he did not know, or probably seek to know. He valued the sacrifice not for its own sake, not for any benefit which he expected from it, but as part of an august and awful ceremonial. He worshipped the spirits and the genii because it was the ancient law, the established custom: therein consisted their sacredness in his eyes; but he did not speak of them, he had nothing to tell respecting them. It must not be concluded from this statement that he pretended to a faith, for the sake of the vulgar, which he secretly disowned, or that he looked upon

General conclusion.

the worship as a mere invention to maintain the government. His sincerity There are evidences of sincerity in his own conduct which negative the first supposition; his demand for sincerity in ministers and emperors disproves the second. The following passage might seem even to set at naught all that we have said respecting the ritualism of Khoung-fou-tseu, and to prove that he *did* recognize a hidden ground for those ancient customs which he so diligently preserved. "Tseu-hia asked him the Not a mere ritualist. meaning of these words in the Book of Verses: '*What an agreeable smile there is upon his fine and delicate mouth! how sweet and ravishing his look! The ground of the picture must be prepared if you would paint.*' The philosopher answered, 'You cannot lay on the colours till you have made preparation for them.' 'You hint,' said Tseu-hia, 'that mere ritual laws are secondary things.' 'You have caught my meaning,' answered the philosopher; 'you are beginning to understand my discourses on poetry.'" So, again, he speaks in terms of a hidden sense in the rites and ceremonies of the dynasty of Hai, which laws and the opinions of wise men did not suffice to make known. Such language leads us at once to the main principle of this Forms, the most perfect expression of the principle of reason. eminent teacher. Ceremonies, formalities, etiquette, in one word social customs, embody the principle of reason,—the very secret of order among men. This principle of reason is the divinest thing he knows of; traditional habits and forms are the most accurate expression of it. These are the great restraints upon mere self-will; adherence to them is the sign of the ruler who desires to be in sympathy with his people. The perception of what they signify is the great privilege and endowment of the wise man; that which he is to communicate, so far as he can at least without any intentional reserve, to his disciples; that which it is the great business of education to impress upon End of education. the minds both of rulers and subjects. But, after all, this wisdom cannot be expressed very much better than in the forms themselves: it must be attained by observation, practice, habitual discipline; it must come out in conduct, in gestures, in looks, as much as in words; it must be uttered, so far as it is capable of utterance, in short maxims and somewhat enigmatical poetry; which will interpret themselves slowly to the person who combines an honest purpose, diligence, and political experience.

In the same manner we must understand a phrase of very frequent occurrence in the discourses of Khoung-fou-tseu, and yet which we are told, somewhat strangely, by one of his disciples, that he did not often care to introduce. It is the word which our French guide renders, and we have every reason to suppose renders accurately, *humanity*. There are one or two passages in the Dialogues which show that this word had a sort of profound,

almost cabalistical significance in Khoung-fou-tseu's mind, which Humanity what it means in Khoung-fou-tseu's discourses. may account for the remark that he spoke rarely of it, though, in their reports, his disciples could not avoid frequently attributing it to him. "Ming-wow-pe asked, 'if Tseu-lou was humane?' The philosopher said, 'I do not know.' When the same question was repeated, the philosopher answered, 'If it was a question about commanding the military forces of a great kingdom, Tseu-lou would be capable of it; but I do not know what is his humanity.' 'And Kieou, what think you of him?' 'Well, he might be the governor of a city with a thousand houses, or of a family with a hundred chariots: I do not know what is his humanity.' 'And Tchi, what of him?' The sage said, 'Tchi, in an official sash, and occupying a post at the court, A sacred word. might be capable, with his good elocution, of introducing and handing out the guests: I do not know what is his humanity.'" We have already quoted passages from Khoung-fou-tseu which indicate his great love for music. The importance which he attached to it as an instrument of education and government is, perhaps, the one point in which it is possible to discover a resemblance between him and Plato. New music he evidently connected very closely with the sublime virtue, or complex of virtues, which he calls humanity. Humanity imports therefore, Music: the expression by it. we conceive, that order and harmony of relations in the body politic, and the corresponding order and harmony of feelings and faculties in the individual man, of which music may be considered the natural expression. There is a passage in which one of the disciples of Khoung-fou-tseu declares, that the doctrine of his A man is to love his neighbour as himself. master consists simply in having rectitude of heart, and in loving our neighbour as ourselves. M. Pauthier apologizes for giving this form to his translation, but says he could find no other so accurate. Till some greater scholar contradicts him, we are bound to accept his statement. If he supposes that those who believe that these words proceeded from higher lips will be scandalized by it, we think he mistakes the matter altogether. Those who attach the most awful significance to the utterances Can such a maxim be found in a Chinese book? of these lips, and to the Person from whom they fell, will be the least disposed to look upon him as the propounder of great maxims, and not rather as the giver of a new life; will be the least likely to grudge a Chinese teacher any glimpses which may have been vouchsafed to him of that which the true regenerator of humanity should effect for it.

Connected with this phrase is another to which we have The command of heaven. alluded already, and which is also one of the key phrases of the Confucian system; one also of those which its propounder seems always to have uttered with hesitation and diffidence. The philosopher, it is said, spoke rarely of destiny or of the *command*

of heaven. Perhaps the philosopher did not know precisely what he meant by heaven; but he did know that he meant something which was real, and not imaginary. It is consistent with the character which we have attributed to the original Chinese worship, and with the character of his own mind, that he should have been profoundly impressed with the order of the heavenly bodies—with the evenness, calmness, steadfastness, which the succession of day and night reveals to us. Such an order he desired and sought for in the transactions of human society. Such an order he believed that the imperial dignity was intended to represent and uphold. It was executing the mandate of heaven when it actually presented the image of this order; disobeying the mandate of heaven when it forgot this principle, and promoted or permitted derangement or confusion. A direct responsibility then in the emperor is presumed by Khoung-fou-tseu; but to whom? A number of expressions which recognize the misery that ensues in the government when the sovereign forgets his relations and duties to the governed, lead his modern interpreters continually to hope that he may have a dream of responsibility to the popular voice. Such a notion, however plausibly supported by certain sentences, we believe outrages the whole principle and history of the Confucian doctrine. The emperor could not have transgressed the commandment of heaven more in the mind of the philosopher than by forgetting that he was an emperor and confessing he was a subject. But responsibility to an actual living Being, who could call the emperor to account for his conduct, is equally out of the question. Homage to a principle, a law, to the idea of duty, is what remains, and this it was which Khoung-fou-tseu, by all his education and discipline, was labouring to realize in his own heart and in the hearts of others. He had a wise consciousness of its vagueness; he felt the necessity of connecting it with some superior order, even if was but a natural order: he did not like to say what the emperor obeyed, yet he must feel, and even declare, that he, like all other men, nay because he was the first of men, lived by obedience. Here is the point in which the personal convictions of the teacher became identical with his political philosophy, of which it behoves us now to render a more exact account.

The order of nature and of human society.

Responsibility of the emperor,

Not to the people,

Not to any divine person,

But to the law, or the sense of duty.

Extracts from the Tchoung Young.

Idea of good government.

10. "Ngrâi-Koung questioned Khoung-fou-tseu on the constitutive principles of a good government. The philosopher said, The laws of the kings Wen and Wou were consigned to bamboo tablets; if their ministers were living now their laws would be in vigour: their ministers have ceased to be, and their principles of good government are no longer followed. The combined virtues and qualities of the ministers of a prince make the administration of a state good, as the virtue of the earth, uniting the moist and the dry, gives forth and causes to grow the plants which cover its surface. This good administration resembles the reeds which are on the borders of rivers: it springs up naturally on a soil that is suitable to it. . . . . A prince who wishes to imitate the old administration of the kings must choose his ministers according to his own sentiments, which must be always inspired by the public good. That his sentiments may always have the public good for their moving principle, he must conform himself to the great law of duty, and this great law of duty must be searched for in humanity, which is the principle of love for all men. This humanity *is man himself:* regard for relations is the first duty of it.

Depends mainly upon administration.

Who can choose good ministers.

"The prince can never cease to correct himself and bring himself to perfection. Having the purpose of correcting and perfecting himself, he cannot dispense with the rendering to his relations that which is due to them. Having the purpose of rendering to his relations that which is due to them, he cannot dispense with the acquaintance of wise men, that he may honour them, and that they may instruct him in his duties. Having the purpose of obtaining the acquaintance of wise men, he cannot dispense with the knowledge of heaven, nor with the law which directs in the practice of prescribed duties.

What is necessary in a prince.

"The most universal duties for the human race are five, and the man possesses three natural faculties for practising them. The five duties are: the relations which subsist between the prince and his ministers, the father and his children, the husband and his wife, the elder and younger brother, and those of friends among themselves. Conscience, which is the light of intelligence to distinguish good and evil; humanity, which is the equity of the heart; moral courage, which is the force of the soul,—these are the three grand and universal moral faculties of the man.

The five human duties.

"Whether nature is sufficient for the knowledge of these universal duties, whether study is necessary to apprehend them, whether the knowledge is arrived at with great difficulty or not —when one has got the knowledge, the result is the same. Whether we practise these duties naturally and without effort, whether we practise them for the sake of getting profit and personal advantage from them—when we have succeeded in accomplishing useful works, the result is the same.

Results more important than the method of arriving at them.

"He who loves study, or the application of his intelligence to the search of the law of duty, is very near to acquire moral science. He who devotes all his efforts to practise his moral duties is near that devotion to the happiness of man which is called humanity. He who knows how to blush for his weakness

Practice leads to knowledge

in the practice of his duties is very near to acquire the force of mind necessary to their accomplishment.

How to make the condition of an empire blessed and enviable.

"So soon as the prince shall have well regulated and improved himself, straightway the universal duties will be accomplished towards him. So soon as he shall have learnt to revere wise men, straightway he will have no longer any doubt about the principles of truth and falsehood, of good and evil; so soon as his parents shall be the objects of the affection which is due to them, straightway there will be no more discussions between his uncles, his elder brothers and his younger brothers; so soon as he shall treat, as it becomes him, secondary functionaries and magistrates, the doctors and literary men will zealously acquit themselves of their duties in the seminaries; so soon as he shall love and treat the people as his son, the people will be drawn to imitate its superior; so soon as he shall have drawn about him all the savans and the artists, his wealth will be advantageously spent; so soon as he shall entertain agreeably the men who come from a distance, straightway will men from the four ends of the empire flock in crowds into his state, to receive part in his benefits; so soon as he shall treat with kindness his great vassals, straightway he will be respected throughout the whole empire."

We must not separate these political axioms from the following, which are more purely moral:—

Resolution the greatest element of action.

"All virtuous actions, all duties which have been resolved beforehand, are thereby accomplished; if they are not resolved upon, they are thereby in a state of infraction. If we have determined beforehand the words which we must speak, we shall not hesitate. If we have determined beforehand our affairs and occupations in the world, they will thereby be easily accomplished.

Perfection.

"The perfect, the true, disengaged from all mixture, is the law of heaven. The process of perfection, which consists in using all one's efforts to discover the celestial law, the true principle of the mandate of heaven,—this is the law of man. The perfect man attains this law without help from without; he has no need of meditation, or long reflection to obtain it; he arrives at it with calmness and tranquillity. This is the holy man. He who is continually tending towards perfection, who attaches himself strongly to the good, and fears to lose it, is the sage."

The saint and the sage.

The leading principle of this philosophy.

11. These extracts are taken from the second of the classical books which bear the general title of "The Invariable in the Mean." In the opinion of the Chinese, it contains the very essence of all philosophy—that which belongs to the great school, for which the first school—what may be called the school of custom or etiquette—is the vestibule. As we shall so often

have to deal with the doctrine of the mean or middle in the schools of the West, it is as well that we should ascertain, as nearly as we can, what anticipation there is of it in the passages we have quoted from the Tchoung-Young.

Form of its proportions.

Our readers will not have failed to have been struck with the *form* in which the Confucian maxims evolve themselves. The sorites, says M. Pauthier, is clearly a Chinese invention. To be a good emperor, you must be a good friend; to be a good friend, you must be a good son; to be a good son, you must know the law of right, &c. This is the mode in which the sage seems naturally and habitually to deliver himself.

The sorites.

The straight line.

Each duty involves another. What is the first duty from which all derive their sanction—the performance of which makes the performance of the others possible? It is difficult to find: often we seem to be moving in a circle. But evidently all duties involve a rule. To be right is to be regular. Irregularity must be the common expression for the violation of all relations. But irregularity is clearly the effect of some bias determining us to one side or another. The law of rectitude, then, must be the law of the *mean*. All study and discipline must be for the preservation of this. "Before joy, satisfaction, anger, sorrow, have been produced in the soul [says our book], the state in which we are found is called the mean. When once they have been produced in the soul, and they have not transgressed certain limits, the state in which we are is called harmonic. This Mean is the grand foundation of the world. Harmony is the universal and permanent law of it. When the Mean and the harmony have been carried to the point of perfection, heaven and earth are in a state of perfect tranquillity, and all beings receive their full development. Khoung-fou-tseu said, the man of superior virtue perseveres invariably in the mean; the vulgar or unprincipled man is constantly in opposition to this invariable mean. Few men are there, he cried at another time, who know how to keep long in the right way. I know the reason: cultivated men pass beyond it,—ignorant men do not attain it; men of strong virtue go too far,—men of feeble virtue stop short."

The mean.

The harmonic state.

The less and the more.

Here we have the very marrow of Chinese life, Chinese morals, Chinese politics. Hence we may explain that passion for minute ceremony which seems to Western people so ridiculous and intolerable. Hence it arises that the most affectionate disciples of a man really so honest and simple as Khoung-fou-tseu was, should spend whole pages in informing us that if he had to salute persons who presented themselves to him either on the right or the left, his robe, behind and before, always fell straight and well-arranged; that his step was quickened when he introduced guests, and that he held his arms extended like the wings

The Chinese ceremonial belongs to its most inward philosophy.

Reports of disciples respecting Khoung-fou-tseu's behaviour.

of a bird; that when he entered under the gate of the palace he bent his body as if the gate had not been sufficiently high to let him pass; that in passing before the throne his countenance changed all at once, his step being grave and measured, as if he had fetters on, and his words being as embarrassed as his feet; that, taking his robe with his two hands, he ascended into the hall of the palace, his body bent, and holding his breath as if he had not dared to breathe; that his nightdress was always half as long again as his body; that he never ate meat which was not cut in straight lines; that if a meat had not the sauce which belonged to it, he never touched it;—with a thousand other particulars, of which these are fair specimens, and which we willingly omit lest we should diminish our readers' respect for a really remarkable man, when our intention is only to throw light upon the national character, and to show how entirely the philosophy of Khoung-fou-tseu grew out of it, and was determined by it. That philosophy is not a mere collection of dry formalities; it is based upon a large experience; brings out the idea of duty as it was never brought out in the West, till Greek philosophy was remoulded by the Latin mind. It suggests very deep thoughts respecting the connection of social and individual life; it may help us as much by that which it fails to recognize, as by that which it actually proclaims. But the blanks which are so significant to us have been filled up in China, as they could only be filled up, by new maxims, a more rigid ceremonial, an intense self-conceit and self-satisfaction. There have, indeed, been other experiments to supply Khoung-fou-tseu's deficiencies. A mystical rationalism and the Buddhist divinity have been both called in to help out the cold atheism of the authorized creed. But the true Confucian feels, and feels rightly, that these plants are not indigenous to the Chinese soil, and have no rightful affinity with it. He still clings to his classical books, learns them by heart, dwells on the rules of equity, the contempt of money, the reverence for antiquity which they enforce; shows by the contradictions of his acts and life what truth there is in these maxims, and what powerlessness; how faithfully they foretell the decline of a country in which they are not obeyed; how utterly unable they are to produce obedience. The philosophers of the last century had a right to point to the existence of China through so many centuries, with all its mechanical appliances, its early maturity, its political experience, and to say "See what can be effected by mere intelligence, content to dwell upon the earth, aspiring to no acquaintance with things divine." We accept their words and their example. Such intelligence could do this; so God has willed. Alas for human beings, if there is nothing which can do more!

Worth of this philosophy. Idea of duty.

Individual and social life.

Attempts to supply its deficiencies.

Its great effects.

Its variableness.

12. We should do great injustice to China if we said nothing of the fourth of the classical books, which bears another name than that of the great teacher and reformer; of a man, however, who was a teacher and reformer, who considered Khoung-fou-tseu the great legislator of the world, and laboured in a society which had become again degenerated to restore his precepts and his practice. Meng-tseu belongs to the fourth century B.C. He is immeasurably more interesting to us than his predecessor, and therefore we should suppose must seem far inferior to him in Chinese eyes. Inferior he probably was, inferior in quietness and self-control, and in perfect adaptation to the habits of the people with whom he conversed. We can quite imagine that he never would have been a great legislator, or have left any great impression upon the mind of his country, if Khoung-fou-tseu had not led the way. But in place of the solemnity and general dryness of his master, there appears to have been in Meng-tseu real humour, a very earnest dislike of oppression, a courage in telling disagreeable truths to the highest personages, and a power of perceiving the practical application of sound maxims to the details of government, which cannot be contemplated without admiration and profit after a lapse of 2,000 years. We have tempted our readers to imitate the worst habits of the Chinese, if we have led them to think scornfully of eastern wisdom, or to suppose that it has no lessons for England in the nineteenth century. Let us repair our error, by asking them to listen to a conversation of Meng-tseu with Siouan-Wang the king of Tshi.

The fourth classical book.

Meng-tseu.

Not so typical a Chinese as Khoung-fou-tseu.

But much more interesting to us.

The king interrogated Meng-tseu in these terms: "I have been told that the park of the king Wen-Wang was seven leagues in circumference; was that the case?" Meng-tseu answered respectfully, "History tells us so." The king said, "If so, was not its extent excessive?" Meng-tseu answered, "The people considered it too small." The king said, "My insignificance has a park only four leagues in circumference, and the people consider it too large; whence this difference?" Meng-tseu answered, "The park of Wen-Wang contained all these leagues, but thither resorted all persons who wanted to cut grass or wood. Thither went all who wanted to take pheasants and hares. As the king had his park in common with the people, the people thought it small, though it was seven leagues round. Was that wonderful? I, your servant, when I was about to cross the frontier, took care to inform myself of what was especially forbidden in your kingdom, before I dared to venture further. Your servant learnt that there was within your line of customs a park four leagues round, and that the man who killed a stag there, was punished with death, as if he had killed a man. So that there is an actual pit of death of four leagues in circum-

When the people complain of royal parks for being too small.

When for being too large.

ference, opened in the heart of your kingdom. The people think that park too great. Is it wonderful?"

From a very long conversation with the same prince, all of which well deserves to be extracted, we take a passage which is not so illustrative of the talent of Meng-tseu as many others; but it will at least prove that his philosophy is not obsolete.

Crimes of the poor: how connected with their poverty.

"To want things necessary for life, and yet to preserve an equal and virtuous mind, is only possible for men whose intelligence raises them above the multitude. The mass of the people, when it wants the necessaries of life, wants also an equal and virtuous mind. Then follow violation of law, licence, and debauchery; there is nothing which it is not capable of doing. Then you bring them before judgment-seats, then you punish them. So you catch the people in a net. If there was a man truly endowed with the virtue of humanity occupying the throne, could he commit this criminal action of catching the people in such a snare?

Condition of China in the days of Meng-tseu.

"At present, the constitution of the private property of the people is such, that the children have not wherewith to minister to their fathers and mothers; the fathers have not wherewith to support their wives and their children. In years of abundance, the people suffer to the end of life pain and misery; in years of calamity they are not preserved from famine and death. In such extremities, the people think only of escaping from death. What time can they have to occupy themselves with the moral doctrines which may teach them how to conduct themselves according to the laws of justice and equity?" Meng-tseu proceeds to suggest remedies: improved cultivation of the land, plantation of trees, rearing of animals, the manufacture of silk—above all, education.

Sympathy of monarch and people.

One of his great maxims is, that the monarch should always share his pleasures with his people. "If a prince rejoices in the joy of his people, the people rejoice also in his joy. If a prince sorrows in the sorrows of his people, the people also sorrow in his sorrow. Let a prince rejoice with everybody, let him sorrow with everybody; in so doing it is impossible he can find any difficulty in reigning."

How to gratify a taste for riches

The same monarch, in another conversation with Meng-tseu, expressed great admiration for two lines in the Book of Verses: "We may be rich and powerful, but we should have compassion on the widows and orphans." Meng-tseu answered, rather abruptly, "Oh, king! if you find them so good, why do you not practise them?" The king answered, "My insignificance has a defect; my insignificance loves riches." Meng-tseu answered respectfully, "Kong-lieou loved riches also, so he shared them with his people that he might gratify his love. If you love them, try the same plan." The king said, "My insignificance has another weakness; my insignificance loves pleasure." Meng-tseu answered, with respect, "Tai-wang loved pleasure; he loved his wife dearly, so he contrived that in all his kingdom there should be no celibats."

and for pleasure.

What an emperor is to do who cannot govern his provinces.

The following is still more pointed: it is a conversation with the same patient prince. "Suppose a servant of the king trusts a friend with his wife and children, just as he is about to set out for a journey: if, on his return, he finds that his wife and children have suffered cold and hunger, what must he do?" The king: "He must break with his friend." Meng-tseu went on: "If the chief judge cannot govern the magistrates who are under him, what must be done with him?" The king: "He must be deposed." Meng-tseu: "If the provinces situated at the extreme limits of the kingdom are not well governed, what must be done?" The king looked to the right and left, and turned the conversation. Meng-tseu said, "The great man has three satisfactions: to have his father and mother still living, without any cause of dissatisfaction or dissension between the elder and the younger brother, is the first; to have nothing to blush for in the face of heaven or of man, is the second; to meet wise and virtuous men among those of his generation, is the third. These are the three causes of satisfaction to a wise man. To rule an empire is not included among them."

The ambition of the wise man.

Hearty love of good a compensation for the want of gifts in a minister.

"When the prince of Lou desired that Lo-tching-tseu, a disciple of Meng-tseu, should undertake the whole administration of the kingdom, Meng-tseu said, 'Since I have heard that news, I cannot sleep for joy.' Some one asked, 'What, has he a great deal of energy?' Meng-tseu said 'Not at all.' 'Has he prudence, and a mind that is apt to form great designs?' 'Not at all.' 'Has he studied much, and has he very extensive knowledge?' 'Not at all.' If so, why do you lie awake for joy at his promotion?' 'Because he is a man who loves what is good.' 'Is th[illegible] enough?' 'Yes; to love what is good is more than enough to govern the empire: how much more to govern the kingdom of Lou! If one who is proposed for the administration of a state loves what is good, the good men who inhabit within the four seas will think nothing of travelling one hundred leagues to come and give him good counsel. But if he loves not what is good, these men will say within themselves, He is a self-satisfied man, who always answers, "I knew that a long while ago." That tone and air will drive good counsellors one hundred leagues from him. If they go, then the slanderers, the flatterers, the people whose countenances say "Yes" to every word he speaks, will arrive in crowds. In such company, if he wishes to govern well, how can he?'"

Suffering the school in which great men are trained by Heaven.

The following is in a yet higher strain. "Chun came to the empire from the midst of the fields; Fou-youé was raised to the rank of minister from a mason; Kiao-he was raised from a seller of fish and of salt; Kouan-i-ou became a minister from a gaoler. Thus it is when heaven wishes to confer a great office upon its chosen men, it begins always by proving their souls and their intellects by days of sorrow; their nerves and their bones are worn out by hard toil, their flesh is tormented with hunger. The results of their actions are always contrary to those which they hope to obtain. Thus their souls are stimulated, their natures hardened, their force augmented by an energy, without which they would have been unable to accomplish their high destiny. Men begin by committing faults, before they can correct themselves. They experience anguish of heart, are hindered in their projects, till at last they come forth. It is universally true that life comes through pains and trials, death through pleasures and repose."

The respectable people of a village:

what they are.

We cannot help thinking that Khoung-feu-tseu himself comes forth in a somewhat braver and fine spirit in the reports and commentaries of Meng-tseu. For instance, he quotes him as saying "that the most honest men of a neighbourhood are the pests of virtue." "Who are these men?" asked Wen-tchang. "Those," said Mengtseu, "who take pains never to speak or act otherwise than all around them. If you wish to find them in a fault, you never know where to take them. Whatever side you attack them, you never get at them. That which dwells in their heart has a certain resemblance to rectitude and sincerity; what they practise seem like acts of temperance and of integrity. As all their neighbourhood boasts of them incessantly, they fancy themselves perfect people. Therefore Khoung-fou-tseu calls them the pests of virtue. 'I detest,' says Khoung-fou-tseu, 'that which has appearance without reality; I detest clever men, for fear that they shall confound justice; I detest an eloquent mouth, fearing lest it should confuse truth; I detest the sounds of the music Tching, because they corrupt music; I detest the colour of violet because it mimics the colour of purple; I detest the most respectable people of a neighbourhood because they mimic virtue.'"

Why Khoung-fou-tseu hated them.

Meng-tseu's democratical tendencies.

13. Meng-tseu, it will be perceived, in spite of this last extract, has a much more democratic tendency than his master. He is even reported to have said, "The people is the most noble thing in the world. The spirits of the earth and the fruits of the earth are second to them. The prince is of the least importance of all." Such a sentiment as this, found in a book which all Chinese men of education learn by heart, found

side by side with precepts which seem to represent the emperor as the source of all light and wisdom to his people, must needs give rise to great perplexities in the more thoughtful members of the Celestial Empire, especially in those who are necessarily brought into contact with the notions and history of barbarians. The effects of such teaching may be much greater than we can foresee. Certainly one cannot expect that they will be favourable to the real freedom and moral culture of this singular people. The deepest wisdom both of Khoung-fou-tseu and Meng-tseu seems to have consisted in awaking monarchs to a consciousness of their position and their duties; their greatest failures to have arisen from their inability to show what higher and more righteous power sustains them in that position, and can give them energy for the discharge of these duties. Whatever teaching can supply that defect may be the instrument of making China what God intends it to be. A subversion of its political order must be also the subversion of its ancient wisdom, without giving it any capacity for the acquisition of fresh light.

CHAPTER V.

PERSIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Zerduscht, his biography.

1. The biography of Khoung-fou-tseu is as clear, accurate, and formal as that of a man who lived a century ago. The biography of Zerduscht, who occupies the corresponding place in the annals of Persian philosophy, is altogether confused and mythical. It is hardly possible to compose any orderly history out of the wild legends of his birth, his adventures, and his reformation. The most intelligent modern critics have given up the task. They doubt whether such a man ever existed; they think that he represents an epoch, or a great struggle of opposing principles,—that different persons who illustrated that epoch, or engaged in that struggle, may have been blended under one name, and that the traditionary history may have as much or as little to do with one as with another of them.

His age.

2. If we were forced to acquiesce in this conclusion, to what period will this imaginary hero belong? It is difficult not to connect him with that general movement of the Asiatic mind to which we have already alluded in this sketch. The Buddhist convulsion in Hindostan, the great Chinese reformation, and the movement in Iran or Persia, of which we are now to speak, if not strictly contemporaneous events, may not have been sepa-

What was common in the different Oriental reformations.

rated by the distance of more than a century. That there was something common in them all will easily be admitted. The Indian, the Chinese, the Persian reformers, alike believed that they were bringing back some old order or principle, which had been forgotten or violated, or for which some modern practices and notions had been substituted. Neither the Buddhist nor the disciple of Zerduscht would have allowed, any more than Khoung-fou-tseu, that they were introducing innovations into the worship or polity of their country: all professed to sweep

Their great differences.

innovations away. But their differences are only made the more remarkable by this coincidence, and by the power which all were able to put forth. They did leave an impress upon vast regions of the earth,—they proved that there were certain great ideas of which these nations were, and perhaps had always been, the appointed depositaries. We have tried to discover in the practical records of Chinese thought and legislation what their characteristic is; is it possible to penetrate through the vagueness of the Zendavesta, and to detect what was latent in the minds of those who composed it, or believed in it?

The Zendavesta.

3. To give any account of this strange collection of litanies seems impossible. How it came together is a question still unsolved. The debates about the language in which it is composed are receiving so much illustration from recent inquiries, that it would be unwise to enter upon them, even if our subject required it. If we gave specimens of the style of the book, as it comes to us through the French compiler, M. Anquetil, we should perhaps rather confuse our readers respecting its object than help them to arrive at it. We shall, therefore, content ourselves with some general hints respecting the meaning and purpose of the change which has been for so many centuries connected with the name of Zoroaster,—hints not in the least novel, in accordance for the most part with the conclusions at which all students of the subject have arrived, but which may throw some light upon the question, what place Persia occupies in the history of philosophical inquiries, and how it is connected in the way, either of resemblance or opposition, with Egypt, with India, with China, with Greece.

The Persian reformer a real person.

4. The difficulty of attributing a personal existence to Zoroaster is very much that which meets us again in the cases of Lycurgus, Odin, and many more; a difficulty, we may be permitted to remark, belonging chiefly to our own time, connected with a true feeling of the wonderful manner in which institutions, beliefs, habits, have diffused themselves through particular races, and characterised them from the very first; connected also with a vague and false feeling, that acts can some-

how accomplish themselves without living agents,—that great conflicts may be transacted in the clouds and the air, without human combatants or personal leaders. In each instance we have named, it is probable that we shall ultimately return to the belief of our forefathers in an actual legislator or champion, however we may confess our inability to arrive at that very definite notion of his position and acts, which they attained by supplying the chasms of fact out of the stores of their imagination, or by the opposite process of stripping legends of their poetry,—of all that gives them their worth and significance,—and so reducing them into facts. Of Zerduscht we must speak as an actual person; he may have had some other name,—he may have done acts of which we know nothing, and have not done any of those his biographers record; but that there was some one who maintained the conflict which produced results so striking and so lasting we may at once assume, and speak upon the assumption.

His enemies The Magians.

5. The conflict of Zerduscht was with the Magians. This we take to be the facts of his history, whatever fictions may surround it. He found a set of men doing homage, as he believed, to powers, or a power of evil. Probably they made no secret of this homage. They taught that such a power was to be worshipped; they could teach the method of the worship. They knew the secrets of the evil being; they could explain how his wrath was to be averted. Upon the belief that they possessed this knowledge their influence stood.

Ahriman the object of Magian worship.

6. This was practically the case whatever worship they might also pay to a beneficent Divinity. There is no reason to suppose that the reverence for Ormuzd had ceased among them. Most likely there were services which they rendered habitually and punctually to him, and called upon the people to render. But what is the worship of a good Being, when the Evil dwells professedly side by side with him? The latter becomes inevitably *the* God. The character of the whole service is leavened and moulded by his character. Let the theories respecting the relation of the two beings towards each other be what they may, Ormuzd becomes really the servant of Ahriman. The Magians were in truth his priests, even when they were nominally bowing to his rival.

Effects of this worship on tillage.

7. The effects of such a religion manifest themselves in all directions. Zerduscht felt them in one direction especially. The earth in Iran was overgrown with weeds; nothing was done to till it or make it fruitful. How much is gathered up in these words! What a history of the effects of a priesthood, which looks upon its chief Divinity as the author of curses instead of blessings! Slavish dependence upon seasons, without any study

of the laws which govern them,—a fear of meddling with the thorns and thistles as if they grew by Divine ordinance, and had a sacred right which could not be disturbed,—the arms growing feeble every day from want of manly exercise in their appointed work,—the heart growing feeble through the decay of hope: here was a state of things to which a Magian might triumphantly point and say, "See the proof of our doctrine! Does not the evil prevail; is it not becoming mightier? What can we do but bribe it to be less severe and all-exacting? Where shall we direct our prayers and sacrifices if not to this terrible conqueror?" It was an opinion which was always establishing itself by new evidence,—always producing the facts which demonstrated it.

Practice and theory acting and reacting on each other.

8. What line must a reformer take to encounter them? He could admit no compromise. He must declare at once "Your whole scheme of worship is a lie; the ground on which it is based is a lie. The earth is meant to bring forth and bud; the thistles are meant to be destroyed. Man is meant to put the seeds into it, and call the strength out of it. These evil spirits are not his masters; he owes them no service. They create nothing, produce nothing, keep nothing alive. The powers of creation, production, nourishment, are all good. Whatever begets, brings forth, makes life more plentiful,—this is to be sought for as a counteraction to the powers of death. Let them be as strong as they will, there must be that which is stronger."

The Ormuzd worshipper.

9. To these Powers of life and production, then, Zerduscht raises his prayer. It is idle to pretend that he invokes only one Power. The litanies of the Zendavesta are addressed to a multitude of Powers. And yet the opinion is not so wrong as it may seem. Zerduscht would have affirmed himself that he worshipped only Ormuzd. He felt assuredly that as all which is destructive and evil tends to division, so everything which is good tends to unity. This was not a theory in his mind, as it would have been in a Hindoo's; it was a strong practical conviction which he did not so much utter in words as exhibit in his acts. He worshipped goodness. Whatever seemed to be doing good, to be acting beneficially for man whether in nature or out of nature, this seemed to him to have proceeded from Ormuzd, and to have a tendency to return to him.

Polytheism of Zerduscht

The Monotheistic element latent in it.

10. The Magians were of course astrologers. Their tendency was to contemplate the stars as evil agencies,—prophets of mischief to man. Zerduscht does not depart from the line of thought which he finds in his country. Light is the object of his reverence. Light is evidently the great source of fruitfulness to the earth. Light is man's benefactor. It becomes

Ormuzd light.

identical in Zerduscht's mind with Ormuzd. It is Good, or such a witness and symbol of Good as he cannot distinguish from it. Hymns and invocations to Light are surely means of resisting the dark being and his agents,—means of bringing good to the land, and to those who cultivate it.

Prayer the great weapon of the Persian against the evil powers.

11. Zerduscht was, therefore, as practical a man as Khoung-fou-tseu, as much aiming at the increase of the wealth of his country in the simplest sense of the word. But he was directly opposed to the Chinese, in that devotion was his great instrument. The word "instrument" is hardly adequate to express this difference. Zerduscht did not look upon prayer in any sense as a mere means to a result; it was in his mind an actual looking up to a Power who was capable of helping men against their enemies. The petitioner is driven to it by the might and the multitude of the evil powers which are striving against him. His litanies, if they seek for material blessings and deliverance from material evils, yet are undoubtedly addressed to some invisible Power, some Power of Light, against a tyrant partly visible, partly invisible, who would make all his acts and his thoughts confused and dark. It is not easy to say how much of visible idolatry he would himself have tolerated; but the testimony of Herodotus as to the character of Persian worship is certainly entitled to very great weight, and is not, we conceive, overborne by any clear evidence on the other side. He felt the absence of visible symbols to be the characteristic difference between the Persian service and his own. Though he did not see the empire in the time of its strength, when we may suppose the Zerduscht reform to have been most strongly felt, yet we may be sure that its influence had not passed away; and we may fairly conclude that it was not only a protest against the worship of Ahriman, but against the homage to visible things, which his servants the Magi will doubtless have encouraged. All the petitions of the Zendavesta seem to point, primarily at least, to powers and influences,—powers and influences, as we have said already, which dwelt in natural things, but still which were not cognizable by the senses. This distinction we may believe would come out more and more prominently in the two opposing worships, till at last some eclectical philosophy, seeking to establish a kind of reconciliation between them, and to make a fair distribution of their respective provinces, will have assigned the whole outward framework of things to Ahriman as his proper and original territory, maintaining the invisible as the creation of Ormuzd, and that through which he was carrying on repeated assaults and incursions upon the possessions of his rival.

Prayer mainly to invisible powers.

The later philosophy gives up the visible world to Ahriman.

12. But there was so such eclecticism as this in Zerduscht himself, or in any of his true followers. His faith was in a perpetual uncompromising war between the powers of good and evil. The earth was no permitted or tolerated habitation of Ahriman or his subjects; on the contrary, it was for the sake of the earth and for its restoration that all prayers and sacrifices were to be addressed to Ormuzd. And herein certainly is the interest of the Zerduscht doctrine and reformation for the moral philosopher. It was a search after light, an inquiry after the Being who gives light and order to the universe. Only this source of light and order did not present itself mainly to the Persian as an intelligence, but mainly as one who is right and true. Good and evil, right and wrong, became in his mind much more primitive, fundamental distinctions, than they ever did in the mind of any heathen people of the east or of the west. The Persians were much more distinctly a moral people than the Hindoos, or than any tribe of the Greeks. Xenophon's romance is a distinct acknowledgment of this fact by a Greek. Though he must have had plentiful experience of the gross dishonesty into which they fell when they were engaged in transactions with his countrymen, yet he still recognised and admired this as the typical form of that character which he had seen in some measure in the younger Cyrus, and which he fancied, or tried to fancy, had been exhibited almost perfectly in the founder of the nation.

Opposition between Zerduscht and the Brahmins.

The Persian morality.

Xenophon.

13. In one way it has been supposed that Zerduscht did recognise a kind of reconciliation between the divinity whom he abjured and the divinity whom he worshipped. A Time without bounds, it has been thought, lay in the mind of the Reformer, beneath all his conceptions either of a good or evil being; both alike must have proceeded from it. That there are litanies in the Zendavesta which suggest such a notion, and which may be as early as the time of Zerduscht, it is impossible to deny; that the doctrine which is deduced from them very greatly influenced the later Persian philosophy we shall see when we come, in the second part of this sketch, to consider how it affected, and was affected by, the faith of the Christian church. But that this abstraction really interfered in any practical sense with the homage—the exclusive homage—which Zerduscht paid to Ormuzd, and to the different benignant powers which he supposed to proceed from him, there is, we conceive, not the slightest proof. The use of prayers to a Time without bounds did, it seems to us, express the teacher's consciousness that there must be a deeper Unity, a more absolute Being, than he had apprehended. He was not satisfied—how could he be?—with a Being whom he

Time without bounds.

How this idea entered into the faith of Zerduscht.

must contemplate as one and almighty, and yet who was identical with every gracious influence, every productive power. For the sake and honour of Ormuzd himself he needed some other more distinct mode of declaring him, of invoking him. This was the mode—awkward and incoherent, leading to the very consequence which he sought to avoid, pregnant with future abstractions and confusions, but one which a man so thoroughly practical as Zerduscht could resort to without any care about its speculative difficulties, as an escape for his spirit from a real and oppressive contradiction, as a way of bringing his worship into closer sympathy with his human and political faith.

14. The Cyropædia, and the testimonies of Herodotus respecting the feelings of the Persians towards their king, and his inseparable connection with their worship, fully confirm another most important inference which we should deduce from the legends respecting Zerduscht. The Magian, officially, was his antagonist; some *monarch* was always the ally in his reforms. To exalt the royal above the sacerdotal function, to prevent the kings from being the servants of the priests, was unquestionably a great part of his work. Herein he was probably acting out a faith which was far older in Persia than himself. It is difficult not to trace—most modern historians have traced—an opposition between the Persian and Median tribes (an opposition not preventing but necessitating an attempt at union between them), which points to more than the strife of mere personal feelings and interests. The Median predominance seems always to indicate the triumph of a priestly order and of priestly habits; the Persian prevalence shows that a king is ruling who knows that he is a king, and is determined to maintain his authority against all opposers, by whatever visible or invisible instruments they may work. The nobler kings, such as were Cyrus and Darius Hystaspes, do not merely proclaim their own tyranny. They assert that Ormuzd is King; they are as entirely religious as those who are leagued against them; their faith is the ground of all their acts; in the strength of it they decree justice, organize satrapies, improve the tillage of the land, constitute one of those mighty monarchies in which we recognised the characteristic strength and spirit of Asia. In those monarchies everything depends upon the central power, or rather upon the earnestness with which the central power confesses its subjection to a gracious and beneficent Power in whose name it rules and fights. The inscriptions which Major Rawlinson has recently interpreted show how remarkably this was the case with Darius Hystaspes: they embody the very spirit of the Zerduscht reformation, and might almost tempt us to the notion, a favourite with some German critics, (not, however, it seems to us, com-

The Persian king.

An antagonist of the priests.

Medians and Persians.

Darius Hystaspes.

patible with any of the popular traditions,) that he was identical with the Prophet. He no doubt realised the conception of the teacher much more than any mere teacher could have realised it. His order was that attempt to imitate the order of the heavenly bodies, the calmness and regularity of Nature, which one who looked upon light as the centre of the outward universe, and the king as the centre of the human society, would especially have admired and rejoiced in.

The king the source of light.

Weakness of the Persian order and mind.

15. But in the heart of this order, wonderful as it was, lay seeds of weakness and decay. The king confessed a King mightier than himself; a King in whom dwelt supreme right and justice. But he was the one utterer of the will of this higher Sovereign; his own absolute dominion represented the divine absoluteness. The light which comes forth from the heavenly bodies *may* symbolize a goodness and wisdom that penetrates into the remotest corners, that quickens and enlivens the least thing as well as the greatest, calling forth its own distinct nature and properties. But this light *may* be looked upon as gathered into one luminous orb, an object of distant reverence, altogether unlike the materials on which it shines. Such was more and more the tendency of the Persian mind; the Zerduscht reform did not resist it for more than a short time, nay, in one sense promoted it. There was probably in him more of tribe feeling, more of patriotism in the western sense of the word, than we commonly meet with among Asiatics. But the strength which his faith gave to the monarchy soon made it, like the great monarchies that had preceded it, impatient of boundaries, eager to swallow up all tribes within itself, careless of their distinctions. Zerduscht's zeal in breaking the chains of priestly domination, which had prevented the free activity of the sovereign, might give a large scope to beneficent government, and be the instrument of putting down a multitude of abuses and abominations that were fostered by the Ahrimanic devotion. On the other hand, he weakened the witness which was latent in the priestly character, which could not be wholly lost even after the priest had become a servant of evil powers, that there is a refuge for the oppressed subject when the visible ruler becomes a mere self-willed despot, when all feeling of relationship to his subjects has forsaken him, when *he* pays habitual homage to Ahriman. The later history of Persia, while it interprets the meaning and illustrates the power of Zerduscht's principle, shows also how small a protection it afforded against this danger; what an opening, nay, what a necessity there was for Magian conspiracies and counter-revolutions to check the regal tyranny, even to restore it when it had fallen through its own crimes and weakness; what a still greater need there was that some witness, which Asia

could not afford, to prove that life and movement are necessary for man, as well as a fixed eternal law.

Zerduscht's ambition and fanaticism.

16. Those who find an especial delight in proving eminent teachers of former generations to be impostors, charlatans, or knaves, dwell much upon some of the legends of Zerduscht's life, which convict him, they think, of many violent and ambitious acts. When it is settled how much of these legends are entitled to credence, we may accept them as evidence against the Reformer. But to reject all the records which show the high estimate that his countrymen formed of him, as mere fictions—to assume those as veracious, though not less miraculous, which offend our consciences—is a monstrous violation of critical fairness. The total inference which they leave upon our mind is certainly this, that Zerduscht was possessed with a sense of his vocation to put down, by all possible means, the Ahrimanic worship, to assert the worship of Ormuzd. Whether this should be done or not was a question of life and death; the material, as much as the spiritual, well-being of Persia depended upon it. We have no doubt that, in the accomplishment of this purpose, he stirred up wars, persecuted, urged his own claims to inspiration, till he may sometimes have forgotten the work in its champion. But we are equally convinced, from the results of his labours, that he did, in the main, sacrifice himself to the cause, and not the cause to himself.

Zerduscht, in what sense a philosopher.

17. By doing so he has, we think, earned for himself a right to no unimportant place in a history of Philosophy. The name does not belong to Persia, or to the Persian character as it was formed by Zerduscht. The light which the Persian worshipped told him what it behoved him to follow, what to shun. Their rule of right was given once and for ever; whoso trangressed it was doomed. There was no room for speculation. They abhorred it as leading to confusion and darkness—refined symbolism implied in their minds falsehood, and traffic with evil spirits. Intellectual subtlety of all kinds in the days of their strength they crushed with law and the sword, as leading to dishonesty and trickery; in the days of their weakness, they shrunk from it as an unknown mysterious power which they could not cope with. The fanaticism of Cambyses in Egypt, the struggles which are attributed to Zerduscht with the intellectualism and priestcraft of the Brahmin, exhibit some aspects of another character towards foreigners. We have now to contemplate that title, by viewing them in contrast with the nation to which every sage of its existence, merits the apostle's description, "They seek after wisdom."

CHAPTER VI.

GRECIAN PHILOSOPHY.

DIVISION I.—PERIOD BEFORE SOCRATES.

SECTION I.

GREEK WISDOM IN THE LEGENDARY AGES.

Greece and Asia: the contrast between the histories.

1. THE opposition between Greece and Asia presents itself to the schoolboy who is reading the Homeric poems. It meets him again in the first pages of Herodotus; he traces it through the whole of his varied narrative; it connects the episodes with the main story; it gives a unity to books which strike him at first as confused and miscellaneous. In them, Persia gradually becomes the representative of Asia; the glorious conflict of the historian's own age interprets all the ages that had preceded it. Wherever the young reader turns he is reminded of this contrast, and the connection between the two people. He finds it in the retreat of the Ten Thousand; it is forced upon him by the efforts of the leader of that retreat to bring Persian manners and Persian virtues before the minds of his countrymen. He cannot dwell upon the conflicts of the republics among themselves without some event to recall to him the monarchy which had sought to crush them, and which they had defied. The mind of Demosthenes is inspired by the thought of that republican triumph, when he determines that a pretended Greek shall not obtain the dominion which the ruler of the whole barbarian world could not win. It inspires no less the heart of the son of the hated Macedonian, when he goes forth to prove that the signal-fires which proclaimed that Troy had fallen were faithful prophecies that the furthest regions of the East should bow before the descendants of Odysseus and Neoptolemus.

Ground of this contrast.

2. A few very notorious facts will show that the opposition which thus presents itself on the surface of the history existed in the heart of these nations. The student perceives at once

Ormuzd and Zeus.

that Ormuzd was not the god of the Greeks. Goodness is not the primary characteristic of any one of their divinities. What their essential and common quality is, it is not, we think, ha to discover. The continually recurring epithet μητίετα applied to Zeus, immediately suggests it. The title Cow compeller may express his acts: this is clearly meant to ex nificant of his very nature. For it is not a solitary expr and the more we consider the different transactions which store attributes to the father of gods and men, the more do what "counsel" to be the main quality which is indicated Asia

The mind of the god may be swayed by various impulses and passions, but he always acts with a purpose and devises a train of means for the accomplishment of it.

Counsel the attribute of the Greek god.

3. The other gods are like Zeus. Apollo is the deviser and suggester of counsels; Athene still more conspicuously. If this character is wanting in Ares and Aphrodite, they become, for that reason, objects of ridicule to mortals, let the sword of the first and the girdle of the other be ever so mighty.

The divine assembly.

4. This quality seems to involve at once the idea of secresy and of society. The counsels are carried on deep within the heart of the divinity, but they must be shared. Zeus must communicate his intentions, or part of his intentions, to the Olympian assembly; they must be submitted to discussion, deliberation, opposition: there must be ministers to execute them; often opposing agents to thwart them. Instead of various beneficent powers, all proceeding from Ormuzd, all invoked by his name, all united against the realm of darkness, the Greek does homage to a number of beings who are bringing about a result by their conspiracies and contradictions, who are in themselves neither good nor evil, who have the same inclinations to good and evil with human beings, who often seem physically not more powerful, but who have a depth and subtlety of wisdom to which men cannot attain.

The Greek heroes and kings spring from Zeus.

5. In Persia the king presents an image of god, but he is not personally related to him. Ormuzd is continually contemplated as the unapproachable light; his goodness, though it is shown in acts of mercy to man, is not to be confounded with human goodness. But the counsellors in Olympus are always related to sages below; they meet with mortal nymphs, become the fathers of earthly heroes, impart to them their sceptres and their wisdom. The kings reign as sons of Jove. In early times the feeling of belonging to the divine race is the warrant of their sharing the divine attributes. There is never the least doubt what is the special and necessary constituent of royalty; it is not physical strength—it is not mercy, kindness, justice—it is not courage; it is the being a man of many devices. Courage, justice, mercy, may or may not be added to this gift or be involved in it; but *it* is the fundamental one, all others are accessory. Strength is thrown into the shade in those heroes in whom we would expect it most; lightness and grace are preferred to it: Achilles is the "swift-of-foot." The ambush and stratagem, as has been so often observed, are quite as much the test of the hero as the open fight. Diomed shows his heroic talent not more in wounding Ares than in persuading Glaucon to change the golden armour for the iron, that worth a hundred oxen's hides for that worth nine, when they are meeting

Wisdom or counsel the royal characteristic.

as friends on the field of battle and telling the story of their kinsmanship. These are indications of a deep and pervading spirit, exhibiting itself, be it remembered, in a stage of society which we are wont to speak of, and in one sense rightly, as one of great simplicity, and in those fights where strength and personal prowess might seem to be all in all. Clearly they are not all in all; the council-chamber is as much a part of the Homeric picture as the field of battle: on that field, if we see distinct heroes in a death-struggle, we see also the troops moving collected, in ranks, in silence (an excellence which, except on a field of battle, would not have been specially characteristic of Greeks).

The Homeric battle-field and council-chamber.

6. No one who considers the story of Odysseus, and feels, as all have felt, that he represented actually and prophetically all of his country's mind and tendencies, will doubt that πολύμητις is the epithet for the Greek hero as much as for the god. But no one who feels the exceeding beauty, delicacy, pathos of that story, will admit for a moment that "cunning" or "crafty" is an adequate — even the most distant approximation to an adequate—version of that title. All possibilities of craft and cunning lie in it; such qualities can scarcely have been morally offensive to the man or the nation that claimed it as the most honourable of all badges. Within it also lay the possibilities of a wisdom which might rise superior to tricks and falsehood, which might discover them to be essentially foolish. The "man of many counsels" had a large sympathy, a wonderful power of communicating with men, of receiving impressions from them, of making an impression on them. He had the clearest, sharpest faculty of observation; all the forms of nature presented themselves to him in their distinctest outline, with all their varying shadows. Animal nature did homage to the higher instinct which dwelt in him. He felt that material things were given him to shape and mould, and quicken. Though fond of seeing the ways and the cities of men, he had still the sense of a home; the rocks of Ithaca were dearer to him than all the world besides—dear to him for the sake of those who dwelt there. He might cast away many ties which he found established at his birth; he might leave his father's house to become a wanderer and seeker of new lands: but the voluntary bonds into which he had entered, the marriage-tie, the oath to the kinsman, or fellow-citizen, or even the stranger, confirmed by the divine sacrifice, were unspeakably precious; no perils or wars were too long or distant to punish the breach of them. Of all men he most understands the meaning and worth of association, yet he is of all men the most tempted to choose a way of his own: of all men he is most disposed to recognise law

Odysseus the type of the Greek nation.

Trick not essential to the character.

Its noble qualities.

Sacredness of voluntary ties: marriage.

and government as especially belonging to man, and distinguishing them from the inferior creatures; the most inclined to break loose from law and government, in his eagerness to assert the skill of men to create them for themselves.

7. In process of time some of these great contrasts, especially the last, were exhibited in the rivalship of the Dorian and Ionian tribes. Though we may be continually tempted to fix upon the last as the proper specimens of the Greek character, though there is great excuse for such a notion, yet it is only in contemplating them as both equally Greeks that we can attain to a full appreciation of that which distinguished this people from every other on the face of the earth. If there were points of sympathy between the Lacedæmonian and the Persian character, there was also the strongest repulsion between them. The Spartan Pausanias, affecting the airs of an Asiatic satrap, is a far more ludicrous object than Themistocles would have been in the same position. The Spartan kings when compared with *the* king exhibit the difference between the East and West even more strikingly than the Athenian democracy. The legislation of Lycurgus is as little like that of the Medes and Persians as Solon's. If we inquire the reason of the difference, we shall find that counsel or wisdom, not goodness, is the object of faith and reverence as much with one tribe as the other. It was the very fact of their having this common ground to start from—the sense of a community of feeling and of language—which made the differences of their conceptions respecting the conditions of wisdom and the modes of attaining it so remarkable, and their actual contests so terrible. Indeed, the existence of such opposing tribes, and the vast influence which they were both able to exert, suggest the greatest and most memorable contrast between European and Asiatic life. The vastness of the oriental despotism, with all the different races blended together, submitting to one central lord—what a picture is this to contemplate side by side with the struggles of two small cities, each possessed with the idea of one government or principle being better than another, ready to destroy or be sacrificed for the sake of its own maxim—imparting the conviction of it, and the enthusiasm for it, to twenty other cities in different parts of the world, and in a measure to every man who dwelt in every one of them! And it must never be forgotten that, amidst all these conflicts, there was still the common Hellenic name—there was still the feeling in all Greeks that they were separated from barbarians by that name, and by the gifts which it indicated—there was still the god of Delphi who gave counsel to the Ionians and Dorians alike, and from whom the rulers of Asia believed that oracles proceeded by which they also might be guided.

Contrast of Dorian and Ionian.

The character of both opposed to the Persian.

Both essentially Greek.

Delphi.

8. The acknowledgment of this teacher of civil wisdom, who at the same time could not easily be separated from the source of light to the world, is one of those facts in Greek history which every thoughtful student has seen to be full of significance. Apollo and Artemis, as our own great poet has said, "held the sun and moon in fee;" they, beautiful beings, with human forms and human sympathies, possessed and governed these natural orbs; the material light which proceeded from them was only an emblem of the light which was imparted to the mind of him who sought help from the divine priestess. This inspiration was not merely produced by the exhalations of the cave, nor was it confined to her—the votary shared it in a much more practical sense. In later times, belief in an inspiring god, prompting the highest song as well as the wildest revelry, became embodied in the legends and the festivals of Dionysus. The Greek felt an impulse near him which was degrading him into a beast and a slave, and one which could raise him into a man and freeman. His actual history proved the truth of both his convictions.

Apollo and the light.

Inspiration.

Zeus and Brahm.

9. If the Zeus of the Greeks is very different from Ormuzd, he is almost as unlike to Brahm. The object of Hindoo worship we have seen is *Intelligence*, but it is intelligence as contrasted with action. Every Greek legend exhibits gods or heroes as the teachers of some art, as deliverers from some plague or nuisance, as making some one region habitable, or introducing communication between different regions, as establishers of law and order, as builders or defenders of cities. The main tendency of the Greek mind is certainly to contemplate intelligence only as bearing upon action, leading to direct practical results, governing material things and bodies of men.

Greek scepticism.

10. Hence the skill, or counsel, or wisdom of the Greek was especially valued for its creative or productive powers. The more this power exerted itself, the more various the directions which it took; the more the suspicion began to arise in the minds of the people, that they were themselves the authors of that to which they looked up,—that the king, the priest, the god, were their own handiwork. Hence there lay in the very heart of the faith of the Greek a seed of unbelief, which was continually fructifying. Hence this unbelief was likely to be most active in those whose faculties were the liveliest and the most energetic. Hence, also, there was something akin to it in the popular feeling and sympathy, even then when it clung most fondly to its old legends and ceremonies. These were loved with a parental more than a childlike fondness; the Greek clave to them as his own, as something which he was to hold against others, not which he depended upon and revered himself.

Hermes.

The power of words.

11. If Zeus and Apollo hold the highest place as objects of Greek devotion, Hermes had his own special honour. The teacher of words, the author of eloquence, had conferred a gift upon mortals which the Greeks felt to be greater and more wonderful than the gifts of corn and wine. Their latest historian points out with especial carefulness and earnestness, how in the very infancy of the nation the power of words was recognised; how significant was the picture on the shield of Achilles, of the trial in the Agora, and the pleaders who supported each side; how public speaking was felt to be "the standing engine of government and the proximate cause of obedience,"[1] long before the heroical had given place to the historical period. The most careless reader of the Iliad must have been struck by the poet's sense of the wonder which lies in "winged words," by the emphasis with which he recognises them as the especial characteristic of human beings, by his feeling that through them men held communication with the gods as well as with each other. The power of wisdom and the power of words became indissolubly connected in the Greek mind. By these, men exerted the highest influence of which they were capable; they flew forth from the lips of the speaker messengers of health or of destruction; they were in the most remarkable sense *his*. Yet there was that in them which he did not make; an order to which he was obliged to conform.

The mysteries: what they imported.

12. The mysteries expressed something which words could not express. So far as these were connected with Demeter and her worship, they bore reference of course to the secret and productive powers of vegetables or animals; they might be invested with a more material significance, they might be associated with all gross and sensual images. But the importance which was attached to them by statesmen showed that they were acknowledgments of a wisdom dwelling somewhere, which could not be measured or reduced into human forms, by which the operations of nature, of the mind, and even of political society, were ultimately regulated.

SECTION II.

THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY.

The wise men of Greece.

1. The seven wise men bear the same relation to the after history of Greece which the seven champions of Christendom bear to the history of the Middle Ages. No doubt Bias, Pittacus, Periander, Solon, belong to the region of fact; St. George and St. Denys chiefly to that of fable. But their mys-

[1] Grote, vol. ii. c. xx. p. 106.

tical number shows that they were felt to represent different aspects of the same character. Amongst them are included tyrants, legislators, students of nature. There were the most various reports respecting them. One said that they all occupied themselves with poetry.[1] Another that they were merely a set of clever men concerned about law-making.[2] They were reported to be favourites of Crœsus, with the exception of Thales. Others spoke of their meeting together at the Panionium, or at Delphi. These reports may all be correct. They were, no doubt, mainly men of sagacity, σοφοί, held to possess the divine, heroic, Odyssean gift in a greater degree than their neighbours. That they should have been fond of putting their thoughts in verse was natural. It was a language different from that which men spoke in the market—more than met the ear was expressed by it; common men felt the power of it; a notion of prophecy was still connected with it. That these sages should have cultivated the acquaintance of a great Asiatic dynast, some for a directly personal object, some for the sake of their city, some for the pleasure of exhibiting the power of the Greek in contrast with that which seemed so much greater and was so inferior, is probable. That they should still have been thoroughly Greeks, should have interested themselves in all Greek events for council and government, might also have been concluded. For this reason they will no doubt have held much intercourse with Delphi

The various notions of them reconcilable.

2. But, supposing these to have been common characteristics, there was room for the widest divergency in their pursuits. One might glorify himself upon his knowledge of all the weaknesses of his fellows; might apply to his own use the recognised Greek maxim, that the wise man was to have dominion over fools; by fair means or foul, by courtesy or violence, by beneficent acts or destructive ones, he might make himself a tyrant. His claim to that title, his power of holding it, would still be, not that he was member of some illustrious family, or that he supported some particular theory, or that he was a military chief; but that he was a wise man. Another might count it a much nobler work to lay down rules for the preservation and well-being of the city in which he dwelt—rules that would endure after he ceased to belong to it; he might part with ease, wealth, temporary power, for the sake of compassing this end. Such a man would be a legislator in the higher sense of the word; but his legislation would still be a form of his "wisdom." He would be listened to and obeyed only so far as he had acquired the reputation of being a wise man, and could retain it. Lastly, if a

The different directions which their wisdom took

The tyrant.

The legislator.

[1] Diog. Laert. lib. i. c. i. s. 14. [2] σανετοὺς τινας καὶ νομοθετικούς.

man had acquired any of the properly oriental lore, if he had studied astrology, and could calculate eclipses of the sun, there would be some perplexity in the Greek mind respecting him. If he turned his studies in nature to account, either for his own benefit or for the good of his country, he would be regarded as essentially a politician; if he was seen to retire from society for the sake of contemplation, he would be stigmatised as a star-gazer. But still the phrase "wise man" would describe him in both characters. It would denote the shrewdness which he displayed in the common affairs of life; it would intimate that he knew or pretended to know things which people in general were ignorant of.

The student of physics.

3. In this last description our reader will recognise *Thales*, who commonly holds the first place among the σοφοί. Herodotus says that "he was a citizen of Miletus, and a Phœnician by descent;" Diogenes Laertius,[1] that "he was believed by some to have come from Phœnicia, and to have been made a citizen of Miletus, but that the greater number of people believed him to have been a native, and of an illustrious family." The authority of Herodotus must assuredly outweigh the judgment of this "greater number of people," who, of course, were not willing to share the glory of such a name with Asiatics. After all, the Greeks have immeasurably the largest portion in him. If he brought his astrology from Phœnicia, he was a thorough Milesian in the application of it. To the Ionians, says Herodotus,[2] he predicted the eclipse which happened when the Lydians and Medes were fighting, and which led to a peace between them. It was he, the Greeks generally believed—Herodotus had a different opinion—who enabled Crœsus to pass the Halys, by turning the course of the river, when he was making his fatal attack upon Persia.[3] It was said, however, by others that he was no friend of Crœsus, that he prevented Miletus from allying itself with his fortunes, and so saved it from the wrath of the conqueror. Bias of Priene gave good advice to the Ionian cities after their overthrow by Harpagus, but Thales, says Herodotus,[4] had urged them before their fall to establish a common assembly, and to fix it at Teos.

Thales, born Ol. 35, 3, or 36, 1. B.C. 639, or 636. Clinton, F. H.

His Asiatic origin.

4. There were very opposite reports current respecting Thales. Some said that he bought up the oil-presses just before the olive season, that he might show how easily a wise man could make himself rich; others told of his falling into a pit while he was looking at the stars, and of his being mocked by an old woman for knowing that which was over his head so much better than

The perplexity of the Greeks respecting him.

[1] Diog. Laert. lib. i. c. i. s. 1. [2] Κλειώ, c. lxxiv. [3] Κλειώ, c. lxxv. [4] Κλειώ, c. clxx.

that which lay at his feet.[1] These stories are both probably the produce of Greek invention, but they indicate the uncertainty of his countrymen whether they should assign him a place among men of business or theorists, and their notion that in some way or other he blended the two characters. Neither of them, however, accounts for the special distinction which he has acquired, that of being separated from the rest of the σοφοὶ, and being named a philosopher. He obtains that title from no less an authority than Aristotle,[2] who certainly would not have given it him merely because he calculated eclipses, or studied astrology, or made himself rich, or turned the course of the Halys, or suggested a common assembly of Ionians. Nor was the judge a specially favourable one. Aristotle seems to have known little of the Ionian sage. His words intimate that he had seen no writings of Thales, or that there were none. He includes him in a class which he compares to the untrained boxers, who deal out many good blows, but without science.[3]

The philosophy of Thales.

5. "He maintained water to be the ground of all things, and the world to have a soul, and to be full of demons." Such is the account which the gossiping Greek biographer gives of the "philosophy" of Thales. But this surely was not his philosophy; it is merely the index to his philosophy. How came Thales to think about water at all, or about a ground of all things, or about a world with or without a soul, full or empty of demons? What put him upon seeking when he had the reputation of having found out so much more than other men? And what was he seeking for? The word *Philosophy* is the plainest and best answer to the question. He was thought to have got *Wisdom*, a wisdom which might be used for ruling men, or making bridges, or making money, or making laws. He had tried it in some of these ways; not altogether without success. He had obtained his full share of admiration. Probably if he had wished to put himself at the head of some party in Miletus, or to embroil it with some other city, he would have found his wisdom amply sufficient. But he had cherished a more extravagant ambition; he had thought he could bind his countrymen and their cities together; that he could make them a peaceful community. Then he discovered that he had elements to deal with which did

Wisdom seeking to regulate human affairs.

Disappointment.

[1] Diog. Laert. lib. i. c. i. pp. 5 and 8.

[2] The words of Aristotle are not so strong as they are sometimes made to appear. He calls him (Met. A. c. 3) ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας, meaning the philosophy which sought for a physical ἀρχὴ or element. But as this was the first school of Greek inquiry, the language certainly implies that he was the first philosopher

[3] Ἀμυδρῶς καὶ οὐδὲν σαφῶς, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ἐν ταῖς μάχαις οἱ ἀγύμναστοι ποιουσιν. These words apply directly to Empedocles, but they evidently include all of whom he has been speaking before.

not acknowledge fixed laws, like the stars; bodies subject to alternations of light and darkness that could not certainly be predicted; strong currents which could not be turned out of their courses so easily as the Halys. Was it among these that he could look with any hope for the principle of order and unity? Must it not rather be in the world which offered itself to his senses, a world subject no doubt to fierce convulsions, but even in them confessing a control? And the wisdom that we boast of so much, can the first principle and root of it be in us? Must it not be somewhere else? Must it not be there where the caprices of men are not at work, or are counterworked by an order which is mightier than they are? *Philosophy* was the search not for something else, but for Wisdom itself; for the very thing of which other people thought he had the full usufruct and mastery.

The order of nature.

6. Whether, then, Thales dealt straight blows or random ones, he was the Greek who discovered that he must ask the question which the man of Uz asked long before: "*Where* is wisdom found, and where is the place of understanding?"—that it was one to which he and his countrymen were not yet provided with an answer; that it was one to which they might from some source or another expect an answer. If it is said, the answer of Thales was poor and unsatisfactory—even more poor and unsatisfactory on this showing than on any other—we may admit at once that it was not *the* answer which was wanted for the sake of Thales, or of Ionia, or of mankind. But we cannot admit that it was a worthless answer. The fact that moisture is necessary to the life of all things that live, to the growth of all things that grow, is it nothing? Does it not deserve to be noted? No doubt every one has noted it; as every one has remarked the fall of an apple. Is not almost the whole difference between a man whose eyes are in his head and one whose eyes are in the ends of the earth, just this, that the one observes commonplaces, and thinks of them, and that the other passes by and despises them? It cannot be said that Thales exaggerated the importance of the fact which seemed to him so wonderful. He probably underrated its importance. And if it appeared to him the one all-absorbing fact, that to which every other was to bow and do homage, let it be remembered that it was *his* fact, that for which he had travelled, that which had presented itself with mighty force and conviction to his mind. The world would not surely be the better if there were not some to treasure such facts with a mother's love; we suspect it would be very barren of all precious observations and discoveries.

The application of wisdom changed into the search for it.

The result at which Thales arrived.

His fact not an insignificant one.

7. It may, however, be urged that such a course actually led and could only lead to scepticism; that the early Greeks, if they

Greek scepticism.

had an insecure faith, had still some faith; that they referred wisdom to divine persons, if those persons were called Zeus, Apollo, Athene; that what is personal must be better than what is impersonal; that to find the beginning of things in an element like water is virtually to deny the existence of any distinct divinity; that the doctrines attributed to Thales concerning the world's soul, and the world being full of demons, contain the germ of all the later Greek pantheism.

The true source of this scepticism.

8. These objections are very important, and require a serious treatment. What we shall say of them at present will only be for the sake of removing perplexities from the student's mind, and enabling him to see more clearly the answer which the subsequent history gives to them. We have observed already that the seed of the most widely-spreading scepticism lay in the Greek mind. The wise Greek had learnt to believe that he was not sprung from the gods, but that they were sprung from him; that their wisdom was derived to them from his. Every new exercise of his faculties—those exercises especially which led to the production of beautiful forms of the divinity—strengthened this conviction; it had already taken unconscious possession of a multitude of minds, it was working itself rapidly into consciousness. Now surely the feeling, "I do not possess wisdom, I must look for it," instead of being an aggravation of this tendency, was a powerful counteraction of it. If Thales had discarded all faith in Apollo and Athene, and had substituted the belief in water as the first germ of all things for it, he would at least have been laying hold of a fact in nature of which he was not the author, while the tendency of his countrymen was to believe nothing except that which they had created. But, so far as we see, the effect of physical inquiries on his mind was not this at all. The acknowledgment of something beyond himself, out of himself, seems rather to have given a religious awe to his mind. "Can our ill doings escape the eye of the gods?" "Nay, not our thoughts," Thales is said to have answered. The words are less like what a later Greek would have uttered than most of those which are attributed to him; if they are genuine, they may be taken to interpret the other words, "that all things are full of the gods or of demons."

The philosophy of Thales an effort to rise out of himself.

The religious awe which accompanied it.

The world full of demons.

9. Whether this phrase of Thales pointed most directly to the connection of demons with himself, or with the world which he beheld through his senses, we may not be able to ascertain. Probably if we had asked him, he could not have told us. The question which occupied him was just this: whether that which he knew was working in him might not have its original home, its highest throne, in Nature; whether the order which he perceived there might not be the order to which he belonged? But

it would be a very great mistake to suppose that because he was engaged in this inquiry, all past traditions which reminded him of beings like and related to man were indifferent to him. Poseidon and Oceanus may have been more, not less, venerable to him, from the significance which he attached to the element of water. And when he is said to have believed in "a world with a soul," we must not allow ourselves to be perplexed by the determinations of the more recent schools from which this language is derived.[1] Aristotle felt that Thales was rather seeking to know what the soul is, than settling whether it should be attributed to the universe. Thales seems, he says, to have considered it "a moving power or principle."[2] He found a living moving power in himself, apart from which his own solid body would have been a mere heap of atoms ready to fall into pieces. He found a living power in nature—water or moisture—apart from which the solid framework of things would have been a mere dead heap of atoms. The two facts illustrated and explained each other. It was natural to give a common name to both. What is this which I call soul, or wisdom, in myself—that which distinguishes Greeks from barbarians, slaves from freemen? Is it not here also, or a particle of it, or perhaps the very root and ground of it?

The World.

The soul.

SECTION III.

THE FIRST SCHOOL.

1. We ought to distinguish the first philosopher from those who follow him, that we may not be confused by the word *school*, or derive our definition of it from times in which it meant chiefly the receivers, transmitters, expounders, developers of a certain set of theories about gods, men, and nature. The men of that which is called the Ionic school were not, in this sense, disciples of Thales. They did not adopt his maxim respecting water, incorporate it with certain maxims of their own, and establish a sect called after their founder. They were connected together by a real bond; but it was one of quite another kind. They were all seekers after wisdom, and they all sought in the same direction, though the conclusions at which they arrived were markedly distinct and opposite. There have been some who have represented this opposition as even more decided than it actually was. It was a favourite practice in old digests of philosophy to speak of Thales as referring all things to *water*, Anaximander to *earth*, Anaximenes to *air*, Heraclitus to *fire*. Thus the so-called four elements were amicably apportioned

The word "school" what it meant to the early Greeks.

[1] Ἔμψυχος κόσμος. Diog Laert. lib. i. cap. i. 27.
[2] Κινητικόν τι. Περι ψυχης, lib. i. cap. v.

The elements divided between the philosophers

among four Ionic teachers. In more learned and modern treatises, the natural philosophers of Greece are divided into the dynamical and mechanical—Thales being assigned to the former class; his immediate successor, Anaximander, to the second: whence it is concluded that they cannot have stood to each other in the relation of master and disciple.

ANAXIMANDER, born B.C. 610. Ol. 42, 3. Clinton, F. H.

2. Now Thales did, as we have seen, refer to water as a first principle. *Anaximander* was a geographer and an inventor of geographical instruments. The earth, therefore, considered as the complex of sea and land, occupied much of his thoughts. But the Infinite (*το ἄπειρον*), not the earth, was his watchword. Such a phrase shows that an aggregate of phænomena seemed to him a worthier and more profitable subject of contemplation than a vital power. On this ground he may be called anti-dynamical. But the historian of philosophy has no right to adopt a classification which is formally correct, if it is not one which represents the contrast between the mind and purpose of two inquirers. This opposition of "mechanical" and "dynamical" suggests the notion that Thales and Anaximander devoted themselves to the study of nature, in the sense and spirit in which a modern German or Englishman devotes himself to it; that is to say, with a distinct consciousness that the physical world is one field of investigation, and the political or human world another. It is very important, we conceive, to recollect that this was not the case at all; that they were by vocation wisdom-hunters; that they started their game in another ground, and were led by various accidents and impulses to follow it hither. The track of the first pursuer was that in which the next ran, till some fresh scent turned him out of it. Anaximander can hardly have been old enough to hear Thales, yet he belonged to the same city, and was greatly influenced at least by the reports and traditions of his predecessor. But Thales discoursed; he wrote—a difference of the greatest practical importance. Thales, seeking for that order in things which he could not find among men, lighted upon a fact. Anaximander having to set down in written characters the object of the student's inquiries *calls* it the beginning or element (*ἀρχὴ* or *στοιχεῖον*).[1] The *name* which seems so convenient for pointing out the direction of the philosophy, to a certain extent changes it. The pursuit of an *ἀρχὴ* threatens to take the place of the pursuit of wisdom. Still more dangerous was Anaximander's other phrase, "the Infinite." A formula so comprehensive seemed to exhaust all possibilities. Philosophy, just beginning, had already reached its goal. What could it find which lay beyond the unbounded! Let us, however, do

Division between dynamical and mechanical philosophers: why objectionable.

Relation of Anaximander to Thales.

The Ionian philosophers were seeking for an *ἀρχὴ*.

The infinite no mere phrase.

[1] Diog. Laert. lib. ii. cap. i. s. 1.

Anaximander the justice to believe that "the Infinite" was not merely a formula in his mind; that the name expressed thoughts too deep for utterance; that he really bowed before that which he could not measure and comprehend, while he seemed ambitious of summing it up in a few syllables.

Anaximander.

ANAXIMENES was flourishing B.C. 548; Ol. 58; lived to Ol. 74.

3. In *Anaximenes* we perceive the effect of the step which Anaximander had taken, and at the same time evident indications of a return to the line which he abandoned. The word *ἀρχὴ* is equivocal. It suggests the idea of "rule" as well as that of "beginning." Anaximenes seems to have perceived that the philosopher should seek for a power which rules, not merely for an element or starting-point. Plutarch, who can never be taken as a fair judge of the old philosophers, seeing that he contemplated all the subjects of their inquiry from entirely a different point of view, may be received as evidence respecting them when he attributes language to them which he is not likely to have invented, and which has all the marks of an earlier stage of thought. Anaximenes, he says, held that "the air rules over all things, as the soul, being air, rules in man."[1] Such a phrase at once explains the assertion of Aristotle, that Anaximenes made air his *ἀρχὴ*, and connects him with the seekers for wisdom. This ruling power in man—this invisible, intangible power, which nevertheless accomplishes such wonders, compels huge bodies to obey it—what is it, where is it? We are looking into the natural universe to see if it is there. Is not this air—invisible, impalpable, all-penetrating, all-commanding,—the very thing? Jove was said of old to rule in the air; to be the cloud-compeller. May he not *be* this air? It was a perilous question. When it was answered in the affirmative by the untrembling lips of later teachers, the result was fatal to all sense of a personal moral ruler. We conceive the suggestion of it by Anaximenes may have been in quite a different spirit. The air may rather have been humanised and glorified by its association with Jove, than Jove naturalised and materialised by his identification with the air. The coarseness of the old mythology may have been diminished in the mind of the student; it may not have been stripped of all its real associations.

The double force of the word *ἀρχὴ*.

The air and the soul.

The air and Jove.

HERACLITUS flourished B.C. 503; Ol. 69, 2 died at the age of 60. Clinton, F. H

4. There was, however, another danger lurking in such language, though not caused by it. The Greek was more liable, in practice, to confound the "great Counsellor" with the soul, the ruling element which dwelt in himself, than with the air. Of that tendency in his countryman, *Heraclitus* the Ephesian

[1] Plutarch, De Placitis Philosophorum, lib. i. (*περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν*) *οἷον ἡ ψυχὴ, ἡ ἡμέτερα, ἀὴρ οὖσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς.*

Heraclitus. seems to have been especially aware; his dread of it seems to be connected with all his political theories, his physical specula-

Politics of Heraclitus. tions, his individual sorrows. In his mind, it is quite evident that these were never separated.

Love of law. 5. He believed that we should fight to death for the law. But he would not be a magistrate of Ephesus; he would rather play at dice with the children before the temple of Artemis.[1] What good could come of making laws for evil men? He would live upon herbs upon the mountains rather than among those who banished their best citizens, and would not of their own choice have a good one left among them. Heraclitus, therefore,

Dislike of Greek democracy. was considered a stern aristocrat and despiser of the people. Yet he is said to have received the civilities of the great king with even more indifference than those of his countrymen. His feelings towards *them* were, we should judge, much more those of a disappointed lover than of a scorner. "Pride or insolence," he said, "should be stifled more diligently than a fire." The vaunting of the Greeks, their sense of superiority to the rest of the world, seems to have inspired him with pity and mourning. "Your knowledge of many things," he said, "does not give you reason or wisdom." An obvious saying, in which, nevertheless, much of his philosophy is latent. Is the individual soul, as Anaximenes thought, the ruling power in man? Is it not in

How his natural philosophy grew out of his personal feelings. itself a very poor, weak, insignificant thing, most contemptible when it is most presuming? Separate a man from his fellows,

All things, considered apart, unreal. and what is he worth? Abolish laws, government, and what becomes of the atoms which compose your society? What is each good for? You Greeks are always making the experiment. See what comes of it in this city of mine! See what infinite disorder, what infinite cause for sorrow. Would not nature have told you the secret if you had studied her? We do not find a set of individual energies and powers at work there. All things

The central force. are efficient and energetical only in their harmony; only in their subjection to some central principle of life. Take that away, and the things we behold are only phantoms; the phænomena of the universe exhibit only an endless flux. The coal without

Flux and reflux. the fire, is a man trying to exist in himself; the coal ignited, receiving communication from another nature, there is a man's soul enkindled by communication with a higher diviner reason.

Fire. 6. This statement and this comparison may explain why Heraclitus has been supposed to attach so much sacredness and significance to the element of fire. It seemed to him (old fables, diligently considered and connected with facts of experience, might teach him the lesson,) the vital quickening power of the

[1] Diog. Laert. lib. ix. cap. i.

Heraclitus. universe; that which *was* or which *expressed*—sometimes it might present itself to him as the symbol, sometimes as the

Symbol of the central law or power. thing symbolised—the universal life, by participation in which all particular things have their being; apart from which they are unsubstantial, unreal. But this physical fire was never divorced from the law which holds societies together, from the higher and universal mind with which the individual mind is meant to be in communion. When, therefore, we are

The name of Jupiter. told that Heraclitus said the object of man's life is to know the name of Jupiter, we may be sure that Jupiter did not mean to *him* either air or fire; that it did mean a reality which he could not comprehend, which he desired should comprehend him.

The crying philosopher. 7. Such was Heraclitus, a man with a marked individual character, full of deep and pregnant intuitions. The vulgar notion of him as the crying philosopher must not be discarded as if it meant nothing, or had no connection with the history of his speculations. His thoughts are like fragments torn from his own personal being, and not torn from it without such effort and violence as must needs have drawn many a sigh from the sufferer. Neither is that other notion of him, as "the obscure or dark" man, an unfounded one. The fire that was in his heart and brain, and of which all the world around had presented to him the image, no doubt emitted much smoke which confused and stifled, not, perhaps, to his displeasure, the careless gazers and passers by. But there was something within him which neither his tears nor his smoke at all adequately represent. The sense of a harmony existing beneath a perpetual conflict of powers, and making that very conflict the means of their preservation, pervaded his being, gave the tone to all his thoughts, and realised itself to him in all the inner forms and outward images of nature.

The Ionians proper. The other naturalists. 8. These four men, Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus, have been usually regarded as constituting the Ionic school. There is a reason and an advantage in the classification. They belonged to the same region, they were exposed to similar external influences; they succeeded each other at no very considerable intervals; there was, we think, a certain transmission of apprehensions and discoveries from the first to the last. Still it is a needful preparation for the study of those writers who were technically and practically the moral and metaphysical philosophers of Greece, that we should speak briefly of two or three others, who, in different circumstances, were led to occupy themselves chiefly with the phænomena and powers of Nature.

Democritus. B.C. 460. Ol. 80. Clinton.

9. We depart a little from chronological order,[1] for the sake of bringing *Democritus* of Abdera into immediate juxtaposition with Heraclitus of Ephesus. The old story, which opposes the smiles of the one to the tears of the other, is not without its significance, either as to the characters of the men or of their philosophies. He who recognises the existence of a central power adequate to keep all things at one, who believes in an order, must at times be overwhelmed by the distractions which the actual world presents to him. In proportion to the intensity of his belief will he be oppressed by the contradictions of experience. Heraclitus worshipped law, and saw a multitude of incoherent elements resolving to disregard it. He found a refuge (but how imperfect a refuge!) in nature. There he could detect an uniting organising energy. But how, with his mind harassed and tormented by human confusions, could he help also seeing their counterpart here: a whirl of atoms, which, if the invisible compulsion that bound them together was for a moment forgotten, must make the brain sick, and the heart sadder than it was before.

The traditional contrast between him and Heraclitus not unimportant.

Effects of a good temper and easy circumstances.

10. But suppose a man should arise, whose position did not lead him to meditate much on the perplexities of human society, or to seek for the removal of them; a man provided with external comforts, blessed with a good digestion, indifferent to fame,[2] with a Greek habit of observation, with opportunities of seeing various cities and men, for no one of which he has any passionate preference; and we need be at no loss to conjecture the results at which he would arrive both in practice and theory. Every one will see in such a man the elements of a benignant, agreeable, sociable companion; of one who would regard the disorders of humanity as mere eccentricities, to be noticed with so much the more kindliness if the suspicion should intrude itself that some of their results may be serious, even painful, to those who exhibit them. He would gradually come to think even the word "eccentricities" too strong to express variations which after all might not be deviations from any standard. For is there a standard, is there a centre? Can we find one in human beings, can we find one in the physical world? Our senses tell us of no such. Perhaps we cannot depend on our senses. But have we anything better to depend upon? Can we see more than those atoms, the sight of which so disturbed Heraclitus? Is it not worth while to get at them; to examine and dissect the world; to see what it is actually made of; to leave our own

View of humanity.

View of nature.

Atoms, no centre.

[1] Γεγονε δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις (ὡς αὐτός φησιν ἐν τῷ μικρῷ Διακόσμῳ) νέος κατὰ τρισβύτην Ἀναξαγόραν. Diog. Laert. i. ix. c. 7.

[2] Λυκεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἀθήναζε ἐλθεῖν καὶ μὴ σπουδάσαι γνωσθῆναι, δόξης καταφρονῶν. Diog. Laert. *ubi sup.* 5.

guesses, dreams, beliefs, hopes, as much as may be out of the question? Is not that the course for the sound physical inquirer who wishes to know what may be known? Is it not the course for the man who wishes to keep his mind quiet, easy, and healthy, without the disturbance of expectations, dark or cheerful, that may never be realised?

Democritus. How a wise man is to behave himself.

11. Here we seem to have Democritus the Thracian, whom Aristotle and Bacon both honoured above the majority of Greek speculators, because he mixed, they thought, less of speculation with the actual observation of facts—because he looked hardily at the materials of which the world is composed, without fearing that he might meet something in it which must not be looked at. We do not undervalue qualities which two such judges felt to be important. Democritus no doubt has filled his place among physical inquirers, and has brought to light a kind of investigation which is indispensable. But we may venture to remark that if there had been no men more sombre and less pleasant than he was, no inquirers who were haunted by the sense of powers and mysteries of which he ignored the existence, physical philosophy would have been as little possible as moral, the examination of atoms would have been as lazily pursued and as little productive as the study of laws and of spirit.

Democritus held in respect by Aristotle and Bacon.

Use of the atomic doctrine.

Insufficiency of it for its own ends.

Empedocles, flourishing B.C. 455. Ol. 81, 2.

12. *Empedocles* of Agrigentum presents us with yet another phase of Greek life and feeling. Utterly unlike Democritus in his indifference and equanimity, not less unlike Heraclitus in his scorn of the mob and his hatred of equality, this enthusiastic Sicilian exhibited in his acts, his poetry, and his philosophy, all the strange elements that were at work through so many ages in the political and physical microcosm in which he dwelt.

A lover of equality.

13. Nowhere had a man such an opportunity as in Sicily of witnessing every change and condition of society; nowhere had he more temptation to take part in its revolutions. Nowhere would he be more constantly reminded of the similar convulsions which are going on in the earth's womb, of the influence of Nature upon man, of the powers which man is able to put forth in opposing Nature. The last observation seems to have impressed Empedocles most, and to have connected itself with all he had heard and read of divine helpers of men, who had instructed them in mysterious arts, and had delivered them from oppressive plagues. That there were still such helpers, and that he who studied the powers of nature diligently might still be guided and inspired by them, seems to have been his inmost conviction. It procured him the name of an enchanter; it was mixed partially in his own mind with a confused notion that he was himself a kind of celestial person, who could wield natural

Influence of Sicily upon his mind and philosophy.

Divine teachers and inspirers.

Empedocles. powers at his pleasure. But in general it would seem that he used the wisdom which he had, honestly and benevolently, for the good of others more than for his own glory; and it is certain that he was not content with that wisdom; he was a seeker after the springs and fountain of it. For him the varied powers in the universe could reduce themselves into no one

The war of elements. element; the endless warfare of opposing forces, none of which could destroy the other, none of which, perhaps, could subsist without the other—this was the marvel which filled his heart.

The human passions at war in nature. 14. It was no imaginary battle-field in the mind of Empedocles; the selfsame powers which Homer had exhibited fighting for Greeks and Trojans were engaged in it. The human passions,—love, hatred, friendship, dissension,—were all seen mixing in the war of earth, air, fire, and water. Aristotle, the great classifier of the world, is of course shocked at this confusion of physics and ethics. With much admiration for Empedocles as an artist, he seems to have had a more than common dislike to him

Value of this seeming confusion. as a speculator. We may be excused from participating in his feelings, since that which offended him is for the historian of human inquiries one of the most interesting of all facts, that these early and zealous students of the outward world did not and could not disengage it from the deeper perplexities which they found in themselves and in human intercourse. To insist upon their doing so is simply to insist upon their not following out the great question which agitated their whole being. For ourselves, we have no wish to separate Empedocles who won at the chariot race, as his father had done before him, and who fought for the liberty of Agrigentum, from Empedocles the author of the Καθαρμοί, who as a poet forms a curious link between Homer, Pindar, and his Roman admirer Lucretius.

Anaxagoras, born B.C. 500, died B.C. 428. Clinton. 15. *Anaxagoras* of Clazomenæ belongs by birth and early education to the Ionic school. But it was at Athens that he

Teaches in Athens. taught; to the influences which surrounded him at Athens the direction of his mind and the peculiarity of his doctrines may, we think, clearly be traced. Anaxagoras would have been most reluctant to confess this obligation; he was, it would seem, even more utterly without patriotism, in the ordinary sense, than even Democritus. "You care nothing for your country," some

The stars his country. one said to him. "Very much indeed," was the answer; "my country is there," pointing to the stars. There appears to have been no affectation in such language. He was, to a degree in which no Greek before him ever had been, absorbed in mere physical contemplation. Natural philosophy in his mind was separated from political wisdom, even opposed to it

Anaxagoras. 16. But this violent reaction against the habits and tendencies of his countrymen must have been produced by seeing them in

Effect of Athenian life upon him. their fullest activity. The bustle of Athens drove him to the stars. And into that country of his choice and adoption one finds him unawares introducing the maxims of the one which he despised. As he listened, wearily and with forced interest, to the accounts of party affinities, club fellowships, alliances among leaders formed and broken, which were brought him by some favourite and admiring disciple, one can conceive how he was led to reflect on the way in which a whole is made up of certain portions that seem perfectly distinct, and which have a mysterious attraction for each other; how the loss of that attraction is what we mean by dissolution or destruction, how by it all things are preserved in life. Out of such reflections,

Homœomeriæ. quickly transferred from the region for which he had an utter distaste to the one in which he delighted to dwell, the theory of *Homœomeriæ*, in which modern students have perceived the germs of important discoveries respecting the laws of cohesion,

Political and natural. may easily have developed itself. Pericles, we may be sure, would at once perceive the human analogy of which his master had lost the sense, and though he might feel pleasure at being transported for a while into a world so different from that in which his ordinary work lay, and may have found his thoughts elevated by the clearer and rarer atmosphere which he breathed there, we cannot doubt how *he* applied the doctrine; where he

Application of the doctrine by Pericles. looked for the similar particles which he was to combine. For that there must be a combiner, Anaxagoras also taught. The mere cohesion of particles was not sufficient. As Aristotle observes, the particles could not be the cause of the change which took place in their position and relation to each other.

Nous. 17. Nous (Intelligence) was called in to produce and maintain

Its part in the scheme of the universe. their fellowship—called in, the critic remarks, merely as a resource when the other expedient for solving the difficulty had been tried and failed. Be that as it may, the philosopher clearly told the Athenians that "all things at first were in a heap; that Nous came in and set them in order" (turned a chaos into a universe); a doctrine which had been always latent in the Greek mind, of which the μητίετα Ζευς in Homer had been the indication which was implied in the Ionic search for wisdom amidst natural elements.

Connexion of Nous with the old divinities. 18. But if Anaxagoras had brought to light the principle which his countrymen half-unconsciously recognised, he had stripped that principle not only of certain confused sensual additions which they had made to it, but of all which had rendered it practically and vitally precious to them. This Nous, which had set the stars in order, what was it to them? It was

Anaxagoras. Athenian suspicions.

not Zeus; not the acting, living ruler, taking part in human affairs and interests, whom Homer had brought before them. Yet it seemed to assume all his functions; to do all the work which they had ascribed to him. Was this what they had meant; was there nothing else in their traditions and their hearts besides this? The conscience of the Athenians answered that there was something besides this. But the answer was a confused muttering one, mixed with a painful suspicion that they did not habitually believe more than Anaxagoras told them: not generally quite as much as he told them. Out of that mixed impression, with the true indignation, the malignant hypocritical bitterness which the different portions of it engendered, an accusation of impiety against him naturally proceeded. Mixed with it was another, which Anaxagoras must have listened to with profound astonishment. He was accused of Medism—a disposition to betray Athens into the hands of Persia. Probably the fact that there was such an empire as the Persian existing had escaped him, or only remained with him as connected with some geographical observation. But his devotion to the stars may have furnished those who wished to wound Pericles through the side of his teacher with a very plausible plea for representing him as having Magian tastes and propensities. The charge of malignancy during the English Civil Wars, and of the Popish Plot—of *incivisme* during the French Revolution—was established by evidence which can leave us and our neighbours little excuse for condemning the Athenian democracy, if they yielded to such proofs. Anaxagoras, whether condemned for political or religious offences, retired to Lampsacus, we are told, with a smile of regret that his countrymen had exiled themselves from him. He suffered less than almost any man would have suffered from the loss of home ties and affections; the stars were to be seen at Lampsacus as at Athens. It is difficult to feel all the sympathy we wish for a victim to the injustice of men in whose welfare he took no interest, whose evils he had never sought to reform.

Grounds for suspicions.

Accusation of Μηδισμός.

Excuse for it.

His banishment.

SECTION IV.

PYTHAGORAS.

BORN B.C. 608 OR 605 (BENTLEY); B.C. 570 (DODWELL AND CLINTON).

Transition to a new kind of inquiry.

1. We pass from the least political to the most political of all the Greek philosophers. The records concerning Pythagoras which we possess, imperfect as they are, are important, not only as an introduction to the next division of our subject,—to the life of Socrates, and to the doctrines of Plato; they also throw

light upon the Ionic school, out of which this eminent teacher arose—some members of which, Empedocles especially, confessed the greatest obligations to him.

2. The same traditions which speak of Thales as the first philosopher of Greece, affirm that Pythagoras first used the name. He dared not, we are told, arrogate to himself wisdom. That he held to be a divine possession; men could only love it and seek for it. Such modesty, in the judgment of some, is very inconsistent with the character of Pythagoras; if he exhibited it, they say it must have been feigned. For he habitually claimed a divine inspiration, he took to himself the credit of most unusual gifts. Could he have renounced a name which had been freely bestowed upon quite ordinary mortals?

The name "philosopher."

Belief in his inspiration.

3. The answer to this question lies in his history. At present we shall only remark that the difficulty is not diminished, if, following other authorities, we suppose Socrates to have invented, as he pertinaciously adopted, the word Philosopher, in the sense we have given it. Socrates also claimed to be under divine teaching, and, what is more remarkable, made that claim the very reason for renouncing the title of "wise man." The nature of the inspiration which Pythagoras believed was vouchsafed to him, we may consider presently; we only ask our readers not to judge of it or of him by the reports of fanatical admirers in the post-Christian period, or by the satires of Lucian of Samosata.

Word "Philosopher" sometimes attributed to Socrates.

4. Pythagoras was born at Samos, in what precise year may be doubtful. Under what master he studied has been a subject of great controversy; if we might venture to choose one guess out of many, which may all be false or all true, we should take that which assigns his early training to Anaximander. That philosopher, as we have seen, carried his mathematical studies further than any of his predecessors; his geometry in a great degree determined the nature of his theory. A youthful pupil of earnest character and high imagination, coming into contact with such a thinker, would be likely to experience a great conflict of feelings. The science, new not only to himself, but in some measure to all around him, would seem to him strange, wonderful, sublime; the doctrine appended to it would repel him as cold, vague, and unsatisfactory. He would begin, we may fancy, to meditate on his teacher's favourite phrases, "the Infinite"—*το ἄπειρον*—this forsooth is the sum of all things in the universe. A conclusion how unlike that which geometry would have suggested! that leads us to the idea of limitation, distinctness, in each thing and in all things. And is not such limitation, such distinctness, that which constitutes their perfection? Surely it is this, the *πέρας*—the ultimate limit, and not the limitless, which the wise man is to seek after. Again, Anaxi-

His master and his early studies.

Geometry.

Arithmetic.

mander talked of an ἀρχή. Here, indeed, he has profited by his science. Mathematics did not teach him the necessity of this. He found every line starting from a point, every series beginning from a fixed number. "But why forsake the teacher? Why go abroad to look for your beginning when you have it in the very instrument which you carry with you? You Ionian philosophers are groping after unity in the world about you. But where did you get that idea? Was it not from these numbers, from this geometry? Surely it is there that we find not the mere shadow of unity, but unity itself."

The το πέρας.

5. Such thoughts we may fancy began to work in the mind of Pythagoras while he was yet among Ionians; to excite in him a discontent with previous methods of inquiry, and a hope that he might discover a better. With these feelings we may suppose him to set out on his travels, his impulse to leave his country being, it is said, the tyranny of Polycrates. He carried away another (perhaps a greater) benefit from his Asiatic education. The rhapsodists, who used to sing the legends of earlier days to the Greeks of that region in which Troy stood, and in which Homer or a number of Homers lived, these were perhaps silent. But not only their words were preserved, and by this time at least committed to enduring characters, but the melodies in which they had spoken still lived in the hearts of the people.

Music.

The impression of the Dorian and Lydian measures on a young Greek must have been very deep; it might be effaced afterwards in some by the passion for abstract speculation, in others it would give speculation itself a richer and more poetical character. All the thoughts of Pythagoras respecting the mystery of number seemed to have combined themselves from the first with musical feelings and associations. Was not music itself an illustration, the highest illustration, of this mystery? Whence came that strange disposition of thoughts and words into verse? whence the fascination of melody and tune? whence, if number be not the secret law, the moving soul of the universe?

Pythagoras a traveller.

6. All these apprehensions and imaginations might have dwelt in his mind and produced little fruit, or no better fruit than a crude philosophical system. But Pythagoras, as we said, became a traveller. The reports of the regions through which he journeyed are all uncertain. This at least we may conjecture with tolerable confidence, that he was brought into contact with human beings in a variety of different positions and circumstances, and that he began to think more deeply of their nature and destiny. And then what with new interest, in what a new light, would the number-mystery present itself to him! This surely was the very problem which all legislators had been seeking to solve,—in what way a number of apparently separate units might be able to feel themselves really a unity. All society

all government, was but the working out of this problem. Away then once and for ever with all Ionian experiments after a physical unity! here was the true field for examination and discovery. But what is it in man which has the capacity for association and organization? It is not resemblance in feature which produces it; it is not contiguity in space which produces it. It is that wonderful thing which inhabits this animal frame —which can transport itself beyond all limits of space and time. I, Pythagoras, can carry myself back to the age of Achilles and Agamemnon; doubtless in some condition or other I actually lived in their time. I can project myself forwards into ages that shall come; doubtless under some condition or other I shall live in those ages. But in what condition? This soul, which can thus look before and after, can shrink and shrivel itself into an incapacity of contemplating aught but the present moment: of what depths of degeneracy it is capable! what a beast it may become! And if something lower than itself, why not something higher? And if something higher or lower, why may there not be a law accurately determining its elevations and descents? Each soul has its particular evil tastes, bringing it to the likeness of different creatures beneath itself; why may it not be under a necessity of abiding in the condition of that thing to which it has adapted and reduced itself?

Metempsychosis.

7. Such thoughts Pythagoras may, or may not, have borrowed from Egyptian priests. Doubtless to a man in his posture of mind every old tradition, every relic of national faith, will have been precious; still there was nothing in the doctrine of a metempsychosis which might not easily and naturally have grown out of his reflections upon that which makes men human, and enables them as human beings to associate with each other. To another and deeper discovery he was no doubt led by studying the governments of different countries, especially those which had received the Dorian impress. He found everywhere in these communities that the bond of connection was the recognition of a power superior to man, a righteous law-giving power. No human legislature ever dared to dispense with this recognition, no society could cohere without it. Deep and awful idea! The union of men presumes a still deeper ground. Is not this ground the πέρας, the ultimate unity, after which we are seeking?

Where he learnt it.

Law.

Results of his inquiry

8. Thus gradually we suppose the idea of limitation, which Pythagoras had acquired from geometry, and which had been brought out in his mind in opposition to the notion of an all-comprehending Infinite or Indefinite; and the idea of beginning and succession which he had acquired from arithmetic, and which had come out in his mind in opposition to the notion of a mere external ground of things, fused and softened as they both were

by a sense of music dwelling deep in the heart of the world, may have become associated with practical thoughts respecting the nature of the human soul, and the bonds by which souls are related to each other.

Wisdom above the soul.

9. The more this feeling of the sacredness and mysteriousness of human fellowship unfolded itself in the mind of Pythagoras, the more peril and evil he will have seen in the pretensions of men to wisdom. The destruction of order lay in such individual pretensions. Wisdom must be contemplated as altogether above the soul; as something which it cannot appropriate, to which it must do homage; which it must seek in silence, yet not in solitude; which each man must reverence for himself, but yet which he must feel is not his more than his fellows'; which can only be truly pursued by those who are willing to abandon outward enjoyments for the sake of it. The philosophy of Pythagoras therefore *could* not be carried out except in a community of living men.

A community essential to the Pythagorean philosophy.

10. In the bonds by which they were held together in their dealings with each other and with men without—in the silence and fear with which they acknowledged an invisible ruler—was his inmost meaning to be expressed. Thus would the proportions and relations of the universe be manifested on their highest ground; thus would the mystical harmony be felt and acknowledged; thus would the dignity of the human soul, its capacity for growth and perfectionment, be proved; thus would the nature of distributive justice, the geometry and arithmetic of politics, be practically realised; thus would the idea of God be felt as the foundation of social life. Such we apprehend was the feeling that led to the formation of the Pythagorean society, which grew up in the South of Italy; which after all deductions for the extravagance of later reporters, must have exercised a great influence on various cities of Magna Græcia; which wrought legislative and moral reforms, engaged in political intrigues, and was finally put down as a dangerous religious confederacy, incompatible with the existence of regular government.

The society in South Italy.

11. In calling this society "an order," Bishop Thirlwall and Mr. Grote have done much to explain the secret of its strength and influence, as well as of its errors and its decay. The earnest seeker of wisdom found hearts yearning for it like his own. It was an inheritance intended for them and him: in proportion as they could make it the common object of their lives, they might hope to share it together. The lessons which they received from their master were not communicable except to those who formed the circle around him; to others they would have been different lessons: apart from the practical discipline which accompanied them, they were not true; they served no purpose

Its character and perils.

of purification, they were not a method of seeking wisdom. The allegiance which men so associated pay to him who has given the first impulse to their minds, and who is directing all their energies, is affectionate, devout, dangerous. They are united by sympathies and reverence. A man is the object of their reverence and sympathy. If that man has felt deeply that their union does not stand in any power or wisdom of his, he will tell them so continually; he will strive, by all the forms and arrangements of their polity, to preserve them in the recollection. But if he believes that what he teaches is not his own, he must believe, and strive to make them believe, that it has been imparted to him; he must regard his work as a vocation. The more he uses the language which expresses this conviction, the more it will be perverted by passionate idolatrous followers; the more will his earnest desire to disclaim wisdom be made an excuse for maintaining that he possesses it under conditions altogether new and peculiar. How can that idolatry fail to react upon the object of it? How can it fail to awaken in him a vanity, a self-consciousness, a self-glorification, which have to maintain a fearful struggle with the earnest truth-seeking, truth-loving temper which led him to say, "I did not choose this course for myself; I did not make this discovery. A mightier wisdom has guided me on my way, and showed me what I could never have found." The histories of such struggles are not written, or written very imperfectly, even in the autobiographies and secret confessions of great teachers: another day may reveal them to us, with all the strange contradictions which have provoked our harsh judgments, and should have called forth our pity and sorrow. The outward results of the secret battles are better known, and are often very tragical. In the case of the Pythagoreans, we have only indistinct glimpses of them, but enough, with the experience we have since acquired, to show how zealous the society must have been to bring others within the circle of their light; yet how proud in their boast of enjoying that light by some exclusive tenure! how resolute they must have been not to separate their essential and moral practices from their outward doctrines, yet how apt, in the vehemence of propagandism, to part with all inconvenient austerity, to tolerate and use the corruptions which they undertook to remove; how their first object will have been to use their society as a means of making all society deeper in its foundations, truer in its acts; how at last they may have come to think that it had no deeper foundation than the Pythagorean rule, and that false and dishonest means might be legitimate for the establishment of that rule. Some traditions would represent the founder as forwarding the ambitious views of his order, as sharing in its

Sense of a vocation in the teacher.

Idolatry of disciples.

Destruction of the order desirable.

downfall. We have no means of testing their accuracy. If they are true, they need not make us doubt the sincerity of his purpose, nor the real worth of the principle for which he testified. The failure of a noble scheme may make good the internal conviction of him who planned it better than its success. If Pythagoras believed that human society had a mysterious and divine ground, and that every true philosopher and reformer lives to convince it of that fact, it was fitting that he and his order should perish when he or they began to fancy that they could build up society by their devices, upon their wisdom. His name remained a sacred and venerable name for Greece. None might be able to tell in terms what it had done for them. Those who spoke of Pythagorean doctrines in earlier times meant the doctrine of Philolaus, Lysis, Eurytus, Archytas,—men who knew nothing of the Italian master, who had never shared his discipline, who had been brought up amidst the ordinary influences of Greek society. Those who spoke of Pythagoras himself in neo-Platonic times meant a Thaumaturgist whom they had created by mixing Christian and Pagan records together, to convince the world that the Christian church was a plagiarism. But Plato and Aristotle retained a reverence for the name of the original master, which they never transferred to the school where his opinions were dried for use and exportation. Iamblichus and Porphyry were bearing unconscious testimony to the fact that the best and wisest teachers of ancient Greece had been led by all their studies of nature and of man, and, as they rightly deemed, by some guide who was higher than either, to seek for a brotherhood which did not rest on human wisdom; that they tried to create one, and that they failed.

The feeling about Pythagoras in after times.

SECTION V.

XENOPHANES—PARMENIDES—ZENO.

Poetry and philosophy.

1. It has been observed before, that most of the Greek sages were poets. Verse seemed the natural language for thoughts which were to be a kind of oracles meant for the experienced ear, perplexing to the vulgar. When the wise man became the philosopher, he more rarely used this medium of communication. The mind of Empedocles was evidently rich and poetic: Anaxagoras, Anaximander, Anaximenes, probably never departed from ordinary discourse. But in each, whether they used this vehicle or not, the suspicion began to arise, that the poet, so far as he answered to his name, so far as he was a Maker, was the antagonist of the philosopher. Homer had a hold upon the sympathies of the Greek, which the most profound student did not

possess. Whence did it arise? Was it a wholesome influence? Were not his creations hindrances in the way of the investigator? Had he not assumed the result of an inquiry which they were pursuing?

Xenophanes, flourished B. C. 540-500. Ol. 60-70.

2. The sense of this opposition reached its highest point in *Xenophanes*. He was, like Pythagoras, an Ionian by birth: he became, like him, an Italian colonist. He felt bitterly the luxury of his own city, Colophon. The manners, and especially the love of amusement in the Greeks of Asia and of the islands, disgusted him. He must have gone to Italy a discontented man,—discontented, probably, with the investigations of Ionians, as well as with their political life. The example of Pythagoras, or his own reflections, will have taught him that what he wanted was not an element or ἀρχή. But he does not seem to have been much interested in geometry or arithmetic, or to have received any of the same deep impressions which Pythagoras received from music. The thoughts of Pythagoras respecting the soul of man and its migrations took no hold of him. In one of his fragments he ridicules a sage for not suffering a dog to be beaten because he recognised in his growl the voice of an old friend.

Education of Xenophanes.

3. Neither does he seem to have had a desire to be the founder or the member of any political association. He may have heard of the dispersion of the Pythagorean society, and may have turned with dislike from similar experiments. His genius, however, did not impel him in that direction. Social unity was not the problem which he sought to resolve. The problem which did present itself to him concerned unity, but in quite a different sense. What are the gods in the Homeric poems? Is there any reality corresponding to them? Are they not formed by the poet's brain, and clothed by him in sensible forms and images? Is it to sensible forms and images that our minds do homage? Pythagoras had approached the last question, but from a different side and in a different spirit. He had recognised a Being near to man, to be adored in silence and awe. Such a Being had not much in common with the gods whom his countrymen worshipped; but he never denied that homage was due to them. Nor can his secret instructions to his disciples have been that this homage was only to be paid in deference to the opinions of the vulgar. They must have been efforts to make it more sincere and significant than it was with the majority. Pythagoras felt that he had no substitute to offer for the personal objects he had been taught to revere. He felt that some living being, not an abstraction, not a creation of his own mind, must sustain his and every human polity.

His question respecting the gods.

4. In Xenophanes all these checks to freedom of inquiry

The nature of the answer.

respecting the faith of his country were wanting. The naked question, "What does my soul affirm respecting God; what conceptions can it or can it not form respecting Him?" came before him. His verses—for he wrote in verse of various styles and measures—were answers to it. The philosopher tries as a poet to criticise the poets; to show that they have been making the beings to whom they bow down. All the Homeric gods have the shapes and forms of men; why, but because men have formed them after their own likeness? If an ox were to form a god, would he not give him horns and hoofs? How is it possible to form any conceptions of God? What mean your finite and your infinite? Are they not both alike terms of your own mind? How can you make Him out of them?

Not a sceptic.

5. This may sound like scepticism; but it was not scepticism in the mind of Xenophanes. He did not say that because the senses cannot tell us of God—because we cannot measure Him by our conceptions, therefore He is not. He said just the reverse: he said, "My senses do not tell me that which is; they only tell me of appearances. My conceptions do not measure that which is; it lies deeper" Instead, therefore, of denying that to be, of which he said the Homeric pictures presented no likeness, his disapprobation of them arose from his desire to assert a real ground of things, independent of man's conclusions or conceptions; which he affirms to be, but which he does not make.

A very wonderful process of thought indeed, pregnant with results which our future history must unfold. Xenophanes was no atheist, but a very earnest theist. He asserted *a* Being. If he had been asked "*what* Being?" he would have owned that he could not reply. He could only say what he was not. He approached the border of negation, but he approached it manfully and reverently; therefore he did not pass it. He pointed out a void which he could not fill. That alone would have been a reason for feeling gratitude to him. But he also saw the way to a deep and radical truth.

But the Being he worshipped almost a negation.

6. A healthier thinker than Xenophanes, yet one in whom it is not perhaps possible to feel the same interest, took up his course of inquiry: this was *Parmenides*. The question respecting the nature of God, which had so occupied the philosopher of whom we have just been speaking, does not seem at all in the same degree to have agitated him. His mind rested on the principle of Xenophanes, that what the senses present to us are appearances; that only that which the mind affirms without the aid of the senses actually *is*. What is this, then, that the mind affirms? Xenophanes had said "God." Parmenides said "Unity," or "The One." My senses tell me thousands of

PARMENIDES, born about B.C. 536. Ol. 61.

The One.

things, and yet has not every man who thinks and feels ever been groping after some one root and ground of all these things? This, verily, is what man wants, and this is affirmed to be by that within him which fights against apparitions and phantoms. Plurality is merely one of these apparitions—deceitful, transitory; nothing abides but unity: this is permanent, eternal. Such a belief could not dawn upon the mind of a Greek philosopher without imparting to him a feeling of deep wonder. He had seen a succession of Ionians questioning all nature to tell them of this unity. He had seen Pythagoras evoking it out of the relations of number, and actually constructing a human society to illustrate it. And now this unity declared itself to be a condition of the human mind itself—it had been seeking for that in all other things which really dwelt only with itself. The confused look of a child gazing upon a new world, is but a faint emblem of the surprise with which such a thought must have possessed the mind of an earnest seeker on whom it has just burst. Yet he cannot doubt that it is a true thought. It makes so much of all that had before been perplexed in his mind intelligible, it accounts so well for the thoughts which have revealed themselves to other men. But what consequences follow? Faith in the things about us becomes impossible; we live in a shadow world; we do not, in fact, behold anything. For these distinctions of things, this apparent multitude of objects, exists not; it speaks to our fancy only. The unity which the mind beholds and demands, this only has substance.

Plurality an apparition.

7. Every one must see how this doctrine of Parmenides laid him open to the jests of witty men, such as grow upon the surface of all lands, and of which Greece and her colonies were certainly not less productive than others. These wits believed no doubt that they were opposing self-evident facts to mere dreams. But Parmenides had a friend and disciple who was not willing to leave them in undisturbed possession of this opinion. *Zeno* of Elea was convinced that there was not only positive falsehood, but direct absurdity in that doctrine which experience seemed so irresistibly to establish, and he boldly undertook to make this absurdity palpable to the popular mind. In a series of arguments, some of which are still preserved to us, he endeavoured to show that space cannot exist, that we cannot suppose a plurality of objects without attributing self-destructive qualities to them; that if there be a number of real existences this number must be both finite and infinite; lastly, that the notion of movement involves a contradiction. Our readers would not, perhaps, be much interested in these early specimens of Greek subtlety; nay, they would be inclined to denounce them as the exploits of a mere word-conjurer. But assuredly Zeno deserves

ZENO, born about B.C. 500. Ol. 70.

His answer to the wits and men of experience.

no such name. He was both in action and speculation a brave man, and we owe to him a great practical discovery. In fact, he occupies a peculiarly important position as a thinker, which it is for the advantage of our future studies in Greek philosophy that we should understand.

The Eleatic organ.

8. Every philosophy must have an instrument or organ to work with if it would make itself intelligible. Some external object served this purpose for the Ionic philosopher; lines and numbers for the Pythagorean. But what was the instrument of the Eleatic philosopher? He seems to have ascended into a region of such pure metaphysic, and so entirely to have rejected all common and sensible analogies, that one does not at first see how he can ever impart his doctrine to others, or at least suggest any successful method of pursuing investigations in his own direction. This difficulty seems to have been felt by Xenophanes, and to a certain extent by Parmenides. Precious and pregnant as are the hints which each of them presents us with, it seems likely that they will be obliged to stop at the point which they have already obtained, and to leave no race of successors. But Zeno has found the solution of the puzzle; he has found that *words* bear to this philosophy the relation which sensible objects and numbers bear respectively to the other two. The language in which we discourse with each other must needs embody the law and principle of our own mental workings, and it was exactly this principle which the Eleatics were dealing with.

Zeno honest in the use of words.

9. Zeno had only an imperfect consciousness of this truth, but he acted upon it, and it bore useful fruits for him and for us. There was no falseness in his use of words. He felt that they did affirm and embody truths, and he employed them for the purpose of elucidating truths. And herein he was surely as honest as those wits who set themselves to confute Parmenides and philosophers of his class by an appeal to experience. For they too profit by our belief in words. They awaken our consciousness to the fact, that the words which we speak bear on them an impress and image of the external world; and it is this consciousness which they rest upon as their real defence against the philosophers who set at nought the evidence of the external world. Zeno awakens our consciousness to the fact, that the words which we utter express something to which there is no counterpart in the external world, and he rests upon this consciousness to oppose the conclusions of those who set at nought the witness of their own minds. Both appeals are in themselves fair, and carry conviction with them. But the one merely convinces us of a fact which we took for granted previously; the other obliges us to perceive truths lying very near our inmost being, which were yet almost entirely hidden from us.

Logic

10. But it is the practical discovery which was the direct result of this search after an organ or instrument for the Parmenidean philosophy that obliges us to regard Zeno with most admiration and gratitude. Mathematical science we owe, according to the best historical evidence, to the East. And it entirely accords with the calm, contemplative, and yet sensual character of the Orientals, that this should have been their contribution to human knowledge. But the science of *Logic*, the science which declares, not what are the conditions to which external things are subject, but the conditions under which we ourselves speak and judge—this was of purely Greek invention. No other people had ever the subtlety to conceive the possibility of such a science, far less to ascertain its distinct province and its appointed work. Though logic, in a formal and narrow sense, is considered as the antagonist of poetry, yet only a most imaginative and poetical nation could have discovered the meaning and necessity of logic, and have given it the statue-like perfection which it has attained in Greek hands. Now Zeno is believed, on the best grounds, to be the inventor of logic. He first was led clearly to perceive that the mind has a distinct law regulating its own affirmations, and he consequently was first stimulated to inquire what this law may be. How much we owe to him for this achievement we shall understand better as we advance. Our principal object here has been to point out the connection between it and the Eleatic philosophy, of which Zeno was the accomplished and able defender; to indicate the kind of influence which that philosophy exercised upon the mind of Greece; to show how important a place it fills in the history of human inquiry; and to excite our readers' interest in the future development of the doctrine which they have beheld in its first germ. In so very rapid a sketch as ours it is clearly impossible to do more than notice what seems to us the living and central peculiarity of each thinker as he arises up before us. But the real germinant principle is often hard to discover amidst the multitude of mere notions and opinions with which it has environed itself. An historian will distrust his own sagacity in detecting it, and will rejoice greatly if he can find it anywhere in its rude and primitive shape. Little value as it may seem to have, nay, as it may actually have, while it remains in this condition, yet he deems it not wise to wait till the animalcule has become a perfect insect, or till the insect has died, before he commences his examination of it. We offer this apology for noticing the ante-Socratic schools, briefly indeed, but yet at a length which many may think disproportionate to the time that we shall be able to bestow upon their successors. We are convinced that our readers, whom we wish not to furnish with a

a Greek discovery.

Value of the early schools.

history, but to put in a right method of procuring one for themselves, will have a clear or confused understanding of the palmy period of Greek philosophy between the age of Socrates and of Aristotle, as well as of the age of senility which followed, exactly in proportion as they study or pass over the years of its infancy. Let them not hope to understand Plato or Aristotle, or even Epicurus, Zeno of Cittium, and Carneades, if they have begun with despising Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and Parmenides. Nay, we might go further, and say that we should greatly doubt the pretensions of any one professing to have a real acquaintance with Hobbes, Locke, Leibnitz, or Kant, who could discover nothing but confusion and barrenness in these early inquiries.

DIVISION II.—GREEK PHILOSOPHY FROM SOCRATES TO ARISTOTLE.

SECTION I.

ATHENS IN THE TIME OF SOCRATES.—THE SOPHISTS.

The city of Wisdom.

1. If Greece was the country of wisdom and wise men, no one has ever doubted that Athens was in this sense the capital of Greece; that there Wisdom was worshipped with all her rites; that there wise men had an honour which was bestowed upon them in no other part of the world. The name of the city affected all the acts of the citizens; the meanest of them had some sense that the Goddess of Wisdom was his protectress, and that he had received some endowments from her.

2. As there is no dispute about this fact, so there is none that the age of Pericles was that in which Athens attained the glory she was always aiming at, that it was then all the powers of her sons reached their manhood. The great statesman thoroughly understood the character of the people whom he ruled. The funeral oration which Thucydides puts into his mouth, may not have been delivered by him in the very form in which we receive it, but it expresses exactly that accurate perception of the Athenian mind which the historian knew that he possessed. With the same dramatical propriety, if the speech be not a report, he exhibits it as the settled purpose of Pericles, not to restrain the tendencies of this character, but to give them their full play and development. He would suffer no Spartan moroseness to interfere with Athenian freedom. The corrections which it needed, so he believed, must be supplied from itself. Any attempt to introduce the maxims and habits of another tribe would destroy the Athenian energy without really imparting to it the Dorian self-restraint.

Pericles: his idea of Athenian life.

3. Whether this calculation were a right or a wrong one, the effects of it are memorable in the history of the world. Those to which we most naturally recur are the creations of the sculptors and poets. The perception of the beauty and symmetry of the human form which was awakened at that time, the images of the gods to which it gave birth, though they may have won the admiration and influenced the character of future generations, must be considered in connexion with the processions and the temples of the people for whose use they were immediately designed. So again the works of the great tragedians, however much they may deserve the attention of solitary students, ought to be thought of as represented at the festivals, as rivals for a popular prize, as acted before delighted or critical crowds. Those which have lasted through all the changes of much more than 2,000 years, show with what deep thoughts concerning the destiny of man the minds of some Athenians were exercised. But they were mixed with multitudes of other works which were probably at the time not felt to be inferior to them; they themselves were judged by their fitness to confer present amusement, by their adaptation to the varying demands of exceedingly clever, but also probably very impatient, spectators. The quickness and versatility of an author in creating that which should excite their sorrow or their mirth, would be the measure of his popularity, even though on the whole he who had thought and felt most would call forth the deepest echoes in their minds, and would ultimately obtain the greatest reverence. Æschylus and Sophocles towered above their contemporaries probably even in the judgment of the many, but the qualities which we admire in them must have been to a great degree forgotten in the contemplation of the immediate effects which they produced. It was for after-times to discover how much there was in them which could not be exhausted in any shows, and which did not belong to one age or to one nation, but to mankind.

The sculptors and poets: how they were viewed by their contemporaries.

4. Why, it may be asked, are such reflections more appropriate to the age of Pericles than to the age of James I.? Were not Ben Jonson and Fletcher regarded chiefly as men who produced masques for the entertainment of the court—Shakspeare as an actor in the Globe Theatre? Such a remark is true in itself; but there is a special need for a student of philosophy, most of all for a student of the life of Socrates, to recollect in what light all the great men in Athens, whose main instruments were words, appeared to their fellow-citizens at this time. They were all exercising some kind of *wisdom*; that wisdom was addressed in the theatre, or the agora, to a class of judges who were themselves wise and conscious of wisdom; able to appreciate it, able to bestow the rewards of it. The great tragedians, fixing their minds on the heroic ages, were able to preserve them-

They professed a *particular* kind of wisdom.

selves from making their own wisdom the creature of the mob wisdom. It required very high genius in a comic writer, whose business was with the present, to resist that influence; such a man would try to do it in a measure by choosing the most broad and conspicuous conceits and affectations of his age as objects of his ridicule. But the strongest temptation could not after all beset those who were using their wisdom for purposes of entertainment. Those who employed it for the direct object of persuasion, those who uttered words for the sake of leading their fellow-citizens to deeds, would be in a far more dangerous position for their own honesty, might be instruments of greater and more wide-spreading mischief. By degrees the kind of power which they exercised would become the measure of all others. The rhetorician would be regarded as the man who had ascertained the effectual use of words. Poets, statesmen, thinkers of all classes, even the commonest handicraftsmen, would gradually become rhetoricians; it would be looked upon as the craft of the wise city.

The Sophists

5. It has been commonly supposed that there was a certain class of men, formed in the different cities of Greece, but always esteeming Athens as their head-quarters, who helped to keep alive this tendency in the minds of young Athenians, and to give it a very dangerous prominence. These men have been called Sophists; from them especially the notion of the name as an evil name has been derived; it has been supposed that the main work of Socrates was to counteract and undermine their influence. Learned men have shared this impression with the vulgar; the most modern and critical writers with mere narrators. Recently these notions have been impugned with great skill, and apparently with a great weight of evidence. The existence of a sophistical system has been distinctly denied. Those who are designated by the common name were unlike each other, it is said, in all their doctrines, pursuits, habits of life. They were not men to whom any corrupt purpose or an immoral character can be imputed; proofs of their respectability may be obtained from the books of their greatest opponents. They did not cause Athenian society to degenerate from the standard of past ages, for no such degeneracy is visible in the history. The opprobrious epithet Sophist was not such at all in Greek apprehension; it was only a synonym for the wise man; it was conferred by impartial writers upon poets, upon philosophers, upon the supposed antagonist of sophistry himself. Plato and Aristotle have chosen to use it in a bad sense; they had a right to their own definition; but they cannot give us a right to pronounce an *ex post facto* sentence upon their contemporaries. Finally, we may hold the object of the life of Socrates to be a decidedly good object, without blaming the different Sophists

Mr. Grote's arguments.

whom he or his disciple blames. He aimed at a universal standard of wisdom and truth; they professed only to teach Athenians how to think, speak, and act. These conclusions, if they are true, must affect the whole course of our after history. It becomes us therefore to consider how far they are borne out by the able arguments and undoubted facts which Mr. Grote has produced.[1]

The Sophist a professor of *general* wisdom

6. We at once accept Mr. Grote's definition of the Sophist as the Platonical and the true one. He was "the professor of wisdom; he taught young men to speak, think, and act." We wish for no other and no worse account of him. If modern artists have thrown any darker shades into their picture, we believe they have done him a benefit instead of an injury. Their clumsy exaggeration hides the essential ugliness which Mr. Grote's flattering sketch brings out in full relief.

The age of the Sophists: in what respects better than former ages

7. They have, we conceive, been especially wrong in their attempts to blacken the age of Pericles, as if it was, essentially and inherently, worse than any previous age. In many respects it was assuredly much better. Not only were all the intellectual energies of the people more developed, but their great writers displayed a moral insight and purpose which are not to be found in the older times or in their immediate predecessors. Who can deny that the tone of Thucydides is much higher than that of Herodotus? that there is a much deeper recognition of principle in the Œdipus Tyrannus than in the Odyssey—that even Aristophanes (though we may quite agree with Mr. Grote in refusing him the dignity of a moral teacher) yet tacitly acknowledges a standard in his satires upon bad citizens, which would not have been as readily perceived by poets or recognised by their audiences in the times of Solon and Pisistratus? There had been a progress unquestionably in the minds of the better men in moral perceptions and apprehensions, a progress which could not have been found in them unless their contemporaries had been *capable* of the same. The political training and discipline of the Athenians must have greatly contributed to this result; their experience of society and government led them to practical distinctions which, without it, would have been hidden from them.

8. Whatever we may think of the Athenian democracy, we cannot doubt that it rendered this signal service to the eminent men who lived under it, and through them to the world. Its corrupt maxims and practices are made known to us by the emphatic protests against them which have come to us in historical reflections and prophecies—in lessons from the past, in

[1] Grote, vol. viii. cap. lxvii.

In what respect worse.

ridicule of the present. But the protests show us what the peculiar temptation of the Athenians was; why they were more prone to it in this than in any former time; what kind of influences were most certain to foster it. We have seen that a majority of the Greek wise men were tyrants (or despots, as Mr. Grote prefers to call them). The natural use of their wisdom was to obtain power—to make them fit for governing fools. Every Greek was inclined to hold this opinion. It grew in him with the growth of his faculties. Democracy afforded him an obvious opportunity of exercising them in this particular direction. The Peloponnesian war suggested thoughts (which had been latent in the Persian) of rivalry between Greeks, of Athenian ascendancy, of the difference between forms of government. The passionate impulses of patriotism, which had their own characteristic dangers, had yielded to deliberate schemes and calculations respecting the method of obtaining rule and wielding it. There might not be more of evil-doing in the one time than in the other. There must have been more consciousness of evil-doing; more internal wickedness; a greater readiness in bringing crimes under a theory, and in defending them upon that theory. This is the inference which the Melian controversy inevitably suggests. Make what allowance you please for the aristocratical tendencies of the writer: it cannot be denied that an experienced and wise man imputes to his fellow-citizens such a distinct understanding of an evil purpose and principles as we do not meet with elsewhere, and yet such an understanding as we should, without his authority, have attributed to a people possessing the Athenian wit and subtlety.

The professors all of different schools.

9. All that was wanting to give this wit and subtlety their full play, was, that a set of men should appear, starting from the same maxim as the wise men in general had started from, but furnished with a set of instruments which had not belonged to them, and ready to *teach* the skill which they had *used* in a narrower sphere for their own advantage. The professors of whom we are speaking exactly answer to this description. They possessed all the respectability which Mr. Grote claims for them; were many of them aged and grave; were men of uncommon sagacity and penetration. They had studied in different schools. Some had learnt under Empedocles, some under Zeno. Some devoted themselves to physical studies, some to moral, some directly to political. Each possessed some sort of wisdom. Each undertook to teach that wisdom. Each held out the acquisition of political power as the prize to be obtained. There was their common point of agreement; possibly there was no other. The young Athenians wanted to learn how to think, act,

and speak upon all subjects, that they might guide the people according to their pleasure. For this purpose they sought the aid of a Sophist or Professor.

How they taught to think, speak, and act.

10. It was very needful that the Athenians should learn to *think*. What was to be their teaching for this end? They must be told about natural subjects, about moral subjects, about political subjects, by men who had been at the pains to learn what Thales said about them, what Pythagoras said about them, what Parmenides said about them. They must be told about the views of ancient cosmogonists respecting the world and the gods; about the views of modern thinkers and allegorists upon the same subject. They must hear about the Heraclitan flux, and the Parmenidean One: they must hear about the way in which cities were said to be built by the lyre of Apollo in former days, about the way in which they had been held together by the skill or legislation of recent despots. All these different views they were taught to compare together—to see the greater strength of the one and feebleness of the other, or to combine and reconcile them. Thus the Sophist taught his pupils to think. But all thinking is for the sake of *action*. Our professors are thoroughly practical men. They do not come to withdraw us from the business or work of the world at all. What should we care for them in Athens if they did? We want to know about men, not about the stars. We want to defeat Brasidas, or to support our party at home against Nicias, or to make ourselves rivals to Cleon, much more than to know anything about Heraclitus, or Parmenides, or Zeno. Well! But the one learning is the way to the other; for remember what comes between thinking and acting; remember what Homer says of "winged words;" remember that these have been with Greeks always "the great engines of government, the proximate cause of obedience." If we teach you to *speak*, we teach you in the most efficient manner to act. These different physical, and metaphysical, and moral theories, will furnish you with topics for speaking; they will be the tools of your trade; they will give you a wonderful power of embarrassing, confuting, overawing an uninstructed opponent. All may serve this end. Theories about the order and formation of the world in the skilful hands of Hippias may make as good a rhetorician as direct moral teaching from Prodicus, or speculations upon government, human or divine, from Protagoras. All will supply topics; all will be instruments of persuasion. And then see what power Zeno has put into our hands! Words you see may mean the most opposite, the most contradictory, things. If you could be taught the secret of this contradiction, and how to turn it to account, would not this be invaluable lore?

Speech the chief thing.

11. In the last paragraph we have just hinted at the modern meaning of the word Sophist, which Mr. Grote so indignantly repudiates. Unquestionably it is not *the* meaning. The one which our historian has substituted for it is far more comprehensive and satisfactory. But by the necessity of his calling, he who taught to think, to act, to speak, would come to regard the last part of his profession as that which included both the others. He would become a rhetorician and a teacher of rhetoric. For that purpose he must deal with the subtle meanings of words; whether honestly, as Zeno did, or treacherously, would depend upon the object which he proposed to himself. If that object was to influence the mind of a mob, he was at least in considerable danger of leading his pupils to give the word sophistry that force with which we are most familiar.[1]

12. We cannot think, then, that accomplished scholars and honest men, like Ritter and Brandis, are fairly charged with imposing upon their less-instructed readers when they use such a phrase as "Die Sophistik" to express their feeling that there was an art which was practised by all the different professors of wisdom in the age of Pericles. Such an opinion does not in the least interfere with the fact that the word Sophist may have been applied to a poet, to any person who exercised an influence through words rather than swords,—to Thales, to Pythagoras, to Socrates. Astrology has an undoubted meaning,—most persons think a bad meaning; yet, is an astrologer more than one who studies the stars? Why should not the man who studied them with the most ample intention of ascertaining the laws by which their courses are regulated have been called an astrologer as well as any one of the innumerable doctors who determined from the stars the events which were to occur in the political world? These traders in natural knowledge did not form one school or guild, any more than the Athenian professors; they had their different maxims; they were rivals; they were enemies: yet it has been usual to think that they had a common work, which may be denoted by a common name. And every man who claimed to be an astronomer, and not an astrologer, was bound to make good his claim by the labours of a life, to show wherein he differed from him who cast nativities. By doing so, he must put a stigma upon a name which was not necessarily evil before; he must acquire a name for himself which was in some sense new. He will have the ultimate compensation of vindicating the fame of many a worthy predecessor who had not been distinctly conscious of his own end, but who had honestly sought for light when others were boasting that they possessed it and could turn it to account. Till he has accomplished his task he must be content to bear the same reproach with those whom he is most opposing; from whom he is seeking to deliver his fellows.

[1] As we have admitted the respectability of the Sophists generally, it is not necessary to consider the arguments which Mr. Grote has brought to prove that respectability in each particular case. But one of his statements, upon which he places much reliance, requires a short notice. Prodicus, he thinks, can be shown by more than negative evidence to be not an immoral, but a highly moral, teacher. The story of the Choice of Hercules, in the form in which we commonly read it, claims him for its author. What more decided proof can be given that he urged upon the Athenian youth a severe, even an ascetical, self-restraint? We have no wish to dispute the beauty or the worth of that fable. It must have been full of instruction for that age, since it has been found full of instruction for all ages. But we submit that the effect of the lesson which it inculcates is good or evil according to the object which the reader of it proposes to himself. If he wishes to acquire the power of draining marshes and killing noisome beasts, all must bless him for not yielding to the voice of the Goddess of Pleasure. If he merely seeks to be the strongest of men, by resisting the enchantress, it might have been better for the world and for himself that he should have yielded to her blandishments. Mr. Grote is not likely to have forgotten the celebrated paradox of Gibbon respecting the clergy, "Their virtues are more dangerous to society than their vices." On the hypothesis which Gibbon no doubt adopted, that this order is divided into those who deny themselves for the sake of obtaining dominion over their fellow-creatures, and those who yield to animal indulgences, his dictum may be easily admitted. The monk who restrains his appetites that he may be more followed and idolised as a confessor, does more harm to others, is probably more evil in himself, than the sleek abbot who is given up to his hawks and hounds. The principle is of universal application. We must know whether Prodicus departed from the general rule of the professorial class, by not holding out political power as his prize, before we can pronounce him a useful teacher, because he told his pupils how they might obtain the bone and nerve of Hercules.

The denouncers of the Sophists—Aristophanes, &c.

13. There were many at this time who scorned and ridiculed the young men of Athens because they frequented the teaching of one or another Sophist, and because they exhibited the effects of the teaching in their self-conceited words and acts. Aristophanes, above all, could teach these young men to laugh at themselves—at their own thoughts, speculations, imaginations—as well as at those of their teachers. In doing so, he expected perhaps to restore the habits of an older, and, as it seemed to him, a simpler method.

Neither reason nor evidence warrant us in believing that his success was proportioned to his zeal or to his genius. He may have abated some of the nuisances which were infesting Athens; he may have diminished the race of sycophants, have made the vulgar kinds of mob-persuasion less effectual, have even done something to abate the litigious spirit of his fellow-citizens; but he can have helped very little to root out that which was the real cancer of the nation's being,—that which fed upon the hearts, not of the worst, but of the best, and noblest, and most

promising of the Athenian youth. No one could apply any sound remedy to this evil who despised the age into which he was born,—who merely saw the effects of the sophistical poison, without understanding its nature and the constitutions on which it was working. He only could hope to reform the young men of Athens who could heartily and affectionately sympathise with them, who did not express his contempt or indignation for their favourite teachers, but was ready to follow them through all their windings and subtleties,—who, without for a moment forgetting the purpose of finding his way back to realities, could yet grapple fearlessly with the most shadowy and impalpable abstractions. A man of this kind would have sore difficulties to encounter, through which nothing but the clear perception of his object could possibly lead him unhurt. His inward conflicts, before he could be fitted for his task, must be severe; of his outward, the greatest, perhaps, would be this: that his purpose would be infallibly misconstrued by those who were aiming, with very different instruments indeed, to resist the same evils. It would be inevitable that he would pass with them for one, perhaps the subtlest and most mischievous, of the sophistical class. Because he sought to make men feel that there was no resting-place in any of their theories or opinions, he would be suspected of universal scepticism; because he led them to feel that they were not without a ground to stand upon, if they would seek for it, he would be accused of undermining the ground on which their forefathers stood; because he endeavoured to look through the clouds which had been drawn up from the earth, into the serene heaven that lay behind them, it would be fancied that he invoked their protection and did them homage.

The true Reformer.

Such a man was Socrates, and this was his fate. He was hated by Sophists, and ridiculed as the worst of them. He treated the diseases of his country according to a method exactly the opposite of that which Aristophanes adopted, and therefore he was denounced by Aristophanes as the great promoter of them.—We have now to consider what his method was, how it affected his own age, and what traces it has left of itself for subsequent generations.

SECTION II.

SOCRATES.

BORN OL. 77, 4; B.C. 468.

Socrates.

1. There is little doubt that Socrates was the son of a statuary and a midwife. He was born in a little burgh of Attica. When he came to Athens we know not with any exactness; probably about the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, when

Pericles was still living and Anaxagoras teaching. He frequented the school of the latter. Nor is it at all unlikely that he must have entered with considerable ardour into the studies of his master, and may have carried away from him many valuable hints.

His first teacher.

2. Anaxagoras, as we have seen, was at the furthest remove from the trading Sophists of his day. Political life was with them everything; with him it was nothing. He sought to dwell apart from the world of human beings, to find a home in the world of nature. It was surely a noble experiment. If young Pericles felt it to be so, though the desire of his life was political ascendancy, young Socrates, who never evinced that desire in any period of his life, would, one might have thought, have been carried away by it. But he could not find a country where Anaxagoras sought for one. As he listened to the sublime physical speculations of his master, he seems to have asked himself, "What are all these to me? Let atoms be connected by what law of affinity they will; let them whirl at random through space, or be guided by an intelligence; still the question remains, What am I? They do not help to answer this question. But in some way or other it must be answered. Any carpenter or shoemaker who can put me in the way of solving this problem would be my benefactor. The profoundest teacher whose thoughts are turned in another direction is not the man I want." The school of Anaxagoras therefore was forsaken. There was something very inviting in its quietness; but if that quietness was to be obtained by the sacrifice of human feelings and interests, the gossip of the Agora, the bustle of the Piræus, was better.

Why he did not become a student of Nature.

3. Socrates then was, like the Sophists, a man of business and action. His wisdom, if he had any, must, like theirs, be directed to that which was passing around him, not to that which was going on in some other sphere. But had he wisdom which was available for this purpose? Could he communicate knowledge about things on earth, or things in the skies? The more he considered, the more he found that he was not a possessor of wisdom; that it was the very thing which he needed. He could not put it into the hands of a set of disciples to use it and traffic with it. He must go in search of it. The distinction between the Sophist, or wise man, and the philosopher, had dawned upon Pythagoras, perhaps upon Thales; it became the cardinal distinction in the mind of Socrates. To possess wisdom, to profess it, would be for him at least the most utter falsehood. He did not find that he could lay down theories or maxims about the commonest things. What he needed was to understand them; and this, that he might understand himself, that he might find out what ground he had to stand upon; whether he had any, or was only floating in the air.

Why he did not become a professor of wisdom.

The Dæmon of Socrates.

4. Who can assist him in this inquiry? It was one which concerned his own very self; that which no eye could see, that which lay beneath all utterance, all thought. There was near him (as Socrates believed) one who did take cognizance of the most secret movements of his mind and will, who reproved him, restrained him, warned him. A divine teacher was with him at all times. Though he did not possess wisdom, this teacher could put him in the road to seek for it, could preserve him from the delusions which might turn him out of that road, could keep his mind fixed upon the end for which he was to act and live. Xenophon asks with plain, soldier-like honesty, whether his accusers could believe that he told a lie about this matter, and hints that it would shake his faith in all reality, to suppose that the mind of a man so clear-sighted and free from superstition could be the victim of an utterly false impression, or that it could produce the wholesome effects which he himself had witnessed. We believe that Socrates told no lie about his Dæmon; that it was precisely this faith which kept him from lying; which was the cause of his clearness of sight and his freedom from superstition.

The god at Delphi.

5. This guide or teacher Socrates connected with the mythology of his countrymen. He seems to have interpreted the one by the other. He was sure that there was such a teacher of himself; he could acknowledge, therefore, a teacher of wisdom to Greeks and men. Much that was said about the god of Delphi might seem to him profane; he turned from it with disgust. But on the whole he believed much more, not less, than his countrymen believed, and he shrunk from the scepticism and irreverence which they and their poets ventured to indulge in. He had no notion of substituting a Nous or Intelligence for Jupiter or Apollo. It would have been altogether strange if he had done so, since he was not accounting for the existence of the universe, but craving for a light to show him his own path through it. He was not, therefore, a Monotheist in the sense in which some have represented him as being so; he did not affirm that there were not various objects of worship. In many acts of his life he confessed them. But as he felt that there was one teacher, one source of light and wisdom, who was leading him out of the confusions and bewilderments of sense, he was practically more of a Monotheist than he could have been if he had tried to reduce the traditions of Greece into physical speculations, or had treated them as mere follies.

His calling.

6. Socrates spoke of his Dæmon as reproving and restraining himself; but since he connected this Dæmon with the gods of his country, he felt of course that other men had also a director whom they were to obey, and who could lead them to the object

which he sought. Instead of being a solitary thinker, he had the most intense sense of a vocation to help and instruct others. Though he could not give them wisdom, he might put them into the same way of seeking it, in which he was striving to walk himself.

His character and influence.

7. What charms he used to draw a circle about him may seem at first inexplicable. Most of the Sophists were men advanced in age and reputation when he first appeared in Athens. They promised to fit men for being politicians, orators, generals, and offered very plausible evidence to prove that they could do what they promised. He promised nothing. He was come, he said, to exercise his mother's profession on behalf of those who had thoughts of which they wished to be delivered. You could not understand what line he took; whether he was a philologer, like Prodicus, or a professor of statesmanship, like Protagoras; he seemed to be all things by turns, and nothing definitively or constantly. Personal gracefulness and beauty were great recommendations among the Athenians: he had large projecting eyes, like those of a bull, a flattened and upturned nose, a protuberant stomach; he wore a tattered cloak, and was seldom seen with sandals. Nevertheless, the youth of Athens began to flock about him; they thought that he had something to teach them; perhaps that by some means or other he would be able to impart to them the art of governing better than the more regular doctors. It is impossible to say that some of the causes which we have mentioned as likely to alienate his countrymen may not themselves have contributed to this result. The Athenians liked a humorist, and a humorist Socrates, by his outward negligences, as well as by the whole tone of his discourse, showed himself to be. Moreover, he had a most hearty, genial way of interesting himself in whatever interested those with whom he was mixing; as little of solemn quackery as was ever found in the composition of any man. Add to this that he was a thorough, genuine Greek; Greek in all the habits of his mind, Greek in his taste for society, Greek in wit and argument, Greek in a brave unflinching love for his own land, Greek in making freedom (to a much greater degree than is usually observed or acknowledged) the passion and end of his life. But all these circumstances together could not have availed to counteract the many disadvantages under which he laboured, if he had not possessed the real magnet which must draw the hearts of young men after it, be they never so reluctant—a knowledge of the thing which they are really wanting, and which they have been toiling in vain to find.

His dialogues.

8. Political power was, as we have seen, the one prize which the Sophists proposed to themselves and held out to their pupils

as the reward of all the trouble which they bestowed upon abstract speculations. Now, though there were different roads to this end, and though each teacher believed himself, and induced his disciples to believe, that his was the shortest, yet one method was common to them all; all sought to acquire power by means of *words*. The mastery over words was the great art which the Athenian youth was to cultivate; his own feelings, and an observation of what was passing every day in his city, told him that there was a charm and fascination in these which the physical force of an Oriental tyrant might vainly try to compete with. It seems to have been the first observation of Socrates when he began earnestly to meditate on the condition of his countrymen, that in this case, as in most others, the tyrants were slaves; that those who wished to rule the world by the help of words were themselves in the most ignominious bondage to words. The wish to break this spell seems to have taken strong possession of his mind. But the wish would have been ineffectual, and would only have interfered with the main feeling of his life, if he had not been able to connect the study of words with that deep question respecting his own being of which we spoke just now. As he reflected, he began more and more clearly to perceive that words, besides being the instruments by which we govern others, are means by which we may become acquainted with ourselves. In trying really to understand a word, to ascertain what was the *bonâ fide* meaning which he himself gave it, he found that he gained more insight into his own ignorance, and at the same time that he acquired more real knowledge, than by all other studies together. In this work he knew that he was really honest; he was feeling for a ground; he was breaking through a thousand trickeries and self-deceptions. If, then, he was to deliver his countrymen from that miserable shallowness into which they had been betrayed by the ambition of wisdom and depth,—if he was to lead them out of the multitude of systems above morality into any firm feeling that there was a morality,—above all, if he was to rescue them from the worship of *power*,—this must be his means. He must not stop to canvass the wisdom of this proposition or that. He must not denounce with great moral indignation some that struck him as very mischievous or outrageous. He must not candidly and generously concede the truth and wisdom of those which seemed to him plausible or reasonable. But in every case he must lead his disciples to inquire what they actually meant by the words of the propositions which they were using, and must consider no time wasted which they honestly spent in this labour; no perplexities or contradictions dangerous which started out of their own minds in the course of it.

How Socrates used them.

9. No doubt this would be a most irritating, vexatious course of proceeding. No doubt an opponent who had adopted a certain proposition, and was provided with abundance of arguments in defence of it, would be tortured beyond measure by finding himself not fairly encountered upon those arguments, but led back into a question which he had assumed, forced to give an account of a word which he fancied every one was agreed upon, and not permitted, after all, to bring any of his own resources into play. It was most perplexing for a disciple who had come expecting that a certain doctrine would be either established or refuted, and, perhaps, that the ingenious arguments on both sides of the question might serve his purpose in a popular assembly, to find that he got no decision either way, and, moreover, that he himself had been talking all his life in a language which he did not understand, and using words as if they were algebraic characters. Yet in some way or other the Sophist was taught that he was in the presence of one stronger than himself. He might chafe and fret, and complain that he had been treated with great unfairness. He could not say that his opponent had not got the better of him in his own word-fighting; he could not say that all the scepticism which he had brought into play against the common thoughts and feelings of his countrymen and of mankind had not been made to tell with tenfold force upon himself; he could not help owning and feeling that there was one in conflict with him who had some other end than the mere exercise or display of power, and yet who did possess a power before which his own quailed. On the other hand, the disciple, amidst all his bewilderment, will have gone away with a feeling that he (perhaps for the first time in his life) had actually learned something, and with a conviction that if there be not something better than the attainment of dominion over other men's minds, there is at least a most important and indispensable preliminary to it, unless we would have our own the sport of every deceiver.

His elenchus.

10. The infinite humour and vivacity of Socrates must of course have been of the greatest service in such dialogues as these. But oftentimes his opponents will have fancied that he was merely indulging his humour when he was, in fact, following out his principle. The practice of confessing his uncertainty or his ignorance upon any subject that was presented to him, which formed in their eyes the chief element of his "irony," was not always or generally affected. We make no doubt that he often entered upon a discussion without knowing whither it would lead; actually, as he professed, hoping to be a learner by the result of it. He was certain, not of a particular conclusion but that his method was a sound one, and that it would conduce

His irony

Knowledge in what sense the basis of virtue.

each person who followed it to clearness and truth. It is probable that his discoveries respecting himself and his fellow-creatures were the practical fruits of this method. For instance, it was by repeated experiments that he convinced himself of the immense importance of the habit of recollection; how the mind that wants it is at the mercy of all accidents; how the mind that possesses it is continually realising its own possessions, receiving them as if they were then for the first time bestowed. Upon this principle the greatest part of his moral discipline depended The necessity of removing the impediments to recollection, of leading the mind away from mere sensible images and impressions into an examination of its own treasures, was the purpose and ground of it. But this principle was redeemed from any Brahminical tendency by his habitual use of words and sensible images as the means whereby a man feels his way into the principles and grounds of his being. It is in trying to understand all common things—what the carpenter does with his wood, the shoemaker with his leather, the mason with his stones, —it is by really getting to know what we intend when we talk of all these things, that a man learns to understand himself. It was not therefore to an escape from common life, from daily business, that the withdrawment or recollection of Socrates pointed. It formed the habit of seeking out in everything that which it really is, and not merely its shapes, and appearances, and accidents, which the man is to cultivate, and which is ultimately to fit him for perceiving that which is deepest and truest. Now, it is the faith attained by repeated proofs and trials, that man has that in him which does desire to find out the truth of things; and again, that he has an inclination to be constantly conversing with the mere images of things, and that just so far as the first of these tendencies is kept uppermost, and subordinates the other to it, he is in his honest sound position; and that just so far as the lower tendency is uppermost, he becomes a mere shadow-pursuer and shadow-fighter, which is the soul of Socrates's doctrine. It was not adopted as a scheme to supplant another scheme; he stumbled upon it as a fact which he could no more gainsay than any one for which he had the evidence of his senses—a fact which *was*, let it be explained as it would, and must be recognised in all our dealings with ourselves or with other men.

Recollection

A moral foundation.

Alcibiades the type of the Athenian character.

11. There was one young man in Athens whom Socrates regarded with an intense affection. In him the qualities of the Greek were exhibited in their highest perfection. Creative power, skill in the management of words, personal beauty, this[illegible]ination of manner, were all united in him. The love which starte[illegible]rates bore him shows how thoroughly he sympathised with

the feelings which he regarded with most fear, and in which he saw all possibilities of evil. If Alcibiades could have learnt to see that there was a right and a wrong—that to walk in a line, not to devise one—to perceive, not to create—is man's business, the whole history of Athens might have been different. No doubt there must have been critical moments in the life of this youth, when he confessed to himself that there was something that was more worth seeking than dominion. No doubt there were moments when the feeling that he too had a guide and monitor within him whom he might obey, was stronger than the sense of power and the inclination to wrong-doing which accompanied it. But Ahriman prevailed over Ormuzd: Alcibiades yielded to the darker power within, which was tempting him continually to glorify his own intellect—to use the mighty gifts which had been entrusted to him, for the destruction of his country and of himself. Then all the skill which he had seen his master exercising in word-fighting became his curse. It was an instrument of mighty mischief in his hands. Having once parted with the moral purpose at which Socrates was aiming, that which he received from him became indeed sophistry of the worst kind. It taught him to act more effectually upon the maxim, that all order and society had been invented some time or other by the strongest or the cunningest, and that what they invented they could pull down.

12. This, says our recent historian of Greece, was not the sophistical teaching. The Sophists merely intended to fit Athenian young men for the purposes of civil life. Their aim was not so high a one as that of Socrates, but it was far from a bad aim. We believe that Socrates would have answered, "Either it is *this* aim that I am setting before myself, or it must be a bad aim. All my own teaching, my own influence, if it has not this aim, is bad teaching, bad influence. My elenchus is nothing better in itself than the logic or rhetoric of any other professor. If it is merely taken up as a more skilful or ingenious art, it will be worse; for its purpose is to lead men into the apprehension of that which is—to sift and separate that which is from its shapes and counterfeits, from that which is not. The Sophists are destroying the heart and soul of my countrymen, because they are continually leading them to think that what they want is an *art* which shall enable them to do or to make, when what they actually want is a *science*, a means of seeing that which they did not make, that which lies beneath all our doings, which is at the root of our ownselves."

The mere art of Socrates might prove mischievous

13. From this statement it will be seen in what sense knowledge seemed to Socrates the basis of morality. Those who suppose that he meant to exalt the human faculties and to make

Knowledge in what sense the basis of virtue.

them the grounds of virtue and of truth, do not merely mistake. but invert his meaning. To destroy the worship of power, and especially of intellectual power, may be said to have been the purpose of his life. And in nothing did he show this more than in his doctrine respecting the relation of knowledge to morality. As the outward eye sees certain objects, and is good for nothing except as it sees them, so the inward eye perceives certain objects, and is good for nothing except as it sees them. The objects are there. It is the whole blessing of the man to behold them; as he beholds them he is like them, but they *are*, not the variable functions of his mind, but the eternal, unchangeable principles and grounds of it. A notice of Socrates is only an occasion for indicating this faith; in speaking of his great disciple, we must strive to expound it.

Socrates the specimen of a philosopher.

14. Socrates then was, we conceive, as he said himself, a philosopher, a philosopher and nothing else—a philosopher in the most strict sense of the word—a philosopher who helps us better than any one else to know what philosophy is. He never imagines that his philosophy contains or provides its own object. He is the wisest of men, as the oracle said, because he knows nothing; that is to say, because he brings nothing with him, but acknowledges or recognises that which presents itself to him. When he speaks of the dignity of the philosopher, he means us to understand the dignity of a man who does not exalt himself, who does not put himself in the way of the thing which he is examining, who has the simplest, most open eye for receiving light, whencesoever it shall come. That there is a source of light from whence it does come, and that this light is connected with man, is a principle assumed, if it is ever so imperfectly developed, in all his words and acts.

The condemnation of Socrates natural.

15. How can such a man, it has often been asked, have been compelled to drink hemlock? Must not the restored democracy of Athens have been worse, and more intolerant, than any power which ever existed on the earth? Mr. Grote answers, we think, most reasonably, that the wonder is how such a man should have been suffered to go on teaching for so long. No state, he adds, ever showed so much tolerance for differences of opinion as Athens. We would make an addition to this statement. If it had been possible to regard Socrates merely as an utterer of peculiar opinions, as one of the Greek Sophists or professors, he might still have taught with impunity. Anytus and Meletus might have had their own special causes of dislike to him; his connexion with Critias or Alcibiades might have awakened suspicion in different minds; the ridicule of comedians might have kept up an habitual prejudice against him; but the tolerance of the Athenian people would have triumphed. He would have been

acquitted on the count of corrupting the minds of the youth, as well as on that of introducing new dæmons. But there always has been, and always will be, a limit to the indulgence of those who regard all opinions as equally possible. If a man positively denies that he is proclaiming an opinion, if he speaks of the possibility of *knowing*, of the duty of *distinguishing*, of a truth which men do not create, and which does not change with the changes of our intellect—he comes under quite a different category from the promulger of opinions; he is not entitled to the same mercy. Tolerant people, on the very ground of their tolerance, feel bound to silence or to crush him. What business has he to insult the opinions of other men; to tell them that there is something which it is dangerous for them not to see; that there are falsehoods clinging to their lives which they ought to cast off? It is long indeed before a thoroughly good-natured man can persuade himself that any one has reached this height of criminality. All pity will be shown to his fanaticism as long as it is possible. He will be treated in spite of himself as a sectarian teacher propounding a particular opinion. But if he continues with incurable pertinacity, as Socrates did, to assert that he is not a Sophist, not the putter forth of a certain theory, it is evident that tolerant men must—experience shows that they will—resort, though reluctantly, to the same racks, dungeons, and poison-cups, which bigots are wont to employ. For it comes to this: if the teacher is right in what he says, he must be regarded as a public benefactor; the city must honour him above all its citizens. When the judges had condemned Socrates to death, they asked him, according to Athenian custom, what milder sentence he would propose for himself. He answered, "A public support in the Prytanæum." Though they might be offended at his audacity, their consciences told them that this was the real alternative. Not being prepared to take it, they allowed the sentence to be executed; so assuredly choosing a course immeasurably more honourable to Socrates, and more instructive to after ages.

The Athenians tolerant of all opinions, not of a seeker of truth.

16. We must be careful of separating the discourse of Socrates after his condemnation from the course of his life which preceded it. His faith in a future state is often put forward as a characteristic which distinguished him from the rest of his countrymen and of the pagan world. Now, no one refers more frequently than Socrates himself to the old stories which express this faith; to Æacus and Rhadamanthus, the functions that were attributed to them, the souls upon which they passed judgment. Evidently he believed that the essence of these stories was true; that they did set forth the fact of a correspondence between the condition of men hereafter and their condition here. As in other

The discourse of Socrates on immortality.

cases, he received the teaching of those who had gone before him; but he asked himself what that teaching meant, and how it concerned him. His countrymen believed that, somehow or other, they should be judged hereafter by what they had done here; that some particle of themselves would suffer a vague punishment or enjoy a vague happiness. He was fixed in the conviction that a man's blessedness consists in knowing that which is, in having his soul engaged in the pursuit of this knowledge; that his misery consists in being without it, in being given up to dreams and unrealities. He hoped that what he had desired to know here he should know; he sought for arguments to convince himself that, however the accidents which surrounded him might change, he himself should continue, and being more disengaged and purified from the corruptions and restraints of which he had been conscious here, should be able to converse with the perfect Wisdom and Goodness. Socrates did not tell his disciples that his future life was to be separate from his life here; it was the continuation and unfolding of that life which he looked for. He felt that his eyes had been partially opened, that they would be opened more perfectly, that he should still, and always, be a seeker after wisdom; but that wisdom would meet him and embrace him, and ever reveal to him new treasures, which would awaken in him ever fresh longings, and would continually satisfy them. The seeker of wisdom, who passed here for a pursuer of shadows, would grasp substance; the seeker of wealth and power, who passed here for a pursuer of substance, would grasp a shadow.

The Socrates of the Clouds.

17. The hints which we have thrown out may, we think, enable our readers to reconcile the three documents which we possess concerning the life of Socrates. If we look first at the Aristophanic portrait, we shall find that it is indeed a broad and extravagant caricature, but drawn by a consummate artist, who, even in distorting the expression of his original, shows that he has studied it. We could not consistently bestow this praise upon him if he had, as some of his commentators pretend, represented Socrates as a natural philosopher. But the name of the play of which he is the hero is almost the only excuse for such a notion. And who that knows anything of the genius of Aristophanes, or of the delicacy of the Athenian taste, will suspect him of perpetrating, or his audience of tolerating, the wretched conceit that a man worships the clouds, because he is fond of gazing at the stars? Far rather the airy nymphs whom the philosopher is said to have substituted for the gods of his country, are the patronesses of those attempts to catch the thin, delicate, evanescent meanings and shadows of the meanings of words which might so plausibly be imputed to one who estimated

philology highly for its own sake, and found it so indispensable a weapon in his warfare with the Sophists. The basket, too, in which the philosopher is found hanging between heaven and earth, because he wishes to mingle his thoughts with the congenial air, indicates no sort of apprehension on the part of the poet that Socrates looked upon himself as a mere particle of the general life of the world, and desired to be reunited with his native element; but, on the contrary, points to that doctrine of the withdrawment of the spirit from the phantasms of the world, which we have spoken of as forming so capital an article in the moral creed of Socrates, and of which his idea respecting the condition of the soul after death is only the expansion and fulfilment. The maps and geometrical instruments which the old Athenian found in the phrontisterium partly prove that illustrations from subjects with which the education of the Athenian youth made them familiar, were frequently in the philosopher's mouth, and partly seem intended as a joke at the Socratic attempt to reduce morality to a science. The dialogue respecting the cause of thunder is evidently intended far more as a caricature of the philosopher's method of discourse than as an exposition of any of his particular opinions; the chief object being to leave an impression on the hearer's mind, that Socrates substituted some special dæmon of his own (which the poet, to keep his metaphors consistent, and to strike an oblique blow at the really physical speculators, calls Δῖνος) for Jupiter. It is necessary to make these remarks in justification of Aristophanes, for if in these parts of his play he has wished to represent Socrates as a naturalist, the whole plot of it is absurd and inappropriate. Why should Strepsiades go to a natural philosopher that he may learn how to cheat his creditors? or how should such a teacher give Pheidippides lessons in beating his father? But the most remarkable feature in the whole play—the contest between the just and the unjust principle—is at once decisive as to the meaning of Aristophanes. The ingenious satirist, with the quick, intuitive discernment which might be expected from an Athenian, and such an Athenian, has perceived the conflict between an uplooking and a downlooking mind to be the most characteristic and important peculiarity of the system he was ridiculing.

Socrates not represented by Aristophanes as a teacher of Physics.

The Socrates of the Memorabilia.

18. The one point in the life of Socrates of which Aristophanes shows himself to have been utterly ignorant, is the object of it; and this is the one point upon which Xenophon is anxious to give us information. This worthy disciple is too anxious to show us Socrates in his dignity, and therefore we miss the hearty humorist who may be seen, though disguised, in the comedian's picture. It was natural that a soldier should be

more struck with the positive conclusions at which Socrates arrived upon direct practical matters, than with his method of arriving at them. It was equally natural that the professed apologist should be eager to exhibit his master in the way that would be most intelligible to plain persons, who had been puzzled with reports of his strange argumentations, and who had fancied that some great mischief must lurk in them. But if we bear these facts in mind, and look upon Xenophon as rather the expounder of the Socratic discipline than of the man himself, or of his principles, we shall probably be much more struck with the agreements than with the differences between him and the other biographers. Homage to an invisible guide and teacher, the distinction between the principle in man that looks upward and that which gravitates to the earth, the recognition of restraints upon the animal nature as means for the enfranchisement of the true man, we shall find in every page of the *Memorabilia*. Standing alone, Xenophon would be unsatisfactory—nay, even misleading. His Socrates would be almost as much a mere bundle of fine qualities or true opinions as his Cyrus. But he is most useful in giving clearness and steadiness to the apprehensions which we derive from other, and, on the whole, better sources. We see clearly in him that Socrates did from first to last keep a moral end before him. We see that he was, to all intents and purposes, a practical man. And this discovery, instead of making it more difficult to interpret the accounts of him which some think inconsistent with it, renders those accounts more intelligible and more consistent with themselves than we should otherwise have thought them.

The Platonic Socrates.

19. In the Socrates of Plato we find both the Aristophanic and the Xenophontic Socrates—the mere humorist and debater, and the mere moralist—uniting to form the real man. It has often been said that the brilliant imagination of this philosopher created a hero between whom and the actual Socrates there were, perhaps, very few points of resemblance. Certainly it would be a hopeless task to vindicate Plato from the charge of a brilliant, and more than a brilliant, imagination. But two meanings may be given to this word. If it signifies a contempt of reason and probability, the gift, we apprehend, must belong in a much lower degree to Plato than to those who conceive it possible for a person living in the very city wherein Socrates had been for years walking and talking, to have palmed upon his countrymen a false or fantastic image of him. If, on the contrary, by imagination we understand the power of giving to that which would be otherwise a mere shadow, substance and life, it must surely be a most serviceable ally to him who would collect and harmonise the remembrances of an actual character,

no less than to him who would call into being one that never existed. Strong affection may supersede the necessity of such a faculty in a mere biographer; or rather, perhaps, may awaken it. But one who has not only to describe the thoughts, words, and acts of a friend, but to show how they bore upon the state of his country, and how they will bear upon men's speculations and lives for ages to come, has need that no ordinary measure of this faculty should be imparted to him. This is the work of Plato. It was Socrates, as the guide into a particular line and course of thought, whom he proposed to exhibit. But in order to do this, it was absolutely necessary that he should be brought livingly before us; that we should see, not his opinions, but himself; that we should be able to trace the workings of his mind, to see how he acted upon others and they upon him. By any other means Plato would have been unable to give us the true Socrates; and without presenting us the true Socrates he could never have brought out with any clearness and distinctness the different sides of his own philosophy.

SECTION III.

THE SOCRATICS.

The Cyrenaic school: Aristippus, Theodorus, Hegesias, Anniceris.

1. The immediate outgrowths of the Socratic philosophy and discipline were three schools, ordinarily distinguished as the *Cyrenaic*, *Cynic*, and *Megaric*. These may be said to be the parents of the most conspicuous theories with which later Greece was occupied. The Cyrenaic doctrine, having mingled with a tributary stream flowing from the physics of Democritus, terminated in Epicurism. The Cynic combined with the Megarian to constitute Stoicism. The Megarian, moreover, contributed one element to the important speculations which had their home at a much later period at Alexandria. It is interesting, therefore, to trace the leading thoughts of each, and to show how they originated with Socrates.

Aristippus, flourished B.C. 366.

2. Aristippus of Cyrene seems to have been a man of a singularly easy, happy temperament. Pleasures excited him not, pains passed lightly over him. Few men, one would have thought, would have had less sympathy with Socrates, who was a hard fighter, all his life long, with himself and with the world. Nevertheless this earnest thinker had charms even for Aristippus. Socrates said that we are not to yield to circumstances, but are the masters of them; and the light spirit which no circumstance affected or oppressed found an interpretation for the maxim in his own experience. The perturbations and restlessness of the thoughtless, unrecollected man were frequent topics for the pity and warnings of Socrates; could there be a more

natural inference than that freedom from annoyance, a dismissal of all careful and turbulent anxieties, is the great end of philosophy? In addition to these, the well-known commonplaces of his master's discourse, Aristippus could no doubt quote authentic fragments of his conversations, in which he had seemed to assume pleasure as the end of life, and to adjust his other maxims to this conclusion. He could tell, we may be sure, of cases in which Socrates, addressing himself to his own lazy, voluptuous habits of mind, and reprehending them, had yet seemed to make it his object to prove, not that they were leading to a wrong end, but that they were ill-chosen means for accomplishing that end. Aristippus, therefore, easily persuaded himself that he had a good title to call himself a Socratic—nay, that he was the best and most complete interpreter of the Socratic views—when he announced the great discovery that pleasure and pain are the ultimate principles of human life; that the pursuit of the one and the avoidance of the other is and must be the business of every man. Whatever honour belongs to the first formal promulgator of a doctrine which has occupied so prominent a place in the philosophy of all ages as this, must in all justice be given to Aristippus. That in which he is distinguished from later and less practical reasoners of the same class is in the distinct and honest assertion that the momentary, concrete gratification, and not the complex notion of happiness, is and must be the object of men's desires and labours. It was easy for Aristippus to adjust some other portions of the Socratic creed to this doctrine. If the choice of what is agreeable, and the rejection of what is disagreeable, be the great virtue of the human soul, how conveniently might the language of Socrates respecting the connection of virtue with reason and knowledge be pressed into the service of the new sect! Of course it is the intellectual faculty which prefers and discards; and why should not these acts of judgment be the same with those acts of reason, that perception of what is and what is not, to which the master had so constantly referred? And as for the apparent self-restraint and bodily privations of Socrates, these were in no real contradiction to the Cyrenaic theory, which admits, of course, all varieties of taste, and may well permit one man to seek mental pleasure at the expense of corporeal,—another, corporeal at the loss of mental. This school underwent several changes. In the hands of Theodorus pleasure and pain ceased to be real outward objects, and self-seeking and self-glorification became the defined, acknowledged ends of the wise man. In Hegesias the hope of attaining pleasure is exchanged for a mere invention of contrivances to avoid pain. Anniceris seems to have taken off the rough edges of the doctrine, and to have prepared the way for

His excuse for calling himself a disciple of Socrates.

its merging in the more general notions about happiness which were matured by Epicurus.

3. The Cynic school—as it presents itself in the persons of Antisthenes, its founder, and Diogenes, its only very notorious disciple—is the formal opposite of the Cyrenaic. Yet they added one to the numerous illustrations of the old maxim, which Mr. Coleridge has observed to be of all maxims the most pregnant for the philosopher and the philosophical historian,—"Extremes meet." Both, in fact, started from the same Socratic maxim; both may probably have alleged the same discourses in vindication of their system. The wise man should not submit to circumstances, but rule them, said Aristippus; his whole business is to arrange his circumstances that they may produce the maximum of pleasure and the minimum of pain. A man is to be superior to his circumstances, said Antisthenes, and therefore he is by all means to overcome his sensibility to pleasure or pain, and endeavour to live solely within himself, cultivating that nobler part of him which is not affected by outward impulses and impressions. If the first could allege passages from the discourses of Socrates in support of his theory, the latter could more confidently appeal to the whole course of his life, to his habitual endeavours after a victory over mere sensations. The Cynics were, in fact, more disciplinarians than doctrinists. They had a hard dogmatism of their own, but they were much more ambitious to show their own indifference to passing accidents than to discover principles and reasons for such an indifference. Of the two professors of the school, Antisthenes seems to have been the honester, Diogenes the more original. The first was hard and narrow, but apparently sincere; the second was an ostentatious coxcomb, from whose proud and insolent spirit were emitted now and then sparks of what might have been genius if it had been accompanied with simplicity of character and a true purpose.

The Cynic school: Antisthenes and Diogenes.

Antisthenes, about B.C. 426-371.

Diogenes, B.C. 412-323.

4. Euclides of Megara was unquestionably a more sagacious and subtle man than any of those we have named. He was attracted to Socrates by no hope, either of obtaining a theory respecting life, or of discovering a scheme of self-culture, but by his unrivalled skill in disputation. Had Euclides lived thirty years earlier, he would have been an Eleatic, or else a Sophist. But in nothing is the effect of the Socratic teaching, and the change it had wrought upon the minds of his countrymen, more remarkable than in the moral tone which it imparted to the thoughts of those who would otherwise have been debaters merely. To argue was the taste and the vocation of the Megarian school, but their arguments were all irresistibly drawn to the question, "What is the Good?" In pursuing this inquiry,

The Megarian school: Euclides, Eubulides, Diodorus, Stilpo.

they were naturally led to those pregnant positions of Socrates respecting evil, as a departure from, and rebellion against, what *is*, which constituted, as we have seen, the ultimate, and, in one way, the most characteristic part of his philosophy. This principle, in fact, disjoined from all the living processes by which Socrates had arrived at it, and by which he sought to make other men conscious of it, and exhibited in naked opposition to all other ideas of virtue or goodness, constituted the Megarian doctrine. All their labours were employed in disproving the obvious and apparently irresistible opinion, that those things whereof the senses give us information are the most real and certain. We have heard how Zeno defended the doctrine of his friend and master Parmenides by showing the utter instability of sensible presumptions and conclusions. The Megarian school adopted the same method. The difference lay in the characters of the respective periods; the purpose of Zeno was to support the metaphysical idea of Oneness,—of the Megarian, to support the moral idea of absolute, unchangeable Being.

Degeneracy of this school.

5. The history of this school is melancholy and instructive. Euclides, though the bias of his mind was to disputation, felt the grandeur of the moral lessons which he had learned from Socrates. In Eubulides positive faith was superseded by delight in his own subtlety, and in the confutation of antagonist arguments. The mere forms of the understanding, apart from all vital principles or results, were the objects of admiration and reverence to Diodorus Cronos. Lastly, Stilpo seems to have lost the characteristic idea of the Megarian school altogether, while he carried its characteristic infirmity to its greatest height. Not to establish the existence of objective truth, but to show how an intellect may be formed which shall be most impassive to influences from without, and least disturbed by affections from within, was his problem. One of his pupils was Zeno of Cittium, the author of Stoicism.

SECTION IV.

PLATO.

The dream of Socrates.

1. Once upon a time, the biographer of the Greek philosophers reports,[1] Socrates dreamed a dream. He found an unfledged cygnet upon his knee. In a few moments it became winged and flew away, uttering a very sweet sound. The next day a young man came to him, who was said to reckon Solon among his nearer ancestors, and looked back through him to Codrus and to the god Poseidon. The name of this young man was Plato.

[1] Diog. Laert. lib. iii. cap. i. s. 7

Plato's early life.

2. Before he came to Socrates, this youth had been a writer of dithyrambics, and songs, and tragedies. He had studied under Ariston, the Argive, a celebrated wrestler. Some say that he won his name from the breadth of his chest, and that he gained a prize for wrestling at the Isthmian games. But, whatever his earlier studies may have been, the day in which he settled on the knees of Socrates was the one which determined the course of his after-life. Nothing that he had learnt before that time was assuredly wasted, but the discourses of Socrates gave his studies a meaning and a direction. From him Plato learnt to understand himself, and thence to understand his predecessors and contemporaries. From him he learnt what it behoved a Greek to seek for, what it behoved a man to seek for, what perils and temptations beset the one and the other if he enters upon the search.

The paucity of facts concerning his life.

3. So completely has Plato identified himself with his master, that it is difficult to discover with any certainty the events and circumstances of his own life. Less is recorded of him than of many of the most insignificant of Greek sophists. What is recorded rests upon very unsatisfactory evidence. The epistles which are called by his name have long been rejected as spurious, though some fragments of information respecting him may be derived from them. The most interesting of these concern his expeditions into Sicily, his connection with the elder tyrant Dionysius, his experiments for the reformation of the younger, his hope of realising some ideal polity through the influence of a dissolute and worthless tyrant, his direct influence upon the character and fortunes of the stern aristocrat, the conspirator, the despot Dion. Though it may not be possible to arrange the parts of this history, we may perhaps admit that Plato had an intense longing to prove that he was no mere dreamer; that what he believed was capable of realisation. We have not enough facts to point a moral respecting the infirmity of a noble mind in yielding to the hope of great results through such instruments. He may never have entertained any flattering expectations, but may simply, and perhaps reluctantly, have fulfilled a task that was imposed upon him. How far it was *necessary* that his polity should be tried in Syracuse, or anywhere else, in order that the truth of its principles might be tested, we may understand better when we have considered what that polity was. The question which immediately concerns us is, whether Plato, when he became fledged, flew away into the air, and left his master upon the earth, as some have fancied, and as the old tradition seems to intimate, or whether he was the truest and most faithful expounder of his master's doctrines, the true Socratic, because he was not the founder of a Socratic system, but a living and original investigator.

Relation between the Socratic schools and Plato.

4. Plato conversed with both Aristippus and Antisthenes. With Euclides he enjoyed a closer intimacy than with either of them, for to Megara he and other disciples fled after the death of Socrates, when it seemed less safe to dwell in Athens. It would be rash to say that the direction of his own thoughts was determined by his observation of these three men, for it is a notion apparently well supported by internal evidence, that his *Phædrus* and his *Laches* were written in the lifetime of his master. Yet it seems impossible to doubt that he had very early noticed the tendency in his different fellow-disciples to adopt certain sentences which fell from their teacher's lips, and from these to form systems and schools, and that he had considered very deeply whether there was no course by which he might escape from the like temptation. If Socrates had compounded his creed out of the different systems then prevalent in Greece, it could surprise no one that the elements thus artificially put together should reassert their independence, and in some new shape, perhaps, be claimed as the property of the minds to which they were severally most adapted. Everything that he had seen of his master made this supposition impossible. Whether he had studied the doctrines of other schools or no, it is evident that every thought which he uttered came fresh and living from himself, or, rather, was the united fruit of his own reflections and of those of the persons with whom he conversed. It was evident that he had been able to minister to other minds, because he knew so well what was passing in his own, and had sought out every principle as the solution of an actual difficulty. But it is fair to suppose that every philosopher is in some sort an inquirer into the workings of his own mind—nay, that his philosophy, so far as it is sincere, is an exhibition of his own mind. How then was Socrates, who was so remarkably *himself*, preserved from that narrowness and exclusiveness into which Aristippus and Antisthenes, both sincere men in their way, had obviously fallen?

How Socrates escaped narrowness and the temptation to theorise.

5. Plato could only answer the question by supposing that it was the healthy habit of always connecting his own thoughts with outward circumstances, and with the puzzles of the age in which he was living, which prevented the Socratic doctrines, in their owner's hands, from ever stagnating into a mere theory. The obvious resource for making a philosophy complete and general, and suited to all times, was to strip it of those accidental features which had adapted it so happily to a particular crisis. Plato was convinced, by reflection and experience, that precisely the opposite course was the safe one. The poetry of Homer could be read and enjoyed in the age of Pericles, not because it stood aloof from all temporary and local accidents, but because it was enveloped in them. It was exactly when men were presented to them as they were in an entirely different state of manners, that they were able to realise them as their brethren and their countrymen. Reasons will no doubt occur in multitudes to the reader why the analogy of poetry is inapplicable to philosophy: it is sufficient for our purpose that they did not weigh with Plato. No one knew so well as he—no one felt so strongly—the essential difference between poetry and philosophy; he even was betrayed into exaggerations in his attempt practically to assert it. But he was convinced that it did not consist in this, that the poet obtains immortality for thoughts which he utters by adapting himself to the feelings of the age in which he lives, and the philosopher by divesting himself of them all. He thought he could see that the abandonment of all living and practical sympathies, the attempt to divorce himself from human interests, gives to the philosopher that narrow and bounded character from which he hopes by these means to deliver himself. If, then, Grecian wisdom was not to retrograde from the point to which Socrates had brought it, or if it was ever to become useful in other countries and periods, Plato concluded that it must not resolve itself into speculations or declamations about this or that scheme of life, this or that principle of action or pursuit, but must be content to exhibit itself in the conversations of actual men, not of some imaginary day, but of that day, talking about the matters of which they did talk when they met in the streets or at their feasts. He would not take the least pains to forget the people among when he was living, or the transactions that were occupying them, or adopt any more universal mode of thought and speech than that which was common among them.

Why Plato wrote Dialogues.

6. The *Dialogue* of Plato is not then, as some have represented it, an artistical invention, in which the philosopher sacrificed his severe judgment to his imagination, or to a desire of reputation for dramatic skill with his contemporaries or with posterity, or to the ambition of presenting truths in an agreeable form. It is evident that he regarded it as a necessary mean for the elucidation of the truths with which he believed himself to be possessed; and that he is not at all more anxious to impress any one principle upon his readers than this, that in the Dialogue, rightly used, we have the induction to all principles. It is strange, indeed, that Plato should be accused of sacrificing the interest of his disciples to a selfish desire of fame, by that method which has the effect of leading them onwards step by step in self-inquiry; or that he should be supposed to have used this as a way of conciliating their favour, when, in fact, it has caused more conscious vexation and irritation to every superficial talker of that day, than any which his genius could have devised. A

mere artist endeavours to carry us at once into noble contemplations, which make us conscious of our own greatness and dignity. It is Plato's desire that we should feel our own way into these contemplations, ascending into them through rugged and thorny paths, discovering how many frivolous difficulties suggest themselves to us, which must be cleared away before we can see anything as it is. His Dialogues are literally an *education*, explaining to us how we are to deal with our own minds, how far we are to humour them, how far we are to resist them; how they are to entertain the glimpses of light which sometimes fall upon them; how they are to make their way through the complications and darkness in which they so often feel themselves lost. Nowhere but in the sacred oracles do we find an author so cognisant of his own perplexities, so little anxious to hide them from us; nay, so anxious to awaken us to the consciousness of them, in order that we may be delivered from them. Herein lies the art of Plato. Most consummate art it is, we admit; superior in the depth of insight which must have led to it, and in the influence which it exerts, to that which is displayed in almost any human composition. Still it is not art, in the sense commonly given to that word; it has no independent purpose of pleasing. It does not work underground, leaving the ordinary man to feel its effects simply, and the thoughtful man to judge of its character by its effects. On the contrary, it anxiously draws your attention to its own methods and contrivances; that you should enter into them, and understand all the springs and valves that are at work, is as much the writer's ambition, as that you should accept any one of the final results. Indeed, he does not acknowledge the results as yours, till in the region of your own inner being you have gone through the processes which lead to them.

Character of his Dialogues.

A chain gradually unwinding itself.

7. Plato above all men must be studied in Plato. A hearty and sympathising acquaintance with one Dialogue will do more to initiate a student into what is blunderingly called his system, than the reports of all philosophical critics and historians. There you find no digests of doctrine, no collections of ready-manufactured notions, to be adopted and carried away. Every one is alive and at work. The actors too are not, as in our best Dialogues—in those of Berkeley, for instance—personages with significant names; they are real Phædruses, Gorgiases, and Protagorases, discoursing, in a place which is ascertained to us by an accurate and vivid description, about some passing question in the folds of which are found to be contained the deepest and highest principles of our being. These are drawn forth, not violently by any predetermination that such and such facts shall give forth such and such a moral, but by the ordinary

accidents of conversation, amidst explanations and contradictions, the confusion of disciples, the anger of doctors, clumsy attempts at reconciliation by good-natured bystanders. The dialogue is often a *Siris*. Like Berkeley's admirable treatise, it may be bound here on earth to no worthier a stake than the properties and virtues of tar-water. Oftentimes the starting-point may be one far less worthy than this, the lying speech of some rhetorician in support of some mischievous and vulgar paradox. Yet the chain is unwound with a skill of which our modest countryman would have cheerfully confessed that his was but a feeble copy, till its highest link is felt to be about the throne of Him whose name it was the privilege of Berkeley to utter, the honesty of Plato to declare unutterable.

8. Thus far we have described Plato as reasserting the entire principle of Socrates against those who had dismembered it. But a notion has gone forth, and has received support from an able and eloquent French commentator of our day, that Plato was an Eclectic; in other words, that his object on every occasion was to set in opposition two imperfect principles, and either, by merely showing their inadequacy, to suggest the hint, or, by clear exposition, to develope the form, of a third idea which should include them both. This is the most plausible shape which the theory has taken. Another and common way in which it is stated is, that Plato framed to himself the notion of a philosophy which, taking its start from the doctrine of Socrates, should adopt into itself all the other Greek philosophies, whether metaphysical or moral, and that accordingly we do find in him not only an attempt to harmonise the doctrines of the schools which took their name from Socrates, but also of those which preceded him. In both these statements there is, as it seems to us, much truth: yet truth put into a form which is exceedingly likely to mislead a reader, and utterly to pervert his notions respecting the real object of the Greek teacher. We suspect that, in considering these theories, we may both arrive at a clearer apprehension of Plato's meaning, and gain some light which will profit us in all our future inquiries.

His supposed Eclecticism.

9. One main object of Plato in using the dialogue was, that he might discover the latent meaning of words, and might lead the inquirer to recognise this meaning as that which had been implied in them from their origin, and had been floating in the minds of those who had given them quite a different signification. Hereby he was carrying out the method which Socrates, as we have seen, had been throughout his life maturing, and to which we have traced the success of all his experiments in moral science. For this practice was grounded upon a faith which is

Moral distinction the primary purpose of Plato.

ripened day by day into certainty, that there is in every man that which apprehends and recognises truth; that the truth is continually near him; and again, that his view of it is continually interrupted and distorted by the phantoms which are presented to his senses. In drawing forth this truth out of the mind of the student, and teaching him to realise it as his own, consisted, as Plato believed, the great duty of the Socratic teacher; to this all his labours were to be bent; so far as he did this work faithfully, he might hope to be rewarded with greater illumination. Never, however, was it to be forgotten that the discipline was a moral as well as an intellectual one, nay, that it was primarily and essentially moral; that he must resist the attractions and bribery of sense in order to escape her impositions. Now the process we have described leads to a result which often looks like the result of *Eclecticism*. An opinion seems to be rejected as false, an opinion that is set in opposition to it is shown also to be unsatisfactory, and then at last a truth is seen, or suspected to be hidden somewhere, which both alike had been aiming ineffectually to reach. The reader of Plato's Dialogues will be encountered again and again with instances of this sort. But let him beware of hurrying to the conclusion, that the reconcilement of these opinions, or the construction of another opinion which shall be more comprehensive than both, was the aim of the teacher. If he will quietly accompany him along the road, he will find that in such conversations as these, *distinction* is much more his object than accommodation. To distinguish between those images which the mind shapes for itself out of the objects of sense when it is sense-ridden and sense-possessed, and that sound meaning and reality which it is capable of perceiving when it has sought to purge itself of its natural and habitual delusions—to teach it the art of rejecting as well as choosing, and to put it in the posture for either one act or the other; this is the intention of Plato. It may be that he has done more to introduce harmony and unity into moral speculations than any philosopher who ever lived; we fully believe that he has. But he begins with cultivating in us the habit of moral distinction. He begins with leading us to feel that truth and falsehood are radical ultimate contradictions which cannot be accounted for or resolved into any others. To see that which is, as it verily is, this is the highest privilege of the best and wisest man; to see things as they are not, confused, sensualised, corrupted, this is the misery and curse of the thoughtless, slavish victim of inclination. To open that inward eye by which the reality of things is discerned in other men, is the vocation and privilege of him who has himself served an apprenticeship to truth, and feels that he is her servant.

Purely Socratic Dialogues

10. Such, we conceive, is the object of one large class of the Platonic Dialogues, which are the induction or vestibule to the rest. In these Plato is distinctly and emphatically Socratic. They must, indeed, differ in an important respect from the actual conversations of Socrates, in that the end must always have been more present to the mind of the writer, than it could have been to that of the speaker. In Socrates the strongest feeling seems to have been, "I am certain there is something which is not appearance or phantasy, which man did not shape out for himself, but which will remain when all phantasies have disappeared, which is, and which I must recognise if I would be anything but a phantom or shadow myself." This was the conclusion of a practical working mind. By earnest meditation upon this conclusion, Plato came to feel that if there is an unseen reality in all things, a truth, a substance in things, of which the eye sees only the shape and colour, there must be a truth and substance which has none of those sensible adjuncts, which is in *itself*, and the beholding of which is the function and highest attainment of the purified spirit. Now the outward shell of this opinion so closely resembles the doctrine of Euclides that we cannot wonder that some critics, in their desire to reduce the philosophy of Plato into fragments, should have pronounced several of the earlier Dialogues to be not in fact his, but productions of the Megarian school. All in which they found this substance, this τὸ ὄν, put forward as the end of human investigations, they naturally connected with a system which had the assertion that Good and Being are identical for its prominent characteristic. Those who agree with us in the view we have taken will at once see the plausibility of the critic's notion, and its utter untenableness. In no part of Plato's works is the distinction between him and the Megarians so conspicuous as in this where he is asserting their own principle. For by adhering closely to the method of Socrates, by making his Dialogues not the declaration of a truth, but a mental exercise to arrive at it, he has not only divested the doctrine of all its dryness and prickliness, but he has shown how it is connected with those other more obvious notions to which the Megarian set it in rude opposition. Pleasure is not the good, they said; self-denial is not the good; Being is the good. Yes, said Plato, but there is a Being in pleasure, there is a reality in it as well as a falsehood in it. Whatever man has found an expression for in language, whatever man has pursued as an object in life, there is in *that* a truth, a substance, which may be distinguished from the lying phantom that surrounds and counterfeits it. And so far as a man does this, so far does he put himself into the right condition of mind for arriving ultimately at the perception of *that* Truth,

These Dialogues not Megarian.

that Being which is encompassed with no accidents. But then, in order to attain or to cultivate this state of mind, there must be a discipline, a curbing, and contradiction of the lower nature, and therefore this too is a good.

Second class of Dialogues

11. Without, then, any purpose of combining opinions, nay, while resolutely maintaining boundaries, and using a most subtle test for the discrimination of the true from the apparent, Plato had actually reduced the three doctrines which assumed the name of Socratic into a certain relation and harmony. It now became him to consider how far this same doctrine and method might be applied to the earlier philosophers of Greece; how far his master had been anticipated by Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, or Pythagoras; how far he had thrown back a light upon them which might make their speculations more intelligible and consistent with each other. Here commences, in our judgment, the second class of the Platonic Dialogues, that in which the link between Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, between the doctrine of Being which Socrates had asserted, and the question respecting Unity, which had been so great an occupation of the Greek mind, is illustrated and developed.

12. Our readers will not have forgotten that the leader of the Eleatic school, Xenophanes, was in one respect distinguished from his successors. His language at first sight seems remarkably to accord with that of Socrates. That which he supposed to be the true object of man's contemplation was God, or "The Being." Yet, while doing justice to the course of thought by which he arrived at this conclusion, we were obliged to admit that he was essentially a destructive thinker; that he reduced his Being to a mere negation of human qualities and attributes; and that Parmenides found a happier expression for the results of his inquiries when he said that they simply led to the affirmation of Oneness. How, then, did the doctrine of Socrates differ from that of Xenophanes? It was separated from it by a whole heaven. The Being of Xenophanes was altogether exclusive; the Being of Socrates was altogether inclusive. If the language of men contained such words as "just," "merciful," "good," if it attributed these names to certain acts, then, whether these words had been understood or no, whether they had been rightly applied or no, there was a reality corresponding to them, there was a "justice," a "mercy," a "goodness," and all these centred and united themselves in the Being. No Sophist could embarrass him with the question, "Seeing man also uses the words 'unjust,' 'unmerciful,' 'bad,' why should not these also have their appropriate archetypes? and why may not these, as much as the others, dwell in that permanent and

Difference between Xenophanes and Socrates

all-containing substance?" For it was assumed in the very hypothesis that all these are departures from that which is, that they are intrinsically falsehoods. Now, it was by reflection upon this difference, so delicate yet so vital, so strikingly marking the man who was fighting against all popular opinions and faith from the man who was finding out substance and life in all, that Plato seems to have gained his first insight into that doctrine of Ideas which constitutes the most native and peculiar portion of his philosophy, that which may not wrongly be called its purely Platonic portion. We are perfectly willing to admit the assertion which the other disciples of Socrates seem to have made with no little vehemence, and which Aristotle has adopted from them, that no such principle as this was enunciated by Socrates in any of his discourses. Yet we believe as undoubtedly, that by his steady adoption of the Socratic method, Plato arrived at this principle, and that they failed in apprehending it only because they neglected that method. In endeavouring to make this remark clear, we shall also perhaps be able to give our readers such insight as a treatise like this may hope to give into the subject itself.

Ideas

Practical difficulty in the Socratic doctrine.

13. The Greek word for *appearance* and for *opinion* is the same. An opinion is that which *seems* to each man. Now the whole of the education and discipline of Socrates had been to lead his disciples away from appearances to realities. And just so far as he did this he felt that he was leading them from Opinions to Knowledge. His experiments upon others convinced him, his own heart told him, that there is in us a thirst after knowledge, that with less than knowledge we cannot be satisfied. These at least are Socratic assertions; no one pretends that they were palmed upon him by Plato. But how could this be? The essence, the being of a thing, or of a person, seems shut up in that thing or person. I may acknowledge that it is there, but how can it ever come within the region of my perceptions? Must it not be, after all, some shape, or image, or phantom of this thing which I take account of, and not the very thing itself? Supposing this were admitted, the Socratic philosophy falls to the ground. And what falls with it? Not a scheme or a system, but the faith that truth is anyhow cognisable by man, the faith that he is not the necessary dupe of shadows and impostures; the fact that he is a moral being. It was not a doubtful question whether these results would follow from such a determination as this; they had followed; the practice and education of Socrates had been nothing less or more than a deliverance from them. The Sophists had turned the world into a shadow world, in which they could safely practise their jugglerries. It was the great assertion that something is, and that

Opinion and knowledge.

only what is may be known, which had discomfited them, and made a mock of their subtleties. Yet unless this great practical puzzle could in some manner be resolved, the conclusions of Socrates, however ascertained to be sound by the reason and moral feeling of every one who fairly worked them out, would be liable to continual assaults on the side of the understanding. On this point, too, Plato was not left to his own conjectures. The Sophists had stolen their armour from the real, the honest philosophers of Greece. *They* had not dared to grapple with this difficulty, and the proofs which they had left of its existence in their speculations had been eagerly laid hold of by those who knew so well how to suck the poison out of every flower.

Heracleitans and Eleatics.

14. We have intimated that a faithful and affectionate study of the strange, earnest thoughts which occupied Heraclitus might be profitable to any man. But his sayings concerning the endless vicissitude of things, and the falsehood of all human conjectures, made far more impression upon the Greek mind than his deeper thoughts respecting the universal light in man, and the power he possesses of conversing with that which is universal. These latter sentiments had only connected themselves with the vague pantheistic notions which were now gaining ascendancy (notions probably very far indeed from the mind of Heraclitus himself, who thought it the ultimate wisdom to know the name of Jupiter); the former, in the hands of Protagoras, had become a system which excluded all feeling of constancy and permanence or order. One man has one notion of the things which he beholds or meditates upon; another man another. Any one of these notions may be as right as another; and that we cannot have more than such notions, that we cannot arrive any more nearly to the truth of things, is a proposition not so much to be proved as to be taken for granted. Meantime the Eleatic "fixedness," which was the formal opposite of the Heracleitan "flux," served the purpose of the deceiver equally well. To be able to deny the fact of plurality, and so embarrass the minds of men respecting the objects of their worship, was just as convenient a line of policy as to upset their faith in their own convictions. Such observation might have led another man to despair of all inquiries; they only gave Plato a stronger moral interest in prosecuting those upon which he had entered.

15. All the notions, you say, which the mind forms respecting that which the bodily eye sees, or that which its own inward eye sees, are confused, fluctuating, contradictory. My notion of the flower is not the very flower; my notion of what is just is not the very just. Most true, Heraclitus; most true, Protagoras. But these notions are indexes, guiding-posts to that which is not false, or confused, or contradictory. This notion

of the flower and of justice proves that there is a very flower—a very justice. Again, the mind is capable of beholding the Being, the One. But of this Being, of this One, all the notions, imaginations, premonitions of the sensual understanding offer most miserable and counterfeit resemblances. True, Xenophanes and Parmenides; yet there is that in this Being, this One, which does and must answer to these notions; that which they are trying, however vainly, however awkwardly, to express. If, then, we connect the results of these inquiries, which start from such opposite points, what follows? There are forms permanent and unchangeable in which that which is, manifests itself as it is; in which we behold it as it is. Are these forms, then, in the beholder, or in that which he beholds? We answer, the region of pure Being, that in which the inner mind dwells, may be (one might expect that it would be) under some corresponding law to that of sensible phenomena. At all events there could be no *à priori* presumption against the doctrine that as a sound cannot, by the very nature of language and of things, be referred only to that whence it proceeds, but likewise involves the supposition of an ear which receives it, so there may be such a presentation of that which actually is, of the substance or essence of each thing, as can neither be understood merely in reference to that thing, nor merely in reference to that whereunto it is made, but must by its nature appertain one and the same moment to both. But then this presentation cannot by its very nature be fluctuating or variable; it must be permanent and substantial, or it cannot make known that which is permanent and substantial; it must be the very opposite to that which is its parallel in the world of sense. Are we to say of such ideas or forms that they are eternal as well as substantial? To answer "Yes," would perhaps startle no one, if these ideas or forms had merely reference to Justice, Goodness, or even Beauty. But when we speak of the actual flower and tree that we behold as having a primary form or idea, is there not something dangerous in a doctrine which would represent such forms as eternal? The reply is, that this statement would do but very partial justice to Plato. For if in the minutest thing he believes that there is a reality, and therefore in some sense an archetypal form or idea, yet he believes also, just as firmly, that every idea has its ground and termination in one higher than itself, and that there is a supreme idea, the foundation and consummation of all these, even the idea of the absolute and perfect Being, in whose mind they all dwelt, and in whose eternity alone they can be thought or dreamed of as eternal.

Notions and ideas.

Ideas substantial.

16. This remark may also relieve the doctrine of another objection. These ideas, being by their very nature substantial,

must be substantially in him who perceives them. It is only seeking to remove the difficulty a step further from us, and falling into a contradiction and absurdity in the attempt, to suppose that there are indeed forms or ideas of things, but that we have only notions or conceptions of these ideas. The idea itself must be considered as with us and in us; the notion which we form about that whereof it is the idea, when we begin to use our senses, to compare and to reflect, must not be identified with the idea, but is a witness and proof of its presence, and that we are feeling after it; to realise or to possess the idea is to have the science or the knowledge of the thing. But then this assertion, that these ideas are substantially with us, must be taken in connection with what has been said before, and it will be seen at once that, instead of affirming the ground and root of our knowledge to be in ourselves, this is the very falsehood which Plato was seeking to overturn. These ideas are the witnesses in our inmost being that there is something beyond us and above us; when we enter into the idea of anything we abdicate our own pretensions to be authors or creators, we become mere acknowledgers of that which is. And to enter into that deepest and ultimate idea, which is the ground of our being, must be in the deepest sense an abdication of our own notions and imaginations, an act of submission to, and reception of, the Truth.

Ideas—how in us.

Plato no theorist.

17. Here, then, we find Plato most consistently carrying out the principle which it had been the vocation of his master from first to last to assert. Here we see how perfectly harmonious the Socratic doctrine, that knowledge is the end of life, is with that humility and confession of ignorance which are at the root of all the Socratic discipline and culture. Here we see the harmony between knowledge and being; how necessarily a certain state of character and affections is presupposed in every act of knowledge. Here, lastly, we see how truly Plato reconciled those two forms of philosophy, one of which had dealt with the objects of our knowledge, one with our acts of perception—how truly he discovered a truth, one side of which each had dimly perceived, yet how little this was the result of any project for harmonising opposite theories,—how much rather it was the effect of resolutely pursuing a principle which supersedes theories altogether, and so far as it is faithfully acted upon, delivers us from our bondage to them. Not to frame a comprehensive system which shall include nature and society, man and God, as its different elements, or in its different compartments, and which therefore necessarily leads the system-builder to consider himself above them all, but to demonstrate the utter impossibility of such a system, to cut up the notion and dream

of it by the roots, this is the work and the glory of Plato. He who is attempting the construction of such a Babel must understand not merely that he will not find the model of it in Plato, but that before he advances one step he must undo everything that Plato has done, must disprove all his conclusions, and prove the falsehood of the process by which he has arrived at them. Those commentators who can find in Plato nothing but the most exquisite ridicule of all the system-makers in his own and in past days have, it is true, understood him imperfectly. That ridicule would not be so delightful and satisfying as it is, so thoroughly genial and consolatory to every earnest student, if he did not feel that it was the handmaid of the most severe demonstration, that it was only another aspect of the most generous and noble sympathy with everything that is honest and humble, practical and true. The kind and experienced teacher smiles at our useless waste of time in attempting to build, but it is that he may urge us to the more profitable occupation of seeking after the foundation of that which is built. The first is the employment of those who desire to be gods, the second of those who believe that the highest blessing of which man is capable is to know God.

His supposed classification.

18. But if it be true that Plato is almost free from that propensity for theories which has beset most philosophers, nay, that his principle, consistently followed out, is positively incompatible with them, how is it that he is so commonly supposed to have mapped out the domain of human knowledge into the three provinces of Dialectics, Ethics, and Physics? In considering this question we shall perhaps discover the purpose of a third class of his Dialogues, and be able, moreover, to contemplate his so-called Eclecticism under yet another aspect.

His dialectics and ethics inseparable

19. The critics who have discovered this classification in Plato evidently cannot mean that there is one portion of the Dialogues which does, and one portion which does not, treat of dialectics. They must be aware that every dialogue exhibits the dialectic method of Plato, that every one is making with more or less success some new trial or application of it. Neither, we think, can they pretend, without doing violence to the purpose and language of their author, that these dialectical dialogues are not also ethical. Not only is a moral purpose conspicuous throughout them, but, as we have said before, the development of the method by which the truth is perceived and ascertained is inseparably interwoven with a moral culture. The disengagement of the mind from sensible impressions and sensible fascinations is the joint effect of restraint upon inclination and of the art by which the apparent is distinguished from the real. Without the feeling of this connection and intertwining of the ethical with

the intellectual discipline, the most beautiful Dialogues are unintelligible; nay, the desire to separate that which Plato has believed inseparable, is perhaps the main cause of the narrow and partial views which have prevailed as to the object and construction of his works.

The Phædrus.

20. Look, for instance, at the *Phædrus*. Lysias had proposed a certain thesis respecting Love, and had defended it with abundance of ingenuity in studiously-balanced sentences, the aptest clothing for a rhetorical purpose and a rhetorical method. Socrates shows, first, how easy it is to meet his arguments with a counter series as ingenious and as artificially expressed. Then he discovers the radical defect of both sets of arguments, that they were dealing with a word the meaning of which had not been ascertained. In the attempt to find what this word signifies, to separate the true from the apparent meanings of it, he unveils the principles of his dialectics. But there is combined with this exposition the most distinct declaration and warning, (assuming a form which, however unfit for us, was appropriate to the evil condition of Greek society, and proves the purity of the writer who, in the midst of such society, could maintain so elevated a standard,) that only by restraining the grosser appetites can we be in a state for apprehending the true nature of Love. In the conclusion of the Dialogue, the two principles are harmonised in a splendid mythus, wherein the disciple is taught that only he who governs himself, who has his lower nature in subjection, can be fit for the highest exercise of his faculties, for the contemplation of that which verily and indeed is. We cannot reduce this Dialogue under any of the partial names and descriptions that have been given of it. We cannot consider it a mere attack upon the rhetoricians, or a mere development of the Socratic method for testing the meaning of words. Neither does it seem to us a treatise on pure love, or on the idea of beauty. All these subjects may be hinted at, and even most valuably illustrated. But the reader of the *Phædrus* must be contented to feel how they sustain each other, and to let them form themselves into a whole in his mind, without being eager to give the absolute supremacy to any one of them. He will then find, we believe, that this Dialogue is one of the most conspicuous, we might say the type dialogue, of that class which teaches us how to make substance or being the end of our inquiries and meditations; but he certainly will not be able to discover whether it is more ethical or dialectical.

The Gorgias

21. The *Gorgias* is another almost equally striking instance of the same kind. Formal critics have determined that this too shall be merely an attack upon rhetoric, or else that it shall have the merely moral object of explaining the nature and purpose of

punishment. It must strike a person, who only hears of this discussion, that a work which could suggest such opposite interpretations must be most incoherent and rhapsodical. The more he reads it the more he will be struck with the sequency of its thoughts, with the natural and easy manner in which one grows out of another. And he will find, we believe, upon reflection, that as the intellectual purpose of the Sophist was inseparably combined with the moral, as the pursuit of political power for an end was inseparably united to the cultivation of a treacherous art as the means, so it was impossible to introduce a sounder intellectual discipline among the youth of Athens, without leading them at the same time to perceive that the true purpose of their lives was not the acquisition of dominion, or the escape from suffering and punishment, but the attainment, even through suffering, punishment, and disgrace, of a deliverance from the moral evil which obstructed their search after truth, and made power a curse to them. Here, again, he distinguishes the true from the apparent, not by the help of ethics without dialectics, or of dialectics without ethics, but of both conjointly.

22. How the case stands in reference to physics we shall have to explain shortly. But thus much we may affirm now, that whensoever his opponents have engaged in physical speculations, Plato is not unwilling in those Dialogues, which have most distinctly a moral purpose, to cope with them, and that he never in such wise divides these two provinces as to suggest the thought that the principles by which either is governed may not most usefully or injuriously affect the other. Of this fact we could easily convince our readers, if we could afford space for an analysis of the *Theætetus*. But we must do no more than commend that exquisite specimen of Platonic wisdom to their careful study, and proceed to show how the notion that Plato established a formal division in the subjects of human thought may have originated, and may be reconciled with our belief in his hatred of theories and consistency of purpose.

The Theætetus.

Third class of dialogues.

23. We have often observed that the founders of the different schools in Greece had been led by the circumstances of their position, or by the peculiar tendencies of their own minds, to choose for themselves a distinct sphere of observation. It was no forethought or wish to be a natural philosopher that drew Thales into his course of speculation. It was merely that the outward facts submitted to his senses were those which struck him as the most likely to contain the solution of the problem which he found within. In like manner, Pythagoras was led by a series of scarcely known or acknowledged influences gradually to desert the maxims of his native soil, and to make Society, or the State, the subject of his inquiries. To these we know he

Search after unity.

added a scheme of nature which he tried to reduce under the same law as the facts which related to the order and government of men. Parmenides and Zeno again entered into their purely metaphysical region, not from any resolution of choosing one province of thought more than another, but merely by reflecting upon the two preceding systems, and finding that they were inadequate. They too sought to make their own system universal, and to make the scheme of the political world and of nature in some sense dependent on the laws which concern the region of pure mind. Plato then found the fact already established for him, that there actually are these three lines in which the thoughts of men, when they are strongly exercised, naturally run. He had not to create any artificial distinctions; the natural distinctions had been discovered by the experience of his predecessors. What remained for him? To follow them into each of these regions, to inquire how far any of them had discovered the unity of which he was in search, to consider whether what they had looked for *in* nature, *in* society, *in* the mind of man, may not be implied indeed in each of these, yet have its foundations beneath them all. This, we believe, was the final and consummate effort of the Platonic philosophy. As there is a set of Dialogues which seem to us designed merely to unfold the Socratic doctrine of Being, another expressly intended to develope the principle of Ideas, as necessary to the support of the former, and as solving a problem which the Heracleitans and Eleatics had shown to exist, so we believe there is a third in which Plato reflects upon his master's discoveries and his own, and exhibits them in direct application to the three subjects of nature, of society, and of knowledge. Every one will recognise in the *Timæus* an attempt to discover a unity for the external universe; in the *Republic*, an attempt to discover the meaning of political unity. And, therefore, without contradicting our previous assertion that, in all his Dialogues, Plato is evolving a dialectical method, we may also admit that there are some in which he proposes to himself the direct and formal aim of showing how this method is a guide to the true unity in *knowledge*. Nor must it be forgotten that Plato was enabled by his position as a reviewer of past systems, was *obliged* by his position as an expounder of Socrates, to reverse the order which we have followed in tracing the rise of these schools historically. He not only might begin with those principles which the Eleatics had expounded, and descend to the natural speculations of the Ionians, but he could not follow any other course if he was to make the Socratic doctrine of Being, and the Socratic method of distinguishing the real from the fantastic, his guiding stars through the whole journey. Here, then, we must begin our

Unity in nature, in society, in knowledge.

Why Plato reverses this order.

notice of his experiments in search of unity. We are eager to introduce our readers to that which we consider the crowning labour of his life, the end at which he was obscurely aiming through the whole of it—his POLITY; but we must first refer to his discussions respecting the conditions and meaning of SCIENCE. A few words will then be sufficient for the less important, though by no means uninteresting, question—how far his views respecting the PHYSICAL WORLD were in conformity or disagreement with his other principles.

Unity in science.

24. There was one great and obvious difference between the position of the Parmenideans and that of the Pythagoreans or Ionians. No one could doubt that they had a real subject for their inquiries, let those inquiries be as idle as they might. But the Eleatic had to produce both the dream and the interpretation; to maintain that there was a region of pure mind, as well as to show what was transacted there. Plato, therefore, had also two tasks. He had to show that their assumption was sound, before he ventured to inquire how far it was able to carry them. For this purpose he adopted a method which has greatly puzzled many of his readers. In the Dialogue entitled *Parmenides* he introduces Socrates, full of youthful vivacity, broaching the doctrine of ideas in opposition to the antiplurality doctrine of Parmenides and Zeno. The aged philosopher treats his antagonist with most graceful courtesy, allows him to put forth one explanation after another of his scheme, shows him that all are untenable, then encourages him to hope that, after a more severe philosophical training, he will understand himself better, and finally proceeds to establish his own doctrine of the One in a series of annihilating propositions, wherein he shows that it must exist, and that it cannot exist under any conditions or limitations with which the understanding is acquainted. Probably no one but Plato ever ventured upon such an experiment as this—the experiment, we mean, of showing that his own principle was untenable except so far as it is connected with and grounded upon the principle of another philosopher who did not recognise it. But the Dialogue of the *Parmenides* does not merely serve the purpose of establishing the truth that the mind witnesses of something which is not under sensible laws, but it also prepares us to feel the want which the Eleatic doctrine could not satisfy. A conviction of the purely negative character of the method grows upon us as we read, and while we assent to its conclusions we feel an increasing moral interest in seeking for some higher point of view from which we may contemplate it, and that imperfect substitute which the young Socrates had proposed for it. In the *Sophist* this wish is to a great degree realised. There we have an Eleatic stranger discussing with the

The Parmenides

The Sophist.

young Theætetus the meaning of the word Sophist, and the qualities of the animal which it denoted, how far it belongs to the same genus with the Philosopher, or how they are distinguished. In the course of this dialogue we arrive at the conclusion that the great object of the Sophist is to set up a universal science. By universal science he means merely a capacity of talking upon all manner of subjects, of framing a set of images of that which is, and passing these off for substances and realities. But here a difficulty arises: Parmenides, whose opinions the Eleatic stranger might be supposed to favour, has told us that we are not to inquire respecting that which is not; that the conception is in fact an impossible one. How then will our definition of the Sophist practically avail us? How shall we be able ever to pursue him on to that ground whereunto we have had the clearest evidence that he has betaken himself? The Eleatic stranger finds himself obliged then, much as he fears the guilt of parricide, to inquire into the soundness of this doctrine of his honoured countryman and teacher. By degrees the fallacy unveils itself. We find that in refusing to recognise the notion of not-being, he was in fact shutting his eyes to something which is. The contradiction may appear startling, but we do not escape it by refusing to look it in the face. We have actually stumbled upon an instance in which that which is adverse to reality must be treated to all intents and purposes as real. And when we look a little further into the use of language, we see more and more the impossibility of giving that definite rigid exclusiveness to the word or notion of Being which it must bear in the system of Parmenides. We find that we cannot by any means identify our notion of sameness or of difference with our notion of Being. And yet the notion of Being enters into both of these; there *is* a sameness and a difference between things. Whither does all this lead? It leads to the conclusion which, as is so constantly the case in Plato, is carried more directly home to our understanding than it is expressed in words, that Parmenides is after all dwelling in a region of words. For all that he seems to have sounded the very inmost depth of thought, and though he has actually discovered that there are depths which words do not reach, yet he himself is at last only setting up one notion against another notion. It is not Being, but the notion of Being which he has been investigating, and which he has necessarily investigated most imperfectly. And now, then, the vision of a new kind of science wholly unlike that of the Sophist, yet in one sense as universal as his, wholly different from that exclusive dogmatic national philosophy of Parmenides, yet, like his, having unity for its condition and ultimate ground, opens upon us. This is the

The Sophist and Philosopher.

The dialectical science.

science of dialectics, the science expressly appertaining to the philosopher. It is that which rejects no form of thought or language as unfit for its investigation, but searches out the idea of each, and ascertains what notions and phantasms are inconsistent with it, and attach themselves to it, and have sought to make themselves part of it. Being it looks upon as the object of its search, but Being connected with life, connected with power, not a dry abstract notion, the mere negation of other notions. This must be the science of sciences; not because it reduces all forms of thought to one, or because it includes all existing sciences, but because it discovers in all forms of thought an ultimate ground of unity beneath them all, because it assigns to each science its specific object, and its relation to every other.

25. Every science is seeking after a foundation. It rests upon the faith that there is a law for the facts which it inquires into; what that law is, is the subject of its inquiry. *The* science should explain to us how the mind proceeds in the search after these laws through whatever set of facts we may be looking for them. But its own specific object is the deep ground of all laws, the Being from whom they derive their life and potency. This dialectics then is the search after premises. Parmenides and Zeno had gone no higher than to the notion of a Logic which, taking the premises of the mind for granted, should affirm what conclusions will legitimately and necessarily flow from them. This was in fact their universal science, as Rhetoric was that of the Sophist. The first overthrew all facts, setting up a law in the mind in opposition to them. The second confounded law and fact, using certain laws of the mind to overturn admitted facts, or the contradictions of facts to disprove the existence of law. The principle of seeking for laws in and through facts is the principle by which Socrates upheld the faith and morality of men against the invasions of *Rhetoric*, and by which Plato upheld the possibility of science against the invasions of *Logic*. Here is that inductive science which two thousand years after had to maintain the same battle against the same enemies, when it for the first time clearly and efficiently asserted itself as the only guide to a knowledge of the physical world. The Socratic doctrine of Being makes us feel that it is necessary. The Platonic doctrine of Ideas makes us understand that it is possible. The demand in the mind for a Unity which shall be not negative, but positive, not the amalgamation of parts, but that which precedes all distinction into parts, and remains unaffected by it; this makes us confident that it is real.

Dialectical science *the* science: what it must do.

26. The connection between the Platonic dialectics and the Platonic politics is indicated by several passages in the Dialogues, which are intended to unfold the character of each. Thus in

Dialectics and politics connected: how?

the *Sophist* the Eleatic stranger proposes to examine the meaning of three words, *Sophist*, *Philosopher*, *Politician*. The last is reserved for a separate discussion, and actually forms the subject of one dialogue. But it is obvious that Plato intended us to feel how strong was the relation between the three persons denoted by the words, and how impossible it would be to investigate the last without a previous knowledge of the other two. The young Athenian, under the teaching of the Sophist, began more and more to feel that the rhetorician and the statesman were convertible terms, that the efficient and practical ruler of men was the efficient master of words. On the other hand, it is obvious that the logic of Parmenides and Zeno must have made politics a mere set of abstract propositions, to which an earnest and enthusiastic man might impart a practical meaning and life, but which would lose all the qualities that had endeared them to him as a logician, in proportion as they received this impregnation. Zeno himself was probably a specimen of this class, but we have no reason to suppose that he left any successors; his disciples must either have devoted themselves merely to inquiries respecting entity and unity, or have become politicians of the rhetorical kind. Now, it is obvious that the dialectics of Plato, by their very nature and definition, could not pretend to be themselves Politics. They necessarily assumed facts, not indeed as premises to start from, but as the raw materials, in the heart of which premises lay hid. The laws and conditions of society were to be investigated by this dialectic, could not be investigated without it: but they were presumed to exist, and they were perfectly distinct from the faculty and science by which they were discovered. Plato then was in a condition to do justice to Pythagoras as he had done justice to Parmenides. He could believe that there might be much in the discoveries of the one respecting the order of society, as there had been much in the discoveries of the other respecting the conditions and requirements of the pure mind, and he prepared himself to use the philosophy which he had ascertained to be true in one region for an investigation of the observations which had been made and the doctrines which had been broached respecting the other.

The Republic: the notion that it is merely an ethical or dialectical treatise.

27. But this is not all. The reader of Plato's *Republic* will discover, not perhaps without some surprise, that questions respecting the nature and objects of dialectics occupy a considerable place in this political treatise. Hence it has been inferred that the title of the work is altogether misleading; that it is not the purpose of Plato to teach us the conditions and the relations of a State, but merely to raise a platform upon which to carry forward with more interest, and probably with greater success, the philosophical inquiries which he has commenced in

his other Dialogues. The *Republic*, according to these commentators, is a kind of laboratory which he has built for the purpose of pursuing his experiments into the nature of the individual man. On many accounts this hypothesis will be likely to find acceptance in this day, even if it had not been supported by talents and erudition of the first order. We are not anxious to refute it, but we are anxious that our readers should study the *Republic* with a free spirit, and that they should not be hindered by a theory from perceiving how it illustrates a subject which has occupied us so much already, and must occupy us at every step of our future progress; we mean the relations between the mind of man and the constitution of society. To Plato we believe was committed the task of expressing the deepest wants and necessities of our being, and of discovering or prophesying the kind of satisfaction that must be provided for them. We make no apology for dwelling so long upon his name in this rapid sketch of moral and metaphysical inquiries, because we are satisfied that if we put our readers in a right course for studying his works and those of Aristotle, and the Jewish Scriptures, they will be able to trace with little assistance from us the progress of these inquiries in modern Europe, whether in the age of the fathers, of the schoolmen, or in the period since the Reformation; whereas the most able and elaborate discourses upon the ethics and metaphysics of later times without this preparation can, we think, avail them little. It must, therefore, be a great point with us to ascertain whether Plato is silent upon those wants which belong to our social being and position; whether he thought them of a purely secondary and accidental character; or whether he found them so imbedded in the constitution of man that he could not investigate the law of each man's internal life without also investigating that by which he is related to his fellows. The supporters of the former opinion (as the readers of Schleiermacher's Introduction to the *Republic* will perceive) have felt that they needed and have not failed to exercise the most admirable ingenuity in working out their conclusion. Those who adopt the latter may content themselves with beseeching attention to the express language of Plato, and with briefly recapitulating the heads of his dialogue.

The Republic, first book. Opening:

28. We find ourselves at the beginning of the *Republic* in a circle of Athenians met to witness a religious ceremony lately introduced from Thrace. The most prominent and interesting person in the group is old Cephalus, a cheerful and benignant octogenarian, with whom Socrates begins a discourse on the comforts of old age, and the advantage or disadvantage of riches. A remark of Cephalus leads to the inquiry, whether the definition of justice given by Simonides, that it consists in speaking

the truth, and giving to each man that which is his due, is satisfactory or no? Cephalus being called away to perform a sacrifice, his part in the dialogue devolves upon Polemarchus. But Justice. we have not advanced further in the discussion than to a general consent of the parties that the mere external acts indicated in the words of Simonides cannot satisfy the idea of justice; and again, that its obligations cannot be affected by our position to each other as friends or enemies; when the sophist Thrasymachus breaks in with a vehement assertion that the whole notion of justice is a fraud practised by the strong man upon the weaker. The consequence, that the life of an unjust man would be in itself desirable, is one from which he does not shrink, and to the examination of this doctrine the greater part of the first book is devoted.

Second book 29. In the beginning of the second, we find young Glaucon and Adeimantus professing themselves dissatisfied with the manner in which Thrasymachus has defended his cause, and with his haste in abandoning it. They have no sympathy with his views, they are convinced in their feelings that Justice is intrinsically good, but the arguments by which it is proved to be so seem to them inconclusive. Is it not true that society has put honour on a certain course of conduct which ministers to its own security and advantage? Has it not succeeded in helping Can justice be shown not to be the creature of society? out the weakness of its own sanctions by religious feelings and terrors? Are we not brought into the world under this twofold set of impressions in favour of what is called justice, and against injustice? Can we suppose a man retaining the idea and practice of Justice in opposition to laws and his fellow-men, and without the imagination of some divine sanction or patronage? The question Socrates allows to be difficult; perhaps it cannot be at once answered. But might we not arrive at some solution of it if we examined it upon a larger scale? The question presumes an existing state of society; it supposes this notion of justice, be it a fiction or reality, to be necessary to the support of a State. Shall we inquire then how it becomes necessary to a State; what justice in a State is? Then possibly we may know better what justice in an individual is, and whether it can or cannot be maintained under the disadvantages imagined by Glaucon.

30. Now we would remark in passing, that those who consider the political part of the *Republic* merely accidental and subordinate, look upon this Preface as the great staff of their theory. They maintain that it is altogether so much easier and more consistent to believe that the subject started in the outset is really the main and central one of the book, and that all subjects which may occur by the way are merely intended for the illustration of it, that no student of Plato who really understands that teacher's method will tolerate any other supposition. We admit at once that this is the object of Plato; that the *Republic* The Republic is an inquiry respecting justice. is an inquiry into the nature and meaning of Justice; that if this end be lost sight of, it would be quite impossible to understand the connection of its different parts. But then we say that the most natural and obvious construction of Plato's words leads to the belief that the idea of political justice was in his mind inseparable from that of individual justice; that this was precisely the quality which he perceived to be the meeting point between the spheres of ethics and politics; say, rather, which proved that these are two concentric spheres. The clear establishment of this relation is, we conceive, the great purpose of these two first books. They are a lesson to all future reasoners with sophistical men, that they can only maintain the moral ground safely when they are content to follow their opponents to their own political ground; when, instead of contending that there is an order which the individual is obliged to follow, supposing society to have no existence, they will be at the pains to prove that there are eternal principles involved in the constitution of society itself, to which its individual members conform themselves, not because they are content to sacrifice their own distinct personality, but because they have no other way of asserting it. Whether modern writers on ethics would have fared worse or better if they had attended to the admonition of the most experienced and subtle of all the antagonists of sophistry, we may have occasion to inquire hereafter. At all events, those who believe that the main purpose of the Platonic Dialogues is to discover and develope a method of thought, must, we think, be strangely hampered by a theory which compels them to suppose that on this occasion the result arrived at is the only important consideration; and that the processes for attaining it are altogether artificial, and yet, withal, most clumsy and cumbrous.

Third book 31. But to return: Starting with the hope that the proposed scheme for seeking after justice in a State will lead to a solution of our difficulties, Plato proceeds at once to the formation of a society. Now any one who looks in the arrangements which he here sets forth for the outlines of some imaginary perfect commonwealth, will unquestionably be much disappointed. So far from there being anything mystical or Utopian in his primary Its freedom from mysticism. conception of the society, everything is as terrestrial and commonplace as the merest materialist could desire. Men meet together, and find that each is not sufficient to provide for his own animal wants. Different necessities arise, different capacities discover themselves among the persons associated, adapted to these necessities; hence division of labour, distinct occupa-

tions and professions. By and by comes the desire for an excess of the good things which earth produces; hence tumults and external wars. Now we feel the necessity for a set of guardians or watch-dogs of the state. What manner of persons must these guardians be? Clearly they are in danger of becoming wolves instead of watch-dogs. How is this to be prevented? How are we to produce in them those internal qualities which are so obviously necessary for the welfare of the whole community? We say that these arrangements are very unlike what might be expected from the builder of an imaginary commonwealth. No assumption of any advantageous position; no previous theory about the wants and feelings of the persons composing the society; above all, no hope, by outward contrivances and dispositions, to avert the occurrence of crime. How can this be accounted for? Does not such apparent carelessness about external contrivances rather favour the notion that the society is only a scaffolding? We answer, if it were so we should be utterly unable to account for the scaffolding not being more elaborately constructed. If Plato had the liberty of forming his own plan and choosing his own materials; if it were a matter of utter indifference to him how far these are consistent with the nature of things, provided they did but help him to a discovery which would afterwards be good and entire on its own ground, whatever steps had led us to it, any attempt to conform to dry ordinary facts as they meet us in the world would be idle, and, as an offence against art, censurable. If, on the contrary, his object were not to frame a society after an ideal in his own mind, but, as we have supposed all along, to investigate the conditions of political unity – the idea involved in the very existence of society, by departing from which it has become confused and incoherent —if this be the view of the treatise, which is most consistent with the rest of Plato's philosophy, and which most clearly exhibits its relation to the other Dialogues, then it can be no matter of wonder to us that Plato should carefully abstain from any exercises of imagination while he is setting before us the bare and naked elements of which society is composed; that he should take pains to convince us that he is not a creator but a searcher; not one of those poets to whom he can assign no place in his commonwealth, but one of those investigators of the truth as it actually is whom he would put at the head of it.

The guardians.

The Republic not imaginary at all.

32. The *Republic* of Plato then assumes selfish desires to exist, and the evil results of them to have occurred. And it is an examination of this question,—Under what conditions can we suppose it permanently to cohere, in spite of the tendencies to decomposition which manifestly discover themselves within it? When, however, we direct our attention to the means of preserving any body from decay, we may either consider what positive precautions are necessary in order to resist the progress of its corruption; or, on the other hand, by what means it is possible to call forth and invigorate those principles of life which it must have within it in order that it may be at all, though their presence may only make itself manifest through the power which opposes them. Plato again and again gives us to understand that it is with the development of these principles of life, and not with the outward regulations for the repression of evil, that he concerns himself in this dialogue. It is on this account that the *Republic* has assumed to many persons the appearance simply of a treatise on education, nay, of little more than a censure upon the existing Greek education. These critics remind us that he has scarcely given the first rude hint of his society before he tells us that the minds of the guardians of the State must not be corrupted by those false ideas of the gods which occur in the poems of Homer. That a great part of the third book is occupied with the consideration of two particular branches of education, gymnastics and music, and even with a minute and elaborate inquiry respecting the kinds of music which serve or frustrate the ends of education. That the subject is renewed in the sixth and seventh books, where the use of all the sciences in forming the mind of a statesman is carefully investigated. All this is true, yet we are persuaded that the value of this portion of the work will be far more appreciated by those who consider it subordinate to the great object of discovering the principle which lies at the foundation of society, which connects it with the processes of the individual mind, and which gives consistency and harmony to both of them, than by those who determine that it shall be the sole and independent purpose of the dialogue. Nothing is more entirely consistent with the purpose which we have attributed to Plato than his placing a right view of the character of the gods at the threshold of his education; for the idea of the Good, and of this as connected with Order, is that which underlies his whole scheme. To make men feel that this *is*, that this exists, to teach them how to distinguish between the anomalies of society and its principles, is his great endeavour. Above all things, therefore, we must see that our models are not defaced with our own corruptions.

Is the Republic a treatise on education?

Reasons for the opinion.

Character of the gods.

33. For precisely the same reason the subject of music becomes invested with so much importance. To develope the sense of order and harmony in the minds of the members of the commonwealth, is the secret for making it really that which it pretends to be. It is a part of this order that the feeling of it should be first communicated to the guiding, guarding minds of the society, that from them it should diffuse itself through the whole. By

Music.

this means a new and most important element of our *Republic* is brought to light. Among the guardians will be some of a higher order than the rest. They will be those on whom the education has produced its complete mellowing effect; distinguished from the others in this, that whereas *they* have chiefly derived a more braced and masculine tone of character from the union of gymnastic exercises with the higher forms of music, these have imbibed the very essence of the music, have acquired that perfectly harmonised temper, that sense of wholeness, which makes them the true ideals and representatives of the entire community. These are obviously our *magistrates*. But how shall we persuade our people that these different qualities exist, and that they constitute a fitness for the different offices in the state? We must tell them a story, says Plato, in order that we may bring home this conviction to their minds. We must inform them that they were all made originally out of the earth, which, on that account, they are to love as their common mother; reckoning themselves brethren in consequence of their relation to her. That however it pleased the gods to introduce different materials into their composition, making some of gold, some of silver, some of inferior metals; that it is important that these should not be confounded, but should be kept distinct and applied to distinct uses, in order that the society may receive benefit from each of them. Such is the parable by which our author teaches us that he looks upon himself not as the contriver of some imaginary scheme, but only as following out the intentions of Providence in the institution of society.

The qualities of the magistrates.

34. All this time we seem to have been forgetting our original question respecting Justice. But we find in the fourth book that the arrangements of the State, and even our long discussion upon music, have been preparing the way for a more clear development of this idea. We have discovered three classes in society, and we have seen that each of these classes embodies a certain characteristic quality, which through it becomes the quality of the whole fellowship. The class of magistrates expresses to us the very idea of Wisdom, superintending, distinguishing, arranging; the class of guardians, the very idea of Fortitude, sustaining, amalgamating, preserving; the inferior classes, while they keep their position, the very idea of Temperance, self-restraining, and submitting. Without any of these it is obvious that a society could not exist, and the permanence of its existence depends upon the degree in which the qualities of each class interpenetrate the rest. But then do not these imply the existence of still another quality—of some principle or power which fuses together all the classes and all these qualities —which belongs not primarily or particularly to one class, but

Relation of the state to the individual.

Fourth book

Music and justice.

must by its very nature be predicated of the whole? This is evidently that musical principle which we have been seeking by all our education to instil. But what shall be the name of it? Is not this that Justice which we have been trying to understand the meaning of? Do we not translate the rude outward notion of Simonides into a practical, satisfactory idea, when instead of making justice consist in giving every man his due and in speaking the truth, we describe it as that which determines the true relation of all things and persons to each other, the very law and harmony of the world. Yet may we not go still a little deeper? Our first object was to discover the nature and effect of justice, not in society, but in the individual. At every step of our progress we seem to have found proof that these two considerations are inseparable; that the law of society must be the law of the individual. Now, perhaps, we are in a condition to explain this fact more particularly. Our inquiry has brought to light three classes as the necessary constituents of the State; a class of magistrates, a class of guardians, a class occupied in supplying the animal wants of the whole body. Whence the necessity for this distribution of society? Is it not that there is a similar distribution of parts in the man himself? Is there not in him Reason, Energy, or Will, Cupidity, or an animal nature? And if these are not to exist in perpetual discord, the man in perpetual misery, must there not be that in him which preserves each of these parts in its proper relation to the rest, giving the supremacy to Reason, preserving the strength and purity of Will, subjecting Cupidity? Is not Justice then necessary to each of us?

35. This point being ascertained, Socrates is willing to finish the dialogue. But Glaucon and Adeimantus remind him that justice being, according to him, the principle of harmony or unity in the commonwealth, he is bound to explain the other conditions of this unity. For if any inevitable circumstances make this union impracticable, justice itself is impracticable; and if for the commonwealth, then, according to the whole tenour of the argument, for the individual also; so that we should be obliged at last to acquiesce in a conclusion not very unlike that sophistical one which we have been labouring to confute. The four next books, then, from the beginning of the fifth to the end of the ninth, are occupied with these questions: first, in what sense are family relationships compatible with the unity of a commonwealth? secondly, how far can it consist with individual selfishness and ambition? thirdly, how can it consist with that law of decay and degeneracy to which all societies seem to have been subject?

The great problem of society.

36. What Plato's statements are upon the first of these sub-

jects we have no need to inform any reader. Those who know scarcely anything else of him have heard that he has somewhere spoken of the two sexes as intended to perform exactly the same duties and exercises, and that he has connected with this doctrine another (which indeed in a logical mind will generally be inseparable from it), of a community in wives and children. They have heard also that these notions actually enter into the composition of his perfect commonwealth, and that he wishes to supersede all the existing relations of father and child, wife and husband, which lie, as we suppose, at the foundation of all moral apprehensions and all political order. The question, then, naturally suggests itself, not whether we are prepared to offer any justification for this part of his speculations, but how, while such a huge and hideous blot exists in them, we can venture to speak of them as important; above all, can devote so much time to the examination of them? Many readers and admirers of Plato have dwelt with much satisfaction on the fact, that in the *Laws* (a later work, undoubtedly, than the *Republic*) he appears to have changed his views, and to recognise the sanctity of human relationships as they exist. We confess that we do not regard the passages referred to as a recantation. Even if Plato considered them so himself (of which there is no proof), we feel convinced that he would have relapsed into his former opinion, if he had again devoted himself to the task of studying the idea of a commonwealth. The *Laws*, it seems to us, are intended to explain the conditions under which any particular nation exists; whence proceeds the coercive power by which the evils of its members are restrained; how it is to be preserved as a distinct community. For this end Plato perceived the importance of distinct relationships; he could not help seeing that they lie at the very foundation of national life; that with the loss of them it would perish. The *Republic*, on the other hand, is not an inquiry respecting the conditions of a particular state. Phrases may occur in it again and again which seem to define this as its object; but others, far more pregnant in their meaning, and oftentimes uttered unconsciously, show that another and grander aim was present to the mind of the writer, and was haunting him when he could not realise it. He felt that there should be some body which expresses, not the law of a confined, definite national life, but the law of society itself, the principle of its unity. He felt that such a body as this is implied in the existence of every national community, but yet transcends it, and is not subject to its limitations. We could easily produce proofs of this feeling from every book of the *Republic*, but we know none in which it comes forth more strikingly than in that fifth book of which we are now speaking. The idea of a universal

Plato's communism.

The doctrine of the Laws: how and why different from that of the Republic

Greek society is there formally put forth, yet it is evident that this does not satisfy the mind of Plato; he has the dream of something still more comprehensive: a feeble sophist would have tried to express the dream in big words; *he* is content to suggest the nearest practical approximation to an expression of it that his circumstances made possible. But with this universal society Plato does not see how distinct relationships are compatible. Perfect community seems the very law of its being; whatsoever interferes with this seems to frustrate its intention.

37. Here, then, we see at once the ignorance and knowledge of Plato. How such a universal society as this could grow out of a national community, out of a family, and could preserve uninjured, in harmony with itself, both those holy institutions which had been its cradle, this he did not know; this wisdom was reserved for the shepherds of Palestine. To them it was only communicated by degrees, and their chief duty consisted in keeping that which had been divinely given them in the sure confidence that more would be added. But this *was* permitted to the sage of Greece—he was allowed to feel the necessity of a universal community to the life of man; he was permitted to feel that it was a great living truth implied in the existence of society, though yet undeveloped. To such insight and honesty of purpose, rejecting no light that has been vouchsafed, it is granted, that even the crudities and ignorances into which he fell in the search after truth shall be for the benefit of future generations, nay for the practical correction and exposure of these very crudities when they are reproduced by men of a different spirit. The fifth book of the *Republic* is a curious anticipation of every scheme of universal society which has been propounded by religious fanatics or political theorists from the propagation of Christianity to the present day. It remains a standing practical testimony from the wisest man in the ancient world, that this is the only consistent law, and must be the ultimate law of every such society, whensoever it attempts to exist alone, as a merely spiritual or cosmical family. Rejecting, then, with indignation the *errare mehercule malo* of the Roman academician, and loving Plato only as far as he loved truth, we may yet find a worth even in this unfortunate passage of his writings.

Advantages of Plato's error to us.

38. The portion of the *Republic* comprehended in the sixth and seventh books is second to no part of it in interest. The difficulty to be solved in it is the compatibility of such a State as we have described with the selfish notions of men. Plato does not blink the question. He at once declares his conviction that such a State could only be administered by philosophers; and he then goes on to explain what he means by a philosopher;

How a perfect commonwealth is compatible with selfishness.

Sixth book.

why it is that the persons generally bearing that name are unfit to be practical politicians; what their real relation to the rest of their countrymen is. Here then we have the full exposition and development of that doctrine which we found lying at the root of Socratic teaching; that the selfish, self-seeking principle, leading men to animal gratifications, is the source of disorder and confusion in the life of man, not really the moving spring of it; that there is in man something higher, which is not satisfied with itself, but which seeks after converse with the Good. The philosopher is the man who is holding this converse; whose mind is fixed on the true end and meaning of things, upon the substance, the reality of them. The rest are following images and shadows, but still in the pursuit of these are confessing their want of a Good, and are blindly feeling after it. The philosopher, if he descends to the pursuit of their shadows, becomes worthy of their contempt, for there is a perpetual contradiction between the higher aims of which he is conscious and the grovelling course he has actually taken. If, on the other hand, he steadily keeps his own idea in sight, he is necessarily unintelligible to them, and on that account they despise him. But suppose, having worked his own way out of the mine in which they are dwelling, and no longer receiving light through the little crannies which transmit it broken and confused, and lead men utterly astray as to the fountain from which it has flowed, he has come out into the open sunlight, and by it seen all objects as they are, he neither glorifies himself by living apart from them, nor yet submits to confuse his light with their darkness, but goes down amongst them that he may lead them by the same track which he has himself trodden into the clear day—would he not then be fulfilling his function as a philosopher, and yet be most truly a politician? If the question occurs to you, what is this upward road? Plato is ready to consider it with you. There is a certain education recognised among men; they teach arithmetic, geometry, as well as the gymnastics and music we spoke of before, and they evidently attach a high value to these studies. Are they wrong? surely not. They are wrong only in this, that throughout their whole lives they are seeking shadows instead of substances, and that they have made all these sciences helpful to their low ambition. Arithmetic and geometry have been resorted to merely for secular commercial ends; they might be made the means of purifying the mind to a perception of the truth of things. What is the appropriate function of each of these sciences, with a view to this object, he carefully inquires: and this inquiry brings out the necessity of that grand, deeper science of Dialectics, which directly leads to the contemplation of truth as truth, of good as

The philosopher's duty to the multitude.

Seventh book.

good, in its pure essence. Now a nation thus guided and educated comes into the condition of such a republic as we have described. Its wisest, deepest-minded men will be its magistrates; the community will have one end; that principle of justice, which assigns to each his proper place, imparts a sense of proportion and harmony to all, will be diffused through it and actuate it. Thus, then, the existence of ambition and selfishness does not upset the idea of our Republic, does not prove that it is not implied in the nature of society, does not show that it may not be at some time or somewhere realised.

39. We come next to that law of decay in societies which most speculators have recognised, and which the Pythagorean philosophers fancied they could express in certain numerical ratios. Plato has given a very valuable turn to the inquiry by connecting it with the cardinal doctrine of the *Republic*, that the life of men and the life of States explain each other. In conformity with this doctrine, he maintains that there is a democratical, an oligarchical, and a tyrannical form of character answering to those respective forms of government. This form of character is obviously a departure from some true and original model. The same may be shown of the governments; and it is possible in each case to trace the process of degeneration, and to show how that which takes place in society, and that which takes place in the individual, react upon each other. In this part of the dialogue, Plato proves that his faculty of close, lively, practical observation had not been impaired but strengthened by his converse with transcendent realities. It would be hard to find a passage in any ancient work on which a modern statesman might more profitably meditate, or in which he would be more sure to find hints explaining to him the facts of his daily experience, than the eighth and ninth books of the *Republic*. The result of the investigation is the same as in the former case. This law of degeneracy exists in the commonwealths of the earth, just because they have not understood and steadfastly contemplated that original model, that perfect idea of a commonwealth, which is also the original model and perfect idea of a human character. It is a contradiction and absurdity then to allege the fact of this degeneracy as a proof that no such model is to be found. But after all these inquiries does the thought still linger about the mind, *where* is it to be found? Plato answers (book ix. p. fin.), Αλλ' ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. Is it wonderful that such words should have suggested to some of the Christian fathers the recollection of those words in the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, which describe the hopes of the head of the covenanted people, Εξεδέχετο γὰρ τὴν τοὺς θεμελίους ἔχουσαι

Law of decay in societies. Eighth and ninth books.

πόλιν ἧς τεχνίτης καὶ δημιουργὸς ὁ Θεός; or those which describe this hope as accomplished, Ἡμῶν τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει?

Tenth book. Art and poetry.

40. There is still one subject upon which it is needful to say a few words, especially as Plato has devoted his last book to the full exposition of it: we mean his opinion respecting the imitative arts generally, and especially respecting poetry, so far as it is included among those arts. It is evident that our author attached great importance to these opinions, and yet that he was never wholly satisfied with them. He touches upon the question almost as soon as he has sketched the first outline of his society; he recurs to it again when his task seems completed, partly as if he felt there was no security for the reception of his idea while any doubt overhung this point, partly as if there was something in it which he had not fully penetrated. Again, in the introduction to the *Timæus*, he offers a kind of apology to the poets for his severity, and appears to think that they may have an important vocation, though he does not clearly understand what it is. It is observable that the grounds upon which he places his arguments in the third and in the tenth books, are not precisely the same. In both, indeed, he dwells much upon the fact that the poet must adapt himself to the opinions of mankind respecting actions and character, otherwise they will not acknowledge the verisimilitude of his picture; hence he must need pervert the truth of things, and can never exalt those minds to which he accommodates himself. But in the last he appears to see a peculiar mischief in poetry from its tendency to destroy the harmony of character, to weaken self-control, and thus to undermine the justice and order of the commonwealth by the honour which it bestows upon all excited and passionate feelings. The latter argument might lead one to suspect that Plato was at least in part determined to these views by the circumstances of his own age. The exaltation of passion, the want of balance and harmony in characters, the preference of weak, earthly creatures to calm and stately ideals, were the great characteristics of the Euripidean, as distinguished from the Sophoclean drama. Add to this the influence of a poetical age (an influence felt most when that age had departed) in fostering the worship of mere creative power, and the notion of the mind of man being the origin of all that is, which lay, as we have seen, at the root of Greek sophistry, and which it had been the great aim of Socrates throughout his life to combat. Still Plato's attack upon Homer, and his eagerness to disprove the common opinion that the Greeks were indebted to him for much of their organisation and cultivation, are proofs that he was not merely affected by these temporary considerations.

How far he was influenced by the circumstances of his own time.

We leave it then as a hint for our reader's reflection, whether this reluctant condemnation of poetry by one who had been himself a poet in the formal sense of the word, and in the best sense continued a poet always, may not be explained in the same way as we explained just now his theory respecting relationship. Poetry seems to belong primarily and almost exclusively to national life. The sense of national union gives the first impulse to it; when that sense is weakened it withers, with its revival it starts to life again; without it men would never become conscious of their own powers, their own affections, their own wants; and in the consciousness of these consist the joy and freedom of their life as the citizens of a state. By calling this forth in the Greeks, Homer may be said to have made them a nation, a nation full of life, full of turbulence. But is there nothing better than this mere consciousness of power? Is there no higher condition of society than this of being citizens of a state? The *Republic* is an answer to the question. It teaches that far beyond this consciousness of power lies the contemplation of truth and goodness, and the assimilation of the soul to these. It shows that far beyond the mere feeling of energy to dare, to act, to revenge, lies the perception of order and harmony, an intimate fellowship with a Being above us, and the beings around us. It teaches that there is a universal society, of which this contemplation and assimilation are the ground, this perception of order and harmony the life, of which this fellowship is the result and the realisation. With this community, says Plato, poetry hath little to do. Praise of the gods, eulogies of great men, these are the only fields for its exercise. Strictly speaking, we think he is right; that is to say, if it were possible for us, as it was necessary for him, to separate (how important it is to distinguish we hope we have explained) the national life from the universal life, the national society from the universal, poetry, which is the soul of the first, would, except in the cases named by him, be excluded from the other. If we would connect all the vital energies of which poetry is the expression, with those deeper insights, that perfect moral state and moral life which belong to the higher region, we must also understand, and by understanding realise, for ourselves at least, and, so far as is permitted us, for mankind, the law by which the universal and the national societies sustain each other.

Poetry expressly national.

41. The *Republic* ends nobly with a discussion on immortality, which has been less popular than that in the *Phædo*, because the scenery of it is less solemn and affecting, but which for its own merits seems entitled to even more attention. We are far, indeed, from thinking so lightly as some have done of those arguments from reminiscence, and from the law of interchange

Immortality

between light and darkness, death and life, which occur in the dying conversation of Socrates. On the contrary, they seem to us pregnant with the deepest meaning. But we cannot help thinking that when Plato had once realised in his own mind the connection between the life of the individual and the life of society, he felt he had a stronger ground to fix his hope of immortality upon—that he had found the point where the witness in the heart meets the demands of the reason. The sense of belonging to a community, stretching behind and before, outlasting the deaths of generations of men, is an evidence to each man of his individual immortality, which you may be quite unable to translate into syllogisms, but which happily supersedes the necessity of them. Plato only went to the roots of this feeling, when, having shown that the existence of the individual and of society are alike based upon the idea of justice, and are alike sustained by the contemplation of that which is true and permanent, and alike die a moral death when they contradict the principles of their being, he affirmed that the accident of physical death can as little change the condition of one as of the other, and that as they have lived here must be their life hereafter.[1]

[1] As the *Republic*, like so many other of the Platonic Dialogues, closes with a mythus, and as the passage in the third book on Lying brings the whole subject of the use which Plato thought it lawful to make of fables and legends directly before us, it may be as well to make one remark on this subject. Throughout this dialogue, even more than in his other writings, it is evident that, dearly as he loved truth for its own sake, and firmly as he believed it could be contemplated in its pure essence, he yet felt that there was no criterion of truth so sure as that it governed practice and was the law of life. To substitute a pure idealism for the faith of his country was never his object or his dream. He hated such attempts, not more for their hardness and cruelty than for their utter inconsistency with his whole doctrine. He left them to men who did not believe that ideas were substantial, who thought they were mere creations of the mind and had nothing to do with living acts. While then he was very jealous of all those stories which evidently hindered men from acknowledging goodness and truth as the ultimate ends of their existence, he was equally certain that, somehow or other, all great principles must have an investiture of *facts*, and cannot be fully or satisfactorily presented to man except in facts. And if no such series of facts embodying and revealing truths were within his reach, rather than leave it to be fancied that his truths were bare naked conceptions of his mind, he would invent a clothing for them: it was the least evil of the two. But it was an evil; it exposed him to fearful contradictions; it often put his love for truth in the greatest jeopardy. Then what pretence have those to the name of Platonists who *wish* to believe that there is no series of facts containing a revelation of supersensual and transcendent truths, who think it an *à priori* probability that the deep want of such facts which Plato experienced has not been satisfied; who are determined even by the most violent treatment of historical evidence to prove that whenever a supposed fact manifests a principle it must be a fable?

Plato, how far a Pythagorean.

42. We have dwelt so long, for reasons which we have explained already, upon this great summary of the ethical, metaphysical, and political philosophy of Greece, that we can afford time but for one remark, which is necessary to show how the doctrine of Plato is connected with that of the great predecessor whose labours, we suppose, it was his intention to review. That there is a Pythagorean character in the *Republic*, the book on music, the passages on geometry and arithmetic, and certain mystical sentences respecting the law of decay in a State—which have defied the skill of commentators—prove abundantly. But if we look well at the work, we shall find that the whole of it may in one sense be called Pythagorean. For the discovery of the musical law which gives internal wholeness to a State, as distinguished from that external law by which its parts are prevented from falling asunder, is in fact the object of the treatise. Wherein then does he differ from Pythagoras? Precisely in this—that while he gives music and arithmetic their due honour as instruments for cultivating in man the feeling of his own position and relations, he does not deduce that position and those relations from any combinations of notes or series of numbers. He makes Justice—a moral principle—the music of his commonwealth. And this is the more remarkable and the more honourable, because it is evident that he felt the temptation to be a cabbalist, and never divested himself of the belief (perhaps no deep thinker was ever able quite to divest himself of it) that there is something profoundly and mysteriously interwoven with the life of man in the relations of lines, of numbers, and of sounds. It was a great merit thus to keep the practical ground so steadily, and never to forget that this is really the highest ground. By doing so he was enabled to perform the same service in one sphere which he had already performed in another, to discover the political principle which Pythagoras had been seeking for amidst the laws that connect us with nature, as he had discerned the scientific principle which Parmenides had been groping after amidst the forms of our own minds.

Physics of Plato.

43. It is a great satisfaction to us that our duty, as historians of moral and metaphysical inquiries, does not call upon us, or even permit us, to say many words on the subject of Plato's *Physics*. Still the *Timæus* is so curiously connected with the *Republic* by the exquisite introduction to it, in which Critias tells the story of the submerged State, so like in all respects to that which Socrates had described the day before, (here we have the doctrine of reminiscence obviously brought into play, and a new evidence that our philosopher considered the *Republic* as no work of imagination, but the discovery of a truth implied and forgotten in the constitution of all societies,) and so much

The Timæus

importance has been attached, both in early and later times, to this dialogue, as if it contained the very heart of Platonism, that we cannot venture entirely to pass it over. With respect to the link between the *Politics* and the *Physics* of Plato, we would not speak confidently. He may have perceived a closer relation between the moral κόσμος, which he had been investigating in the *Republic*, and the material universe which Timæus creates, than we are able to trace. But this we think is evident, that he did enter upon his new task with a kind of consciousness that it behoved him to fill up a gap in his speculations, and to complete his review of the ancient philosophy, and at the same time with a secret apprehension that the light which had hitherto guided him might forsake him in this region. It is strange at all events that, while undertaking to develope a subject so important in Greek eyes as the creation and organisation of nature, he should make Socrates merely a listener. To a faithful student of Plato it must seem still more strange that he should on this occasion utterly desert his customary method, that the dialogue form should be merely used to throw a graceful dramatical veil over the introduction, and that in the expository part it should be exchanged for the haranguing style to which Plato was in general so averse.

Peculiarities of it.

44. And yet it is to this cause more than any other that the *Timæus* owes its reputation among those who undertake to furnish summaries and synopses of Platonical doctrine. Elsewhere they found him balancing opinions, often refusing to pronounce a verdict upon their respective merits—most unnecessarily tedious (as they think) in tracing the road to a conclusion, most unaccountably and ill-naturedly forgetful of the duty of clothing it in precise, available, transferable formulas. Here, on the contrary, though his language may be more obscure than it is in other places; though there may be more allusions to ill-understood portions of Greek speculation than in all the rest; though, lastly, his teachings refer to a question upon which we all believe that he could have only very partial illumination; still the manifest convenience of catching so Protean a philosopher for one moment in a rigid definite state, has overweighed all these considerations, and has made the Platonic cosmogony the grand storehouse from which diligent redacteurs have been wont to collect their notions of the mind and the works of Plato. Nay, it has even been a plausible and popular theory, ingeniously accounting for the uncertainty of the other Dialogues, that they were only intended as a vestibule to the inner oracle of the *Timæus*. Having sufficiently explained our views respecting these so-called uncertainties, and having endeavoured to show how much the method of Plato is part and

Use that has been made of it.

parcel of Plato himself, we must needs regard this particular work with very different feelings. Not pretending to behold with indifference the splendid theory which it developes, aware how closely that theory is connected with some of those which exercised the strongest influence upon the minds of men, especially in the first ages of the Christian Church, and being very willing to accept for Plato the compliments which natural philosophers have paid him for his intuition of truths hereafter to be established, we must yet confess that the *Timæus* seems to us chiefly valuable because it illustrates the worth of the principle from which it is so signal a departure. In every other dialogue, Plato is teaching us how to discover a universal law in any particular fact which falls under our notice; here we have huge hypotheses to begin with, and all facts fitted and disposed according to them.

His confusion of theology with physics

45. For whatever there is of truth in these hypotheses he is indebted to his previous studies in another direction. Having arrived by his own sure course of upward investigation at the doctrine of ideas, he was able to see that the world must be created according to an idea. But having attained this point, his light forsook him; he was not able to apply his dialectic to the elimination of this idea, from the names or facts in which it was imbedded. He had simply to trust to his imagination to construct a theory. Whereas in other cases he is a philosopher seeking for light, and when he could not perceive the tract of it, showing where it ought to be, and from what unrisen sun it must flow; here he is a presumptuous theologian, assuming himself capable of declaring that which must be revealed, and thereby losing the right way to that which may be discovered. Bacon does him no injustice in respect to his *Physics* when he says that he confused and corrupted them with theology; when he implicitly includes him among the giants who piled hill on hill in hopes of reaching heaven. Would that our countryman, for the honour of his own character, for the sake of the ages which were to follow him, had been as willing to recognise the truth of Plato, as he was acute in detecting his falsehood; as honest in acknowledging him for a guide, as he was right in pointing him out for a beacon. He would then have seen that the *Timæus* was in contradiction to the principle of induction, because it was inconsistent with the principle of Plato. He would have seen that in one solitary instance the Greek sage was betrayed by that ambition of completeness and circularity (which far more than the desire of fame deserves to be called the last infirmity of noble minds) into the examination of a subject on which he could only dogmatise, and could dogmatise only by forsaking his own method. He would have

Plato and Bacon.

confessed that the *Novum Organum* was but the extension of that method to a new class of subjects. He would have taught his disciples that the course of investigation which promised them such new discoveries in the world of sense—which was grounded upon the great principle that man is but a seeker, which is prosperous in proportion as he endeavours simply to behold that which is, and not to darken it by the mists of his own conceptions—had been ages before marked out as the only one by which they might safely hope to become acquainted with the truths of their own being. He would solemnly have conjured them to remember that a heathen, uninstructed by that revelation which deals directly with these transcendent truths and lays them open to every peasant, had yet perceived that they must be the most precious which a man can know, and that only in knowing them he is truly a man. He would have told them, that if ever that study, in which the heathen sage forgot his usual wisdom, should become the only one in which Christians care to be proficients, if ever *ex reseratione viarum sensûs et accensione majore luminis naturæ aliquid incredulitatis et noctis animis nostris erga divina mysteria oboriatur*—or there should grow up a feeling towards these mysteries which is worse than unbelief, if it be not another form of unbelief, a stupid acquiescence in them without the acknowledgment that they answer to any cravings in the heart, any necessities of the reason, any predictions of the imagination, then, for the sake of the age and country upon which such a disease had fallen, for the sake of all that should follow it, for the sake of physical knowledge itself, which can never long flourish apart from moral light, it would be most desirable that men should resume the study of the Athenian philosopher, should realise the wants of their minds by observing those which he experienced in his, should consider in what way we can find an adequate provision for both.

DIVISION III.—ARISTOTLE.

SECTION I.

ARISTOTLE THE BEGINNER OF A NEW EPOCH.

The age of Plato an age of ideals.

1. When we speak of Plato as the ideal philosopher, we sometimes forget that the people of Greece, his own fellow-citizens especially, were pursuing ideals during the whole time in which he and his master flourished. Socrates was born in 468 B.C. Plato died 347 B.C. Pericles had begun to take part in public affairs one year before the birth of Socrates; Olynthus was taken by Philip of Macedon the very year in which Plato

died. If one could find an expression for this period of 120 years, it would surely be this, that sculptors, painters, poets, politicians, cities, mobs, were all occupied with some ideal of beauty, wisdom, freedom, self-government, were striving to realise it, or setting it before themselves in some dream, or playing with it to bewilder their fellow-men. The philosopher, if he belonged to mankind, belonged as remarkably to his own time; he interpreted, methodised, justified its cravings, showed that they had a true foundation, and must have an ultimate satisfaction.

The Macedonian period.

2. It is quite clear that we enter upon a different stage of the history when Philip appears in it. His name is a sign that the age of individual energy, when pregnant events were transacted in insignificant localities, when the lowest party contests were developing the most permanent and universal principles, had passed away. His name is a signal that an age has come of concentrated organising power, of successful assaults upon freedom, of grand conceptions, of extensive conquests, of what has well been called material sublimity. This age needed its own philosophical expounder and representative. One was provided for it, who was destined to exercise a mightier influence upon after times than upon his own.

Aristotle: his early years.

3. In the year 367 a young man arrived in Athens who was born at Stagira in Chalcidice. His father was a physician at the court of Amyntas II., king of Macedonia. This youth had already been brought to that court, and had met there Philip, the son of the king, who was a few years younger than himself. But when he was seventeen years of age, no court attractions could keep him from the city in which Plato dwelt, and in which all wisdom was to be found. Perhaps he was almost ashamed of a country which Athenians still affected to consider semi-barbarous.

An Athenian student.

4. The most scrupulous Athenian could have detected nothing barbarous in the young Aristotle, for a certain defect which was observable in his pronunciation[1] was owing to a lisp. Some difference might be seen between him and an ordinary student, in that he was more attentive to his person, setting off, it would appear, his short and slender figure with the advantages of a somewhat fastidious costume.[2] Small quick eyes, and a sarcastic curl about his lips, were noted as characteristics of him, perhaps the only important characteristics, till Plato, who appears to have been absent on his Sicilian journey, returned and found the most promising pupil who had ever appeared in his school, one

[1] τραυλὸς τὴν φωνὴν ὥς φησι Τιμόθεος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Βίων.

[2] Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰσχνοσκελὴς, φασὶν, ἦν, καὶ μικρόμματος· ἐσθῆτι τε ἐπισήμῳ χρώμενος, καὶ δακτυλίοις, καὶ κουρᾷ.

whom he surnamed "the reader," and whose philosophical devotion he found it necessary to check rather than excite.

The tutor of Alexander.

5. Nevertheless Speusippus, not Aristotle, succeeded Plato in the Academy. Aristotle left Athens just at the time, as we have mentioned already, when the triumphs of Philip were becoming terrible to the liberties of Greece. Five years after he was at the court of Philip educating his son Alexander. It is evident that the influence of Aristotle upon Alexander's mind must have been prodigious; that all his subsequent history depended upon the period which elapsed between his fourteenth and his seventeeth year. He came into the hands of his master a raw untamed youth, with impulses which no man could understand or govern. He left him a Greek prince, uniting the vigour and accomplishments of the republican period, with the schemes and capacities of his father, with a desire to conquer the world, and with an intellect that was able to effect what he desired. It is not necessary to inquire whether the particular projects of Alexander were inspired or favoured by Aristotle. Even if they were discouraged, it would not be less true that the direction of mind which made the conception or the achievement of them possible, was received from the teacher by one who, without this culture, might have aspired no higher than to be a victor in one of those Olympic contests from which a not very remote ancestor had been excluded.

His later life.

6. Alexander bestowed upon his master the only reward for these precious gifts which he really prized: he enabled him to make his history of animals a book which should be one of instruction and wonder to all after generations—not least to that of Cuvier and Owen. Every nation which he conquered enriched Aristotle with some new and more valuable facts. It was in Athens that Aristotle husbanded and meditated upon these treasures. There all his great works were written. There he gathered about him a circle of devoted pupils, who listened to his more popular and his more systematic instruction; there he commented upon his predecessors, corresponded with Alexander, endured the misunderstandings of him and his court, suffered domestic sorrows, which he felt as a man, and which give us a personal interest in him; finally underwent the popular charge of impiety, which had caused the banishment of Anaxagoras and the death of Socrates. On this charge Aristotle was summoned before the Areopagus; he declined to appear, and was condemned to death. He retired to Chalcis, and died there in 322 B.C.

SECTION II.

RELATION OF ARISTOTLE TO PLATO.

The Dialogue and the Treatise.

1. A student passing from the works of Plato to those of Aristotle is struck first of all with the entire absence of that dramatic form and that dramatic feeling with which he has become familiar. The living human beings with whom he has conversed have passed away. Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias, are no longer lounging upon their couches amidst groups of admiring pupils; we have no walks along the wall of the city, no readings besides the Ilissus, no lively symposia giving occasion to high discourses about love, no Critias recalling the stories he had heard in the days of his youth, before he became a tyrant, of ancient and glorious republics; above all, no Socrates forming a centre to these various groups, while yet he stands out clear and distinct in his individual character, showing that the most subtle of dialecticians may be the most thoroughly humorous and humane of men. Some little sorrow for the loss of so many clear and beautiful pictures will be felt perhaps by every one. But by far the greater portion of readers will believe that they have an ample compensation in the precision and philosophical dignity of the treatise for the richness and variety of the dialogue. To hear solemn questions treated solemnly; to hear opinions calmly discussed without the interruption of personalities; above all, to have a profound and considerate judge, able, and not unwilling, to pronounce a positive decision upon the evidence before him; this they think a great advantage, and this, and far more than this, they find in Aristotle.

Was Aristotle more practical than his master?

2. Still we are of opinion that a person who is able to render justice to the method of the master, will, on the whole, be the most likely to appreciate the disciple; at all events we shall not understand either well if we content ourselves with a vague notion that one was a consummate artist, the other a profound practical philosopher. That Plato did not adopt his dialogue form for any artistical purpose, but simply because it was necessary for the development of his idea of science, we have contended already. And we feel it equally necessary, in order that we may claim for Aristotle the true and very noble position which of right belongs to him, not to let it be supposed that his pretensions to be either practical or profound rest upon his want of those qualities, and his abandonment of that method, by which Plato is distinguished. In common parlance we are wont to consider those most practical whose studies are most connected with real, living, passing questions. Now it was the actual opposition of Sophists, which drove Socrates and Plato to seek

for principles not yet recognised, lest they should lose those which they had. Aristotle had the advantage of being able calmly to examine sophistical arguments, because it was the hour in the school for that particular subject to be lectured upon. It was a question of life and death in Plato's day, whether we have something permanent to rest on or not; for men in every town of Greece were abusing the name of Heraclitus in support of the doctrine of a perpetual flux. Aristotle could label this question physical or metaphysical, and patiently balance it against some opposite theory. The Parmenideans forced Plato to investigate the nature and conditions of science, for they threatened it with a hopeless stationariness. Aristotle is under no such alarm; he has merely to make out a system of analytics. It was because the body of Socrates was about to pass through death, that he was led to consider the meaning, and nature, and enduring properties of the soul. Aristotle begins his treatise on the same subject, with inquiring whether it is to be considered in reference to any particular person at all or abstractedly, and whether we are to speak of it physically or dialectically. Without determining which of the two courses we have indicated is the best, we think it must be a violence upon ordinary usage to say that the latter is the more practical.

or more profound?

3. Neither is the quality of depth precisely that one which we conceive ought to be predicated of Aristotle, when it is our object to contrast him with his predecessor. It was the necessary consequence of Plato's situation, and of the task which had been committed to him, that he was always seeking for principles. The most simple every-day facts puzzled him; nothing that human beings were interested in was beneath his attention: but then it was the meaning of these things, the truth implied in them, which he was continually inquiring after. He found the commonest word that men speak, the commonest act that men do, unintelligible, except by the light which comes from another region than that in which they are habitually dwelling. Of this feeling there are no traces in Aristotle. To collect all possible facts, to arrange and classify them, was his ambition, and perhaps his appointed function: no one is less tempted to suspect any deep meaning in facts, or to grope after it. In like manner, to get words pressed and settled into a definition is his highest aim: the thought that there is a life in words, that they are connected with the life in us, and may lead at all to the interpretation of its marvels, never was admitted into his mind, or at least never tarried there. In this disposition there may be a comfort and an advantage; but it certainly is not that upon which persons who are careful in the use of language would bestow the epithet "profound."

How far Aristotle reverenced Socrates.

4. Another prejudice in reference to these great men it is necessary to remove, or we shall not understand their relative positions. It is often fancied—and Aristotle seems not altogether anxious to do away the impression—that Plato's disciple forsook him when he forsook his master; that the later philosophy is in some important respects a return to the simple faith of Socrates. If what we have just said be correct, this notion must be not only wide of the truth, but in direct contradiction to it. The personality of Plato was precisely that quality of his mind and of his writings which he had inherited from Socrates. That he so seldom deviated into abstractions,—that he preserved so strongly the feeling, "we are actual men, wrestling against evil tendencies within, and evil powers without, capable of being educated, and of educating each other into a longing after, and perception of, the perfect Goodness and Truth:" this he owed to Socrates. His own especial work was to connect this personal struggle with the orderly development of principles. It was precisely then with the Socrates in Plato that Aristotle was incapable of feeling sympathy. That he had a general reverence for his good sense, that he recognised him as the useful and victorious opposer of what was mischievous and unphilosophical, and that he sincerely believed him not to have held certain offensive opinions of his disciple: this we can easily imagine. But that he the least admired the Socratic method, or that all his wisdom could avail to teach him into what conclusions that method must necessarily lead one who habitually followed it, we cannot believe.

Feelings of Aristotle towards Plato.

5. Though these remarks seem for a moment derogatory to the fame of this wonderful man, they will be found upon reflection to relieve his character from some unjust imputations, to set his actual merits in a clearer light, and to explain the kind of influence which he has exerted, and must always exert, over mankind. There are passages in his works which, in the opinion of over-watchful and sensitive critics, indicate a personal jealousy and dislike of Plato. They remark that he does not introduce his comments upon him in a manly, philosophical spirit, but generally with some of those affected phrases of reluctance which display often more than the strongest vituperation the ill-will that is lurking within. Possibly far less meaning would have been seen in these passages, if the gossiping anecdote-mongers of later Greece had not illustrated them by stories of dissensions between the master and the pupil, which, though obviously derived from a very vulgar invention, or a memory generally treacherous, because always trivial, still unconsciously influence our minds when we have once heard them, and prevent us from fairly looking at the evidence which gives them their

only plausibility. Separated from these stories, the quotations we think prove no more than that Aristotle felt a certain irritation and displeasure when he perceived there was something in the words of Plato which his large intellect and immense information did not enable him to comprehend. To be continually haunted with a consciousness of this kind, "In all definable qualities I am equal, nay superior to my predecessor; I have reduced subjects into far greater order, I analyse far more perfectly, I have a far greater store of facts at my command; and yet there is in him something quite *undefinable*, which seems to make an incredible difference between us:" this may, no doubt, have been very vexatious even to an honest and great mind. For it was not merely the personal humiliation of such a reflection which would be grievous to him, it would jar against his strongest conviction that nothing ought to be incapable of definition, and that whatsoever does defy it can scarcely be of any great worth. While, then, it is no doubt possible that petty quarrels may have been stirred up between two such men by admirers and flatterers, who were equally incapable of understanding either, we have no need of that supposition to account for the sneers and taunts (if such they must be called) which now and then displease us in Aristotle.

The Dialectics of Plato: why different to him and to his disciples.

6. In conformity with these remarks, it will not be difficult to show wherein the peculiarity of the Stagirite philosophy consisted; how it grew out of the Platonic, how far they are contradictory, how far one occupies a space which the other had left void. We have seen by what steps Plato was led into his high estimate of dialectics. He watched his master maintaining a safe moral position against the attacks of the sophists. To assert realities against appearances and counterfeits was *his* single aim. Keeping this aim steadily before him, he almost unconsciously wrought out a method entirely different from that of previous philosophers. As Plato reflected upon the end which Socrates had proposed to himself, he perceived the full practical meaning of that truth which in terms had been asserted by Xenophanes and others,—that Being is the object of all our inquiries. He saw at the same time how necessary it was to connect the end with the method; for till that method had been practised, Being had been a word, a notion, a negation,—not an object to be really beheld and striven after. Hence the immense importance of bringing that method forward; of presenting it substantively, as it were, to his pupils; not allowing them *merely* to contemplate it as leading to certain results, but as the safe and universal means of arriving at any results. We have alluded to a class of dialogues having this purpose; and these, or something answering to them (*approaching*, it is possible, the nature of ordinary

exposition, though we can scarcely believe that Plato *ever* abandoned the dialogue as his vehicle of instruction), must have been the peculiar study of the Academy, as such, and expressly of the more advanced disciples.[1] Hence there will have grown up among these pupils a feeling respecting dialectics which Plato would have been anxious to discourage, and yet which his own works continually tended to foster. Seeing it used as a key to unlock the secrets of social life, of moral life, of physical life, and seeing likewise the pains which their master took that they should examine the wards of the key, it was most natural that they should think a much fuller and more systematic development of this all-important science was desirable, and even necessary. It would occur to them that there was something like confusion and irregularity in the proceedings of their great teacher. Had he not strangely mixed together inquiries respecting the grounds of morality with statements respecting the nature of science? Surely it would have been much better, much more orderly, that these questions should have been kept distinct, and referred to particular heads. And were there not also some indications of narrowness in Plato, which a more accurate habit of distinction would have delivered him from? Had not his aversion to some of the usual abuses of rhetoric led him to undervalue the whole art, when it was undoubtedly capable, like every other, of being reduced to strict laws, and must deserve to be contemplated without any reference to its accidental results? The same might be said of his doctrine respecting poetry; the same, still more strongly, of his ill-concealed indifference to physical speculations. If all these subjects could be directly looked at in themselves as distinct branches of human culture, how much increase of knowledge might be expected in each, how much increase of clearness respecting the capacities and limitations of the human intellect!

Ambition of greater arrangement and system.

7. Such thoughts, we suppose, may have been at work in the minds of many who frequented the school of Plato. In few they will have borne any fruit, in most of these few the unripe or blighted fruit of some feeble theories, professing to universalise the system of Plato, really proving that their authors knew nothing either of Plato or of themselves. But there was one who was able to make the thoughts of the rest intelligible. To him Platonism will have appeared a needful preparation for a

Aristotle satisfies this desire.

[1] In the Life of Aristotle, by Mr. Blakesley (published in the Encyclopædia Metropolitana), it has been shown, we think most satisfactorily, that the *acroamatic* treatises of Aristotle differed from the *exoteric* not in the abstruseness or mysteriousness of their subject-matter, but in this, that the one formed part of a course or system, while the others were casual discussions or lectures on a particular thesis. The remark in the text is an extension and adaptation of this doctrine to the case of Plato.

complete and circular philosophy. Its unsystematic character, its imaginative flights, its disregard of certain provinces of thought, will have seemed to him indications of rudeness and infancy. And he will have conceived the thought of assigning to each study its true position, that one which Plato declared and proved to be so important, occupying the first place, being exhibited in its full proportions, and determining the character and treatment of the rest. Dialectics, then, was in some sense the centre of both philosophies. Nor would it be correct to say that Aristotle consciously altered the signification which the word dialectics had borne in the discourses of his predecessor. He only wished to give the study more distinctness and prominence, to exhibit the processes and operations of which it treated apart from any particular applications and results. But in fulfilling this desire, the character of the pursuit became inevitably changed. The feeling of Plato was, There are certain objects presented to my mind; they may be sensible objects, as trees; they may be objects for the understanding merely, as names; but objects they are still,—things *thrown in my way;* and I must know what they mean, I must find out the truth of them. For this end I must have dialectics. The object has vanished from before the eyes and mind of Aristotle; he has begun to devote the whole energy of his mind to the contemplation of dialectics in themselves. What is the consequence? The sense of requiring them as the means of escape from the impositions which intercept our views of things as they are, becomes more and more weakened, till at last it disappears altogether. That principle which it had been the business of Plato's life to assert against Protagoras and his school, that the mind is not its own standard, that the aspects under which objects present themselves to us do not constitute our knowledge of them, but that we may arrive at an acquaintance with them as they are in themselves; this principle, which had given his dialectics all their meaning, is no longer felt with any potency by his disciple. On the contrary, it is precisely the aspects under which we see and judge of things that he proposes to investigate. He wants to know what are the rules and conditions under which the mind, by its own constitution, considers and discourses. He makes the mind a centre, referring everything to itself, just as those did with whom Plato contended. But he differed from them in this, that their intention was knavish, his most honest. They set up the doctrine that all things are merely as they seem to us, for the purpose of unsettling all faith, and proving the judgment of each individual to be a lawful standard. He sought to convince men that all is not unstable and fluctuating, by showing them that there is a fixed rule to which human judgments

In doing which he necessarily abandons the Platonical principle.

must conform, which limits the exercises of individual taste and caprice, which tests and reduces to order those appearances which the Sophist pretended were infinite.

8. From this statement it will be easily apparent that the definition of dialectics in Plato and Aristotle may be almost the same, and yet that the whole scope and object of the science indicated by this common definition will be different. One as much as the other could say, Dialectics is that science which discovers the difference between the false and the true. But the false in Plato is the semblance which any object presents to the sensualised mind; the true, the very substance and meaning of that object. The false in Aristotle is a wrong *affirmation* concerning any matter whereof the mind takes cognizance; the true, a right *affirmation* concerning the same matter. Hence the dialectic of the one treats of the way whereby we obtain to a clear and vital perception of things; the dialectic of the other treats of the way in which we discourse of things. Words to the one are the means whereby we ascend to an apprehension of realities of which there are no sensible exponents. Words to the other are the formulas wherein we set forth our notions and judgments. The one desires to ascertain of what hidden meaning the word is an index; the other desires to prevent the word from transgressing certain boundaries which he has fixed for it. Hence it happened that the sense and leading maxim of Plato's philosophy became not only more distasteful, but positively more unintelligible to his wisest disciple, than to many who had never studied in the Academy, or who had set themselves in direct opposition to it. When Aristotle had matured his system of dialectics, there was something in it so perfect and satisfactory, that he could not even dream of anything lying out of its circle, and incapable of being brought under its rules. He felt that he had discovered all the forms under which it is possible to set down any proposition in words, and what there could be besides this, what opening there could be for another region entirely out of the government of these forms, he had no conception. At any rate, if there were such a one, it must be a vague, uninhabited world. To suppose it peopled with other, and those most real and distinct forms, was the extravagance of philosophical delirium. Accordingly, when he speaks of the doctrine of substantial ideas—of ideas, that is to say, which are the grounds of all our forms of thought, and consequently cannot be subject to them—he is reduced to the strange, and for so consummate a logician, most disagreeable necessity of begging the whole question, of arguing that, since these ideas ought to be included under some of the ascertained conditions of logic, and by the hypothesis are not included under any, they must be fictitious.

The dialectics of realities and affirmations.

The worth of both philosophies.

9. As we proceed we shall have occasion to notice how this primary difference affected the views of these philosophers upon all questions which came under their notice. At present we speak of it in order to show that the methods having a perfectly distinct object, do not of necessity interfere with each other; that the Platonic doctrine is not absurd, because Aristotle could find no place for it in his system; that the labours of Aristotle are not useless or ill-directed, because they do not supply, as he fancied they did, any satisfaction to the inquiries which Plato had awakened.

SECTION III.

THE LOGICAL TREATISES OF ARISTOTLE.

The Aristotelian logic the key to his philosophy.

1. Every orderly examination of Aristotle must then, we conceive, take its start from his treatises on logic. That these are not the most interesting of the works which he has bequeathed to the world we may easily admit; but, unless something is understood of their nature and purpose, it is scarcely possible to understand the character, the value, and the necessary limitation of his opinions on ethics, on politics, on rhetoric, on poetry. We shall presently quote the opinion of an eminent writer on physical science, to prove that a just estimate of Aristotle's labours in that department depends upon our knowledge of the importance which he attached to the forms of logic. And the settlement of the long-debated question which falls more within the province of this sketch, what precise meaning he attached to the word Metaphysics, or what portion of his thoughts his disciples referred to under that name, can, we think, be hoped for only from a previous examination of his dialectics.

Completeness of these treatises.

2. In the Berlin edition of Aristotle, the *Categories* occupy the first place. Some doubt has been entertained respecting the genuineness of this treatise, which modern inquiries appear to have removed. It would in many cases afford a reasonable ground of suspicion against a work, that it exactly filled up a gap in a set of acknowledged works by the same author, so that with it they form a complete system of instruction upon the subject which they treat. But it is a set-off against this consideration, that roundness is the great characteristic of Aristotle; and that it is less hard to imagine how a perfect series of his logical writings can have come down to us, than to believe any pupil capable of supplying a void which he had left in it. The difficulty, too, of supposing one man to possess the full mastery of this subject indicated by the successive works which he has left, is diminished when we remember that the original conception of the study was not his but Zeno's. How naturally that conception arose in a mind which had once entered into the great principle

of Xenophanes and Parmenides, that the mind has laws of its own, and is independent of the appearances and determinations of the senses, we have explained already. What more than this discovery, and the application of it in confuting sensible conclusions, may be owing to Zeno, we do not know. It is not impossible that some of the Sophists, while they turned the art to the worst purposes, may have done something for the refinement and improvement of it. In the school of Euclides, not only the practice, but the principles of logic must have been studied and elucidated. With these materials to work upon, it seems nowise incredible that one trained in the school of Plato to the greatest subtlety and precision of thought, and possessing in himself a comprehension and a diligence quite unparalleled, should have been able to produce a design and an edifice which after ages have found it scarcely possible to alter or amend. He had not to raise a science from its foundations; but *lateritiam invenit, marmoream reliquit*, may, perhaps, be said of him with as strict truth as of almost any architect that the world has seen.

The Categories: object of the work.

3. Now the work on the *Categories* seems to be a fitting vestibule to this building. On entering it, we feel at once that the purpose to which it is consecrated is altogether different from that which Plato has been teaching us to regard as all-important, and we feel that it is a true purpose still. There is a way of penetrating into the nature and essence of things, whether those which present an outward image to my senses, or those, equally real, which merely utter themselves to my mind. With this way Aristotle does not concern himself. But it is equally certain that our mind forms notions and conceptions about the things belonging to both these kinds which it contemplates, and it may be that these conceptions themselves are subject to certain rules. They may be defined and classified; there may be a general set of conceptions to which all particular conceptions will refer themselves. This Aristotle affirms to be the case. Under the ten notions of Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Time, Place, Position, Possession, Action, Passion, he says you may reduce all your notions. Now a Platonist is very likely to ask, "But what do these words Substance, Quantity, &c. themselves signify?" "How do I know what Substance is, better than I know what a man or a horse is?" "Quantity, better than I know what three cubits long is?" And these are questions which, as we shall find hereafter, had need to be asked, and were asked with effect and advantage when the Aristotelian province of thought had endeavoured to bring all other provinces within it. But for any further purpose than for destroying this pretension they are impertinent. When I study an actual man, or an actual horse, the substance is doubtless the x or unknown

quantity which I am inquiring after; to assume that I know it, is to stop all investigation. But I understand the *name* substance, as well as I understand the *name* man or horse. And who told you that, because there is a science of *things*, there is not a science of *names?* that there are not laws of dependence and affinity among them? and that conformity or nonconformity to these laws is not exactly what we mean by coherent or incoherent discourse? There is no alternative between the assertion, that the desire so deeply implanted in us of arrangement and classification, is a mere disease, or the belief that it arises from the sense of certain limitations and conditions to which our minds themselves are subject, and is another name for the wish to understand what they are.

Such a work necessary.

4. The rules of grammar, the terminology of every art and science, the very attempt to be intelligible, presume these. And there is no safety from the efforts of men to invent divisions and schemes of thought, no safety for the great principles and laws, which these dividers and schemers are continually narrowing and stifling, but in the clear and steady perception of certain necessary boundaries not imposed upon us by our fellow-men, but by the nature of our own understandings. Let, then, the reader carefully consider this work on the *Categories*. Let him ask himself whether it has not the effect of clearing his mind, and that in no ordinary degree, respecting his own modes of speech; whether it does not lead him to feel, more than he did before, that his words, winged though they be, can take no chance flight, but must move along an appointed preordained path; and, therefore, whether there be not a witness in himself that Aristotle has a distinct and reasonable end of his own, which it is very much for our interest to be acquainted with.

Logic based on facts.

5. From the investigation of these general forms under which we reduce all the notions that enter our minds, he proceeds in his treatise Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, to inquire respecting the mode of our affirmations and denials. In this treatise he developes the nature and limitations of propositions, the meaning of contraries and contradictories, the force of affirmations and denials, in impossible, contingent, and necessary matter. We have no excuse for dwelling on works of a merely formal character, but we mention them for the purpose of pressing the important remark of Archbishop Whateley on our readers, that the two books of Ἀναλύτικα Πρότερα develope the syllogistic principle and process. Aristotle is not the mere inventor of an art, but the masterly expounder of the facts upon which that art rests, and but for which it would have no meaning. He does not teach us how to make propositions, but what propositions are, and necessarily must be, according to the conditions of the human intellect.

He does not tell us how to make syllogisms, but now we do syllogise, when we do not violate the laws of our mind as much as we should violate the laws of our body, if we tried to walk upon our heads instead of upon our feet.

The later analytics.

6. But Aristotle perceived that this analysis of our mental operations was not sufficient. He had told us how we *discourse*, but he had not told us how we *know*. Are these forms of logic themselves knowledge? Is the syllogistic demonstration the same thing with science? Or, is one kind of it science? Or, are the results of it science? Or, are there certain premises assumed in it which also do or may belong to science? What are these? how do we get at them? Such are the important inquiries which occupy Aristotle in his Ἀναλύτικα ὕστερα. We shall endeavour to seize a few of those points in the investigation which will best enable the reader to estimate the character of Aristotle's mind, and to see how he stands related as well to his great master, as to the expounder of the inductive philosophy.

7. The treatise opens thus:—Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προυπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως· φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτο θεωροῦσιν ἐπὶ πασῶν· αἵ τε γὰρ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου παράγίνονται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη τεχνῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς λογοὺς οἵ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς· αμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων, οἱ δὲ δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ οἱ Ρητορικοὶ συμπείθουσιν· ἢ γὰρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων ὅ ἐστι ἐπαγωγὴ ἢ δι' ἐνθυμημάτων ὅπερ ἐστὶ συλλογισμός. There are two very important words in the opening clause of this sentence which we imagine were carefully distinguished in the school from which Aristotle came, διδασκαλία and μάθησις. We feel confident, also, that the last being, by the force of its name, the method of learning and acquisition, would have uniformly taken precedence of the other, which points to the communication of knowledge. That the order is here changed, that διδασκαλία is put foremost as if it included the other within itself, is a very significant circumstance, which is an explanation of much that follows. Plato, it is well known, had a profound reverence for mathematics. He was wont to say, "Let no man undisciplined in geometry enter the halls of philosophy." Now we cannot account for this admiration unless we suppose him to have perceived in the mathematical process something akin to his own method. But this resemblance certainly does not lie in that which we are wont to call the mathematical demonstration, it does not lie in the machinery of axioms, definitions, hypotheses, propositions. This machinery, valuable as it is, has scarcely a Socratic element in it. What remains? Plato, we conceive, would have answered, Exactly

How Plato and Aristotle differed in their views of mathematics.

that which is the essence of mathematics, exactly the μάθησις. For this demonstration is but the διδασκαλία, a necessary and inseparable accident of the science, but implying the presence of something else and unmeaning without it. The μάθησις is the process whereby in any particular triangle I arrive at this as one of the laws which belong to it as a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right angles; the διδασκαλία is the formal verbal enunciation of that law, and the confirmation of it by certain deductions from previously admitted premises. In this sense mathematics would seem to him not indeed *the* science, but the best preparation for it, because it recognises certain permanent forms and principles existing in visible objects, which we are capable of entering into and discovering. Now Aristotle, as we have often hinted, perceives only the forms and laws of our mind. That, consequently, which was the subordinate and accessory part of mathematics in the judgment of his master, became in his judgment the whole. He looks upon mathematics simply in reference to the demonstrations; the characteristic of mathematics is that it deals with necessary matter. If you ask why necessary, the only answer you can get is, that it starts ultimately from some self-evident propositions. So that, after all, the proposition, a mode of our own mind, becomes the ultimate ground of all things. Or if you will find out a Hercules' pillar beyond these, you have the *Categories*. Pent within these limits, it becomes difficult to grasp the meaning of science. Aristotle feels the difficulty, and with his usual honesty does not evade it. He acknowledges that it may puzzle us to tell whether science is only that which we obtain after a series of satisfactory syllogisms, or whether the premises assumed in those syllogisms must not of themselves be entitled to the same character. And he can only say, that we must deal fairly with facts, and that what we are bound to assume as known, we do actually in some sort know. Ultimate knowledge, then, as well as primary knowledge, the most perfect truth which the philosopher can attain, as well as the point from which he starts, is still a proposition. All knowledge seems to be included under the two forms,—knowledge *that* it is so; knowledge *why* it is so. Neither of these can, of course, include the knowledge at which Plato is aiming, knowledge which is correlative with Being—a knowledge not *about* things, or persons, but *of* them.

Is knowledge the result of syllogism?

8. But if these forms of our mind are the ground of our knowledge, we cannot at once arrive at them. What are the steps? Here comes in the Aristotelian doctrine about sensible objects. Our perception of these is not strictly to be called knowledge; that word, whether used about premises or conclusions, the data of a syllogism or its results, has still reference

Sensible perception: is it knowledge?

to what is universal. Our sensible apprehensions refer only to particulars, to individuals. But from these, which are the most evident to us, we come to the more general by a process of induction. What this induction is, and how entirely it differs from that process which bears the same name in the writings of Bacon, the reader will perceive the more he studies the different writings of Aristotle. He will find, first, that the sensible *phenomenon* is taken for granted as a safe starting-point. That phenomena are not principles, Aristotle believed as strongly as we could. But to suspect phenomena, to suppose that they need sifting and probing in order that we may know what the fact is which they denote, this is no part of his system. The sensible impression was to him satisfactory, not indeed to rest in, but as a true beginning; all the difference between those who acquiesce in it and the most consummate philosopher, lay in the use which the latter made of his power of generalising and syllogising. It is in this way that Aristotle has become the parent of all the modern schools of sensible philosophy, which schools have, nevertheless, drawn their very best and most convincing arguments from the errors into which Aristotle and the Aristotelians were led by the adoption of their own hypothesis. The first book of Locke may be justly said to be an elaborate and satisfactory exposure of the notions into which the Stagirite school is driven, by its determination to recognise no foundation of truth but sense and experience. They were too learned and thoughtful not to perceive that universal forms are in some way or other demanded by the mind; and because they would not acknowledge them as the grounds of our mind, they were forced to seek for them in the mind, and thus to conceive them in the shape of propositions. Hence the fancy of an innate notion that whatever is, is; that the whole is greater than its part, &c.; a fancy which Mr. Locke has confuted amidst such shouts of triumph from his admirers, while he was, in fact, conspiring with Aristotle to disparage the principle which delivers us from such fallacies. But we are anticipating a future page of our sketch.

The Aristotelian induction.

9. These later analytics deal, it will be seen, entirely with demonstrative reasoning. The *Topics*, a much longer work, refer wholly to probable reasoning. On this subject Aristotle, it seems to us, is much more at home than on the other. We have intimated our suspicion that he never did possess or could possess the idea of Science. It lay altogether out of his province; when he tried to grapple with it he necessarily brought it within conditions and forms which robbed it of its very essence. But no one ever did so much as he to give a scientific form and semblance to those subjects which are by their nature not scientific. No one ever did so much to give our thoughts

The Topics

precision and clearness respecting all the wavering and fluctuating matters that fall within the domain of opinion and of ordinary conduct. When we look at the *Topics*, we are brought to confess (not without a certain reluctance) that there is no method of persuasion or human discourse so loose and random but that it may be subjected to analysis, and shown to involve certain inevitable limitations. Undoubtedly there is some justification for our discontent with these resolute reductions of all our thoughts and arguments to a system; we feel that the vital power is not there; that what really brings men into consent with either a falsehood or a truth, the energy and conviction of him who utters it is taken no account of, and that the habit of contemplating arguments without reference either to the truth of that which they are meant to establish, or to the moral influence which they exert, is somewhat hardening and deadening to the mind. But we shall find that the work of a thorough master in this line, like Aristotle, will, on the whole, produce a good effect. He so entirely understands himself and what he is able to do, that we cannot commit the mistake which inferior writers often draw us into, of fancying that nothing is wanted but what he tells us. His exquisite dissections teach us what more blundering dissectors might not; that there is something which cannot be dissected. To understand Aristotle rightly, the *Topics* should be read together with the three books on Rhetoric. We cannot speak of that work now, because so much of the moral and political wisdom of Aristotle is presumed in it. Nevertheless it is closely connected with this work on probable arguments. The *Topics* are to it what the six books of Euclid are to a treatise on practical mechanics. Now, though it may seem strange to talk of a geometry expressly for a rhetorician, and though we have already shown in what sense geometry was very alien from the habits of Aristotle's mind, yet we cannot help seeing that just so far as a person who has the faculty of persuasion can be taught that his is not a mere craft, but has maxims and laws to govern it, he will become at any rate less mischievous, and may become a sincere, true-minded man. In another point of view the *Topics* give that roundness and completeness to the logical system of Aristotle which we said that he evidently desired, and had in so remarkable a manner realised.

Probable reasoning reduced to rules.

SECTION IV.

THE PHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE.

Extract from Dr. Whewell.

1. A short treatise on *Sophistical Proofs* winds up the series of Aristotle's works on logic. Then follow his voluminous writings on physics. In these we have no direct interest. To show, however, how the logical ideas of Aristotle affected his views in this department, we shall take the liberty of extracting a passage from Dr. Whewell's *History of the Inductive Sciences* vol. i. sec. 2; "The Aristotelian Physical Philosophy."

The books on physical facts.

2. "The principal treatises of Aristotle are, the eight books of *Physical Lectures*, the four books *Of the Heavens*, the two books *Of Production and Destruction*, for the book *Of the World* is now universally acknowledged to be spurious, and the *Meteorologics*, though full of physical explanations of natural phenomena, does not exhibit the doctrines and reasonings of the schools in so general a form; the same may be said of the *Mechanical Problems*. The treatises on the various subjects of natural history, *On Animals*, *On the Parts of Animals*, *On Plants*, *On Physiognomies*, *On Colours*, *On Sounds*, contain an extraordinary accumulation of facts, and manifest a wonderful power of systematising; but are not works which expound principles, and therefore do not require to be here considered.

The Physical Lectures.

3. "The *Physical Lectures* are the works concerning which the well-known anecdote is related by Simplicius, a Greek commentator of the sixth century, as well as by Plutarch. It is said that Alexander the Great wrote to his former tutor to this effect: 'You have not done well in publishing these *Lectures*, for how shall we, your pupils, excel other men if you make that public to all which we learned from you?' To this Aristotle is said to have replied: 'My *Lectures* are published and not published; they will be intelligible to those who heard them and to none beside.' This may very easily be a story inscribed and circulated among those who found the works beyond their comprehension; and it cannot be denied that to make out the meaning and reasoning of every part would be a task very laborious and difficult, if not impossible. But we may follow the import of a large portion of the work with sufficient clearness to apprehend the character and principles of the reasoning; and this is what I shall endeavour to do.

His use of words.

4. "The author's introductory statement of his view of the nature of philosophy falls in very closely with what has been said, that he takes his facts and his generalisations as they are implied in the structure of language. 'We must in all cases proceed,' he says, 'from what is known to what is unknown.' This will not be denied; but we can hardly follow him in his inference. He adds, 'We must proceed, therefore, from universal to particular. And something of this,' he pursues, 'may be seen in language; for names signify things in a general and indefinite manner, as *circles*, and by defining we unfold them into particulars.' He illustrates this by saying, 'thus children

at first call all men *father*, and all women *mother*, but afterwards distinguish.'

5. "In accordance with this view he endeavours to settle several of the great questions concerning the universe, which had been started among subtle and speculative men, by unfolding the meaning of the words and phrases which are applied to the most general notions of things and relations. We have already noticed this method. A few examples will illustrate it further. Whether there was or was not a void, or place without matter had already been debated among rival sects of philosophers. The antagonist arguments were briefly these: there must be a void because a body cannot move into a space except it is empty, and therefore without a void there could be no motion; and, on the other hand, there is no void, for the intervals between bodies are filled with air, and air is something. These opinions had even been supported by reference to experiment. On the one hand, Anaxagoras and his school had shown, that air when confined resisted compression, by squeezing a blown bladder, and pressing down an inverted vessel in the water; on the other hand, it was alleged that a vessel full of fine ashes held as much water as if the ashes were not there, which could only be explained by supposing void spaces between the ashes. Aristotle decides that there is no void on such arguments as this:—In a void there could be no differences of up and down; for as in nothing there are no differences, so there are none in a privation or negation; but a void is merely a privation or negation of matter; therefore, in a void, bodies could not move up and down, which it is in their nature to do. It is easily seen that such a mode of reasoning elevates the familiar forms of language, and the intellectual connections of terms to a supremacy over facts; making truth depend upon whether terms are or are not primitive, and whether we say that bodies fall naturally. In such a philosophy every new result of observation would be compelled to conform to the usual combinations of phrases as they had been associated by the modes of apprehension previously familiar.

A void.

How Aristotle proves that there is none.

6. "It is not intended here to intimate that the common modes of apprehension, which are the basis of common language, are limited and casual. They imply, on the contrary, universal and necessary conditions of our perceptions and conceptions; thus all things are necessarily apprehended as existing in time and space, and as connected by relations of cause and effect; and, so far as the Aristotelian philosophy reasons from these assumptions, it has a real foundation, though even in this case the conclusions are often insecure. We have one example of this reasoning in the eighth book, where he says that there never was a time in which change and motion did not exist;

Before and After.

'for if all things were at rest, the first motion must have been produced by some change in some of these things; that is, there must have been a change before the first change:' and again, 'How can *before* and *after* apply where time is not? or how can time be when motion is not?' 'If,' he adds, 'time is a mensuration of motion, and if time be eternal, motion must be eternal.' But we have sometimes principles introduced of a more arbitrary character, and, besides the general relations of thought, the inventions of previous speculators are taken for granted; such, for instance, as the then commonly received opinions concerning the frame of the world. From the assertion that motion is eternal, proved in the manner just stated, Aristotle proceeds by a curious train of reasoning to identify this eternal motion with the diurnal motion of the heavens. 'There must,' he says, 'be something which is the first moved;' this follows from the relation of causes and effects. Again, 'Motion must go on constantly, and therefore must be either continuous or successive. Now what is continuous is more properly said to take place *constantly*, than what is successive. Also the continuous is better; but we always suppose that which is better to take place in nature, if it be possible.' We see here the vague judgment of *better* and *worse* introduced, as that of *natural* and *unnatural* was before into physical reasonings.

Better and Worse.

7. "I proceed with Aristotle's argument, 'We have now, therefore, to show that there may be an infinite, single, continuous motion, and that this is circular.' This is, in fact, proved, as may readily be conceived, from the consideration that a body may go on habitually revolving regularly in a circle. And thus we have a demonstration, on the principles of this philosophy, that there is and must be a first mover, revolving eternally with a uniform circular motion.

Circularity of motion.

"Though this kind of philosophy may appear too trifling to deserve being dwelt upon, it is important for our purpose so far to exemplify it that we may afterwards advance, conscious that we have done it no injustice.

8. "I will now pass from the doctrines relating to the motions of the heavens to those which concern the material elements of the universe. And here it may be remarked, that the tendency (of which we are here tracing the development) to extract speculative opinions from the relations of words must be very natural to man; for the very widely-accepted doctrine of the four elements, which appears to be founded upon the opposition of the adjectives *hot* and *cold*, *wet* and *dry*, is much older than Aristotle, and was probably one of the earliest of philosophical dogmas. The great master of this philosophy, however, puts the opinion in a more systematic manner than his predecessors.

Elements of the universe.

Contrarieties.

9. "'We seek,' he says, 'the principles of sensible things, that is, of tangible bodies. We must take, therefore, not all the contrarieties of quality, but those only which have reference to the touch. Thus black and white, sweet and bitter, do not differ as tangible qualities, and therefore must be rejected from our consideration.

"'Now the contrarieties of quality which refer to the touch are these, hot, cold; dry, wet; heavy, light; hard, soft; unctuous, meagre; rough, smooth; dense, rare.' He then proceeds to reject all but the four first of these, for various reasons; heavy and light because they are not active and passive qualities; the others because they are combinations of the four first, which, therefore, he infers to be the four elementary qualities.

"'Now in four things there are six combinations of two; but the combinations of two opposites, as hot and cold, must be rejected; we have, therefore, four elementary combinations which agree with the four apparently elementary bodies; air is hot, wet, (for steam is air,) water is cold and wet, and earth is cold and dry.'

Bacon infected by this nominalism.

10. "It may be remarked that this disposition to assume that some common elementary quality must exist in the cases in which we habitually apply a common adjective, as it begun before the reign of the Aristotelian philosophy, so also survived its influence. Not to mention other uses, it would be difficult to free Bacon's *Inquisitio in Naturam Calidi*, 'Examination of the Nature of Heat,' from the charge of confounding together very different classes of phenomena under the cover of the word *hot*.

"The rectification of these opinions concerning the elementary composition of bodies belongs to an advanced period in the history of physical knowledge, even after the revival of its progress.

Absolute and relative levity.

11. "The Aristotelian doctrines concerning motion are still founded upon the same mode of reasoning from adjectives; but in this case the result follows, not only from the opposition of the words, but also from the distinction of their being *absolutely* and *relatively* true. 'Former writers,' says Aristotle, 'have considered heavy and light *relatively* only, taking cases where both things have weight, but one is lighter than the other; and they imagine that in this way they defined what was *absolutely* (ἁπλῶς) heavy and light.' We now know that things which rise by their lightness do so only because they are pressed upwards by heavier surrounding bodies; and this assumption of absolute levity, which is evidently gratuitous, or rather merely nominal, entirely vitiated the whole of the succeeding reasoning. The inference was that fire must be absolutely light, since it tends to take its place above the three other elements; earth absolutely heavy, since it tends to take its place below fire, air, and water. The philosopher argued also with great acuteness that air, which tends to take its place below fire and above water, must do so *by its nature*, and not in virtue of any combination of heavy and light elements. For if air was composed of two parts, which give fire its levity, joined to other parts which produce gravity, we might assume a quantity of air so large that it should be lighter than a similar quantity of fire, having more of the light parts. It thus follows that each of the four elements tends to take its own place, fire being the highest, air the next, water the next, and earth the lowest. The whole of this train of errors arises from fallacies which have a verbal origin; from considering light as opposite to heavy, and from considering levity as a quality of a body, instead of as the effect of surrounding bodies."

SECTION V.

THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE.

1. These remarks of Dr. Whewell's show how necessarily the method of Aristotle obstructed the true observation and interpretation of nature. To us they are important chiefly from the connection which has always been felt to exist between the physical treatises and those which by Aristotle himself, or some disciple, are classed under the name of Metaphysical. These latter writings have been the subject of much dispute. Some have supposed that they owe their name to an accidental juxtaposition with the books on Physics, among which it was evident that they could not conveniently be classed; some to a feeling in the mind of Aristotle, that he was ascending into a region above and beyond that in which he had been dwelling previously.

The two senses of the word Metaphysics

2. One of his early commentators appears to adopt both explanations of the title.[1] He says, "The object of this treatise is theological. Herein Aristotle theologises. The order is this: we make our beginning from those things which naturally are the last, seeing that these are the better known to us. For this reason, then, he discoursed to us first concerning physical matters, for these are last by nature, but to us first. But this present subject is first in nature, but to us last, since the imperishable things are older than the perishable, and the ungenerated than the generated. Wherefore Aristotle discoursed to us first concerning those things that are moved without an order (in his book on *Meteors*); then again concerning those things which are moved according to an order or system (in the work on the

Old opinions on the question.

[1] The Scholia of Asclepius after Ammonius. Ammonius belongs to the fifth century A.D., Asclepius to the sixth.

Heavens, concerning the stars and the spheres); and finally in this treatise he discourses to us concerning those things which are in all cases immovable. Now this is theology, for such a study befits the gods. For this reason the work is inscribed *After-the-Physics* (Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ); seeing that he first discoursed to us concerning the physical things, then consecutively concerning this; it is proper, therefore, to read it after the physical treatises: this the title shows." Another of the scholiasts is more decisive: "This work is entitled Μετὰ τα φυσικὰ, not in reference to the character of the book, but to the order in reading it, for he treats concerning physical *principles*." These hints, if considered in connection with the books themselves, will, we conceive, explain the origin of the two theories, and in a great degree reconcile them. We shall see as we proceed in what sense Aristotle "theologises;" in what sense he treats of things "unmoved," and therefore not physical; or in what sense he treats of physical "principles."

The first book.

3. The first Book of the Metaphysics, or that which we reasonably suppose to be the first from its style and method, ascends from an investigation of the words Art and Experience (words which we shall meet with again in the Ethics), to an examination of the word Wisdom or σοφία. Wisdom is the knowledge about certain causes and principles. The question seems to follow of course, What kinds of causes or principles? But this question Aristotle thinks that he has answered implicitly already. Sense and experience take cognizance of individual cases; wisdom rises to the first causes and the first principles—those that are most universal, those that lie furthest from mere casual observation. We must continue in his own very striking words: "Through Wonder, men both now and heretofore began to philosophise. At first, indeed, they wondered at the more difficult things which lay close by them, then went on by little and little, inquiring concerning greater things, as concerning the changes of the moon, or about the sun, and the stars, and the generation of the universe. But he that is at a loss and that wonders, thinks that he is ignorant. Wherefore also the lover of wisdom (the philosopher) is in some sort a lover of fables, for the fable consists of wonders. Now, seeing they philosophised for the sake of escaping ignorance, it is evident that they pursued knowledge for the sake of knowing, and not for the sake of any advantage. The fact supports this conclusion; this kind of wisdom began to be sought out, when things sufficient for occupation and leisure were already provided. Just as we say that a man is free who exists for his own sake and not for the sake of another, so this is the only knowledge which is perfectly free, for it is the only one which exists purely

Experience and Wisdom.

for its own sake. Wherefore the possession of it may be justly considered as not pertaining to man. For oftentimes the nature of men is servile; so that, according to Simonides, 'God alone would have this prize, and it is unworthy not to seek that (to be content with that) knowledge which is appropriate to him.'

"If indeed the poets say truly that the Divine Nature is envious, Simonides must be right, and all over-learned people must be unhappy. But the Divine Nature *cannot* be envious; rather, as the proverb says, 'the poets lie;' nor is it fitting to think any study more honourable than this, for that which is most godlike is also most honourable. Now science may be godlike in two ways; godlike because it is that thing which God hath above all others, or because it is itself the knowledge of the Divine. This fulfils both these conditions, for God seems to be a sort of beginning of causes, and God will possess this kind of knowledge alone or chiefly. All kinds of knowledge then are more needful than this (for common purposes), but none is better."

The "Wise Man" of Aristotle.

4. The wise man now presented to us is not the old Greek sage who could overreach his fellows and build up a tyranny; he is not the anxious questioner in all different directions, "Where is wisdom found?" he is not the Sophist who brings all different kinds of knowledge to the market, and sells them to the highest bidder, under a pledge that they will procure him power and the fruits of power; he is not the Socratic philosopher asking all the things that he sees for the meaning or truth which is latent in them; he is not the Platonic philosopher seeking for that which keeps knowledge, society, nature, at one. He is a man who must be carefully distinguished from, and opposed to, the man of business or practice (a person, nevertheless, to be highly prized in his way), who has a function altogether his own, a function which raises him to an almost Divine level, and makes him the one fit beholder of that which is Divine. If we ask what this is, the answer we receive is, the Divine is *the Cause*, that which lies beneath all other causes, that which is not subject to accident, movement, the law of growth; that which is the original root of all things. Here we have the Aristotelian theology.

The Aristotelian theology and metaphysics one.

5. But this theology is by the definition *Metaphysics*. It comes after physics in the order of its discovery: after physics because it is implied in them; after physics because it is beyond them. Yet for this very reason it cannot be separated from them; you do not know what it is except by considering it in its relation to them. We have been careful hitherto to use the name as little as we might, at least in our sketch of Greek

inquirers. It is dangerous to anticipate a name. The time will come, we may be sure, when it will be imposed if it is wanted. Soon a definer of boundaries will certainly appear, to say, "This is Morals;" This is Physics;" "This is Metaphysics." When he appears, if he is a man who shows he has a right to be heard, we must of course listen to him. But his accurate limitations will be far less intelligible to us, we shall not appreciate them as they deserve, if we have not allowed previous students to take their own course and explain themselves. In general, however grateful we may be to our teacher for telling us what we are to call and are not to call each thing that comes before us, we must be careful of taking him as the interpreter of his predecessors. He has a service of his own to render us, but it is involved in the nature of this service that he should be an overstrict disciplinarian, insisting that guerilla troops whose worth consists in their sudden and irregular appearance, should conform to the rules of regular warfare; compelling those whose order is quite as strict as his own, but altogether different from it, to adopt his signs and divisions under peril of being treated as disobedient and lawless.

Review of previous philosophies

6. This remark is especially applicable to an able review of the previous Greek philosophers, which is contained in the first book of the Metaphysics. Causes, Aristotle says, are fourfold: 1. The substance of a thing, or that which constitutes it. 2. The matter of a thing, or that which is the needful condition of it. 3. The source whence the motion of anything proceeds. 4. The reason, or purpose, or good of its existence. No one can deny the value of this classification for Aristotelian purposes, nor that it may help, if used with moderation, to clear the mind of any student respecting his own objects. But Aristotle believes that one or other of these courses of inquiry *was* followed by each school of Greek thinkers, and was considered by that school as the only and all-sufficient method. Thus the Ionic philosophers studied the matter of things in hopes of discovering a primary element to which all other things might be referred. Those of this class who selected fire as their element, were naturally led by the effects which they observed resulting from that power, to speculate upon the meaning and mystery of Motion. Hence a new kind of inquiry was started, which proceeded, however, much in the spirit of those respecting elements, till Anaxagoras discovered the necessity of an Intelligence to set physical agents in movement. As, however, he had only recourse to this ultimate principle when other instruments failed him, the Atomic theory, which furnished a more plausible explanation of the facts of nature than his Homæomeriæ, easily supplanted them. Between this theory and that which affirmed Numbers

to be the first principles of things, Aristotle appears to detect a connection, one not well supported by chronology. That doctrine of numbers he considers the first form of the inquiry after the essence or substance of things. The archetypal ideas of the Platonists, who regarded numbers as a kind of intervening powers between sensible things and pure essences, is the second and higher form of it. The inquiry respecting the object or purpose of things had not, he imagines, been pursued distinctly by any class of his predecessors, but it had entered somewhat confusedly into the speculations of them all.

Objection to Aristotle's classification.

7. Now if Socrates was, as we have maintained, the keystone of Greek speculations—an opinion which derives support from many passages in Aristotle himself—this historical sketch, however ingenious, cannot be correct. For in it Socrates is merely an interloper; of right therefore only mentioned in a parenthesis, as chiefly devoting himself to ethical inquiries, Plato's intellectual descent being traced, not through him, to the Ionian and Heraclitan schools. Throughout this treatise Aristotle shows a want of sympathy with his predecessors, which must have made it impossible for him to understand those complicated thoughts and anxieties, even if he had not been determined to arrange them, and therefore became needlessly irritated with those whose vagrant habits defied arrangement. But his hints respecting other men are very important helps in becoming acquainted with himself. The Metaphysics of Aristotle are troublesome reading, partly from the frequent repetitions which occur in them, partly from the difficulty of discovering a sequence in the books. Nevertheless they should be read by any student who wishes to investigate the questions which have occupied men in later times. We shall illustrate our previous remarks by tracing a very rude outline of the subjects which are discussed in them, and recording some of the solutions Aristotle has given of the difficulties which he starts.

The theoretic and practical man.

8. A kind of appendix which follows the first book contains a proof that causes are not infinite, that there is consequently a possibility of carrying on that inquiry in which past philosophers had engaged. The same short book contains some important remarks upon the manner in which the search was to be conducted, upon the contributions to truth which each school may have made, upon the advantages which a philosopher may derive from attending even to popular notions, upon the dislike which some have to exact mathematical reasoning, and the determination of others to have nothing else, and upon the proper limitation of mathematical accuracy to things without matter. We have here also the clear announcement of a principle which the student of Aristotle has need to keep constantly in recollection.

θεωρητικῆς μὲν τέλος ἀλήθεια, πρακτικῆς δ' ἔργον. He adds an explanation, which still further illustrates his meaning, and makes the difference between him and his master more conspicuous, that the practical man has nothing to do with the eternal or the absolute, but only with the relative. This book ends with a promise of an inquiry into the meaning of the word Nature, which is not, however, fulfilled in that which is commonly placed next to it.

Problems for solution.

9. This second book is a collection of doubts or questions to be hereafter resolved. The first doubt is, whether it is the business of one science, or of more, to inquire into all kinds of causes or principles. This question involves the very subject of the whole treatise. So many different subjects seem to be included in that province to which the general name *σοφία* has been given—matters purely belonging to the senses, the causes of motion, the nature of Being, the reason and purpose of things—how is it possible to suppose a single science dealing with principles apparently not admitting either of analogy or contrast? Secondly, are we to look upon the most comprehensive Genera to which individual things can be referred, or upon the atoms of which they consist, as their Principles? The third question is connected with this, is there anything besides individual things? If not, how can they be known, for are not individual things infinite, and is not knowledge of that which is one and universal? Fourthly, are the principles of things perishable, and of things imperishable, the same? Fifthly (which is the great question of all), are Being and Unity the essences of things that are, and not distinguishable from them; or are we to seek for the *τὸ ὄν* and *τὸ ἕν* as if they had each a distinct nature? Sixthly, are numbers, bodies, planes, and points, substances or not? Such are the general controversies of which we are to hope for some settlement in the books that follow.

The Dialectician, the Philosopher, and the Sophist.

10. The third book may be considered an answer to the first question. There is a science which contemplates Existence *as* Existence, and whatever appertains to it in reference to it; not like other sciences, merely the attributes of certain particular existences. There are, he says, certain things peculiar to Being as Being, and these are things concerning which it is the philosopher's function to investigate the truth. The dialectician and the sophist resemble indeed the philosopher; Being is the common subject-matter to all three. They *discourse* concerning the subjects which are in a peculiar sense his property. The dialectical *δύναμις* differs from the philosophical in its nature; the sophistical in the intention of him who uses it, *ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστικὴ, ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη, οὖσα δ' οὔ.* This is an important passage as illustrating the difference between the Platonic and the Aristotelian dialectics. According to Plato dialectics was *the* human science, the science of the philosopher as such. *Σοφία* in its essence belongs to God. Aristotle, we see, discovers a difference between dialectics and the highest philosophy, and inevitably; for, as his dialectic treats only of the forms of human thought, as it deals with knowledge merely in the sense of the powers and means of knowing possessed by us, there must be another science concerning the objects of knowledge as such. But then, in this science also, the objects cease to be objects; they become *subjects* for man's contemplation; they become Metaphysics or Ontology. The hint respecting the *Sophist* contained in this sentence should also be compared with the elaborate exhibition of his character and functions in the dialogue between the Eleatic stranger and Theætetus. It connects itself with the inquiry, whether mathematical axioms are subjects of inquiry for the Ontologist or highest philosopher. The answer is in the affirmative. Those axioms were assumed by the mathematician. The student of physics sometimes meddles with them, but rashly and presumptuously; they are first principles, and as such are cognizable only by the person whose office we are defining. Now as it was the especial delight of the Sophist to deny axioms, to say that the same thing could be and not be, this becomes the natural place for settling his pretensions. Consistly with their characteristic difference, Aristotle represents him, not in Plato's manner, as one who invents counterfeit images of that which is, but as one who attributes accidents to accidents instead of to substances. We can scarcely conceive two portraits of the same person so correct and felicitous, and yet expressing so thoroughly the manner and principle of the respective artists.

Definitions.

11. The fourth book is a book of definitions. We can only convey a notion of its importance by giving a list of the words defined. They are Principle (*ἀρχή*), Cause, Element, Nature, Necessity, Unity, Being, Substance, Sameness, Opposition, First and Last, Power, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Perfection, Limitation, Τὸ *καθ' ὅ* (*secundum quid*); [the meaning is easily understood from Touchstone's words in *As You Like It*, "In respect that it is of the country it is a good life, but in respect that it is not of the court it is a vile life," &c.] Disposition, Habit, Passion, Privation, Inclusion, Derivation, Part, Whole, *κόλοβον* (the mutilated), Kind, Falsehood, Accident. The explanations of some of these words will, it is obvious, have been repeated from the *Categories* and the *Analytics*. Some of them will be better understood from the arguments in the subsequent books than they could be from any formal definitions; still they

are worthy to be read and reflected on. The one on "Nature" is perhaps the most important; but to his notions of this word the entire treatise is the only satisfactory clue.

Ontology · how it differs from Physics.

12. The fifth book explains Aristotle's view of the difference between physical and ontological science. They agree in this, that they are theoretic, not practical or poetic. They differ in this that the physical deals with that which has a capacity for change or movement, and with that which is imbedded in matter. The primary philosophy deals with the unchangeable, and with that which is separate from matter. Mathematical science lies between them, resembling ontological science in the first characteristic, physical in the second. If there be such a science as Theology, it must be a part, and the highest part, of the primary Philosophy. The Divine Nature must be pre-eminently that which is out of the circle of composite and movable things. The condition of those things whereof physical science treats, is, that they are susceptible of accidents. Not that there can be a science of accidents; as such they exclude science altogether. But there may be, and there are, principles and causes of those things which admit of accidents. Seeking these, physical science still retains its formal distinction from that higher science which deals with beings and essences as such. There is another sense in which "Being" had been used, especially by the Platonists, which it is necessary to distinguish from our notion of it. Being had been confounded with truth, Not-being with falsehood. Now truth, according to Aristotle, is not in the things but in the mind. Affirmation combines, negation separates; falsehood separates that which should be combined, combines that which should be separate. But the existences with which we are dealing are simple or uncompounded. Here again we have one of the capital and vital points of difference between the two philosophies.

13. The sixth book contains some of the most important distinctions and differences in the whole treatise. Ontology is concerned with Substance. What is to be included among substances? Are walking, sitting, being in health, substances? No; all these imply a subject to which they must be considered as referring. In this way we get rid of the notion of a substantial good, as well as a substantial warmth or whiteness, &c. All these alike are considered as qualities of some subject, and what that subject is must be sought in each individual which offers itself to our observation.

Qualities and Substance.

14. But does not substance when thus considered necessarily connect itself with body? Here is one of our great puzzles. Some would have the *boundaries* of body to be substances; some would have substances which are in nowise cognizable by the

senses; some would make the One the primary substance, and suppose different sets of substances, such as numbers, magnitudes, souls, to be generated from this. Aristotle's opinion is this:—To every subject belongs, first, ὕλη, which we must translate matter; secondly, μορφή, or form. The matter of a thing is its necessary condition. But this matter is not its essence; something else is implied in it, something which it presents or makes manifest. Applying this principle to the questions which occupied the third class of philosophers mentioned in the introductory book—the Platonists namely, and the Pythagoreans—it appears that this form is the true εἶδος of which they dreamed. It is the essential thing in each thing; it is that in virtue of which substance is possible, without which it is inconceivable. But it does not exist apart from each particular subject; it is that which enters into the definition of every subject, and without which the definition would be no definition: obviously, therefore, it must be viewed in that subject, and cannot be contemplated as a distinct, peculiar essence. Tested by this rule it is obvious also that all notions of an ideal form of hollowness or of pugnosedness (we use Aristotle's favourite illustration) must be out of the question; these cannot be, primarily at least, subjects for a definition; they presuppose something whereof they are properties, and in that, and that only, can you look for an εἶδος. All notion again of Being as distinct from the particular person who, or the thing which, is, falls to the ground. Socrates and the being of Socrates are identical; the αὐτοέκαστον, of which he had talked, is nothing else but this εἶδος, or form, inherent in the thing itself.

Form and Matter.

Production; natural, artificial, automatic.

15. The mode in which this same principle is applied to another class of inquiries, those which relate to the genesis or first origin of things, requires a more minute examination.

In considering any production we find, first, something whence it has been generated; secondly, something by which it has been generated; thirdly, the result or the thing itself. There are three modes of production—natural, artificial, automatic. In natural productions we discern at once a matter; nay, in the largest sense, Nature itself may be defined that out of which things are produced. Everything that becomes has a nature, which is only another way of saying that it has a ὕλη; and that in each thing which might not have been is this ὕλη. Now the result formed out of this matter or nature is any given substance—a vegetable, a beast, a man. But what is the producing, generating cause in each case? Clearly something akin in kind to the result. A man generates a man. Then there is implied in the resulting thing a productive force distinct from the matter upon which it works. And this is our εἶδος. And it is the

combination of this εἶδος with the ὕλη which both produces a substance and constitutes it. Look now at artificial productions. Here the εἶδος is still the producing power. It is in the soul. The art of the physician, the plan of the architect, is that εἶδος which produces actual health or an actual house. Here, however, a distinction arises. In these artificial productions is supposed a νόησις and a ποίησις. The νόησις is the perception and internal entertainment of the form; the ποίησις the creation out of the given matter. But we mentioned a third mode of production not strictly natural or artificial, but by the action of the thing itself. For instance, a cure may take place by the application of warmth; a body may become warm by rubbing; this warmth then in the body is either itself a portion of health, or something is consequent upon it like itself, which is a portion of health. Evidently this implies the previous presence either of nature or of an artificer. Evidently also there is a necessity that this kind of generative influence should combine with another. There must be a productive power, there must be something out of which it is produced. In every case, then, there will be an ὕλη and an εἶδος. That which is generated is the whole substance, consisting of matter and form. But the form, properly speaking, is not generated. It is reproduced in each particular subject in combination with a certain matter, and it becomes a new and peculiar form in virtue of that combination. There is necessary then to every production a certain form and a certain matter; and all the qualities appertaining to this substance which is produced *must* inhere (not actually but potentially) in the substance producing, and *may* belong to the form when they are produced.

16. It remains to consider how this doctrine bears upon the inquiries of those philosophers who busied themselves with the search after a primary element: the inquiries of those who sought for the τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα are reserved for another discussion. But before we can enter upon this subject several of the doubts in our second book must be resolved. First, as to the meaning of the words Part and Whole. The first and most obvious signification of part has relation to quantity, but this has nothing to do with our subject. What we want to know is the connexion of the idea of *Part* with substance. Assuming the division of substance into ὕλη and εἶδος, we should say that in a brass statue the brass formed *part* of the statue, as the complex of form and matter, but not of the statue considered as a Form. Now as Form is the proper subject of a definition, seeing it can be described in itself, and since that which is material cannot be so described, it comes to pass that in certain cases we necessarily speak of the parts as constituting the whole, and in other cases

Part and Whole.

not. We define a circle without reference to its parts. We define a syllable by the letters or elements which compose it; for the parts of the circle are material parts, the parts of the syllable are formal, logical parts. Of course if you look upon a syllable as composed of certain letters in wax, or even of sounds in the air, its divisions become material and do not fall within the scope of a logical definition. Again, in a material division you assume the whole as preceding the part. On the contrary, logically and formally, the part precedes the whole. For instance, if you define the life of an animal you will describe it by some of its functions. None of its other functions can be performed without sensation. This particular faculty of sensation, therefore, will be assumed in the existence of the whole animal. This principle holds equally in reference to æsthetic matter (that which the senses take account of), as in noetic (the figures of mathematics). Generally, therefore, it may be affirmed that the question as to the priority of "part" and "whole" depend upon the distinction between matter and form, and that you cannot settle it if that distinction be disregarded. At the same time, Aristotle admits the difficulty of defining simply with reference to form, and not to the complex substance, which consists of it and of matter together. He acknowledges that the attempt to divide matter from substance and to look upon things sensible as not sensible, has led to all the Pythagorean and Platonical inventions which he regards with so much dislike.

17. Another question, in which these philosophers are also involved, follows immediately upon this. How are substances connected with *kinds?* If there be certain types after which all sensible things are formed, these types would seem to be universals, and those things with which the senses converse, particulars. All possible differences and properties which can be discovered in the most marked individual of any kind must then upon this showing be included in those primitive, universal forms; but, according to logic, precisely the opposite is the case. The genus is divested of the difference which goes to the composition of the species, and of the properties which go to the composition of the individual. Your genera can never be types of the individual. By their very nature they are deficient in all that characterises him. The εἶδος then which forms the essential in each thing, which makes it be that which it is, must be looked upon as individualised by the ὕλη with which it is connected. Apart from the modification which it thus undergoes it is only a logical existence, the highest genus to which it is ultimately referred being pre-eminently that which can only be contemplated by and in the mind. Such we take to be the meaning of

Genera and Individuals.

Aristotle, and from it the doctrine seems to follow very closely with which he winds up this book, and which applies the meaning of it to those who had dealt mainly with the ὕλη. Any fact or thing being given, I have no further occasion to trouble myself about the fact, the ὅτι. This the sense, or something corresponding to sense, supplies. I am not to ask what is the musical man when I see a musical man. He is that which I behold, and nothing else. My business is with the διότι, the cause. Why is he this or that? And the answer is in the εἶδος, the form or constitution. This is the ultimate reason of that which each thing is. Consequently I do not get nearer the cause or reason of things by reducing them into their natural elements. The analysis may be physically proper or useful, but it does not lead me to that of which I am in search. Everything which is, and which I can either behold with my senses or my mind, is not the A or the B whereof it is composed, but is something else; the synthesis of the A and the B involves the presence of a form or existence, which cannot be found in either of them separately. So that find out as many primary elements as you will, you do not thereby find an ἀρχή.

The seekers for an element confuted.

Energies.

18. Our main business then is to discover the meaning of this εἶδος, and the relation which exists between it and the ὕλη. The seventh book takes up this subject, and carries forward a hint which was given in the last—one which is, perhaps, the most pregnant of all the hints in Aristotle's writings, and that which has most effect upon his whole philosophy. The εἶδος or μορφὴ is an energy, the ὕλη is a δύναμις or capacity, implying and requiring the action or co-operation of the energy to produce a result. Οὐσια, as we said before, is the synthesis of these: omitting the ἐνέργεια you come merely to certain material elements and combinations which do not in any way give you the actual things you are examining. The difficulty is respecting those things which appear to have no ἐνέργεια in themselves, as a house. Must the substances of these be considered as something distinct from them and external to them? The answer is this:—Do you mean to ask whether the material house, that is to say the stones and cement, is a substance? Certainly not: you have excluded the very notion of substance by the mode of your question. But do you mean to ask whether that house is actually something? You assume it by your very question. You cannot define anything without treating it as a substance, satisfy yourself as you will about the reason that it is so; there is something then not distinct from the house, but implied in it, which is a form or εἶδος. The test that there is, is your own attempt to define it.

Test of Substance: definition.

Capacity.

19. Proceeding upon this principle of an energy and a δύναμις

in each substance, he shows how needful it is in any inquiry after causes to keep the three questions in sight. By cause do you mean capacity, δύναμις? By cause do you mean moving power? By cause do you mean the form? (The two last *may* always be the same, still the inquiry after the constitution of each thing is distinct from the inquiry after its productive force.) Do you mean, lastly, the οὗ ἕνεκα? (This also may be the same question with the last, though differently stated; that is to say, the constitution of each thing may determine the purpose or object of it.)

20. But this use of the word capacity (δύναμις) suggests another doubt. Has not every subject a capacity for contraries? Must not we say that every healthy body is potentially sick? that water is potentially both wine and vinegar? The answer is, that this absence or deprivation of qualities is an accident of these qualities, and not itself a quality. For a dead body to become alive it must pass into a certain ὕλη, which has therefore the potentiality of life; for vinegar to become wine it must pass into water; nothing similar happens in the opposite case. Finally, he applies this principle to the solution of that difficulty respecting unity at which he had so often hinted, and on which he had expressed his opinion with sufficient plainness already. If the definition of a man be that he is a biped animal, how comes it that each of these—"animal," "biped," does not constitute a separate entity? What, in short, is the ground of our conception of each thing and person as one? Aristotle intimates that this question is hopeless and unanswerable if put in this form, for then by each variety of your definition you create a new puzzle. He would rather then assume the unity of each thing as a fact or datum of the understanding, and account for its being reduced into different constituent elements. And this *is* accounted for by the necessary co-presence of matter and form in each thing, and from the matter being merely a potentiality, and the form an energy. In this way the dream of a *unity* distinct from the individual thing is got rid of, as the dream of a *substance* distinct from each particular thing had been got rid of before.

Capacity for contraries.

21. The eighth book is still occupied with the subject of capacities and energies. Aristotle inquires into the different senses of the word δύναμις; what we mean when we say that a thing can or cannot be. There is a use of this language in geometry, which is metaphorical, and not to our present purpose. We say that a thing can or cannot be, meaning that it is or it is not. But all δυνάμεις, in their proper sense, have reference to some primary δύναμις, *which is the cause or beginning of a change in some other thing as another thing.* Warmth, for

Definition of Capacities.

instance, is a δύναμις. It is so equally in that which warms, as in that which is warmed. The δύναμις in the thing warmed hath reference or relation to the corresponding primary δύναμις in the thing warming, and this necessary implication of that which answers to itself in something besides itself, is its characteristic nature. To every capacity there will of course correspond a certain incapacity, which may be understood either as the absence of a faculty of communication, the absence of a faculty of reception, or, again, merely as a negative want, or as a positive state involving that want.

Division of them

22. Δυνάμεις are divided into rational and irrational; the rational those which subsist in the reasonable soul, the irrational those that are merely physical. All art and knowledge are of the first class. Now, if we look for a radical distinction between them, we may find it in this way. Warmth, an irrational δύναμις, has the power only of producing warmth; the art of the physician has the power of producing either health or sickness. Generally, therefore, the one kind of power can produce contrary changes, the other only a certain change; and these contrary changes are wrought by the rational powers with and upon the irrational powers.

Being and Becoming.

23. This description of δυνάμεις might seem in some points to trench upon that notion of energies which Aristotle had given us in his last book. He proceeds therefore to distinguish them. The Megarian sect, in conformity with their general rule of reducing every idea into that of Being, and of excluding all distinct notion of production and *becoming*, had identified Power or Capacity with energy. Where there is no building, said they, there is no builder. Apply this, says Aristotle, to arts, and the man who has studied the longest ceases to have the art as soon as he ceases to exercise it. Apply it to things without reason or life, and there is nothing sweet, nor warm, nor cold, except at the moment when it is tasted or felt; an argument not, perhaps, very destructive of the proposition, in our minds, but which was very effective as against the Megarians, who had a great horror of the Protagorean doctrine. It is then possible for a thing to have the capacity of being and not to be, and to have the capacity of not being and to be; that of which it is the capacity takes place when something is superadded to it, which is Energy. Energy is analogous to motion. You cannot predicate either motion or energy of things which are not; the moment energy or motion is added to them they are; but many things which are not have a possible or potential existence.[1] At

[1] "Οὐκ ἔστι δέ," adds Aristotle, "ὅτι οὐκ ἐντελέχεια ἐστίν" (Met. 8, iii. 36). This passage, perhaps, determines as clearly as any we could produce, the meaning of the word ἐντελέχεια, which is so important in some branches

the same time Energy is not to be confounded with Motion. The difference does not lie where we might suspect, in that motion belongs to that which is irrational, energy to the rational, for Learning is referred to the head of Motion, sight to the head of Energy. The difference is in this, that every motion is incomplete, tending towards an end, but not including the end in itself; that energy has an end in itself, and that it does not involve a pause or a termination. Learning, building, walking, all imply a termination. Seeing, thinking, being happy, imply no termination; these are Energies.

Relation of Energies and Capacities to each other.

24. Upon this showing, energy, in the order of reason and of substance, precedes δύναμις; in the order of time not always. It precedes in the order of reason because the first of all capacities or possibilities is the capacity or possibility of energising. A man who has the faculty of building, is one who has in him the capacity of using his energy in the art of building. In time it is otherwise. The primary energising power of course precedes, even in this sense, that which receives the impression of it, Form being older than Matter. But if you take the case of any particular person or thing, we say that its capacity of being that person or thing precedes its being such actually or energetically. Yet, though this is the case in each particular thing, there is always a foregone energy presumed in some other thing to which it owes its existence. And thus the principle is asserted, which we shall find afterwards turned to practical account in the Ethics, that the exercise of any particular energy precedes the habitual use of the faculty appertaining to that energy; that it is by playing on the harp we become harp players. Several important ethical doctrines are in fact developed in the course of this inquiry, but of these we shall take distinct notice hereafter. One pregnant notion more directly bearing upon our present subject occurs in the course of it. Δύναμις had been defined that which is the cause of change in some other thing as another thing. But this notion wants a resting-place, unless you believe that there is some primary δύναμις presupposed in all others, which is the beginning of motion. This is φύσις, and thus we have arrived at the most complete notion of it which we can expect. This first and primary cause of all change, Energy still precedes and surpasses.

of the Aristotelian philosophy. It is the opposite to *potentiality*, yet would be ill translated by that which we often oppose to potentiality,—*actuality*. Εἶδος expresses the substance of each thing viewed in repose,—its form or constitution; ἐνέργεια its substance, considered as active and generative; ἐντελέχεια seems to be the synthesis or harmony of these two ideas. The *effectio* of Cicero, therefore, represents the most important side of it, but not the whole.

Aristotle proceeds to show wherein Energy is better and more glorious than δύναμις; as, for instance, because δύναμις is the same of contraries. The capacity of health and sickness is the same; of stillness and movement; of being raised up and of falling down. But one of these must be good, and therefore the energy which determines which of these contraries shall have effect must be better than the Faculty or Capacity. Two consequences follow. The Energy is that which makes things be evil which have only the possibility or potentiality of evil in them. Secondly, in those things which are primary and eternal there is no evil, no fault, no decay; the capacity for evil lies in Nature. The importance of these two axioms will be felt by every moral and theological student. Another proposition, which has been extensively applied in another direction, is added respecting *discovery*. It is, that Discovery means the bringing things into Energy which exist potentially; because Knowing is an Energy.

Distinction of subjects.

25. This book concludes with another reference to the relation between truth and being, falsehood and not-being. Truth and falsehood being the accordance or discordance of our judgment with the actual state of things, there are three cases which may fall under our notice. First, things always united and inseparable, or things always separable and never united. Respecting these the judgment must be uniform; the same will be truth in all cases, falsehood in all cases. Secondly, things which may be either separated or united. Here comes in the possibility of that being true to-day which is false to-morrow; of that being true under one aspect which is false under another. Thirdly, things perfectly simple, things admitting neither of division nor combination. To these the words true and false do not apply, but merely knowledge and ignorance. You either know such things or you do not. Respecting these there is no mistake, no deception possible; but merely the presence or absence of knowledge. All sensible objects whose existence you ascertain by touch or sight are of this kind; the want of touch or sight, not a false opinion, excluding them from you.

Oneness: different definitions of it.

26. In the ninth book we come again upon the question of unity. The name One is used, he says, in four ways. It means that which is *continuous by nature, a whole, an individual thing, that which is predicated of a whole.* The general sense of the Indivisible is common to all these. And again unity in any of these senses we may attribute to some particular substance which is inseparable in place, in form, in thought, as well as to some actually indivisible whole. The fundamental notion of unity he conceives to be that of a measure to quantities; without such a measure quantity is inconceivable. There may be some-

thing actually indivisible; there may be that which is indivisible to our senses; an actual unity in form, and a supposititious unity in matter. Each will bear the name, because each will be used as a measure. The need of such a measure he asserts, in opposition to the Protagorean notion of man being the measure of all things, which he treats as a silly truism, putting on the form of a paradox, and producing the effects of a falsehood.

No absolute Unity.

27. The existence of a distinct absolute unity is denied on precisely the same ground as the existence of a distinct absolute substance. The One is always *some* one thing or nature. In colours, if you suppose them all to originate from white, white is the one. In voices, the elementary vowel, and so in all other cases. Of course, then, the Ionic attempt to discover some matter, such as air or fire, which shall be unity, is as unreasonable as the Parmenidean, Pythagorean, and Platonic attempts to invest unity itself with a formal and separate character.

Plurality.

28. "The One" is the undivided, or the indivisible; this is the primary notion of it, to which all others may be reduced. "The many" then will mean the divided or the divisible; from which, as more cognizable by the senses, the One will be inferred. The question occurs next, how the one and the many are opposed to each other; whether the "many" and the "few" are not equally opposed, and whether, if this be the case, unity is not merely an element of plurality. This question introduces a discussion respecting the different modes of opposition; the opposition of contradiction, of things in relation, of privation, of strict contrariety. Possibly there has been some confusion of different lectures or reports in this part of the book; for in the lengthened explanation we seem to lose sight of the original subject. Our readers cannot fail to have remarked how much the idea of a "law of opposition" in things entered into all Greek speculations, so as to seem to many the foundation of them. Aristotle contemplates the subject from the logical side; the forms of opposition which he discovers in our minds determine his view of the actual opposition which exists in nature. And in this way his remarks on this point, though apparently irrelevant, throw considerable light on his doctrine respecting unity. What our understanding wants in order to explain to itself the existence of multitude, this he called "the One." Unity was therefore, in his mind, identical with Singleness.

29. The next book is for the most part a recapitulation of puzzles and solutions already given; not, however, to be passed over on that account, for Aristotle's repetitions of himself, or the reports of his different pupils, generally clear away many difficulties: and here, especially, the remarks on the nature and

limitations of the primary philosophy, and his confutation of the two cardinal sophisms of Protagoras, are, in many respects, more complete than those in the third book. We shall, however, notice merely his analysis of Motion and his remarks on the idea of the Infinite. Motion is neither an energy nor yet merely a potency; but it must be contemplated, alternately, as each. A lump of brass is potentially a statue; the energy which is to make it one is in the mind of the sculptor. The motion, *i. e.* the transition from its condition as brass to its condition as a statue, is not found in the brass, neither is it found in the mind; it is that which gives the potentiality of the brass its meaning and connects it with the energy. Or to express this in a formula. "Motion is the entelechy (the perfecting power or principle) of the potential as potential." He admits the difficulty of finding an expression for this idea; but he shows, by an examination of previous attempts, that his own, however awkward, is the only one which is satisfactory.

Motion.

The Infinite.

30. On the subject of the Infinite, which had so much exercised the minds of previous Greek speculators, and had been resorted to as an ultimate solution of so many difficulties, he aims at no precision of language. By its very nature it excludes precision. To bring it into a scheme, or regard it as a helpful definition of nature or the universe, is, in his judgment, absurd; it can only be looked upon as marking the *ne plus ultra* to which human thoughts and inquiries can reach, or, at least, have already reached. The limitations by which alone you are able to deal with the subjects that fall under human cognizance it excludes by its very name. His opinion on this point is characteristic of his mind, and it has an important bearing upon the history of metaphysics. Scarcely any more interesting question occupied the Greek mind than that which was at issue between the schools of Pythagoras and Xenophanes, whether it is more true and reverential to speak of God as the τὸ πέρας, or as the Infinite. Aristotle's concluding remark on the subject of the Infinite should be quoted for the casual light which the latter clause of it throws on his idea of Time, an idea which the student of modern philosophy has so much need to reflect on:—

τὸ δ' ἄπειρον οὐ ταὐτὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ κινήσει καὶ χρόνῳ ὡς μία τις φύσις, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὕστερον λέγεται κατὰ τὸ πρότερον, οἷον κίνησις κατὰ τὸ μεγεθος ἐφ οὗ κινεῖται ἢ αλλοιοῦται ἢ αὔξεται, χρόνος δε δια τὴν κίνησιν.

Number of first principles.

31. Book eleventh opens with an attempt to ascertain the number of causes or first principles. There is in every sensible substance a capacity of change: these changes are four: changes in respect of substance, of quality, of quantity, and of place. Generation and corruption are the names for the first kind of

change, growth and decay for the second, alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) for the third, transference (φορά) for the fourth. These are changes into contraries. But contraries themselves do not change; there must be something which undergoes the change from one to the other of them. This something must be *Matter*. Being does not arise from not-being; but being in potency is changed into being in energy; and being in potency is matter. Assuming this, there are three ἀρχαὶ or first principles; the two contraries Form and Privation (στέρησις), and the Matter which passes from one to the other.

The Cause.

32. But Aristotle says that this enunciation is strictly applicable only to material things; in these the element (στοιχεῖον) and the principle (ἀρχὴ) are the same. You have heat, the εἶδος; cold, the στέρησις; that which has the potency of being either (ὕλη); the resulting substance, the flesh, bone, or whatever it may be. But in those things which are apprehended by the mind, another idea intrudes itself. Besides the two opposites, health and sickness, and the matter, which is susceptible of both, you have the health-making art of the physician. The principle in this use of it acquires a double meaning which does not belong to the element. It must be contemplated both as the stationary Form and the moving Power. There must in a sense be four ἀρχαὶ, though only three elements. These conclusions have been, the reader will perceive, partly anticipated, but it is needful to repeat them here; for here is the link between Aristotle's Metaphysics and his Theology; this is the road, or at least one step of the road, by which he arrives at the conception of a First Moving Cause. To the unfolding of this conception the greater part of this remarkable book is devoted. We can but give our readers the results of an argument which Aristotle evidently felt to be the summing up of his metaphysical series. There must be an eternal, immovable Substance, which is at the same time the source of all movement. The primary notion of this substance is that it is an Energy. The notion of potentiality is excluded from it, for the highest form of Being is incompatible with the mere capacity of Being. And seeing Matter and Potentiality are convertible terms, it must be immaterial. There is no refuge from the notion that all things proceeded from darkness and nothingness, except in this belief. Energy being anterior to mere potency, eternity must be predicated of the chaos or night out of which things are supposed to be formed, in a different sense from that in which it is affirmed of the Primeval Being.

Eternity, how predicable of Matter.

33. We must attribute a continual *negative* existence to this potency, but a continual *operative* existence can only be attributed to the First Cause. We want the one to account for

Corruption and Decay. We want the other to account for actual Existence and Life. Matter is in no sense a cause either to itself or to any other thing; and to a First Cause we necessarily attribute self-causation. Other things impart motion, having first received it; this must be its own Mover. The next step in the apprehension of this Being we obtain by the consideration of our own intellect and volition. There is an object of cognition or thing to be known; an object of volition or thing to be desired. By these respectively the intellect and the volition in us are set in motion. That which appears good to each Understanding or Will actuates it; that which *primarily* actuates, must be that which *is* good. In this we discover the union of the faculty of knowledge with that which is to be known, the union of the faculty of will with that which is to be desired. Thus self-contemplation and self-delight must be the essentials of Deity.[1] By other processes of reasoning he arrives at the conclusion that the Being must be without parts (*αμερὴς*), without passions (*απαθὲς*: our readers will perceive the change of gender, and will easily believe that *τὸ θεῖον* is the more common antecedent than *ὁ θέος*), and subject to no vicissitude (*ἀναλλοίωτον*).

One cause, not many.

34. We then approach the grand question, whether there is one such cause, or many. In nothing is the difference between Aristotle and his master more remarkable than here. We have seen with what tenderness Plato treated the mythology of his countrymen, not from cowardice, but because he felt that it contained a latent truth for which no philosophical abstractions or generalities could offer a substitute. Aristotle, having satisfied himself that the *argument* was in favour of a one cause, sweeps away all notions which interfered with it, considers the gods whom his country worshipped as derived from certain astrological notions, and merely as setting forth the secondary sensible substances which proceed from the first immaterial Cause.

Previous teachers.

35. With equal decision he denounces (upon this new ground) the different philosophical schemes which had been substituted for the old cosmogonies; attributing to them these two common vices, that they had acknowledged an antithesis and contradiction in things, but had not taken account of that third element, matter, which is the only explanation of the evil and disorder in the universe, and that they had substituted many original principles for the one.

[1] We must quote the fine passage in which this argument is summed up. *Ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ' αὑτήν τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀρίστου καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. αὑτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς· ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων· ὥστ' ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον τούτου ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς αεί, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ὧδι. καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει. ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνεργεία ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ενέργεια· ενεργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὑτην ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀίδιος.* Met. xi. 7.

Real object of all these books.

36. In the two last books, their doctrines (respecting ideas and numbers) are again discussed at great length, and with Aristotle's wonted ingenuity. It cannot be expected that we should go over arguments to which we have so often adverted, and which we are less anxious to present fully and formally than to fit our readers for studying them in the places where they occur. But we may take this opportunity of remarking, that the continual renewal of these discussions with the Platonists and Pythagoreans is very important in helping us to determine the nature and connection of these particular treatises, as well as the character of Aristotle's whole mind and system. It is evident that he felt the refutation of these opinions, and the substitution of something else for them, to be in a manner the business of his life. At all events, it was the needful preliminary to his more positive proceedings: while his mind was haunted with these notions, the system—physical, metaphysical, or moral—which he proposed to rear, had, it seemed to him, a dubious and infirm foundation. We look, therefore, upon the metaphysical treatises (whether capable or not of being reduced into a formal sequence and unity) as having this subject for their centre. To show what ideas are not, and what they are; to establish the doctrine, that the *εἶδος* is not distinct from the particular individual substance—existing apart and connecting it with some higher substance—but merely its inherent form; to connect the *εἶδος*, which is the constituent principle of each thing, with the *ἐνέργεια*, whereby it is called into existence, and thus to make the same answer satisfactorily to the two Greek inquiries respecting the nature of being and origin of matter; to explain the nature and conditions of the *ὕλη*, and by depriving it of all intrinsical substantial properties, and reducing it into a mere potency, practically to get rid of the old Ionic investigations; then finally to hint at a principle of which his moral writings are the full exposition, that the final Cause, or the *οὗ ἕνεκα*, is also connected with the *εἶδος* and *ἐνέργεια*; that the good or purpose of each class of substances is known when we know what its nature and proper energy are: this is the object at which he is aiming most consistently amidst all his windings and recapitulations in the books of Metaphysics.

Metaphysics—how connected with Logic.

37. But this object is connected on the one side with *Logic*, on the other (as the scholiast is so anxious to inform us) with *Theology*. Though we have not seen our way to adopt Ritter's method of identifying the logical treatises with the metaphysical (a plan inconsistent with the very words of the third book):

though, as it seems to us, we should sacrifice by such a course much insight into the habits of the philosopher's mind, and the growth of his opinions, which we obey by studying them distinctly, and yet acknowledging the most intimate connection between them, we believe Aristotle to be primarily and at heart a logician; to have become thoroughly enamoured of the forms of logic, and convinced that they supplied a satisfactory exposition of the facts of the world; and then gradually to have worked out in his mind an Ontological system, which gave the rationale of those forms and interpreted their relation to different phenomena. Now, if it be true, as we have maintained, that the *mathematician* has another set of laws, discovered to him in the course of his inquiries, from those with which the *logician* is conversant, we need not be surprised either that the arguments of Aristotle against Ideas should be so constantly mixed with allusions to the Pythagorean study of Lines or Numbers, or that that study should actually have been the *base* of the principle which he is endeavouring to subvert.

How connected with Theology.

38. It is on all accounts a more important inquiry how *Theology* became interwoven with either set of speculations. We think it cannot be denied that the recognition of an absolute Being, of an absolute Good, was that which gave life to the whole doctrine of Plato, and without which it is unmeaning; that, on the contrary, it is merely the crowning result, or at least the necessary postulate, of Aristotle's philosophy. In strict consistency with this difference, it was a Being to satisfy the wants of Man which Plato sighed for; it was a first Cause of Things to which Aristotle did homage. The first would part with no indication or symbol of the truth that God has held intercourse with men, has made himself known to them; the second was content with seeking in nature and logic for demonstrations of his attributes and his unity. When we use personal language to describe the God of whom Plato speaks, we feel that we are using that which suits best with his feelings and his principles, even when, through reverence or ignorance, he forbears to use it himself. When we use personal language to describe the Deity of Aristotle, we feel that it is improper and unsuitable, even if, through deference to ordinary notions, or the difficulty of inventing any other, he resorts to it himself. Theology then can have no connection with the ethics of Aristotle.

SECTION VI.

ARISTOTELIAN PSYCHOLOGY.

Aristotelian Ethics not based on Theology;

1. The light which the metaphysical treatises throw upon the point to which we last referred, makes them an important introduction to Aristotle's ethical system.

We might have concluded from his Dialectics, that he utterly rejected the Platonical doctrine of Ideas as a scientific exposition. It would not follow that he should discard that belief in some ideal of excellence which had impregnated all mythologies, and had never been banished from the hearts of men. But the Aristotelian conception of God as a ground of nature simply, leads us at once to perceive that no recognition of his perfection can have the least connection in his mind with a scheme of practical life and conduct. It is not with Plato, or any philosopher who had attempted to give the rationale of men's dreams on this matter, that he will feel a want of sympathy; he actually has not discovered in himself, and does not recognise in his brethren, the want which all ages had been contriving in so many forms to express. And then it becomes an interesting question, what groundwork in the Aristotelian ethics will replace that Theology which is so obviously the foundation of the Platonic?

but on the nature of the Soul.

2. The answer to this question brings us to a very important treatise of Aristotle, which embodies more of what has, in our day, been commonly called metaphysics, especially here and in Scotland, than the works professedly bearing that title. We mean the three books on the Soul. The first of these books is occupied as usual with an examination of previous theories on the subject. He despatches very elaborately the different notions respecting the soul which Democritus, Empedocles, or the Pythagoreans had encouraged. He shows why we can never be satisfied with calling it motion, or the principle of motion, or the primary element or number. He then proceeds in the second book to develope his own doctrine. The soul belongs to the category of entities. It has then, of course, a matter and a form; the matter here, as elsewhere, coincides with its δύναμις; the form is ἐντελέχεια. The soul is neither of these separately, but the result of both. There go to the forming of sight the energy of vision, and the faculty of vision, and there is, in addition to both, an organ, an actual eye. What is true of this sense is true of the whole substance of which it may be said to form a part. The soul, possessing both its energy and its faculty distinct from the organ through which both are manifested, does yet require such an organ. The soul is not a body, but neither is it without a body. Generally, it is the distinction of a living creature (ζῶον), that it has a ψυχή.

Soul the characteristic of living creatures.

Distinction of souls.

3. But all living creatures have not a soul exercising the same δυνάμεις. We may define all the faculties which can exist in any living creature to be these: first, the faculty of receiving nourishment (θρεπτική); secondly, the faculty of sensation (αἰσθητική); thirdly, the faculty of motion in place (κινητική);

fourthly, the faculty of impulse or desire (ὀρεκτική); fifthly, the faculty of intelligence (διανοητική). The threptic faculty is the lowest of these, and is present in all cases. The soul, therefore, as endued with this one faculty, may be attributed to vegetables. Wherever any of the higher faculties are present, there all the lower will exist also. Under each of these heads a very interesting discussion arises respecting the character and limits of the particular faculty. The question, for instance, under the first head is, whether the life in each plant or thing must be considered as the active or only the passive instrument in self-sustentation? Under the head of sensation many more complicated points arise, and Aristotle enters into the whole theory of the subject, examining the operation of each sense in detail. This, it may be remembered, is the discussion which is carried on with so much liveliness and profundity in one part of the *Theætetus*. The opinions there attributed to Protagoras (and so far as the doctrine of sensation goes, apart from its moral consequences, not denied by Plato) is nearly the same as that maintained by Aristotle. Sensation is neither in the organ of sense nor in the object, but is generated between both, and is the effect of the medium through which they hold communion with each other. The question as to the motive faculty involves us at once in a consideration of that which is higher than itself. Movement must depend upon impulse. This will be true in all creatures. And in spite of the effect of the appearances which are produced upon or by means of the senses, in generating impulses or desires, we must not impute a governing power to sensation; we must rather think that the nature of the faculty of impulse determines how these shall influence it, than that it is determined by them. It would seem, then, that each creature has a nature, which is expressly seen in this faculty of impulse. Wherein then does man differ from other creatures? Neither, it would seem, in the absence of this impulsive faculty, nor in its being less properly his nature than it is that of other animals, but rather in his having the dianoetic faculty to direct it and act with it. In the coincidence and conspiracy then of these two faculties will consist the true nature of man. Thus, the soul may be considered as containing three portions, logically not materially separate, one absolutely without reason, the other rational, another participant of reason.

In this psychological system we discover the root of the Aristotelian ethics of which we were in search: they begin in Psychology and terminate in Politics.

SECTION VII.

THE ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS.

The Aristotelian Ethics.

1. At the outset of the Nicomachæan Ethics (which has always been regarded as the most complete exposition of his views on this subject), Aristotle tells us that Ethics is an introduction to Politics. The two, therefore, are not identified in his mind as they are in Plato's; it is quite possible, nay necessary, to treat of them distinctly. According to his uniform method, he seeks for the grounds of combination and society in the nature of man. He cannot tolerate Plato's simplicity in admitting outward necessities and accidents to be the *occasions* of society; for this simplicity necessarily involves another proceeding which seemed to him not simple but pregnant with all Plato's idealism, that of supposing some higher Unity than that which is expressed in the character of any particular society to be involved in the constitution of Society itself. A principle of equality and adjustment is that which seems to him to pervade all things, to be in a manner a law of the universe, and to be especially the secret of human order and government. The like principle, taking a different form, is the mainspring of his ethical system. Virtue lies in a mean; in a sense it may be said to *be* a mean, so that, on the one hand, Government, which is also a mean, is naturally occupied in sustaining the virtue of particular men, and on the other, this Virtue is itself the great conservation of government. This observation ought to be made, as without it the connection between these two spheres, which is as much acknowledged by Aristotle as by his master, will not be apparent. Many difficulties also will present themselves to the reader as insurmountable, if he looks at the ethics as an entire system, and does not remember that a directing educating power is for practical purposes presumed to reside in a governing body, the functions and nature of which have not yet been defined.

Happiness the object of human pursuit.

2. But we are not to suppose that Virtue, or the attainment of this mean, is in Aristotle's judgment the formal object at which either the life of each particular man, or society at large, is aiming. When once the notion of an absolute good, which "those dear" and troublesome men, the Platonists, had introduced, was taken out of the way, there remained one obvious and generally admitted end of all human desires and searchings. Happiness is emphatically the human τέλος. But if human, then the definition of this happiness must be sought in that which is peculiarly the characteristic of the human class. It cannot exist in any of those powers or faculties which are

common to it with other classes; not therefore in the threptic or the æsthetic powers merely and chiefly. And anyhow, it must be in some exercises or energies that it will consist, for in these the soul or life of every creature makes itself manifest. It must be then in the energies of our best and highest nature, exercised not at intervals, but through a whole life, a life possessing so much of external prosperity as shall permit them a free scope.

The human virtue.

3. But all energies must have a certain direction; the right direction of its energies constitutes the *virtue* of each class. What then will be specifically the human virtue? It must of course be in the man, and, according to our psychology, the ὄρεξις (the impulsive faculty) is the constitutive faculty of the human soul, though its excellence consists in its subjection to the dianoetic faculty. Virtue then will imply the presence and harmony of both these; still it will be found most positively and characteristically in the former. It must be then a habit. But of what kind? To what does it point? What is its aim, seeing that an absolute good, or an ideal, is out of the question, and that happiness cannot be the aim, because it is the very nature of happiness which we are now resolving into its elements? We are not, Aristotle says, to trouble ourselves about scientific accuracy in our definitions; our purpose is purely practical; we want to form an actual man of a certain character, not a theoretic man.

Excesses.

4. Well, then, practically speaking, excess is in every case that to which you attribute mischief and derangement. There is an excess called Timidity, and an excess called Foolhardiness, an excess called Prodigality, and an excess called Narrowness

The Mean.

or Avarice. But the extremes suppose a mean. This is the end at which our habit aims. Virtue generally lies in this. But we are aiming at action; and actions are not general, but specific; how then shall we arrive at the notion of specific virtues? Their species will be determined by their distinct objects. Certain tendencies and habits will be conversant with external pleasures. Certain others with passions of the mind itself; in each case it will be found that the practical purpose defines the virtue. But though a general description may be given both of the excesses and the means which correspond to them, a description which will be really applicable in all cases, it must ever be remembered that the excess itself may be different for each man, actually different according to his actual circumstances, different in its effects and influence upon him according to his greater proneness to one side or the other. For instance, liberality will be practically a different quality in the rich man and the poor man, and the temptation to profusion

will be that which is to be most resisted by one, to meanness by another. Virtue will be therefore in a *mean*, that is one to *us*, and not one which can be absolutely and invariably ascertained by rule.

Predetermination.

5. Hence it follows that this habit supposes the exercise of a faculty of choice or predetermination. But what is predetermination? Is it the same as the act of willing? Clearly not: that has reference to ends, this to the choice of means for the attainment of ends. It implies a right end, and a right determination of the will to that end. It may be called ὄρεξις βουλευτική (the reader will observe how steadily his psychological axiom which we have spoken of is kept in view throughout the scheme). But to what cases does this will or counsel refer, and how far is it dependent upon ourselves? Clearly we do not consult about things absolute or eternal, nor about things within the sphere of accident. What remain are all such things as are done by us or with our concurrence. Now of such some may be doubtless taken from under our control by actual violence practised upon us; such cases give rise to various questions of casuistry, as to the course which a virtuous man will choose, whether he will submit to do wrong or to die, each of which cases must be determined on its own merits. With respect to ordinary cases, the doubt arises, whether inclination is not itself a force upon the will and on the reason both. Such a notion Aristotle disposes of, first, by the remark that an influence upon the impulse or will cannot by any reasonable man be confounded with a force by which its operations are hindered; and secondly, by admitting that an incapacity for particular action may doubtless be produced in any man by these influences, but that this incapacity is itself the result of a previous habit which need not have been formed. Habits then are in our own power, actions not always.

Specific characters.

6. Having settled these foundations, the particular ethical virtues come next under his consideration. Here lies a field for the exercise of his always acute and often delicate habits of observation. It is alien from the temper of mind which Shakspeare has wrought into us, to contemplate any character as the mere development of a single specific quality. We do not like to hear of a man as the Magnificent, or the Magnanimous, or the Modest, or the Temperate, or the Just. But, doubtless, there was something in this which suited well with Greek habits. Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon, if they had not a distinct purpose of realising a particular form of character, yet drop more readily into certain moulds than the traditionary characters in the story either of ancient Rome or modern Europe. How a similar tendency was revived at one period

in Christian society, and how its revival was connected with a scholastic reverence for Aristotle, we may have to notice hereafter.

Justice. 7. Among these virtues it behoves us especially to take notice of two, because they throw some light upon the entire system, and upon ethical inquiries generally. The first is Justice (*δικαιοσύνη*). Is not this virtue itself an abstract of all the virtues? We have seen how Plato answers the question in his *Republic*. Aristotle treats it differently, yet so as to make us see how much he had felt the influence of his master's ideas, even when he rejected them. In one sense (he says) *δικαιοσύνη* may indeed be said to be a complex of virtues. For as it is the habit which mainly disposes us to obey the laws, and as laws prohibit excesses of all kinds, and encourage virtues of all kinds, this will have respect to them all. But yet there is such an offence as overreaching, and there must be a specific virtue answering to this. The specific virtue will bear relation to the general. Inequality, in matters appertaining to property, will be the evil. Evenness or equality will be the virtue. This evenness or equality implies, on each side, an excess, a more and a less; a more and a less, however, in reference to given persons. The conservation of the right proportion or relation of things to persons, and the restoration of the balance when it has been violated, is then that at which this virtue especially aims. Take away the restriction to property, and this virtue would seem to be in a remarkable manner the very virtue of virtues; so emphatically is it the preserver of the mean. But that very restriction makes it more difficult to tell how far this virtue belongs to the individual, and how far to the State, so that *δικαιοσύνη*, though bearing a much more limited meaning, becomes, to our author as to his master, a kind of debatable ground between the two regions. At all events *δικαισύνη* must be looked upon as *the* ethical virtue of a statesman.

Moderation. 8. The other virtue we must speak of is *σωφροσύνη*. As this is opposed to *ακολασία*, and involves the general notion of an even habit of mind not overcome or disturbed by sensual desires, it might seem to include within it *ἐγκράτεια*, or self-restraint.

Self-restraint. But as in the psychology of Aristotle the soul consists of a rational, an irrational, and a quasi-rational part, the quality which implies a control over the irrational or merely animal nature will not necessarily be the same with that which concerns the quasi-rational, that is, the passions and affections. As the name *σωφροσύνη* is given to the first, the name *ἐγκράτεια* is used for the second. Hence a curious consequence. This self-government seems something distinct not only from the peculiar virtue which has reference to sensual desires, but even

from virtue itself. *That* has its chief seat in the nature or impulsive faculty over which *this* is supposed to rule. We are somewhat puzzled, therefore, after going through our catalogue of virtues, to find a book opening with the remark, that there are three moral states to be avoided, *κακία*, *ἀκρασία*, *θηριότης*, and three good states corresponding to these, *ἀρετή*, *ἐγκράτεια*, and a certain divine excellence as much transcending ordinary humanity as *θηριότης* sinks below it. This result will appear inevitable to any one who reflects upon the system; that which is conservative of virtue must in some way be distinct from virtue, but we must acknowledge also that it considerably impairs the symmetry of a design otherwise singularly complete.

The Dianoetic faculties. 9. Before, however, Aristotle touched upon this conservative power, which, of course, is connected with the purely ethical part of man, it was needful for him to expound more distinctly than he had done in his psychology the nature of these dianoetic faculties to which such important functions are committed. He begins with reaffirming the position so often insisted upon, that the *ὄρεξις*, and the *διάνοια*, must co-operate in order that any good moral act may be the result, or, as he expresses it, with neatness and in more strict accordance with his own notion of the *διάνοια*—that what is affirmed or denied by the one should be what is pursued or avoided by the other. Now, the soul, he says, may affirm or deny truly in five ways, by *τέχνη*, by *ἐπιστήμη*, by *φρόνησις*, by *σοφία*, by *νοῦς*. Τέχνη is what in modern language would be called the creative power or faculty, the poetic organ in its highest and lowest sense. Ἐπιστήμη is the converse of this. It deals with that which cannot be otherwise, it does not fashion anew but perceives; what it deals with are universals, not particulars. Aristotelian science is, as we have seen already, conversant with conclusions, not premises; but there must be some faculty which deals with premises, a tact, intuition, or spiritual sense; this is *νοῦς*. The sphere of this faculty would seem to be very limited, for as it is bounded on one side by *ἐπιστήμη*, it is bounded on the other by *σοφία*. This faculty, we were told in the *Metaphysics*, was conversant with *ἀρχαὶ* or principles; it might therefore seem to cover the whole ground which is assigned to *νοῦς*. But that which affirms things to be so and so without a reasoning process, is undoubtedly distinct from that faculty which, through long and winding labyrinths, searches for causes. Now, when the *νοῦς* is said to deal with premises, the first kind of operation is indicated; when the *σοφία*, the second. Φρόνησις, the last of the five, is different, and yet has something of the character of the preceding. Its sphere is with the altering and the alterable, like *τέχνη*, yet it is not productive or creative, but perceptive

and distinguishing. So far it resembles ἐπιστήμη, differing from it wholly in its subject-matter. It has a quickness of tact like the νοῦς, but this is merely the result of practice and experience. It is, therefore, like σοφία, a laborious investigating faculty. Yet its end is not speculation, but practice. The φρόνιμος, or practical experimental man, therefore, is contrasted with the σοφός, or the meditative speculative man; though it is not denied that σοφία may assist and be usefully connected with φρόνησις. From this analysis it is evident that this last quality is especially that which, in combination with a right ἦθος, or a proper condition of the impulsive faculty, produces virtue. The doctrine of Socrates, that virtue *is* φρόνησις (a doctrine, by the way, which is somewhat carelessly stated, for the real Socratic doctrine treats virtue as ἐπιστήμη, the knowledge of what is absolutely good, prudence being only a guardian faculty to preserve the soul when seeking that knowledge from the seductions and confusions of sense), this doctrine is said to form only one side of the truth; φρόνησις is not virtue, though virtue cannot exist without it.

Friendship.

10. We have seen that δικαιοσύνη does to a certain extent occupy the same position in the Aristotelian and in the Platonic system as a link between morals and politics. But Aristotle could not help perceiving that this quality, under the conditions which he had imposed upon it, explained but very imperfectly the connection of human society with the life of the individual. This dry and hard principle of distribution, commutation, and rectification, could never be substituted for the music of Plato's *Commonwealth*. Reflecting on this difference, it seems to have struck him, that in the idea of Friendship we have that which fills up the void, and that Friendship together with Justice constitute the social law. Regarded in this light, Friendship occupies the most important place in a system of ethics, which is always looking onwards to Politics. And we cannot wonder that Aristotle should have devoted two elaborate books to the consideration of it. Any one who is acquainted with the traditions and with the mythology of Greece, must be aware how much the Greek mind was occupied with this subject. Here, as elsewhere, physical and moral thoughts became intertwined, and the same language was used to explain the law of sympathy between the skies and earth, and that between man and man. Aristotle is careful to disengage himself from these ambiguous phrases, which he had not perhaps imagination enough to perceive were more than metaphors, and fixes his mind upon Friendship as one of the essential conditions of our nature to which the very existence of communion must be referred.

Ground of friendship.

11. This being assumed, he has no hesitation in setting aside many popular notions of friendship as giving a wholly inadequate view of its nature. The doctrine which refers friendship either to Utility or to Pleasure as its ultimate foundation, he rejects, not with sentimental indignation, but as being at variance with facts and reason. The transitoriness of such friendships, and their dependence upon accidents, are arguments as much to the practical man as to the philosopher, that the essence of the quality is not to be discovered in them. The friendship of good men for each other must then be that from which we are to deduce the nature of friendship itself. Here, and here only, we learn the conditions, or even the possibility of friendship, for, properly speaking, it is not possible, except upon the supposition that one man can really delight in another, and love him as himself. A politician seriously reflecting on the existence of society, must feel that a principle is at work among men which can only be defined in these terms; that all the imperfect appearances which it presents in the world, so far as they are imperfect, make its meaning less intelligible; that, supposing selfishness absolute, it could not exist at all, and that the highest form in which it exhibits itself is the test of its character. These important conclusions are stated again and again, and with the greatest precision, by Aristotle. On the strength of them he affirms, that the idea of equality or proportion is as much discoverable in friendship as in justice; only that in justice the worth of each object is the first consideration, its fitness to us the second; in friendship, fitness or suitableness the first, worth the subordinate. On the same ground he maintains that friendship is to be seen in its true operation, not in clubs, nor societies, nor partnerships, where men associate for some specific object (though here also Justice is required as its assessor and its complement, every kind of society implying a law to regulate it, as well as a motive to form it, a principle of government as well as of concord), but in a *polity* of which all these must be considered as portions. An inquiry, therefore, into the different kinds of government becomes connected with an inquiry into the law of friendship.

Ground of Society in relationships.

12. In this passage we discover how much Aristotle surpassed Plato in his apprehensions respecting the nature of relationships, while he fell so far short of him in everything that concerns the absolute. He discovers in the relations of father to son, of husband to wife, of brother to sister, three primary forms, as it were, of friendship; and the grounds of the three kinds of government to which all others may be reduced: Monarchy, Aristocracy, Timocracy, of which the three corruptions are, Tyranny, Oligarchy, Democracy. Under each of these true

forms of government, friendship and justice will be found existing and mutually sustaining each other. Friendship, however, will take its peculiar form from the form of the society. It will be the friendship of patronage and of reverence in a monarchy. It will have the conjugal model in an aristocracy, one party being respected as the superior in worth, and retaining that respect only while he asserts dominion on that ground. The fraternal type of equality will be preserved in all friendship under a Timocracy. On the other hand, in the depraved forms, friendship will be depraved and weak; and in a tyranny, which he regards as the worst of all, because the corruption of the best, both it and justice will disappear, subjects being regarded as animals, and as such incapable of human qualities. The existence of this law of sympathy being then established as one of the two necessary conditions of human fellowship, and virtue being shown to be the necessary condition of friendship, Aristotle proceeds to solve a great many questions of deep and practical interest. The most important of these turn upon the relation between friendship and self-love. In what sense is friendship a part of self-love? in what sense opposed to it? As the notion of pleasure or utility had already been separated from friendship, it is obvious that the vulgar notion of self-love must be separated from it also. Still, ordinary language intimates that there must be some analogy between the two ideas, and it seems hard to arrive at any higher description than this, that the friend is loved as another self. May not the difficulty then be solved thus? may not self-love be itself distinguished from all associations of profit and loss? and may we not affirm that the wise and good man is the true self-lover, the person who alone is at one with himself, and can take pleasure in his own company? If this be so, it would not be correct to seek for the ground of friendship in self-love; it would be more correct to say that they mutually illustrate each other. Only the man who has the capacity of friendship will have himself for a friend; and only he who can enjoy and love himself, is capable of enjoying and loving another. These two books on Friendship are certainly not the least profound in Aristotle's writings, and to the general reader they will be far the most delightful.

Friendship and Self-love.

Pleasure.

13. From this subject we proceed, in the tenth book, to the question of Pleasure; what it is; how far, according to the doctrine of some philosophers, it is to be denounced as an evil, how far it is *a good*, or connected with *the good*. Aristotle argues against many prevalent definitions of pleasure. He shows why it is neither a κίνησις, a mere movement, a γένεσις, the passage into a state, or an ἀναπλήρωσις, the filling up of a want. He considers the universal longing of mankind a sufficient witness that pleasure is something real and worthy in itself, and not merely a means to some other end. An examination of the facts leads to the same conclusion. But it leads also to a refutation of the opinion, that pleasure can be made a distinct formal purpose of life. It is the flower or consummation of something else. The exercise of sight, the exercise of hearing, each brings its own appropriate pleasure after it. But the pleasure is connected with the energy or exercise, and cannot be severed from it. If then you would understand what pleasure is, and what are the highest pleasures, you must understand what energies are, and what are the highest energies. You cannot refer the last to the first, you must refer the first to the last. That energy, then, which is most appropriate to each creature, brings the pleasure which is appropriate to that creature; "the energy of the soul, according to virtue," brings the highest pleasure to man. The pleasure which an act gives to him who performs it is the test of that act having become habitual to him, of his having acquired the character corresponding to that act. The man who delights in musical energies has become a musician. The man who delights in just acts is a just man.

14. From this analysis of the nature of pleasure, the step is easy to a reconsideration of the meaning and nature of happiness, and so to a brief review of the whole treatise. Happiness he has found to be the end of man, and to *consist in* (not, like pleasure, merely to be the effect of) the use of his highest energies. What then, on the whole, is the highest happiness? It is that of the contemplative man. If we can imagine what the life of the gods is, seeing it is absurd to attribute to them Justice, because that has respect to contracts and conventions; Temperance, because that implies temptations to which they cannot be exposed; and so of most of the other acts which preserve the mean for man,—we must believe it to consist in Contemplation. But then for the attainment of this celestial life in those who can attain it, there is need of early discipline and education. There is need that they should be trained to the avoidance of those extremes in which evil lies, and to the exercise of those virtues which are the only conditions of, and preparations for, the contemplative happiness, though it transcends them. And for the rest there must be a discipline to cultivate what capacities there are in them; or in case of resistance to such cultivation, to coerce and punish them. Here then is the field for the science of Politics. That science, Aristotle says, the Sophists had resolved into a mere teaching how to talk and argue, but the foundations of it lie in ethical knowledge and ethical practice; it must be worthless and

The highest happiness.

Contemplation.

rotten when these foundations are not discovered. This is the introduction to the book on Politics.

SECTION VIII.

POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE.

How Ontology is applied to Politics.

1. We can but give our readers a few hints to assist them in the study of this treatise, which, valuable and interesting as it is, can never bear the same relation to the other Aristotelian writings which the Platonic Republic bears to his dialogues. Not, it will be evident enough from our former remarks, that the Politics of Aristotle are not most closely connected with his Ethics and his Ontology, but that they are connected with them rather as results and deductions than as being a principal and fundamental part of the design. The doctrine which has been set forth with so much diligence in the Metaphysics, that every substance presupposes a lordly energising power, and a submissive receptive faculty or matter, reappears again here in connection with the most obvious and outward facts. The relation of Male and Female is assumed as the first hint of the existence of society, and as containing the principle of it. The idea of fellowship implied in this relation involves another,—that of rule and subjection, which has its complete expression in the relation of Master and Slave. Compare these two relations with that relation in each man which has been explained in the Psychology and illustrated in the Ethics, between the reasoning power, the faculty participant of reason, and the mere animal nature, and you feel at once that the two explain each other, and set forth the condition under which society is meant to exist. Where the reason is developed and its magisterial authority acknowledged, the other faculty being in fellowship with and subordination to it, and the animal nature controlled and subjected, there you have as well the true condition of the individual man as the true condition of society; there the relations of husband and wife, and master and servant, will be preserved; they will not be arbitrary, but legal and orderly.

The household and the city.

2. In such a state of things only a polity is possible; and, as this is the only true condition of each man, it is evident that a political state is his only proper and natural condition, every other must be anomalous. You find then the constituents of a polity in a household; but a house is not therefore a miniature city; a city is not merely a collection of households; each has its own distinct nature and laws, though each alike has this characteristic—that by human relations it consists—that in them you discover the end of its existence—and that all means and instruments are to be contemplated with reference to these.

Economy is not primarily, but secondarily and accidentally, the management of the goods or property of the household; it is mainly the right ordering of the household itself. The slave is the connecting link between one branch of economy and the other; he must be considered as an instrument, and yet he must be treated as a man. A polity can be considered only as composed of freemen, quite as much because a freeman only understands how to obey as because he only understands how to govern.

The Platonic Unity rejected.

3. It follows almost necessarily from this view of the case—first, that the Platonic idea of unity should be as little heeded by Aristotle in his Polity as in his Metaphysics; that he should utterly abhor the attempt to embody that idea by abolishing distinct relationships, these being in his opinion the very foundation of society; that he should recognise all forms of government as good which have their ground in any actual relation, and all as evil which have become in any sense arbitrary; that he should therefore acknowledge, much as Plato did, three true forms, and three departures from these; and that he should look on the democratical departure, the attempt to establish a society in which all should govern, with at least as little complacency as the rest; that, at the same time, he should conceive the form from which this is a deviation,—the form which makes all freemen eligible to government, though not necessarily participant of it, as his ideal. These seem to us the main principles of the book, which being understood, the occasional difficulties and contradictions it presents will be less puzzling; its position in reference to the other parts of the philosophy will be felt; its value as a key to the political science of modern as well as ancient times will be appreciated.

DIVISION IV.—THE LATER SECTS.

SECTION I.

GREECE AFTER THE TIME OF ALEXANDER.

The small remains of the later schools.

1. It may surprise our readers that so large a portion of this sketch should have been devoted to Greek philosophy, and that nothing should yet have been said about those schools which we are wont to regard as the great representatives of it. The Epicureans, the Stoics, the Academics, are continually spoken of as *the* Greek schools. Not a few young Englishmen grow up with the impression that in them are to be found those thoughts in their highest and most concentrated form, which have made Greece wonderful. Such an impression is strangely

at variance with facts. What have the teachers of these great schools left, by which we may judge of them and of their doings? Of Epicurus, we have three letters preserved by Diogenes Laertius; of Zeno, nothing; of Cleanthes, a single hymn to Jupiter; of the Academics, merely traditions. We have not spoken of the three books of Aristotle's Rhetoric, because, amidst the multitude of his books, it was necessary to choose those which refer most directly to our subject. In each of these books—we might add, in the short notes on poetry—there is five times as much matter bearing directly upon moral and metaphysical philosophy as in all the Greek remains of the later schools (of course we limit the remark to the time before Christ). If their words and those of Aristotle were weighed instead of measured, we believe the disproportion would be found far greater.

yet they wrote largely.

2. It cannot be replied to this statement that Thales, Pythagoras, Socrates, wrote nothing, and yet that few men have done more to awaken the energies by which books are produced. Epicurus, Zeno, and their respective followers, belong to an age of books, and were in the strictest sense makers of books. Each of them may have written as much as Aristotle. The dialogue, as an interchange of feelings with disciples, can never have been characteristic of them; they were teachers, lecturers, men who laid down maxims and laws which their disciples repeated, modified, and argued for.

3. And this is in part the explanation and the justification of the place which has been assigned them among their countrymen. We have heard of seekers of wisdom, of men who were steadily working out problems. The men we are speaking of had finished their search, had solved their problems. They had ascertained what was to be known and not to be known; they could set down the results of their inquiries in definite, manageable propositions; they had a well-ascertained, transmissible doctrine. They therefore deserve the name which has been given them—they are *the* Greek *sects*. To call them the Greek *philosophers* is absurd, at least if philosophy is to bear the sense which Socrates or even which Aristotle gave to it. But they did distinctly appropriate to themselves one set of conclusions or results; they had fixed theses and formulas which could be learned by heart; they could supply the Greeks of the ages to which they belonged with all that the Greeks of those ages wanted—topics of disputation; they could supply another, and a nobler race, with suggestions which *they* could mould into something like a satisfaction for the cravings of their energetic minds.

The age of Alexander.

4. The great Alexandrian period had succeeded to the republican period—the age when Greeks proved that they could

subdue barbarians to the age when they maintained their own freedom against barbarians, or indulged the excesses of that freedom in conflicts with each other. Of this time we have considered Aristotle as the representative. This was the time when he surveyed all the different provinces of human thought, and mapped them out; when he reproduced the inquiries of his predecessors, and cast them into moulds of his own; above all, when he assigned to the wise man and to the practical man, two perfectly distinct spheres of activity, though spheres in which each might beneficially or injuriously affect the other. Aristotle then, to a great extent, proclaimed the search for wisdom to be at an end. He left the impression on the minds of his disciples that the whole scheme of the universe could be brought under the forms of the human understanding. No doubt there was much in his teaching to counteract this impression. There was a vast range for the activity of the practical man in regulating his own mind, in preserving or improving society. The divine "Theorist" might surely hope that he, too, had a field to explore which was almost or quite inexhaustible. So long as the age of Alexander lasted, the practical man and the theorist would alike gain strength and hope from the change which was taking place in the state of the world, from the new treasures that were discovered in it, from the prospect of seeing Greek wisdom at the head of it.

The age which succeeded

5. That dream passed away: there were some, perhaps, who felt while it lasted how brief it was to be. An age of intrigue succeeded, in which all great principles were lost sight of; in which it was proved that the elements of which Greek society consisted were absolutely unsociable; in which, however, the restoration of the older freedom was as hopeless as the preservation of a united empire. What a sense of weariness and exhaustion must alterations so sudden have produced in the mind of the most active and feverish nation that ever existed! How certainly would the speculations of its wise men reflect that weariness and hopelessness!

The new Scepticism

6. Scepticism we have spoken of as a Greek characteristic. So far from attributing it to philosophy, we have supposed that philosophy was a great protest against it. If a Greek could learn that there was something which he could not create, he had advanced a certain way towards reverence and belief. But another kind of scepticism was possible, which may, in some sense, be called the fruit of philosophy. A man might say, "We have been seeking a long time; what have we found? Have we got hold of any certain determinations? Aristotle says that we have. Socrates and Plato seem to say the reverse. They perhaps are as good authorities as he is. And when we

consider what a multitude of different notions have been circulating among us for these two or three hundred years, who can be confident that any one is entitled to more respect than any other? Some function there is, undoubtedly, for the wise man. We Greeks are assuredly to be still, as we have always been, the wise people of the earth. But the function of the wise man is not perhaps to determine anything. May it not be rather that he is to tell us how it is best for those to behave themselves, who, as Socrates said, know that they know nothing."

Pyrrho; his history.

7. Of this state of mind, Pyrrho has always been considered the representative. He is said to have been in the army of Alexander, to have conversed with the Indian Gymnosophists, to have arrived at the conclusion that there is nothing noble or base, or just or unjust; that nothing truly is; that men do all things by custom and law; that each individual thing is not more this than that. Being naturally nervous, he is said to have cultivated, with great success, ἀταραξία, or freedom from disturbance; so that he would not leave the road to escape from being thrown down by a carriage, or bitten by a dog; that he lived 90 years; that he was made a high priest by his own citizens, who, for his sake, excused philosophers from payment of taxes; that the Athenians honoured him with their citizenship.

Its internal probability.

8. Excepting the reports about his practical conduct, which are merely jokes, not very clever ones, upon his efforts after quietness, the outlines of this story are very credible. A Greek coming into contact with an absorbed Brahmin would be very likely to admire his seeming freedom from external disquiet, and, at the same time, to increase his own growing doubts about the importance or reality of the questions in which his people had been interested. The language about the good and the base is the ordinary language of sceptical despair. Such despair being compatible with the belief that anything is possible because nothing is true, could not the least disqualify a man for a priest. It was not natural that the city which in less degenerate days gave Socrates the hemlock, should give Pyrrho its highest rewards for stating in words that which a great majority of Athenians will at once have recognised as their own inward persuasion. Whether the history of the individual man Pyrrho is authentic or fictitious, it is no doubt in substance the history of thousands in that time.

Pyrrhonism at the root of the sects, which were, however, a reaction against it.

9. But what is there in this universal scepticism which at all corresponds to the character we have given of the different *sects?* In one sense, Pyrrhonism lay at the root of all these sects; in another they were the reaction against it. A despair of discovery—of *philosophy* in its old sense—was implied in them all. A belief that the main object of the wise man is to seek for freedom from the disturbances and distresses of the ordinary man, is implied in them all. But men who have fallen into doubt through exhaustion soon find doubt itself very *exhausting.* They crave for some distinct, positive decisions; decisions, if possible, which shall be novel, which shall be better than any given before; which shall make them conscious of their superiority to those in past times who toiled and travailed, and after all affirmed little; decisions which shall embody the results of much thinking without calling for the effort of it; but, at all events, *decisions*, which can be easily set forth and argued for, and used to controvert any old or new opinion that may be opposed to them.

SECTION II.

EPICURUS.

BORN B.C. 342, DIED B.C. 270.

Epicurus a dogmatist.

1. EPICURUS, we are told, liked to hear anecdotes respecting the indifference and apathy of Pyrrho. In these qualities he aspired to imitate him. But Epicurus was no doubter; he was the most imperious of dogmatists. No one had ever such entire faith in his own conclusions; no one more thoroughly and heartily rejected all conclusions but his own, as absurd, even as impossible. Unless he had attained to this perfect satisfaction in his own judgment, he would have missed the main object which he proposed to himself. But, on the other hand, any one who proposes that object to himself may be tolerably secure of attaining such self-confidence. A man must be brought into a peculiar condition of mind before he can believe that the universe and all that it contains exist only that they may tell him how he is to be comfortable; but when he has once believed this, it will be wonderful indeed if his ears ever catch any sound which is not an echo to his demand, or some fragment of an answer to it. Do you deny that all men like pleasure and dislike pain? This is his kind of inquiry, which, as it means simply, Do you deny that all men like what they like, and dislike what they dislike? certainly reduces an opponent to very considerable perplexity.

His boast of originality.

2. Epicurus was fond of boasting that he had made his own philosophy. He was a "self-taught" man. A really original thinker seldom puts forth such a profession. He knows that what he has learnt is his own; he is glad to confess from whom he has learnt. Epicurus might be perfectly honest in saying that he had read very little, and had worked out his conclusions in his own mind; but he was a copyist nevertheless; few men

more entirely so. Aristotle had shown clearly that if an absolute good is not the end of practical life, happiness must be its end. Epicurus could say no more; he could only find out some new criterion of happiness, seeing that Aristotle's definition of it as an energy of the soul, put forth in conformity with certain existing relations, implying a body politic, must needs be unsatisfactory. In seeking for this criterion, Epicurus had no resource but to adopt the old sophistical dogma; he could only say that we must refer everything to the standard of our sensations. No doubt he may have refined considerably upon this thought, for, in the first place, he had a body of formulas provided him by Plato and Aristotle on the subject of sensations; and, secondly, he lived in an age in which thought was less active, but in which all that contributes to mere gratification, whether bodily or mental, was far better understood. It is a question which has been much, and we think very unnecessarily, debated, whether, by making sensation his standard of happiness, Epicurus did, or did not, mean to encourage what is formally called sensuality. The testimonies of antiquity respecting his personal character are various, and the most modern criticism seems rather inclined to revert to the vulgar opinion respecting it, rejecting, certainly with good reason, the fanatical panegyrics of some French and English writers in the last century. Upon the whole, we are inclined to believe that Epicurus was an apathetic, decorous, formal man, who was able, without any great difficulty, to cultivate a measured and even habit of mind, who may have occasionally indulged in sensual gratifications to prove that he thought them lawful, but who generally preferred, as a matter of taste, the exercises of the intellect to the more violent forms of self-indulgence. And this life would, it seems to us, be most consistent with his opinions. To avoid commotion, to make the stream of life flow on as easily and uninterruptedly as possible, was clearly the aim of his philosophy.

Sensation.

Dialectics and Physics — why touched by Epicurus.

3. For this end it was advisable to avoid the pursuit of wealth and honours; it was better to abstain from extremely vehement enjoyments, but it was absolutely necessary to get rid of all superstitious fears. How these were produced was, therefore, an important question for the founder of such a system. The answer to it led him much further than he at first intended to go. Naturally, Epicurus cared only for moral questions, that is to say, for such questions as related to the management of human life. With dialectics, either in the Platonic or Aristotelian sense of the word, he had no proper concern; for what had he to do with a science which distinguishes the false from the true either in things or words? In physics he took even less interest; the fixed order of nature is a painful weight upon the mind of a man who aims at adjusting a scheme for himself, and who disbelieves in any actual order and government. Theology, so intimately blended with both of these in the earlier systems, would have been still more resolutely banished from his. But then all these subjects must pass under his review, because from all of them conclusions had been derived which affect man's serenity and cause him dreams. A study answering to logic may be used to explain the origin of opinions, and why some of them must, for want of better epithets, be called false and some true. A man has certain sensations, and certain images are presented to him from without. The sensations are to be trusted, the representations are to be trusted: only in the exercise of some power by which a judgment is formed from these sensations or representations does error arise. These are corrected by referring again to the sensations, the only ultimate standards. Here again the originality of Epicurus consists, it will be seen, wholly in his omissions.

How to escape from the sense of an order.

4. The relation between the senses and the visible representations which are set before them had been treated by Plato and Aristotle, each in his own method, with the profoundest skill and discrimination. Epicurus had only to avail himself of such fragments from the intuitive observations of the one, or the rigid analysis of the other, as were consistent with the rejection of their principle that there is another and a surer standard than that which the senses supply. In physics Epicurus was still a copyist; and any one who studies the rest of his philosophy may perceive that, as he adopted the theory of Democritus simply because it was the one which it was most comfortable to hold, so he was guided, in many changes which he introduced into it, simply by the wish to get rid of some distressing fact which interfered with his moral speculations, and made his scheme of life less practicable. The idea of mysterious powers in nature had been one which had at all times haunted the Greek mind, and to which the speculations of the philosophers bore as much witness as the fables of the mythologists. With this thought was connected another, still more oppressive to the mind of Epicurus, still more interfering with the calmness and apathy of the true sage. It seemed that these powers were organised, that there were the vestiges of a scheme in nature, that there was something in them which answered to man's own powers of art and contrivance, while it controlled them. From these painful impressions there was one joyful refuge. The notion of the world being composed of atoms which had met in empty space, had united and disposed themselves into the light forms or heavy

masses of which our senses take cognizance, at once relieved Physics of its connection with Theology.

The Soul of man

5. And since one product of these invisible atoms was that which had been called the soul of man, a new light dawned upon the moral system from this natural philosophy, a new confirmation of the great principle that man is a machine which may, like any other, be regulated and adjusted to produce certain desirable results.

Declination of Atoms.

6. One fault, however, there is in the doctrine of Democritus. His descent of atoms in a direct line savoured too much of a determinate purpose, a fixed law. Suppose them to decline a little from the line—a very little—and this charm is broken, and, what is better still, you have a method of accounting for the existence of choice and freedom in man. If Epicurus anticipated an actual physical discovery in this speculation, it is a new evidence that the divinity which he supposed took no interest in human thoughts or designs, does sometimes shape them into a strange resemblance of what is true, when they are shaping themselves into the most grotesque forms of falsehood. On the whole, it seems unnecessary to attribute to the founder of this philosophy any deep and malignant design of undermining the foundations of human belief or human conduct. The worst that can be said of him is, that he exactly caught the impression of a wretched emasculated age; the best that can be said of him is, that he showed some skill in combining the notions of former philosophers into the only scheme of doctrine which could seem to the men of such an age plausible or possible. One thing should be noticed, that if Epicurism is ultimately destructive of moral habits, it is not to these, but to science, that it sets itself in direct opposition. The Epicurean is essentially the unscientific man—it would be more correct to say, the hater of science; a fact the more striking, because in modern days, when physical science has established itself in the world by another agency than theirs, the disciples of this school have sometimes affected to take it under their patronage, and even to boast of themselves as the exclusive promoters of it. Perhaps we shall find, when we come to speak of them, that they have departed more in appearance than in reality from the fundamental principle of their sect.

The Epicurean the enemy of science.

SECTION III.

STOICISM.

Stoicism, a struggle against unbelief.

1. The second great effort against the Pyrrhonism of this age is the Stoic philosophy. In speaking of this system, as well as of the last, we must endeavour to detach ourselves as much as possible from Roman associations and representations. To do this entirely is out of the question, for the these philosophies were adopted by the living minds of Rome, they can scarcely be said to have found their meaning. Still it is important to consider the form of the statue as it came from Greek artists, now no longer able of themselves to impart animation to their works, before it was embraced by the Italian Pygmalion. If we reflect how deeply the feeling of an intercourse between men and a divine race superior to themselves had worked itself into the Greek character, what a number of fables, some beautiful, some impure, it had impregnated and procured credence for, how it sustained every form of polity and every system of laws, we may imagine what the effects must have been of its disappearance. If it is possible for a man, it certainly was not possible for a Greek, to feel himself connected by any real bonds with his fellow-creatures around him, when he felt himself utterly separated from every being but them. But the sense of this isolation would affect different minds very differently. It drove the Epicurean to consider how he might make a world in which he should live comfortably, without distracting visions of the past and future, and the dread of those powers who no longer awakened in him any feelings of sympathy. It drove Zeno to consider whether a man may not find enough in himself to satisfy him, though what is beyond him be ever so unfriendly. This again was no new problem, either for a practical man or a theorist to deal with. Again and again it had presented itself to the Greek sages; again and again experiments had been made to solve it, and the conditions under which it could and could not be solved had been profoundly investigated. Here then, as in the former case, we can expect no originality in conception; the sole interest lies in the thorough desolation of heart which led the philosophers of the Porch to venture once more upon this inquiry. We may trace in the productions which are attributed to Zeno a very clear indication of the feeling which was at work in his mind. He undertook, for instance, among other tasks, to answer Plato's *Republic*. The truth that man is a political being, which informs and pervades that book, was one which must have been particularly harassing to his mind, and which he felt must be got rid of before he could hope to assert his doctrine of a man's solitary dignity. He appears to have carried out, with some consistency and steadiness in his life, the principle for which he was contending, really showing an indifference to outward circumstances, and maintaining, with less dogmatical affectation than many others, a creditable independence and uprightness of character. Zeno taught at Athens. He was not accused of

Zeno: birth uncertain; died 263 B.C.

The Athenian respect for him.

corrupting the youth or bringing in new demons; he received a golden crown, and was buried publicly in the Ceramicus. Athens may not have sympathised with his severity as much as with the indifference of Pyrrho; but it could do justice to the good qualities of any man whom it could understand. Socrates was neither sceptic nor dogmatist; they knew not where to have him; it was safer to get rid of him.

Cleanthes, born about B.C. 300.

2. It is pleasant to meet with a hardy, energetic, and free man in this dreary and formal time. *Cleanthes*, the disciple and successor of Zeno, seems to deserve this character.

One who began life as a boxer,[1] who came to Athens with five drachmas; who drew water by night that he might have leisure to attend Zeno's lectures by day; who was brought before the Dicastery to account for his healthy appearance when he had no obvious means of supporting existence, and who was acquitted upon the testimony of the gardeners for whom he worked; who refused the ten minæ which the Areopagus offered him as a reward of this discovery; who was accounted a very slow toilsome man,[2] and patiently endured to be called "The ass," taking it as a compliment that he could bear the burden which Zeno put upon him—such a man would be a striking figure in any time, specially striking amidst a race of clever talkers, impatient of rough toil, ambitious above all things of the reputation for quickness and wit.

Cleanthes wrote a great many beautiful books, says the biographer. The list of their titles makes us glad that they are lost, as they might probably have spoiled our impressions of him as a living being; degraded him into a mere discourser upon Sensation, Time, Art. He survives truly and satisfactory in his Hymn to Jupiter, which is the only production remaining to us that connects the early Stoicism with the higher and nobler form it acquired, after it had received the Roman impregnation, in the Life and Meditations of Marcus Aurelius.

Chrysippus, born B.C. 280.

3. The "slow" Cleanthes had far less favour in the Porch than his pupil, the rapid Chrysippus.[3] "Give me your doctrines and I will find the demonstrations," he said to the humble bearer of burdens. "If the gods have a science of dialectics among them it must be that of Chrysippus," was the reverent language of his disciples. He did not dissent from their judgment respecting him. "To what instructor shall I commit my son?" asked an anxious parent. "To me," said the Stoic; "if

[1] πρῶτον ἦν πυκτης.

[2] Ἦν δὲ πονικὸς μὲν καὶδαφύσικος δὲ καὶ βραδὺς ὑπερβαλλόντως. Ὄνος ἀκούων προσεδε χετο· λέγων αὐτὸς μόνος δύνασθαι βαστάζειν τὸ Ζήνωνος φορτίον. Diog. Laert. lib. vii c. v.

[3] ἀνὴρ εὐφυὴς καὶ αξύτατος εν παντὶ μερεί. Diog. lib. vii. cap. vii.

there were a better philosopher to be found, should not I go to him?"

Such a person was not likely to write a hymn to Jupiter; but he was the man of all others to perfect the Stoical system. There had been many differences among the professed followers of Zeno. Ariston scorned dialectics; and seems, in some of his conclusions, to have approached Epicurus. Chrysippus put an end to these heresies, and gave the school a definite form and culture. It may be worth while to point out very briefly how the first naked conception of a man striving to live apart from the time and things around him, shaped itself into a compact and tolerably consistent theory of the universe.

Stoical division.

3. The Stoics could hardly invent any division of studies different from that which use had so long sanctioned; they could not be so negligent as not to extend their theory into the different departments of Morals, Logic, and Physics. They introduced, however, a novelty of expression. They spoke of *Virtue* as being ethical, logical, and physical. It was not that there were three different kinds of virtue, but three different parts which composed it: logic, they said, was the shell of the egg, ethics the white, physics the yelk. Much may be learnt from this language. First we learn that virtue, a certain state of mind or character in the individual man, is all that the Stoic is capable of conceiving. This is the ultimate idea upon which all ideas of truth, as well as of outward tangible forms, are dependent. It will be seen at once how easily such an opinion as this grew out of the Aristotelian doctrine, and yet how it may have appeared, in certain points of view, more unlike to that than to the Platonic. In the doctrine of Socrates, developed by his great disciple, virtue in man is always a conformity to a standard out of himself, a participation in that which is absolutely good, and inseparable from the possession of that which is absolutely true. This doctrine Aristotle rejected, striving to fix practical morality in one department, and the study of Being in another. Upon his system, virtue and happiness acquired the substantive and independent character which neither Socrates nor Plato could ever have assigned them. But the very separation which he had effected between the provinces of Ethics and Ontology enabled him the more easily to follow the natural bent of his character, and to represent the contemplative life as the highest life—that which peculiarly appertains to the philosopher. The Stoic, in carrying out his conception respecting virtue, disconnecting it entirely from every dream of an absolute good, rejected with indignation his praise of Contemplation, and seemed to return to the older Socratic language by representing virtue as consisting in a conflict with appear-

The difference between the Stoic and Socrates.

ances and deceptions. But the fact is that the Stoic took only the negative side of the Socratic doctrine; his virtue had nothing to converse with, nothing to behold but itself; the impediments which it was to clear out of its way, the temptations which it was to resist, were not those which dimmed the human vision, and prevented it from beholding its proper object, but only those which made it less conscious of its own independence and glory. The Stoical ethics, therefore—borrowing all which was genuine and vital in them from the language of Socrates respecting the slavery of the undisciplined and sensual spirit, borrowing also and misapplying many of his phrases respecting the connection of virtue with science—so far as they were of native manufacture, consisted merely of pithy maxims of conduct, wire-drawn and minute, entering into the lowest details and frivolities, tending to emasculate the character under pretence of elevating it, and worthy of the censure that they were fitter for nurses than for philosophers. This was the white of the egg.

The Dialectical shell.

5. That Dialectics should have been nothing more than the shell, is a proof how very little of the real feeling of the Socratic philosophy had survived in this feeble imitation of it. In fact, the language to which we have just alluded, in which science was represented as connected, nay, almost identical with virtue, meant, in the mouths of the Stoics, nothing more than this—that a virtuous man is a man of good taste, has a shrewd discernment of what should be accepted and of what should be rejected. Truth as reality, falsehood as a positive opposite to truth, they in nowise recognised. Dialectics, therefore, in the Platonic sense, which is the science of distinguishing between truth and falsehood, they had no use for. All they understood was that in some way or other that which is desirable is preferred by some and not preferred by others, and that it was necessary, therefore, to inquire what it is in us which determines the fitness or unfitness of things; how we know when we get a right result from things, and when we get a wrong one. In all essential respects their conclusions upon the subject were the same as the Epicurean; that is to say, the one has just as little belief as the other in any standard besides sense, in any difference between the real and the apparent. The difference of their moral scheme, however, made the Stoics unwilling to acknowledge this similarity; they wished to persuade themselves—to a certain extent they could persuade themselves honestly—that those who aimed at the attainment of virtue as their end, would not have the same fluctuating rule and measure of what was good, as those who aimed only at the production of certain pleasurable results. The Stoics sought therefore for a science, though they could not reach it; and in their attempt to reach it they invented a

number of acute verbal distinctions, which, with some mixture of grammar and rhetoric, constituted their dialectical virtue, as those rules of behaviour of which we spoke just now constituted their moral. Certainly this was very fitly compared to a shell containing no nourishment in itself, and so conveniently fragile as to afford an easy passage to the yelk within.

The physical yelk.

6. It may surprise our readers that the essential part of the Stoical egg, the whole of which is the type of Virtue, should be the physical part. But there is nothing really inconsistent in this notion, either with the origin of Stoicism or its after-development. If the Epicurean undervalued physics because they spoke of something fixed and pre-ordained, something therefore inconsistent with that adjustment and adaptation to circumstances and accidents which he considered his chief good, the Stoic, who wished to rise above circumstances, to attain a firm and independent position, as naturally delighted to contemplate an undeviating system. The perception of any real law and standard for man had forsaken both alike. But there are some who can never lose their deep feeling of the necessity for such a law; these, therefore, in their despair of discovering it, will take refuge in the most exact type and counterpart of that which they are seeking, in the sequence of the operations of nature. The invariable attendant upon this feeling is, reverence for fate or necessity, with a proud and voluntary submission of ourselves to its dominion. Such a Fate became the god of the Stoic—strictly speaking his only god; but as he saw it imaged in the movements of the universe, and as he felt at times the need of something more real, more connected with himself than this abstraction, the World became the living form in which he contemplated the object of his worship. And since he found it expedient for the strengthening of some of his moral habits, and accordant with some of the maxims of his philosophy, not to reject established opinions, he easily persuaded himself to adopt the opinion of Aristotle, that the old legends did in fact represent processes in the material world. They might, therefore, without any violation of his philosophical dignity, be recognised and defended. Theology being thus identified with physics, it surely becomes no matter of surprise that the latter should be treated as the most inward and sacred part of morality.

SECTION IV.

THE ACADEMIC.

Plato most perplexing to his school.

1. One sect yet remains to be mentioned to complete our picture of Grecian philosophy in its decrepitude and decline. This is the Academic. We have seen how entirely the very power of conceiving that which we have described as the central

principle of Plato's philosophy had departed from his countrymen. All his language about Being was to them the merest dream; they could not even understand the elaborate arguments of Aristotle against his doctrine. Nay, his views respecting the Form and the Matter in each substance had become practically as unintelligible as the deeper speculations of his master. Under such circumstances we may easily conceive what a change must have taken place in the schools bearing their names. The Peripatetic, who worshipped the name of Aristotle, might still satisfactorily expound his Physics, his Logic, part of his Metaphysics, and whatever of his Ethics could be detached from the Politics; but the Academics found the incomprehensibe part of their master's creed impregnating all his works; it could no more be detached from the *Phædrus* and the *Phædon* than from the *Republic*.

The resource

2. There was, however, one circumstance in their favour. For reasons which we have considered at quite sufficient length, the great principle of Plato is developed in dialogues, in which two propositions seem to be set up for the purpose of knocking each other down. Could anything be more natural than the notion that Plato intended hereby to keep men's judgments in a perpetual equilibrium; to maintain, in short, a habit of entire interminable scepticism? The conclusion was most plausible; yet so much did there appear in the writings and in the whole purpose of Plato to refute it, so much did it seem the very object of his life to overthrow scepticism, that a long time elapsed before this plausible notion was able to establish itself. The Academy appears to have undergone many changes; what they were has been the subject of much controversy, but the language of Cicero leaves little doubt that it did at one time assert certain dogmatical propositions as the doctrine of Plato, and that it passed by slow degrees into that purely sceptical society from which he derived, or fancied he derived, his own opinions.

Platonists, Sophists, and Rhetoricians.

3. The result is curious, but by no means inexplicable. Scepticism was, as we have said, the foundation of both the other sects, though they attempted to break loose from it. The Academic yielded submissively to the spirit of the times, and embodied it most consistently in his own *no views*. He discoursed eloquently upon all topics, carefully abstained from coming to a conclusion upon any; he could not say what was right, but he was satisfied that both Epicurean and Stoic were wrong, and this was quite sufficient for his purpose. Arguing was his vocation; a kind of arguing, however, which did not exclude an indulgence in flights and flourishes of rhetoric, when the occasion might serve for their introduction. In fact, the disciples of that philosopher who wrote the *Gorgias* and the *Phædrus* became nothing else than the teachers of men how to become Sophists and Rhetoricians. Such were the lees of Greek philosophy, from which one may conjecture how rich must have been its flavour, how full its body, when it was in its prime.

CHAPTER VII.

ROMAN PHILOSOPHY.

SECTION I.

ROMAN HISTORY AND MYTHOLOGY.

The Roman Divinities.

1. In the ballads or songs, which are supposed to be the foundation of one part of Roman history, there will assuredly have been allusions to a number of divine persons. But there will assuredly *not* have been a divine counsellor, a God of wisdom, in the centre of them. This is not the leading characteristic of the Roman Jove. Neither is it the leading quality of any of the subordinate demigods. They are lawgivers, rulers, preservers of boundaries, champions of right, avengers of wrong. It could never have occurred to any Latin mind to reverence them chiefly, or perhaps at all, for their wit and subtlety.

The Roman Heroes.

2. All the heroic characters in early Roman history or tradition are distinguished in the same manner from the Greek hero. There is not a single Odysseus among them. His countrymen, indeed, might easily have transferred his qualities to Romulus, or Numa, or Publicola; they might have said, "Intelligence is that which organises infant communities, which prescribes rites and laws; if you suppose the creation of an order, you presume device or counsel in him who establishes it." No doubt this was necessary to a Greek; he could not separate the two thoughts from each other. A Roman separated them without the least effort. Even if he felt that wisdom was necessary to the preservation of order, the order would always be first in his mind, the wisdom second. He might confess that the legislator was a wise man; he never would have allowed that the wise man was as such a legislator.

The Roman Commonwealth.

3. Though we may reject a great part of the stories in Livy (he himself scarcely asks us to believe them), no one can doubt that he had a very deep perception of the meaning of the history. A simple reader, who takes his facts for granted, receives from them the impression that a wonderful order was growing up during a great many centuries, by mysterious influences, through conflicts of opposing forces, under a divine direction. The critical investigator brings us at last to the same conclusion. Each event, truly or falsely recorded, preserved by the vanity of patrician families, or expressive of popular sympathy or indig-

nation, still explains the development of some new principle in the commonwealth—shows how that which had been latent became manifest, how actual institutions came forth when they were needed out of seeds that had been in the soil ages before. We may understand better than in former days what elements, Latin or Etruscan, entered into the composition of the body politic; but the fact that it was a body politic, and that influences higher than mortal gave it its coherency and preserved it from dissolution, remains as the common result of old credulity and modern investigation.

Apparent absence of the elements of philosophy in the Roman mind.

4. These considerations may enable us to understand why the old Roman life seems so much less a preparation for philosophy than either the old Oriental or the old Greek life. The seeds of all later Brahminism were contained in the original Hindoo faith. It is a natural transition from the Homeric chief or king to the sage tyrant of Samos or Corinth; thence to the student of physics or of man. But what germs of such a student were there in the countrymen of Fabricius and Camillus? By what steps could they be led to become professors of wisdom, or hunters for it—sophists or philosophers?

SECTION II.

ORIGIN OF LATIN PHILOSOPHY.

Roman love of order supplies the want.

1. If we recollect how many of the inquiries which have hitherto occupied us have been inquiries after an *order* in nature or in human society, we may find an answer to this question. No doubt the naked problem, "Where is wisdom found?" was not likely to present itself to the Roman of any age. Those who had been seeking hither and thither for some solution of that problem he would never really understand. The mere wisdom trader or hawker might, in certain periods of the commonwealth, be a person of some reputation; for the prizes which he held out to the Athenian—the possession of rhetorical skill and political power—were quite as precious to the Roman. But the course of the history, the forms of the constitution, the kind of arguments by which the Roman candidate appealed to the sympathies of his electors, would make the mere skill in disputation, in the use of general maxims, in word-subtleties, not generally available for his purpose. The Sophist and the Rhetorician both might exist; but they would have distinct functions. And the former trade, one may be quite sure, would not be carried on by native hands. They would be found altogether clumsy both in making the wares and disposing of them. When Sophists were wanted in Rome, they would be brought in as part of the spoils of the conqueror, to march, like any other slaves, in his triumph, and furnish him with a new

luxury. But the love of order which was so deeply seated in the heart of the Roman—which was connected with all his hardest fights—which was identified with his glory—if it failed to be satisfied by the aspect of the surrounding society, might bring forth questionings as deep and earnest as those by which any Greek in the past times had ever been exercised.

Motives to study Greek wisdom.

2. These inquiries, in any distinct shape which could be recognised under the name of philosophy, would of course be of late appearance. They would be preceded by a long internal growth of the national powers, by a sudden and wonderful exhibition of them in victories over the surrounding world, by a bewildering sense of their vastness, by an accompanying and contradictory consciousness of weakness and decay. Clever Greeks coming to Rome at such a time, with a whole apparatus of notions and phrases which were strange to the Latin ear, would produce the most different impressions upon different minds. A new fashion is, of course, most desirable for men in search of excitement, and who have exhausted their old resources. Men tired of the monotony and stateliness of Roman traditions would eagerly catch at the promise of something that would raise them above the past, and enable them to despise it. The old conservative, who was doing much himself to separate the present from the past by his adherence to corrupt practices, and by carrying out all the worst habits of ambition and aggrandisement to which his countrymen were inclined, would be startled and shocked by the invasion of fantastic follies, and would take the coarsest and rudest methods of resisting them. He would be quite unaware that there was a class of men far more patriotic than himself, who listened to the Greek teachers in the very hope that they might find the way of recovering a state of things which they fancied had once been theirs, and which had departed, listened to them with astonishment and admiration, even with blind and devout acquiescence, and yet really brought to them far more than they received from them—feelings, recollections, hopes, which could convert the driest chips of doctrine into practical realities.

Why the Roman preferred the later schools.

3. The young Roman, it may be said, was obliged to take what he could get. If Carneades or Cratippus was the teacher of his day, he must learn of him, and not of Plato nor of Aristotle; since the living voice will always be mightier than the book, and has the power of transforming it. This is partly true. Yet it will be evident from what we have said that the Roman had a natural affinity for the later schools, and an incapacity for appreciating the earlier. Epicureans, Stoics, Academics, were occupying themselves about the manner in which men were to live; they had distinct and definite propositions about the condition and conduct of the human or physical universe in which

they were dwelling. The Roman, discontented with the political schemes and intrigues in the midst of which his lot was cast —unable to recover the maxims of his ancestors—aware of the tricks which were resorted to by the augurs and diviners of his land—of the state-craft which had worked itself into all the religion of his country—cared little for questions about Being or Unity, but eagerly craved for anything which should give him a hope of greater coherency and consistency in his own relations.

SECTION III.

THE ROMAN EPICUREAN.

The poem of Lucretius.

1. The poem of Lucretius naturally presents itself as the first and most marvellous outburst of that spirit which all the wisdom of the Censor and of the older Romans was unable to keep in check. Everything at first sight tends to heighten the wonder which this poem produces in us. The philosophical poems of that nation which had furnished the language of philosophy, and given birth to the most splendid poetry, have perished; only a few fragments remain of the verses in which Xenophanes and Parmenides conveyed their opinions; Empedocles of Agrigentum is scarcely more than the shadow of a name. Nor have we any reason to believe that the productions of these men, though they were men of genius and originality, deserve to be regretted, at least as works of art. How strange, then, does it seem that the greatest effort of Roman genius should be a work written on a subject utterly alien from the habits of the Latin mind, by a young man struggling with a language which, for his purposes at least, was barren and uncouth; a language too which one would have thought could only have become poetical when it was used to speak of the actions of great men, and of people subdued to laws! It may seem to some even a more astonishing circumstance than any of these, that the theory which Lucretius undertook to defend and illustrate was, of all that Greece had produced from the days of Thales downwards, the hardest and most mechanical—one would have said the most flat and prosaic. Genius, no doubt, is called forth by difficulties, and if it had nothing to overcome would not deserve its name. Still there is a fitness in the choice of subjects which we are generally able to recognise, and without which it is hardly possible that a work, even if it were written, could become a great national possession. With respect to the doctrine, no thoughtful reader can believe that it was adopted from a false notion either that it was particularly suited for poetry, or that great fame would be obtained by triumphing over its unsuitableness. Lucretius writes with the most entire conviction; his whole mind is evidently impregnated with his doctrine. And this was

Its peculiarity.

one necessary condition of his producing so great a poem,—he felt what he said: an earnestness, which had not been in the mind of any Greek for at least two centuries, had got possession of his. He may have selected a miserable idol, but such as it was he rendered to it the most entire, devoted worship.

Owes its strength to Roman, not to Greek influences.

2. This earnestness he owed to his Roman education. He had not perhaps himself any strong impulses towards active life, or much of the legal and rhetorical abilities which were the qualification for it. The rage and contention of parties, the atrocities and the meannesses which, in the days of Marius, Cinna, and Sylla, he must have heard of every day, will have been most distracting to him. *We* may be able to perceive how much better Roman society in that age, with all its abominable crimes, was, than the dreary condition of Greece, even when its sleep was confused by those dreamy efforts of patriotism which the appearance of Flaminius and the Romans called forth. *We* may see that great social principles were struggling with each other in those conflicts of rival parties which could not have left such an impression upon history, if there had not been much good mixed with the apparently unbroken evil. But to Lucretius the misery and confusion will have presented themselves almost without relief; and then, little knowing how much he was indebted to the forms of his country's polity, and to the truths that lay underneath its false worship, for the disgust which such spectacles excited in him, he will have been led to question the worth of the faith and reverence by which a system of falsehood and cruelty seemed to be upheld. In such inquiries he will probably have found most of the thoughtful youths about him engaged, with no great difference in the result, except that they could abide quietly in contempt of the popular opinions, while he required some positive substitute for them. Arriving with such feelings at Athens, what could be more natural than that the words of an Epicurean lecturer should take a hold of his soul which they never had obtained over the person who uttered them; that he should have welcomed them as the deliverance from an intolerable burden, as the discovery of a region of which he had been dreaming, but which he never believed to exist; nay, as the satisfaction of that love of order which his Roman discipline had imparted to him, and which the circumstances of Rome itself were continually affronting?

Influence of his age upon Lucretius.

3. A poem on the Nature of Things, written under such circumstances by a man possessing the vision and the faculty divine, might well embody some of the deepest, nay, truest feelings. The strongest patriotism, the greatest command of his native tongue, might be exhibited by a man apparently adopting all the habits and notions of a Greek. Under the guise of Epicurism, he might express a religious desire for a deliverance

from the tyranny of powers whom he could not love; the Democritic concourse of atoms might convey to him his first notion of any scheme or order in the universe: and such a poem might well become national, for it would express the very state of mind of the age in which it was produced as reflected in the person of the most genius; it would bring out the whole nature of the union which was effected in that age between Greek speculation and Roman life; would show how the latter really asserted its dominion over the beggarly materials with which it had to work.

4. We have no excuse for dwelling at any length upon this noble poem, both because it is so well known, and because the illustration which it gives of Roman feeling at this crisis is the chief light which it throws upon the history of philosophy. In reference to that point, however, we would suggest two reflections to our reader. The first relates to a marked difference between the poet and his master. Epicurus, as we have seen, valued himself mainly upon the moral or human part of his system: the physical, which he borrowed from Democritus, was adopted only as a resource. Lucretius, on the contrary, at once fixed upon the atomic theory as the central part of his philosophy. Nothing can illustrate more strikingly the difference between them. How to find an excuse for a voluptuous and indolent temper, whether it were a sensual one or not—how to arrange the world in conformity with it—was the problem proposed to himself by the Greek; to recognise some kind of principle and connection in things was the delight of the Roman. Such being their repective impulses, we may fairly say, that Lucretius was in spirit further removed from Epicurus than either Zeno or Chrysippus. Another obvious peculiarity of Lucretius illustrates a remark which has been made already. He has evidently the greatest craving for an order in the physical world; but he does not feel the least necessary connection between it and the Nous which Anaxagoras spoke of. He can more readily regard it as the result of a concurrence of atoms. Lucretius wanted a Moral Ruler; not finding one he became an Atheist. Has the Atheism of any Latin been ever removed by the mere acknowledgment of a skilful Designer or Demiurgus?

SECTION IV.

THE ROMAN STOIC.

Motives to embrace Stoicism

1. If there were some of a more adventurous genius, who fled *ex fæce Romuli* to the study of the laws of the material universe, there were many more who found their great relief in contemplating the severe forms of the elder Romans; who either saw in the records of their country, or created out of the materials which they furnished, men of a stately character to whom wealth was indifferent, loving their country above all

things, ready to sacrifice themselves, or whatever was dearest to them, for its sake. Between such simple men and the stiff solemn conscious Stoic a whole heaven would seem to intervene. Yet there was enough of external resemblance in the two characters to deceive those who felt that they wanted some knowledge which their fathers had not, who were unwillingly half ashamed of their old ignorance, and half afraid lest their new philosophy should weaken their admiration and their patriotism. To be taught how they might upon rule and principle be that which their ancestors had been from some unattainable instinct —to be taught how they might be only better and more consistent Romans for this Greek infusion—was most soothing and satisfactory.

Cato and Brutus.

2. That such feelings existed we have abundant evidence; but they did not, like the thoughts of the great Epicurean, find their principal expression in words. The lives of Cato and Brutus—the one more formal and severe, as of a person who felt that he was trying to support a character, the other more genial and free, like one who had really caught the spirit of the olden time,—both Roman aristocrats at heart, however they might speak the language of the schools—these are the true utterances of Roman stoicism, which have thrown a splendour around the doctrine that it could never have obtained either from its first teachers, or from Seneca and the rhetoricians who afterwards talked of it in Latin.

SECTION V.

THE PROPER ROMAN PHILOSOPHY.

1. Thus far we have seen the Romans only translating into living words or living acts the dead formulas of the Greek schools. But Rome was also to have a formal philosophy of its own; if not to make any new discoveries or to follow any course of thought which had not been previously marked out, at least to give a dignity to one particular department of thought, which, in the minds of even the greatest Greeks, had obtained only a secondary importance. We have spoken of Cicero as an Academic; and doubtless there was much in his character, in his political career, and in his rhetorical habits, which might have led us to predict that this was the sect to which he would be most naturally drawn. He appears to have had a singular equitable, balancing, compromising nature. The circumstances of his age, the utter impossibility of adhering with steadiness to any one party, when parties were so constantly shifting their ground; his conscientious unwillingness not to take some part in political life, or to set up any immutable, unattainable standard for those who were engaged in it, confirmed all his original tendencies; the profession of an advocate

Cicero.

riveted and perfected them. Though certainly not the person to be fixed upon as exemplifying the highest form of the Roman character, he had in a remarkable degree the Roman temperament, and he seems especially formed to show us what the intellect of his nation was when at its greatest natural stretch, not raised by some extraordinary impulse of genius or devotion above itself. On this account it is that his letters, speeches, and dialogues, present so perfect an image of his own age, and that some have thought a history of Rome might have been composed from them, if all other monuments were lost.

Why he preferred the Academy.

2. But it must be observed, that merely practical wisdom is not able to express and embody itself in words till it has been mixed with an apparently incongruous element. If Cicero had not studied Greek philosophy, and been, so far as an accomplished scholar and statesman can be so, a pedant, he would not have enabled us to understand himself or his countrymen as he has done. His philosophy was unquestionably important to him and to us; still it is amusing to hear him speak as if his habits of mind had been in any considerable degree moulded by its influence, when it is evident that they were wrought into him by the influence of old forms and institutions, by the circumstances of his country, and the tone of the men who surrounded him. These determined the system of philosophy which he took under his patronage. He found the Academics treating philosophical questions in the same manner and with the same fairness as prosecutor and defendant were treated in the Roman courts: arriving at no settlement, as he could arrive at none in the disputes of factions, yet inclining to established notions in opposition to the dogmatical denials of the Epicurean, and to a moderate behaviour accommodated to circumstances, in opposition to the fixed rule of the Stoic, he was therefore irresistibly prepossessed in favour of their views.

How he differed from his teachers.

3. But that which gave those views favour in the mind of the Greek was their fitness for talk—a talk which might be carried on for ever without the least reference to life. That which endeared them to the Roman was their apparent suitableness for practice, their seeming to show the very point where the lines of philosophy and practice intersect each other. This was the point at which he was aiming; and in his own speculations, however they may seem to be merely derived from the Academics, he is continually bringing it before us. If there was one feeling in which the Greek Academician was utterly deficient, it was the feeling of Duty, the feeling that there is a work which a man is sent into the world to do. This feeling is wanting in all the sects: each was framing a scheme of life, or aiming at some ideal of excellence; none was acknowledging a vocation. It would be very unjust to say that the sense of duty was absent

from the minds of Plato and Aristotle; they had it unquestionably, or they would not have been what they were, or have done what they did. But it is true that it was not the prominent characteristic in either of them, or in any Greek. On the other hand, this feeling is the one which gives all the meaning and interest to the works of Cicero. You can always see that he is impatient of any subject which he does not think has a direct bearing upon human life; that when he writes upon such subjects, he has only the use of his left hand; that they never do really affect him at all; that he has no opinions upon them, and does not care to have any. He will, therefore, retail the opinions of all the philosophers so far as he knows them, or will allow some able representative of the different sects to state the views of each, and will seem to have no aversion to anything but the dogmatism which each exhibits. Yet in the end you find that he has a set of firm convictions in his mind, which have remained undisturbed by all these controversies, and by his own nominal scepticism. He can see nothing but a difference of words between the Peripatetics and the Academics, and it is quite clear that he means to extend the observation to the original masters of those two schools. The whole subject of Being and Ideas, about which Greek philosophy in its best days was conversant, is an unknown world to him. Plato he looks upon chiefly as the most eloquent of men; from Aristotle he has gained good helps in the study of rhetoric. One cannot discover that he cared anything about physics; logic he prized chiefly as a mental exercise, and in all disputes about the nature of the gods, so far as they bear upon either of these subjects, he seems to be neutral, and, if one tried him by modern rules, we might fancy atheistic. But he is not so at all; he has a much stronger belief in a Divine power, and a Divine government, than many whose opportunities of knowledge are infinitely greater than his. He attained this belief without any assistance from the Greeks, and he retained it, not at all strengthened certainly, but not materially weakened, by what he learnt through them. Without a Divine Being there can be no sanctity, no duties, no laws; this was the conclusion of his heart and reason both, and he felt that it was a deeper and securer one than any which arguments could furnish him with. This ground, therefore, he vindicated to himself; he brought out the idea of MORAL OBLIGATION with a distinction with which it had not been presented before. Not that it would be easy to point out passages in his books in which the subject is discussed amply and satisfactorily; not that the student will not often have to complain of much looseness in his language upon it; not that he will not be sometimes puzzled to conceive how so much indifference to absolute truth can consist with a strong sense of

Not an Atheist nor a Sceptic.

Idea of Duty or moral obligation.

moral duty; yet this seems to be the total effect of his books, — the result which is left upon our minds both by their merits and their omissions. Though he has established nothing, he leaves us with the conviction that something is established, and that it is not something independent of us, but something with which we are concerned, and in conformity with which we are bound to act. His philosophical works, therefore, appear to have been unjustly exalted, and as unjustly disparaged. When he is used as an interpreter of the older Greeks—when we try to understand Plato through his means—we confer on him a station which was never intended for him, and he will unquestionably lead us astray. On the contrary, when we regard him merely as the translator into eloquent Latin of what he had heard from his teachers in Athens, we degrade him just as unfairly. His philosophy has a substantive value; such language as his can never be a mere clothing for other men's conceptions, though it may not be a fitting expression for the very deepest ideas. And it should be observed, that in those works wherein he has adopted Plato's titles, and might seem to have followed him most closely, as in the *Laws* and the *Republic*, he has really drawn most upon his native resources, and established the truth of his own words, that he had learned more from the Twelve Tables than from all the philosophers.

A new age beginning.

4. The sentence upon Cicero, sealed and sanctioned by the young Octavius, was the sign that the republic had really passed away; that a new age was beginning. What the character of that new age would be, how it would affect the condition of Rome and of the universe, what questions it would settle, to what questions it would give rise—we may have to consider hereafter. Possibly we shall find that the answer is not to be gained wholly or chiefly from Roman history. The youth who, as Virgil hoped, was carried *everso succurrere sæclo*, did not fulfil that task. The return of the Saturnian reign was not brought about by the son of Pollio. When Dante spoke of his noble predecessor as a teacher and guide in the search for wisdom, it was mainly because he had led his hero into the invisible world, and had suggested to his Florentine disciple the thought that thence he must obtain his knowledge respecting the destinies of Italy and of mankind.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY.

SECTION I.

ALEXANDRIA.

The Greek Egypt.

1. THE kingdom of the Ptolemies in Egypt was the most remarkable result of the conquests of Alexander. This capital

was worthy to bear his name: so much of the Greek wisdom which he sought to make supreme in the world was gathered there; so much of the wisdom of other people of the earth came thither to do it homage. There Indian sages perceived the connection between their faith and the old Egyptian mysteries. There the Persian, who had once waged war against those mysteries, might declare his own belief in the conflict of good and evil powers. Thither came the members of a nation which had had a much older connection with Egypt. A powerful Jewish colony established itself in Egypt; in Egypt the Jews had even a temple. At the command of an Egyptian monarch the Jewish scriptures were translated into Greek.

Confluence of thoughts there.

2. Thus the country in which we find the first beginnings of civilization, and perhaps also of speculation, was appointed to receive into itself different streams of thought, which had been running, in various directions, during all the period between the birth of Moses and the birth of our Lord. Was it possible that these streams should really mingle? Could it be at all ascertained which had descended from the highest ground? To what river the rest were tributary?

Feebleness of each

3. The Gymnosophist or Brahmin was a subject of curious speculation to the observers and geographers of Greece; but, except in the case of Pyrrho, there is no instance of any effect upon Greek thought and speculation proceeding from him. The dualism of the Persians had actually entered largely and practically into the thoughts of Socrates and his great disciple. Neither in its own native form, nor in any other, was it likely to affect the minds of men who had ceased to feel there was a conflict in themselves—who merely discoursed and criticised. The Egyptian animal worship had become too gross for any symbolism. If symbolism took no form but that, it would only affect Greeks with disgust. None of these different doctrines then could subdue the Greek mind to itself, or even change its direction. And, certainly, the teachers of Alexandria could as little interpret the faith of any people of the East or West. They knew nothing really of Plato or Aristotle; they could comment upon them ably; they had never thought or felt with them at all.

The Roman conqueror

4. In time another element was added to those which the patronage of the Ptolemies had collected. The Roman appeared on the Egyptian soil; Egypt became a Roman province. A sufficient proof seemed to be afforded by this fact, that there was something stronger in the world than Greek subtilty.

submits to the Greek.

5. Yet here, as elsewhere, the Roman conqueror did homage to the Greek slave. No countryman of Cicero would have dared to express his thoughts or conceptions in an Alexandrian school which the legions of his country protected or overawed.

However conscious he might be of a capacity in government, which was utterly unknown to the Greek of any age, he could yet feel that the Greeks of the lowest age had in this department of philosophy a right to be his masters and dictators. Nowhere less than in Egypt were his maxims respecting duty and obedience likely to be heeded. Among all the motley classes which composed the population of Alexandria, there were scarcely any but the Roman soldiers upon whom they would make the slightest impression.

The Jew.

6. Among all those who visited the city of the Ptolemies the Jew is perhaps the last in whom men generally would expect to find an expounder or reconciler of the thoughts which had possessed or disturbed the minds of other people. Was he not prevented from his very calling and position from meddling with the words and acts of the uncircumcised? Was he not bound especially to regard their search after wisdom as profane and dangerous? Did not the Divine lore which he had received exclude and condemn all other? We have partly considered these questions already, so far as the principle of them is concerned; we have now to consider what answer facts return to them.

SECTION II.

THE JEWISH PHILOSOPHY.

Ecclesiasticus and the Wisdom of Solomon.

1. The books which we call apocryphal, with the exception of the two books of Maccabees, contain little that is interesting or valuable as history. The books of Ecclesiasticus and the Wisdom of Solomon are in the strict and formal sense of the word philosophical. Amidst much that seems to most Western readers trivial and inflated, the passages which speak of Wisdom as a teacher, of Wisdom as an object of passionate love, of Wisdom as that for which all things else are to be sacrificed, possess a beauty which every one confesses. The fervour of these passages has been caught in a study of those which belong really to the age of Solomon; they are commentaries upon his writings, but not mere commentaries; the writer was not a book student only or chiefly; he has himself pursued wisdom, and lived under her discipline. There is a devout recognition of the sacredness of Jewish history in these books. The Divine Ruler of the nation is looked upon as the Ruler of the spirit of each individual man; every fact in the revelation is treasured up as needful for the education and meditation of the seeker for wisdom. And yet it is not only the language which separates these books from the Scriptures, and connects them with Greek thought; there is a Platonic character about them, such as we do not meet with in Cicero, or even in Cicero's great pupil. Intellectually the son of Sirach, whoever he may have been,

Philo, born about B.C. 20.

was beyond measure inferior to Aristotle or to Cicero, yet we cannot help believing that Plato would have sympathised with him more than with them, and have found him capable of apprehending positions which all their intimate acquaintance with the technical phraseology of the schools could not have enabled them to master.

Philo.

2. When these apocryphal books were written, the Jew, however, had probably not *claimed* his connection with the philosophers of Greece and of the world. About the beginning of the Christian era, a Jew was teaching in Alexandria, who, while he retained the profoundest reverence for the Divine oracles of his country, acknowledged the Indian Gymnosophist, the Greek philosopher, the Egyptian symbolizer, as having received wisdom from the Source of wisdom, as having been led, so far as they were led, out of the pursuit of visible and sensible things, by One who is seeking to bring man's spirit into communion with Himself.

His mental history.

3. There are few particulars known respecting the early life of Philo, this Alexandrian Jew. His own narrative of his embassy to Caligula, for the purpose of representing the state of his countrymen in Egypt, is a curious document both for Roman and Jewish history, but it throws no light upon his own life, except so far that it shows that when a very old man he retained his patriotic sympathies, had not destroyed his practical powers by speculation, and possessed to a great degree the confidence of his Jewish fellow-citizens. What else is known of Philo must be gathered from his books; those books which exercised so great an influence over the early Christian church, and which have procured him the name of the *Theosopher*.

An admirer of philosophy.

4. An examination of the meaning of this word will be the best help to the explanation of the writings which have established his claim to it. The word *philosopher* is of continual recurrence in Philo's writings. He speaks of the lover and pursuer of wisdom as the spiritual or divine man; who has quitted the downward path, and is seeking his proper object. But the seeker of wisdom is also the seeker of God. Wisdom is not an aggregate of conclusions; it is not the human soul, it is not a something diffused through all things; it is the I AM who spoke to Moses in the bush—the Instructor and Inspirer of all the prophets—He who gave the law on Sinai.

The Divine Word.

5. Philo confessed, as any Jew must, an absolute Being; one dwelling in light which no man hath seen or can see. How such a Being should converse with man, how there could be sympathy between Him and a creature, was the wonder of the Hebrew psalmist and prophet. But he believed while he wondered. Philo saw that such an intercourse was as much implied in all the Hebrew records; as much implied in the nature of God Himself as His self-existence and self-concentration. The two

truths could not be reconciled in a theory. A Divine Word, a Logos, speaking to the mind and spirit which was opened to hear the voice, was, Philo thought, the reconciliation. Such a speaker he traced in all the most obvious and minute expressions of the divine book, in all the steps of the Hebrew history.

The teacher of men.

6. It is this principle, worked out through all the Scripture narratives, which constitutes the peculiarity of Philo's writings. This is his philosophy or theosophy. On this ground he can contemplate with interest the Brahminical aspirations after absorption in the divine essence; the struggles of men to know the divine, the beautiful, the good; their eagerness to escape from sensual defilements and the prison-house of the body; their sense of moral obligation; their mythological or natural allegories. The path of sensuality and darkness is that which most men tread; a few have been led along the upward path; a few in all countries and generations have been wisdom-seekers, or seekers of God; they have been so because the Divine Word or Wisdom has looked upon them, choosing them for the knowledge and service of Himself.

Philo's great merits.

7. From the hints which we threw out when we left the Jewish Prophets to enter upon the wide field of Gentile speculation, it may be fancied that we shall gladly rest in Alexandrian theosophy as the end and consummation of our inquiries. We spoke of the Divine Word who had taught the prophets as the one source from which, as they and we believe, all illumination proceeded. Philo, holding that faith, has discovered a standing point, from which he can regard with affectionate sympathy a number of earnest thoughts which have occupied the hearts of men in different ages. He has escaped the temptation of supposing that any general theory or system can unite these thoughts; from the temptation, that is to say, of killing them, that he may harmonise them. He has told us what the philosopher is pursuing, and who is guiding him in the pursuit. But there are several serious questions to be asked before we can give ourselves up to the hopes which the Alexandrian teacher seems to hold out. What has he done to explain the great puzzle of the Bhagavad Gita—how practical life can be reconciled with the life of the Brahminical sage? What link is there between his mysticism and the dry business-like reflections of Khoung-fou-tseu? What one step has he taken towards solving the problem of Plato's republic? If the Aristotelian "theory" is abundantly honoured in his books, what hint is there which can explain Aristotle's assertion that politics is the architectonical science, or can bring his reverence for human relationships into consent with the communism of his master? If the Roman sense of duty meets with some respect from the Alexandrian, how can he enable any Roman to understand his

feeling, that a divine power had been building up his city for generations; to foretell whether the battle of Actium and the death of the Egyptian queen would be the means of restoring or destroying its order; to guess whether Augustus, or some ruler of quite a different kind, would be the founder of a universal kingdom in which freemen could dwell?

Philo's great deficiencies.

8. On all these points Philo is silent. The meditations of the philosopher or theosopher are everything to him; the condition of the universe, except as it consists of philosophers or theosophers, nothing. He cannot, therefore, satisfy the demands of philosophy, for that in its highest, as well as its humblest form, is occupied with questions, not about itself, nor about the class which professes it, but about nature, man, God. Did this incapacity arise from his adhering too closely to his own records? *They* speak from first to last of a polity; they describe the gradual growth of one under Divine superintendence, out of a single family. Of this growth Philo sees nothing. The shepherd life of Abraham—the acts of Moses and Joshua—are nothing, except as they suggest divine allegories, from which the theosopher may derive nourishment. Is it not possible, then, that he failed to explain Plato, and the teachers of the old world, precisely because he had not a sufficiently simple apprehension of the books which he studied so profoundly, and admired so earnestly, and in which he thought that he could find the essence of all philosophy?

A Jew witnessing for a divine Polity grounded in the Revelation of the Absolute Being.

1. A society arose in the days of Philo which said that it was the expansion and fulfilment of the polity, the beginnings of which are recorded in the Hebrew histories. A teacher who had lately become one of the officers in that society, was accused by a synagogue of the Alexandrians, before the High Priest and Sanhedrim at Jerusalem, of speaking blasphemous words against the temple and the law,—of saying that One was come who would change the customs which Moses had delivered. He defended himself, not by interpreting the story in an allegorical sense, but by showing in a plain narrative how in each period there had been a fresh unfolding of a divine kingdom, through human agents,—how each period assumed and made necessary the manifestation of One who should prove its foundation to be actually divine and actually human. That witness was stoned, as those who spoke like him in former days had been.

A Jew connecting the search of Greeks after Wisdom with a divine and human Person.

2. Another Jew, who was present at his death and took part in it, shortly after incurred the hatred of his countrymen by inviting heathen citizens of Corinth, of Ephesus, and of Thessalonica, to become members of the society which had begun in Palestine, and which at first had only included circumcised men. His disciples at Corinth were full of the Greek passion for

wisdom; they fancied that he and an Alexandrian teacher were rival sophists, each desirous to palm his own doctrine or theory upon them, and to bind them together in a sect called after their name. He told them that that teacher and himself had come to proclaim a hidden and divine wisdom, but a wisdom which had shone forth in weakness, of which the only perfect manifestation was in a Man who had been crucified. He told them that their fellowship included the weakest, the most ignorant, the most evil; that the members of it formed one body in one Head, and that whoever sought to divide them, or boasted of some wisdom of his own, was their enemy and destroyer. He told the people of the city in which Heraclitus had dwelt, that all spiritual blessings were theirs,—all the mysteries of divine knowledge; and yet that they were composed of all the kindreds and tribes of the earth, the invisible and the visible worlds being reconciled in Him who united divine glory with human nothingness. At Jerusalem he said that this divine society was the flower and consummation of that which their fathers had possessed,—of that which had begun in Abraham's tent. Finally, to the Jews and Gentiles of Rome he asserted the worth of outward law, because it made men conscious of internal evil,—because it made them realize the opposition between the flesh, which flies from what is right and true, and the spirit, which desires but cannot attain—because it drives man to seek a righteousness above his own, which condemns his evil nature, justifies and satisfies the cravings of his inner man.

A Jew the reconciler of the Old and the New.

3. Finally, an aged Galilæan fisherman, living in the country where Greek philosophy began, proclaimed the reconciliation of that Revelation which had been from the beginning, with the Light which had shined afresh upon the world, declared that the Word was with God and was God; that in Him was Life, and the Life was the Light of men; uttered a divine Name which expressed The Being and The Unity; saw a city descending out of heaven, of which this Unity was the centre and the ground.

4. There are some readers who fancy that ancient and modern history are divided by the so-called fall of the Western Empire. The historian of philosophy cannot adopt their arrangement. The point at which we arrived is the one at which the curtain falls on the speculations of the old world. When it rises again we shall find a set of new actors, occupied with questions closely connected with all which we have been considering, but in many important respects different from them. A new element we shall find has been infused into the minds of Pagans and Jews, as well as of Christians. If we agree with Philo that the speculations of men in the ages before Christ were under the guidance of a Teacher who knew what was in man, we need not fear to enter upon the more complicated and embarrassing inquiries of the later time.

PHILOSOPHY OF

THE FIRST SIX CENTURIES.

INTRODUCTION.

1. In the sketch of Ancient Philosophy, we spoke of different nations which were busy in the search for Wisdom. The Hindoo enquired whence the Thoughts which he found within him, whence the mysterious power of thinking, had flowed. The Chinese found it hard to regulate his outward acts: he asked for some Rule or principle of Conduct. The Persian perceived a war in himself and in the world between two powers, one of which should be obeyed, one resisted: he sought for the meaning of Good and Evil. The Greek felt in himself a power of Governing men who were physically stronger than himself: he asked what this power was, and how he became possessed of it. The Roman perceived that there was an Order to which he, and all persons, and all things must conform: he asked what that Order was,—what place he and other men had in it. The Philosophy of the Old World.

2. Out of these questions, others arose which made the solution of the first more difficult. The philosopher of each nation or race, whatever was the motive which led him to commence his search, aimed at some one object or principle. The pursuit of Unity, or the one, became formally and consciously with some, really with all, the absorbing pursuit. But the traditions of each nation had preserved the belief of many objects demanding the reverence of man. How to respect these traditions, and yet faithfully to engage in that pursuit, became in every country a most perplexing problem. The more earnestly men investigated the problem with a real desire to solve it, and to fulfil what they felt to be the duty of their lives, without forsaking their respect for their fathers and their love for their land, the more they felt the embarrassment. If they endeavoured to be citizens as well as sages, to teach and act as well as think, the freest and most tolerant of all states was most likely to Its Perplexities. (1) Unity and Polytheism.

condemn them as corrupters of youth and despisers of the gods.

(2) The Invisible and Visible World.

3. Another difficulty was inseparable from this. The philosopher evidently sought for something not visible, not tangible. The source of Thoughts must be as impalpable as themselves. The outward acts and forms of life might be worthy of the most minute and devout observance, but the Rule which was at the root of them could not be one of them. The evils which he saw led the disciple of Zoroaster to crave for a Good which he could not see. The very difference of the Greek from other men was, that his Power did not lie in that which had bulk, and could be measured. The Roman Order was reverenced as that which surmounted all visible power and authority. Hence the material world, with which men generally seemed to be occupied, was certainly not that with which the seeker was occupied. He was looking into some other. What had that world to do with this? Were they under the same law, or under different and opposite laws? So long as the philosopher occupied himself as Confucius, Zoroaster, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle did, with the actual conditions of society, he must try, by some means or other, to reconcile the two spheres, to show that he was investigating the laws which concern the ordinary life of men. To point out the method of this reconciliation,—to prove this fact, was the business of his life. But there was latent in the minds of all these eminent thinkers a feeling which frequently expressed itself in their words and acts, that the region with which the philosopher had to do was in fact altogether opposed to that with which the common man had to do. With all his practical zeal, the Persian reformer could not overcome the habitual conviction of his countrymen, that an evil power had created the visible universe. With all his wish to prove that justice or righteousness is equally at the root of society and of individual life, Plato could not sometimes help thinking that the philosopher must have an Atlantis, not an Attica, to work in. The theoretic man was the object of Aristotle's profoundest admiration, in spite of his large and minute acquaintance with the facts of the earth on which he moved, and his deep interest in all the concerns of it. That belief which Persians and Greeks in their vigour could not escape, was the original and unchanging maxim of the contemplative Hindoo. For the most opposite reason, it became also the maxim of the active Roman, when he began to receive philosophy from the lips of Stoics, Academicians, and Epicureans. The fixed and long-established forms of his national life withstood the application of any new discoveries. When those

forms decayed, and the vulgar strife of factions absorbed the toils of the most accomplished men, so far as they were statesmen and men of action, they welcomed speculation as a delightful region into which they might escape if ever they could exchange the noise of the forum for their villas and gardens. Cicero laboured diligently to bring his rhetorical and political views into harmony with his philosophical. But the contrast between them became more and more evident even to himself. The administration of such a republic as Rome could have nothing to do with studies which he had conducted, or fancied that he had conducted, in the school of Plato.

(3.) The Philosopher and the Man

4. But if there was a world for the philosopher, and a world for the common man, how was the philosopher distinguished from the common man? Hindoos, Persians, Greeks in the time of Pythagoras, even in the time of Socrates, would have said,—"The philosopher is an inspired man. Some divinity has taken him out of the crowd, and brought him to know secrets which the crowd does not know." Much temptation to vanity and imposture lay of course in this belief; nevertheless, those who held it were less, not more, exclusive than their fellows. Their sympathy with their disciples was cordial and fraternal; they felt that light was given them that they might descend into the darkness to bring others out of it. Philosophical pride really began when this conviction departed. The Sophists and the heads of the Latin sects felt they were different from other men, not in virtue of gifts and a calling, but in virtue of their own native endowments. In proportion as philosophy became a profession, the whole race of non-philosophers—that is to say, all mankind, except the school or its chief members—were regarded with contempt, or with indifference, if so strong a feeling as contempt was incompatible with the sage's ideal

How did the establishment of the Roman Empire affect these inquiries?

5. It may naturally be supposed that the difficulties of which we have spoken presented themselves in a new light to the philosopher under the Roman Empire, especially under the first twelve Cæsars. The seeker for Unity found the habits, rites, gods of all nations, adopted into the same society: if *this* reconciliation was that which he aimed at, his object was attained. He found all the nations subjected to one head: if *this* was unity, his problem was resolved in the most practical manner. What effect would it produce on the Roman seeker after Order, to find himself and his law subjected to a mortal will? How would the Greek search for government, and freedom thrive, when the Greek found himself a slave? Would there be the dream in any heart, that the gods bethought themselves of a world which Tiberius or Nero governed,—that such a world could have a moral and metaphysical foundation?

The first century.

6. The records of the first century of the Christian Era furnish interesting and valuable answers to these questions. They give us clear and full portraits of a Roman and a Greek Stoic, with an unfinished sketch of a reformer and enthusiast in whom many Greek and Oriental qualities were mingled; they supply us with other facts, sometimes supposed to have no connection with a history of philosophy, which throw light upon these, and are necessary to the comprehension of the ages which follow.

Seneca born a few years B.C.; died A.D. 65.

7. LUCIUS ANNÆUS SENECA was born in Cordova. He inherited from his father, Marcus Seneca, a considerable property, and a great aptitude for rhetorical studies. There was much in his education which might have led him to think the enlargement of his fortune and the study of words the main business of life. But Seneca became a Stoic. He proposed to himself the acquisition of inward contentment and self-satisfaction as his end; he looked upon philosophy, not the courts, as the means to that end. He was, however, a Roman before he was a Stoic. A pedantic contempt for wealth formed no part of his profession; if he could make it minister to his main object, he was quite willing to hold it and increase it. It separated him from the vulgar; it allowed him leisure for self-cultivation. He was as little anxious to alienate the other part of his patrimony from any notion that barrenness and dryness of style are necessary or becoming in the seeker of wisdom. He early found that the forum was not the place in which a subject of the Cæsars was likely to realize the blessings which he especially desired; but the gifts which qualified him for the forum might, he thought, be applied advantageously in the closet.

His wealth and Rhetoric not inconsistent with his Stoicism.

8. The contemporaries of Seneca, of course, were quick in detecting what seemed to them the gross contradiction of a Stoic dwelling in some of the finest gardens in Italy, and patronized by an Emperor. Later times have been more busy in their complaints of Seneca for his points and antitheses. Neither, we conceive, have been just to him. He worked out the problem which Zeno had set before his disciples, with as much consistency as any of them had ever done. But he worked it out in new circumstances. He tried to show that the material objects in which other men placed their happiness did not necessarily hinder a philosopher from attaining that which specially belongs to himself; that equanimity was possible in the midst of a society liable to hourly changes from the will of a tyrant. His style may be called artificial, but it is the perfectly natural expression of the mind of the man who used it. No other could enable us so well to understand the continual

effort which he was making to steady himself while all was reeling about him; the skill with which he availed himself of all resources for this purpose; the degree in which he was able to subordinate all other purposes to it. If self-concentration, independence of mere circumstances, independence of other men and their interests, an assertion of the position of the philosopher as immeasurably higher than that of the ordinary man, be stoical aims and characteristics, Seneca was in the very strictest sense of the word a Stoic. He was a Stoic, too, in his reverence for physics. A brilliant essayist and historian of our day has alleged him as the most damning proof of the inutility and barrenness of moral studies; his Treatise on Anger being contrasted with those beneficial investigations of nature which have led to the construction of various necessary and marketable articles. Seneca himself might have been quoted in support of this opinion, though he exalted natural above human studies, not on the ground of their utility but their sublimity. He valued even the knowledge which he could acquire of meteors and volcanoes above all theories about Indignation and Consolation. It may seem strange that so prolific a writer on ethics, and one who connected ethics so much with the practice of life, should have taken such a view of the relative worth of these pursuits. But, in truth, Nature furnished him, as well as other Stoics, with their ethical standard. How nearly they might approximate to its fixed order,—how far they might cast aside the disturbing forces of impulse and affection, was their question. Seneca went farther in finding the answer to it than any of his predecessors. His Treatise on Anger is no mere collection of well-turned sentences; it exhibits an ideal of character which he set before himself habitually, and which it cannot be denied that in a great measure he realized. The miseries and oppressions of the earth did not disturb his peace. The crimes of the palace never led him to dream, as an old Athenian might have dreamt, of Harmodius; or to pray, as an old Roman might have prayed, for a divine avenger; or to mix, like his kinsman Lucan, reverence for Pompey and Cato with adulation of Nero. He was not inspired, as Juvenal was in a somewhat later time, by mere indignation to pour out verses. He did not brood, like Tacitus, over the inevitable fall of his country's glory when its virtue had departed, nor anticipate the possible greatness of the untamed tribes in the forests of Germany, because traces of old Roman virtue were to be seen in them. Seneca was as much offended as so old a man could be, by the dangerous sentiment of Aristotle, that anger, though a bad master, is a good servant. It is bad, he said, altogether. He disposed rapidly and decisively of the objection that moral evil ought to

His preference for physics.

See the Preface to the Nat. Quest. lib. i.

How accounted for.

His calmness.

De Irâ, lib. i. § ix.

excite the displeasure of a philosopher, by urging that the philosopher in Rome who began to act upon that maxim must be displeased all day long.

De Irâ, lib. ii. § vii.

Treatise De Otio Sapientis.

9. Whatever subject Seneca handled is treated in this spirit. Some extracts from his fragment on the Rest of a Philosopher, addressed to Gallio, will illustrate the tone of his mind and of his style. The reader will not fail to observe that the two republics of which Seneca speaks in it explain *his* idea of the philosopher's own world. It is not the ideal republic of Plato into which he would transport himself, but into the largest conception of this visible universe which he can frame.

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c. xxviii. and xxxi.

After some general comments on the blessings of retirement as a deliverance from the influence of opinion,—from the distraction of different objects,—from the fluctuations and inconstancy which characterise us even in our vices,—Seneca proceeds to defend himself from a charge which he had perhaps heard from Gallio himself, to which, at all events, he must have known that he was liable from rival professors.

Allegation of Epicurism.

"You will say to me, 'Seneca, what do you mean? When you praise idleness in this fashion you are deserting your party. Your friends the Stoics say, 'Even to the very end of our lives we will be acting; we will not cease to work for the common good, to aid individuals, to stretch out a kind hand even to our enemies. We grant freedom from service to no age; as the saying is, we keep the hoary head pressed with the helmet. We are so impatient of rest before death, that, if it were possible, we would not have death itself a rest! Why do you mix the precepts of Epicurus with the principles of Zeno? If you are ashamed of your party, why not desert it rather than betray it.'"

Coincidence of Zeno and Epicurus.

Seneca answers that he does not hold himself pledged to all the sentiments of Zeno or Chrysippus; that he is a seeker of truth as well as they; that, however, he has not deserted either their principles or their example. "The two great sects," he says, "of Epicureans and Stoics differ in this matter, but they arrive at my conclusion by different routes. Epicurus says a wise man will not take part in the management of the state unless there is some special reason for doing so; Zeno says he will take part in the state unless there is some special hindrance. One seeks rest of purpose, the other from necessity. But the necessity has a wide scope. If the Republic is so corrupt that it cannot be aided,—if it is completely possessed with evils,—the wise man will not spend his strength for nought; he will not devote himself to a task in which he can do no good. As a man would not go to sea in a damaged ship,

Political life.

—as he would not enter military service when utterly out of health,—so he will not enter upon a political life which he knows to be untenable. No doubt it is demanded of him that he should do good to many men when it is possible,—if not, to a few—if not, to those nearest to him,—if not to them, then to himself. But if a man makes himself worse, he hurts besides himself, all those whom, if he had been made better, he might have benefited. So if any one deserves well of himself, he does thereby good to others, in that he puts himself in a condition to do them good.

The two states. c. xxxi.

"Let us present to our mind," Seneca continues, "the two different societies,—one, that great republic in which gods and men are contained, in which we do not look at this corner or that, but measure our city by the course of the sun; the other, that in which the condition of our birth hath enrolled us. Some devote themselves at the same time to both societies, the greater and the less; some only to the less; some only to the greater. To this greater republic we may be servants even when we are at rest,—yea, I know not whether we cannot serve it better at rest."

Questions for the contemplative man.

He goes on to mention some of the exercises in which a contemplative man may engage. "He may ask, What is virtue? Is there one virtue, or are there many? Is it nature or art that makes good men? Is this a great unity which embraces seas and lands, and whatever is in them? or hath God scattered through the Universe many bodies of the same kind? Is the matter from which all things are sprung, full and unbroken? or is it dispersed, and a void intermixed with the things that are solid? Doth God sit still in the contemplation of his own work; or doth he meddle with it? Is He diffused beyond it, outside of it; or doth He inhabit the whole of it? Is the world immortal; or is it to be reckoned among perishable things,—things born for time".....

c. xxxii.

Seneca proceeds, in an eloquent passage, to show what a multitude of objects Nature forces upon the mind of man; how she stirs him up to acts of contemplation, for which the time allotted to his life is all to short. Therefore he concludes—"I live according to Nature if I have given myself wholly to her,—if I am her admirer and worshipper. 'But Nature,' you say, 'would have me both act and have leisure for contemplation.' I do both, since contemplation implies action. 'But,' you say, 'surely it makes a difference whether one comes to this work for the mere sake of pleasure, seeking nothing from contemplation but itself, which, however purposeless, no doubt has its seductions. I answer," he says," "it also makes a great difference with what spirit you

Contemplation and action.

Both may be pursued for bad or good ends.

engage in civil life,—whether it is that you may always be in a bustle, and never have any time left in which you may withdraw from human things to divine. The mere craving for action, and doing works for their own sake, is not to be approved, any more than the virtue which is wholly contemplative and never exhibits what it has learnt. With what mind does a wise man withdraw into leisure?—That he may ascertain with himself what things he is to do by which he may benefit those that come after. "I affirm," he says, "that Zeno and Chrysippus did greater things than if they had led armies, had borne civil honours, had laid down laws for *one* state, instead of laying them down, as they have done, for the whole human race."

He argues that the supporters of pleasure and of action both recognise the necessity of contemplation; he, on his side, does not affirm that it is the ultimate port, but only a place for lying at anchor. "A man, according to Chrysippus, may not only suffer but choose rest. The Stoics lay it down as a general rule that he should concern himself in the affairs of the State, but they do not admit that he should concern himself with *every* State. Will you tell me, then, which it shall be? Shall it be the Athenian, in which Socrates was put to death and Aristotle had to fly lest he should be condemned? Shall it be the Carthaginian, in which there were perpetual seditions, the liberty of which was dangerous to every good citizen,—where there was inhumanity towards enemies, hostility to friends? If I chose to go through them one by one, I should not find one which could suffer a wise man, or which a wise man could suffer. But if that state does not exist which we feign for ourselves, Rest begins to be necessary for all; because the one thing that might have been preferred to Rest is nowhere. If I am told that it is an excellent thing to go out to sea, but that I must not for the world sail in a sea in which shipwrecks are wont to happen, which carry the steersman where he would not go, I think I am told plainly enough never to loose my ship from shore, though sailing is so excellent a thing."

Republics too bad to mend.

Conclusion.

Seneca the tutor of Nero. Treatise De Clementia. c. i.

10. With the philosophical habits and convictions which this extract discloses, Seneca was called to form the mind of an emperor. His Treatise on Clemency, addressed to his pupil, is probably a fair illustration of the method of his education. The royal youth is reminded how like his position is to that of the gods, how many millions are subject to his nod, how graceful and divine kindness and goodness must be. Objections to the value of a quality which presumes transgressions are dexterously suggested and dexterously taken off. Nero is congratulated that he is exhibiting in the commencement of his reign,

c. ii.

—in the hey-day of his passions,—all the noble qualities which his predecessor, Augustus, only acquired after a series of crimes. How great will be the maturity of excellence of which the first buds are so beautiful!

Crimes of Seneca.

See especially Dio Cass. lib. 61. c. 10.

11. It may not be fair for an Englishman, with Bacon's dedication of the "Advancement of Learning" before him, to complain of the pagan parasite; it may not be fair to look upon the life of him to whom the "Treatise on Clemency" was addressed, as a commentary upon it and upon the views of the writer. But if the tutor is not answerable for the acts of his pupil, what must be said of his own? Though we may admit that the censure of Dio Cassius upon the tenor of his life is malicious and false,—though we may even force ourselves to believe that the evidence of his privity to the death of Agrippina is not conclusive,*—no one has ever doubted that he wrote the apology for the matricide. Which crime was the greater must always remain a question. Forgiveness has been asked for this and other acts of the philosopher, on the plea that he was exposed to temptations under which we might any of us have fallen. We do not say that the atrocity of the offence is an answer to such an argument; certainly every one would wish to accept it on behalf of a man who has so many claims upon our gratitude as Seneca. But, before it can be admitted, there should be some evidence of weakness, of reluctance, of shame. None such are produced. We have not the least reason to conclude that Seneca felt he was departing from the maxim on which his life was regulated in this instance, any more than when he submitted quietly and manfully to the sentence upon himself. He had tutored himself to endure personal injuries without indulging in anger; he had tutored himself to look upon all moral evil without anger. If the doctrine is sound, and the discipline desirable, we must be content to take the whole result of them. If we will not do that, we must resolve that it is well to hate oppression and wrong, even at the cost of philosophical composure.

Tacitus, Ann. lib. xiv. c. 12.

Not the effects of weakness.

Epictetus the seeker of freedom. He lived till the reign of Hadrian; but was driven from Rome as a philosopher by Domitian

12. Epictetus inherited no gardens, and learned no rhetoric; he was the slave of a freedman of that emperor whom Seneca educated. The difference in their position affects the whole nature of their philosophy. They were both Stoics; they had both a right to the name; they both redeemed Stoicism from schoolmen and nurses, and gave it a manly, practical character. But

* The words of Tacitus, Ann. lib. xiv. c. 7, only leave it uncertain whether Seneca and Burrhus knew of the first plot of Anicetus; the completion of the crime our philosopher seems to have suggested.

Epictetus.

Seneca enquired after the secret of quietude,—Epictetus after the secret of freedom. The poor Greek slave in the Roman empire applied himself to the study of that problem which the sophists, poets, statesmen of Athens, had been working out in the days of Pericles: what is more, he found a solution of the problem which justified all the aspirations of old Greece, and explained their failure.

13. Viewed in this light, Epictetus becomes one of the most striking figures in the history of philosophy. He has thrown back a glory upon the early Stoicism which does not belong to it; his influence upon men's thoughts in later times has been very considerable; what he has said upon the subject to which his whole mind was devoted, had never been said in language so distinct and brave by any Greek or Roman predecessor. But the real grandeur of his work consists in this, that he broke down the barrier which Seneca, and the comfortable men of letters before and since his age, have been always seeking to establish and perpetuate. The man and the philosopher are not different persons with him; the sole business of the philosopher is to ascertain how he can be most a man. It was not a question, how he could acquire a certain amount of wisdom which would set him above his fellows; it was the question, how he could live when all his circumstances seemed to bid him die. "Thou art a slave:" that was the fact presented to him by his outward condition. "What makes thee one?" was the thought awakened in him. "Is it Nero? Is it fate? Is it God?—None of the three," was the reply which by degrees came to him. "Not Nero, for he is a slave as well as thou; not fate, for thou art not bound to be a slave; not God, for He would not have thee a slave:—it is thyself. Thou fanciest that all these things, the accidents which surround thee, over which thou hast no power, are necessary to thee: therein consists thy slavery. When thou ceasest to desire these things, and desirest to be what thou art meant to be, thy freedom begins."

The philosopher and the man one.

His philosophy altogether practical.

14. Here is his view of the state of man and the divine purpose respecting him:—It will be perceived that he limits the omnipotence of the gods by a kind of necessity; but that he desires to assert their Righteousness at all events.

Book i. chap. 1. What the gods give men power over, and why.

"The gods have made that which is highest of all, and which is the lord of the rest, alone dependent upon us,—namely, the right use of the objects which are presented to us; but other things not. Is it because they were not willing? I, for my part, think that, if they could, they would have committed even those things to us..... But what saith Jupiter? 'Oh, Epictetus! if it had been possible, I would have made that little body of thine, and that which thou possessest, free and unencumbered. But do not forget that this is not yours; it is only a little mud skilfully moulded. Seeing I could not do this, I gave thee a portion of that which belongs to us—the power of desiring and declining,—the power of pressing into action and turning from action,—and, in general, the power of using the images that are presented to thee; of which power if thou takest care, and placest thy well-being in it, thou wilt not be hindered or interfered with, thou will not groan, thou wilt not complain of anybody, thou wilt not flatter anybody.'"

Here is his view of human greatness, and the ground of it:—

Book i. Chap. 3. Men's relationship to Jupiter.

"If any one hath been able worthily to enter into this doctrine,—that we are in some very eminent sense born of God, that He is the father of men and of gods,—I do not think that he will have any grovelling or mean thoughts of himself. If the Cæsar had adopted thee, how proud thy looks would be! and if thou knowest that thou art the son of Jove, will not that elevate thee? It is not so with us, however; for these two things have been mixed in our birth,—the body, which is common to us with the animals; the reason and the mind, which are common to us with the gods. Many decline to that unhappy and dead relationship, while only a few ascend to this godly and blessed one. Seeing, therefore, it is needful that every person whatsoever should use each thing according to his conception of it, those few who think that they are born to faith, and to modesty, and to safety in the use of the images that are presented to them, cannot judge meanly of themselves. But the majority cry, 'What am I?—A poor miserable little creature;' and 'This miserable flesh and bones of mine!' Miserable enough, no doubt; but you have something better than that flesh and these bones. Why, then, letting the worse go, have you not cleaved to the better?"

The following extract is perhaps more remarkable:—

Book i. Chap. 13. How to please the gods in common things.

When a certain man asked him how it is possible to eat in a manner well pleasing to the gods, "If it is possible," he said, "to eat justly, with an even mind, temperately, modestly; is it not possible also to eat in a manner pleasing to the gods? When you have asked for warm water, and the servant does not hear, or, having heard, brings it a little tepid, or does not happen to be in the house, not to be angry and break out,—is not this pleasing to the gods? 'But how can one bear such things as these?' Poor slave! will you not bear your own brother, who hath Jove for his author,—who, as a son, hath sprung from the same seed and the same divine generation? Because you have been cast on some place which is a little higher than another, will you straightway set yourself up as a tyrant? Will you not

Ground of patience.

remember who you are and whom you rule,—that they are kinsmen, brothers by nature, Jove's offspring? 'Aye, but I have paid for them, and they have not paid for me.' 'Do you not see where you are turning your eyes,—that it is to the earth, to the pit, to those miserable laws of the dead; while to the laws of the gods you have no regard?'"

How to read Epictetus.

51. We have taken these extracts almost at hazard from Arrian's reports, which are, on the whole, more valuable, because freer and more human, than the Enchiridion. They explain the grand maxim of Epictetus, the one which lay close to his heart, which he had tested and knew to be true. We shall utterly fail to understand him if we make a digest of his opinions upon ethics, physics, theology; or busy ourselves with inquiring which were derived from older authorities, which were original. He derived nothing from older authorities, if to derive means to receive as part of a traditional system. There was nothing in his philosophy original, if by original is meant that which is invented as an easy method of explaining the phenomena of the Universe. Epictetus needed to be free. Any one who would show him how he might take a chain from off his neck, was welcomed as a benefactor. But he knew that no precepts can break fetters which we forge for ourselves. Stoicism became transformed in his hands, not because he wished to alter it, but of necessity; one who craved freedom for his spirit as its first condition, must give a new aspect to doctrines which prescribed a stern submission to fate. Yet he did not contradict his masters,—he understood them better than they understood themselves. He asserted as strongly as they did, that the course of the world is under a law which man cannot alter; it is his folly and calamity that he is always complaining of things which are independent of him. He asserted as much as they could do, that man himself is under a law. Why does not he obey it, and so cease to be a slave of things which have no rightful dominion over him?

He was not a plagiarist nor an inventor.

His theology.

16. So with respect to the theology of Epictetus; it could not be any longer physico-theology, such as Chrysippus had promulgated. The world could not be God, nor could he worship a collection of world-gods. There was an eye over him; he wanted a divine power to help him against the things which were trying to crush him. Seneca, in his gardens, conceived of a distant Omnipotence, of which the Emperor was the living and practical image; Epictetus, the bondsman, came to believe in One to whom a suffering man might look up for help and deliverance.

17. Supposing there was this possibility of freedom and greatness in man, was it possible that the multitude of slaves, rich and poor, in prisons and high places, could be awakened to seek for emancipation? How, and by whom, should they be awakened? These thoughts seem to have occupied Epictetus scarcely more than they occupied Seneca; but there were philosophers in this time who aspired to be reformers, not of themselves only, but of their age. The figure of APOLLONIUS of Tyana floats dimly before us in the traditions of the third and fourth centuries, when he had been changed into a model hero, and when his name was needed for a polemical purpose. But that there was such a man in the first century, and that he indicates some of the stronger feelings that were at work in it, cannot, we think, be doubted. His biographer, Philostratus, belongs to the time of Septimus Severus. The distance of less than 150 years is not so great that we need suspect any mistake in the assertion that Apollonius conceived an early admiration for Pythagoras, and a desire to do for his own generation what he supposed the old sage had sought to do for his. Pythagoras, as we have seen, was distinguished from the later teachers by the assured conviction of a divine inspiration; by the acknowledgment of an invisible power to be served in silence and awe as the source of that inspiration; by the belief that it was to be used for the reformation of society. Apollonius seems to have felt strongly the difference between such a philosophy and one which belongs to the schools, to be used for the purpose of endless disputation. He felt even more strongly the difference between the worship which Pythagoras had encouraged among his disciples, and that worship of evil powers to be propitiated by sacrifices, which was kept alive by the priests of various nations and gods, in the Roman and Parthian empires. That a young man should encounter many of these priests, should have proclaimed the pure philosophical devotion which he supposed to be the substitute of their dark rites, is not, surely, an impossible, even an improbable, supposition. It is more consolatory to think Philostratus true than false, when he affirms that supposition to be the fact. That he could not have entered upon his gigantic task without a sense of a calling which he had learnt from Pythagoras to regard as the characteristic of a sage, and that he prepared himself for it by the methods of silence and purification which his master prescribed, we may also believe. That the sense of the impossibility of any radical change in the faith of men and the order of society without a divine power should have grown upon him as he proceeded, was most natural. The statements of his idolatrous admirers compel us to think that he ultimately identified these powers with

Dreams of reformation.

Apollonius of Tyana.

His admiration for Pythagoras.

Opposition to priests.

Sense of inspiration.

himself; used the gifts which he had, and the opinion of his mission, for selfish and dishonest purposes; practised the ordinary trick of the enchanters, who were then everywhere so numerous. The admission of this fact does not oblige us to question the sincerity of his original purpose, to deny that a better Wisdom than his own stirred him, as it stirs every reformer, with a sense of the evils of his time, and a passionate desire to cure them. Nor need we be at pains to refute his conclusion, that some mightier agency than any which the philosophers or priests of his time were dreaming of, must be at work to renew the universe.

An enchanter.

Relation of the Jews to philosophy.

18. There was one nation now reduced under the power of the Cæsars, which had stood in a different relation to philosophy from all the rest. The Jew was not pledged by his faith to reverence the multitude of sensible objects which interfered with the search after Unity; he was pledged to protest that they were no gods, and to refuse them worship. The search after Wisdom did not contradict, in his apprehension, the fact that the Divine Wisdom had revealed itself to him: the more earnest his conviction on the latter point was, the more vigorous and continuous did his search become. The belief that the seeker of Wisdom was inspired, that he could not seek unless Wisdom first sought him, was therefore deeply rooted in his mind. But the seeker was also the prophet who was to communicate; he could claim no part of his knowledge as his own, his privileges were those of an Israelite; he could have no greater.

Reference to the Alexandrian school.

19. We have seen that an Alexandrian teacher living under the Roman Government during this century, understood the advantage which his Jewish birth gave him, and asserted his right on the strength of it to pursue Wisdom himself, and to sympathise with the efforts which other men had made in various directions to pursue it. Instead of condemning the Gentile philosophers, he referred their light to the same origin as his own. Philo, whom we spoke of as in some sense winding up the philosophy of the old world, does also in a very important sense introduce the new. We shall have to trace his influence through several centuries, not in his own city, or among his own countrymen only. Yet Philo, we saw, regarded the philosopher almost as Seneca regarded him. Chosen by God, separate from other creatures, he has feelings, interests, hopes, in which common men are not intended to share. How can so zealous and enlightened an Israelite have wandered so far from the principles upon which the commonwealth of Israel stood? Evidently, because he has lost the sense of it as a commonwealth; its homely facts have become allegories; the history has evaporated into a philosophy.

The Pharisee.

20. A strong practical protest against the Philonic tendency, still more against the mixture of Jewish with Heathen wisdom, arose from the sect of the Pharisees. This sect could not be accused of sacrificing the outward to the inward, of converting letters into symbols, of substituting spiritual contemplations for authoritative dogmas. But they were as little historical as the Alexandrian school. Tradition stood with them for history; the living records which make the past a part of the present, were exchanged for dead customs and rules, which make the present merely the slave of the past. The past itself was the indistinct echo of human voices; God was not heard in it. A school of self-righteous men was as far removed from sympathy with those who bowed to its decrees, confessed its divinity, hated its inhumanity, as the professors of the most occult lore, the aspirants after the most divine communion.

The Sadducee.

21. The Sadducee was a philosopher like the Alexandrian, but in the most opposite sense. For him there was no invisible world. He scorned the formalities of the Pharisee, but he substituted for them formalities of another kind,—maxims of conduct, the proprieties and decorums which separate the easy and respectable from the multitude, the sagacity and experience which separate the civilized from the unlettered. Some have called him an Epicurean, some a Stoic; he may at times have resembled both; he had no natural affinity with either. His sacred books supplied him with the hint of a morality which is higher and deeper than all ceremonies and services; he had only to separate this morality from all relation to any powers and influences beyond the visible world upon which it was to be exercised, and there came forth a system compact and manageable enough for all ordinary uses, capable of putting forth some vigour as long as it had any thing not more vital or substantial than itself to fight with, turning that vigour into ferocity when it had.

Both opposed to Philosophy, in any real sense.

22. If philosophy is the pursuit of Unity, it was as little likely to thrive amidst those divided sects, as in any countries which nominally professed a divided worship. The hard dogmatism of the Pharisee made all search fruitless and profane. The dogmatism of the Sadducee kept enquiry within limits, which nearly every philosopher of the old world had felt it the first duty and necessity of his vocation to transgress. The idea of spiritual guidance and inspiration, formally recognised by the one, contemptuously denied by the other, was equally alien from the heart and intellect of both. It was incompatible with the slavish reverence which the one paid to

the dead letter of the sacred books, and the comments of the elders upon it,—with the confidence which the other had in his own intellect, with his assurance that there could be nothing of which it did not give him information

The Christian Gospel: why apparently opposed to Philosophy.

23. It would seem at first as if the proclamation which called forth all the jealousy and bitterness of both these schools, was even more opposed to philosophy than they were. For it *was* a proclamation. Those who made it called themselves heralds, not seekers. They said they had news of their nation and for mankind of that which actually was, not hints of that which might be. They spoke of a revelation of a hidden world, and of Him who ruled it,—not of a method of discovering it or Him. This language is even more characteristic of the cultivated Saul of Tarsus, than of the Galilean fishermen; there is a more strong assertion in his writings than in theirs, that the wisdom of the world must stoop to the folly of preaching. What could be expected of such a faith, but that it should treat all the questions with which philosophy has been occupied as vain, or that it should pronounce decisions upon them so definite and precise, as to make past enquiries obsolete, future enquiries needless or rebellious?

It touches upon all the questions of Philosophy.

24. The Christian teachers were not able to take the first course; for the Gospel which they preached treated of all the questions in which philosophy had been engaged, and proclaimed them to be of transcendant importance. The thoughts and movements of the mind and heart within, were as profoundly interesting to the preacher of the cross, as they could be to the Brahminical devotee. The acts which he does in the common relations of life are as much connected with his faith as they can be with that of the Chinese. All the facts which he believes refer to the conflict between Good and Evil, and to the question which is to triumph. How spirit is to be free from the control of that which is merely material, and shall exercise dominion over it, is a subject as carefully discussed and elaborated by St. Paul as by Plato. The announcement of a divine and spiritual kingdom, which was the primary subject of the new Gospel, at once appealed to all that desire for an Order by which the Latin was possessed.

The Christian could not oppose Thought and Search without abandoning his position.

25. The Christian Church did not therefore occupy a ground of its own, different from that on which the philosopher had been working: it was his own ground. He had a right to say that it was invaded. The Christian abandoned his position if he denied the charge. He abandoned it equally if he took up the other plea, and affirmed that he was furnished with certain propositions which entitled him to put down the thoughts

that were stirring in the minds of men already,—to prohibit the rise and growth of them. For he came declaring that the eternal God who had made man in His own image, had sent forth His Son to regenerate human society and human life in its first root, and that His Spirit was given to men to awaken them out of a dead sleep into a knowledge of their position as men, into the apprehension and enjoyment of a spiritual world—a kingdom of righteousness and truth. Everything, then, of torpor and death was at war with this faith, and with Him who was the object of it. All desire, striving, effort, however confused and likely to be abortive, was recognised as originating in a divine source, was capable of being organized and directed to a divine end.

The Church in the first century.

26. Already during the first century all the principles of this faith had been developed. It had come forth in an actual society. It had encountered the Sages of the Athenian market-place, as well as approached the palace of the Cæsars. But it was still regarded, by both sages and Cæsars, as the most insignificant of the numerous sects of the most turbulent province and incomprehensible religion of the empire, till the capital of that province and religion fell before the army of Titus. Then it came forth in a new character: separated from all local associations, denounced by the race from which it had sprung, it called upon all races of which the Roman Empire was composed, to acknowledge the God of Abraham. It affirmed that an actual kingdom, grounded not upon strength, but upon submission and sacrifice, was existing in the midst of those races; that all might claim the King of it, as their King; that an actual invisible power had come forth, and was at work to unite them in this fellowship. Such assertions had their political, as well as their popular and their philosophical side. Emperors, mobs, sophists, were equally bound to take notice of them. We are not anxious to force this conflict upon the notice of our readers; but it forces itself upon them even more when they are reading the civil history of Gibbon, than when they are reading the ecclesiastical histories of Baronius or of Mosheim. The historian of philosophy can pass it over less than either of them For five centuries it presents itself in different forms to his notice. If those five are disregarded, the thirteen which follow become unintelligible. Upon this subject we now enter. The Christian Scriptures treat the years previous to the destruction of Jerusalem, or the death of the last apostle, as the winding up of a period, rather than as the commencement of one. The same arrangement of epochs is suggested by the circumstances of the Roman Empire. The reign of Vespasian seemed to his contemporaries to mark a new

New position in the second

Its place in a History of Philosophy.

The first century transitional.

epoch. Domitian's reign revived the dark time of Tiberius and Nero. With Nerva an age commences which Gibbon rashly calls the happiest in the annals of the world; and which, though famines, pestilences, wars, rob it of that honour, is certainly illustrated by a series of princes who stand in the most marked and brilliant contrast to the Cæsars of the first century. We are justified, therefore, in treating that century as transitional, belonging equally to the old world and to the new. The new world we divide into three periods. The first will embrace the years which elapse between the commencement of the reign of Trajan and the appearance of Mahomet.

PART I.

FROM THE REIGN OF TRAJAN TO THE APPEARANCE OF MAHOMET.

CHAPTER I

The Second Century.

FROM TRAJAN TO SEPTIMUS SEVERUS.

Greek and Latin languages.

1. The distinction between the Greek and Latin provinces of the Roman Empire becomes more strongly marked while other distinctions disappear. The two languages, by whomsoever they were written or spoken, seem always to denote two essentially different habits of mind. The great Latin writers after Seneca did not cease to be philosophical, but they ceased to be formal professional philosophers. Tacitus felt that it was a more truly Roman work to study the actions of men and the condition of empires, than to acquire the art of being unaffected by either. Quinctilian felt that he was a truer patriot when he was doing his best to prevent rhetoric from becoming a trade, by making it a science, than if he had used his rhetoric in the construction of moral theories and apophthegms. On the other hand, the great Greek writers who followed Epictetus all testify that his thoughts had taken the direction which was most strictly in accordance with the language which he used as his instrument. They might derive great benefit from their Roman position and their Roman masters; but the tongue of Plato and Aristotle, now especially that it was no more claimed by poets, was the natural inheritance of those who made the search after wisdom the end of their lives.

Plutarch of Cheronæa.

2. There was one writer of this time who clearly understood that this was the vocation of his countrymen, but who perceived also, more clearly than his predecessors or any of his cotemporaries, that the Greek mind and the Latin mind at this time were needed to sustain and illustrate each other. To this conviction we may fairly attribute the great services which Plutarch of

Cheronæa has rendered to mankind. It must have struck many as a puzzling fact, that they owe the strongest and most vital impressions which they have respecting the freest ages of Athens and of Rome, to a writer who lived under Domitian and Trajan. The obvious suggestion, that at no other time could the lives of the heroes of each country have been so well compared, is a help to the solution of the difficulty, but does not remove it. Plutarch could not have understood enough of either to compare them, if he had not united some of the higher qualites of both. He saw in the old Roman the domestic affection, the reverence to invisible powers, the subjection to law, which were the strength of the commonwealth, the loss of which was its destruction. His beautiful letter to his wife on the death of their child, his practical treatises on all, even the minutest parts, of education, his eagerness to vindicate the old forms of religion from the dark and malignant superstitions with which they had been mingled, show how much pains he had taken to train himself to those habits which did not belong to the land of his birth. But the passion for liberty, the love of the soil, the eagerness to discover the principle that lay beneath outward facts, were as obviously the causes of the past glory of Greece, the witnesses of its present degradation. The interest which Plutarch compelled himself to feel in polities when all polities seemed to have passed away, his amusing vehemence against Herodotus for his libels upon Bœotia, and his efforts to understand the old philosophers, show how thoroughly and heartily he was determined to make his extraneous education a means of bringing out more fully the sympathies and powers which belonged to the countrymen whom he celebrated.

Union of Greek and Roman qualities in him.

Objections to him as uncritical and as a plagiarist.

3. Only this combination could have enabled Plutarch to be what he has been to modern Europeans, and to Englishmen, through Shakspeare, more than to all others. It has been the ungrateful fashion of some modern historians to speak of him as an uncritical retailer of anecdotes; it has been still more the fashion with philosophers to treat him as a man without originality, the mere reproducer of opinions which greater men had held. The former pedantry is harmless enough if it does not prevent children from reading Plutarch: were it to have that effect, our interest in classical antiquity would speedly disappear; we should have a set of old heroes clad in unexceptionable costume, not a single feature remaining which marks them as individual men. The other affectation is connected with the doctrine which has been so widely diffused among the historians of opinions, that a man's thoughts are good for nothing till you can ascertain to what school they belong, and that they must have been copied into his mind from books, if

he shared them with any more ancient teacher. Plutarch, instead of being a mere copyist, was, it seems to us, one of the great restorers of life and originality to philosophies which had become utterly dead. His genial habits of mind, his historical spirit, his affectionate study of actual men, enabled him to appreciate thoughts and feelings which some even of the great teachers of the world had been unable to grasp. Aristotle, we have seen, though living so near the time of Socrates, could not in the least understand him; for him he was merely a teacher of Ethics, so standing in contrast with his pupil, who dealt with Theology and Physics likewise. In the schools of Academics, full of disputations as they were, the great disputer and confuter was utterly misrepresented,—the object of his life inverted. Cicero apprehended him only through Xenophon, or through some of those splendid passages of declamation in Plato which exhibited least of the master's character. To Seneca he must have been an exceedingly disagreeable object, always suggesting some topic to disturb the equanimity which a sage desires. But Plutarch, in his "Platonic Questions," entered at once into the subtlest essence of the Socratic teaching,—that which belonged to the spirit of the man himself, and in which lay the secret of his power. Why, instead of boasting of his art as a generative one, he called it obstetric; why he thought that the deepest wisdom was not invented, but recollected; lastly, how the Dæmon gave the meaning to all the deepest thoughts which he uttered, so that his philosophy never could be understood apart from it,—these are points which Plutarch handles more courageously and successfully than they perhaps ever have been handled before or since his time, because he felt more to Socrates as a learner and as a friend, than as a panegyrist or a critic.

His work as a philosopher.

His understanding of Socrates.

4. If Plutarch holds a most important place as the reviver, in the truest sense of that word, of lessons which had been mistaken or had become obsolete, he is not less important as the foreteller of a new philosophical era. From his time it became quite clear that the age of the old sects had passed away. We do not mean that Epicuræans, Stoics, and Academicians, might not go on maintaining their different theses and collecting bands of disciples around them; such occupations or amusements, if less animating than the games and shows in the amphitheatres, were also less expensive and less bloody. But the discovery that these questions meant something to the men who engaged in them in the old world,—that they bore upon their business, that they had to do with the most serious struggles of their lives,—inspired thoughtful men with a disgust for the abuse of them to mere purposes of talk or display, and

Assists in overthrowing the sects.

Plutarch.

His practical wisdom.

with a hope that there might yet be treasures lying very close to human beings which they had not discovered, and of which they did not suspect the existence. And secondly, no one did more than Plutarch to prove that, in some way or other, the old belief in divine helpers, protectors, inspirers, must be connected with the search for practical wisdom,—with all our efforts after self-knowledge and self-government. He may not have succeeded in showing how the reconciliation was to be effected; but, at least, he makes us aware of some of the difficulties which lie in the way of it; and he leaves us in no doubt that whosoever stifles man's questionings for the sake of asserting a divine authority, blackens and blasphemes that authority; that whoever seeks to carry on such inquiries without referring them to a deeper source and a superior guidance, makes them feeble and abortive.

His "Dæmon of Socrates."

5. We should be glad, for other reasons, to give our readers a sketch of the dialogue, which is entitled "The Dæmon of Socrates," though only a small portion of it bears directly upon that subject. But there is one passage so important, not for the illustration of Plutarch's mind, but of the whole philosophical movement of this time, that we must translate it:—

Not a visible appearance.

His speech not addressed to the external ear.

The purified spirit the true listener.

"When we considered this question privately among ourselves, the suspicion suggested itself whether it was a visible appearance at all which Socrates spoke of, whether it might not be the sensation of some voice, or rather the intellectual recognition of a word coming, in some wonderful manner, into contact with him, as even in sleep it is not a voice that is uttered, but those who receive the impressions and perceptions of certain words think that they hear people speaking. To these, this kind of apprehensions is in very deed a dream, coming to them in the silence and serenity of the body while they sleep. [There is a word lost in the next sentence, which leaves some doubt about its meaning.] And having been stifled with the tumult of the passions and the whirl of outward necessities, they cannot listen and address the mind fully to the things which are signified to them. But the reason of Socrates being pure, not under the dominion of passion, nor mixing itself greatly, under the pretence of outward necessities, with the body, was quick and sensitive in responding to that which encountered it; and this, one would conjecture, was not the *voice*, but the *word* of a dæmon coming in its signification, without voice, into contact with the perceiver. For the voice, when we speak with one another, is like a blow upon the soul, which opens by force to receive the word through the ears. But the reason of the better man leads the well-matured soul, which needs no blow, directing it to that which has been internally signified to it;

and it permits itself to be guided by the light gentle reins which the reason uses,—no violent passions champing the bit, and striving to be loose."

The important distinctions in this passage.

6. The student of philosophy will do well to consider the whole passage, from which this is an extract, attentively. It will afford him great light respecting the distinction between αἴσθησις and νόησις, which is of such vast importance for the understanding of the earliest as well as the latest metaphysics. Scarcely less valuable are the suggestions which the passage offers respecting the relation of the Νοῦς to the Ψυχή, of the teaching governing power which apprehends spiritual objects directly, to that respective faculty or principle which may be either the victim and slave of the senses, or may obey a higher guidance. But it is especially needful to remark, that both these vital distinctions depend in Plutarch's teaching upon the previous acknowledgment of some Dæmon or Spirit, who addresses itself to an organ in man capable of communicating with it, and to which that organ must yield itself freely if it fulfils its proper function. He does not profess to define the faculties (the beautiful language which he was using, not with the perfect freedom and mastery of an old Greek, but perhaps with even a more critical apprehension of its powers and distinctions, almost forbade him to do so) apart from the power which moves them, and the object to which they are directed.

The Emperor Trajan.

His tolerant maxims.

7. It may be doubted whether the Emperor Trajan, to whom Plutarch dedicated his "Sayings of Kings and Generals," ever troubled himself to read the dialogue on the Dæmon of Socrates. In spite of his cultivation, he was probably too much occupied with Dacian conquests, and the internal management of the Empire, to have much time for what would have seemed to him ingenious and somewhat difficult speculation. He was, therefore, the less prepared to encounter a new and very startling form of the doctrine of an inward teacher and guide, which was presented to him when he came to the city of Antioch, on his way to an expedition against the Parthians. The ordinary policy of the Empire, the habits of toleration which accorded with the character of Trajan and which his intercourse with Pliny had nourished, would have forbidden him to interfere with any strange opinion, whether it took the shape of religion or philosophy. Under his benignant despotism, all schools might deliver their separate and contradictory oracles,—all races whose rites were not outrageously inhuman, might worship their separate gods according to the traditions of their fathers. But Trajan heard of a society in Antioch, which his very tenderness

Apparent exception to Trajan's rules.

for the feelings and faith of its volatile inhabitants led him to regard with dislike and suspicion. He understood that the members of it drew men away from the worship of their native and proper gods, proclaiming, as the humbled Jewish nation had done, one invisible Ruler of the whole earth, but inviting men of all tribes, as the Jews had not done, to abandon their divinities, and unite in confessing Him. He found that these men spoke of themselves as parts of a kingdom; a phraseology altogether different from that of any sect or school. It might have been the mere phraseology of harmless fanaticism; but there was evidently an organization in the Antioch community; one, called a father, presided over it; it was connected by mysterious bands with societies similarly organised in the other cities of the Empire. To suppress such a body, as outraging the religion of Syria, as interfering with the polity of Rome, was a most natural course for the Emperor to adopt. He sent for Ignatius, the father of the Society or Family, which was called Christian, in Antioch. It is to his conversation with this father that we must for a moment direct the attention of our readers.

Grounds of it.

Ignatius of Antioch.

8. "When Ignatius stood before the face of Trajan the king,—'Who art thou, poor devil,' said the Emperor, 'who art so wilfully transgressing our decrees, and moreover art tempting others to their destruction?' Ignatius answered, 'No one calleth him who bears a God within him a poor devil, for the devils turn away from the servants of God. But if thou meanest that I am evilly inclined towards the devils, and that I give them trouble, I confess it. For having Christ as my heavenly King, I set at nought the plots of these evil spirits.' Trajan said, 'And who is this that beareth a God within him?' Ignatius answered, 'He that hath Christ in his heart.' Trajan said, 'seem we not in our minds to have gods, seeing that we use them as allies against our enemies?' Ignatius said, 'The devils of the nations you call gods through a mistake. For there is one God that made the heaven, and the earth, and the sea, and one Christ Jesus the Son of God, the only begotten: of whose kingdom may I be a sharer!' Trajan said, 'Thou meanest Him who was crucified under Pontius Pilate?' Ignatius said, 'Him who hath crucified my sin with the author of it, and hath put down all devilish error and evil under the feet of those that bear him in their heart.' Trajan said, 'Dost thou, then, bear this crucified One in thyself?' Ignatius said, 'Yes, verily, for it is written, I will dwell in them and walk in them.' Trajan exclaimed, 'We decree that Ignatius, who saith that he beareth the crucified One within him, be led bound to Rome, there to be the food of wild beasts.'"

The evil spirit.

The divine teacher.

The deliverer.

How this dialogue bears upon the history of philosophy.

9. We have hesitated to introduce a passage at once so theological and so sacred as this; but it is impossible faithfully to exhibit the history of Christian, or even of heathen, philosophy, during the first three centuries, if we pass it over. Even if we had any doubt about the substantial veracity of the record (it may of course have received additions from the reporter, but the part which specially concerns us is not that which would have been interpolated at a later time), we should still be obliged to receive it as an important testimony to the opinion which was entertained in Antioch respecting that which was most characteristic in the belief of Ignatius. Its value consists in this, that Ignatius was not a philosopher, that he had apparently no communication with philosophers, that he was acquainted with scarcely any book but the Jewish Scriptures, that he resorted to them, not for the sake of any deep lore, but to find warnings and examples for the time in which he lived, of the dangers to which they were exposed from envy, ambition, self-will, and of the way in which they might escape those perils. Whatever be our judgment respecting his epistles, our conclusion upon this point will be the same. They stand out in the most marked contrast to the later apologetic literature: they are simple, child-like, practical in the highest degree. The dialogue with Trajan, therefore, must be taken for what it appears on the face of it to be—first, as the expression of the simplest conviction of an aged Christian confessor looking death in the face; secondly, as marking out the points of difference which this confessor supposed to exist between him and the heathen people around him; thirdly, as explaining the deepest and most radical ground of the punishment with which the Emperor visited him. He believed that the King and Lord of the whole earth did, in the strictest sense, dwell in him; he believed that the heathen world were doing homage to evil powers, instead of to a perfectly good Being; he believed that he was to proclaim Him who dwelt in him and ruled over him to all men; he believed that, when they acknowledged Him, they would be delivered from their servitude to evil. That there was such a Guide of the wise, the most thoughtful of them had confessed. Even Trajan, in his military Roman manner, claimed for himself a certain belief in such a Director. But Ignatius affirmed that the Invisible Guide had actually come upon earth, and borne a human nature, had died a human death; He was not a mere dæmon, not a special teacher of the wise man—He was the Governor and Ruler of men. To all races and all classes, Syrians and Romans, masters and serfs, His kingdom must be announced. Trajan perceived at once that such a doctrine had nothing of the quietness and harmlessness of a school

Simplicity of Ignatius.

What his testimony signified.

Why it necessarily led to his condemnation.

dogma. Whatever affinity it might have to the teaching of any Greek or Roman sage, it went altogether beyond the limits within which opinions might be safely tolerated; it united the perils of the definite and the indefinite; it carried you to a depth which no plummet-line could sound,—yet it bore directly upon the common life and common relations of man. If we fairly put ourselves into Trajan's position, we shall certainly not be inclined to condemn his act as a strange or monstrous one. It was that which, in his circumstances, the most tolerant modern statesman might have adopted, if his toleration did not rest upon that belief of a divine guide to Truth which Ignatius proclaimed.

The Syrian Gnosis.

10. Not long after the death of Ignatius, there appeared in the Church of Antioch a man named Saturninus. He is memorable in history as the author of one of the so-called gnostical heresies. We shall not attempt a definition either of the adjective, gnostical, or the substantive heresy, till we have considered some of the particular appearances from which the names were generalised. The ordinary assertions that Saturninus attempted to connect Christian theology with Persian philosophy, is undoubtedly true; but no power in the world can succeed in connecting two things which have not some natural affinity.

Its relation with Persian faith and philosophy.

The Persian philosophy was nothing except an attempt to inquire into certain puzzling facts which present themselves to the minds of human beings, and which demand a solution. The Christian theology did encounter those facts; they were presumed in it. The single-hearted Ignatius believed that there were powers of evil which were seeking to bring man's spirit into captivity; that the idolatry into which men had fallen, the worship of this visible world, was the effect of the seduction of these evil powers; that there was a Deliverer of man's spirit, One who dwelt with him, and in whom he was to trust. The

The good and evil creators.

Persians recognised evil powers; the Persian recognised a power which could overcome them, and which man might obey. He had suspected that the visible world was especially the domain —perhaps the creation—of Ahriman; that Ormuzd belonged to a secret region of light; that he is to be apprehended by some higher faculty. This distinction between mere animal perception and the intuition, or higher knowledge, was not as clear to his mind as it was to that of the Greek, for he had not the same capacity for delicate and accurate distinctions; but it was implied in his belief. No one could doubt that evil things, however secret might be the origin of them, appealed very directly to the senses, are tangible, visible, audible. Only the good man seemed to have a perception of what was

beyond these. Surely he must perceive something that was not tangible, isible, audible; surely his perception must have some affinity with goodness. Was this all that the Christian disciple had been taught?—No; he had heard that a spiritual world, a spiritual kingdom, had been unfolded to man. Was he not to explore that spiritual world? Was not the knowledge of it his highest privilege and blessing? Had not St. Paul told him so?

The Christian intuitions respecting the invisible world.

11. But where can be the limit of this knowledge? Who has a right to confine the exercise of the faculty by which it is obtained? It seemed, probably, to Saturninus that the Christian Church had diminished the range of objects which the Persian philosophy had embraced. In the Zendavesta a number of good principles were invoked: Zoroaster seemed to suppose that many powers might have come forth from the source of Good as deliverers from the Evil. Was a new revelation to contract this multitude? Must it not rather make some addition to it? Why should not He of whom the Church spoke have come forth as one, perhaps the last, the highest, of these deliverers, to break the chains of the outward world, the evil kingdom, and shed light into the midst of its darkness?

Docetism.

12. It was impossible to stop at this point. The Gnostic, however disposed he might be to enlarge the spiritual realm and to discover new forms in it, could not tolerate the notion that any one who had proceeded from it was actually connected with the evil which is inseparable from Matter; He could but have taken the appearance of a mortal body, He could but have undergone an apparent death. Such in its outlines was this early form of Syriac philosophized Christianity.

Gnosticism not dangerous to the empire.

13. It was evident that such a faith would provoke no hostility of emperors. If the doctrine was expansive, it was also safe; for what was there in such a scheme which could be the bond of a society, which could make that society suspicious to the Roman state? A theory of the spiritual world might be permitted to any one; the elements of which it consisted might all be furnished by undoubted perceptions of the human spirit; names denoting virtues and principles which men had felt to be precious and real might compose the new economy. But each fresh traveller would suggest a new arrangement of its provinces. The theory of visible and material evil was a perpetual barrier and protection against its intruding into the sphere of practical life. Above all, what centre was there, at once divine and human, to scare the Cæsar on his throne, and to claim a dominion more extensive and permanent than his?

14. Here was the real test. The new revelation was not a

It can form no society; must lead to infinite sects.

revelation of a society for all kindreds and races, if this was the nature and form of it. The Gnosis would take its colour from every different locality, from every different thinker. There must be a Syrian Gnosis and an Alexandrian Gnosis,—one of which the elements were chiefly Jewish, one of which the elements were chiefly Gentile. Basilides, Hermogenes, Valentinus, Carpocrates, a hundred more, each must exhibit his own skill in combination, his skill in tracing the generations of powers and principles, his capacity for spiritual architecture. Each of these men did exhibit talents of no vulgar order; their thoughts, however wild and monstrous they may seem when they are presented together in a system, had each a meaning. Ever and anon one can trace hints of relations between moral qualities which are suggestive, evident tokens that the theorist had seen something of the world he professed to describe, and had brought back a flower from its surface, or a gem out of its recesses. But the members of the different Churches said with emphasis, "You are founders of heresies or sects; you are not adding to our treasures, but robbing us of those we have already. Good news has been preached to man, and you have none for man. A centre has been proclaimed, and you say it does not exist. We felt we had a common fellowship; you substitute a set of notions which are sources of endless division. Lastly, you rob us of all sound morality: you would have us despise our bodies, therefore we cannot keep them pure: you would have us regard the world as necessarily evil, therefore we cannot reform it; you may be ascetics to-day, grossly sensual to-morrow. Each extreme may be defended by the same maxim. A Gnostic is no doubt he that knows, and, therefore, whose life is wholly intellectual, not animal: the Gnostic may become the most animal of all creatures; for why should such a contemptible thing as the flesh not be suffered to sink to the very lowest level which it can reach?"

Perils to morality in Gnosticism.

Mutual dislike of Christians and the philosophical schools connected with Gnosticism.

15. The name of Gnostic became for a long time specially odious in the ears of all members of the Church who did not join one of the Gnostical parties. It was supposed that the most gross of all the heretical schools—that of Carpocrates—held the name by a more pre-eminent title than the rest. The intuition which the doctors of all the schools claimed was opposed on one side to Fate, on another to Action. And as the acknowledgment of this intuition was the bond between the Gnostics within and the philosophers without the Church, the latter began to be more and more suspected as enemies of the Gospel. They frequently justified the charge. The new kingdom evidently interfered with them far more than the old religions were ever likely to do. Questioning seemed at an end if the

Christian dogmatism was to prevail. Philosophical distinctions were extinguished by a message to the ignorant and the evil. The rise of the class of men called Apologists tended to strengthen this mutual animosity. They were polemics by profession, bound to make out a case against their popular as well as their learned antagonists. It was a kind of necessity that they should exhibit that which they were defending in the most definite and tangible form. In arguing with Jews, they of course appealed to the Scriptures; in arguing with Romans, they tried to prove that their faith led to practical moral results. When they met Greeks they might enter more into speculation; but they were always disposed to confute the schools by showing that they had hold of something fixed and positive.

The Apologists

16. The earliest Greek apologist who is preserved to us illustrates this tendency in a very remarkable manner. Justin was born in a village of Samaria. He must have conversed much with Jews, though there is no reason to suppose he had any direct affinity with them. He belongs to the crisis of Christian history, when the Church, in consequence of the war in which Barcochba was leader, had become completely separated from the Synagogue. The passages which we shall select from his dialogue with Trypho throw light upon the relation in which Jews as well as Christians of the second century stood to philosophy.

Justin.

17. If Justin is the hero of his own tale, he was accosted, as he was walking one morning in the portico of a gymnasium, by a man, who hailed him as a philosopher, and presently joined him with several of his friends. When he asks their business, he is told that his companion has learned from a teacher of the Academy always to reverence those who wear the philosophical garb, and, if possible, to make their acquaintance, in hopes of learning something from them. The stranger announces himself as one of the Hebrew race who has been a fugitive after the war. He spent most of his time in Greece, especially at Corinth. Justin asks him what philosophy can help him as much as his law-giver and the prophets? Trypho defends himself by saying that God, His unity, His providence, are the great objects of philosophical investigation. Justin admits this to be the object of philosophy; but he complains that philosophers speak of God as caring for the Universe, for genera and species,—not for individuals, not for you and me. And he does not see how, with such a faith as that, "you and I are to be better or worse." Trypho wishes to know what his own theories are on these matters,—to what school of philosophy he belongs. The question introduces a narrative. Justin fully believes philosophy to be a very great blessing, and one most honoured by God; and

His dialogue with Trypho.

The Jew seeking Greek wisdom.

Knowledge of God the object of philosophy.

Justin.

that those are, in the truest sense, holy who have given their mind to it; but he does not believe that any of the sects know what philosophy is, or for what reason it was sent to men. "Knowledge," he says, "is one, but these opinions are various." He had tried most of them. He began with the Stoics: of them he could learn nothing concerning God,—that was not the subject with which they specially occupied themselves. A Peripatetic, to whom he next applied, a sharp clear-sighted man, disgusted him by insisting on a rate of payment for the lectures he gave:—no profit could be expected till that point was settled. An eminent Pythagorean insisted upon such a long preparation in music, astronomy, and geometry, before he could give him any information upon the questions for which he was longing for light, that he left him in despair. He stayed much longer with a Platonist, "for the apprehension of incorporeal things delighted me greatly, and the beholding of ideas gave wings to my intellect, and I thought I had become wise in an incredibly little time, and I hoped that I should presently have the vision of God, for this I knew to be the end of the Platonic philosophy." Then he tells how, when, for the purpose of converse with himself, he had retired to a place not far from the sea, an old man of gentle and venerable appearance entered into discourse with him, and declared himself a Christian. The passages of the discourse which most concern us are these:—"How," said he, "can the philosophers think rightly concerning God, or speak anything truly of Him, not having the knowledge of Him, or having seen Him, or ever heard Him?" "But it is not with the eye," said I, "that the Deity is beheld; with the reason only is it comprehended: so Plato says, and I agree with him." "Are there, then," he said, "in that reason of ours, powers so great and of such a kind; or will the mind of man ever see God, if it hath not been invested with a holy spirit?" "Plato says," said I, "that there is an eye of the mind which is capable of seeing, and which has been given us for the very purpose of seeing purely and undisturbedly that which is. This is the primary and original cause of all that is perceived by the intellect; it hath no form, or colour, or size,—none of those things which the eye takes note of; it is above all substance; it cannot be described or discoursed of; it alone is good and beautiful; it enters into well-constituted souls, in virtue of their relationship to it and their desire to behold it." "What is our relationship," said the old man, "with God? Is it that the soul itself is godly and immortal, and a portion of that royal reason? And when it sees God, is it possible for us to embrace that Divinity which comes in contact with our reason, and thereby to become blessed?" "Cer-

Trial of the schools.

The new teacher.

Question how the Divinity can be known.

The intellectual and moral insight.

tainly," said I. "Are the same souls," he asked, "in all animals, or is there one soul of a man and one of a horse or an ass?" "The same in all," I answered. "Will, then, horses or asses see, or have they ever seen, God?" "No," said I, "nor will the great majority of men; only he who lives righteously, purifying himself by the exercise of all virtues." "The mind, then, does not see God in consequence of its relationship to Him, nor because it is mind, but because it is temperate and just?" "Yes," said I, "and because it has the capacity of knowing God." "Why, then," said the old man, "do not the animals see God, seeing they have done nothing evil?" "Their body is the hindrance," was the answer.

Justin.

Those who have and have not the capacity to know God.

The next point discussed between them is the nature of punishment, and how the soul can be better for punishment in another world or condition, if it does not remember what it has been and has done. Thence the old man goes on to proclaim the prophets, who were filled with a true and holy spirit, and not the philosophers, as the true guides to wisdom.

Punishment and memory.

The rest of the dialogue is addressed to Trypho's Jewish feelings, and is an argument from the prophets to show that his position is no longer a tenable one.

18. Justin called himself a philosopher, and wore the philosophical cloak to the end of his days. Apparently he held no recognised ecclesiastical office; nevertheless, the simple Ignatius evidently approached more nearly, at certain points, to such a thinker as Plutarch, than he did. The man who knew nothing of what Greek sages had been saying, proclaimed, as part of his baptismal faith, of his Scriptural lore, a conviction which stood in wonderful affinity to some of the thoughts which had been awakened in them; the other, who was conversant with all the terms and methods of the old philosophy, felt a kind of repugnance to it, partly from a conviction of its inadequacy to satisfy his wants, partly from a desire to make the Gospel an antagonist philosophy. The position he took up is a most natural and intelligible one, but it prevented him from doing full justice to those whom he had abandoned,—perhaps from doing full justice to the cause which he had embraced.

Justin's position.

19. Justin's first apology was addressed to Antoninus Pius, though it was intended also for his colleague in the empire. His death* is usually, and on good grounds, assigned to the reign of Marcus Aurelius. This Emperor opens a new

Marcus Aurelius.

* It is commonly ascribed to the intrigues of Crescens, one of the favourite court philosophers. There is no reason to doubt the tradition; the Sophists who basked in the Emperor's patronage seem to have been as despicable as he was noble. That they should have availed themselves of his dislike to the Christians to put down one who adopted their own character, is most natural.

Marcus Aurelius.

page in our history. Like Plutarch, the Greek and Roman characters were in him remarkably blended; but, unlike Plutarch, the foundation of his mind was Roman: he was a student, that he might more effectually carry on the business of an Emperor. He was therefore not, like Plutarch, first of all a follower of Plato, but, like Seneca and Epictetus, a Stoic. Seneca we mention, however, much more for the sake of their contrast than their resemblance: they were both busy about a practical object, but Marcus Aurelius did not make *his* object the acquisition of personal ease and quietness. He far more resembled Epictetus in the character of his Stoicism: to him he confessed great obligations. But their ends were different, as their positions were different: the slave inquired after the secret of moral freedom; the Cæsar inquired after the secret of Self-government.

His relation to Plutarch and Epictetus.

20. It would not be easy to find any man in any period of the world's history who pursued this end more strenuously. A Stoic was, in the judgment of Marcus, simply a man who sought carefully and deliberately for the means of ruling himself; he thought it, therefore, not a dereliction of his sect, but a fulfilment of its primary function, if he asked help from every other quarter, as well as from the teachers of the Porch. He opens his first book with an enumeration—a little too formal and elaborate, perhaps, but exhibiting evident and sincere gratitude —of his different benefactors. His mother stands almost first among them; to her he owes his reverence for that which is divine,—a disposition to communicate, a restraint not only upon his actions, but upon his thoughts. He thanks Rusticus for keeping him from the love of sophistry, of rhetoric, of poetry, of all display, whether in speech or in appearance. He thanks Alexander, the Platonist, for teaching him not often, or without necessity, to say to any one, or to write in a letter, that he is busy. From his brother Severus he learned love of justice, love of truth, love of kinsfolk; he learned through him to be acquainted with Cato, Dion, and Brutus, and to conceive of a just polity ordered according to maxims of equality and freedom, and of a kingdom that honours above all things the liberty of the governed. These examples we take at random. The other obligations which he confesses are even more directly for lessons of self-government. The gods he thanks for all kinds of benefits, but especially for good ancestors, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good members of his household, good kinsmen, good friends. To them, also, he owes it that he had a passion for philosophy, that he did not fall into the hands of any sophist, that he did not waste his time among writers of books, or in unravelling syllogisms, or in studying meteorology.

Glad to profit by help from all quarters.

His benefactors.

Meditations, lib. i.

The gods.

19. These indications will, perhaps, suffice to show that the root of the Emperor's mind was to be found in the old Roman discipline of affections and relationships; but that he grafted upon this an amount of self-consciousness and reflection which belong much more to the country whose language he used, than to that of which he was a citizen and ruler. "Every hour think strongly with thyself," he says, "that thou art, as a Roman and as a male, to do that which is before thee with accurate, severe, and unfeigned gravity, with kindliness, and freedom, and justice. And take care to give thyself rest from all surrounding fantasies that may interfere with thy immediate work. And this you will secure if you work each action as if it were the last of your life, avoiding all precipitation and every influence that would withdraw you from the word that has hold of you (ἀπὸ τοῦ αἱρουντος λόγου): avoiding also hypocrisy, self-love, discontent with the things that are appointed for you. You see how few the things are, by laying hold of which, a man may live a tranquil and god-conformed life: nor will the gods ask anything more from the man who is careful of these things." "Nothing is more miserable," he says in another place, "than the man who is always moving round and round, and surveying all things that lie about him, and prying into the things below the earth and speculating upon that which passes in the souls of his neighbours, and not perceiving that it suffices to dwell with the dæmon within himself, and to serve him manfully. But the service of him is the keeping oneself free from passion and temerity, and from discontent with the things that come to us from the gods and from men. For the things that come from the gods are venerable; those from men are dear because of our relationship to them. Some things there are, no doubt, which are sad, in consequence of our ignorance of what is good and what is evil: this blindness is not less than the one which deprives us of the power of distinguishing white from black." "You must accustom yourself," he says, "only to set such images before yourself, that if any one should suddenly ask you, what you are now thinking about, you should be able to answer him immediately, with all confidence, *this* or *that*; so that it may be clear at once that all is simple and gracious, and becoming a creature that has fellowship with other creatures, and is indifferent to mere pleasures of sense, and generally to all images, of mere enjoyment; and has no rivalry, or envy, or suspicion, or ought else in the mind at which you would blush if you were discovered in it." "Let the god that is in thee," he says, shortly after, "be the guardian of a creature that hath the qualities of a male and an elder, and of a political being, and of a Roman, and of a ruler, one that hath set himself

His Roman sympathies.

Care to avoid distractions

Book 2, chap. 5.

Service of the dæmon within.

Discipline of the thoughts.

Book 2, chap. 13.

Book 3, chap. 4.

in order, one who is awaiting the summons out of life, ready to be set free; one that needeth not an oath, nor any human witness.

The body, soul, and reason. Book 3, chap. 5.

20. The following passage contains something more of formal philosophy, yet combined, as always, with practice and self-examination. "Body, soul, reason,—to the body belong sensations, to the soul impulses, to the mind or reason determinations (*δόγματα*). To receive impressions from outward appearances belongs even to cattle; nervous impulses may belong to wild beasts, to Phalaris, to Nero; to have the reason as a guide in reference to the phenomena that present themselves, may belong to those who do not believe in the gods, and to those who desert their country, and to those who do acts which require that they should shut their doors. If, then, all else is common to these we have enumerated, that which remains as the special gift of the good man is the being content with and welcoming the things that befal him, and those things that have been spun by the destinies for him; the not mixing or disturbing the dæmon that is established in the heart with a crowd of phantasies, but the keeping him propitious, reverently submitting to him, speaking nothing that is contrary to the truth, doing nothing that is beyond the right. And though all disbelieve that such a man is living a simple, and reverend, and brave life, he is not angry with any of them, nor does he turn out of the way that is leading him to the goal of his life, to which he must come pure, silent, ready for dismissal, cheerfully fitted for that which is appointed him."

What distinguishes the good man.

Book 3, chap. 16.

Impressions; how to govern them. Book 5, chap. 16.

21. Marcus Aurelius had a very strong feeling, like Epictetus, that the management of the impressions which objects make upon us was the chief part of mental discipline. Hear how he applies this to his own position, which was so different from that of Epictetus:—"According to the impressions which thou art continually receiving, will be the temper of thy mind; for the soul gets its dye from these impressions. Dye it then with the continual repetition of such impressions as these; that wheresoever it is appointed you to live, there it is possible to live well; that it is your appointed lot to live in a palace, then it is possible to live well in a palace. And again, that each thing is carried on towards that for the sake of which it has been prepared and ordained. That in that point to which it is bearing, you will find the end or purpose of it; that wherever is the end and purpose of it, there is the good of it; that the good of the reasonable creature is society. That we were born for society, has been shown long ago. For is it not evident that the worse things exist for the sake of the better, the better for the sake of each other? But creatures that have

Social life, its dignity.

life are better than creatures without life, and creatures that have reason are better than those who have merely life."

Tendency to Pantheism; how resisted.

22. This idea of man as a social or political being enters very deeply into the mind and philosophy of Marcus Aurelius. "We are portions of the great whole" is a thought which continually recurs to him. At times it gives a coldness to his speculations: the man seems in danger of being lost in the universe. But quite as often it is urged as an argument, apparently an effective one to the writer's mind, against selfishness and self-exaltation. Unquestionably he was more inclined than Epictetus was to follow the old Stoics in identifying God with the world—the world signifying not the earth or the visible frame-work of things, but the order and constitution to which we belong. There was much, however, in his Roman education, his devout temper, his personal affections, and his watchfulness over himself, to counteract this tendency. He has no idea of the universe as self-governed. The phrase "directing reason," is one which occurs continually in connection with his idea of the whole; and to this "directing reason" he assigns gracious and human qualities. "The being of the universe," he says, in the beginning of his 6th Book, "is easy to be entreated, and flexible. The reason that directs it hath in itself no motive to ill-doing. Malice is not in it, nor is anything done by it maliciously, nor is anything injured by it. All things come to pass and are accomplished in obedience to it." The first clause of this sentence may seem somewhat unintelligible. The Emperor designs, we apprehend, to oppose the universal substance to that which is the cause of all untractableness, the feelings and passions of the individual. He would lead the man out of these by bringing him to feel that he is not a separate existence, but part of a scheme from which he cannot tear himself without destroying himself. "All particular things," he says just after, "fulfil their end according to the nature of the whole; not in conformity with some other nature, either inclosing it from without, or comprehended within, or existing apart from it and only accidentally attached to it. Either there is in this universe only a mixture of elements, a strange entanglement, to terminate in dispersion and dissolution, or there is unity, order, providence. Supposing the first to be the right view, why do I desire to meddle with such a ferment and confusion of accidents? What else have I to trouble myself about than the how and when I am to become earth? And in that case why do I fret myself? The dissolution will come to me whatever I do. But if the other is the case, I bow down with reverence, I set myself in order, I put confidence in the Director of all things." One extract more may set this point

The personality of the divinity he worshipped.

The alternative.

Consequence of either.

Book, 6. cc. 9, 10.

clearer:—"All things are woven into one another, and it is a holy combination, and scarcely any two things are heterogeneous. For they have been put together, and together compose the same harmony (*συγκοσμεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν κόσμον*). For there is one harmony made up of all things, and there is one God through all things, and one substance and one law, one word of reason that is common to all reasonable creatures, and one truth; since there is also one perfection of all creatures of the same kind, participant of that same word or reason."

Book 7, chap. 9.

23. This last sentence will so immediately recall to the reader's mind one of St. Paul's, that the question naturally suggests itself,—What is the relation between them? How was Marcus Aurelius likely to regard those who held the faith of St. Paul? How did he actually regard them? On the last point there is no doubt. The Church had far more to suffer from Marcus, than from his son Commodus; he deliberately adopted the policy which Trajan had originated, he followed it out with far greater severity than Trajan. All the arguments which recommended it to the one Emperor, presented themselves with new force to his successor; they were strengthened by considerations peculiar to himself. As Marcus Aurelius was more devout than his predecessors, as the worship of the gods was with him less a mere deference to opinion and tradition, he felt a more hearty indignation against those who seemed to be undermining it. As he had more zeal for the well-being of his subjects, and a stronger impression of the danger of their losing any portion of the faith and reverence which they had, the political motives which swayed earlier emperors acted more mightily upon him. As he had convinced himself that the severest course of self-discipline is necessary in order to fit a man for overcoming the allurements of the visible and the terrors of the invisible world, he despised and disbelieved those who seemed to have attained the results without the preparatory processes. As he wished to reconcile the obligations of an emperor to perform all external duties with the obligation of a philosopher to self-culture, and found the task laborious enough, the strange mixture of the ideas of a polity with ideas belonging to the spiritual nature of man, which he heard of among the Christians, must have made him suspect them of aping the Cæsars and the Roman wisdom in their government, as well as of aping the Stoics in their contempt of pain. Such reasons, if we made no allowance for the malignant reports of courtiers and philosophers, the prevalent belief of unheard-of crimes in the secret assemblies of the Christians, the foolish statements and wrong acts of which they may themselves have been guilty, will explain sufficiently why the venerable age and character of Polycarp, the beautiful fidelity

Relation of Marcus Aurelius to the Christian Church.

Causes of his dislike,

political religious, philosophical.

of the martyrs of Lyons, did not prevent them from being victims of the decrees of the best men who ever reigned in Rome.

Affinity of his doctrines with Christian doctrines: how accounted for.

24. Any notion, therefore, that the great principles and maxims which are announced in the writings of Marcus Aurelius were derived from Christian teachers, or indicated even a partial allegiance to Christian maxims, must be at once discarded, not merely as wanting evidence, but as refuted by it. The question, what relation there is between his principles and those which the teachers of the Gospel were promulgating, is a very different one, and cannot be resolved by any hasty inferences from the treatment which they received at his hands. Those who think of the Christian Church as a mere human society set up in the world to defend a certain religion against a certain other religion, will naturally try to prove that its members were in possession of truth by proving that its opponents were only asserters of falsehood. Those who believe that it was a society established by God as a witness of the true constitution of all human beings, will rejoice to acknowledge its members to be what they believed themselves to be—confessors and martyrs for a truth which they could not embrace or comprehend, of which they often perceived only a small portion, but which, through their lives and deaths, as well as through the right and wrong acts, the true and false words of those who understand them least, was to manifest and prove itself. Those who hold this conviction dare not conceal, or misrepresent, or undervalue, any one of those weighty and memorable sentences which are to be found in the meditations of Marcus Aurelius. If they did, they would be undervaluing a portion of that very truth which the preachers of the Gospel were appointed to set forth; they would be adopting the error of the philosophical emperor without his excuses for it. Nor dare they pretend that, by some means or other, the Christian preaching had unconsciously imparted to him a portion of its own light even while he seemed to exclude it. They will believe that it was God's good pleasure that a certain great truth should be seized and apprehended by this age, and they will see indications of what that truth was in the efforts of Plutarch to understand the dæmon which guided Socrates, in the courageous language of the Martyr of Antioch, in the bewildering dreams of the Gnostics, in the eagerness of Justin to prove Christianity a philosophy, and to confute the philosophers, in the apprehension of Christian principles by Marcus Aurelius, and in his hatred of the Christians. From every side they will derive evidence that a doctrine and society which are meant for mankind, cannot depend upon the partial views and apprehensions of men, but must go on justifying, reconciling, confuting those views and apprehensions by the demonstration of facts.

The human and divine solution.

CHAPTER II.

The Third Century.

FROM MARCUS AURELIUS TO CONSTANTINE.

The Emperors after Marcus; their common object.

1. The miserable period from the death of Marcus Aurelius to the accession of Septimus Severus, explains the difference between the characteristics of the 2nd and of the 3rd centuries. The effort to make despotism orderly and righteous, to give an empire the form of a republic, had been continued with different degrees of earnestness, ability, and success, through four reigns; the climax of the experiment was in the last. The Roman world saw that it had failed. Something was wanting besides the honesty, self-restraint, philosophy, of the temporary ruler. All these qualities, combined with a resolute purpose of crushing what seemed hostile to the integrity of the empire, and the belief of the people in its divine protectors, had given the Roman world an appearance of stability which the accession of one contemptible ruffian could at once turn into a mockery. The meaning of the word Imperator, the basis on which the imperial power was standing, the instruments which must overthrow it, then made themselves evident to all tolerably thoughtful observers. The question, how the dissolution of the Society might be for the longest time averted, became the only one which an intelligent ruler had to propose to himself. Various answers were found for it during the 3rd century. Strive to preserve the traditional reverence for Roman law, so you may at least impose some restraint upon the power of arms, was the suggestion which the sage jurisconsults of the first Severus offered to him, and upon which he endeavoured to act. An eclectical unity, resulting from a tolerance and comprehension of different parties, seems to have been dreamed of by Alexander Severus, and to have been carried out with more of ambition and vanity by Philippus Arabs. Stern discipline, and consequent restraint upon all novelties of opinion, appeared to Decius, who saw the weakness of this last attempt, the only remedy for the mischiefs to which it had led. To divide the empire under different heads, and to give it more the character of an oriental government, was the policy of

Policy of S. Severus,

Of Alex. Severus and Philippus,

Of Decius,

Diocletian. These are the only distinct purposes which present themselves in that age. The rest of the Emperors chose one or other of them, or merely yielded to their passions, not setting before themselves any end at all.

Of Diocletian.

2. The preservation or pursuit of unity therefore marks and defines this period much more distinctly than the last. What is true of the statesmen, is equally true of the philosophers. Each experiment in the world had one which corresponded to it in the schools, as well as in the hearts of human beings. The 3rd century is eminently a philosophical century, for it is one in which the great problem of philosophy forced itself upon men's minds, from whatever point they might start, into whatever lines of thought they might diverge. The ultimate ground of unity, as well as the conditions under which men might actually become one, alike engaged the thoughts of the soldier, the lawyer, the solitary thinker, of the doctor and the disciple, of the persecutor and the martyr.

How the world and the schools answer to each other.

3. In spite of the strong opposition which began to display itself during the 2nd century between the Christian preachers and the Pagan philosophers, we have seen that there were tendencies to approximation between them, and that the violent efforts of the Gnostics to pour the new wine into the old bottles had been one main occasion of their repugnance. In the latter part of that century, some feeling of the connexion began to manifest itself on the other side. If we had not heard of Philo, we might be disposed to wonder that the Judaical element in Christianity should be that which most attracted the notice and sympathy of a Pagan speculator. This appears to have been the case with Numenius. We are bound to speak with hesitation about him, because we derive our knowledge of him from the work of Eusebius, on the Preparation for the Gospel, a work written with a special purpose, and by a man with a strong Alexandrian bias. Still we have no reason to suspect the Church historian of quoting unfaithfully, and it is from his extracts, not from his comments, that we may form our conclusions. The most important sentiment which is attributed to Numenius, we have on the earlier and higher authority of Clemens. "Numenius, the Pythagorean philosopher," he says, "plainly writes, what is Plato but Moses talking Attic?" Clemens apparently supposed Numenius to hint at some historical relation between them, for in the same paragraph he quotes Jewish authors, who held the Greek philosophers, as they naturally would, to be copiers of their books, or inheritors of their traditions. Numenius may have indulged in guesses as random and uncertain as those of Clemens, or of the Jews, upon this subject; but his feeling

Numenius the Pythagorean.

Notion of a union between Jewish and Gentile wisdom.

Præp. Evang. Book 9, cc. 7, 8.

respecting the moral relation between Plato and Moses is not in the least affected by them. Plato is certainly *not* Moses talking Attic. No two great men were ever more unlike in the habit of their thoughts, or in the work which they had to do. But it is very important for the history of this period, to know that there were men, reflecting and earnest men, who were unable to perceive this difference, and who did perceive an agreement between the two minds, which they could only express to themselves in some phrase like that which we have quoted. It is one of the signs of the craving for reconciliation which was working in various directions, a craving which led then, as it leads always, to a number of practical as well as theoretical confusions, but which was pointing to deep principles concerning the life of Man and the nature of God.

The opinion of their similarity, instructive.

4. The ground of the similarity which Numenius discovered between Plato and Moses, is evident from an extract which Eusebius gives from his book concerning the Good. "The Being," he says, "is fixed and eternal, ever the same in itself, and in the same, hath never perished, or increased or decreased, is susceptible of no accidents, or movements, or locality." Here, no doubt, he found the beginning and real object of the Platonical search. The well-known passages which Eusebius quotes from the Hebrew Scriptures, "I am the Lord who change not;" "They shall perish, but Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail;" might well strike the Pythagorean as wonderful anticipations of Greek discoveries. Probably he was much more impressed by observing that these were not isolated passages, but stood in the most intimate relation with the whole record in which they occurred. At the same time, the historical character of that record might be easily forgotten or overlooked by one who was in search of principles rather than of facts. The other greater distinction which was involved in this, that in Moses the Being is speaking, acting, declaring Himself, may not have been observed by Numenius; but he may have thought that this was implied, if not expressed, in the creed and inquiries of Plato, and he may have felt that for his own age it was quite necessary that the omission, if it was one, in the thoughts of the Greeks, should be supplied, that in some way or other the absolute ground of all things should be confessed as a person, and should enter into communication with his creatures.

Præp. Evang. book 11, chap. 10.

Awfulness of the inquiry.

5. How this could be he seems to have undertaken to explain in a very memorable passage which occurs in the 11th book of Eusebius, out of all chronological order, as it follows a long extract from Plotinus. The passage is written with great caution and reverence. Numenius begins with a prayer that

The secondary god. Præp. Evang. book 3, c. 18.

God himself may be the standard and rule of his utterances, that He will open to him the treasury of thought, since he is convinced that whoever snatches at it eagerly and irreverently will find it turn to ashes. Then he proceeds, "That primary or Highest God being in himself, is altogether simple, conversing altogether with himself, nowise to be divided. But the god who is the second and third is one. Moving about, however, in matter which is dual, he unites it and yet is divided by it: seeing that it is fluxional, and hath a certain appetitive character. Therefore, not being in direct communication with the purely noetic—for so he would be wholly occupied with himself—by looking upon matter, he becomes occupied with that, and as it were unobservant of himself. And he touches and deals with that which is sensible, and draws it up into his own proper character, stretching himself out to (or with a view to stretch himself out so as to take up) the material." He goes on a little after to distinguish between the primary God and the Demiurgus or Creator. The first must be looked upon as the father of the second, for of Him, the primary Being, it would be impious to predicate any activity. "The primary God," he says, "must be free from all works, and a king. But the Demiurgus must exercise government, going through the heavens. Through him comes this our condition; through him Reason being sent down in transit or efflux (ἐν διέξοδῳ) to hold communion with all that are prepared for it. God then looking down and turning himself to each of us, it comes to pass that our bodies live and are nourished, receiving strength from the outer rays that come from him. But when God turns us to the contemplation of Himself, it comes to pass that these things are worn out and consumed, but that the reason lives, being made partaker of a blessed life."

The great Paradox.

Demiurgus

The divinely communicated Mind or Reason.

6. The introduction to this passage is not less important than the doctrine which it contains. Serious men evidently began to tremble when they perceived into what awful depths they were plunging. They felt that there was no shrinking even from such questions as those which Numenius grapples with here: some secret necessity was enforcing the study of them: philosophy and practical life seemed both to have some strange connection with them. But to enter upon them rashly, with unhallowed unprepared hearts, how infinitely perilous this must be! how certainly the conscience and moral being of the intruder into the sanctuary must suffer, even if he was not permitted to deface or to destroy any of its treasures! It is difficult to measure the extent of this feeling in the 3d century. Some of the truest and some of the falsest tendencies in the School as in the Church had their origin in it. A Pythagorean

The secret discipline.

like Numenius was sure to feel with especial strength the duty of meditating in silence upon principles lying so near to the heart of man, and yet so far beyond his conceptions. He, of all persons, would be most likely to teach that only a band of carefully disciplined scholars should hear these topics broached, or be tempted to investigate them. No one seems to have felt more strongly than Numenius, how much the different philosophies had lost their relation to each other, as well as their internal meaning, in their transmission through different generations of expositors and disputants. His history of the Platonic school, part of which is preserved by Eusebius, seems to have been written for the purpose of establishing this point, and of reclaiming Plato for a true guide into those mysteries to which the Samian teacher had pointed the way;—a worthy and noble object, yet one which would almost inevitably give birth to a kind of pride, different in form, but not in principle, from that which it displaced.

The profaneness of the schools.

7. Numenius was a Syrian. But we must turn to two other portions of the Roman world before we can understand how thoughts like his were likely to work, and what different fruits they would produce, according to the minds with which they came in contact. No countries ever presented so remarkable a moral and intellectual contrast to each other as the African province of which Carthage was the capital, and Egypt, as represented in the city of the Ptolemies. Both these countries (of course we do not refer to the rural districts in either) had attained a high refinement and civilization. But the civilization of the one was of the most strictly Latin, the other of the most strictly Greek type. The victory of Rome over its ancient rival was very imperfectly exhibited in the conquests of either Scipio. The subsequent transformation of the whole Punic mind, under the influence of Roman institutions and education, was infinitely more wonderful. In Carthage we may see the simple and naked effects of Roman discipline, not counteracted nor modified by those strange elements which it met with among the Gothic or Gothicized nations of modern Europe. Legal and rhetorical forms had there their full sway over the mind. In the school, almost in the nursery, the habits of the advocate and the jurist were forming themselves, and giving the impulse and direction to all the activity and vehemence of the African character. In Carthage, as in all the great cities of the Empire, the Christian Church found a home. Before the end of the 2d century, eminent writers had appeared among its members. The most illustrious of them suggests some curious topics of reflection to the historian of philosophy. No man could detest it more cordially than Tertullian. Plato and

Carthage and Alexandria.

Tertullian.

Aristotle were in his judgment the sources of every detestable doctrine which had obtained currency among the heretics of the Church. "What communion," he asked, "could there be between the synagogue and the porch? How was it possible that men who had inherited a divine doctrine should turn again to be seekers and enquirers?" In vain it was suggested to him that the words "Ask and ye shall receive, seek and ye shall find," had proceeded from the highest of all authorities; he peremptorily decided that that sentence was only intended for those who had not yet learnt the Doctrine of the Church, and was utterly inapplicable to any who had. No one ever possessed a more remarkable facility of appealing to authority for the purpose of silencing argument, or of flying to argument for the purpose of evading authority. Though he feared to be indebted to Greek sages, he had not the least fear of incurring obligations to Roman lawyers. The maxim of the courts, that a certain term of uninterrupted possession is a bar to any adverse claim, was at once transferred by him to spiritual treasures; a plea which was good for the defence of houses and lands must be good for the defence of moral and divine principles. Always alive to the perils of the student, of which he knew almost nothing, he never seems to have anticipated the least danger from the temptations of the rhetorician, or of a fierce African temper, both of which, one would fancy, must have been besetting him every hour. He was ever on the watch against some form of error, yet he never thought it an error—doubted that it was a virtue—to suspect an opponent's motives, or to impute intentions to him of which he may have been innocent. And therefore it seems to have been permitted, by a most righteous dispensation, and for a most useful warning to after times, that the great denouncer of heretics should end by becoming a heretic.

De Præscript. Hæretic. §7. Ipsæ denique hæreses a Philosophia subornantur, etc. Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis, eod. loc. Quærendum est donec invenias, et credendum ubi inveneris; at nihil amplius nisi custodiendum quod credidisti. § 8.

8. It may readily be admitted—we have all along asserted—that there is a most valuable side of truth presented to us in the Roman mind, without which the Greek side would be utterly imperfect, Any one who looks upon the Christian Church as intended to combine and reconcile different habits and modes of feeling apparently opposed, must demand that there should be in it representatives of each of these characters. Were we contemplating Tertullian on his positive side, we should speak gratefully of his fervid eloquence, of the light he has thrown on various truths which Gnostics and Spiritualists have disguised or denied, of the use of his labours in preventing a society of men from becoming a school of doctors, of his services in showing that old legal maxims do contain a moral signification. It is not our duty nor our wish to disparage any

Merits of Tertullian

one of his excellencies, nor to deal hardly with defects for which his education and position offer so valid an excuse, and which may, if we please, be salutary, not injurious, to ourselves. But to the historian of Philosophy, he presents himself merely as pugnacious and destructive. We must, in self-defence, sternly resist Tertullian's denunciations, and any canons which he has invented for the purpose of enforcing them. Unless we do so, we must condemn a class of men, contemporaries of Tertullian, his equals in every Christian gift, immeasurably his superiors in the grace of humility, who followed a course as nearly as possible the opposite to his. Nay, every after age, as well as every section of Christendom, is interested in this opposition to Carthaginian dogmas. Luther, and all who have followed him in appealing to a higher and elder law than Tertullian's rule of prescription, are not greater rebels against his authority than Augustin, Anselm, Aquinas. If he was right, their dallying with the questions in which the moralist and metaphysicians of the old world took part,—their reverence for Plato or Aristotle,—must degrade them from doctors to infidels.

Why he must be opposed.

9. The Christian Church in Alexandria had more temptation than any Carthaginian could have had, to protest against the old philosophers, for they had been brought into immediate contact with the dangers which Tertullian contemplated from a distance. Gnosticism, as we have hinted already, had established itself very early among them. For one sect or form of it which appeared in Syria, they might reckon twenty. The relation, too, in which these sects stood to the heathen sects, as well as to the school of Philo, was obvious. It did not require polemical ingenuity to trace the affinity or the descent; the offenders would themselves have acknowledged it and boasted of it. It was most likely that such a discovery should have produced in Alexandrian Christians a dread of all intercourse with living teachers of philosophy, or with the books that contained it. We have no facts which can enable us to refute that supposition, for the history of the Egyptian Church is almost a blank till nearly the end of the 2d century. But this we can affirm confidently, that the moment it ceases to be a blank, when illustrious teachers begin to appear in it, this reactionary tendency has been entirely overcome, and a new course had been commenced, entirely in accordance with the character of the city to which this Church belonged. The Christian doctors of whom we shall have to speak, did not tremble at the name of Philo, but eagerly availed themselves of his wisdom; did not set up dogmatism against Gnosticism, but affirmed that there was a true Gnosis which was the only effectual antidote of the false; did not repudiate the thoughts and inquiries of former

The Alexandrian characteristic.

Christian motives for dreading Philo.

generations of Greeks, but attributed them to Him from whom the new covenant proceeded, and regarded them as preparations for it.

10. Of Pantænus, the first teacher of this school, there is little to record. The missionary activity which is attributed to him by historians, must have been connected with that belief in a Divine Guide of men, who was educating them through preparatory stages for the highest wisdom, which was afterwards brought out in its clearness and fulness by Clemens. His name is so memorable in connection with the movements of this age, that we must speak of him at some length. And as we have not the good fortune to possess biographical details respecting him, like those which throw so much light upon the writings of his successor Origen, we must confine ourselves to such extracts as seem fittest to explain the purpose of his three principal treatises. The shortest of them, which is especially addressed to heathens, seems at first sight at variance with the maxims which we have attributed to his school. It evinces certainly a more intense repugnance to idolatry in its outward forms and in its inward nature, than Tertullian can ever have felt. The deliverance of the human spirit from idolatry, and all the moral fruits of it, is that which Clemens regards as the highest blessing which man can receive,—as the great end of the divine counsels respecting him. The legends of the poets are odious to him, because he supposes that they have been ministers of idolatry, though he discovers in them certain adumbrations of divine truths. The music of Orpheus, and Amphion, and Arion, he thinks only tended to excite the passions, and seduce men by a certain enchantment into the worship of visible things; but it bore witness of a higher and more celestial harmony, which has spoken to the heart and spirit, and drawn them away from the objects and appetites to which they naturally become enslaved. The different theories of the philosophers respecting the gods, are not in general spoken of with more respect. The search for elements by the Ionic school struck Clemens as simply materialistic. The resolution of all things into the infinite, as well as the speculations respecting space, terminated, he supposes, naturally in the Atheism of the later schools. It is only when he comes to Plato, that Clemens pauses to express an admiration and sympathy, which are yet by no means rapturous or unqualified.

The teachers of the Alexandrian school.

The exhortation to the Gentiles.

The Poets and Philosophers;

Plato.

"I desire," he cries, "not the winds, but the Lord of the winds; not the fire, but the Lord of the fire; not the world, but the Artificer of the world; not the sun, but Him who brings light to the sun; I seek God, not the works of God. Whom shall I have with me as my fellow-labourer in this enquiry? I

c. 6. The quotation is from the Timæus.

The search for God.

cannot disclaim thee, Plato, if thou wilt go along with me. But tell me, then, Plato, in what way we must trace the footsteps of the God? *It is a mighty work to find the Father and Creator of this great whole. And having found, to speak of Him to all is impossible.* Why so? Because, thou sayest, *He is in no wise expressible in language.* Right, O Plato; thou touchest the truth. But thou shouldest not have despaired. Join me in the search concerning the *good*; for some divine efflux hath descended upon all men whatsoever, especially on those who are occupied about wisdom. Wherefore even unwillingly they confess, that there is one God, indestructible and unbegotten; that he is somewhere behind the heaven, dwelling always in his own proper habitation. 'Tell me,' says Euripides, 'what kind of God we are to conceive of Him that seeth all things, and Himself is unseen.' Menander was therefore evidently bewildered when he said, 'O sun, for thee must we worship as the first of gods, by whose light it is permitted us to see the other gods.' The sun would never shew that true God. He is shewn us by that pure Word who is the Sun of the soul, by whose rising within, in the depth of the reason, the eye of the reason itself is illuminated..... Plato indicates him thus: All things are about the King of all, and He is the author of all that is good."

Having discovered this one memorable exception to the idolatrous tendency of the surrounding world, Clemens proceeds to notice others, both poets and philosophers, who bore at least an unconscious testimony to the invisible God. "Xenophon," he said, "would have spoken openly, if he had not feared his master's hemlock." He repeats the hymn of Cleanthes, alludes to the dogmas of the Pythagoræans, extracts passages even from poets, from Hesiod, Homer, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aratus, affirming the principle which the popular creed denied.

Explanation of this treatise.

11. There is no real contradiction between this treatise and one of which we shall have to speak presently. They belong no doubt to different periods and states of Clemens's mind; but the principle in them is the same, and the growth from one to the other orderly and natural. Clemens recognises a conflict going on unceasingly in the minds of all persons in the old world, consciously in the minds of its most conspicuous teachers, between a power of sense which the greater part obeyed, and a divine teacher whom even in the midst of their slavery they confessed. His business and vocation as a Christian teacher is to to proclaim to all this Guide and Illuminator of the heart and conscience, to declare the outward facts by which He has made known His presence and His power, to invite all to embrace His Government. The belief of such a divine teacher was in the judgment of Clemens the antidote to that Gnosticism

which exalted the intuitions of man so highly, and made them at the same time so precarious and contradictory. The man was not exploring for himself; he was perpetually under guidance. There was not a separate revelation for each man; there was one divine truth, one object, the knowledge of whom was the highest reward that could be granted to any.

12. The difference between Clemens and the pseudo-gnostic, comes out most strikingly in the next treatise, Ὁ Παιδαγωγος. The whole of this very striking discourse is employed in pointing out the gracious human discipline which the divine teacher uses with men, in order to lead them to that highest knowledge which he designs for them. The practical life which was so divorced from the speculative by the gnostical teachers, is here shown to be its necessary condition. The opening of the book will explain the relation between the treatise and its predecessor, the anthropology of Clemens generally, and the inseparable connexion of that anthropology with his divinity. He describes man as a threefold creature, possessing habits or a certain mould of character, practical or intended for action, susceptible of affections or passions. The Divine Word he speaks of as having a threefold office, corresponding to these distinctions of the creature whom He undertakes to educate. The discipline of the habits or character he would call protreptic, of the actions hypothetic, of the passions paramuthetic. By the first word, he appears to understand the giving a new purpose or inclination to the man; by the second the suggestion of methods for accomplishing the end which he hath set before himself; by the third the purifying influences whereby the wounds in the soul are healed, and it is made capable of a higher love. His purpose in this treatise is not to speak of the infusion of a new principle, so much as the cultivation of one which has been already confessed. He proposes to consider the Divine Word rather as a guide in practice than as an instructor in doctrine; to set Him forth as the conductor of a moral rather than of a scientific training. It is not, he intimates, that he in the least undervalues that training, or can attribute it to any less than a divine school-master, but that his immediate object is to contemplate Him in the other aspect.

The divine discipline of the human spirit.

Relation of this discipline to the history of philosophy.

13. The importance of this treatise to the ecclesiastical historian, and to the practical moralist, is, we think, very great. The historian of philosophy has not the same excuse as they have for entering into the details of it. But he would be guilty of a great omission if he passed it over upon the plea that it belongs more to the province of the divine than to his, or that so much of it is occupied with questions of practice rather than speculation. It will have been seen from the extract which we

Relation of this treatise to philosophy.

have given out of Numenius, how much the thoughts of men everywhere were exercised with difficulties respecting a primary absolute Being dwelling in His own perfection, and one who is cognisable by human faculties, though not by the human senses; who holds relations with matter, though for the purpose of raising spirit above matter. This deep enquiry had been suggested to heathen philosophers by the facts of their own lives. It was connected with a long line of previous enquiries, conducted by the most earnest and painful thinkers. Some solution of the difficulty must be found. The demand for unity, the great demand of this time, was seen to be involved in it. The more philosophers sought for unity, the more discontented they were with the reverence for divided objects; the more this duplicity presented itself to them, the more closely it seemed to be involved with the very roots of their own being, with the existence of man, and the foundations of the universe. The attempt of Numenius to find his way out of the difficulty may seem to us in many respects confused and unsuccessful; yet surely no one can consider it without wonder, and some increased insight into the nature of the problem, into its depth, and yet into its practical significance. It seems like entering into a new world to pass from such a speculation to such words as these of Clemens. "The teacher of ours, O my children, is like to His Father, *the* God, of whom He is the sinless Son, having His soul free from all passions, God unpolluted though in human form, the Divine Word, He that is in the Father, He that is on the right hand of the Father, and in His form divine. He is that stainless image which is set before us. Let us strive with all our might to bring our souls to His likeness." Or this: "Naturally therefore is the man dear to God, seeing that he is His handywork. And all things else He only made by commanding them to exist; but the man He wrought by His own hands, and infused into him something that belongs to Himself. . . . . The man, then, whom God hath made his chosen for his own sake. But that which is loved for its own sake is ultimately related to Him by whom it is so loved, and that is of all things most heartily welcomed and embraced." The whole education of man being, according to Clemens, grounded in his original love, and being carried on with the most regular method in order to produce the reaction and reciprocation of love in the creature who is the object of it, we have something very different from the view of the Demiurgus, whose connection with matter it was so hard to explain; a very different relation between him and the primary God, with whom Numenius felt he must be united, and yet from whom, that he might converse with matter, he must be separated. The contrast is great, and yet who does not feel that both teachers are occupied with the same mighty problem, and that if Clemens has the glimpse and apprehension of a higher unity than Numenius had, it is in a great measure because he looked at the whole subject in a more practical light, and was able to contemplate the Creator and Archetype of man as actually engaged in renewing His image in him?

Relation to the inquiries of heathens.

chap. 2.

chap. 3.

The divine parentage the ground of an education.

14. We wish to point out this relation between a treatise which is not formally philosophical, and the philosophy of the time, before we proceed to the largest work of Clemens, in which he directly addresses himself to the subject of philosophy, and defends himself from the charge of meddling with topics which a Christian teacher would be wiser to pass by. The Stromata, as its name indicates, is a collection of patch-work, each piece of which, Clemens believes, has some duty of its own, and some relation to the others, and which the truly instructed Divine Artificer can bring together, so that they shall form a consistent whole. Seeing that all the treasures of Clemens' past readings were to be laid under contribution for this work, it was needful that he should assert his right to deal with those authors whom Tertullian would have banished altogether from the divine republic. Against those who affirm that philosophy has polluted life, being the artificer of falsehood and foul works, he boldly affirms it to be an evident likeness or image of the truth, a divine gift bestowed upon the Greeks. In studying it, he affirms that he is not carried away by the enchantment of a deceitful art, but that he is engaging in an exercise which is an ally and demonstration of faith. He allows most readily that there is a false philosophy, and that "great is the danger of parading the unspeakable word of the real philosophy before those who desire merely to argue and contradict, who throw about words and names without order or reverence. They who trifle thus," he says, "deceive themselves, and play tricks with all who adhere to them." But in direct opposition to the dogma of Tertullian, about asking and seeking, he affirms that, "as the lover of the chase values the animal which he has pursued long, tracked out, searched for in holes and bye-places, followed with his dogs; so that truth appears in all its sweetness when it has been hunted for and won by toil." He argues from the law and the prophets, that all forms of wisdom and art are from God. "The wise in mind," he says, "have no doubt some peculiar endowment of nature. But when they have offered themselves for their work, they receive a spirit of perfection from the highest Wisdom, giving them a new fitness for it." He insists upon all laborious

The Stromata of Clemens.

Lib. I. cap. 2, § 20.

§ 26

Cap. 4, § 26.

Cap. 5, § 32. study, as well as sympathetic feelings, as a proper exercise and cultivation of this spiritual endowment. Having adopted from Philo an ingenious and fantastic Scripture allegory in defence of this proposition, he utters these memorable words. "We affirm then from hence, in plain words, that philosophy carries on an enquiry concerning Truth and the nature of being, and this Truth is that concerning which the Lord Himself said, 'I am the Truth.'. . . . And when the initiated find or rather receive the true philosophy, they have it from the Truth itself."

Stromata, c. 7, § 37. 15. "It appears to me, then," says Clemens, "that that whole discipline of the Greeks, with philosophy itself, came down from God upon man, not according to a distinct pre-ordination, but in the same way as the rains pour themselves forth, both on the good ground and on the dung-heaps, and on the house-tops. On all these grass and corn bud forth, nay sometimes figs and some of the hardier trees spring upon the very tombs. Those sown in the most careless way bend like the truest specimens of their kind, because they have enjoyed the same influence from the rain, but those which have not had the advantage of good ground wither or are plucked up." He applies the parable of the sower in illustration of this position, contends that all plants whatever which are good for life have the same sower and husbandman, as all arts and sciences which are necessary for their cultivation proceed from
§ 30. the same wisdom. Philosophy, of course, in so large and catholic a view, must take a very high place among God's gifts. "And when I speak of philosophy," says Clemens, "I do not mean the Stoic, or the Platonic, or the Epicurean, or the Aristotelic, but whatsoever hath been said in each of these sects well, teaching righteousness with reverent science. All this I call Philosophy; to this I give the name Eclectic. But whatsoever they have cut out or cut off by their mere human reasonings, these I should never call divine."

16. These patches from Clemens, though they may give little notion of the long and elaborate work from which they are taken, may suffice for the purpose of such a treatise as this. They will at least show what place Clemens holds among the thinkers of the early centuries after Christ. There are two passages, or rather two words, that have occurred in the course of our extracts, to which we would direct the attention of our readers before we part with this author. One is the word
The initiated. "*initiated*," the other is "*eclectic*." These are great and significant expressions in the history of that time, and of subsequent times. It is very necessary that we should examine into them if we would know anything of the Pagan or of the

Christian philosophy of the 3d century, or of the relation in which they stood to each other.

Was the word borrowed from the Pythagoreans? 17. When we are told, as we so often are, by a certain class of commentators on ecclesiastical history, that the Christian teachers derived their notion of a lore which was not to be communicated to the vulgar herd, but to be reserved for those who had passed through certain stages of discipline, from the Pythagorean doctors, a half truth is uttered, which, like all half truths, may lead us into decided falsehood. That this was a time in which the Pythagorean discipline put itself forth with a power which it had scarcely possessed even in the first days of the political community in southern Italy, we might infer from the cases of Apollonius and Numenius, if there were not the conditional and still more conclusive evidence of Lucian to establish the opinion. His ridicule had no doubt abundant and most legitimate scope for its exercise in the quacks and mountebanks who practised mystifications, sometimes mischievous, sometimes only foolish, under the name of mysteries, or who made the glories of science the theme of continual prating. Lucian, of course, never took the pains to distinguish these pretenders from the truer men whom they counterfeited. Their real awe and conscientious belief were quite unintelligible to his lively, sparkling, clear-sighted incredulity. But that such Christian excuses for the idea. men as Numenius trembled, not at the shows and forms of things,—at the masks and phantoms of a degrading demoniacal superstition,—but at the actual presence of a Being whom they adored and wished to love, seems to us unquestionable. Was the Christian a plagiarist if he believed that he was to take his shoes from off his feet when he was admitted into the same presence? What did his faith mean, if he was not admitted into it? And yet could he hide from himself the fact that there were numbers professing that faith, to whom it had no such signification; many entirely wrapt up in material pursuits, who yet had committed no scandals that should exclude them from the fellowship of the Church; many with honest and affectionate hearts desirous of light, and yet who seemed unable to contemplate spiritual objects, except under sensual forms, which contracted, often distorted, them? The nature of the difference which we have pointed out between the belief of Numenius and that of Clemens, did not seem to involve a difference between them in this respect. The divine and philanthropical Teacher, far more than the mere Demiurgus, might desire to proportion the degrees of light which He revealed to the organs which were intended to receive it. The Perfect Love which casts out fear, may demand a reverence greater than it is possible to feel for the mere absolute entity

which haunted, though it did not satisfy, the reason of the Pythagorean.

Idea of sacrifice.

18. In this sense, then, the Christian who spoke of the "initiated" disciple, used language which seemed even more appropriate to him than it could be to the philosopher. Nor must it be omitted that he had another claim to this mode of speech, and to the thoughts which it expressed. The Pythagorean had risen above the dark faith in the necessity of propitiations to an evil dignity. Sacrifice was to him little more than a process of purification. The Christian had equally abjured the traditional sacrifices, so far as they implied appeals to any thing which is evil; but he had recognised sacrifice as importing reconciliation and renewed fellowship with a perfectly good Being; not merely an act on the part of the worshipper, but as originating with the object of his worship. Such a sacrifice could not but seem to him in the highest sense a Mystery. In proportion as he was aware of the counterfeit notions which surrounded the idea of sacrifice, and the temptations of uninstructed sensual men to substitute them for it, he would have a motive to insist upon that name, and carefully to guard this sacred truth from the intrusion of profane speculators.

Dangers of the *disciplina arcani*.

19. Thus the *disciplina arcani* which has been so much spoken of in the early Church, touched at one point upon the philosophical, at the other upon the religious, habits and feelings of the surrounding world. It was not really derived from either. It testified to the fact that the Christian Church had a real relation to both those sides of truth which among heathens had been almost inevitably separated. But it is impossible to deny that there lay in one aspect of this discipline all the temptations to philosophical pride, in the other to religious imposture, which had been at work in the old world. The initiated disciple who was admitted into a higher region of thought, into a more secret knowledge, than the body of his brethren might share, would be exceedingly likely to regard the humbler members of the Church as creatures so far below himself in spiritual illumination, that there could not be any actual communion with them. He who believed that the mystery of sacrifice was only cognisable by the few, while yet it was a fundamental part of his faith that the sacrifice itself was for all, would gradually convince himself that only the sensual exhibition of the truth was meant for the multitude; would begin with severing that from its signification: would then impute to the bare material a sacredness which he had himself extracted from it; and so would prepare the way for results in which the student of theology and of philosophy are both

deeply interested, but in which the ordinary human being has a deeper interest than either. If the Gospel had been left to the mercy of Alexandrian doctors, it would have been in as great danger of losing its human quality, its sympathy with publicans and sinners, as it was of losing its finer and purer essence when it fell among the rough dogmatists of Carthage. Much as there was in the gentle, pure, and humble mind of Clemens to counteract this danger, it required the stronger counteraction of an opposing, and in itself perhaps a more mischievous tendency, together with the discipline of persecutions, and a direct antagonism from heathen philosophy, that it might not pass into a mere system for novices and adepts; husks being the only food provided for the first, and an intoxicating mephitic vapour being the nourishment of the other.

How the danger was checked.

Eclecticism.

20. The phrase *eclectic* suggests a series of reflections scarcely less serious, and even alarming. The sense in which it is used by Clemens is obvious enough. He did not care for Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, as such; far less did he care for the opinions and conflicts of the schools which bore their names: he found in each, hints of precious truths of which he desired to avail himself; he would gather the flowers without asking in what garden they grew, the prickles he would leave for those who had a fancy for them. Eclecticism in this sense seemed only like another name for catholic wisdom. A man conscious that every thing in nature and in art was given for his learning, had a right to suck honey wherever it was to be found; he could find sweetness in it if it was hanging wild on trees and shrubs, he could admire the elaborate architecture of the cells in which it was stored. The Author of all good to man had scattered the gifts, had imparted the skill; to receive them thankfully was an act of homage to Him. But once lose the feeling of devotion and gratitude which belonged so remarkably to Clemens,—once let it be fancied that the philosopher was not a mere receiver of treasures which had been provided for him, but an ingenious chemist and compounder of various naturally unsociable ingredients, and the eclectical doctrine would lead to more self-conceit, would be more unreal and heartless, than any one of the sectarian elements out of which it was fashioned. It would want the belief and conviction which dwell, with whatever unsuitable companions, even in the narrowest theory. Many of the most vital characteristics of the original dogmas would be effaced under pretence of taking off their rough edges and fitting them into each other. In general, the superficialities and formalities of each creed would be preserved in the new system; its original and essential characteristics sacrificed. We shall have abundant illustrations

Its perils.

of these remarks as we proceed. Our present business is to notice some of the contemporaneous manifestations of that philosophical temper, the Christian type of which is exhibited in Clemens.

Ammonius Saccas.

21. Among the sages of Alexandria at the end of the 2d century, and the beginning of the 3d, was one person who has given occasion to much controversy. Ammonius Saccas has left no writings behind him from which we may judge what he was, or wherein lay the secret of the influence which he evidently exerted over men of great ability, and very differently educated. In fact, one main part of our knowledge respecting him is that he did not write,—at all events, that he did not put forth what he had written; and that he exacted an oath of secresy from his hearers. No one, therefore, seems to have carried the esoteric habit of this age farther than he did. The question arises whether in doing so he started from the ground of Numenius or of Clemens,—whether his silence and reserve rested upon maxims of the Church or of the Schools. Porphyry claims him as a deserter from the Christian camp. The Christian historians of the next century do not admit the apostacy; but they do not claim Ammonius as an ally. The dispute, however it may be settled, is instructive. It shows that there was a class of men who occupied a position which might easily be misunderstood,—men who seemed to have affinities with the

His probable relation to the Christians.

teachers of the Church, who probably listened to them, and were listened to by them; who on certain points came apparently into the closest contact with them, and yet who, at some period of their life, may have diverged very markedly and widely from them,—may have even come into collision with them. It would seem exceedingly likely that Ammonius had heard the historical facts which the preachers of the Gospel believed; that he had perceived how much less the Alexandrian Christians dwelt upon them than upon the principles which those facts were said to embody,—how readily they translated the fact into a principle; that he may have conceived the possibility of dwelling exclusively upon the one without positively repudiating the other; that he may have spoken of the principles as very profound and mysterious, fit only for the most prepared and disciplined ears, and may have condemned the Christian teachers for profaning them in popular addresses; that he may have become more and more distinguished from them, and opposed to them in so far forth as they were preachers, without feeling any great repugnance to them as seekers and students; that he may have learnt at the same time from their example, that principles do need to take some concrete form, if they are to be made intelligible; that he may have considered and talked with his disciples about the different forms and media through which they might become apprehensible to the vulgar; but that at the same time he may have strongly urged the possibility of a higher and diviner intuition through which the philosopher might rise into converse with truth in its essence and nakedness; that the method which he pointed out for this end, as well as his general views respecting the other and lower method, may have been confined to the most chosen circle of his followers, who will have been forbidden, not so much from any jealousy which the master might have of his own fame, as on account of the very nature of the doctrine, to divulge. The concealment was, in fact, inevitable. A person contemplating things from this point of view must demand it if he is not inconsistent with himself.

22. While Ammonius was lecturing in Alexandria, there came to it a young man in the 27th year of his age. He had been smitten with the love of wisdom, and he wandered from doctor to doctor to find the object of his passion. He returned from each, disappointed and heavy-hearted. A friend to whom he told his grief bade him visit the school of Ammonius, whom he had not yet tried. "This," he exclaimed at the first lecture, "is the man I was seeking for." The charm was not worn out after eleven years. All our knowledge of the teacher is derived from this pupil. We should have little interest in Ammonius if it were not for the influence he exercised over Plotinus.

Plotinus.

23. When he had taken his fill of Alexandrian doctrine, this ardent student entered the army of the Emperor Gordianus, then starting for Persia, that he might acquaint himself with the science of the Magians, and perhaps come into converse with the Brahmins. After the Emperor had been slain in Mesopotamia, Plotinus escaped with some difficulty to Antioch. In his 40th year, during the reign of the Emperor Philip, he went to Rome. All this time he had written nothing. His reverence for Ammonius and for his oath kept him from divulging the secret lore which two of his fellow disciples, Herennius and Origen, according to Porphyry, had already betrayed. He allowed, however, different students to visit him, and to ask him questions. Their various reports of his responses, as might have been expected, gave rise to no little perplexity and misrepresentation. Aurelius, who had already written out or committed to memory all the dogmas of Numenius, came to him in the fourth year of his stay at Rome, and listened to him for twenty-four years. He made a collection of scholia, or commentaries, the results of their interviews, which grew to the number of 100 volumes. But he never ventured

His education

Life by Porphyry, c. 3.

His disciples

to write down the utterances of the master himself. When Plotinus was above fifty years old, he began himself to be a
c. 4. writer. Porphyry joined him about nine years after; he had then composed twenty-one books. He communicated them to very few. But for Porphyry, they might never have seen the light. In the following ten years, the conversation of his two disciples brought out the books which exhibit, Porphyry thinks, the fulness of his power. He afterwards wrote nine more when it was in its decline.

A converser more than a writer.

24. Plotinus was therefore not chiefly a book-maker or a lecturer. His wisdom came forth in the better and more natural form of conversation. His Enneads are resolutions of difficulties which had occurred to himself or to others. There is no reason to doubt that he was,—what Apollo, in a somewhat lengthy oracle faithfully reported by his disciple, and what that
c. 23. disciple, on the equally satisfactory evidence of his own experience, testifies him to have been—"good and gentle and benignant in a very high degree, and pleasant in all his intercourse."
c. 9. He seems to have won the affection of many who could have understood nothing of his teaching,—to have given them sensible
c. 11. advice about mundane affairs, and even to have been a careful steward of the monies which they entrusted to him. But of his own body he was utterly negligent. No entreaties could persuade him to allow a portrait of himself to be taken. "Was it not humiliating enough to be obliged to carry a shadow about
c. 1 & 2. with him, without having a shadow made of that shadow?" He declined all the natural remedies when he was afflicted with a serious sickness, refused animal food, abstained from baths. He was attacked with a pestilence which prevailed in Italy, lost the use of his hands, his feet, and his voice; his sufferings being terribly aggravated, it would appear, from his rejection of all alleviations. He at last left the city, was taken to the estate of a friend in Campania, and died, as Eustochius reported, exclaiming, "I am striving to bring the divine thing which is in us, to the divine which is in the universe."

Object of Plotinus.

25. Whether Plotinus uttered these words or not, as his spirit was departing, they certainly express the effort of his life, and the object of his philosophy. We have spoken of him as in one respect resembling Socrates,—that he conversed rather than wrote. He himself supposed that he resembled Socrates in most things,—that he was, in fact, restoring to the world the very spirit which had spoken in him when his friends were gathered about his couch, and he was thanking the Athenian dicasts for the emancipation which they were preparing for him. Yet no two men were ever really more strongly contrasted with each other, not merely in their characters, but in

The Socratic method.

their whole method. If Socrates sought for the Being, for the eternal substance which no images could present to him, and which he could only truly embrace while he turned away from shadows and phantoms, he hoped to attain this blessing for himself, or to show his disciples how they might attain it, by testing the words which they spoke, by entering into converse with the tools of every ordinary craft, by acknowledging the worth of the most vulgar and earthly things. Unless he could arrive at the truth of each thing which presented itself to him, he had no hope of arriving at the absolute truth. All his genial habits of mind, his sympathy, his humour, became thus the inseparable ministers of his philosophy, nay almost constituted it. They kept him in communion with facts; they would not allow him to mistake that which is, for the creation of his own mind; they made him seek for a road by which every man might rise to the height which he was climbing.

Why Plotinus could not adopt it.

26. Plotinus was born into an age when it was impossible, or at least unspeakably difficult, to begin where Socrates began. The Christian teachers had been asserting pertinaciously, for two centuries, that there had been an actual revelation of the most transcendent mysteries; that princes and beggars might have communion with the Divine Nature; might be partakers of it. Every sage was bound to say whether this was his end, and how he hoped to attain it. He was forced to commence with a theology, and to explain how he connected it with the condition of humanity. Supposing he utterly discarded the doctrine of God taking human flesh, he must find some substitute for that doctrine; his ethics, his physics, his dialectics, would all depend upon it. If we forget those thoughts respecting the Absolute Being, and the Being in contact with man or with matter, which Numenius and Clemens have brought before us, the processes in the mind of Plotinus will be quite unintelligible to us. We shall suppose that he is wilfully and industriously combining some old notions of divinity with his Platonism, whereas the conjunction was inevitable. He could escape neither the vagueness and impersonality which will often seem characteristic of his highest speculations, nor those allusions to secondary powers and divinities, to a race of inferior dæmons which may seem to us to contain the germs of a very gross superstition. How the mixture afterwards worked, what kind of influence it produced through two centuries, we shall have to consider hereafter. The real key to all the subsequent developments of the school lies in the writings of its illustrious founder.

The Enneads.

27. Plotinus committed the arrangement of his books to Porphyry. He disposed them according to subjects, sacrificing the chronology of the writings—which we might have been glad

to trace—to philosophical symmetry. "I disposed them," he says, "into six Enneads, gladly availing myself of the two perfect numbers (6 and 9)." He hoped that the reader would rise to the more difficult problems by a regular gradation.

Life, c. 24.

The Ethical.

His first Enneas contains what he calls the more purely ethical discussions. It embraces such topics as these—What is the Animal and what is the Man?—On Virtues—On Dialectics—On Happiness—Whether Blessedness consists in the lengthening out of Time—On the Beautiful—On the Primary Good and the other goods—Whence spring Evils—On a reasonable Departure out of Life.

The Physical.

The next Enneas is on physical questions—Of the World—Of Circular Motion—Whether the Stars have any activity—On the Potential and the Actual—On Quality and Form or Species—An answer to those who think the Maker of the World, or the World itself, to be Evil..

As this division includes several topics which Aristotle would certainly have assigned to metaphysics rather than physics, so it is not very obvious where Porphyry draws the line between it and the succeeding one, which he says still treats of the Κόσμος, but includes those subjects which have relation to it, not merely those which are embraced in it. This Enneas discusses Fate—Providence—Of the Dæmon to whose lot we have fallen (τῶν εἰληχότος ἡμᾶς δαίμονος)—Of Love—Of Eternity and Time—Of Nature, Contemplation, and the One. The editor excuses himself for introducing some of these titles here; his defence is scarcely satisfactory. The fourth Enneas treats entirely of the Soul—On the Substance of the Soul—On Sensation and Memory—On the Immortality of the Soul—On the Descent of the Soul into Bodies. The fifth ascends into the transcendent region: it treats of Reason, and Being, and Ideas. The last speaks of the kinds of Being—Of the Identity of Being, and Unity—Of Numbers—How there comes to be Plurality of Ideas—Of the Good.

Ontology.

Porphyry regards the first three Enneads as forming one section of the work, the fourth and fifth another, the sixth complete in itself.

28. Union with the Divinity being the one object of Plotinus, various questions suggest themselves to him, in which ethics and theology are intimately combined. The second book of the first Ennead, "On Virtues," brings these especially before us. It is doubtless by virtues that we are to be assimilated to the divine nature. But can virtues be predicated of that nature? Can there be courage in a Being who has nothing to fear? self-restraint in one who has nothing to desire? Perhaps a distinction might be drawn between the noetic and the political

Virtue whether divine.

virtues, between those which have reference to the pure objects of the intellect, and those which have reference to the conditions of human society. Perhaps too there might be some god to whom such qualities might be ascribed; say the Soul of the world, or the presiding principle in it. Still such explanations hardly satisfy the enquirer. Is it possible, then, that there may be obtained through virtue some likeness to One who himself does not possess it, or possesses it under quite different conditions; as it is not absolutely necessary to suppose that a substance from which heat is received has itself the sensation of heat. If one examines that illustration more deeply, Plotinus thinks it may suggest another inference, that the heat is innate in that which communicates the heat; in that which receives it, derivative; and that similarly there ought to be, if not virtue, yet something higher than virtue, in him from whom man proceeds. The actual visible house, he says, is not the same with that which is in the mind; yet one has the likeness of the other, and derives from it its order and harmony. These qualities of the building cannot be said to exist in their noetic or spiritual counterpart. So, though there may be no need of what we call virtue in God, the possession of it may be that which brings us into consent with his nature. The result at which the discussion arrives is this: that virtues are purgative, that the worth of them is to separate that in man which is capable of converse with the noetic, the essntially pure, from that which is animal and earthly; that by this process they prepare the reason to come into contact with its highest object. Virtue being in the Soul which is in connection with the body, and liable to its influence, not in the pure Reason, or in that which lies beyond it, is a perpetual exercise of restraint and cleansing for the purpose of disengaging the man from his lower companion, and fitting him for—the question cannot be avoided—for what? Plotinus answers, for becoming a god. Supposing him to reach such a point as that he shall be wholly free from voluntary transgression, but shall still be exposed to assaults from anger, desire, and the like, he may be only a Dæmon, possessing still a twofold nature, in which the higher is supreme. But if he could overcome his propensities entirely, then he would be simply a god, "one of those that follow the Highest God."

The difficulty stated and resolved.

Virtue a means of attaining Godhead.

29. The book on Dialectics, which follows this on Virtues, should be read in connection with the Platonic Phædrus, that the student may appreciate the difference between the ancient teacher and the reviver, and may acquit Plotinus of any servile imitation. He is not open to that charge; what he inherited he certainly reduced into possession, and yet no one more

Dialectics of Plotinus.

reverently and frankly confesses his obligations. The question is, by what process we are to ascend into that region of the good, to that original principle, which has been shown before to be the right goal of our pilgrimage. The man may be looked upon in three stages of progress, or rather he may be said to have originally descended into three types of being, out of which he is gradually to rise. "First, the Musician, easily impressed and carried on towards the beautiful, but without the power of being directly moved by it; readily affected towards sounds, as cowards are by noises, and catching at the beautiful, which lies close at hand in them; ever flying from the discordant, and seeking for the harmonious and the proportionate; may be lifted above the sensible sounds, and measures, and forms, to the beauty that is above them; may be taught the noetic harmony which lies beneath the things towards which he is carried away; may attain, not to some beautiful thing, but to *the* Beauty." Plotinus intimates that there may be yet a further passage for him out of this region into the truths of pure science, of which he is ignorant, though in a manner he possesses them. "Next the Lover, into whom the musician may very probably be converted. He has a certain recollection of beauty; but being outside of it, he is not able to learn what it is. But being stricken by the beautiful things which come under his sight, he is carried about by them. You must teach him not to fly round and round about one body, with the danger of always descending lower towards it; you must bring him by reason to compare bodies together, pointing out to him that which is the same in all; and you must tell him that it is different from the bodies, and that it comes from elsewhere, and that it dwells in others more than in these; shewing him how beautiful Studies may be, and how beautiful Laws may be. Thus the Lover may become habituated to that which is without body, discovering it in arts and sciences, and virtues. Then you must make him feel that there is one Beauty in all things, and you must teach him how they arise out of it. Then, from the virtues, teach him how to ascend to the pure Reason, and after into Being itself, and there he may move along on his upward journey. Last of all, the Philosopher: ready by nature, and as it were already furnished with wings; not needing to sever them from matter like the others; disposed already to ascend to that which is above; but still being perplexed, he wants some one to point the way. To him you must give mathematics, for the discipline of his intellect and of his incorporeal faith. These he will readily receive, being greedy of knowledge, and seeing that he has a natural aptitude for virtue. And after mathematics you must give him dialectics; you must make him

Process of ascent to the divine.

The Musician.

The Lover.

The Philosopher

thoroughly a dialectician. But what is this dialectic which must be given in some proportion to the musician and the lover also? "It is," answers Plotinus, "the habit which enables one to say about each thing what its peculiarity is, wherein it differs from other things, what there is in common between them, and where each of these things is, and whether that is which is, and how many are the things that are, and again the things that are not, and how they differ from those that are. It discourses," he says, "also concerning the Good and concerning the Not-good, and how many things fall under the Good, and what is manifestly Eternal, and what is not so. It aims in all things at science, not at opinion, restraining the soul from its wanderings after sensible things, disciplining it to the noetic; there lies its whole occupation. And whence," he asks, "has this science its principles? The answer is, that the pure reason gives them, and the soul, by different processes of discipline, is made capable of receiving them. The dialectical habit is the highest and most honourable of all that man can possess, and it is exercised about the highest and noblest things. It results from the combination of the prudential faculty with the pure reason, the one referring to Being, the other carrying you beyond Being. Is it, then, the same thing with philosophy? No; but it is the most essential and glorious part of philosophy. It must not be imagined to be a mere instrument of philosophy. It does not invent propositions about things, but it deals with the substances themselves. Pure Being, if we can bear the contradiction, is the *material* with which it works."

Dialectic what?

30. If we suppose that there is a point at which the master of Plotinus was in contact with the Christian teachers of Alexandria, the passages which we have selected from the Enneads may perhaps assist us in understanding and feeling the reason of their divergence. The necessity of emancipation would be recognised alike by both. One as much as the other might describe it as the emancipation of a spirit from the chains of sense: one as much as the other might think that the man was gradually to ascend into the region which was intended for him out of a material world in which he was sunk, and the phantoms of which were continually misleading and detaining him. But the moment the Church teacher spoke to the man, not of an oppression that was arising from a lower nature attached to him, but of an evil that dwelt in himself, his language would become partly disagreeable, partly unintelligible to the new school. A dialectician, even a lover or a musician, who has a perception of some beautiful and transcendent object, will meet with a certain sympathy from Plotinus. He will help him to rise into a more ethereal, one would fancy

Relation of Plotinus to Christians.

also, into rather a colder region, than that from which he has escaped,—one in which his attachment to every thing distinct and particular would be lost in the vision of the absolute and universal. But if the highest of these forms of being, or either of the subordinate ones, besides being philosophical, or loving, or musical, should chance to be human, and to be conscious of certain inward torments and distempers, which, though very closely mingling with all his passions and pursuits, have nevertheless a character and root of their own; if any one of them should ever be brought to feel "it is myself that is my torment: it is from that, I want to be delivered," one cannot help fearing that the prescriptions of Plotinus would be found not quite adequate to the seriousness of the emergency. The inevitable result of them, one must think, is to re-establish that barrier between the man and the philosopher which it seemed to us that all the better and more earnest teachers of the old world had wished to remove, and to which they only submitted through a hard necessity; a distinction which, however plausible and hopeful, does, in fact, quite as much injury to the select band whom it glorifies, as to the mass whom it scorns, making the highest point to which they reach, one where there is pure light without the slightest warmth. It is most satisfactory to think that neither Plotinus himself, nor perhaps any of his followers, ever succeeded in reaching this point. They continued to be men, not such Dæmons or Gods as they dreamed they might become.

Sense of evil, of self.

Philosophers still men.

31. In saying this, we do not in the least design to disparage the dialectic of which Plotinus speaks so ably, and of which Plato had spoken with immeasurably more freedom, precision, and practical sense, before him. To cultivate that habit of which he speaks, that wonderful habit of distinguishing the substance within from that which encircles it,—the reality from the counterfeit,—must be indeed the highest effort of a sound and practical education. The complete possession of it must be the greatest gift which can be conferred upon a man. None of the means for obtaining it which Plotinus has suggested, ought to be slighted by those who can avail themselves of them. What we venture to doubt is, whether those means will be found sufficient, whether we shall ever have a consummate dialectician, in this sense of the word, who has not been engaged in a much more close death embrace with evil than a Neo-Platonist would have thought desirable or graceful; whether he must not have much more understood the evils of other men as his own, than could be right for those who were striving to be gods; whether a simple clownish man, who had entered heartily into this strife, would not have a dialectical discernment which a person well trained in mathematics and

True education of the Dialectician

that excellent discipline which Plotinus recommends, might after all utterly want. Meantime, though these observations are needful to connect the different sides of our history together, let no one make them an excuse for not profiting by the lessons which an eminent man, who has worked zealously in one direction, can give us. It would certainly be a poor evidence of any one having acquired greater humility in another school, that he had been brought to despise Plotinus.

32. It must not be inferred from what we have said of his internal sense of evil, that we think he has treated the subject of evil less successfully than other moralists, or that we regard this as the weak part of his discourses. There is no book we should more recommend to the attention of our readers than the eighth of the first Ennead, in which he grapples with the question, What is evil, and whence comes it? Plotinus states fairly and honestly the different suggestions which present themselves to all serious and reflecting minds when they approach this abyss. Is it positive? Is it only a failure and eclipse of good? Is it in matter? Is it in the soul? Must there not be an original archetypal evil, from which the different forms of it have proceeded, and wherein they terminate? What is the real conflict of life? What is the victory? What is the ultimate defeat? No one, we think, can follow him through the discussion of these questions without thankfulness for the light which he has thrown on them, and a feeling that some further solution may be and must be had. We should be doing little justice to Plotinus if we stated the formal results to which this enquiry led him. The interest of the book, and that which is the most agreeable characteristic of the writer, is, that he does not put forth a set of dogmatic resolutions, but talks over the different points with himself, giving us glimpses into the processes of his mind, and enabling us to see that it has earnestly fought with a number of intellectual giants, though he may not have been in that thickest and hottest part of the fight where the question is, whether the man must not part with himself in order that he may part with evil.

His theory of evil.

33. Oftentimes the reader may be inclined to suppose that Plotinus must have had some sympathy with the Christian Gnostics. He feels so strongly that the fall of the Soul consists in its becoming subject to matter, that it is lost when it is completely immersed in matter, that it only rises into communion with the perfect good when it becomes separated from matter; that we might suppose him to agree with them, that the source of evil lies in matter. This would itself be a false inference. He believes that the tendency of the soul to sink into that which is below itself, is not derived from that into which it

His dislike to the Gnostics.

sinks; that tendency has its root somewhere else; where, he does not distinctly affirm. But even supposing he had agreed with the Gnostics so far, he would not have been at all nearer to their assertion that the World or Order is evil. He does not look upon this Order as material; nothing seemed to him so utterly shocking, as the notion that it could be anything less than perfect, divine, eternal. The ninth book of the second Ennead is devoted to the confutation of the Gnostical dogma upon this point. "The men," he says, "who complain of the nature of the world, know not what they are doing, and whither their boldness is carrying them. This is because they know not the arrangement of the different portions of this order, its first and second and third degrees, down to the lowest of all, and that it does not become us to find fault with those things that are worse than the first, but meekly to conform ourselves to the universal nature, pressing on still towards the best, and casting aside those empty terrors, such as some are possessed with when they contemplate the great circles of the world, which in truth are procuring all blessings to them. What have these really terrible, as they terrify those who are ignorant of true reason, and who have not submitted themselves to the discipline of science? For what if these forms which they behold are of a fiery nature? We do not therefore need to fear them, seeing that they are in harmony with the nature of the universe, and with the earth. But it behoves them rather to look to those souls, in virtue of which they deem themselves estimable, though they ought to know that their bodies too, excelling as they do in greatness and beauty, are servants and fellow-workers in the scheme of nature, rightly following those things which have rightly the pre-eminence, filling up the universe, and being great elements of it. And if men have an honour beyond all other animals, much more should these things have their honour which exist in the great whole, not as rulers of it, but as supplying to it grace and order. And we are not to demand that all in the world should be good, and to fall into grumbling because this is not possible at once, nor to call the imperfect and lesser good an evil. If one calls nature evil because it is not sensation, and sensation because it is not the reasoning power of the soul, one must call that evil too, seeing that the soul is lower than the pure mind, and there is something higher than that."

The world divine.

This is a summary of the general argument. All things are good in the Order. They become evil when they fall out of it, losing their relations, proportions, sequences. To speak of an evil world, or an evil order, is therefore a contradiction.

34. A faithful disciple of Plotinus would say that we had only touched the outskirts of his doctrine, and not ascended into its more mystical heights, unless we spoke more distinctly of those passages which refer to the pure and essential One, the object towards which the emancipated philosopher is continually moving. But we have given our readers hints which will enable them to perceive how necessarily this was the end which every thinker of the third century set before himself,—Plotinus, more than others, only so far as he more distinctly apprehended that which others mixed with various intermediate and subordinate purposes. The last extract will prove that he recognised these subordinate purposes as being good for themselves, and the other as only attainable by the illuminated few. It was but twice or thrice in his life that Plotinus claimed to have had a direct vision of the perfect and absolute One. In general, it was only some dæmon or lower god whom even he was enabled to contemplate. The existence of such dæmons, and their position in the great economy of the universe, was a subject which forced itself continually on the Neo-Platonist and his disciples. The gods whom the old Athenian had accepted from his country's traditions, but which he tried to divest of the corrupt qualities which had been imputed to them by the minds of their worshippers, must be reproduced in this later age of the world as the necessary completions of a philosophical theory,— as the only steps of a ladder between earth and heaven. Each of the old gods had a place in the new philosophical Pantheon; but it was a most insecure place, which he owed confessedly to the inability of men to divest themselves of accidents, and localities, and affections; to their want of that highest perception which would have made them content with a mere spiritual essence. The Platonist, however, was soon obliged to give them a more tangible existence, otherwise he would have had no standing ground against the Church, which he more and more felt to be the most serious obstacle to the general recognition, even to the secure and comfortable maintenance, of his doctrine.

The One.

Dæmons.

35. There are one or two facts concerning Plotinus recorded by his biographer which we have reserved for a separate consideration, as they greatly illustrate the history of his time and of his school. The first is this. Plotinus was greatly honoured by the Emperor Gallienus and his wife Salolina. Availing himself of this friendship he besought him to rebuild a city in Campania, said to have been formerly a resort of philosophers, but now in decay; to associate with it the surrounding country; to permit the future citizens to be governed by the laws of Plato, and the city itself to be called Platonopolis. There he had promised that he would retire with his companions; and

The new Republic

the wish of the philosopher would have been speedily accomplished, if some of those who were familiar with the Emperor, through envy or dislike, or some other bad motive, had not prevented it.

Attempted imitation of Plato.

36. How much does Neo-Platonism owe to the ill-natured courtiers of Gallienus! A more fatal experiment than the Campanian one could scarcely have been made; one which would have more exposed all the practical weakness of the system. No doubt, Plotinus fancied that he had his master's example to guide him in this case as in all others. Did not Plato hope to realise his Republic by the help of Dionysius? If he ever had so wild a dream, the dispersion of it is recorded in the same tradition which imputes it to him. Plotinus need not have taken the first part of the story and forgotten the sequel. But the fact that a copy of that weakest and most disastrous portion of Plato's life was attempted, is an evidence, we conceive, first, that Plotinus perceived that a Republic was a necessary complement of the Platonic philosophy; next, that he entirely mistook what the relation was between his dialectics and his politics. Plato, as we tried to prove in the sketch of ancient philosophy, was a scientific enquirer into the nature and conditions under which all society must exist.—not the inventor of a particular society. All that Plotinus meant, so far as we can gather from his faithful and intelligent disciple,—all that he certainly would have accomplished, if his success had equalled his highest aspirations,—would have been to construct a city with a fine name which would have been a fit refuge for philosophers who wanted a world of their own unlike that in which ordinary mortals were dwelling. Platonopolis was to have been a place for the élite of the universe—a place in which they would have tried to rule and legislate—where doctors would have been kings, and school formulas would have invented sanctions for themselves—where old rivalries and old crimes would speedily have shown that sages are men, and that they would be much more sage if they admitted the fact boldly, and considered what is involved in it.

Why unsuccessful.

Implicit faith of Plotinus.

37. If Plotinus hoped in this way to establish something which would be far better and more sublime than those churches into which he and Ammonius had seen so many vulgar men admitted, he found also a substitute for the records or sacred books to which these churches appealed. Our readers must be aware by this time that the difference between the Neo-Platonists and the Christians did not consist in any independence of judgment which was claimed by the former. No Father could quote St. Paul or St. John with more absolute or child-like deference than that with which Plotinus habitually quotes Plato. His

name is not often mentioned, but you find sentence after sentence beginning "He says;" and you never doubt for a moment that an oracle is appealed to, which may require elucidation but from which there is no dissent. We shall find, the further we proceed with our history, continual instances of the same kind of subjection on the part, not of weak men, who cannot and dare not think for themselves, but of the most coherent and courageous thinkers. The discovery ought to make us pause before we adopt some very current and popular notions as to the nature and limits of freedom in speculation. If we suppose freedom to be impossible, or not desirable for men, we should commit one huge blunder. If we suppose that a guide or a text-book is necessarily unfavourable to it, we may commit as great a one.

Intellectual freedom.

Magic has resisted.

38. One Olympius, an Alexandrian, Porphyry tells us, who was for a short time a disciple of Ammonius, despised Plotinus, aspiring to the first dignity in philosophy. Nay, so far did he go in his enmity, that he strove to crush him with magical arts. But he soon found that the experiment turned against himself; and he told his associates that the soul of Plotinus had such mighty power that it caused all assaults upon him to react upon those who were hurting him. In fact, all the limbs of Olympius became contracted. Miracles, therefore, we see were closely allied with the new philosophy. Whether there was to be a whole system of Magic and Astrology connected with it, was a question to be considered afterwards. But the power of the man who was approaching the condition of a god to act upon the souls or bodies of other creatures, was not a matter of doubt with those who held the least exaggerated opinions on this subject. The power rested in that communion with higher natures which the philosophers had attained: nor does he seem to have felt that there was anything strange or awful in such a power, or that it might not be used for mere personal ends. On another occasion, an Egyptian priest, who had come to Rome and desired to display his wisdom, persuaded Plotinus to call into his presence the dæmon who was holding familiar converse with him. The temple of Isis having been chosen for the invocation, at the summons of Plotinus, to the admiration of the Egyptian, a god instead of an inferior dæmon appeared. This fact, like the other, is related without timidity, or any attempt to confirm it by evidence. It is worthy of being remembered, not merely as illustrating the theology of the school, but as showing how soon that theology which aspired to be so ethereal and spiritual might become mixed with all the sensible apparitions of ordinary superstition.

Divine apparitions

39. Porphyry was not naturally inclined to dæmonology. A

story which he tells of a discourse which he made in answer to a philosopher who had maintained the most grovelling notions respecting love and self-indulgence—a discourse which won for him the highest reward he could receive, the approving smile of Plotinus—shows that he had strong and healthy moral instincts. His dislike of the common herd, probably the secret of that dislike to Christianity which became so much more definite and vehement in him than it had been in his master, was gratified by all his philosophical studies; he must have been, therefore, very unwilling that they should minister to vulgar tastes and to the passion for the marvellous. Yet to separate the communion with divine natures, wherein consisted the prize and consummation of the new philosophy, from the practices of the magician, which had been hard at all times, was never harder than in the third century after Christ. Was the ascent of the man into the divine region to produce no effect upon himself or upon the world? Was the spiritual in no way to assert its right to control and govern the material as well as to be emancipated from its dominion? The suffering man, of whom the ignorant Christians spoke, was alleged to have healed the sick and cast out devils: must not the divine sage be able to show that he can work greater, of course less common and useful, miracles than these? Porphyry wavered between the necessity of asserting such a power for him that he might prove his elevation or confound adversaries, and the imminent danger of introducing all those dark imaginations and practices against which ancient philosophers had protested,—which their modern disciple Apollonius, at least in the commencement of his career had set himself to encounter.

Difficulties of Porphyry.

The Empirical or Sceptical school.

40. Like other seekers of middle ways, Porphyry soon found himself hardly pressed on the right hand and on the left. No century has been without its school of experimental as well as of mystical philosophy. The third had physicians, who studied, as well as they could, the facts of nature,—who were led by the observation of them to protest against the traders in mysteries—who gradually were led on to disbelieve all mysteries. The time is not come for speaking of them; the influence of their physical speculations on the history of moral philosophy can only be understood in a later age. The Platonic doctrine is *the* characteristic one of the period with which we are occupied. Still, it is necessary to allude to the empirical school, that we may understand why Porphyry, who must have been unable to understand many of its arguments, would have despised its facts, would have been shocked at its incredulity, might be tempted to crave help even from it (if he had known how to use the help) against a more popular and dangerous class of foes which he

discovered in his own camp. Merely to argue against the Christians, merely to show how portions of the old mythology might be made to give out a philosophical meaning, could never satisfy the Greek and Roman, still less the Egyptian and Oriental sages of the empire. Philosophy must resuscitate Paganism, or it would not fulfil its mission. If it did not explain and justify the operations of the old priest, if it could not establish an offensive and defensive alliance with him, it could not maintain its own ground—it would have to be cast aside as a mere dry ungenerative speculation. Such was the language which began to be heard more and more distinctly in the schools which adopted the theories of Ammonius or Plotinus; such was the tendency which Porphyry, after dallying with it for a time, at last girded himself to encounter.

Platonism becoming mythological.

41. The form in which he expressed his objections was cautious, but perhaps the more offensive on that account. His letter to Anebon, an Egyptian prophet, or priest, is a clever, sagacious, well-digested statement of the difficulties which a philosopher discovered, as well in the popular conceptions respecting the gods and dæmons, as in the whole mysteries of Theurgy. This letter, and the answer to it, form so memorable an event in philosophical history, that we think they are entitled to more attention than many larger works written by much greater men than Porphyry or his correspondent.

Letter to Anebon.

42. Porphyry starts from the assumption that there are gods. But he wants to know their distinctions and peculiarities. Does the distinction arise from their actions or their passions; or from their relation to different bodies,—according to a maxim which seems to have been then recognised, that the gods had ethereal bodies, dæmons aerial, souls terrestrial? The next question refers to the attribution of place to the gods: how is this compatible with their infinity? Next their liability to passions, upon which the whole doctrine of Theurgy would seem to depend; since how can those be conciliated or appeased who are not susceptible of impressions from without? And since invocations are addressed to the higher as well as the lower gods, since sacrifices are especially directed to them, they must be treated as subject to passions like the rest,—not as pure minds or intellects. Are gods and dæmons distinguished by the possession or absence of body? How is it that some of the gods are beneficent, and some malevolent? In what way does a hero differ from a dæmon or from a soul? How do you distinguish the appearance of a god, of an angel, of a dæmon, of a soul? For the very highest gods are presented to us in images and sensible forms.

The distinction of gods.

43. These questions Porphyry considers profoundly important

seeing that all good lies in the knowledge of the gods,—all darkness in the ignorance of them. There are a set of subordinate questions arising out of these. The first refers to prophecy. Putting aside the knowledge of the future which comes through dreams, wherein the mind and body are passive, how can all those ecstacies which are produced by noises or mephitic vapours, or how can the knowledge which is obtained from the flights of birds, or the entrails of beasts, be esteemed divine? Is a god, or an angel, or a dæmon, the author of prophecy and apparitions; or may they originate from the soul itself: or may they be attributed to a substance compounded of the soul and of some divine inspiration? May there not be certain affinities and relations between bodies, and may not these bodies produce some mutual pre-cognitions? And may not Nature itself, or Art, working with these, produce the results which are attributed to dæmons or gods? Is there any truth in the notion that there may be a species of deceiving natures assuming various forms which counterfeit the gods and dæmons and the souls of the departed,—which can work no good, but hinder those who are aiming at virtue,—which are full of pride, and rejoice in incense and sacrifices? The next question touches the very heart of Egyptian worship and divination. We call for the help of those whom we esteem more august and divine than ourselves; yet they obey the call of those who are lower and worse than themselves. The contradiction is expanded through a number of particulars; well-known practices, or statements of priests of high authority, being alleged to prove that not only some common dæmon or departed spirit, but that sun, moon, and stars, were treated as obnoxious to the threats as well as the petitions of the priests. No doubt, suggests the questioner, all these things may have a symbolical force,—they may indicate the various powers and changes of these bodies: but then the explanation should be produced, and it should be shown what the influences and changes of the sun and moon had to do with the incantations: and particularly why those incantations should be couched in peculiar, commonly barbarous phrases. For supposing the Deity attends to the signification of that which is said, the thought expressed in the words would be sufficient for him in whatever terms they were conveyed. Next, Anebon is asked whether the Egyptians consider the First Cause Nous, or something above it; whether it is alone or united with any other or others; whether it is corporeal or incorporeal; whether it is the same with the Demiurgus or before him; whether all things came from one or from more; whether they acknowledge matter or not; whether it is generated or eternal; what are the primary bodies. Next, he desires to hear about the

Prophecy, what is it?

May not Nature and art account for it?

Origin of things.

dæmon who belongs to each man; whether he is an efflux, or a life, or a power: whether he may be known, or whether it is impossible to discover him. Are there different dæmons,—one presiding over our health, another over our beauty, and so forth? if so, is there one common superintendent of them? May there be one of the mind, another of the body? May there be one beneficent and one malevolent? Is it not possible that the dæmon may be part of the mind itself, and that the ἐνδαίμων is the man who has a wise mind? Waxing bolder, he asks, in conclusion, whether there may not be another way to blessedness besides theurgy; nay, may not the whole business of theurgy be somewhat deceptive, seeing that people may have the possession of divine prophecy without being blessed, and may know of things to come without knowing how to make use of them? And certainly, if the god or the dæmon does not help us to blessedness, but only to the knowledge of the future, he is not a good dæmon or god, and the whole looks like an invention of mortals.

The dæmon within us

44. The person who answers these questions of Porphyry's calls himself Abammon, the teacher of Anebon. Who he was must be left among the mysteries of which he treats. It has been assumed that he was Iamblichus, because Iamblichus became ultimately the head and representative of that division of the Neo-Platonists which made Theurgy an essential part of philosophy. For practical purposes, Abammon is of more importance to us than his successor, for he has gathered together and reduced into method all that can be said in favour of the principle which Porphyry had sought to undermine, and which was destined to triumph over his objections.

Abammon or Iamblichus

45. The authorities from which the advocate for the priest proceeds, are the traditional theological dogmas of the Assyrians and Egyptians, with the speculations of Hermes, these being the sources from which Pythagoras and Plato are assumed to have drawn their wisdom. The author proposes to discuss each subject according to its proper nature; theological questions theologically, theurgical theurgically, philosophical philosophically. An exception is taken at the outset to Porphyry's language, which involves the most important consequences. You admit that there are gods. You have no business to speak so. It is not a question for a man's judgment whether there are or not. There is an innate knowledge concerning the gods which is beyond all judgment and every exercise of our will,—which precedes reason and demonstration. It is united from the beginning to its own proper cause, and is implied in that effort of the soul after the good which is part of its substance. There is a divine contact of the man with the Divinity, which, in fact,

The book περὶ μυστηρίων c. 1 & 2.

supersedes knowledge; the knowledge is lost or extinguished in the thing known. This principle does not only apply to the first or fundamental Being; it applies also to the dæmons and heroes. The notion of opposition, of that which is supplied in our logical forms of affirmation and denial, has nothing to do with their nature, or with the relations in which they stand to man. An objection growing out of this is taken to the second question about the properties of the different gods. Porphyry is applying notions of property and accident where they cannot apply; viz. to things uncompounded. To them sequence does not belong. All things that have to do with the higher natures must be contemplated in reference to their *being*. They must be judged by themselves; not by the condition of other natures which are below them. The question of Porphyry must be answered by an examination, not of individuals, but of kinds. We can distinguish various kinds of gods and dæmons, of heroes, of souls; we can affirm wherein the differences between them consist. To this task, Abammon proceeds. There is an absolute super-essential Good, and there is a Good which is according to the essence or the nature of the thing which possesses it. The former is the special characteristic of the gods. It belongs to each order of the gods, it preserves their proper ranks and distributions, it is not to be severed from their nature, it is the same in all. Souls, even those that rule bodies, and which before their birth were constituted eternal, possess neither the essential Good nor the super-essential; but there comes upon them a sort of efflux and habit proceeding from it. These being the two extremes, the order of heroes lies between; closely connected with human souls, but far excelling them in power and virtue. Still above these, in nearest relation to the gods yet much beneath them, are the dæmons, who bring forth into action their invisible good, and accomplish the works which are in conformity with it. That which is unspeakable becomes in them pronounced; what is without form they show forth in forms. We attribute to the gods unity; divisibility to souls. Heroes and dæmons then have a relation both to gods and to souls; they have fellowship with both, but they are liable to incline and turn aside to those inferior things which they produce and govern.

Theology above Logic. c. 3 & 4.

c. 5, 6, 7.

Dæmons, Heroes, Souls.

Material division. c. 8.

46. The whole question of Porphyry respecting the ethereal, aerial, and terrestrial gods, is thrown aside with indignation and contempt; all such corporeal divisions and limitations being utterly inconsistent with the divine nature. So far from looking upon these as necessary to theurgy, they are declared to be incompatible with it. How could we invoke beings who live in regions altogether remote from us,—with whom men have nothing

to do, by whom the world has been deserted? In truth all things are full of the gods. The Divinity illuminates heaven and earth, holy cities and places, divine shrines, just as the sun illuminates all the corners of the universe which he looks upon. The author of the book on Mysteries rises into real eloquence while he denounces the notion of comprehending and dividing the divine essence as absolutely monstrous, profane, and irrational.

47. Abammon equally rejects Porphyry's notion that the gods must be subject to passions if they receive sacrifices and are moved by prayers. He denies that even souls considered in their pure essence have anything to do with passions. Nevertheless he does not shrink from defending even the grosser and more impure symbols of Egyptian worship. The general ground of apology for offerings is, that they are medicinal to the human spirit, and help to emancipate it from the evils to which its connection with the body subjects it. The particular excuse for the symbols which presume evil and corruption, is, that they serve the same purpose as the sight of other men's offences or sorrows in the drama,—they help to deliver us from our own, affording besides an outlet for passions which would be more dangerous and virulent if they were wholly suppressed. The defence of prayers and invocations rests on a far deeper principle, and has less the character of special pleading. It is not because the gods are subject to passions, that invocations unite the priest to them; but through the mysterious friendship or affinity which holds the universe together, they produce a community of indissoluble harmony. They do not incline the mind of the gods to men, but they make men fit for converse with the gods. Still more remarkable is the explanation of the divine anger and of propitiation. "We ourselves," he says, "turn away the care of the gods from us, hiding ourselves in the noon-day, bringing darkness upon ourselves, depriving ourselves of the good gift of the gods. Propitiation restores us to the divine communion; instead of presuming passion in the *gods*, it delivers *us* from it." The alleged necessities of the gods are explained in an equally courageous and noble manner. There is a necessity in a perfect and gracious Being of love and companionship, that necessity does not belong only to beings subject to change and passion, but most to those who are freest from them. Every thing being grounded upon this fellowship and sympathy of men with the gods, it is a mistake to say that animal offerings imply an animal nature in *them*. The use of particular sensible objects may betoken and satisfy that connection, and may contain a divine, not an earthly significance.

Passions in gods. c. 10, 11, 12

c. 12

c. 13.

c. 14

c. 17.

Goodness inherent in godhead.

c. 18.

48. To Porphyry's question, how the sun and moon should be gods, if gods are incorporeal, the answer is, that the gods being pure intelligences, can assume bodies without injury to their intellectual natures, and that there are celestial bodies which are specially cognate to the incorporeal substance of the gods, bodies which express their energies and imitate the regularity and uniformity of their substance. To his still more serious demand, whether some gods are benevolent and some malevolent, the reply is decided—the gods are perfectly good. The virtues of the inferior gods derived out of the primary essence are however different, and may often seem to be of opposite kinds. The virtue of Chronos, for instance, is contractive; that of Ares motive. When these powers are brought to bear upon bodies, cold may be the effect of one, heat of the other: but evil only begins when these different powers come into connection with divided and material natures. A weak body may be grievously affected by the heat of the sun, yet the heat of the sun is good; all evil, therefore, belongs to particulars, not to the universal. The author proceeds to explain the relation between the truly intellectual gods, and those to which bodies are attached, making the former the ground and origin of the latter, affirming their perfect unity, and tracing the process by which the lower, perceiving that unity, ascend into the condition of the higher.

Causes of error in worship.

c. 21.

49. Having admitted fully that there are forms and modes of worship which do assume imperfection and passion in the gods, he lays down the important maxim that these have arisen from men attributing their own passions to the gods, instead of seeking the gods to deliver them from their passions. Hence all modes of adoration and sacrifice are justifiable upon the very ground upon which Porphyry would condemn them. They express "a venerable steadfastness, an intellectual joy, a wonder that cannot turn from its object, a fixed purpose of mind." Hence it becomes necessary to describe the orders and operations of the divine powers, that we may base our reverence and worship upon them. This is the subject of a large portion of the treatise. We can only seize a few particulars of this elaborate theogony and theophany, from which our readers may judge of the rest. The appearances of the gods are simple; those of the dæmons various: those of the angels more simple than these, but inferior to the purely divine; those of the archangels approaching nearer to those of the primary gods; those of the rulers of the world who direct elements very various and complex, though all marshalled in due order. Those who preside over matter still manifest themselves in greater varieties than these: souls in all manner of forms. The appearances of the gods are satisfactory

Section II. cc. 8. 1—9.

to the vision; those of the archangels at once mild and awful but more gentle than those of the angels; those of the dæmons terrible. The appearances of heroes are more gentle than those of the dæmons; those of the rulers of the elements painful and grievous; those of souls like those of heroes, but weaker. It is impossible not to trace a Jewish element in these distinctions. The Rabbis have evidently conversed with the priest, as in Egypt they were likely enough to do. Something of the old Jewish feeling, that the Lord of All must not only be the mightiest, but the most gracious of all, is traceable through his refinements. The philosopher of course has also his own word to contribute to the exposition. What it is, Abammon will tell us presently.

Knowledge of the gods

§ II. c. 11.

50. He fully admits the assertion of Porphyry that knowledge of the gods is the highest of all blessings; ignorance the greatest curse. That, he says, is a commonplace in which all are agreed. Nor does he doubt that intellectual effort or meditation is a necessary condition of communion with the gods. But it is not the only condition; the philosopher, as such, may perceive the need of communion, but he does not attain it. Something else is required. Not tricks or deceptions inconsistent with philosophy, as Porphyry supposes. Truth does not proceed from our minds, but from the gods. Priests do not invent; they are the channels of communication. Hence we are introduced to the whole subject of divination. Fore-knowledge, we are told in the outset, is not physical, not artificial, not human,—altogether divine and supernatural, sent down from above. First of dreams. There is a divine dreaming, a state between sleeping and waking, in which divine voices are heard and divine visions perceived, which is to be wholly distinguished from the dreaming that is dependent upon bodily impressions and earthly recollections. The difference turns upon the great doctrine that souls have a two-fold relation,—one to the Divinity, one to the body. Next the divine afflatus is explained, and the test of it laid down. Those who have it have surrendered their whole lives as mere instruments and organs to the inspiring gods. They either obtain the divine life instead of their human life, or they waste their own life in obedience to the god. Such persons may touch fire and not be burnt; may be struck with axes and knifes on their backs and arms, and not perceive it. Their actions are no more human; they may trample on fire or walk through water. There are various forms of this inspiration: it may possess some of the limbs, or the whole body. Some are agitated; some are preternaturally quiet. The whole process of the divine enthusiasm is then described. It must not be called ecstasy, for it translates the mind to something higher,—not merely carries it away, it might be into a lower or more animal

§ III. c. 1.

Divination

§ III. c. 2. 3.

c. 4, s. 6, 7, 8.

state. The true enthusiasm does not come from soul or body: it is wholly divine. The man who has it is simply possessed by the gods. Porphyry had enquired into the effect of music in producing this enthusiasm. He is answered that sounds as such
§ III. c. 9. can have no influence in bringing about a state which is so entirely divine; that the sounds indicate that inner harmony which there is between the soul and the gods. In them it recognises
§ III. c. c. 10 & 11. this harmony, through them may ascend towards it, and so may be ready to receive the full inspiration. All the different agencies which have been connected with divination are to be accounted for upon this same principle. The vapour which the Delphic priestess inhales is not the inspiration of the god; but it is a symbol or instrument which the god may use for the purification of the man, and for fitting him to receive his divine gifts.

Causes of fore knowledge. 51. We need not enumerate the number of inferences and applications of this doctrine into which Abammon enters: the one law being that all divination is directly and purely from the gods, the intermediate agencies are treated as entirely ministerial. Neither the birds, nor the entrails, nor the air, nor the prophet, nor the human soul itself, nor the soul considered as mixed of the human and the divine, nor any passion or affection of it, nor any disease or madness, can be its origin.
§ III. c. 11. —27. The power of foretelling is not a natural instinct, such as belongs to animals; it has nothing in common with the foresight of the sailor or the physician; it is no effect of chance or magical art; it cannot be attributed to some sympathy between
cc. 28, 29, 30. different bodies, so that we may talk of the seeds of prophecy being in us. Further, our author not only derides the notion that idols can be of any avail to the prophet, but he denounces them as worthless and mischievous; he declares that the human maker of the idols is himself better than all the works of his hands; he affirms that nothing which has been compounded by human art can be simple and pure; he declares that the divine light will not shine into the soul of the man who looks upon these as gods. Porphyry had hinted at the existence of evil and deceptive spirits. His opponent does not question their
§ III. c. 31. existence; bad men indulging evil passions draw such evil spirits through sympathy towards themselves. But the true priest is their great antagonist: so little does his inspiration proceed from them, that it arises from that submission of mind to the pure Being which puts all evil thoughts and tempers, and all evil spirits, to flight.

Defence of Providence. 52. The two principles which Abammon has put forward, that all prayer to the gods rests upon an internal affinity between them and their worshippers, and that all evils belong to the partial,

not to the universal, are further pressed in answer to Porphyry's awkward questions respecting the power which the inferior being
§ IV. c. 4. appears to exert over the superior, and the moral evils which are ascribed to those who demand at least an outward purity from their ministers. On this last point our Egyptian theurgist stammers somewhat more than he is wont to do; he hints at the old and modern plea, that our justice and the justice of the gods may be different; that our partial laws cannot bind them; that they see into the heart of things, while we only see a little
c. 6 & 7. way, &c. &c. But, then feeling the inconsistency of these propositions with his main doctrine, he professes out of mere grace and courtesy to discard them, and returns to the maxim that nothing but what is good can originate from the gods; that their sublime and mysterious loves may be misinterpreted when they are looked at through the divided and partial lights of human judgment; and that the authors of corrupt and immoral acts among men, must be the evil dæmons.

Section V. Sacrifice. 53. In the next section Abammon enters at large upon the whole subject of sacrifice. The question, he admits, is a very great one, liable to errors on various sides. Sacrifices cannot be resolved into mere acts of adoration or thank-offerings, nor into certain necessary relations between the different portions of the world, which certainly exist but do not determine the acts and purposes of the gods, who are above nature. All supposed physical analogies between lower natures and the
Section V. c. 1—10. higher celestial natures, such as the animal worshippers of Egypt imagined, are discarded for the same reason. The origin of sacrifices must be drawn from the gods themselves, from a friendship and sympathy between the creators and the things created, the begetters and those who are begotten. The gods
c. 11. do not feed upon the matter of sacrifices; the fire burns that up. The fire is the counterpart of a divine fire, which has the effect of separating the corrupt elements in the man from the divine and the celestial. (This meaning is certainly contained in the words, but, by a natural and sufficiently common process of thought, the material and immaterial fires become so blended in Abammon's discourse, that the distinction between them is not always perceptible to us, nor perhaps to himself.) The kinds of sacrifices are then shown to correspond to the different kinds of the gods, to the character and state of the worshipper, to the threefold division of human life,—into the purely intellectual, the physical, and that which is compounded of both. Forms of Sacrifice. c. 18. Seeing that there is this proportion and relation, there must be a theurgic science to ascertain the number and orders of the gods, and the sacrifice which is appropriate to each. The greatest damage may accrue to man from leaving any one of

the superior beings unheeded, or not heeded in his own proper
Worship of the One. method. Then comes out the very essence of the whole Neo-Platonic divinity. Might not the sacrifices be better if they were directed to *the* one, and if in him all the various substances
c. 22. and powers were worshipped together? No doubt. But this possibility comes very late, and to a very, very few: a man may be glad enough if it happens to him at the end of his life. And since the universe is composed of a number of different orders, we must try by the number and variety of sacrifices to comprehend them all.

Threats. 54. In the next section he defends the different usages of Egyptian worship, apologising for the threats which the theurgist
§ VI. c. 5. uses as being directed to the inferior dæmons, who are entrusted with some of the secrets of the universe which they might
c. 7. reveal. They may be held in check by the terrors of the priestly authority, which is wielded in the name of the higher gods. The Egyptians, he intimates, whose worship is more addressed to the dæmons, occasionally introduce these threats into the higher worship. This is an error from which the Chaldæans, who address themselves more to the higher gods, are free. Abammon
Theosophy. then enters upon an explanation of the Egyptian theosophy; affirms its general principle to be, that the gods delight in
§ VII. c. 1—5. making all lower things typical of the higher; touches upon the Lotus and the Zodiac; defends the use of barbarous names rather than of Greek—the former being original and of divine institution, and especially dedicated to divine mysteries and communion—the latter having been altered according to human art and pleasure. Entering further into the belief of his countrymen, in reply to Porphyry's question respecting their notion of a primary cause, he declares the doctrine of Hermes to be, that, before all substances and the principalities of the world, there is one God, earlier than the first god and king, remaining unmoved in the singleness of his own unity. For neither is the intellectual interwoven with him nor anything
Sect. VIII. 1—8. else. He is his own archetype,—his own Father,—begotten from himself,—*the* good. For he is greatest and first, and fountain of all things, and root of all the intelligible forms. . . . He is the beginning and the God of gods, a monad out of the one, the first substance and the beginning of substance. He is the ruler of the Noetic principalities which are the oldest of all, above the empyreal, and ætherial, and celestial. Next to this being comes Eicton, the first of the intelligences,—to be worshipped in silence: then Emeth, Ammon, Osiris, and so forth. Matter was produced by dividing the essence from that in which it inheres; or, as the author says, despising the obvious jokes of scoffers, by dividing materiality from essentiality. Hermes

taught the Egyptians how to ascend from the natural and fatal to the divine. It is a mistake to say that they subject the human will to the movement of the stars; the gods are above fate, and men ascending to the gods partake of their freedom.

The dæmon within. 55. Touching for a while upon the astrological speculations of the Egyptians, Abammon denies that the dæmon who rules over
§ IX. 1—9. a man's life and destiny is to be ascertained from any observation of the stars. The dæmon who rules in a man existed before the soul came down to birth,—he is present with the soul, he rules its proper life; all our thoughts have their origin from him; all we do he puts into our minds, and leads us on till by the help of the priestly theurgy we acquire a god instead of a dæmon as leader of our souls: then he gives place to one higher than himself. The writer concludes with asserting the high and pure motives of the theurgist. He finds man fallen from the vision of God,—he knows that he can only be blessed by recovering that vision: his whole business is to lead him up by gradual steps till he connects his spirit, freed from all matter, with the eternal word. The perfect good is God himself; the good of man is unity with him. Abammon prays the gods, for himself and correspondent, that they would grant them to hold fast all right thoughts; that they would infuse into them
Concluding prayer. and keep within them the truth for ever; that they would vouchsafe them a more perfect participation of divine knowledge,
§ X. c. 8. wherein consists the blessed accomplishment of all other good things; and would grant them the enjoyment of sympathy and fellowship with each other.

The views of the Church. 56. Long as has been our report of this celebrated treatise, we believe we have saved our readers' time by our copious analysis of it. For it anticipates so much of all the arguments, good and evil, by which theurgy has been defended from that day to this; it is so very much abler than most of the imitations of it which have been produced in later times; the depth and truth of some of its principles serve so admirably to expose the abuse of them; that we shall have but to refer back to Abammon as having already told us all that can be told of the subject. The one question we have to consider, before we leave the third century and enter upon the more stirring subjects which present themselves to us in the fourth, is in what relation the Christian Church stood to this philosophico-theological party,—whether it had anything to do with the questions which were discussed between Porphyry and Abammon,—to which side of the controversy its weight must have inclined.

57. No one, we suppose, can doubt for an instant that the debate was one which concerned the Christian student most

deeply, or that he had many motives which must have drawn him each way. How gladly might he hail the keen and searching interrogations by which Porphyry seemed to lay bare the whole theory of polytheistic worship, making its hollowness evident! What a satisfaction to claim the skilful antagonist of the Church, as a witness against the Heathen world! But, on the other hand, how much of Abammon's doctrine coincided with the most sacred and precious portions of their own! How entirely he was at one with them, as for the end for which man lives and which he is to pursue! How well he had defended their own great principle that God himself is the author of all the good that comes to men; that the prayers and sacrifices which ascend to Him must themselves originate with Him! How clearly, too, he had asserted a direct affinity between God and His creatures, and had made this and not some external edict the foundation of worship! Surely such views had more of the Christian savour in them than the proud negative criticism of the mere philosopher.

Inclinations to each side.

Fondness for Thaumaturgy.

56. Nor must it be concealed that the Christians of this age had another point of attraction to the school of Abammon and Iamblichus. The love of theurgy, or thaumaturgy, was as natural to them as to any other men in the empire. They believed that their Master had asserted his control over the powers of nature, and over the life of man. They believed that His followers were to do greater works than even He did upon earth. It was only at times that they could see that the startling and the prodigious did not belong to the essence of His works,—was scarcely an accident of them; that they were calm, regular, restorative, asserting God's control, and, in a subordinate sense, man's control over the influences and energies of nature; vindicating laws rather than producing exceptions.—It was not to be expected that that which looked wonderful to a sensual, magic-ridden people, should not seem most wonderful to them, and the highest sign of Christ's dominion. Bitter experience was needful to prove how quickly such an apprehension might lead them back into the heart of the idolatry from which they believed that miracles and all other divine manifestations had been intended as the deliverance. Other aspects of the priestly doctrine closely connected with these, also would be welcomed with only too much readiness. Mutatis mutandis, Abammon had put forth more clever pleas for the honouring of relics, for the respect which was just beginning to be paid to local saints, for speculations about the angelic host and their relationship to men, than any refiner of their own could have supplied; a plea just as much qualified as theirs could have been by protests against vulgar, materializing idolatry. Where,

then, was their standing point? Might some of them be Porphyrians, and some of them Iamblichians? Or, did their faith hang in an uncertain balance between the two?

General conclusions.

57. These who speak of Christianity as a religion, or a collection of dogmas, and of the Church as a set of doctors, will, if they are faithful to the facts, return the most various answers to these questions. Those who regard the Church in the light in which it presented itself to the Roman Emperors, and in which it was proclaimed by Christ himself and his apostles, as a kingdom, can understand why it was possible that its subjects should have been utterly unable to represent their position adequately in a theory, and should have exhibited in their writings many of the confusions which were incidental to all existing theories, yet should have maintained their ground and enlarged their borders in the midst of the most tremendous persecutions from without, and of their own imperfections and contradictions within. The root, it would seem, of Porphyry's inability to reach to Heaven by philosophy, the warrant for the theurgy of Abammon, and for the infinite superstitions which lay within it, was the same. If there was no one living person in whom the Creator and the creature met, one of these schemes was inevitable, neither could attain its result. If there, was the history of the world would shew, what Christian as little as Heathen teachers could shew, where the philosophical and theological methods really coincide: how impracticable and how useless to mankind are any artificial experiments for bringing them into harmony.

CHAPTER III.

The Fourth Century.

The new era.

1. The transition from the reign of Diocletian to the reign of Constantine strikes the ecclesiastical historian as the most violent in history. He speaks of the age of persecution as terminating in the age of patronage, the most violent and systematic effort ever made to exterminate a society in the acknowledgment of it to the exclusion of every other. The civil historian finds more points of resemblance between the periods; Diocletian had weakened the prestige of the ancient capital before Constantine established the new one. The forms of the Republic were already giving place to oriental habits and arrangements which were to be adopted and consecrated by the new faith in Byzantium. The historian of philosophy finds the later period evolving itself very naturally out of the previous one; yet no one is more compelled than he is to take notice of the great crisis which separates them.

Constantine how far a Neo-Platonist.

2. The Neo-Platonic philosophy has been called in of late years to explain some phenomena in the life of the first Christian Emperor. It may serve that purpose if we are careful to recollect that Constantine was a Roman and not a Greek, a soldier and not a sophist. Whatever influence he received from the schools, came to him changed and transformed by the world's atmosphere. He probably believed, as the teachers of the new sect believed, that there was a supreme and universal God; he believed that that supreme God had subordinate gods and dæmons through whom his power was exercised, his existence and character manifested to men. But there is no reason to suppose that he had ever formally embraced these tenets, or that he knew that they were maintained by any celebrated teachers, or that he had remoulded his traditional Paganism in conformity with them. They were in all probability the common, prevalent notions among men of ordinary education, who were capable of receiving the impressions of the age to which they belonged, and who, without comparing them or reducing them into system, had eyes open to read the commentaries upon them which experience supplied. The old forms, simply as forms, had lost their hold upon men of this character. Galerius or Maximianus might uphold them as part of the military code which it was a breach of discipline to transgress; Diocletian might support them as an imperial theory: but a young man bred under the moderate and liberal Constantius, observing the failure of their experiments though made on so large a scale, and on the whole with so much skill, might, even if his personal feelings had not been disgusted, have arrived gradually at the conclusion that they were pledged to a hopeless cause. Yet no *doctrine*, we may be sure, could ever commend itself to his mind as having a special claim upon his devotion and sympathy; he never could have exchanged that belief which was bound up with the history of his country and of the world, for the most reasonable theosophy or dæmonology. He was only discontented with that belief because it was evidently weak, too weak to uphold a polity such as Rome ought to be; he tried it by such a standard, not because he was insincere, or regarded religious sanctions as the inventions of priests or sages, but because he had no other proof that they were more than this, that they were fixed and divine, except so far as they sufficed for the political end.

To be judged as an ordinary Roman.

3. To suppose all these processes for a long time at work in his mind, is not to pronounce an opinion whether he actually saw the vision which he spoke of in his later years, on the eve of his battle with Maxentius; far less is it to suggest the thought that he did not really arrive at the conclusion that the cross was the sign in which he must conquer, or that he was not led to that conclusion by the highest of all teachers. What we wish to intimate is, that the conviction, however suddenly brought home in its full power to Constantine—and it may be quite consistent with reason and experience that there should have been a critical moment which decided his whole after-course—that the eagle must stoop to the symbol of ignominy and crime, had been working itself out in the mind of a man, by all the experiences of his life, and in the mind of a people by the experiences of several generations. What we would wish Christians, and those who are not Christians, equally to consider, is whether all such thoughts, and the circumstances which suggested them, do not more imply a spiritual guide of man, and one who uses events for man's education, than the apparition of the Labarum, were it authenticated by the most absolute evidence, could possibly do.

His conversion gradual.

The Church and the Empire in their union

4. Henceforth, then, that polity which confessed a moral and metaphysical basis—which affirmed that there was a supernatural Will and a righteous Will, who was holding its members together and binding them into one—was acknowledged by the polity which seemed to rest on a mere arbitrary and earthly will, as necessarily yoked with it, as in some sense its superior. The Empire which could not gratify the modest ambition of Plotinus

by allowing him to set up a Platonopolis in Campania, had deliberately conceded to a set of men whom they had persecuted perseveringly for ten years, and at intervals for two hundred, the right of establishing *their* city in every province of the Empire; of reorganising the institutions of Rome, and of introducing their own at its very outset into the new Constantinople. The blow to the tottering idols of the east and west was tremendous; but it was scarcely a less severe blow to the rising philosophy. For Ammonius, if not a deserter from the Christian ranks, had at least hoped that his occult philosophy would have undermined its broad and popular statements: Plotinus had substituted the ascent of the divine man into the original and absolute divinity, for the idea of the Son of God stooping to take Man's nature. Porphyry had felt and expressed the opposition which was latent in his master; Iamblichus, and the school most opposed to Porphyry, were deliberately trying to resuscitate Polytheism, and to make its notions of divine descents into earthly natures harmonise with the Greek wisdom, which they said had originally been borrowed from the Egyptian Hermes. By the middle of Constantine's reign, Licinius had gathered together some of the ruder elements of Paganism, and had engaged them in a religious war. But it needed some other head to associate polytheism, Greek philosophy, the dream of old Roman glory, in one valiant effort against the new faith: nor could such a person appear till that faith had already been mightily shaken from within, and till some of the strange effects of the union of the Empire and the Church had made themselves apparent.

Its effects on the Platonic school.

Connection of the Arian controversy with philosophy.

5. The Arian controversy, which affected so seriously the civil condition of the Empire, is no less involved with the history of philosophy. We have seen how much all questions of this time turned upon the relation between the highest being and some power or powers at some distance below him, more nearly related to man The faith of Constantine had probably assigned some indistinct place of this kind to Him whom he nevertheless had acknowledged as supreme over himself and the Roman world. When Arius, in language not very intelligible to the Emperor, affirmed the inferiority of Christ to the Father of All, he could feel no serious objection to the statement, though he was anxious that the subject should not be stirred. When the earnestness of the combatants made his mode of reconciliation ineffectual, he wisely appealed to a council, and enforced its decrees though they asserted the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. But he repented of that course when he perceived that the dispute was not at rest, and readily embraced the dexterous suggestions of Eusebius, so well fitted for the temper

of the monarch, and indicating such an accurate judgment of the desire for quiet in the better sort of the Clergy—of promotion in the worse—that the addition of a single iota to the formula would satisfy the minds of all reasonable people. Athanasius had courage to resist that proposition, believing that it involved nothing less than the inroad of all the Neo-Platonic dæmonology, and with that, of all Heathenism; believing that the church stood as a Society and a Kingdom upon the acknowledgment of a person in whom the Godhead and Manhood were actually reconciled. The Emperor and his son Constantius treated him as an enemy and as the disturber of the world. A majority of the Eastern Bishops agreed with them, and Semi-Arianism triumphed in the palace of the Cæsars and in the councils of the Church—every where except in the deserts of the Thebais and amidst some, not all, the Bishops of the West—till the time of Julian.

Feelings of Athanasius.

6. That young man had enough of reason for hating the memory of his uncle, and the acts of his cousin; enough of excuse for regarding the prelates of Constantinople with contempt. He might have dreamed, he probably did dream, while he was yet in the court where his nearest relations had been murdered, that the days of the older Cæsars would return, if the faith which they professed returned also. He might have the most plausible reasons for thinking that the house which seemed to him to stand on such a new and feeble foundation, would *not* stand now that it was divided against itself. Athens was needed to ripen these thoughts into maturity; Julian had enough of knowledge to recall something of its ancient greatness,—enough of imagination to feel that that glory was not departed while there were still philosophers to teach in its garden. These philosophers opened to him the Neo-Platonic mysteries; mixed with them lay the brilliant forms of the old Mythology, which they could again bring to light. His strength might have evaporated in these visions; his commission to Gaul, and his campaign there, made him conscious of more active powers, and shewed him that he was qualified to rule an army or a people. The three conditions which were necessary for the representative and champion of the world that had fallen, met in him. He entered all armed with the sympathies of a great multitude, with the abilities of a man of letters, and with the command of an Empire, upon the task which he had assigned himself.

Education of Julian.

7. Julian lived only thirty-three years, and reigned only two. But a great part of the thought and mind of his age is expressed in that brief life. The experiment which philosophers had been making in their closets, and continued to make for two centuries, began to be tried on a scale commensurate with

Importance of his history.

its importance, when he arrived at Constantinople and found himself in possession of the empire; was terminated when he fell in Persia. No one has ever questioned his ability, the steadiness of his purpose, or the greatness of his zeal. He had too full a share of prudence. He concealed his attachment to the old gods till he could assist effectually in re-establishing their worship. His measures for that purpose had all the air of being tolerant measures, while yet they effectually crippled the Christians, and would soon have deprived them of what was infinitely more precious than court patronage,—the means of obtaining education. What is important for our purpose is, that Julian fancied himself primarily a philosopher, that his devotion to the Sun, and Minerva, and Serapis, seemed to him a part of his philosophy; that he valued his imperial position mainly because it enabled him to do the work which he supposed was demanded by philosophy. Jovian, who followed him, was simply a soldier. Valens, his successor in the East, was a theological dogmatist; Valentinian, a Roman, who looked upon Christian orthodoxy in the way Decius and Aurelian had looked upon Pagan orthodoxy, as that which it behoved well-disciplined soldiers to uphold. Theodosius, something in the same spirit, but with a character of greater breadth formed in a school of suffering, deliberately trampled upon Arianism with one foot and on Paganism with the other, leaving the first, when it could no longer rule in the palace of the Cæsars, to find a home among the Gothic tribes; the other, when its Greek, Egyptian, Italian temples were overthrown, to intrench itself secretly and securely in the heart of the Catholic church. The miserable reigns of Arcadius and Honorius link this century to the one which saw the downfall of the western empire.

Progress of the history; characters of the emperors.

8. There are many names in this century which are dear to the ecclesiastical biographer; a few on which the ordinary annalist may dwell. There are three men whom the student of philosophy must pause to contemplate.—the two we have mentioned already, Athanasius and Julian, the third, Augustin. The theologian may consider this last thinker under the fifth century, which contains the period of his episcopacy, and of his battles with Donatists and Pelagians. But the time in which his mind was formed, the Manichæan portion of his history, is the one in which we are mainly interested. We shall endeavour to give our readers just so many extracts from the writings of each of these men as may explain why we introduce them. and how we suppose they illustrate their time.

The three men of this time.

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9. In the oration against the Gentiles, Athanasius speaks thus:—In the beginning Evil was not, even as now it is not in

Extract from Athanasius: Λόγος κατα ἑλλήνων.

the saints, nor hath any substantial existence in respect of them. But afterwards men conceived it, and, to their own injury, put it into forms. Wherefore also they conceived the notion of idols, counting the things that are not as though they were. For God, the Former of all, and the universal King, He that transcends all substance and human knowledge, being good and superlatively excellent, by His own Word our Saviour Jesus Christ made the human race in His own image, and fitted him (man,) through this likeness to behold and take cognizance of the things which are; giving him also the perception and knowledge of his own eternity; that preserving this resemblance (or identity, *τὴν ταυτότητα*) he might never at any time withdraw from the vision of God, nor depart from the fellowship of the saints; but holding fast the grace of Him that bestowed it, and that proper power which he received from the Word of the Father, he might rejoice in the Divinity, and hold converse with Him, living a harmless and truly blessed and immortal life. For having nothing to hinder his knowledge of the Godhead, he beholds always through his own purity the image of the Father in whose image he was made. And he wonders as he contemplates the providence over the universe, which comes through Him, being made far above the sensible things and all bodily phantasy in contact through his noetic faculty with the divine and noetic things. For when the reason of men doth not converse with bodies, then hath it not any mixture of the desire which comes from these, but is wholly at one with itself, as it was from the beginning. Then passing through sensible and human things, it becomes raised up, and beholding the Word, sees in Him also the Father of the Word, delights itself with the contemplation of Him, continually renews itself afresh with the longing after Him; even as the Holy Scriptures say that man (who in the Hebrew tongue was called Adam) with unashamed boldness maintained his mind towards God, and had intercourse with the saints in that contemplation of noetic things which he held in the place figuratively named by Moses Paradise. For the purity of the soul is such that through it one may even see God; as our Lord says, in his beatitudes. Well, the Architect thus prepared man, and wished him thus to remain. But men having despised the nobler substances, and having become wearied of pursuing these, sought rather for those that were nearer to themselves. The nearer things were the body and its sensations; whereby men withdrew their reason from noetic things; contemplating themselves and occupying themselves with the body and other sensible objects: beguiled as it were in that which was their own, they fell into the love of themselves, preferring that which was theirs to the contemplation of that which is God's. And

Proper condition of man.

Man's connection with the spiritual world.

Declension

having become thoroughly engaged with these, and not being willing to withdraw from those things which were close at hand, they shut up in the pleasures of the body their soul, which was disturbed and confused with all manner of lusts. At last they forgot altogether that faculty of theirs which they had from God. And this truth one might see from that which the Holy Scriptures speak concerning the first man that was formed. For he who had his mind towards God, and the contemplation of Him, withheld himself from that contemplation which turns downward towards the body. But when, through the counsel of the serpent, he withdrew from that reason which looks towards God, and began to take account of himself, straightway he and his wife fell into the lust of the body, and knew that they were naked, and in consequence of that knowledge were ashamed. They knew themselves naked, not so much of clothes, but that they had become naked of the vision of divine things, and had turned their mind toward that which was contrary to these. When they had apostatized from that knowledge which has respect to the one and the living Being, I mean God, and from the love which is towards Him, they rushed thenceforth into the divided and partial lusts of the body. Then, as is wont to happen, having embraced the desire of each thing, and of many things, they began to be so bound and fastened to these, that they feared to let them go. Hence there came to the soul cowardly anticipations and terrors, and all thoughts that savour of mortality. For not wishing to part with its desires, it fears death and the separation from the body. And coveting again and not being able to obtain things answering to its desires, it learnt violence and murder. How it doth these things it may be right as far as we can to explain. Having revolted from the contemplation of noetic things, misusing the partial energies of the body, pleased with the contemplation, and fancying pleasure to be good for it, it abuses in its confusion that name of the good, and thinks pleasure to be the actual good. Just as a madman asks for a sword to strike every one he meets with, and convinces himself that he is playing the part of a wise man. And being enamoured of pleasure, the soul began to use its energies in various ways. For being by nature quick and free of movement, it must retain this quality even after it has withdrawn from the good; only it is moved no longer according to virtue nor so as to see God, but prizing the things that are not, having free-will either to turn to the good or to turn away from it, it misuses all the power which belongs to it for the gratification of those lusts which it has conceived. And it finds in virtue of this free will that it can direct the different portions of its body both ways, either to the things that are or the things that are not. The things that are, are the good, inasmuch as they are

The complete Fall.

The consequences of Evil to the

Pleasure becomes the good.

the likenesses of the God who is. The things that are not, I call the evil things, inasmuch as they have been fashioned by the thoughts of men." Athanasius then proceeds to point out how each member and energy of the body is turned away from the special good for which it was formed, and to the evil which is the perversion of it, winding up with the words: "All which things are the soul's corruption and sin. But of these there is no other cause save the revolt from the higher and better things. As if a charioteer should be utterly careless of the goal towards which it behoves him to drive; should merely urge the horses just as he can (and where he can, means where he likes); and so oft-times he falls foul of those who meet with him; oft-times he is carried down precipices, whither by help of the swiftness of the horses he has conveyed himself, all the time not thinking that he has erred from his aim; he looks only to the chariot." Then, after quoting the passage from St. Paul, respecting the prize of his high calling, he adds: "Certain of the Greeks having wandered from the right way, and not having known the Christ, have affirmed evil to be in substance, and to have an actual existence of its own, grounding this opinion upon one of two errors. Either they deny the Demiurgus to be the creator of the things that are, or they say, because He is the creator of the universe He must needs be the creator of evil. For evil, according to them, is among the things that are. But the evil does not come out of the good, nor is it in it, nor is it through it. For that would not be good which had a mixed nature, or which was the cause of evil. The heretics, too, who have fallen from the Church's teaching, and have made shipwreck of faith, they also fancy evil to have a substance. And they feign to themselves another God besides the true Father of the Christ, and make him the unbegotten author of evil, the introducer of mischief, the Demiurgus of the creation." These he proceeds to confute from the Scriptures.

Ground of the notion that Evil is part of creation.

10. Much we think is to be learnt from this extract respecting the character and purpose of its author, and also respecting the movements of his time. Many who have only heard of Athanasius as a theologian, or who have heard that he had far less of intellectual training than other churchmen of the century, such as Basil and Gregory, or who rightly conceive of him as a man mainly remarkable for energetic action and that power of writing letters on business for which Gibbon gives him abundant credit, will be surprised to find how much of the Alexandrian habit of thought belongs to him, how naturally he uses the philosophical dialect, how much there is to connect a work so professedly Christian and polemical as this with those which are ostentatiously Platonic. Even the specimen we have given will prevent them

Athanasius a philosopher.

from supposing that these characteristics are owing to any propensity which Athanasius had for heathen teachers, from any want of readiness to follow Tertullian in connecting the heretics of the Church with them. It was for the most thoroughly practical purpose that he betook himself to what some of our later divines and ecclesiastical historians delight to call 'mystical refinements.' He found that idolatry, the whole scheme of outward and sensual worship, could only be resisted by a decided pertinacious assertion that man is a spiritual being, and in that character has a distinct relation to a spiritual author and a spiritual object. Had he disowned what is called Mysticism, merely regarding the Scriptures as the revelation of an outward economy, of certain doctrines to be held, of certain precepts to be followed, the magnificent outward economy of the Roman empire, the doctrines so subtle and ingenious—touching human experience on so many sides—of the new philosophical school, the various precepts for good or evil which had descended as heir-looms from the past, or were struck out by sage moderns, would certainly have prevailed. It was only if he could show that what he held to be a revelation from God actually discovered the true constitution of Man; only if he could show that it was by resisting and breaking loose from this constitution that men had become disorderly, evil, idolatrous; only if he could show that the Christian economy or church involved the recognition of this true constitution, and was based upon it, and that any world-system, however compact and coherent, which assumed any other basis, which rested upon the worship of visible things, and derived its sanction from that worship, must be rotten and inhuman,—only then could he hope that Paganism would really fall, by whatsoever powers, visible or invisible, it might be upheld. How well founded the conclusion was, we think is made sufficiently clear by the writings which interpret the acts, and the acts which interpret the writings of the Emperor Julian.

Connection of his philosophy with his practical objects.

His life a struggle against idolatry.

Lost books.

11. It seems to us that in general too many lamentations are wasted over lost books. Without attempting to controvert the extravagant conceit of Bacon—that only the lightest treasures have floated down the stream of time, while the heaviest have sunk—by maintaining the opposite doctrine, which might be equally unreasonable, we may question whether chasms in books of history have not awakened a diligence and spirit of investigation for which the lost documents would have been a very feeble compensation, whether the books of poetry which have disappeared might not rather have disturbed than completed our image of the artist from whom they came. We certainly have no such transcendant opinion of Julian's writings as to make

him an exception from this remark, and to wish very earnestly that certain lost volumes which the industry of Christian divines is said to have suppressed, should have survived. And yet that act, however well intended, seems to us so exceedingly faithless, and has evidently left such a strange suspicion on many minds of something having been uttered by him which was especially profound and dangerous, that we may confess a stronger temptation to regret this act of violence than many others which have deprived us of possessions more intrinsically valuable. It might have been exceedingly instructive to have every possible help for ascertaining the habit and course of thinking in such a man. It might have enabled us to understand much better wherein lay the weakness of that society which he was seeking to undermine; what that strength was which prevailed against him.

The books of Julian against Christianity

Folly of those who destroyed them.

12. The books which remain to us may, however, be sufficient for our purpose. Nothing can exceed the vehement affection with which Julian, in his epistles, addresses his philosophical friends. Libanius is always his "most sweet and beloved brother." On receiving one of his orations, he falls into a rapture. "What a style! What composition! What divisions! What arguments! What order! What harmony!" &c. He implores Aristomenes to come to him; for though he has never seen his face, he loves him, and wants him to show in Cappadocia what a true Greek is. He reads over the letters of Maximus as Alexander went to sleep with the poems of Homer under his pillow. He entreats him with the profoundest humility to take his writings under his care, not because he is sure they are worth any thing, but because, like an old eagle, he may carry up the unfledged eaglets into the air, that the rays of the sun may ascertain whether they are genuine or bastard. Just at the time when he has been proclaimed Emperor by the legions in Gaul, he writes to the same friend expressing the intense anxiety he has felt for him, and calls Jupiter and the Sun to witness how he invoked them (not openly, for that would not have been safe), to know whether there were any calamities likely to befall him. Now, he tells him, he publicly and openly worships the gods—intimating clearly that he owed to Maximus some of his strongest impulses to this service, and that he looked upon the obligation as the greatest which any man could incur. But his profoundest admiration is reserved for Iamblichus. As soon as he saw a man who he supposed was bringing letters from the philosopher, he says he leapt up, embraced him, and wept for joy. When he had the letters themselves, he kissed them, put them to his eyes, held them fast, for fear lest the image of his countenance should depart while he was reading

Letters of Julian to Libanius.

To Maximus

To Iamblichus.

the lines. He tells him that not only Pindar and Democritus and old Orpheus, but the whole body of Greeks who have attained to the height of philosophy, have been brought by him into the most perfect musical symphony; that he has the hundred eyes of Argus to guard the pure form of virtue; that his wisdom can take all the various forms which Proteus assumed; but that instead of hiding himself like Proteus, he sends forth rays of light like the sun which illuminates those near and those afar off.

These professions not dishonest.

13. These rhapsodies we firmly believe to be honest. Extravagant as they sound, they are not unnatural in a young man escaping from teachers whom he utterly loathed, and whose gross inconsistencies and worldliness offered great excuse for his dislike; to men who told him things which sounded most wonderful, and carried with them an air of demonstration, who led him into what seemed to him a newer and freer world, yet one which he recognised as the old world wherein his fathers had dwelt. Most of us have been too familiar with emotions not very dissimilar—the result, alas! of causes not at all dissimilar—in men of our own time, to be incredulous when we hear words of this kind from an enthusiast of the fourth century. But while we regard these utterances as in themselves sincere, we do not believe that they belong to the sincerest part of Julian's mind. He is evidently gazing at philosophy as a distant prodigy with which naturally he has very little to do, and which overawes him because he cannot approach it or closely grapple with it. It would be as unjust to compare him with Caliban, as to compare Maximus or Libanius with Trinculo; yet his prostrations and exclamations at the taste of the liquor they present to him, make us feel that it was as strange to the lips of the imperial youth as the wine was to the savage. It was not, however, for its own sake chiefly that he delighted in it. His clever, lively, and instructive book on the festival of the Cæsars, explains to what use he believed it might be turned; how seriously he hoped that the doctrines of the Pagan sage would save the empire which he thought that the Church was destroying, which he had good right to think that it would not be permitted to save.

Their extravagance accounted for.

Julian's Cæsars.

14. The Cæsars of Julian were written during the Saturnalia. He is not given to joke, he says, but since he wishes to preserve the rites of that season, he will try to compose something which shall be profitable without being too grave. He fulfils his promise. His humour, though not rich or various, is easy and pleasant. The different Cæsars of the old time are invited to a feast with the gods—Quirinus and Hercules introducing them. Some two or three are rejected as too odious even for the lowest

Purpose and method of the book.

places at such a repast; the others are encouraged to produce their different merits, that the gods may judge between them. Silenus sits by, acting the licensed fool at the divine court, and suggesting various topics of accusation against the past lives of the Emperors. By special favour, Alexander is allowed to appear, that Greece may have its own representative. The acts of the candidates are first proclaimed, Silenus always reminding them of some that had escaped their memory. But the gods observe that acts may be owing in a great degree to fortune; the purpose of the actors is far more important. Alexander is asked what he thought the most excellent of all things, and to what intent he worked and suffered. "That he might bring all things into subjection," he answers. Mercury asks him whether he thinks he succeeded. Alexander believes he did. "Ah! no," says Silenus, "my daughters, the grapes, conquered you." Alexander being well skilled in Aristotelian logic, replies that his battle was not with inanimate things, but with the race of beasts and men. "Consummate dialectician! in which class do you place yourself," enquires the scoffer. "Are you one of the inanimate things? For you were beaten continually by yourself, by your own anger or grief." "I was not thinking about myself," says Alexander. "When you talk of conquering yourself, you use an equivocal expression." "Capital logic again!" cries Silenus; "but that Indian who wounded you, had not he the better of you?" "Stop," cries Dionysus, seeing that Alexander is becoming furious, "or he will deal with you as he did with Clitus." Upon which Alexander is so abashed that he retires from the contest. Each of the Romans gives an answer different from that of Alexander, but in the same spirit: a slight cross-examination demolishes it. No one comes off so badly as Constantine. His highest ambition, according to Julian, was to get many things to himself, then to give many things away; ministering first to his own lusts, then to those of his friends. But when Marcus Aurelius was called he answers that the purpose of his life was to imitate the gods. He is asked what that imitation consisted in. He answers, "to want as few things for himself as possible, and to do as much good as possible to the greatest number." Silenus raises the usual objections; valid ones on the ground of his indulgence of Faustina and Commodus, which Marcus rather sophistically takes off. Another, on his little care for his own body, he affirms to be part of his imitation of the gods.

The seekers of fame discredited.

Conquest of self.

Character of Constantine.

Julian's hero Marcus Aurelius.

His maxims of life.

15. We have given a summary of Julian's best work, not only for the sake of doing him justice, but because it throws a light upon his scheme of life. Marcus was to be his model. *He* had sought to preserve the Empire by exalting philosophy

How Julian hoped to imitate him.

against Christianity; Julian would make the same experiment. He had motives of indignation which Marcus had not. He had seen Christians tried in a new position, and had reason to know how large a portion had disgraced themselves in the trial. Iamblichus and Maximus were greater than any of the stoics who surrounded Marcus. Besides, they had been proved in this very conflict. The new Platonism had come forth expressly to resist and supersede Christianity. It had not triumphed yet. But then how little encouragement it had received from those Pagan emperors who were most earnest to put down the church; how it had been frowned upon by the recent protectors of the church! What might it not do if it were only supported by one who was ready to carry out its precepts even more thoroughly than Marcus had carried out the precepts of stoicism; who, instead of craving for the indulgences which Christian monarchs had thought necessary, was as indifferent to food, sleep, cleanliness, as any Christian monk could possibly be; who detested the theatres and the circus as much as any one of the Galileans; who could adopt those charitable practices which had made them so much reverenced in the days of their poverty; who could reform the heathen priesthood upon the model of their austerer men.

Hopes from new Platonism.

Julian's indifference to bodily decencies. See his Misopogon, p. 39, Ed. Paris, 1583.

16. But though this political end was, we apprehend, predominant in Julian's mind over any passion for philosophy merely as such, we should be wrong to overlook another tendency which is apparent in all his writings. The most genuine and most pleasant passages in his letters, as well as in his more formal treatises, are certainly those which refer to outward nature. When he speaks of a beautiful country or a pleasant climate (like that of his dear Paris, though this city he loved also for the contrast which its rude Celtic inhabitants afforded to the gay theatre-loving citizens of Antioch) he seems to forget himself more than at any other time, and to be more carried away by the recollection of sounds and sights, and by his own emotions. One of his longest letters is about the growth and beauty of the fig-tree, and any topic of the kind has evidently far more true charm for him than the noetic speculations in which he fancied that he took so great an interest. A considerable part of his affection for the old idolatry seems to have arisen from this cause. It was a gratification of that admiration for visible things which the teaching in the Christian schools may very possibly have chilled rather than cultivated. Though there are traces in the letters of Basil, and Gregory of Nazianzum, of the same feeling, for their education had been in many respects similar—Athens had been a foster-mother to all three—yet in general the metaphysics of the divines of that century would

Julian's love of nature.

See the passage in the Misopogon beginning ἐτύγχανον ἐγὼ χειμάζων παρὰ τὴν φίλην Λευκετίαν, κ.τ.λ.

The letter to Serapion, p. 200, Ed. Paris.

Not a taste cultivated in the Christian Church.

seem to one very ardent in his sympathies with nature, cold and repellent. We may well conceive, if other counteracting influences were not strong, how ardently he would rush into a worship which clothed all outward powers and objects with that divinity which the Christians claimed for the invisible Father, the only-begotten Word, and the Divine Spirit.

17. Great evidence for this observation is to be found in Julian's "Hymn to the Sun." A considerable part of that celebrated composition, in which the author talks of the noetic and spiritual principles, the primary good, and so forth, is merely adopted from his teachers, as the "Essay on Man" was adopted from Bolingbroke. The part which is really his own is that wherein he tells us that there had been in him, from childhood upwards, an intense love of the eyes of this god, and that he had been raised up in his mind towards that ethereal light, and had longed to look steadily at it, and that all the beauties of the heavens had had an attraction for him, so that on a cloudless and clear night he became wholly occupied and absorbed, and could not understand what any one spoke to him or did to him; for which reason he was mistaken for a beardless astrologer, though he declares that no book of astrology had ever come into his hands, nor did he know what manner of thing it was. All these signs, he says, made him a follower and worshipper of the sun before he knew any thing about philosophy. Afterwards he presented himself to him as the glorious visible light in which all the intellectual and invisible was represented.

His Hymn to the Sun. Its philosophy

Introd. to the Hymn p. 23, Ed. Paris, 1583.

18. If the reader compares this last statement with the doctrine of Athanasius concerning the Light of Light, the very God of very God, he will, we think, have a key to the nature of Julian's idolatry, and indeed of all the philosophical idolatry of this century. The outward luminous object took the place of the Person in whom the Christian creed affirmed that the full divine glory was gathered up and manifested; the image to the eye was exchanged for the divine image of the invisible Father. The whole conflict was here. Julian perceived most clearly and rightly that it lay more between himself and Athanasius than between any other two men; that no earthly antagonist stood as much in the way of the restoration of the natural worship which he loved as the Bishop of Alexandria. And hence, we understand, too, the other cardinal difference between these two men,—a difference inseparably involved with this, which the extract we chose from Athanasius disclosed. While it would be exceedingly wrong to deny to Julian the honour of putting down many abuses and corruptions in the court of Constantinople, and in the empire generally, which Christian Cæsars to their shame had tolerated, it is equally impossible not to see

The teaching of Athanasius.

How related to these feelings of Julian's.

Julian's ignorance of the conflict with evil.

Transition of St. Augustin

that Evil never presented itself to his mind in its own nature and tenor, as something cleaving close to man, and from which he needs emancipation. The goodness, therefore, which Julian adored in the gods was not a power to which he fled from an enemy that was assaulting his own being. The gods were general divinities to whom he paid a homage which satisfied partly certain devout instincts of his own mind, partly the traditions of old Rome, partly his Athenian culture, partly his dislike of the faith which his uncle and his cousin had professed. On such foundations the edifice which had been thrown down was to be rebuilt. That on such a foundation nothing can stand—that the grounds of every faith, polity, philosophy, must be laid in the acknowledgment of a conflict between good and evil, and on the eternity and victory of the former—the life of the next man of whom we have to speak, illustrating as it does the experience of that age, and of many after ages, we think will sufficiently demonstrate.

Carthage.

19. When last we heard of Carthage and the African Church, it was in contrast with Alexandria. The Christian hatred of philosophy and love of law and rhetoric were represented in the person of Tertullian. The education of Augustin might have fitted him to be as much of a rhetorician as his eminent countryman; there were many qualities of his mind which such a discipline would be likely to call forth. If he became one of the class which Tertullian dreaded, it was not because his father was a heathen, or because he remained so long out of the bounds of the Church; still less was it because he received any extraneous Greek culture. If he did not take up philosophy for the sake of Christianity, he owed his Christianity in a great measure to his philosophy. And he was most thoroughly a Latin, attaining to Greek books, it would seem, chiefly through translations; his language and modes of thought belonging strictly to the West.

Augustin without Greek culture.

20. Of no one can it be so truly said as of Augustin, that he received his lore from within and not from without,—that all his knowledge was purchased by the fiercest personal struggles. Whether he resorted to the Manichees, or to Plato, or to the Bible, it was that he might find an interpretation of himself. He had no doubt a craving, felt in his youth and never lost, for a very definite system of opinions. But the influences which crossed this desire and drove him in search of another object were really the blessed influences of his life, those to which he owed all the strength of his own belief and all his power of teaching others. When he had got his system nearly complete under the voice which asked him, "What art thou?" and forced him in the heights or in the depths to find an answer to the

Driven from systems.

question, broke the thread of his speculations and forced him to begin anew. The oftener in his after life he heard that voice, and believed that it was the one which he was to make others hear, the more fresh and living and full of instruction for all ages did his words become. When he forgot it, and sought to build earthly tabernacles for Moses and Elias and his Divine Lord, his spirit became confused, and he forged afresh for mankind some of those very chains from which he had been set free.

Philosophy of the Confessions.

21. "The Confessions," though not the book to which any one would turn for the formal philosophy of Augustin, is really the key to it all. The book must be studied throughout, if we would understand those portions of it which bear directly upon our own subject: indeed, its whole meaning is lost if we suppose that the passages in it which concern philosophy are not as intimately connected with Augustin himself, as those which describe his first joyful discernment of the meaning of the New Testament: he never separates them himself. Our extracts will illustrate this remark, and may help the reader to appreciate the real significance of a book which is much read, but little known. The following passage is from the third book; it refers to the time when he was in the rhetorical school of Carthage, where he was surrounded by a reckless band of libertines:—

22. "Among such as these, in that unsettled age of mine, learned I books of eloquence, wherein I desired to be eminent, out of a damnable and vain-glorious end, a joy in human vanity. In the ordinary course of study I fell upon a certain book of Cicero, whose speech almost all admire; not so his heart. This book of his contains an exhortation to philosophy, and is called '*Hortensius.*' But this book altered my affections, and turned my prayers to Thyself, O Lord; and made me have other purposes and desires. Every vain hope at once became worthless to me; and I longed with an incredibly burning desire for an immortality of wisdom, and began now to arise, that I might return to Thee. For not to sharpen my tongue, (which thing I seemed to be purchasing with my mother's allowances, in that my nineteenth year, my father being dead two years before), not to sharpen my tongue did I employ that book; nor did it infuse into me its style, but its matter.

Cicero's Hortensius.

"How did I burn then, my God, how did I burn to re-mount from earthly things to Thee; nor knew I what Thou wouldest do with me. For with Thee is wisdom. But the love of wisdom is in Greek called 'philosophy,' with which that book inflamed me. Some there be that seduce through philosophy, under a great, and smooth, and honourable name colouring and disguising their own errors: and almost all who

Cicero a divine Teacher.

in that and former ages were such, are in that book censured and set forth: there also is made plain that wholesome advice of Thy Spirit, by Thy good and devout servant; *Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ. For in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.* And since at that time (Thou, O light of my heart, knowest) Apostolic Scripture was not known to me, I was delighted with that exhortation, so far only, that I was thereby strongly roused, and kindled, and inflamed to love, and seek, and obtain, and hold, and embrace not this or that sect, but wisdom itself whatever it were; and this alone checked me, thus enkindled, that the name of Christ was not in it.

22. The following passages from the 4th Book illustrate an important stage in his experience, and introduce us to his earliest work.

The Beautiful.

"These things I then knew not, and I loved these lower beauties, and I was sinking to the very depths, and to my friends I said, 'do we love anything but the beautiful? What then is the beautiful? and what is beauty? What is it that attracts and wins us to the things that we love? for unless there were in them a grace and beauty, they could by no means draw us unto them.' And I marked and perceived that in bodies themselves, there was a beauty, from their forming a sort of whole, and again, another from apt and mutual correspondence, as of a part of the body with its whole, or a shoe with a foot, and the like. And this consideration sprang up in my mind, out of my inmost heart, and I wrote 'on the fair and fit,' I think two or three books. Thou knowest, O Lord, for it is gone from me; for I have them not, but they are strayed from me, I know not how."

Beauty in the Visible.

"But I saw not yet, whereon this weighty matter turned in Thy wisdom, O Thou Omnipotent, *who only doest wonders;* and my mind ranged through corporeal forms; and 'fair,' I defined and distinguished what is so in itself, and 'fit,' whose beauty is in correspondence to some other thing: and this I supported by corporeal examples. And I turned to the nature of the mind; but the false notion which I had of spiritual things let me not see the truth. Yet the force of truth did of itself flash into mine eyes, and I turned away my panting soul from incorporeal substance to lineaments, and colours, and bulky magnitudes. And not being able to see these in the mind, I thought I could not see my mind. And whereas in virtue I loved peace, and in viciousness I abhorred discord; in the first I observed an unity, but in the other a sort of division. And in

that unity, I conceived the rational soul, and the nature of truth and of the chief good to consist: but in this division I miserably imagined there to be some unknown substance of irrational life, and the nature of the chief evil, which should not only be a substance, but real life also, and yet not derived from Thee, O my God, of whom are all things. And yet that first I called a Monad, as it had been a soul without sex; but the latter a Duad; anger, in deeds of violence, and in flagitiousness, lust; not knowing whereof I spake. For I had not known or learned, that neither was evil a substance, nor our soul that chief and unchangeable good."

23. The following passage shows how little the Aristotelian Logic was able to satisfy the cravings of the young student for absolute Goodness and Truth:—

"What did it profit me, that scarce twenty years old, a book of Aristotle, which they call the ten Predicaments, falling into my hands (on whose very name I hung, as on something great and divine, so often as my rhetoric master of Carthage, and others, accounted learned, mouthed it with cheeks bursting with pride,) I read and understood it unaided? On my conferring with others, who said that they scarcely understood it with very able tutors, not only orally explaining it, but drawing many things in sand, they could tell me no more of it than I had learned, reading it by myself. And the book appeared to me to speak very clearly of substances, such as 'man,' and of their qualities, as the figure of a man, of what sort it is; and stature, how many feet high; and his relationship, whose brother he is; or where placed; or when born; or whether he stands or sits; or be shod or armed; or does, or suffers any thing; and all the innumerable things which might be ranged under these nine Predicaments, of which I have given some specimens, or under that chief Predicament of Substance.'

The Predicaments.

"What did all this further me, seeing it even hindered me? when, imagining whatever was, was comprehended under those ten Predicaments, I essayed in such wise to understand, O my God, Thy wonderful and unchangeable Unity also, as if Thou also hadst been subjected to Thine own greatness or beauty; so that (as in bodies) they should exist in Thee, as their subject: whereas Thou Thyself art Thy greatness and beauty; but a body is not great or fair in that it is a body, seeing that, though it were less great or fair, it should notwithstanding be a body."

Beauty and Unity not conditions of God's Nature, but the very Nature.

24. His addiction to the Manicheans, his longing for Faustus, the promise of unbounded illumination from him on questions which the other members of the sect had not been able to resolve, and his grievous disappointment, are memorable and

well-known facts in his history. The following extract from the 5th Book explains the relation of his theory of Evil to the Christian Theology which he had partly received from his mother.

Evil supposed to have bulk.

"For hence I believed Evil also to be some such kind of substance, and to have its own foul, and hideous bulk; whether gross, which they called earth, or thin and subtile, (like the body of the air,) which they imagine to be some malignant mind, creeping through that earth. And because a piety, such as it was, constrained me to believe, that the good God never created any evil nature, I conceived two masses, contrary to one another, both unbounded, but the evil narrower, the good more expansive. And from this pestilent beginning, the other sacrilegious conceits followed on me. For when my mind endeavoured to recur to the Catholic faith, I was driven back, since that was not the Catholic faith, which I thought to be so. And I seemed to myself more reverential, if I believed of Thee, my God, (to whom Thy mercies confess out of my mouth,) as unbounded, at least on other sides, although on that one where the mass of evil was opposed to Thee, I was constrained to confess Thee bounded; than if on all sides I should imagine Thee to be bounded by the form of a human body. And it seemed to me better to believe Thee to have created no evil, (which to me ignorant seemed not some only, but a bodily substance, because I could not conceive of mind, unless as a subtile body, and that diffused in definite spaces,) than to believe the nature of evil, such as I conceived it, could come from Thee. Yea, and our Saviour himself, Thy Only Begotten, I believed to have been reached forth (as it were) for our salvation, out of the mass of Thy most lucid substance, so as to believe nothing of Him, but what I could imagine in my vanity. His nature, then, being such, I thought could not be born of the Virgin Mary, without being mingled with the flesh: and how that which I had so figured to myself, could be mingled, and not defiled, I saw not."

25. His Pantheistical stage of mind is strikingly described in the 7th book:—

The Corruptible and Incorruptible.

"I, a man, and such a man, sought to conceive of Thee the sovereign, only, true God; and I did in my inmost soul believe that thou wert incorruptible, and uninjurable, and unchangeable; because though not knowing whence or how, yet I saw plainly and was sure, that that which may be corrupted, must be inferior to that which cannot; what could not be injured I preferred unhesitatingly to what could receive injury; the unchangeable to things subject to change. My heart passionately cried out against all my phantoms, and with this one blow I sought to beat away from the eye of my mind all

that uncleau troop which buzzed around it. And lo, being scarce put off, in the twinkling of an eye they gathered again thick about me, flew against my face, and beclouded it; so that though not under the form of the human body, yet was I constrained to conceive of Thee (that incorruptible, uninjurable, and unchangeable, which I preferred before the corruptible, and injurable, and changeable) as being in space, whether infused into the world, or diffused infinitely without it. Because whatsoever I conceived, deprived of this space, seemed to me nothing, yea altogether nothing, not even a void, as if a body were taken out of its place, and the place should remain empty of any body at all, of earth and water, air and heaven, yet would it remain a void place, as it were a spacious nothing.

Struggles to bring God under the limits of Space.

"I then being thus gross-hearted, nor clear even to myself, whatsoever was not extended over certain spaces, nor diffused, nor condensed, nor swelled out, or did not or could not receive some of these dimensions, I thought to be altogether nothing. For over such forms as my eyes are wont to range, did my heart then range: nor yet did I see that this same notion of the mind, whereby I formed those very images, was not of this sort, and yet it could not have formed them, had not itself been some great thing. So also did I endeavour to conceive of Thee, Life of my life, as vast, through infinite spaces, on every side penetrating the whole mass of the universe, and beyond it, every way, through unmeasurable boundless spaces; so that the earth should have Thee, the heaven have Thee, all things have Thee, and they be bounded in Thee, and Thou bounded no where. For that as the body of this air which is above the earth, hindereth not the light of the sun from passing through it, penetrating it, not by bursting or by cutting, but by filling it wholly: so I thought the body not of heaven, air, and sea only, but of the earth too, pervious to Thee, so that in all its parts, the greatest as the smallest, it should admit Thy presence, by a secret inspiration, within and without, directing all things which Thou hast created. So I guessed, only as unable to conceive aught else, for it was false. For thus should a greater part of the earth contain a greater portion of Thee, and a less, a lesser: and all things should in such sort be full of Thee, that the body of an elephant should contain more of Thee than that of a sparrow, by how much larger it is, and takes up more room; and thus shouldest Thou make the several portions of Thyself present unto the several portions of the world, in fragments, large to the large, petty to the petty. But such art not Thou."

26. The question of Evil was still the all-absorbing one, whatever others might grow out of it. The following extract shews how he began to connect it with himself:—

"Whatever it were, I perceived it was in such wise to be sought out, as should not constrain me to believe the immutable God to be mutable, lest I should become that evil I was seeking out. I sought it out then, thus far free from anxiety, certain of the untruth of what the Manichees held, from whom I shrunk with my whole heart: for I saw, that through enquiring the origin of evil, they were filled with evil, in that they preferred to think that Thy substance did suffer ill than their own did commit it.

Certainty of a Will.

"And I strained to perceive what I now heard, that free-will was the cause of our doing ill, and Thy just judgment, of our suffering ill. But I was not able clearly to discern it. So then endeavouring to draw my soul's vision out of that deep pit, I was again plunged therein, and endeavouring often I was plunged back as often. But this raised me a little into Thy light, that I knew as well that I had a will, as that I lived: when then I did will or nill any thing, I was most sure, that no other than myself did will and nill: and I all but saw that there was the cause of my sin. But what I did against my will, I saw that I suffered rather than did, and I judged not to be my fault, but my punishment; whereby, however, holding thee to be just, I speedily confessed myself to be not unjustly punished, But again I said, Who made me? Did not my God, who is not only good, but goodness itself? Whence then came I to will evil and nill good, so that I am thus justly punished? who set this in me, and ingrafted into me this plant of bitterness, seeing I was wholly formed by my most sweet God? If the devil were the author, whence is that same devil? And if he also by his own perverse will, of a good angel became a devil, whence, again, came in him that evil will, whereby he became a devil, seeing the whole nature of angels was made by that most good Creator? By these thoughts I was again sunk down and choked; yet not brought down to that hell of error, (where no man confesseth unto Thee,) to think rather that Thou dost suffer ill, than that man doth it.

The world without and within.

27. This discovery that Evil was close to the seeker of it, and that he was projecting it from himself into the circumstances in which he was placed, and into the nature of the Being who had ordained them, is brought out more fully afterwards.

"I sought, 'whence is evil,' and sought in an evil way; and saw not the evil in my very search. I set now before the sight of my spirit, the whole creation, whatsoever we can see therein, (as sea, earth, air, stars, trees, mortal creatures;) yea, and whatever in it we do not see, as the firmament of heaven, all angels, moreover, and all the spiritual inhabitants thereof. But these very beings, as though they were bodies,

did my fancy dispose in place, and I made one great mass of Thy creation, distinguished as to the kinds of bodies; some, real bodies, some, what myself had feigned for spirits. And this mass I made huge, not as it was, (which I could not know,) but as I thought convenient, yet every way finite. But Thee, O Lord, I imagined on every part environing and penetrating it, though every way infinite: as if there were a sea, every where, and on every side, through unmeasured space, one only boundless sea, and it contained within it some sponge, huge, but bounded; that sponge must needs, in all its parts, be filled from that unmeasureable sea; so conceived I Thy creation, itself finite, full of Thee, the Infinite, and I said, Behold God, and behold what God hath created: and God is good, yea, most mightily and incomparably better than all these: but yet He, the Good, created them good; and see how He environeth them, and ful-fills them. Where is evil then, and whence, and how crept it in hither? What is its root, and what its seed? Or hath it no being? Why then fear we and avoid what is not? Or if we fear it idly, then is that very fear evil, whereby the soul is thus idly goaded and racked. Yea, and so much a greater evil, as we have nothing to fear, and yet do fear. Therefore either is that evil which we fear, or else evil is, that we fear. Whence is it then? seeing God, the Good, hath created all these things good. He indeed, the greater and chiefest Good, hath created these lesser goods; still both Creator and created, all are good. Whence is evil? Or, was there some evil matter of which He made, and formed, and ordered it, yet left something in it, which He did not convert into good? Why so then? Had He no might to turn and change the whole, so that no evil should remain in it, seeing He is All-mighty? Lastly, why would He make any thing at all of it, and not rather by the same Allmightiness cause it not to be at all? Or, could it then be, against his will? Or if it were from eternity, why suffered He it so to be for infinite spaces of time past, and was pleased so long after to make something out of it? Or if He were suddenly pleased now to effect somewhat, this rather should the Allmighty have effected, that this evil matter should not be, and He alone be, the whole, true, sovereign, and infinite Good. Or if it was not good that He who was good, should not also frame and create something that were good, then, that evil matter being taken away and brought to nothing, He might form good matter, whereof to create all things. For He should not be Allmighty, if He might not create something good without the aid of that matter which Himself had not created. These thoughts I revolved in my miserable heart, overcharged with most gnawing cares, lest I should die ere I had found the truth;

Good infinite—Whence, then, is Ill?

Dreams of Omnipotence.

yet was the faith of Thy Christ our Lord and Saviour, professed in the Church Catholic, firmly fixed in my heart, in many points, indeed, as yet unformed, and fluctuating from the rule of doctrine; yet did not my mind utterly leave it, but rather daily took in more and more of it."

28. The result of his struggles, after the scripture revelation had become intelligible to him, is contained in the following extract:—

Augustin coming to quietness.

"And being thence admonished to return to myself, I entered even into my inward self, Thou being my Guide: and able I was, for thou wert become my Helper. And I entered and beheld with the eye of my soul, (such as it was,) above the same eye of my soul, above my mind, the Light Unchangeable. Not this ordinary light, which all flesh may look upon, nor as it were a greater of the same kind, as though the brightness of this should be manifold brighter, and with its greatness take up all space. Not such was this light, but other, yea, far other from all these. Nor was it above my soul, as oil is above water, nor yet as heaven above earth: but above to my soul because It made me; and I below It because I was made by It. He that knows the Truth, knows what that Light is; and he that knows It, knows eternity. Love knoweth it. O Truth who art Eternity! and Love Who art Truth! and Eternity who art Love! Thou art my God, to Thee do I sigh night and day. Thee when I first knew thou liftedst me up, that I might see there was what I might see, and that I was not yet such as to see. And Thou didst beat back the weakness of my sight, streaming forth thy beams of light upon me most strongly, and I trembled with love and awe: and I perceived myself to be far off from Thee, in the region of unlikeness, as if I heard this Thy voice from on high: 'I am the food of grown men; grow, and thou shalt feed upon Me; nor shalt thou convert Me, like the food of thy flesh, into thee, but thou shalt be converted into Me.' And I learned, that *Thou for iniquity chastenest man, and Thou madest my soul to consume away like a spider.* And I said, 'Is Truth therefore nothing, because it is not diffused through space finite or infinite?' And thou criedst to me from afar; 'Yea verily, *I AM that I AM.*' And I heard, as the heart heareth, nor had I room to doubt, and I should sooner doubt that I live, than that truth is not, *which is clearly seen being understood by those things which are made.*

Fear and Wonder.

That which is and is not.

"And I beheld the other things below Thee, and I perceived, that they neither altogether are, nor altogether are not, for they are, since they are from Thee, but are not, because they are not, what Thou art. For that truly is, which remains unchangeably. *It is good then for me to hold fast unto God;* for if I remain not

in Him, I cannot in myself; but *He remaining in himself reneweth all things. And thou art the Lord* my God, since Thou *standest not in need of my goodness.*

"And it was manifested unto me, that those things be good, which yet are corrupted; which neither were they sovereignly good, nor unless they were good, could be corrupted: for if sovereignly good they were incorruptible, if not good at all, there were nothing in them to be corrupted. For corruption injures, but unless it diminished goodness, it could not injure. Either then corruption injures not, which cannot be; or which is most certain, all which is corrupted is deprived of good. But if they be deprived of all good, they shall cease to be. For if they shall be, and can now no longer be corrupted, they shall be better than before, because they shall abide incorruptibly. And what more monstrous than to affirm things to become better by losing all their good? Therefore, if they shall be deprived of all good, they shall no longer be. So long therefore as they are, they are good: therefore whatsoever is, is good. That evil then which I sought, whence it is, is not any substance: for were it a substance, it should be good. For either it should be an incorruptible substance, and so a chief good: or a corruptible substance; which unless it were good, could not be corrupted. I perceived therefore, and it was manifested to me, that Thou madest all things good, nor is there any substance at all, which Thou madest not; and for that Thou madest not all things equal, therefore are all things; because each is good, and altogether very good, because our God *made all things very good.*

The loss of Good.

"And to Thee is nothing whatsoever evil: yea, not only to Thee, but also to Thy creation as a whole, because there is nothing without, which may break in, and corrupt that order which Thou hast appointed it. But in the parts thereof, some things, because unharmonizing with other some, are accounted evil: whereas those very things harmonise with others, and are good; and in themselves are good. And all these things which harmonise not together, do yet with the inferior part, which we call Earth, having its own cloudy and windy sky harmonising with it. Far be it then that I should say, 'These things should not be:' for should I see nought but these, I should indeed long for the better; but still must even for these alone praise Thee; for that Thou art to be *praised*, do shew *from the earth, dragons and all deeps, fire, hail, snow, ice, and stormy wind, which fulfil Thy word; mountains, and all hills, fruitful trees, and all cedars; beasts, and all cattle, creeping things, and flying fowls; kings of the earth, and all people, princes, and all judges of the earth; young men and maidens, old men and young, praise Thy Name.* But when, from heaven, these *praise Thee, praise Thee,*

Good in God.

our God, in the heights, all Thy angels, all Thy hosts, sun and moon, all the stars and light, the Heaven of heavens, and the waters that be above the heavens, praise Thy Name; I did not now long for things better, because I conceived of all: and with a sounder judgment I apprehended that the things above were better than these below, but all together better than those above by themselves.

All things good.

"There is no soundness in them, whom aught of Thy creation displeaseth: as neither in me, when much that Thou hast made displeased me. And because my soul durst not be displeased at my God, it would fain not account that Thine which displeased it. Hence it had gone into the opinion of two substances, and had no rest, but talked idly. And returning thence, it had made to itself a God, through infinite measures of all space, and thought it to be Thee, and placed it in its heart, and had again become the temple of its own idol, to Thee abominable. But after Thou hadst soothed my head, unknown to me, and closed *mine eyes that they should not behold vanity*, I ceased somewhat of my former self, and my frenzy was lulled to sleep; and I awoke in Thee, and saw thee infinite, but in another way, and this sight was not derived from the flesh.

"And I looked back on other things, and I saw that they owed their being to Thee, and were all bounded in Thee, but in a different way; not as being in space, but because Thou containest all things in Thine hand in Thy Truth; and all things are true so far as they be; nor is there any falsehood, unless when that is thought to be which is not. And I saw that all things did harmonize, not with their places only, but with their seasons; and that Thou, who only art Eternal, didst not begin to work after innumerable spaces of times spent; for that all spaces of times, both which have passed, and which shall pass, neither go nor come but through Thee, working and abiding.

Evil no Substance.

"And I perceived and found it nothing strange, that bread which is pleasant to a healthy palate is loathsome to one distempered; and to sore eyes light is offensive, which to the sound is delightful. And thy righteousness displeaseth the wicked; much more the viper and reptiles, which Thou hast created good, fitting in with the inferior portions of Thy Creation, with which the very wicked also fit in; and that the more, by how much they be unlike Thee; but with the superior creatures, by how much they become more like to Thee. And I inquired what iniquity was, and found it to be no substance, but the perversion of the will, turned aside from Thee, O God, the Supreme, towards these lower things, and *casting out its bowels*, and puffed up outwardly.

"And I wondered that I now loved Thee, and no phantasm

for Thee. And yet did I not press on to enjoy my God, but was borne up to Thee by Thy beauty, and soon borne down from Thee by mine own weight, sinking with sorrow into these inferior things. This weight was carnal custom. Yet dwelt there with me a remembrance of Thee; nor did I any way doubt that there was One to whom I might cleave, but that I was not yet such as to cleave to Thee; for that *the body which is corrupted presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things.* And most certain I was *that Thy invisible works from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even Thy eternal power and Godhead.* For examining whence it was that I admired the beauty of bodies celestial or terrestrial, and what aided me in judging soundly on things mutable, and pronouncing, 'This ought to be thus, this not:' examining, I say, whence it was that I so judged, seeing I did so judge, I had found the unchangeable and true Eternity of Truth, above my changeable mind. And thus, by degrees, I passed from bodies to the soul, which through the bodily senses perceives; and thence to its inward faculty, to which the bodily senses represent things external, whitherto reaches the faculties of beasts: and thence again to the reasoning faculty, to which what is received from the senses of the body is referred to be judged. Which finding itself also to be in me a thing variable, raised itself up to its own understanding, and drew away my thoughts from the power of habit, withdrawing itself from those troops of contradictory phantasms; that so it might find what that light was whereby it was bedewed when, without all doubting, it cried out, 'That the unchangeable was to be preferred to the changeable'; whence also it knew That Unchangeable, which, unless it had in some way known, it had had no sure ground to prefer it to the changeable. And thus with the flash of one trembling glance it arrived at THAT WHICH IS; and then I saw Thy *invisible things understood by the things which are made.* But I could not fix my gaze thereon; and my infirmity being struck back, I was thrown again on my wonted habits, carrying along with me only a loving memory thereof, and a longing for what I had, as it were, perceived the odour of, but was not yet able to feed on."

Love of God.

The τὸ ὄν. He who is

29. These passages concern the growth of his belief. There are others of very great significance, which embody some of his later discoveries. Strictly speaking, they should be postponed to those philosophical treatises of which we propose to speak presently; but as they occur in the "Confessions," we cannot be blamed for inserting them here. The following on Eternity and Time is particularly profound and suggestive:—

"Who speak thus, do not yet understand Thee, O Wisdom of God, Light of souls,—understand not yet how the things be made, which by Thee and in Thee are made: yet they strive to comprehend things eternal, whilst their heart fluttereth between the motions of things past and to come, and is still unstable. Who shall hold it, and fix it, that it be settled awhile, and awhile catch the glory of that ever-fixed Eternity, and compare it with the times which are never fixed, and see that it cannot be compared; and that a long time cannot become long, but out of many motions passing by, which cannot be prolonged altogether; but that in the Eternal nothing passeth, but the whole is present; whereas no time is all at once present: and that all time past is driven on by time to come, and all to come followeth upon the past; and all past and to come is created, and flows out of that which is ever present? Who shall hold the heart of man, that it may stand still, and see how eternity ever still-standing, neither past nor to come, uttereth the times past and to come? Can my hand do this, or the hand of my mouth by speech bring about a thing so great?"

Eternity and Time.

"Nor dost Thou by time precede time: else shouldest Thou not precede all times. But Thou precedest all things past, by the sublimity of an ever-present eternity; and surpassest all future because they are future, and when they come they shall be past; *but Thou art the Same, and thy years fail not.* Thy years neither come nor go; whereas ours both come and go, that they all may come. Thy years stand together, because they do stand; nor are departing thrust out by coming years, for they pass not away; but ours shall all be, when they shall no more be. Thy years are one day; and Thy day is not daily, but To-day, seeing Thy To-day gives not place unto to-morrow, for neither doth it replace yesterday. Thy To-day is Eternity; therefore didst Thou beget The Coeternal, to whom Thou saidst, *This day have I begotten Thee.* Thou hast made all things; and before all times Thou art; neither in any time was time not.

Yesterday and to-day.

"At no time then hadst Thou not made any thing, because time itself Thou madest. And no times are coeternal with Thee, because Thou abidest; but if they abode, they should not be times. For what is time? Who can readily and briefly explain this? Who can even in thought comprehend it, so as to utter a word about it? But what in discourse do we mention more familiarly and knowingly, than time? And, we understand, when we speak of it; we understand also, when we hear it spoken of by another. What then is time? If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not: yet I say boldly, that I know, that if nothing passed away, time past were not; and if nothing were coming, a time

to come were not; and if nothing were, time present were not. Those two times then, past and to come, how are they, seeing the past now is not, and that to come is not yet? But the present, should it always be present, and never pass into time past, verily it should not be time, but eternity. If time present (if it is to be time) only cometh into existence, because it passeth into time past, how can we say that either this is, whose cause of being is, that it shall not be; so, namely, that we cannot truly say that time is, but because it is tending not to be?

For ever.

"And yet we say, 'a long time' and 'a short time;' still, only of time past or to come. A long time past (for example) we call an hundred years since; and a long time to come, an hundred years hence. But a short time past, we call (suppose) ten days since; and a short time to come, ten days hence. But in what sense is that long or short, which is not? For the past, is not now; and the future, is not yet. Let us not then say, 'it is long;' but of the past, 'it hath been long;' and of the future, 'it will be long.' O my Lord, my Light, shall not here also Thy Truth mock at man? For that past time which was long, was it long when it was now past, or when it was yet present? For then might it be long, when there was, what could be long; but when past, it was no longer; wherefore neither could that be long, which was not at all. Let us not then say, 'time past hath been long:' for we shall not find, what hath been long, seeing that since it was past, it is no more; but let us say, 'that present time was long;' because, when it was present, it was long. For it had not yet passed away, so as not to be; and therefore there was, what could be long; but after it was past, that ceased also to be long, which ceased to be."

Past and Present.

"What now is clear and plain is, that neither things to come nor past are. Nor is it properly said, 'there be three times, past, present, and to come:' yet perchance it might be properly said, 'there be three times; a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future.' For these three do exist in some sort, in the soul, but otherwhere do I not see them; present of things past, memory; present of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation. If thus we be permitted to speak, I see three times, and I confess there are three. Let it be said too, 'there be three times, past, present, and to come:' in our incorrect way. See, I object not, nor gainsay, nor find fault, if what is so said be but understood, that neither what is to be, now is, nor what is past. For but few things are there, which we speak properly, most things improperly; still the things intended are understood."*

* The extracts from the "Confessions" have been taken from the translation in the Oxford Library of the Fathers.

The book *Contra Academicos.*

30. Shortly before his baptism Augustin wrote three books "*Against the Academics.*" They give us a very delightful picture of his inner mind and of his social life at this crisis of his history. His new discoveries have not carried him into violent hostility with the thoughts or the friends of earlier days:—they have given him a deeper and livelier interest in both. Augustin is still the Philosopher; nay, is urging all over whom he has influence to become philosophers. He speaks of the pursuit of Wisdom as that into which he has been gradually led out of a mere windy profession by grief of heart; and he addresses his books to Romanianus,—a man, it would appear, of highly cultivated tastes, who had plunged into the luxury of the capital, who had been the most sumptuous and popular of citizens, but who, "as he cared to be liberal rather than rich, as he never desired to be more powerful than just," has been brought under the discipline of suffering that he might be led into a love of the true, and not merely of the beautiful. Augustin speaks of this treatise in the "Retractations" as written "when he had betaken himself to the rest of the Christian life." It was natural that in looking back upon it after many years, and in very changed circumstances, he should find something to complain of in it, and that he should not be able quite to reproduce his then state of feeling. But his self-accusations are not serious, and need not expose him to any very severe judgments from us. He thinks that he used the word "fortune" too carelessly, and too like a heathen, though he hinted that it was only a name for some secret order of providence: he speaks of a fable, in the second book, from which we must confess that we have received much profit and encouragement, concerning the two sisters, Philocalia and Philosophia, as silly and impertinent: and, as might perhaps be expected and feared, he thinks his language respecting the Academics was too courteous, and the reverence he expresses for Plato a little dangerous. As there are no other censures, we may presume that he considered the substance of the dialogues sound and profitable.

c. 3. Mundi hujus dona quæ meipsum capere moliebantur quotidie ista cantantem nisi in pectoris dolor ventosam professionem abjicere et in philosophiæ gremium confugere coegisset.

Retract. lib. i. c. 1: Cùm ergo reliquissem vel quæ adeptus fueram in cupiditatibus hujus mundi vel quæ adipisci volebam et me ad Christianæ vitæ otium contulissem nondum baptizatus, etc.

Id. cc. 2, 3.

C. 3: Prorsùs inepta estet insulsa illa fabula de *Philocalia et Philosophia.*

31. Their main object, as we might infer from the persons against whom they are directed, is to show that investigation, however interesting and worthy of all zeal when there is something to be investigated, cannot be an ultimate object,—that uncertainty and a perpetual equilibrium of mind are not desirable,—that Truth is to be sought because it can be found. Here, no doubt, is the link between Augustin's Philosophy and his Divinity; between his energy in study and his confidence of a revelation from above. The Academical theory, or rather the Academical tendency, had been to himself, and was, he saw, to a number, the greatest hindrance to practical belief, precisely because it was the hindrance to manly and hopeful inquiry. Acquiescence in doubt is only another name for acquiescence in sensual gratifications. If the mind has nothing actual to grasp, the body which has, must maintain its superiority: the repose of the Epicurean dogmatist lies very near to the restlessness of the pseudo-Platonical sceptic. Augustin, therefore, might well feel that this was to be his first battle; that unless he could shake the doctrine which affirms that nothing can be known, a Gospel professing to enunciate the highest knowledge would be always pronounced impossible.

Object of these Dialogues.

Augustin as a schoolmaster.

32. But the method which he adopts for this purpose is as unlike that of a dogmatist of the Tertullian school as can well be conceived. Licentius, the son of Romanianus, and Trygetius, are pupils of Augustin. The former he holds up to the example of his father, as an earnest and devoted student; the latter had for a time betaken himself to the army, but had returned with fresh zest to the kind of warfare into which Augustin was so well able to initiate him. The Christian neophyte, it might be supposed, would rather deter these youths from debates and arguments, and treat them as only fit to receive what he gave them. On the contrary, he himself puts them upon a trial of strength, urging them to canvass the whole question which was at issue between the Academicians and their opponents. The boys enter the lists with hearty good-will, their master from time to time interfering, not to check their ardour but to encourage it, to help either party in recovering any ground which he had unwittingly lost, to hinder them from taking any unfair advantages, to show them the duty of making sacrifices of favourable positions for the sake of attaining the ultimate end, which is not victory but truth. As a specimen of a kind, and a very valuable kind, of practical education, the book may take its place by Milton's Letter to Mr. Hartlib, or the treatises of Mr. and Miss Edgeworth. But it is also exceedingly instructive as showing that the Academicians could be most effectively answered by one who understood their method best. Long before the final result is attained, we feel that the young men are in training to be believers in Truth, that they have learnt how well that is worth fighting for, and that nothing else is worth fighting for.

Contra Academicos, lib. i. c. 4.

Id. c. 4.

The book De Beatâ Vitâ.

33. Throughout this lively and interesting discussion the question is always recurring, whether a blessed life can be separated from the knowledge of Truth. It was the characteristic doctrine of Augustin that one was involved in the other,—that the knowledge of truth, however obtained, did not procure blessedness, but was blessedness,—that without it man is miserable. There is a special book on the blessed life. It was written at the same time with those on the Academics. The

occasion of it is stated thus in his dedication to Theodorus:—

The Beatâ Vitâ. c. 6.

"In the ides of November was my birthday. There were present, first, my mother Monnica, my brother Navigius, Trygetius and Licentius my fellow-citizens and disciples, and I would not have my cousins Lastidianus and Rusticus away, for though they cannot endure the schools, I thought their common sense would be of great help in the subject I proposed to discuss. Lastly, there was one among us, the youngest of all, but with a disposition which promises, if love does not deceive me, something very great,—my son Adeodatus." The discussion which takes place after a light repast opens with the question, "whether the soul does not require food as well as the body?" Thence comes the inquiry, "what the appetite of the soul is—what is its satisfaction?" The appetite is shown to be, for the Infinite and Eternal. He is blessed then who has God. But of whom can that be affirmed? Licentius answered, "He possesses God who lives well." Trygetius answered, "He possesses God who does what God wills to be done." The boy said, "He possesses God who hath a pure heart." Monnica approved all the sentiments,—this last most. Navigius and Rusticus were silent! These solemn and reverent utterances do not prevent Augustin from introducing again some of those philosophical topics which occupied us in the former dialogues. The discourse, with all its depth and earnestness, is often pleasant, even humorous. There is evidently a sense in the mind of all the guests at Augustin's feast, that the blessedness which they seek for is within the reach of all, and that each is helping the other to attain it and enjoy it. A divine conversation has seldom been carried on with more of human friendliness and grace, or with a more evident feeling that all outward and sensible beauties ought to be relished and enjoyed by him who has the highest and the most inward.

C. 11.

The books De Ordine.

34. We can but allude to two books on Order which follow these. Why Augustin should have entered upon such a subject will be sufficiently intelligible to those who have traced the growth of his mind in the "Confessions." He found one of two perils threatening him: either God's Providence did not descend into the deepest and minutest things; or else, evil was to be ascribed to Him. Augustin bravely declares, that though the first error is a very great one, the other is much more terrible. It is better to charge Him with negligence than with malice and cruelty. The question, then, as he expresses it in his "Retractations," "whether the Order of Divine Providence containeth all things good as well as evil," is one which the author of the book on the Blessed Life was almost obliged to set before himself and his disciples. But he adds, "When I

c. 1. Negligentiæ verò vituperatio multò est quàm malitiæ crudelitatisque purgatior.

Retract. lib. i. c. 3.

saw that this matter, difficult to be understood in itself, could scarcely be brought at all to the perception of those with whom I had to do, by any process of disputation, I preferred to speak about the order of study whereby we may advance from corporeal to incorporeal things." This explanation will account for some disappointment which the reader may experience when the author digresses into stories respecting Licentius and Monnica, and passes from high considerations of Divine Providence into questions about grammar, music, poetry, dialectic, rhetoric, geometry, astronomy,—valuable and important in themselves, but not exactly what the title of the book had led us to expect.

C. 22, &c.

Lib. ii. c. 12, 13, and 14.

The books of Soliloquies

35. The two books of Soliloquies exhibit the deep conviction in Augustin's mind, that the eternal life of man's spirit and the knowledge of truth are inseparable. The passages at the close of the second book, concerning the Memory, lead us into the very heart of Platonical doctrine. We should be inclined to doubt whether any Latin, before or since, ever entered into it so deeply. The treatise, both for its method and its results, is worthy of the most serious meditation of any student, as a commentary upon the ancient wisdom, and as an induction to that of the Middle Ages. The book on the Immortality of the Soul, Augustin says in his "Retractations," is so obscure, from the contortion of the thoughts and its brevity, that he could scarcely understand it himself. The account in the same honest record, of the book De Quantitate Animæ, will best explain its object: "In the same city I wrote a dialogue in which there are many questions and discussions concerning the soul: whence it is, of what nature, what its greatness, why it was assigned to a body, what effect is produced upon it by its conjunction with a body—what effect by its departure from the body. But seeing that the question—how great it is—is discussed there with much diligence and subtlety that I might show its magnitude not to be a corporeal magnitude, and yet that it has a magnitude of its own, therefore from this single inquiry the whole has taken its name." A criticism upon a passage in this treatise, "that the soul seems to have brought all arts with it, and that learning is nothing else than recollection," shows that the old Bishop had not abandoned all the thoughts of the young student, though he feared to indorse them and to sanction all the inferences which might be drawn from them. The great question of the treatise—how to connect the thoughts of length, of breadth, of height, all that we attribute to mathematical figures, with spiritual substances—is one which has occupied serious men at all times, and which does not cease to occupy us when we forget it. Few doubt

Cap. 20, § 34 and 35.

De Immortalitate Animæ, Retract. lib. i. cap. 5.

The book De Quantitate Animæ, Retract. lib. i. cap. 8.

that language expresses a connection between the two worlds: *what* it indicates respecting the nature of the connection is the difficulty which all in some way or other have been trying to solve. If Augustin does not solve it, he at least makes us feel how it arises, how it is involved in all our common speech, how it may beset those who take most pains to give an account of their thoughts and their words. When we say that Augustin discusses the relation between Reason and Ratiocination, and between Sense and Science,—that he inquires how far science and reason exist in beasts,—whether the soul knows of itself,—whether it is said to grow really or metaphorically,—we have indicated how near he has touched many of the controversies of the most modern world. And his description of the seven degrees of the soul's ascent is a preparation for some of the most curious parts of the practical divinity as well as of the moral philosophy of the later Church.

C. 27 and 29.

C. 20 and 21.

The books on Music.

36. Long as have been our commentaries on Augustin, we cannot quite resolve to pass unmentioned the six books on Music, because it is evident that the thoughts which are expressed in them soothed the mind of the writer after the conflicts of his earlier years, and because he looked back upon them with great tenderness in his mature life. These six books, he says, are on Rhythm; he should have added six more on Melody, if the burden of his ecclesiastical duties had not made all such delights impossible. He is sure there is a passage by regular stages from these corporeal and changeable numbers, to the unchangeable which are in the immutable Truth itself; that through them we may strive after those inmost mysteries where Wisdom joyfully meets those who love her."

The Master.

Nor can we forget the little book on "the Master," which is so much the more interesting and striking, because it is a conversation with the child who reminded him of his youthful errors, and for whom he so frankly and courageously at all times expresses his affection; and because it exhibits the method of his own teaching as well as his idea of the highest teacher. These are his properly philosophical books. Those "On Free-will," "On the Manners of the Church, and the Manicheans," and the more elaborate and better-known treatise "On the City of God," though strictly theological, are full of passages which throw light upon his philosophy, and ought to be considered by all who wish thoroughly to understand it.

Later Treatises.

CHAPTER V.

The Fifth Century.

Theological disputes of the fifth century.

1. A century which opens with the reigns of Arcadius and Honorius holds out small promise of blessings to mankind in the east or in the west. Yet it is one rich in the materials of history, if not in history itself, one which no philosopher can pass over, whatever he may think of its contributions to philosophy. The theological battles of the Greek church and the Greek empire, which aroused the most violent and the pettiest passions of Egyptians, Syrians, and Byzantines, pointed to principles in which all ages and countries are alike interested. Nestorius and Eutyches may be treated by many merely as movers of subtleties which have no significance for the world; the councils which strove to silence them, merely as haughty and ferocious dogmatists. There is excuse enough for each charge. But the question, whether there is a divine foundation for man's life, and whether that is also a human foundation, was involved in these controversies; the philosophers who most hated and despised the Church were really engaged in them as much as its members could be. We cannot interpret Proclus any more than Cyril, if we overlook them, or do not remember what multitudes of hearts were occupied with them. How such debates should have anything to do with the stirring events which were changing the condition of society in western Europe, with the sacking of Rome, the occupation of the different provinces by Visigoths or Vandals, the overthrow of the Western Empire, the establishment of Paganism in Britain, of Frankish orthodoxy in Gaul, we may find it hard at first to discover. And yet the schools and the world were in this time, as in all times, interpreters of each other. The principles which men were acting out in one sphere were those on which they were tormenting their thoughts in the other. We must understand what concerned the *people* if we would know what is meant by the speculations of those who strove most to keep aloof from them, and affected most to despise them.

Philosophers engaged in them really if not directly.

Outward events of the time.

Their relation to philosophy

2. The struggles between the Neo-Platonic school and the Christian Church belong as much to this century as to the last. But the Church has won an outward triumph. The sages can

War of the Church with the Neo-Platonists.

have little hope of finding another imperial champion. When the temple of Serapis was thrown down by the Christian zealots in Egypt, stirred up by the unprincipled Bishop Theophilus, a sign was given that the rites of Paganism belonged to the past and not to the present. They might be loved all the more by the antiquarian and sentimentalist, but a leader of armies, even if he had all Julian's natural taste and acquired cultivation, could scarcely seek to re-establish them. Hence an evident change is visible on both sides. A predominance of mysticism over every other tendency is characteristic of the Heathen devotee. Practical wisdom, degenerating in most cases into worldly wisdom, becomes characteristic of the Churchman. The one asserts the invisible as his possession, and only now and then dreams that he may master the visible. The other begins to think that that is given to him to use and to rule; the spiritual region, the Kingdom of Heaven, he claims as his too, but often chiefly that he may exclude the rest of men from it. The noble-hearted Chrysostom is as essentially a practical and governing man as the proud and unscrupulous Cyril. Even Augustin in this century becomes more occupied with the management of the African Church, and with Donatist quarrels, than with the transcendant thoughts of his earlier years.

Change in the position and character of the combatants.

The Church governing.

Alexandria.

3. We have spoken much of Alexandria in former centuries. This city was still to be the focus of philosophical thought and philosophical contentions. There it was that the Church and the Schools stood out in formal opposition to each other; there both were exhibited in their glory and their humiliation, there the practical power of the Christian faith as a ruler of the world, there the detestable crimes of many of its professors, presented themselves in glaring contrast to the social impotence of the Neo-Platonists, to the high aims of one or two among their teachers. The tragedy of Hypatia brings all these aspects of the fifth century together, and prepares us for the downfall of the antichristian sages, for the temporary triumph of something scarcely less antichristian, for the great judgment upon the eastern world, when Alexandria stooped to Mecca. But Athens is the place in which Neo-Platonism flourished comparatively undisturbed by ecclesiastical influences. There philosophy in its nakedness, or as some say in its purity, put forth its last efforts, and endeavoured to crown and unite all the past achievements of Greek schools.

Hypatia.

Athens.

Proclus, A. D. 412-485.

4. A very high authority, M. Cousin, supposes this attempt to have been perfectly successful. The sacred Platonical succession he believes was faithfully and religiously preserved; the torch was transmitted in undimmed lustre from hand to hand; it never burned so brightly as when Proclus resigned it. The following

is but a specimen of the language in which he speaks of him. "He was illustrious as a mathematician and an astronomer; he was the first among existing philologers; he had so comprehended all religions in his mind, and paid them such equal reverence, that he was as it were the priest of the whole universe: nor was it wonderful that a man possessing such a high knowledge of nature and science should have this initiation into all sacred mysteries."..... "As he was the head of the Athenian school and of all later philosophy, so I venture to affirm that all the earlier is found gathered up in him, and that he may be taken as the one interpreter of the whole philosophy of the Greeks."..... I shall set it down as an established fact that nothing great was thought out by Iamblichus, Porphyry, and Plotinus, either in ethics, in metaphysics, or in physics, which is not found expressed more clearly and methodically in Proclus."..... "The three-fold division of Greek philosophy may be reduced at last to one, which being the same always, by a natural and certain progress enlarges and unfolds itself, and moves on through three stages intimately connected, the first being contained in the second, the second in the third, so that the man who after the lapse of ages finds himself at the end of this gradually evolving series, on the highest apex of that third age, as he embraces all the accumulations of former times in himself, stands as the representative of each sect of Greece, emphatically *the* Greek philosopher. Such a man I say was Proclus, in whom it seems to me are combined and from whom shine forth in no irregular or uncertain rays all the philosophical lights which have illustrated Greece in various times; to wit Orpheus, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus."

M. Cousin's judgment of him: "Procli Opera, etc. illustravit Victor Cousin: Parisiis, 1820." Præfatio generalis, p. 23. P. 24 P. 26 P. 25 and 26.

Unites all Greek wisdom in himself.

5. Besides the weight which this testimony acquires from the learning and genius of M. Cousin, it is more impressive from the country to which he belongs and which he represents. We, and still more our diligent German brethren, are generally supposed to be capable of enduring a considerable amount of tediousness with the tolerance which results from our consciousness of needing the like for our own compositions. But that excellence must be very great indeed which can induce a Frenchman, with his natural liveliness and sense of the ridiculous, to suffer the elaboration through long pages of points which his wit must have reached by a single spring. This, and far more than this, had M. Cousin to bear while he was ascertaining for himself that Proclus was a compendious Orpheus, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle. Thus, for instance, one of the most celebrated of his works is a commentary on the first Alcibiades of Plato. It was evidently a lecture to his class. It aims of course at exhi

Strangeness of this opinion in a French writer.

Tediousness of Proclus

biting the particular worth of the dialogue under discussion, but that only for the purpose of elucidating the method and principles of Plato, and of all science. The dialogue opens with these words, "O! son of Cleinias, I think that you sometimes wonder," &c. Considering the great field which the commentator has before him, a dialogue of some compass in itself, and then the gathering together in one the three periods of Greek wisdom, one would have supposed that these words might have been dismissed with some rapidity; that at all events the teacher might have told his pupils at once what Socrates supposed would cause the wonder of Alcibiades. The Athenian youths were in great error if they looked for any such superficial treatment of the subject from Proclus. First of all we have a discussion on the importance of the openings of the dialogues. It must never be supposed that they are mere easy dramatical introductions to what follows. All great principles are involved in them. But, secondly, Socrates says "*I think*." Why does he say "I think"? Is it not his great object to lead us into science or knowledge, and could he who was guiding other men out of uncertainty and mere opinion be himself subject to such uncertainties? This great difficulty must be cleared up. It must be shewn that there are variable subjects as well as fixed and constant. Aristotle must be quoted to prove that the geometer is not to use rhetoric in his study, nor the rhetorician to apply geometry in persuasion. Necessary things are to be spoken of in necessary language, probable in probable. Moreover, Alcibiades was a hasty and presumptuous youth. It was a peculiarly winning and graceful method of addressing him, to begin with a somewhat doubtful expression of this kind. So that altogether Proclus seems to have proved in the most irrefragable manner, taking the subject out of the region of mere doubt and probability, and bringing it very near to demonstration, that Socrates might consistently with the general maxims and objects of his philosophy use the word "I think" in familiar convesation. But, next, why does he say "Son of Cleinias," when he might have called him simply Alcibiades? The propriety of this language, too, is established after painful and accurate enquiry. The phrase admits of a partial justification on the grounds that children are advantaged by reflection on the glory of him who begat them, and that Cleinias had distinguished himself in an Athenian war; that Homer is fond of patronymics; that it is an old Greek custom to use them. But there is a far deeper motive: Alcibiades might think of the divine reason from which souls issue, when he was reminded that he was the son of somebody.

Commentary on the first Alcibiades.

Ed. Paris. Vol. 2, p. 49.

Examination of the word οἶμαι, p. 57—64.

P. 61.

Εἰ τοίνυν καὶ αἱ γνώσεις διαφέρουσι τῶν τε ἀεὶ καὶ ὡσάυτως ἐχόντων καὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομενών καὶ οἱ λόγοι παμπόλλην ἔλαχον ἐξαλλαγήν, καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς μὲν ἄλλα προσήκει τοῖς δὲ ἄλλα· τί θαυμαστὸν εἰ καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐντάυθα περὶ φύσεως ἀστάτου διαλέγομενος τῷ οἶμαι κατεχρήσατω κ τ.λ.

p. 62.

P. 65—73.

6. We do not quote these passages as if they were conclusive

against the opinion of M. Cousin. On the contrary, we believe that opinion to be justified by evidence which must have seemed to the greatest of modern Eclectics quite irresistible. It is not the mistake of a partial admirer that Proclus gathers up the threads of former Greek enquirers, and weaves them into one woof. It is not a mistake that his intense devotion to Plato, to the intermediate commentators upon him, but especially to his own master Syrianus, is often rewarded by apprehensions which justify themselves to every student, and for which we should be very grateful. Nor is there the least doubt that though Proclus talks an infinite deal of nothing, more than any man in Athens, he not unfrequently enunciates a proposition of great worth with a neatness, sharpness, and perspicuity, such as can scarcely be found in the citizen of any city but his. If the conclusion to which we arrive respecting him must be ultimately something very different from that which M. Cousin's eulogium suggests, we are most willing that our readers should know what plea there is for that eulogium, and should admit the claims of Proclus to canonisation in spite of our devil advocacy.

Merits of Proclus.

7. The lectures on the Alcibiades, of which we have given one or two rather disadvantageous specimens, are not so wholly occupied with transcendental questions that they overlook the characteristics of Alcibiades as a notable historical figure. With some formality and many unnecessary words, but not without real beauty, Proclus developes the character of the love which Socrates bore to him, how different it was from that of all who admired and flattered him, how its whole aim was to draw him away from the restless pursuit of a multitude of objects, and to fix his mind on the real and the abiding. Eight centuries had not passed away without giving even the ordinary commentator certain perceptions on this subject, a certain power of understanding how the higher being stoops from his glory to draw up the inferior after him, how this is effected by sympathy with his weaknesses, by contemplating objects as he contemplates them while yet he retains that elevation of which he wishes his scholar to partake. The ability of describing this as the peculiarity of the best man because it is also the quality of the gods, belongs to the Neo-Platonist more than it did to those at whose feet he sat, and from whom he professed to derive his wisdom. Here especially we discover that change which we have pointed out already as the distinguishing one of the new philosophy, not only that it could not stand apart from theology (for the old Platonism had never tried to do that) but that it assumed theology as its ground and starting-point, not merely as its termination; that it supposed the higher world to have

Idea of Love

See especially pages 88—109.

Love divine and human.

Ἀτεχνῶς οὖν μοι δοκει Δαίμονος ἀγαθοῦ χώραν ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπέχειν πρὸς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ κατοπτεύειν αὐτὸν ἐκ νεότητος ὥσπερ πρεσβύτερος

κα. φρουρεῖν καὶ τας ἐνεργειας αὐτου πάσας ἐπισκοπεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

Theological character of the love. [Examine particularly the striking passage, 162, last line, to 173.]

condescended to the lower, not merely the lower to be in a process of ascent towards the higher. We have seen how Plotinus, and still more Porphyry, struggled, the one to restore philosophy to its purer and colder position, the other to preserve it in that position; how inconsistent each was in this experiment, how inevitably the hierophantic doctrines of Iamblichus triumphed over theirs. In the time of Proclus it was no longer a matter of controversy. The war between mythology and philosophy had terminated. Each was acknowledged as necessary to the other. In their battles with the Christian Church, the Neo-Platonists adopted much of its language. Their theory was that its ideas belonged to them, that they were in fact ideas of the old world implied in all that had been written about heroes and philosophers, and the relations between gods and goddesses; that their function was to restore them to their proper owners, at the same time making use of their philosophy to hinder the ideas from being lost in the stories which had embodied them.

The Christian love mixes with the Platonic.

8. Although, therefore, Athens was not the battle-field between Christianity and the new philosophy, and although it would be unjust to impute to Proclus any directly polemical purpose in his commentaries upon Plato, there can be no doubt that he wished his pupils to understand that the Christian idea of love, and all that was connected with it, had already been practically exhibited in the conduct of the earlier philosophers, as well as expressed in the Pagan divinity, and could now be set forth in its most refined and perfect form by those who harmonised them in their all-embracing Eclecticism. It was in this way that Proclus strove to establish his title to be the priest as well as the dialectician of the universe. It was thus that looking back upon all the teachings of the past, and around upon all the faith and superstitions of the present, he sought to extract the essential oil from them, discarding their superfluous materials. The question is, what was the result of the process, how much of this quintessence has he been able to bequeath for the nourishment of mankind? Something unquestionable, as we have said already, we do owe to him. This especially. It might be fancied that the love of Socrates for Alcibiades was a mere sentimental addition to his philosophical reasonings, that a mere personal interest attaches to the one which must be kept as distinct as possible from that stern and severe method which he continually aimed at in the other. We think Proclus has very clearly shewn this conclusion, however just it might be if applied to Aristotle or Zeno, is entirely false in reference to his master. The chief obligation, if we are not mistaken,—and it is a very great one—which the disciple and admirer of Plato is under to this commentator, is that he has shewn the elenctic or dialectical processes for which Socrates is so famous, to be connected by close and inseparable links not only with a moral purpose but with his affections. The value of his testimony and of his proofs on this point is greatly enhanced by the dryness and formality of his own disposition. His faculty is entirely of the logical kind. Here and there one may find a phrase, or even a sentence, which has a kind of poetical illumination in it; but it shines with an altogether reflected light, and one could scarcely imagine any one so continually in communication with Plato who has so little of vitality or of humour. His homage to Love, then, is a homage to Science. He may be quoted as the most satisfactory of witnesses to a truth which we believe all increased study of philosophical history will demonstrate more fully, that the highest science is not merely compatible with the most divine and most human love, but that they cannot exist apart. Admitting this as a result which is so important that Proclus or any man may well have been sent into the world to illustrate it, and that no fatigue should be grudged by the listeners which helps to fix it in their minds, we must yet remark that it is a very great effort to believe in Socrates or in Alcibiades, or in any living creatures at all, while we are perusing this most ingenious and elaborate commentary upon their relations to each other. The quintessence we have, no doubt, if it consists in refined disquisitions, or in the translation of human beings into the ideas which they embody. But if this is the best thing which the man can do for us who contains Orpheus, Plato, and Aristotle in himself, we should for our own parts be glad to have him reduced again into his original elements, and to get the very tiniest of them in place of the entire compound. If it is asked, then, whether we are content with the hints of a higher and purer love which these men of the old world give us, whether we do not want a Proclus to exhibit, even if it be in a less striking and vital form the complete ideal at which they are aiming; if M. Cousin, or any of his disciples, will force these questions upon us, we must at all hazard of appearing very ridiculous in their eyes answer "We look for the Ideal of that which is personal in a person. We cannot understand either the pure affection of any man of the old world towards a disciple, or his zeal for truth, unless that affection and that zeal are more perfectly embodied than he exhibited then. It seems, therefore, to us that the effort of Proclus was to get rid of that which explains the mysteries of the old world, and to substitute for it a theory which is obliged to sustain itself by the traditions which that world found untenable. Proclus certainly has detected the secret principle which is implied in the dialogue of Alcibiades,

Our obligations to Proclus.

Harmony of love and science.

Proclus not imaginative.

Proclus a lover of abstraction.

Need of an ideal which shall not be an abstraction.

and more or less in all the Platonical dialogues. But he has left it as he found it, only adding to it a ponderous dæmonology, which, if it is true, demands the interpretation which the dialogues demand, and which, if true or false, affords no help to any mortal creature in becoming what Socrates and Plato would have him become."

Mixture of loyalty and slavery in Proclus.

10. We are fully aware that we shall be accused of leading our readers back into an old and customary rut when we venture remarks of this kind. But let those who dread ruts fairly give themselves to the study of Proclus; let them find, if they can, among all the slaves of tradition, one who bound himself so entirely to the yoke of a master as he did, one who so little dared to walk alone. We do not find fault with him for his addiction either to the old teacher or to the members of the sacred succession. Whatever there is good in him arises from his loyalty. He would be far less original than he is if he had trusted more to his native wit. By faithfully endeavouring to understand others, he rose by degrees into some strong and distinct convictions of his own; in trying to bring their thoughts together and present them to his class, he attained to some knowledge of what was going on in himself. Many may have gone through the same process. We have no right to pronounce it an illegitimate one. But for those who affect a particularly free habit of mind, and who scorn the fetters of the past, to take Proclus as their hero and guide, is the most surprising of all contradictions.

General dæmonology p. 182—212. Dæmon of Socrates, p. 212—232.

11. The passages in the commentary which refer to the dæmon of Socrates, though mixed of course with the later dæmonology of which Socrates knew nothing, are perhaps the most instructive in this part of the writings of Proclus, both historically and philosophically. We prefer, indeed, to take Socrates as the interpreter of his teachings and inspirations, and much of what Proclus says about the natural bias of the old Athenian towards good which made it necessary that he should have a power to restrain him, not one to urge him on, is to us unintelligible, and is quite inconsistent, we think, with his own statements. Still, the hints which the lecturer supplies on this topic serve very strikingly to connect the former with the later world, and suggest thoughts to each man respecting the government to which he is subjected, that should profit us more than they did his disciples. There are also observations strangely introduced, which, if they are not quite new, are nevertheless such as time can never make old. Thus, for instance, the mention of the crowd of lovers or admirers by whom Alcibiades was surrounded suggests the enquiry "What, then, is this crowd? Every one must see that it is a multitude, but a multitude undefined, confused, unorganised. It is not a multitude in the sense in which a choir is a multitude, nor in which a people is. For a people is a multitude bound together within itself, but a crowd is a multitude merely consisting of loose elements. Hence it is commonly said that in politics ochlocracy differs from democracy, in that the one is out of measure and tune, the other is established under laws. Evidently, therefore, in this crowd, we have the tokens of a scattered dissipated life, one that draws down the object of its love into the material and divided and complex image of the different passions. Thus, Timæus called by this name all that which was reduced to no law of reason, the unmodulated and disorderly chaos that proceeded from the different elements of fire, and air, and earth, and water." Our readers, we hope, will discern something of an order emerging out of this chaos, and will admit that Proclus has made the most of the hint which Socrates has given him.

P. 213. οὐκ ἐδέατο τῆς αὐτὸν δαίμονος προτροπῆς· ὥρμητο γὰρ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.

Political hints.

P. 157.

The Platonical Triad, p. 138—142

12. A far deeper subject, connected with all the thoughts of this time, and deserving the most careful attention of the historian, is brought before us in the following sentences. Proclus had been saying that Love cannot be reckoned among the highest or among the lowest classes of Beings. The reason given is that the thing loved (τὸ ἐραστὸν) must be beyond Love itself; but that Love cannot be severed from the Good or Beautiful, of which it participates; it is therefore not transcendant but mediatorial. He then proceeds—"In what, then, has it its first subsistence (ποῦ δὴ οὖν ὑπέστη τὴν πρώτην), and how goes it forth towards all things, and with what monads has it sprung out into activity? There being three substances (ὑποστάσεων) in the noetic and hidden gods; the first denoted by Goodness (τῷ ἀγαθῷ χαρακτηριζομένης) perceiving the essential Good, which is, as the oracle declares, the Paternal Monad (πατρικὴ μονάς); the second denoted by Wisdom (τὸ σοφὸν), in which dwells also the primary Intelligence (νόησις); the third denoted by the Beautiful (τὸ καλὸν). Corresponding to these noetic principles there subsist three monads, dwelling together, when contemplated as the principle or cause of noetic things in one form or kind; but first of all shining forth in the unspeakable order of the gods, as Faith, Truth, Love. Faith that establisheth all things, and settleth it in the Good; Truth that unfolds all the knowledge that is in any beings; Love that converteth all things, and draweth them into the nature of the Good. And this Triad proceedeth forth to all the orders of gods, and causeth the unity so to shine forth as to come within the scope of Intelligence; but in each order it has a different manifestation, uniting its own powers with the idiosyncrasies of the gods . . . . For all things, says the oracle, in these three,

Goodness, Wisdom, Love, the three Monads.

Passage from the Ineffable to the Intelligible.

are governed and are; and for that reason the Gods command the Theurgists by these three to unite themselves to the God."

The discourses on the Parmenides, ed. Paris. Vol. 4.

13. We shall not stop now to comment on this passage, though we are not insensible to its importance as condensing the thoughts of many generations of Platonists on this subject, as supplying hints on philosophical and theological terminology, and as marking the differences and resemblances between the Christian and Platonical schools. But all these points will come more properly under our consideration hereafter, and in the meantime we must speak of that work to which Proclus himself and his disciple considered the lectures on the Alcibiades only the vestibule—his discourses on the Parmenides. What he thought of this task, when he entered upon it, may be judged from the solemn prayer with which the first book opens:

Opening invocation, p. 3—5.

—"I pray to all the gods and all the goddesses to guide my reason in the speculation which lies before me, and having kindled in me the pure light of truth, to direct my mind upwards to the very knowledge of the things that are, and to open the doors of my soul to receive the divine guidance of Plato, and having directed my knowledge into the very brightness of being, to withdraw me from the various forms of opinion, from the apparent wisdom, from the wandering about things that are not, by that purest intellectual exercise about the things that are, whereby alone the eye of the soul is nourished and brightened, as Socrates says in the Phædrus, and that the noetic gods will give to me the perfect nous, and the noeric gods the power that leads up to this, and that the rulers of the universe above the heaven will impart to me an energy unshaken by material notions and emancipated from them, and those to whom the world is given as their dominion a winged life, and the angelic choirs a true manifestation of divine things, and the good dæmons the fulness of the inspiration that comes from the gods, and the heroes a grand and venerable and lofty fixedness of mind, and the whole divine race together a perfect preparation for the participation in Plato's most mystical and far-seeing speculations, which he declares to us himself in the Parmenides with the profundity fitting such topics, but which *he* (*i. e.* his master Syrianus) completed by his own most pure and most luminous apprehensions, who did most truly share the Platonic feast, and was the medium for transmitting the divine truth, and was the guide in our speculations and the hierophant of these divine words; who, I should say, came down as a type of philosophy of men to do good to the souls that are here, in place of images, sacrifices, the whole mystery of purification, a leader of salvation to the men that are now and that shall be hereafter. And may the whole band of those that are above us

εὐσυναί τε μοι νῦν μὲν τέλεον τοὺς νοητοὺς θεοὺς δύναμιν δ' ἀναγωγον τοὺς νοεροὺς.

ὁ τῷ Πλάτωνι μὲν συμβακχεύσας ὡς ἀληθῶς, καὶ ὁ μεστὸς κατασὰς τῆς θείας ἀληθείας.

be propitious, and may the whole force that they supply be at hand, kindling before us the light which proceeding *from* them may guide us *to* them."

Reverence of Proclus

14. This somewhat inflated invocation, which will shew the reader what reverence the Athenian doctors bestowed upon each other, as well as upon the heroes and the choirs of angels, is still a satisfactory evidence that Proclus regarded the questions which philosophy raises with an awe which has been greatly wanting in some of its later professors. He was surely right in considering that when Parmenides spoke of the One, he must have had an awful sense that he was approaching the ground and root of things, an abyss deeper than his own spirit, one which that spirit could only contemplate when it had undergone a moral purification. He is certainly right that Socrates, young man as Plato represents him to have been when he conversed with Parmenides and Zeno, felt the dignity and dreadfulness of the enquiry in which they were engaged, though he did not shrink from courageously entering upon it himself, and though the object of his life was to clear a road by which others might travel in the same direction. And we cannot conceive that he was wrong in holding that each new student must tremble as much as his predecessors have done, confessing that he is on holy ground. It is the great redeeming point in Proclus, that while he looks upon the search for absolute unity as the search of the philosopher, he does not willingly reduce this unity into a dead abstraction, that he *tries* to identify it with a living Being. The effort is unspeakably difficult to him, for the Creator of the universe—and he fully admits a Creator of the universe—must, he thinks, be secondary and inferior to the one pure unutterable essence. To mix Him with his works or even with any working, is a kind of impiety. Hence, as we have seen in the preliminary invocation, and as we found was the case with the author of the Mysteries, the primitive and eternal Nous soars above all the efficient and energising gods; a vision of supreme goodness rises above even that; a transcendant unity is still perceivable through this goodness. Through tiers of beings does the poor overwhelmed seeker ascend towards this distant effulgence; or is it an opaque substance from which all effulgence has departed? And the while he feels as if this mysterious unity could not be far from him, as if it were implied in all he speaks and does, as if it were pre-supposed in the multitude of things which his eye beholds, still more in every act of his mind when he thinks of those things. He feels also as if the absolute and eternal One must in a direct and mysterious way be acting upon him, and as if there must be

His great difficulty

some nearer passage to it than through those orders of beings who, howsoever his intellect may arrange and compose them, introduce plurality into his thoughts, and disturb his efforts to dwell in a region that is above it. We will frankly own, that if we had not travelled this road before with Augustin, and had not learnt by what a painful and practical method he was led to behold the absolute Good, the absolute One, as inseparable from a Person in whom he lived, and moved, and had his being, if we had not learnt how he found in Whom this Unity and Goodness might be approached and apprehended, these enquiries of Proclus would seem to us utterly interminable, full of the profoundest interest and the profoundest despair, each step involving a new contradiction, with the perpetual fear that if the mists ever should disperse, and the different forms which perplexed the vision while it was beset by them disappear, nothing would remain but vacancy. When the Commentary is read along with the Confessions, a light falls on it; all the parts of a philosophical method whereby a man may disengage himself from the phantoms of sense, and begin to see things as they are, to recognise a unity in them, to see a unity above and beyond them, for which Proclus is indebted to Socrates, promise to become practically helpful. The Theurgy which was derived from his own immediate masters, is translated from a vague, half believed superstition, necessary to fill up the blank in philosophy, into a divine science which is at the root of it and which quickens it. Even the pettinesses and paltrinesses of the sage give us a kind of interest in him, as witnesses that he shared our frailties, and that a complete system never shall be wrought out in God's living universe, which shall not betray its own feebleness, and let in the light and air of heaven through a thousand cracks and fissures.

Augustin and Proclus. The highest vision of Unity and Good won through the experience of sorrow and evil.

Proclus according to Morbeka.

15. There are three treatises by Proclus, the original of which is lost, but of which the substance is preserved in a Latin translation by a Corinthian Archbishop of the twelfth century. For the easy and tolerably flowing Greek of the Athenian scholar we have the uncouth version of a man who was trying to render philosophical thoughts into a language which he imperfectly understood, and which he must have considered more unfit for the purpose than it actually was. Yet we have the bad taste to think these on the whole the most valuable compositions which Proclus has bequeathed to us; valuable partly for the very cause which makes the reading of them painful. Merely to a philologer, the spectacle of a Greek struggling to find Latin equivalents for his words, or when that task is hopeless, giving them Latin terminations, is amusing and not uninstructive. But to the historian of philosophy, who is about very shortly to leave the original home of science, where all the finest shades and distinctions of thought and speculation had become familiar and conventional, to see a set of hardy Latinised Goths awakening to a new world of invisible things, and trying to make the visible world which they were subduing with sword and ploughshare, furnish them with instruments for expounding the secrets of it, books are of immense value which connect the perishing cultivation with the fresh and hopeful barbarism. Morbeka's translation serves this purpose. And as the works with which he has presented us are not lectures, but letters or essays, Proclus appears less in the character of a verbal critic; his worship of Plato does not afford him the same excuse for endless gossiping. Not that Plato is ever forgotten. In the opening of the second of his treatises on Providence, he boldly affirms that the preservation of the sacred Platonical oracles, and the handing down of them from age to age, through a series of worthy auditors, is itself a demonstration of Providence, were others wanting. At the same time he declares with much truth, as we have already intimated, that the study of Plato had awakened and not stifled his self-reflection, and that Mercury being their common teacher, it signified little whether the words had been first uttered by the ancients or elaborated by himself.

Value of the translation, ed. Paris. Vol. 1.

And of the Treatises themselves.

Etenim hanc ipsam oraculorum traditionem ad dignos Deorum auditores æstimo esse apertissimam Providentiæ demonstrationem, &c p. 91.

16. The first of these treatises is "On Providence and Fate, and that which is in us;" the second resolves ten doubts about Providence; the third treats of the subsistence of evil things. *Theodorus*, to whom the first of these treatises is addressed, had adopted a theory of the universe which he was certainly not the first or the last to maintain. Looking at the various tragical and comical connections of human events, he supposed them to be held together by a certain mechanical law or fate. This he was disposed to call Providence, and to endue with free-will. But that which is called free-will in man, he rejected as merely nominal and imaginary. Fate, then, and Providence differed according to Theodorus, in that the first expressed a series of antecedents and consequents, the latter the necessity which produces these. Proclus, on the contrary, proposes to show, 1st. That Fate and Providence are both causes of the world, and of the things which come to pass in the world, but that Providence is antecedent to Fate, that all things which happen according to Fate come to pass by a much earlier law from Providence, but that the converse is not true, for that the whole order of things depending directly on Providence, is diviner than Fate. 2nd. That there is one soul which is separable from the body,

Opinion of Theodorus P. 10, § 2.

Hanc Providentiam hymnizasti ut solummodo αὐτεξούσιον. Humanæ autem animæ vulgatum αὐτεξούσιον nomen solum esse.

Ambo quidem causas mundi et eorum quæ in mundo fiunt. esse. præexistere autem Providentiam

Fato et omnia quidem quæcunque fiunt secundùm fatum maltò prius a Providentiâ fieri, p. 12.

Scientiam et Veritatem aliam quidem inexistere animabus in generatione versis quamvissint immaculata secundùm vitam; aliam autem refugientibus ex hoc loco et factis ibi et locatis unde prius casus, et qui in hunc mortalem locum descensus, page 12.

Palam erit qualiter multa diffugiunt Fatum, Providentiam autem nihil; (pp 12, 13).

and comes down from above from the gods into this mortal sphere; that there is another dwelling in bodies which cannot be separated from the things that are lying about it and beneath, that the latter indeed depends upon Fate, but the other upon Providence, in virtue of its own substance. 3d. That there is one kind of knowledge and truth in souls brought under the law of generation and birth, even though they be spotless in life, another to those who fly from this mortal sphere and have established themselves in that place whence they first fell and descended hither. If these distinctions are fully recognised, he thinks that all the difficulties of the subject will be cleared away. It will be evident in what wise many things escape Fate, but Providence nothing. It will be evident from the second proposition, how truly there is a free-will in that principle which is within us, but how when this obeys necessity, and is led by Fate, its freedom becomes languid and dead, in consequence of an evil life, though it still participates in a certain phantom of choice in virtue of the better soul which is its neighbour. From the third position we discover what Parmenides, Socrates, and Plato meant when they said that the soul, after it is purged from earthly passions and mixtures, may even here perceive truth, and will enjoy a nobler and purer science after it has been released the laws of birth and matter.

That which is in us.

17. Our readers will not be surprised that Proclus should devote his chief diligence to the illustration of the second of these principles, or that the really valuable part of his treatise should be that which treats of the principle *in us*—that which is immediately under the divine direction, which is free while it acknowledges that direction, which becomes slavish by acknowledging itself merely as a part of nature, and therefore subject to necessity, and yet which can never lose the tokens of a higher origin and life. We must express our gratitude to him for having untied with great dexterity some of the knots in this most difficult and interesting of all questions: untied them, we mean, so far as to make the logical statement of the problems of human life more precise and clear. The problems themselves have to be worked out by other aid, and under other guidance, than that which he can afford us; but *quod dat accipimus*, not without some shame for having perhaps undervalued other presents of his by which we might have profited.

The Doubts on Providence, p. 91—179.
(a) p. 92—98.

17. The ten Doubts on Providence have been in most of our minds, and on the greater part of them Proclus has something to say which is worth listening to. The first (*a*) is, whether Providence takes account of all things, of wholes, of parts, even down to the most individual things in the heavens and under

the heavens, eternal things and corruptible. The second (*b*) is, whether Providence takes cognisance of contingencies. The third (*c*), if Providence is the cause both of things determinate and things indeterminate. Is it the cause of both in the same way or in a different way? The fourth (*d*), is on the question how it is possible to participate in the nature of the gods. The fifth (*e*) is the more terrible question, how evil can have place among beings while there is a Providence. The sixth (*f*) concerns the inequality of the lives of men in the universe. The seventh (*g*) refers to the differences of condition in inanimate creatures apparently not susceptible of moral evil. The eighth (*h*), refers to the delay of punishments and the apparent disconnection between crime and punishment. The ninth (*i*), is on the question how the evils of one generation can be visited upon another. The tenth (*k*) is in what sense, seeing that Providence has been connected with the unity and with the perfect good, angels, and dæmons, and heroes, can be said to exercise it. The statement of these difficulties may shew us with what awful questionings of the human spirit the Neo-Platonist was willing to engage. Are we to mourn that he did not provide us with formulas for the settlement of them which could save us from the necessity of encountering them ourselves?

(*b*) 98—109
(*c*) 109—116
(*d*) 116—123.
(*e*) 123—131.
(*f*) 131—144.
(*g*) 144—153.
(*h*) 153—168.
(*i*) 168—174.
(*k*) 174—179

Third treatise, p. 197.

18. The questions mooted in the third treatise are these. Whether Evil is or not. If it is, whether in things intellectual or not. If in things sensible, whether in virtue of that which is their original cause. If not, whether substance is in any wise to be ascribed to it, or it is to be set down as wholly unsubstantial. If it has subsistence, in what wise it subsists, and whither it tends: how, there being a Providence, Evil is and whence it is. On all these points he says, and before all, he must adhere to the doctrine of Plato; he can do nothing if he departs from him. As we have already made copious extracts from the book of Plotinus which refers to this subject, we shall not trouble our readers with a discussion proceeding from what, in spite of M. Cousin, we must consider an inferior mind. Both sages arrive at the same conclusion. The following passage will perhaps assist us as much in understanding the object and the result of the treatise as any we could select. "Of all things it would seem to be the most difficult to know the nature of Evil in itself, seeing that all knowledge is the knowledge of species or form. But Evil is without form, and, so to speak, privation. Perhaps, however, we may arrive at some satisfaction on this point, too, by contemplating Good in itself, and the nature of things which are good. For as the primary good is beyond and above all things, so Evil in itself is that which is divested of all

Nihil reputabimus tractasse nobis ab illius theoriâ decidentibus, p. 198.

P. 273—274, § 5.

good. In so far forth as it is evil, it is the defect and privation of this. In what wise Good subsists, and what degrees it has, has been set forth elsewhere. But Evil, as Evil, is that which is separated from the fountain of Good; separated in so far as it is objectless and vague from the primary object; in so far as it is weakness, from the power which dwells in that object; in so far as it is want of harmony, falsehood, or baseness, from beauty and truth, and that by which things are united; in so far as it is restless and unstable from the abiding and eternal unity; in so far as it is privation and unvitality, from the first Monad and the life which is in it; in so far as it tends to corrupt, and divide, and make imperfect, the things with which it hath to do, from the goodness which is bringing the universe to perfection. For the corruptive draws from that which is to that which is not; the divisive destroys the continuity and union of being; the imperfect takes from each thing the perfection and order which belongs to its own nature." He goes on to explain with considerable skill and subtlety, though confessing that all he says has been said before by Plato, how that which is evil and unjust while in itself it is only negative, yet derives a kind of positiveness and reality from the presence of the goodness and justice to which it is opposed. And thus it is intelligible how might should belong essentially to right, and be inseparable from it; the very power which seems to belong to wrong being in fact derived from the fellowship of that which it is weakening and undermining

Injustitiam ipsam secundùm se debilem et inactivam esse ait; justitiæ autem præsentiâ et potentiam habere et ad agere duci non manentem in sui ipsius naturâ, neque in ἀξωία privatione solùm, quoniam et præjacens ipsum vitale ens dat et malo vitæ participationem, p. 276.

19. With this precious moral truth upon his lips we take a friendly farewell of Proclus. The parting is somewhat more solemn, because, as our readers must have gathered from our previous remarks, it is not from a man merely but from a period. Whatever be the merits or the defects of this Platonical teacher, it is with him the Greek philosophy, as such, closes its records. We do not mean that he left no successors. It was in the next century, not in this, that the Athenian schools were closed. But it had done whatever it had to do when Proclus delivered his last lecture. Our friend the Corinthian Archbishop, in his barbarous Latin-Greek lingo, signifies to us that whatever had been once spoken in the proper tongue of the wise men, must undergo a transformation before it could live again. And, therefore, we must stand still for a moment, though we have studied the different parts of the landscape with some care, that we may consider it as a whole before it vanishes from us.

Proclus practically the last of an age.

Recapitulation.

20. We spoke in the former part of this treatise of the Platonical dialogues as treating of *Being*, or that which is and which may be detected amidst all the confused appearances of things; of *Ideas*, which could neither be said to exist in the

thinker nor in that of which he thinks, which are substantial, not forms of our minds though implied in all the forms of our minds, not subject to the conditions of time and of space but unchangeable and eternal; finally, of *Unity*, or *the One* which is implied in all the thoughts of man, in the arrangements and existence of human society, in the order of the visible universe. We pointed out why, as it seemed to us, Plato had been least successful in handling this last subject, most profound and instructive when he was treating of that Unity which the politician is obliged to recognise and assume, and that which the dialectician seeks after when he is examining what is implied in the discourse and reasonings of man. In these two cases he was starting from data which his own experience and the experience of his country furnished him with; he was proceeding in a safe, cautious, experimental method, to discover what principles lay beneath facts which could not be gainsayed. In the other case he was starting from hypotheses, he was considering how the world might have been formed; he had not yet learnt how to question its phenomena and to extract from them their law, as he questioned those which had to do directly with himself and with mankind. Hence, we said, it had come to pass that the Timæus, though the great armoury for those who wish to make out a system of Platonical opinions, is the worst guide of all to the Platonical philosophy, which is nothing else than a method of emancipation from Platonical opinions and all other opinions,—a search after a ground of reality that lies beneath all opinions.

Platonical subjects. See Part I. art. Plato.

21. Now, if we are asked how far this philosophy was pursued by the spiritual descendants of Plato—how far a Platonical system was substituted for it—we have endeavoured in several particular cases to indicate the answer. The pursuit after Being, or that which is, in the Socratic sense and Socratic method, was, we have remarked, abandoned by Plotinus not entirely, for he was a self-questioner, but to a very great extent because he had none of the practical habits of Socrates, none of his sympathy with common life. When the Iamblichan theurgy permanently established itself in fellowship with his more pure philosophy, there was no doubt a greater mixture of the popular element with the philosophical; but it was just that popular element of which Socrates was trying to get rid, just that which checked his own pursuit after the reality of things. The reader is not at first aware how much this is the case, because he finds Socratic phrases, respecting the things that are and the things that are not, continually in the mouths of the mythological doctors, and because he finds as frequent allusions to mythological fables in the Platonical dialogues themselves as

The τὸ ὄν.

The abstract and the popular.

The inquirer and the lecturer.

in their commentaries. But if he looks carefully, he will observe this most striking difference, that Socrates is feeling his way to a substantial truth through the story, that the others are trying to justify or reconstruct the story merely as the vehicle or instrument for enunciating some principle. Proclus, it may be admitted, is less busy in this work than some of the more polemical teachers of the preceding century. His intense and slavish addiction to Plato, and his want of imagination, make him prefer the dry letter to the ornamental illustration. But it cannot be said that he comes nearer to the simplicity of Socrates when he forsakes the declamatory style. He is always the lecturer who lays down principles, never the free and friendly inquirer who is working them out.

Ideas.

22. The next department of the Platonical philosophy, that which we spoke of as belonging more to the disciple than to the master, to the profound thinker than to the homely questioner, the doctrine of Ideas, is one on which the New Platonists believed that they had especial illumination. They thought that

How treated by the new school.

if Ideas were, as Plato said, substantial, not mere notions of our minds, they must come to us in some real actual form; they must come forth from the primary substance, and present themselves to us. Thus the Platonic Ideas or Ideals are transformed into that host of spiritual persons, secondary Gods, Angels, Dæmons, Heroes, Souls, which are everywhere flitting before us in the writings of the later doctors. You are never quite certain what guise these personages may put on. You are listening to Syrianus or Proclus in his chair; it is a world of Ideas to which you are introduced, ideas immeasurably less substantial than those with which one has been familiar in Plato's own writings. But the professor has slipped off his cloak, and has clothed himself in the robes which become him as priest of the

Their uncertainty.

universe. In a moment the ideas have been converted into living creatures, mediators between the transcendant Unity and the human sage still mixing with the clods of earth. We are far from wishing to impute this apparent uncertainty as a crime to the new school. We have stated already why we believe it was inevitable. If Plato's statement of the law under which man perceives that which is absolute and eternal is the true one, if any conception which we form of the absolute Essence must be idolatrous and imperfect because it is our conception, if yet the spirit of man is created to receive the knowledge of this highest Essence, and must receive it in order that it may reach its highest blessedness, the Platonist can never have been content until the divine Ideal proved itself not to be

Necessity of a dæmonology.

the work of his intellect or imagination, and yet proved itself to have the most intimate relation with both, with his very

self. Either philosophical anticipations had nothing corresponding to them in reality, which Plato assumes that they must have, or this anticipation must meet some time or other its counterpart. And then how would it be possible to go on merely speaking of the Ideal? The New-Platonist said that when the Christian church talked of the divine Ideal as manifested, they talked nonsense. The only sense that could be substituted for that nonsense was that in which Julian, Iamblichus, and Proclus so firmly believed.

Unity dialectical.

23. The subject of Unity, in so far as it has to do with dialectics,—that is to say in so far as the question is by what process man may obtain to the knowledge of the pure and absolute Unity, has been spoken of already in our remarks upon the Parmenides, as treated by Proclus. That the necessity of such a Unity had become more obvious to the commentator, even than it was to the master, is sufficiently evident. That a mere abstract Unity, apart from a living Being, was a vision from which the elder sage revolted, which the later felt to be impossible, we have joyfully confessed. That Proclus had even more difficulty than Plato in reconciling his conviction with the fact, we have been obliged to admit. By some means or other the belief of a One living ground of man and of the universe had established itself and got root. The philosopher did willing, but somewhat perplexed, homage to a truth which was sweeping a whole world before it; though the philosopher was shewing at the self-same time how much he resembled the crowd in its unwillingness to abandon that old world, in its readiness to rebuild its idolatries upon a new foundation.

Unity political.

24. But if the unity of the Parmenides was partially asserted by the new school, what could they do to assert the unity of the Republic? Proclus could see the difference between a democracy and ochlocracy. Old Athenian wisdom served him so far. But could the great speculator on all human things throw the least light upon the question how men of different races, tribes, languages, might be one? how the divine pattern in the heavens which Plato saw might be a kingdom for the groaning and starving myriads upon earth? The great failure.

Not one syllable upon this subject, we do not say which could be intelligible to ignorant multitudes, but which could guide the thoughts of the man who believed in a higher destiny for his kind, and was willing to suffer with it, came forth from the sages of Athens or Alexandria, who proclaimed each other to be inspired. If what they said was true, a multitude of divine words had been spoken upon this earth, but nothing ever had been upon it for its deliverance. Gods noetic and noeric.

dæmons, heroes and divine souls, had all taken a mighty interest in some of its inhabitants; and it was hastening on to the abyss. We do not, indeed, deny that the earnest and instructive discourses of Proclus on the subject of evil, have a very direct bearing upon political life. The principle which he asserts that that which is one is good, that evil breaks, divides, disperses, contains within it the great maxim of social order, the indication of the causes which interrupt it, the encouragement to all hope in those who seek after it. But why was so precious a truth so ineffective a one? Where was the living uniting power that could hold society in one, despite of the power—apparent power it might only be in the eyes of the philosopher, but tremendously real for those who were crushed by it—that was ever threatening to tear it in pieces? Who could tell men of this, and where it dwelt? If not, what is the use of settling, even in the most satisfactory manner, whether Evil is or is not?

Valuable hint as to social life.

25. The unity of Nature was still left. The Timæus could supply plentiful theories to those who had never found the Atlantis of which it speaks. Proclus, we are told, wrote against the Mosaic account of the creation. Christian priests and Christian emperors, with their accustomed folly, wished to confute or to silence him. They represented, it would seem, that he believed in the eternity of the world, or that he confounded it with its Author. The charge is not true. We have given our readers proof enough out of his writings, in extracts certainly not selected for the purpose of glorifying him, which positively confute it. There was nothing in the tenour or habit of his speculations which inclined him to invest matter with any glory; everything which inclined him to disparage it. And though, like Plotinus, he carefully distinguished the Cosmos from matter, this had never the divinity in his mind which it had in the speculations of the Stoics. At the same time it was absolutely impossible for Proclus to understand Moses. The resemblance which Numenius had discovered between him and Plato had become every day since less visible to the school; the Hebrew had become more hopelessly untranslatable into the Attic. For the facts of light and darkness, of the firmament above and below, of earth and sea, of sun and moon, of birds, beasts, fishes, of man and woman, are those in which Moses finds his order, and which he refers directly to the creative Word; man being in the nearest relation to it. The simple institution of the week, with its day of rest and its days of work, is to the Jew the expression of God's rest and work, of man's rest and work,—of the relation of God to man, and of man to the world. Such an interpretation of the actual universe, as it presents itself to the eye of every peasant, such an assertion

Unity in the Cosmos.

Moses and Proclus.

that the highest God is providing for the ordinary wants of every peasant, and claiming him as the inheritor of the most mysterious blessings, was of course utterly vulgar and intolerable to a great theological cosmogonist who had discovered a multitude of other links and gradations between the divine and the human, the heavenly and the earthly. And how could a priest of the universe like Proclus, who was to eclecticise and harmonise all mythologies, endure the stern Jew who called upon all nations to confess the Lord of a few Syrian outcasts as their king?

The Jew and the Greek.

26. Was it then because the Church was becoming specially Hebrew in its character in the fifth century, that it could not endure the contact of Neo-Platonism, and that the struggle between them was approaching its final crisis? Apparently there was no time in which the Hebrew characteristics were becoming weaker, or were more threatening to disappear. In *their* character of priests of the universe, the bishops and doctors of the Christian Church were practically admitting the old mythological notions to come and dwell within it, as the Platonists were incorporating them in their philosophy. Nor can it be said that they were less busy with hypotheses about the universe, with cosmogonical theories, than their opponents. The text of Moses was rigidly adopted; but it was overlaid with inferences and speculations which destroyed all its character, and made it just as artificial, just as far off from facts, as the Timæus, or as the Hindoo Puranas. But if the document was disguised, the institution which was the true commentary upon it had become a part of the life and order of Christendom. Moreover, men did wake in the morning to the perception that there was day, and were reminded, before twenty-four hours were at an end, that there was night. Summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, were discovered to be parts of the economy of life. And therefore plain people acknowledged a tie between them and the old narrative, and left the doctors to settle their questions as they liked. The Church was Hebraic in spite of itself. It was trying to construct a religion and a philosophy which should expel all other religions and philosophies, and should make the thoughts and inquiries of men needless or sinful. It was, in fact, standing on the proclamation of a one living God, who had created the universe, had revealed Himself to man, and who was awakening man to thoughts, aspirations, and hopes which would have been equally crushed if the patriarchs or the philosophers of Alexandria, of Constantinople, or of Athens, had been able to establish their dominion.

The Church not Hebrew in its speculations.

but Hebrew by necessity of their position.

27. It is necessary to press these remarks upon our readers at this time, though we may have hinted them often before, lest

The Church victory no occasion for triumph.

the fall of the schools of Neo-Platonism should awaken any shout of triumph among Churchmen, as if they had succeeded in treading down a dangerous adversary; or lest philosophers should complain that some great and hideous injustice was committed, or some great loss sustained by the universe. There is no cause for shouting among Churchmen: first, because no true principle which Platonism had asserted could by possibility die, no vital distinction which it had proclaimed could be effaced, though all the statesmen and the Churchmen in the universe should conspire to produce such a result. There *had* been true principles asserted by Plato: if they were forgotten or buried under theological theories, theologians in later days would have to seek them again, and reassert them as the justification of the facts and promises of the Gospel. There *were* vital distinctions established by Platonism,—the distinctions between the eternal and the temporal, the spiritual and the sensual, heaven and earth: if these were denied or made light of by Christian doctors, the humble members of the Christian Church would have to demand them again, that St. Paul and St. John might not be accused of deceiving them,—that they might not be robbed of treasures for which none that can be weighed in earthly balances are any compensation. And, such a shout of triumph over a fallen foe is most idle and uncalled for, because the confusions and perplexities of the Platonical school, and the phantasies and superstitions which overwhelmed it, belong to human nature. We shall have to trace the reappearance of them, under different forms, in all periods. The Christian doctor and priest is not more safe from them than another man. If he does not notice the forms which they have taken, and supposes that they belong to others, not to him, he will certainly fall into them.

The fall of Platonism no cause for lamentation.

28. But the philosophical dirge is as little reasonable as the ecclesiastical pæan. The work which Platonism had to do in the world, it had accomplished. If philosophers wish for a recognition of its worth from those whom they suppose are its enemies, the Christian literature of four centuries will supply it. If we compare Athanasius or Augustin with those who worshipped their names in later days, we shall know how, consciously or unconsciously, they were helped by Plato to do a work which their successors could not have done. And if this is not the kind of homage which the modern admirers of Plato would desire, they may trace through all the history of the time, indications how much the thoughts of which he was the utterer were at work in minds which knew nothing of him,—how much Society was receiving its outward character and form from certain great spiritual principles that could only be expressed in language speaking of Being, of Unity, of a

human and divine Ideal. If these principles present themselves in history not as abstract forms, but as living facts, this is certainly what Socrates and Plato would have expected. This explains why the former clung so tenaciously to the wood of the carpenter and the last of the shoemaker; why the latter could ask even a tyrant of Syracuse to find himan actual world in which he might work, that he might escape from the abstractions which he hated.

Why Plato could not continue to be regarded as *the* philosopher.

29. If indeed Plato had been the only teacher of the old Greek world who had worked out important principles, or discovered a valuable method,—if there was no region besides the one to which he pointed the way—there might be some reason in the complaint that it could not last beyond the fifth or sixth century, and that a Church which had its foundation in Palestine, and received its lore from Semitic teachers, extinguished that which interfered with their supremacy. But we have always maintained that the field of thought in which Aristotle worked is one which requires and rewards cultivation, as well as that which his master tilled. Each, we have contended, in opposition to the pretensions of their respective schools, did what the other could not do. The disciples of Plato made him the systematiser which he was trying not to be, when they sought to bring the universe under his government. The great danger of Aristotle arose from the encyclopædic character of his mind, which made him suppose that he had comprehended all things because he had succeeded in discovering the formulas under which man conceives of all things. The proximate cause of the ruin of the Neo-Platonic school was that they fancied they could include Orpheus, Plato, Aristotle, in themselves,—that the universe had been in travail for nearly 5000 years only to bring them forth. If they were good Platonists, they could not be also good Aristotelians. They might honour Aristotle sincerely and profoundly, but it was mere arrogance to pretend that they could deal with the class of facts which he understood better than any man, upon their method. It was all very well for Cicero to unite the Academician and the Peripatetic. Mere artificial schools may always be accommodated, though they cannot be reconciled. But in the history of the world philosophies will either go for nothing, or they will prove their worth by connecting themselves with some distinct region of human experience which is demanding interpretation. We often hear of a tyranny of Aristotle which succeeded to the tyranny of Plato. Such language may have an important truth in it which we shall have to examine and to confess. But a tyranny does not establish itself for centuries upon an earth which is subject to an order, by mere accident. A man who has been in his grave a thousand

Philosophical tyrannies—what they signify.

Aristotle.

years does not, in despite of a multitude of living obstacles, spring to a throne over the most thinking minds for a series of ages, merely because they have a mad propensity for being in bondage. It is not that propensity, but the desire for deliverance, for illumination, upon subjects on which darkness is intolerable and unsafe, which has led men to seek for one or another guide to their footsteps. We must understand through what path they were travelling, what the surrounding atmosphere was, before we can pronounce that they chose amiss. It may be that their temporary chief is the very one that has been appointed for them; that it would have been as perilous for them to have been without him, as it was to follow him, when they entered a new track which he had not trodden, or in which he had gone astray.

Indications of a new epoch.

30. Before the fifth century closed, there were very clear indications of the approach not of an Aristotelian school but of an Aristotelian epoch. We will point out in what direction these traces are to be sought. But when we have done our duty to chronology, by denoting the man who was to be the commencement of the new period, we shall reserve the consideration of his thoughts, which were to have so great an influence upon it, till it has actually commenced. *Boëthius* is commonly spoken of as the swan from whose throat the dying notes of old classical eloquence proceeded; as the man who preserved the tradition of the age of Cicero, or at least of Pliny, in the days of the Ostrogoth. That honour may doubtless belong to him, and it is the one on which the scholar is most likely to dwell. The cruel sentence of the hitherto just ruler, upon the Roman Senator, the fact that he occupied his prison hours in writing the "Consolations of Philosophy," that, Christian as he was, he clung to that word as fondly as Augustin had done, the somewhat pedantical attachment with which he held by the old forms of the republic, like the Arnolds and Rienzis of after days, offer a sufficient excuse for that classification which connects him with the world that had been, rather than with that which was to be. But those who love to watch the birth more than the death of things—who welcome Theodoric's government as the sign that a modern Europe was bursting from a shell which it had taken 500 years to break—have a right to claim the honourable name of his victim as most properly belonging to them. As Englishmen we might insist that when Saxon and Roman wisdom first began to mingle and understand each other under the auspices of Alfred, the "Consolations of Philosophy" was chosen to express their union, or the transition from one to the other. But the student of the history of European philosophy is under a much stronger obligation not to treat Boëthius as a mere relic of the past.

Boëthius, A. D. 470-524.

The place assigned him by scholars.

He occupies a different one in philosophical history.

The continual references to him in the Middle Ages are not chiefly to his ethics but much more to his logic. It is in his character as a logical writer that he shews what the tendencies of the coming time were, with what kind of questions it would be occupied. Augustin, Latin as he was, is emphatically the Latin *Platonist*: his divinity, as much as his philosophy, is conversant with the eternal, and with man's relations to it. The forms in which men speak and reason are interesting to him only as he contemplates them from this higher ground. Boëthius on the contrary is the Latin *Aristotelian*, and the one who showed how much more naturally the Latin mind, when left to itself, and out of the reach of Greek influences, sympathises with the Aristotelian than with the Platonic temper. Under what modifications this is true, to what apparent and to what real exceptions it is liable, to what degree other influences besides the purely Latin were at work in the Middle Ages, how the Gothic, the Hebrew, the Arabic, the purely Christian influences conspired or counteracted each other, these are questions which we shall have to consider hereafter. And that we may consider them more satisfactorily, we hasten to conclude our narrative of the properly Greek school, by glancing at the events of the sixth century, which was to prepare the way for the future philosophy of Europe, though it may have supplied no names on which it behoves us to dwell.

The Latin Aristotelian

CHAPTER VI.

The Sixth Century.

The leading men of the Sixth Century.

1. We said that no great philosophical names would cause us to linger over the records of the Sixth Century. There are two unphilosophical names which every one recollects who thinks of it: perhaps we may have more to say of these than of many who have founded schools and composed systems. They are both of them far more memorable for what they did by themselves, or through others, than for what they thought; yet they have both, consciously or unconsciously, affected speculation as much as action. When they sought to hinder or direct its course, their movements were often feeble, sometimes mischievous, and ultimately led to results which they did not foresee and might have wished to avert. But a mightier power than their own was using them as instruments in building up the social and spiritual life of Christendom, as well as in preparing the way for its greatest disruption. We speak of the Emperor Justinian and the Pope Gregory I.

Justinian.

2. The life of Justinian is directly connected with our subject, inasmuch as it was his decree which closed for ever the lips of those Athenian teachers with whom we were so much occupied in the last chapter. But after the remarks which we made on the waning of Neo-Platonism even in its great representative, Proclus, and on the evident tokens which his writings furnished that it had fully delivered its message to mankind, this event, taken by itself, would not seem to be of any great importance. Romulus Augustulus stands as the representative of the death of an empire, and the moment of its extinction has a certain solemnity in it; but we feel that it was doomed, and only wonder that it lasted so long. To know exactly when the last Platonist of the Empire fled from it to try his fortune in another region, is not uninteresting; but the interest is rather sentimental than practical. If, therefore, this had been a solitary act of the Emperor; if the rest of his doings, though apparently most unconnected with it, had not been a commentary upon it, and had not received illustration from it; we might have passed it by with a very casual notice. But there is no great transaction of this memorable reign; no proceeding of the monarch, however paltry as to the motive in which it originated, or its immediate object; no war that was waged with other nations; no striving in the Church, or the Circus of Constantinople; which has not a clear internal relation to this decree, and which is not, like this, an index to the moral and intellectual condition of a period.

The outward and inward history of his reign connected.

The legislator.

3. If we contemplate Justinian in that aspect in which his panegyrists would like best to exhibit him, as the man at whose bidding Tribonian and his associates compiled the Institutes, the Pandects, and the Code, we discover the character of his reign and the kind of influence which it was to exercise. Considering that this was the time in which Constantinople most pretended to dominion over the world,—most vindicated the design of its founder, by proving itself to be *the* Capital,—one cannot but be struck with the strange fact, that just then the Greek should have paid the profoundest and most permanent homage to the Latin wisdom. There is, no doubt, mixed in the *Corpus* a certain Greek element; but how weak and inconsiderable compared with the contributions of the old jurists of the Roman world; how clearly they prove *their* language to be the one that was fittest for expounding rights and obligations; the function of their race to be that of organising bodies of men, of ascertaining by what covenants and contracts they are held to each other, of fixing the method and limits of punishment! Justinian's compilation is the most frank and childlike confession of this superiority,—a declaration that Constantinople could only govern the world through the influences bequeathed to it

Bows to Latin wisdom.

by that city which seemed no longer capable of governing itself, scarcely of maintaining its existence.

4. It would be sufficiently clear from this document, were there no other facts to sustain it, that this treasure had passed to heirs who, even when they possessed it, could not use it. Laws might be adopted or enacted by a Greek Emperor, but he did not know wherein their force lay: he fancied they proceeded from his own will: that which had established itself by centuries of struggle between opposing wills,—which could control, as long as anything could, the wild impulses of Italian tyrants and Italian legions,—seemed to the Byzantine the creature of his own despotism. He had not even skill to hide the contradiction from his subjects; still less had he skill to inspire them with any settled reverence either for edicts written in letters, or for the person who sanctioned them. The volatile mob of his Capital was never more prone to tumults, more impatient of authority, than under the man who clothed himself with the justice of foregone centuries, and assumed that it proceeded from his mouth.

The Emperor did not know whence the force of laws is derived.

5. But it was not only to the Rome of other days that Constantinople, in the person of Justinian, paid obeisance. His predecessors, like so many of his successors, maintained the dignity of the Patriarchs, as well as that of the Empire, against the spiritual authority which a series of strange events was making the only one in the old city of the Cæsars. Justinian appearing to have a mightier empire than any Byzantine monarch had ever enjoyed, confessed the dominion of the Popes when it looked most weak and in the greatest peril. For them he legislated, for them he conquered. By whatever means they had won their authority, he felt it to be more substantial than his own, for it was establishing itself over the minds and hearts of men of various tribes, and these, even within his very palace, proved refractory to him.

His homage to the Popes.

6. No doubt there were strong and obvious motives which influenced the monarch in taking this course. The immediate opposition was greater in his eyes than the distant one: Greek and Egyptian bishops, or (if these could be tamed by Court favours)—monks, might be a more perilous disturbance to his power than an Italian bishop could ever be. If he could secure their allegiance by enlisting a ruler on his side whom they would honour because he was ecclesiastical, however they might be offended at him because he was Latin, the concession of a nominal supremacy would be a cheap sacrifice. So Justinian probably argued with himself: the frightful consequences of theological controversies to some recent Emperors added the greatest practical weight to the reasoning. But the policy of

Policy of this obedience.

Justinian was determined by causes far mightier than his powers of seeing or foreseeing. He was yielding to a hidden force which he could not control. He submitted to the Papal ascendancy, for he had no might in his own world which could be matched against it.

Conquests of Justinian.

7. And yet it seemed as if the hosts which Belisarius led into Africa and Italy, and which effected such triumphs there, had a might like that which once belonged to the legions of Pompey or of Trajan. The nature and consequences of these victories concern our subject more nearly than we might at first fancy. The death-bed of Augustin was saddened, his faith called forth, by the news that Hippo was besieged by the Vandals through the crime of his friend Boniface. From that time the Arians had been rulers of the African province; the believers in the Trinity had been exposed to the cruelest persecutions. Justinian sent forth his troops more to put down heretics than to win new provinces for the Empire. The work was a complete one: the Vandals were exterminated. The temporary rule of Constantinople was connected with the reappearance of an indigenous African population. The most signal victory of the Cross, as it appeared to that generation, prepared the way for the triumph of the Crescent a little more than a century afterwards.

Defeat of the Arians in Africa.

The Ostrogoths.

8. The more tremendous and equally balanced war with the Ostrogothic kingdom was also a struggle with Arianism. Here the consequences were different, but not less serious, not less affecting the after destinies of the world; for here the Greek and the Latin, while apparently fighting on the same side, were taught to understand their different powers and their different weaknesses, were taught to feel how impossible it was that they should exist together in Italy, unless they were combined by the terror of some third power, or were seeking to destroy each other. Here it was proved how the petty intrigues of a palace might destroy the hard-won fruits of a campaign, and make new conquests, new depopulations, new wastings of the soil inevitable. Here it was proved how those intrigues and the revenge which they provoked might ultimately, through the mercy of God, lead to results the most necessary for the well-being of mankind. How different would have been the condition of the world if the courtiers had not tempted Narses to invite the Longbeards to supply the place of the enfeebled Ostrogoth, if Italy had been entirely given up to the Exarchs and the Popes!

Connection of these victories with the faith of Christians.

9. These *may* be described as victories of the Trinitarian over the Arian faith. The ordinary phrase that they were triumphs of *orthodoxy*, expresses the character of them far more correctly. If we are asked how we distinguish between two modes of speech which are commonly regarded as synonymous, we should

answer that to understand the difference between them is the greatest possible help in understanding the age of Justinian. No doubt his name stands with a very doubtful mark upon it among orthodox historians. No one who laboured so hard to acquire the reputation by words and arms, and who was so vehement in his condemnation of others for wanting it, more entirely missed his aim. This is one of the facts in his life on which it is most instructive to dwell. The secret of his failure may perhaps be found in the object of his ambition. The Trinity with him was not a belief, but an opinion. Men were to hold right opinions upon it and upon all other subjects. If they did not, they were to be coerced. But, like everything else in Justinian's mind, this doctrine belonged to the region of decrees. It was true because certain councils, and he the Emperor, who was or ought to be higher than they, had said it was true. Why should men not accept it as much as any edict concerning services or the price of provisions?

Comparison of the fourth century with the sixth.

10. Herein consists the amazing difference between the struggle for this doctrine as it was maintained in the fourth century by Athanasius, and in the sixth by Justinian. The extracts which we made from the writings of the Bishop of Alexandria showed us what principles affecting the moral being of man he supposed were involved in the theological principle for which he contended; how, in asserting it, he adopted the method which had been a long while familiar to the inhabitants of his city,—which had been marked out by Clemens and unfolded by Origen. The more masculine and practical mind of Athanasius might not be prone to the allegories into which their fancy and their comparative leisure had tempted them; the hard worker might have escaped from some of the idols of the cave to which the student had bowed down. But in all essentials he was, and never shrunk from confessing that he was, their pupil. If what are called the Platonical distinctions were found in them, he inherited them. Had they looked like school refinements, he would have cast them away with scorn: believing the whole world to be interested in them, he clave to them. Arius seemed to him to be confounding the temporal with the eternal —the relations which belong to change, and accident, and circumstance, with those which belong to the divine mind. However he might be charged with indulging in philosophical subtleties, he must maintain that which was needful to vindicate the substance and unity of God,—that which showed how it was possible for the creature to hold converse with the Creator.

Platonism of Athanasius.

Anti-Platonism of Justinian.

11. But what was all this to the husband of Theodora? With a feverish, restless intellect; always longing to be busy about invisible as well as visible things,—to be making decrees for

heaven, and earth, and hell,—to be fixing what men should think as well as what they should do, he never seems to have had the belief, scarcely the dream, that anything *is*,—that man can know it, or God can reveal it. Arianism was to him partly the disturbing element in a world which he hoped to bring under the Byzantine rule, partly the disobedience to different maxims which were contained in the *Responsa prudentum*, or in the rescripts of former Emperors, and which might be now embodied in the Digest. Such a man may or may not be a supporter of truths. But Truth is odious to him. He looks upon it as a kind of impossibility. He has a spite against all who have sought after it. If he can detect them in having failed or blundered in the pursuit, his triumph is excessive, his eagerness to pass judgment upon them unbounded, his confidence in his own skill in pointing out the source and necessary consequence of their real or supposed mistakes, imperial. Hence it came to pass that the men in whose school Athanasius had learnt the wisdom which he used against the Arians, were the men on whom Justinian, the overthrower of Arians, invoked such horrible judgments as his generals and armies could not bring upon those whom he thought himself appointed to destroy.

His hatred of all Truth-seekers.

12. There was a characteristic difference, too, in the kind of enemies with whom the poor Alexandrian and the mighty Constantinopolitan waged war. Athanasius defied the living, —the men who had broached the newest and most favourite opinion,—the men who were likely to have the patronage of Eusebius and of Constantine. Justinian, more judicious, sought the champions with whom he fought, in their graves. With passionate piety and heroism, the ruler of the East, the conqueror of the West, poured out his anathemas upon Origen who had aspired to be a martyr in his boyhood, and had lived the life of a martyr to his grey hairs. The man who had done more than all others to promote the study of the divine oracles, the teacher of Pagans, the strengthener of Christians, the converter of nations, of whom his contemporaries could not speak without love, who was most admired by those who were brought nearest the circle of his influence, was pronounced accursed by this profound theologian, for opinions which he supposed he had detected in his writings, of which, whether they were there or not, he certainly understood nothing but the mere outside, and the very worst and most confused of which proved Origen to be a wiser and better man than his persecutor ever showed himself to be in the most creditable acts of his life. The comments of the infidel historian upon Justinian and upon the Bishops of the Fifth Council of Constantinople, who registered his edicts against Origen, Theodore, Theodoret, and Ibas, are instructive

Justinian's war with the dead.

and valuable. "If these men," he says, "were already in the fangs of the dæmon, their torments could be neither aggravated nor assuaged by human industry. If in the company of saints and angels they enjoyed the rewards of piety, they must have smiled at the idle fury of the theological insects who still crawled on the surface of the earth." *We* may venture, perhaps, to ask whether in such company *they* will not rather have wept to think what work these theologians were sent upon the earth to do, and what they were actually doing,—to think, supposing them endued with the gift of foresight, what miseries were preparing for the Church, which was at this moment so inflated with pride and cruelty.

Gibbon, vol viii. pp. 326 327.

13. These observations are a proper and necessary introduction to the subject of Justinian's dealings with the Platonical school. We quoted in the last chapter a memorable passage from Proclus respecting the Platonical Trinity. We purposely abstained from any comments upon it, because it is a subject which should be approached, if it is approached at all, in its relation to the life and history of six centuries, not to the opinions of a particular teacher. We avoided this topic even in our general review of the philosophy, lest our readers should think that it merely formed a section or chapter of that philosophy. It behoves us now to say what we have to say respecting it, premising that it would have been regarded as inseparable by Proclus, by his brethren, and by Plato himself, from that great subject of Unity which "The Parmenides" and "The Republic" bring before us.

The schools of philosophy.

14. The passage from Proclus can only be looked upon as containing the hint of a principle which presented itself under the most different aspects at different times to him, and to those who were engaged in his class of speculations. His words will teach us that he looked upon a Triad as implied not only in all acts and manifestations of the Divinity, but also in all the deepest thoughts of man and conditions of human life. Faith, Truth, Love, constitute in his judgment a trinity for man. In all the orders of dæmons and heroes such a trinity, or one of which this is the counterpart, is presumed. Proclus takes it for granted always, at times he directly affirms, that if such a triad exists in all the divine manifestations, and in all the subordinate ranks of beings, it must exist in the highest nature itself. Such had been the belief which had been growing deeper and stronger from age to age in the minds of these men; which they thought they could distinctly trace in their original master; and which received abundant confirmation as they became better acquainted with the religions and philosophies of the East, and perceived under what various forms, in countries widely sepa-

The Platonical Triad.

Confirmations of their belief.

rated by space and circumstance, this idea had presented itself; how unconsciously it seemed to have pervaded popular mythologies which were setting it at nought by the multiplicity of their idols; how it had started up again and again in the consciousness of the students who were most embarrassed by it because it looked like a hindrance to their craving for absolute oneness.

How it affected their relations with the Church.

15. Of course in the polemic of the Platonical school with the Christian Church it was a great object to insist upon their possession of this idea. In this case, as in every other, they desired to show that the essential truth was theirs which had been deprived of all its idealism, and adapted to the necessities of the most unspiritual, in the Christian creeds. But however frequently such observations might have been made in the lecture-room, the more intelligent teachers must have been aware that the only hope of victory for them must come from the diligence with which they made it evident that they had hold of a substance and not a shadow. In so far as they devoted themselves steadily to this object,—in so far as they worked with honest scientific diligence to prove that the law which they had recognised was one which governed the facts of the world, and could be discovered in them, they were entitled to the kind of honour which in another region we now render to Davy or to Faraday. But here too they exhibited the uneasy consciousness that human life demands something more than mere laws to regulate it; that faith, truth, and love, if they constitute a trinity, cannot become mere algebraical symbols,—that they imply a believer and an object believed in, a seer and that which is seen, a lover and that which is loved. It was impossible for them to retain a merely scientific position. For what were they to abandon it? The answer has been given already. Their philosophical dignity would have been violated by acknowledging the Christian doctrine. Nay, it ought not to be concealed, there were other hindrances less dishonourable to *them* than their pride. As the doctrine of the Church became the established and persecuting one, its most vigorous followers became not only unscientific, but anti-scientific. They were not, like Athanasius, or Basil, or Gregory of Nazianzum, earnest in exhibiting their principle as a foundation for human life. They were merely earnest in asserting it as an accepted dogma. They protested against the Platonists, not because they reduced living truths into abstractions—*that* they were doing themselves; not because legions of intermediate powers were shutting out the Divine Being from His creature—that charge might be proved as clearly against *them*; not because they were a band of exclusive sages hostile to the rights of the people,—they too

How far a part of Science: how far distinct from it.

The Church becomes anti-scientific as it becomes secular.

were busy in asserting their own rights, their own notions, their own more paltry and worldly supremacy. The consequence was, that Platonism grew more determined to have a religion of its own, while it grew more incapable of producing or supporting one,—more desirous of asserting its own philosophical idea of a Trinity, while that idea was dwindling into a lifeless notion which had neither outward patronage nor inward force to keep it from sinking into the grave to which all mere notions are destined.

The idea of the Trinity sustained among the Platonists by superstitions that were adverse to it.

16. From the other tasks in which we have seen Justinian engaged, we may judge how fitting it was that he should dig the grave for this corpse, and deposit it in its native earth. His business had been with the dead—"man and boy for thirty years"—either to preserve them as mummies in digests, to trample upon them if they had offended him by their speculations, to bury them with all possible indignity if they had no friends to celebrate their obsequies. In the year 529 the edict went forth which drove Diogenes, Hermias, Eulalius, Priscian, Damascius, Isidore, and Simplicius, from Athens into Persia. The reader is probably familiar with the short history of their fortunes, as it is given by Gibbon. As Chosroes was the great antagonist of the Greek empire,—as he represented not only the old Persian empire, but that Persian religion which had been often so closely associated with philosophy, and was always so powerful a rival of Christianity,—these teachers hoped that they should have found a friend, if not a patron,—nay, perhaps that they should discover the Platonopolis which Plotinus had been unable to establish in Campania. But they returned to the Christian world finding it actually less bigoted and less intolerant than that in which they had trusted they should live under the rule of Cyrus or of Zoroaster. Chosroes, however, who, if not the chief of a divine republic, was at least a far better man than the head of the rival empire, stipulated with Justinian that they should live and die in peace. That the history of Greek philosophy may be complete in outward form as well as in spiritual essence, it is made to close, as it was supposed to begin, with a mystical seven.

Justinian the grave-digger.

The last seven.

Gibbon, vol. vii.

Their return from Persia.

17. The historian of the Decline and Fall happily connects the abolition of the consulship with the banishment of the philosophers. An interval of only twelve years passed between the two events, and they are both, though not equally, illustrative of the character of this epoch. The symbols of Roman greatness in government, as of Greek greatness in thought, were to be swept away; the reality of them having long disappeared. But Justinian, as we have partly perceived already, as we shall see more clearly soon, could only sweep away the vestiges of old

Abolition of the Consulship.

institutions in Rome that he might clear the ground for a more powerful native despotism there; whereas his acts in the Greek world denoted that all its distinctive features were obliterated, —that all its peculiar glory was at an end. Justinian existed, not to destroy, but to declare that the Greek Church and the Greek Empire were withered and ungenerative stocks, from which no more good could be expected for humanity unless some surprising devastation, mocking and subverting all their apparent prosperity, should once more awaken the energy of churchmen and statesmen, and show them that they existed for some other purpose than to debate, to curse, and to lie.

The two acts have a different signification

18. The famous battles of Belisarius had left Italy feeble and wretched. The Catholic Church, through its heretical champion of Constantinople, had won an apparent triumph in the destruction of an Arian empire which was growing feeble of itself: it sustained a heavy shock by the establishment of a more powerful race of which the king might be an Arian, but of which the subjects were commonly Pagans. If the people of Rome were doubtful whether these barbarians, or the Greek exarchs, were more intolerable, their spiritual rulers at least turned to the monarchs of Constantinople for help and deliverance. But those who had succeeded Justinian were gathering in the harvest of which he had sown the seed. The land which had aspired to conquer the West could scarcely maintain its existence against the Persian. The groans of the Romans, though Popes might utter them, and the Archdeacon Gregory might carry them to Constantinople, were as little heeded there as the groans of the Britons had been, a century before, in the now prostrate capital. They might complain of desertion, but what could their feeble masters do but resign them to struggle as they might with Lombards, with their own oppressive emissaries, with pestilence and famine?

Transition to the Latin world.

Constantinople unable to succour Rome.

19. These well-known facts prepare us for the real separation of the Latin from the Greek world,—for the growth and consolidation of the one under circumstances apparently the most unpropitious, whilst the other was sinking more and more rapidly from prosperity into feebleness and ruin. Gregory stands as the representative of this great crisis in the history of Italy and of Western Europe. From his time the language, however insolent and presumptuous, which identifies the Western world with Christendom, acquires a meaning and a justification: we fall into it unawares, even while we protest against it. We feel that it is the organic part of Christendom: and the consideration of the influences which helped or retarded its organisation; attempts to seize the principle which governed it; hasty generalisations which assume that one part of it explains all the

Gregory the Great.

rest; and exposures of the fallacy of these generalisations,—may be said almost to constitute modern history. No doubt the annalist is recalled continually to the East; but he is recalled by the report of convulsions which are dismembering it, or that he may observe what wild vigour, what a strong united purpose, is awakened in the nations of the West by the desire to conquer or to restore it. And as it is in the world of action, so, we have hinted already, it is in the world of thought, with which that is in such close contact. The care of documents, the cultivation of a refined antiquarian scholarship, the preservation of the fossil remains of an earlier generation, are duties which the Greek imposed upon himself, which in the main he fulfilled faithfully, and for which we owe him hearty gratitude. The Odyssean gift still remained to him, changed in its objects, but scarcely less strong under the lower empire than in the days of the heroes. He was still, when occasion called for it, the subtlest and craftiest of men. The ambition of governing men, with all the skill in supplanting rivals which accompanies it, may be as much traced among patriarchs as in the clever tyrants in the Ionian colonies. But the energy which grapples with intellectual as with physical difficulties,—the hope which always points to the end of an enterprise, and yet which makes the enterprise delightful for its own sake,—the eagerness to combine and reconcile things which seem most incongruous,—the stubborn toil,—the passion for building, the readiness to begin again when one edifice after another has tumbled for want of a foundation, —the patience which can dig for one through hard rock and amidst frequent inundations; these are qualities for which we look in vain to the successors of Solon and Thales, and which we find, with all their accompanying extravagances, follies, tyrannies, rebellions, in the world which rose out of the ruins of the empire of Augustus.

How the Western world comes to be regarded as Christendom.

20. The accomplished historian of the Middle Ages, in his work on the Literature of Europe, speaks of Gregory I. and Nicholas V. as aptly represented by the Night and Morning of the great Artist. Such a comparison comes naturally and gracefully from a refined scholar, who not only sees in the banishment of Greek literature from the Western nations an unspeakable loss, but connects with it the formation of a barbarous Latin tongue, and an incapacity to appreciate those who had spoken it in its purity. Still more naturally does it belong to a defender of moral and intellectual freedom, who has good reason to think that it was crushed under a system of government and dogmas which Gregory inaugurated, and that the surest pledge of its recovery was the revival of that classical tone of feeling which Nicholas patronised and helped to diffuse.

Night and morning.

See Hallam, History of Literature, vol. i.

But as annalists of philosophical inquiries, we must demur to the sentence which to a judge who contemplates the subject from Mr. Hallam's point of view appears so reasonable. It is not our present business to canvass the merits of Pope Nicholas. We hope we shall never be found disputing the necessity or the ultimate blessing of the social change which he and the Pontiffs who succeeded him deemed it judicious to encourage. But it is important that we should state our reasons for *not* believing that Pope Gregory was an instrument in shutting out daylight from Europe, and plunging it in darkness.

Probability that Gregory disliked letters;

21. We should wish our readers to understand that they are not bound to agree with Mr. Hallam on this point because they may entirely agree with him in his opinion that Gregory was an enemy to classical literature in general, and to Greek literature in particular. Controversies on this subject have been raised by learned countrymen of Gregory, jealous both for his reputation and for the cause of letters. But without considering the special pleas which they may urge on his behalf, we may admit that those who, with Mr. Hallam, reject them as unsatisfactory, have the strongest *primâ facie* evidence on their side. It is in keeping with all we know of the character of Gregory that he should be jealous of Pagan teaching, willing to substitute the legends of saints not only for the most living fictions, but for the best histories which they had bequeathed. As a man of business, occupied in raising his city and country out of physical and moral degradation, he could have had little leisure for any studies but those which directly belonged to him as a priest, or a priest-legislator. His unfriendly relations both with Greek emperors and Greek patriarchs were certain to confirm his Latin prejudices. As a converter of Pagans he would be anxious that the lore which they received should be that which was contained in the Scriptures, or had originated in the Church. As the organiser of forms of worship which were to bind the different parts of Christendom together, he would wish that they should have as little as possible to remind them of other kinds of worship which civilised nations had adopted, and which had given a colour to their thoughts and writings. It must require some very decisive documents indeed, to show that a man with all this internal bias, and all this power of outward circumstances driving him in one direction, did in fact take the opposite one; that in spite of himself and of his age he encouraged studies which he had every motive to discountenance.

and yet was a great instrument of promoting education.

22. Still his intelligent apologists must have felt that they had some reason for their opinion. They must have thought that Gregory did in some remarkable way contribute to the

intellectual education of Europe, that they should be guilty of ingratitude for all their own advantages if they denied it, that they were bound even to strain facts that they might establish it. Without any straining of facts, we think their position, when so stated, is capable of the most satisfactory defence. Was it not necessary for the education of the West, that it should be left to work out a course of thought for itself? Could the classical writers have been worth anything to it at this time? Was the enthusiasm with which they were welcomed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries merely the rapture at the discovery of a lost treasure? Was it not the consequence of a discipline and preparation which enabled them to perceive a living sense in that which was actually dead to the Greeks, who could construe, admire, and criticise? What that discipline was, we hope we may be able to point out hereafter. We have hinted already, that a portion of it was such as amply to revenge any injury that was put upon the old Greek masters, seeing that it was under one of them, even in the most imperfect and distorted medium, that the Western scholar imbibed the knowledge which he thought most precious. But our present business is to show how Gregory led the way to those philosophical pursuits which he would himself perhaps have regarded with more jealousy than even elegant literature.

What homage the Middle Ages paid to Greece.

Apparent greatness of Gregory.

23. The first feeling when one contemplates a man who, becoming Pope at the moment when Rome had reached its lowest point of depression, succeeded by his gracious and unselfish government in leading the people to hail him as their deliverer, and the best of all civil rulers,—who, finding so large a portion of Europe Arian, brought it into a united fellowship, —who began to draw into that same circle so much of what had been previously heathen,—who, without the command of any of the swords which Justinian wielded, won triumphs for the Church far more extensive as well as far more durable than his, —is certainly one of wonder, if not of gratitude. But this feeling is quenched in the minds of a number of Protestants by the conviction that Gregory was establishing a uniformity of opinion, of government, of language, in countries which could only expand while they realised their distinctness; that the opinions were such as concerned the deepest mysteries, and therefore, whether true or not, could have no practical hold on the people of the countries in which they were established, and could contribute nothing to their moral development; that the government, nominally paternal, was of that worst kind which rests neither upon the worth of the man nor upon the dignity of the family, but only upon sacerdotal assumption and the ignorance which upholds it; that the language was one which

Why Protestants dispute it.

had not the least pretension to be universal, which was hard and ungenial, adapted to laws and forms, unfitted for the seeker of truth, prized only because it excluded that one which was richer and freer, because it would submit to all barbarous innovations from the theologians who wielded it, or from the native dialects which it held down.

These are heavy suspicions; some of which at least we must have a strong disposition to entertain; each of which requires to be seriously considered before we can know whether Gregory was a benefactor or a curse to mankind, and before we can advance many steps in the philosophy of the Middle Ages.

Gregory's orthodoxy not the same in kind with Justinian's.

24. When it is said that Gregory sought to establish a uniformity of opinion in Western Europe, and that to a great extent he succeeded, the words should be carefully weighed, or they will lead to serious confusion. He was not occupied about opinions, as Justinian was. He did not habitually look upon Truth as the sum of his tenets or holdings. He might very often, indeed, act and speak as if he did. But those experiments which he made to produce a common worship in Europe, expressed his true mind much more than any dogmas which he uttered. He desired that the Name into which Christians were baptised should be the object of their common adoration. To unite them in *this*, not in certain intellectual conclusions and definitions, was assuredly his main object. He sent his missionaries to tell pagans that an invisible mysterious Being was calling them from their different idols to serve Him. He bade the Arians acknowledge that there was an Eternal Son, one with Him, in whom they might approach Him. He declared that the whole family was united by one Spirit. Whatever theories he might add to these proclamations, here was the root and substance of them. Whatever superstitious importance he might attach to the forms in which he enjoined that the worship should be celebrated—however much he might sometimes overlook the diversities of character in his old or new disciples,—this was certainly the idea to which everything else in his mind was subordinate.

His leading idea.

The objection that his faith was mysterious.

25. Hence we think it is obvious why the faith which Gregory proclaimed was necessarily in mysteries. It was not that his own mind had any natural affinity for the mysterious. It was hard and practical. Whenever he invented or decreed, he showed how much he clung to the visible, how ready he was to indulge the pagan propensity for it, how much he was disposed to reduce the Eternal and Infinite under the conditions of Space and Time. But by making the worship of the Divine Trinity the foundation of the Christian society which he was doing so much to build up, he was counteracting this tendency of his own

character, he was making the difference between the old Heathenism and the Gospel which he diffused, to consist in this mainly, that Pagans were scaling Heaven by different earthly ladders, making heroic men the grounds of their conception of the divine; that he was putting forth the divine Name revealed in Christ as the mysterious foundation of a Catholic society. The question whether in doing *this* he was checking human thought and inquiry, or whether the hindrances which he and his successors certainly threw in their way, did not arise from their doing something different from this—the direct opposite of this—from their canonising the old Heathen methods, reversing the one which they confessed to be the Christian one—must be determined by the facts of the history. Some negative help has been afforded us already for the formation of a judgment on this point. Without resting overmuch weight on the fact that the most enlightened and tolerant of Arian monarchs was the persecutor of the mild philosopher Boëthius, we have sufficient evidence that the Gothic and Vandalic monarchs, though often far more generous and truthful than their orthodox opponents—though supplying an element in European society which it could ill have dispensed with,—were not favourable to intellectual cultivation. Deriving from the teachings of the excellent Ulphilas, whose simple mind had been formed under the influences of the age of Valens, an impression that Christ was a higher Odin, an illustrious demigod, they probably accepted as much of the Christian faith as they were able to bear, and in the way that was most suitable to their previous discipline. The effects were genuine. The best side of the old character, the love of truth and plain dealing, was brought out. If the new faith did not displace the sottish habits of the old savage, if sometimes it threw a darker glare over his crimes, at least it made him feel the majesty of law, confess the might of weakness; at least it enabled him to quicken the corpse of Roman civilisation. But the belief in heroes, even in a transcendant hero, if it gives energy to action, does not lead to meditation. The visible world fills the Goths with a wild wonder, and they long to conquer it. The battle brings forth a number of thoughts greater than they can master, respecting an invisible world which is about them, and one to come which must be the counterpart of this; the confusion may be expressed in legends and poems, in which the critics of after days try in vain to separate the Pagan from the Christian elements. But the hope of any clear light upon the mysteries of our own life and being, the desire to explore them and arrange them, has been the result in Western Europe of another faith than the Walhalla faith, or than any modification of it.

His inclination anti-mysterious.

Mystery his safety; love of the visible his danger.

The Arians unfavourable to philosophy.

Their merits

The Christianity of the Gothic and Vandalic tribes.

Hero-worship unfavourable to thought and reflection.

Schools in England the result of Augustin's mission.

26. To show that Gregory, with all his own alleged indifference to letters, was a greater instrument in promoting education, in the strictest sense of the word, than all his contemporaries or predecessors, we need only examine the condition of England in the century after it had been brought under the influence of his missionaries. Schools seem to rise as by enchantment; all classes, down to the poorest, (Bede himself is the obvious example,) are admitted to them; the studies beginning from theology, embrace logic, rhetoric, music, astronomy. But these facts, though decisive as to the awakening influence of that faith which it is sometimes assumed must have put the world to sleep, concern us less than the directly philosophical impulse, which we must trace, if we follow plain evidence, to the acknowledgment in Western Europe of the mystery that had formed the subject of conflict for six centuries in the East. The questions to which it had given birth during that strife would naturally take another form; there were no longer Neo-Platonists to speak of a Trinity as ideally true, implied in the existence of man and of the universe, while they disputed the actual revelation of a Trinity; no longer eminent Christian teachers to vindicate the doctrine, both as law and fact, from the impugners of it among themselves and in the outlying world. It had taken its ground among recognised principles embodied in common acts in which king and peasant had an equal interest, asserted by edicts though not deriving its authority from them. But because it had this position it awakened questionings just as the sight of an actual firmament, and the presence of an actual sun, lead to astronomical inquiries which would scarcely be pursued if men had only the dream of a possible firmament or a possible sun. Whatever we may suppose *à priori* might or must have been the case, our *à posteriori* experience enables us to affirm that the Trinity did become the starting-point for all the metaphysical and all the moral philosophy of modern Europe. What different forms these inquiries took; what fears they excited; what efforts were made at different times to suppress them; why these efforts necessarily failed, we shall have to explain hereafter. What we say here is, that no uniformity which Gregory was the instrument of producing, or which he wished to produce, in the least availed to hinder all possible ethical controversies and all metaphysical controversies from arising in the most or in the least reverent minds; in those who were most disposed to acquiesce in the decrees of Popes, or in those who were most fretted by them. What we say further is, that the mystery which lay beneath his desire for uniformity, because he believed it the basis of unity among men, acted as a counterbalancing power to the Latin

Philosophy occupied with the Trinity, though not as in the Platonical age.

Awakens inquiry not less because it is accepted as true.

The philosophical impulse could not be checked.

love of rules, forms, dogmas, and compelled him to ask with as much ardour as the Greek had ever done, what constitutes right, order, obligation among men; under what eternal laws they live, think, speak, act; how they are connected with the physical world; in what respect they differ from all the other portions of it.

Ethics and Metaphysics connected with Theology.

27. We may be suspected of greater reluctance to deal with the second subject to which we referred, that of the government which Gregory was the instrument of binding on the neck of the Western nations. We do not for a moment dispute that he, more than any other man, consolidated the Papal power, and defined the limits within which it could be exercised. We are willing enough to use the favourite *argumentum ad hominem* of Protestants, that he denounced the title of Universal Bishop as profane, but we cannot forget the occasion of that denunciation; that he quarrelled with the assumption when it was put forth on behalf of the Patriarchs by John the Faster; and that therefore his very protest was a link in the chain which was to hold the Latin nations together, and to fasten them to the chair of the successor of St. Peter. That protest; the separation from Constantinople, of which it is one among many indications; Gregory's earnest faith; his deliverance of Rome; his missionary zeal; his freedom from the ambition and secularity, to a considerable extent from the arrogance, of earlier and later Pontiffs; tended, beyond all doubt, to make the assumptions which they might only have been able to express through bulls and anathemas, veritable facts in European history which cannot be gainsayed, whatever may be our judgment about them. That judgment, we believe, will be distinct and satisfactory only if we are willing to acknowledge the experiment to establish a fatherly or patriarchal government over the nations as the most important and interesting of which there is any record,—an experiment which could but involve the deepest truth and the direst contradiction if there is such a fatherly government already existing, and if there is a struggle in man not to acknowledge it. The records of the way in which that truth and that contradiction gradually made themselves manifest through the struggles of the ecclesiastical power with the civil, of the catholic body with the particular nations, belong to general history. But the schools, as always, in their own way represented the world. The subtlest metaphysical questions respecting the individual were involved with questions concerning the social and political, condition of mankind, which after-ages would have to unravel. The limits of Obedience and Freedom, of the Universal and the National, of that which is and that which is enacted, of Faith and Reason, were forced upon

In what sense Gregory established the Popedom on a new basis.

The Papal experiment.

Its place in history.

Its effects on philosophy, metaphysics ethics, and politics.

the minds of men by that mighty effort to create a sacerdotal tyranny, which Papists and Protestants seem agreed to confess was almost entirely successful; while the documents to which both appeal prove that no spiritual or secular terrors and punishments could in the least quell the opposition which it excited, and that it took its shapes of good or evil from those who apparently submitted to it.

The one language.

28. Finally, when we speak of the one language which Gregory, by the forms of devotion which he sanctioned, and by the general character of his missions, did so much to establish as the organ of spiritual communication in the world over which he reigned, we must crave liberty to notice one or two points which Protestant polemics and classical scholars are disposed to forget, but which for our purpose (and, we think, for theirs also) require to be seriously considered.

Uses of a sacred language.

29. It was the existence of a language which did not belong to the market, which represented higher thoughts and feelings than those with which men were commonly occupied, that made the tribes of modern Europe conscious of their spiritual necessities, and of the powers which there were in their own native tongues to express them. The idea of a school,—of instruction and education at all in the higher sense,—was inseparable from the existence of such a medium. Moreover, the Latin operated continually as the third power which mediated between two contending tribe languages, and ultimately enabled to mingle in some higher. The law courts and the palace did not succeed in making the French of the Normans or the French of the Plantagenets triumphant over the Saxon of our people. The ecclesiastical Latin was a common object of reverence and fear to both. Ultimately it helped to bring the strong elements which suited the immature life of our forefathers, into an organic English. Its despotism, then, however severe, however mischievously protracted, was not really injurious to any people who had native strength to encounter it; their old language received its impression, and grew to be a living one, adapted for the highest moral and intellectual purposes, by means of it. But what chiefly concerns us is this: It was the prevalence of this school language, though uncouth, distasteful to the modern man of refinement, hard to manage even by those who wielded it as their ordinary instrument,—nay, by reason of these very qualities,—which determined the peculiar direction of the philosophy of the Middle Ages. The familiarity with which we speak our own dialect makes us forget to ask ourselves about its words,—to inquire how far they are distinct from the visible things or the invisible realities which we connect with them. They become dangerously identified with that which they express at one time,

The Latin cultivates and preserves the native languages.

Character of Middle Age philosophy determined by the use of the Latin tongue.

dangerously separated from it at any other. But we do not question them to know how they are related, or how they are separated; we can scarcely put them at a sufficient distance from us ever fairly to present the puzzle to ourselves. The schoolmen of the Middle Ages had these questions thrust upon them: they could not evade them. After ages might laugh at their folly for raising such doubts. But they did not raise them. There they were, demanding resolution. To pass them by would have been ignominious cowardice: they could have no satisfaction on other points till these were settled. And they had this compensation for the sneers of their descendants: they were contributing in innumerable ways to clear difficulties out of our way; to make it unnecessary that we should often travel the ground which they explored; to point out the track when circumstances call upon us to revisit it; to make it possible that we should enter upon inquiries of which they knew nothing, and yet which they fancied they could settle by their methods. We apprehend that our obligations to them for the clearness and precision which they have been the instruments of giving to discourse; for the hints which they have supplied us respecting the laws of thought; for showing what they could and what they could not do,—would be as cheerfully and cordially recognised by our learned and honoured countryman, Mr. Mill, as by the most fanatical reviver of mediæval notions and practices.

The realist and nominalist discussions of the Middle Ages.

Why necessary.

MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

Scene of the History changed.

1. THE Latin world, as we have explained already, will occupy us, almost exclusively, in this division of the history of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. The East, henceforth, becomes the background of the picture. On the management of that background, it may greatly depend, whether the more prominent figures are presented distinctly, and in their proper relations, to the eye of the spectator. But he must be made to feel what is the *subject* of the sketch, and what are the subordinate and accessary portions of it.

Only one conspicuous Latin teacher in the former sketch

2. To the end that the reader might fully understand the difference in this respect between the first six centuries after the Christian era and those which follow them, we pursued the history of Greek philosophy till its termination in the reign of Justinian, not suffering ourselves to be diverted from this object by some very celebrated Roman names. One conspicuous exception, indeed, we were obliged to make: Augustin, though a Latin, and though his influence on Latin thought has been so remarkable, could not be passed over. He belonged, emphatically, to the age in which Platonism was the prevailing faith of thoughtful students, whether they sought to satisfy the questions which Plato raised by the help of the New Testament, or through the old mythologies. There was another name, only second, as we hinted, in importance to his, which we expressly reserved for the present volume; because, though the man who bears it belongs to a period earlier than that from which we commence, he has many of the most remarkable characteristics of the later time, and helped much to determine what those characteristics should be.

Origin of Boethius.

3. Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius was probably born in the year 470 or 475. His father was consul in the year

487; his grandfather was præfect of the Prætorian guards, and was put to death by order of Valentinian III. He had, therefore, a close hereditary sympathy with the old names and glory of the republic, as well as the strongest and saddest evidence what a miserable and feeble tyranny was permitted to enact its latest crimes in the city of Brutus and Cicero. It cannot be supposed that a young man, bred among these associations, and fully sympathizing in them, can have mourned long and deeply over what we call the extinction of the Western Empire. At all events, he must have hailed, as the termination of anarchy, and the preparation for a better social order, the accession of Theodoric the Goth. He seems to have been an early friend of that monarch, and to have made the best use of his friendship, when he obtained from him the consulship. In that office, he became a faithful administrator of the public revenues. He put the coinage upon a reasonable footing. Finding Italy in a state almost approaching to famine, he took care that the exactions for the support of the army, by which Campania had been almost ruined, should be relaxed. He became the champion of those who had been the victims of false accusations—a scourge of spies and informers. His domestic life was pure, worthy of a Roman statesman. He was tenderly attached to his wife, Rusticiana. His sons appear to have been worthy; they were created consuls during their boyhood. Such a man would make himself bitter enemies. The profligate courtiers, whose hatred he had deserved, might have many excuses for representing that he was sighing for the older days before the Ostrogothic rule had commenced. Theodoric had reason to suspect that many, especially of his orthodox subjects, would look for protection against him to the emperor of the East. He became more suspicious as he grew older. It was a plausible suggestion, readily entertained, that Boethius was intriguing at Constantinople to obtain greater power for the senate. If he had ever cherished so idle a dream, the conduct of the senators to himself must have convinced him of its folly. They abetted his accusers. Theodoric threw him and his father-in-law into prison at Ticinum. Their goods were confiscated. After some years both were put to death, in the sight of their friends. The king is said to have lamented his crime before his own death, which was regarded as the punishment of it. The widow of Boethius, according to Procopius, was forced like Belisarius, in the next age, to beg her bread.

Minister under Theodoric.

His public and domestic character.

Suspicion of his fidelity.

His misfortunes.

4. Those who would understand the life of Boethius the philosopher, must know him first of all as a patriot. That is his truest character. By that, he is at once distinguished from the Athenian schoolmen, whose writings we examined in the last part of this sketch. A tradition, founded upon the misunderstanding of a passage in a letter of Cassiodorus, has given rise to the opinion

Connection of his thoughts with his life.

that he visited the Greek schools, and was a hearer of Proclus. It is probable that he never left Italy. The praise which his correspondent means to bestow upon him is, that he imported Greek wisdom into that country, and made it Roman. To this fame, he is assuredly entitled. And it is by ascertaining what part of Greek wisdom such a Roman as Boethius would desire to naturalize, that we perceive the direction which thought was beginning to take in the West, and which it would take far more determinately, under other influences than his, but yet not without his influence, two or three centuries afterwards.

5. We have observed in many instances, how the reverence for law and order, in which lay the strength of the Roman, disposed him, when he had received the Greek teaching, to seek for that in the world of nature, which he found continually contradicted, in the world of human beings. Even the Epicurism of Lucretius illustrated the assertion. Though he seemed to refer everything to chance, he was really craving for something less irregular, more subject to principle, than the caprices of politicians, and the unrighteous gods of the Pantheon permitted him to behold. The Stoic Seneca fled to nature for the same reason. There only he could discover the quiet undisturbed order, which the philosopher was to reproduce in his own life. Boethius felt neither the disgust for affairs which characterized the earnest mind of the poet, nor the resignation to evil, which the courtier made it his business to cultivate. He had striven to be a righteous man himself, and he had to struggle against unrighteousness not in the closet only, but in the world. But he too wanted to study laws where he could see that they were obeyed. If there was only an approximation to right in the Roman polity, he must contemplate, and encourage his countrymen to contemplate, some other polity where decrees which wisdom and truth had enacted were never infringed. Such a polity, Plato had said must exist. It was morally and spiritually true, though it was nowhere realized. It was implied in the societies of men; though every society of men might be at variance with it. No such vision could present itself to the mind of a man trained in affairs, occupied with outward politics, reminded continually of all their anomalies. To a certain extent Boethius was imaginative, but he distrusted his imagination, and was afraid to believe that there was any truth corresponding to the hopes which it suggested. But in numbers, in lines, in forms, in musical notes, in the motions of the heavenly bodies, there were principles which evidently did not bend to accident or circumstance,—which could not be adjusted, or swayed, at the pleasure of any tyrant. In the investigation of these primary elements, these grounds of the universe, there was rest for a mind which felt that it had no right to shrink from the trivialities of detail, or the vulgarities of

His Roman character.

Wherein he was like and unlike Lucretius and Seneca.

Why he had not sympathy with Plato.

human passions, but which felt also, that it must have something substantial and constant, as a counteraction to them, and a safeguard against them.

The Platonical idea of Arithmetic and Geometry.

6. It will be perceived by the reader that a man who took up the studies of arithmetic, geometry, music, or astronomy from such motives as these, will have agreed with Plato in his estimate of their importance, but will have differed from him greatly in his judgment of their nature, and of the use to which they should be turned. When Plato commanded that no one should enter his halls who had not been disciplined in geometry, he believed, no doubt, that the student would be led by this preparation to seek for that which is, in every subject which he examined; to endure no shadows or appearances which offered themselves in exchange for it. He would be led by the *method* of geometry to seek in a particular case, for the principle which governs all such cases; not to heap together a multitude of observations and merely deduce a general and probable maxim from them. Boethius expected more certainty in the principles concerning numbers and lines than he could ever apply to human acts and wills; but the evenness and harmony to which he became used in one region would reappear in the justness and proportion of his purposes and of his acts, when he was met by disturbing forces which swayed him to the right or to the left. It is not necessary to suppose that he sought no other and more powerful help against these forces; he must have been aware from experience how little, considerations drawn from the natural world can be brought to bear, in moments of inward conflict and temptation. What we mean to intimate, is, that he wished to produce in himself a certain even habit of mind, rather than to familiarize himself with any lofty idea; and that he looked upon physical studies chiefly as contributing to this object, by the very difference which exists between them and human studies. In other words, he was pursuing the Aristotelian mean. The righteousness he aimed at was that which is so strikingly exhibited in the fourth book of "The Ethics," and which in fact explains the whole of that master work. And his idea of science stood in the closest relation to his idea of the end of life. To know the limitation and boundaries of those things which are the subject of human thought, was according to him to know *them*. This may not have been all that he meant by science; it is not all that Aristotle, or any man at any time, meant by it. But on the whole this is a fair representation of his habitual conviction, and it marks him out as the true successor of Aristotle in the West, as the beginner, classic and Ciceronian though he was, of that which we are wont to call the Barbaric or Gothico-Latin philosophy.

The Boethian idea.

Science according to Aristotle.

Liber. de Unitate et Uno.

7. The first treatise of Boethius which it behoves us to notice, is the short one "On Unity and the One." The following sentences

are, it seems to us, very important with a view to the understanding of the mind of our anthor.

"Unity is that in virtue of which anything whatsoever is affirmed to be one. For whether it is simple or compound, spiritual or corporeal, a thing is one by reason of its unity; nor can it be one except by reason of its unity; as a thing cannot be white except from whiteness. But not only is it *one* by reason of its unity, but also it is only so long that which it is, as long as there is unity in it. When it ceases to be one, it ceases to be that which it is; whence comes the maxim, that whatever is, is therefore because it is one. For all being, in things created, belongs to form. But there is no being in form *merely*, but only when form is united to matter. Being, say the philosophers, is the indwelling of Form in Matter. From the conjunction of form with matter, something that is one, is constituted. The destruction of a thing is nothing else than the separation of form from matter."

Definition of Being.

8. The reader will perceive that Boethius is here dealing with our *modes* of thinking and speaking about Being and Unity, not with Being and Unity as the grounds of all thought and speech. It is the more necessary to make this remark, because there is good reason to think, that he was not aware of the distinction himself. It does not appear, that he ever suspected that there was or could be another way of looking at the subject, than that which he followed. He probably read the Platonical philosophers with approbation and sympathy, because he read them according to Aristotle, unconsciously translating them and fitting them into his moulds. The words "*Form and Matter*," which he introduces into this Treatise on Unity, were the common and debateable ground between the two schools. Everything depended on the manner in which they were used. Aristotle perfectly understood that he was not using the word Form in the sense in which his master used it: he is most careful to tell us so in every treatise, ethical, dialectical, metaphysical. Few of his Greek followers perceived as he did, how radical the distinction was; even many of the Platonists, while they followed *their* teacher, did not discern wherein the Stagyrite had diverged from him. For many ages, the Latins were almost wholly unaware that the difference existed, though it was continually perplexing them, and was lying at the root of their most serious controversy. It is interesting and valuable to observe the confusion in a man whose scholarship would have perfectly qualified him to appreciate the diversities of the great teachers, if his habits of mind had not necessarily chained him to one of them. We must always bear in mind that he understands truth and falsehood only in reference to propositions. That which is, is that which can be rightly affirmed concerning any

Inference from this passage.

Form and Matter.

subject. The One is that which we are obliged to consider one by the laws of our understandings.

Treatise on Arithmetic. Cap. I.

9. A passage from the opening of the Treatise on Arithmetic is a further and a very consistent illustration of this habit of mind. "We say that those things are, which neither grow by expansion, nor are diminished by contraction, nor are changed by variations; but preserve themselves ever in their own proper force, depending upon nothing which is extraneous to their own nature. Now these are *qualities*, *quantities*, *forms*, *magnitudes*, *littlenesses*, *equalities*, *actions*, *dispositions*, *places*, *times*, and whatsoever is found in some way or other united in bodies. These things are in their own nature incorporeal; they live under the law of an immutable substance; but they are changed by the participation of body, and pass, through contact with variable things, into instability. These things, therefore, seeing as it is said they have by nature an immutable substance and force, are truly and properly said *to be*. Of these things, therefore, that is of those things that properly are, and which deserve the name of essences, true wisdom professes to give us the knowledge. Now of an essence there are two parts. One continuous and united in its different portions, and not distinguished by any boundaries, such as is a tree, a stone, and all bodies of this

Magnitudes.

universe, which properly are called *Magnitudes*. Others consist of separate and determinate portions, and are brought into one by accumulation, as a flock, a people, a choir. For these the proper

Multitudes.

name is *Multitude*. Again, to this head of *multitude* we refer certain things that are in themselves, as *three* or *four*, or any number whatsoever, which require nothing else that they may be. But some do not exist by themselves, but are referred to something else, as *double*, *half*, *next but one*, *next but two*, and so forth. To *magnitude*, again, belong some things that are stationary, some that are turning

Provinces of Arithmetic and Music.

about in perpetual rotation. The first class of multitudes, those which are such in themselves, Arithmetic contemplates. Those which are relative belong to Music. Of immoveable *magnitude*,

Provinces of Geometry and Astronomy.

Geometry takes cognizance. The knowledge of the moveable the Astronomer promises us. If the inquirer does not recognize these four portions of knowledge, he cannot find truth, and unless he behold truth, no one can be said to have wisdom. For wisdom is the knowledge and entire comprehension of those things which truly are. And I tell any one who despises these different paths of wisdom, that he is no true philosopher. For philosophy is the love of wisdom which, in despising these, he has already despised. I would add further that *multitude* proceeding from a limit, *increases* infinitely. *Magnitude*, on the contrary, beginning from a finite quantity, admits of infinite *division*. This infinity of nature and its indeterminate power, philosophy voluntarily repudiates. For nothing which is infinite can be gathered together in knowledge,

or comprehended in the mind. Therefore reason hath made a selection for itself of those things in which she may exercise her skill, as a searcher of truth. For she hath chosen out of the plurality of infinite multitude, a certain term of finite quantity, and rejecting the divisions of interminable magnitude, hath sought out for herself definite spaces for knowledge. It is clear, then, that whosoever has overlooked these, has lost the whole doctrine of philosophy. This, then, is that *quadrivium* in which those must travel whose mind being raised above the senses, is brought to the heights of intelligence. For there are certain steps, by which we must advance and mount, in order that these studies may again illuminate that eye of the mind, sunk and almost blinded in the senses of the body, which, as Plato says, is much more worthy to be opened and made effectual, than many eyes of the body, seeing that by that light only, can truth be sought out or beheld. Which then of these sciences is to be studied first? Must it not be that which has a sort of maternal relation to all the rest? Now this is arithmetic. For this is before all studies, not only because God the founder of this earthly fabric, had it with Him originally as the exemplar of His own design, and framed according to it all things whatsoever, which, His reason comprehending these, found their harmony in the numbers of a determined order. But in this also is arithmetic proved to be before other studies, because the destruction of that which is first in nature involves the destruction of that which is subsequent to it, whereas the converse is not true." We must condense his arguments in support of this proposition, but they cannot be passed over. "If you take away the nature of the animal, you take away man; but the animal may remain though man perishes. In like manner if you take away numbers, what becomes of the triangle and the square in geometry, the very names of which denote the pre-existence of Number; whereas three and four and the names of other numbers will not disappear though the triangle and the square and the whole of geometry were annihilated. So likewise Musical modulation is denoted by the very names of numbers; hence it depends upon number, and must perish with it. Astronomy of course follows the same rule. For both geometry and music, which have been shown to be subordinate to arithmetic, are presumed in astronomy. Circles, the sphere, the centre, the parallels, all belong to geometrical discipline. Moreover all motion is subsequent to rest, and geometry has been defined to be the science of the moveable, astronomy of the immoveable. Every one knows that the stars move according to the laws of harmony. Music therefore must precede the study of the courses of the stars."

Wisdom and Philosophy.

Philosophy always seeking for definition.

Way to mental vision.

Place of Arithmetic amidst studies.

Reasons for the subordination of Geometry to Arithmetic, and of Astronomy to Music.

10. It would be difficult to select a passage of the same length, as prophetical of the method of study in the Middle Ages as this

A prophetical passage.

one. The rapid arrangement of the Quadrivium, with the reasons that are assigned for it, the mixture of peremptory dogmatism with ingenious reasoning, the glimpses of a high intelligence and perception of the destiny of man, with the boldest presumption about the order of the universe and the scheme of its author, will explain themselves more and more as we advance in our history. But beneath all these Aristotelian tendencies,—hardened, legalized, and yet dignified by the Roman intellect, which was adopting them,—lies that deification of Logic which belonged to the original teacher, but which was to produce far more startling and serious results in his disciples of the later world. Qualities, quantities, magnitudes, multitudes—who does not see that these names were building a prison for Boethius of which the walls were far higher and more impenetrable than those of the one to which Theodoric consigned him? There was positively no escape above, below, through ceiling, or pavement, for one confined within this word-fortress; scarcely an aperture, one would have thought, for air or light to enter in! And yet we shall find that they did enter through both the material and the formal ramparts, within which a brave and noble spirit was enclosed, and that many in after times found not only deliverance out of this confinement, but a certain amount of blessing and benefit in it. Indeed it is not possible to read the extract we have given, without perceiving in it the outlines of an education which modern Europe was to discover for itself and to pass through; an education based upon the acknowledgment of an order in the universe, however that order might be limited by human conceptions; therefore holding out a promise that after a proper period of pupilage, whatever was forced and unnatural in the system would be broken through,—whatever there was of true method latent in it would then or afterwards come forth, and prove itself a way to knowledge and to freedom.

Logic really assumed as *the* study of studies.

Imprisonment in formalities.

11. There is much in the two books on Arithmetic which the student of Middle Age philosophy ought to consider; but we must pass over these as well as the five on Music. Respecting the two on Geometry, we must also be silent, only calling the attention of the reader to an important and characteristic passage near the close of the treatise, where Boethius sums up the history and the benefits of this study. In that passage, we discover the link between the practical moralist and politician, and the scientific doctor. All goodness and all truth he affirms to be fixed, and defined; whereas the nature of evil and error is infinite and refuses to be reduced under laws or principles. The office of the mind is to govern and coerce the passions which are always seeking to break loose. That mind receives strength and stability from culture in the pure sciences. This hint must not be forgotten. It will receive illustration, by and by, from moralists and theologians, with whom Boethius had not

Books on Geometry, lib. ii., near the end.

Bonitas diffinita et sub scientiâ cadens, animoque semper imitabilis, et prima natura est; infinitum vero malitiæ dedecus nullis principiis nexum, &c.

much in common; its immediate explanation may be found in his own Logical Treatises, to which we must now turn.

12. These consist of commentaries upon the "Categories of Aristotle," upon the "Book of Interpretation," upon both the treatises on "Analytics," on "The Topics" and on the "Confutations of the Sophists." As these books are intended to form a course of instruction for Roman students, Boethius introduces them with two dialogues and three books of commentaries on Porphyry, one of whose treatises he regards as the best vestibule to the Aristotelian temple. Not much pains are taken to make the dialogues dramatic. After a very short opening in the manner of Cicero, our statesman proceeds at once to business, giving Latin equivalents for several familiar Greek technicalities, and then explaining the relation of accident to substance, and the purpose of definition. We have, however, in his introduction some general observations, necessary, he conceives, to the understanding of this subject, which throw great light upon his method of thinking.

Logical Treatises.

In Porphyrium Dialogi a Victorino translati.

13. "It would be desirable," he says, "first of all to consider what philosophy itself is. Philosophy is the love and pursuit of wisdom, and in some sort the fellowship with it. By this wisdom, we must not understand that which has to do with special arts or with some mechanical science, but that which needs nothing besides itself, that which is the quickening mind and the primeval principle of things. This love of wisdom is the illumination of the intelligent mind from the pure wisdom, the drawing back and calling, as it were, that mind to herself. So that it may seem as much the pursuit of divinity as the pursuit of wisdom, the friendship of the pure mind with its object. This wisdom, therefore, imposes the worthiness of its own divinity upon every kind of souls which occupy themselves with it, and brings them to the force and purity of their true nature. Hence arises the truth of speculations and thoughts and the holy chastity of acts. Which consideration enables us to ascertain the proper division of philosophy. Philosophy being the genus, there are two species of it, one theoretic or speculative, the other practical or active. There will be as many species of speculative philosophy as there are subjects for reasonable speculation. There will be as many species and varieties of virtues as there are diversities of acts. Of theoretic philosophy there are three subjects, the intellectible, the intelligible, and the natural." Fabius, one of the persons in the dialogue, is surprised at the newly coined word *intellectible*. It is explained to mean "that which is one and the same in itself, consisting always in its own divinity; that which is never perceived by the senses, but only by the mind and intellect." It belongs, therefore, to the contemplation of God and to the incorporeal nature of the mind. It is that part of philosophy which is called by the Greeks *Theology*. Things *intelligible*

Dialogue i. Philosophy.

Philosophy theoretic and active.

Three divisions of the theoretic.

have a close connection with the *intellectible*, look up to them, and acquire a higher and purer nature by commerce with them, but by their relation with bodies, under the power of which they may sink, are differenced from them. The third part of speculative philosophy is physiology, and concerns the natures and passions of bodies. Practical philosophy is likewise divided into three parts. The first concerns the growth of the individual soul and its adornment with all virtues. The second has to do with the care of the state. The third with economy or the management of property.

Divisions of practical philosophy.

14. We might have expected Boethius to tell us under which of these different heads of philosophy *Logic* is to be reckoned. But such a course would not have been consistent with the tendencies of his mind. He intimates at once that logic is not so much a part of philosophy as that which binds all the parts of it together. He has been obliged to assume it, in making the division which he has just attempted. If he had not started from genus and species, what should we have known about philosophy or that which is speculative and active? All his definitions have involved differences, properties, accidents. Grammar, rhetoric, the whole force of argument, are involved in logic. Our main business, therefore, is to understand what the right order in studying logic is; then we shall understand the very principle of order. He traces rapidly the relation between the different books of Aristotle, shows why the Categories must needs be first, and why something is necessary to prepare the reader for them. The primary distinction, he says, is between substance and accident. The nine conditions of quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, possession, doing, suffering, are all conditions of accident. Therefore, it was necessary to say something beforehand about substance and accident; in fact we must have a knowledge of the laws of division, before we have a knowledge of these primary divisions. Porphyry, he says, supplies the want. His introduction, about the genuineness of which Boethius affirms there is no doubt, is the proper manual for the beginner. He then proceeds to comment on the book, paragraph by paragraph. In these elements of the study, one might hope to escape any great and dangerous perplexities. But no. The logical Hercules must be assaulted by serpents while he is yet in his cradle. It is just at this very point of the subject, that those monsters which were to acquire in after times the terrible names of Nominalism and Realism lift up their crests and threaten us with destruction. Porphyry, with true Greek dexterity, foreseeing the perils of the battle, avoids it. Our Roman, with the valour of his race and his own personal intrepidity, rushes into it at once, and thus gravely and peremptorily decides a question in which the doctors of Europe for centuries were, one after another, to engage.

The place of Logic.

Principles of Method.

Difficulties at the outset of the study.

15. "What does Porphyry mean," inquires Fabius, "by saying

that he merely touches and passes over certain points which elder philosophers had discussed at great length? He means this;" answers our author, "he omits the question whether genera and species have an actual subsistence, or dwell in the intellect and mind alone; whether they be corporeal or incorporeal; and whether they are separate or joined to the things which our senses perceive. On these matters, seeing that the disputation was a deep one, he promised to be silent. But let us, holding the reins of self-restraint tightly, touch a little upon each one of them." The question is stated in this way. "Seeing that the mind of man is multiform, it understands things subjected to the *senses*, by the senses, according to their own quality. *Conceptions*, formed by a process of contemplation out of these, it uses as a road to the understanding of incorporeal things. So that when I see individual men, I both am sure that I have *seen* them, and further I boast that I have *understood* that they are men. The *intelligence* which is thus derived, strengthened as it were by the perception of sensible things, raises itself to a higher level and now apprehends the very *species* of man which exists under the animal, and which contains the individual men; the mind understands that to be incorporeal, the corporeal particles of which it had assumed in its sensible perceptions of the individual men. For to say the truth, that Species Man, which encloses us all within the circle of its name, must not be spoken of as corporeal, seeing that we conceive it by the mind and intelligence alone. The mind then resting itself on the first principles of things, is sublimed by a higher intelligence, with which the body has nought to do. Hereby it comes to pass that the soul of man not only becomes capable of understanding incorporeal things through sensible, but also, of inventing them for itself, and even of creating falsehood. For instance, out of the form of a horse and a man, the intellect framed for itself the false species of centaurs. These reflections of the mind which rising from the sensible perception of things to the intelligence, are either perceived or feigned, the Greeks call φαντασίαι, and we may call them (visa). The question then is whether we are to suppose that genera and species are truly subsisting, that they are essential and fixed, so that we may believe the species of man has been *truly* and *fairly* deduced from individual bodies; or whether they are as much feigned as the animal in the verse of Horace with the human head and the horse's neck, which neither does exist nor could exist. The inquiry is a very subtle one, and one of great practical importance. . *If you weigh the truth of things it is impossible to doubt that these genera and species are true.* For seeing that all things that are true cannot be without these five, (genus, species, difference, property, accident,) you cannot doubt that these five things have been true, and understood. They are embedded,

Commentary on the first paragraph.

Senses and Conceptions.

Conceptions are of species which are incorporeal.

Formation of false species.

Decision in favour of Realism.

compacted, conglutinated in all things. Else why should Aristotle speak about those ten primary names, which signify the genera of things? Or why should he collect together their differences and their properties, and treat so specially concerning their accidents, unless these were wrapt up in the things and intimately joined to them? If so there is no question that they are true, and that they are grasped by the certain conclusion of the mind."

The question of the corporeal and incorporeal.

16. Boethius goes on to maintain that Porphyry, in spite of his apparent silence, was really of his mind on this subject, otherwise why should he have discussed the question whether these forms are corporeal or incorporeal? They must *be* if they are either one or the other. To this second question our Roman addresses himself with equal courage. His decision is this. The incorporeal is the primary nature; the body is something added on to this; so that you can never deduce the incorporeal from it. Genus, as such, is neither corporeal nor incorporeal. It includes both as species within it, and may bring both out of itself. Species may be either corporeal or incorporeal. If you put man under substance, you have introduced a corporeal species; if God, an incorporeal. So with differences. If you compare a quadruped with a biped, the difference is corporeal; if rational with irrational, the difference is incorporeal. So of property. If the species is incorporeal, the property will be incorporeal; if corporeal, corporeal. The same principle applies to accidents. Hence all of these, though they may be referred to corporeal or incorporeal subjects, can by no possibility be themselves considered as under the law of corporeal or sensible things. He afterwards adds, "If these five, genus, species, difference, property, or accident, are joined to bodies, they are such as is that primary incorporality which is outside of limits, and yet never is severed from body; but if to incorporeal, they are such as is a mind which is not united to a body." Fabius confesses his inability to understand this language, and his instructor does not vouchsafe any further explanation than that the terms or limits of which he speaks, are the extremities of geometrical figures, and that the incorporality which has to do with these limits, may be studied in the first book of the very learned Macrobius Theodosius concerning the Dream of Scipio. With this information our readers must also be satisfied.

Porphyry's Aristotelianism.

17. We do not intend to follow this treatise into its details. We are now launched on the ocean of Latinized Aristotelian dialectics. If we have become somewhat suddenly acquainted with its shoals and quicksands, we may at least hope that we shall have a better chance of not being wrecked on them hereafter. Porphyry is, in many respects, as convenient a guide, for our purpose, as Boethius considered him, for his countrymen in the fifth century. He occupied, as we have seen, a middle position between the pure

philosophers of the Neo-Platonic school and the Theurgists—always inclining to the former, but oftentimes driven into unwilling consent with their opponents. The natural issue of such a mind was in Aristotelianism. There he was safe from the necessity of investigating the problems of the spiritual world, of considering how dæmons or gods hold converse with men. Yet, in the forms and conditions of the intellect, he can exercise the abstract talent which his master had cultivated in him; he could feel that he was not dwelling amidst the sensible things which the theoretical man was to eschew. A mind like his, could very well stand on the edge of Realism without plunging into it. He had learnt to think of the spiritual region as a substantial one. He had still the tradition of another higher region when he came down into that of names and terms. For a man bred up in actual business as Boethius was, such hesitation was difficult, almost impossible. The forms were to him ridiculous unless he could treat them as he did the things with which he was habitually conversant. Realism was, as his argument shows so clearly, not the result of a process of reasoning, but an assumption from which he started. To have had a doubt on the matter, would have seemed to him monstrous.

Difference between him and Boethius

18. In the preface to his larger commentaries upon his own translation of Porphyry, there are some passages respecting the rise and use of Logic which the student will do well to compare with the directly opposite views in the first book of the Novum Organum. He opens with a triple division of the human mind into the life which it has in common with the vegetables, the sentient life which it shares with other animals, the ratiocinative life which is peculiarly and properly human. This last power, he says, is exercised in four ways, in inquiring whether something is, what it is, of what kind it is, lastly, why it is. The mind in virtue of this power, he says, is exercised in the fixed contemplation of things that are present, in the understanding of things that are absent, in the investigation of things unknown. It can conceive of things that do not fall under the senses. It can put names upon things that are absent. What it has perceived intellectually, it can express in words. This superiority of the ratiocinative faculty to the mere faculty of observation, leads him to condemn Epicurus and the Atomists, because they substituted the exact observation of nature for processes of reasoning. You cannot, he rightly observes, make them always fit into one another. I tell 100 on my fingers, there is an actual 100 corresponding to it. But I may not conclude that whatever our discourse has found out, has its fixed counterpart in nature. We might fancy that this discovery would lead him to suspect the danger of anticipating inquiries by our reasoning. Quite the contrary. It makes him perceive the necessity of a science which shall point out the true and the probable path of dis-

Boethii commentaria in Porphyrium a se translatum.

Division of the human faculties.

Quare necesse erat eos falli qui, abjecta scientiâ disputandi, de rerum naturâ perquirerent. Nisi enim *prius* ad scientiam venerit, quæ ratiocinatio veram teneat disputandi viam quæ verisimilem, et nisi agnoverit

quæ fida possit esse quæve suspecta rerum incorrupta fides, ex ratiocinatione non potest inveniri.

ow to bring
putation. Until we have a science of logic and know h ll arrive
everything to its rules and tests, he has no hope that we sh Aristof the
at any safe or satisfactory conclusions respecting the laws ra otant
world. Here again we perceive the teacher of one impor ndical
branch of human knowledge, forging chains which the physi in
student would afterwards have the most sore labour to break
pieces.

Books on the Categories.

19. The books of Boethius on the writitngs of Aristotle himself were more important in his judgment than those which preceded them, as conducting his pupil into a more advanced stage of the science. To us they are chiefly valuable, as marking out a track of thought in which men were intended for a long time to run, as furnishing a Latin nomenclature for the logician, as carrying out into detail the principles which we have already shown to be characteristic of the mind of the writer, as attesting his indefatigable diligence, as proving how much it was the end of that diligence to supply his countrymen with a regular and systematic course of instruction. That instruction would have been imperfect, according to the notions of either Greeks or Romans, if rhetoric had not come in as the sister, at all events the handmaid, to logic. The commentaries on Cicero's Topics were intended to complete the Boethian circle of studies.

His treatise on Rhetoric.

Supposed treatises. De Trinitate, and De Personis et Naturis duabus.

20. We say to complete, because it seems very difficult to resist the decree of modern criticism which pronounces the theological treatises of Boethius to be spurious. There are many reasons, we conceive, besides those which have been derived from the internal evidence of the treatises themselves, for adopting this opinion, greatly as it is at variance with an old belief or tradition. First, the entire absence of anything like a definite recognition of Christianity in works like those we have commented upon, so far as they are of a truly formal or scientific character, might be accounted for. But that, in marking out the different departments of human thought so carefully as Boethius has done, and in hinting at theology as one and the highest of these branches, no word should be used to indicate that it was the subject of a revelation or in whom that revelation had been made to man, must needs seem almost incredible in one who believed at all, much less who believed with the kind of earnestness which we must attribute, in every question that really interested him, to Boethius. Secondly, it would be painful, and would lower our opinion of the man, to think that he could have written essays on the Trinity and on the two natures of Christ, merely as theses or exercises of his logical faculty. Thirdly, it was almost a matter of course that, if he left treatises so complete in themselves as those on Geometry, Arithmetic, Music, Logic, and Astronomy, some doctor of the Middle Ages would see the necessity of filling up the great blank that was

Reasons for rejecting them.

left, and producing lectures on Divinity as nearly as possible in harmony with those which had been bequeathed by the Roman Senator. Fourthly, the faith in the genuineness of these treatises was inseparable in the Middle Ages from the notion that Boethius died a martyr to Catholicism and Orthodoxy. It is clear that he did die a martyr in a very noble cause, the cause of Roman liberty and justice. But there is nothing whatever in the history of his sufferings which can warrant, or even suggest, the suspicion that the Arianism of Theodoric was the cause of them.

Question about his Christianity

21. On the other hand, we are by no means disposed to adopt the opinion which has been proclaimed by many German scholars, (amongst others by the latest editor of the Consolations,) that Boethius was a heathen. There is not the least evidence, in his writings, of attachment to the forms of the old religion: all external evidence would lead us to conclude that he adopted the established creed. Our readers may fancy, that in this century, there was no middle term between vehement conviction on one side or the other. They will have seen much in our account of the progress of philosophy in Greece to justify such an opinion. But they must beware of applying conclusions which they have rightly drawn respecting the Eastern world, to the West; respecting the Platonical school, to the Aristotelian. Men living at a period when the old imperial traditions were perishing, when the new Gothic world was commencing—surrounded by proofs that Roman law and life which had been so allied to the worship of the old gods had not passed away—with proofs as decisive that the religion which sustained them *had* passed away—may very naturally have endeavoured to hold fast by that which they felt to be an heirloom for all future ages, without attempting to reproduce what had no hold upon the present, and yet without pronouncing whether it was good or evil in the past. A monarch like Theodoric who regarded catholics with jealousy and yet had no affection for paganism, would be likely to encourage men of this class. He would not understand their affection for the old classical world, but their equilibrium of mind and their willingness to treat Arians and Orthodox merely as common citizens of the Republic, would be acceptable to him. They, on their parts, would be confirmed in the position they had taken up, by the apparent uncertainties and the evident disagreements of the Christians. Dogmatism would not have offended Boethius. He was a dogmatist by nature, by principle, by education. But he would certainly be scandalized by any looseness of opinions, by the absence of the logical precision which he demanded of every thinker, by the indefiniteness and infiniteness which he pronounced to be the great enemies of science. These motives, especially the last, had comparatively little influence upon Proclus and the philosophers of

Possible state of mind in Roman citizens under the Ostrogothic sway

The Philosophy of Boethius kept him aloof from Theology.

Athens. They were students of the infinite. They believed indeed that very distinct and definite forms discovered themselves to the meditative and abstracted man in the region which lay beyond the measures and rules of the human intellect; but they were much more disposed to complain of the Christian church, for excluding the imagination, than for giving it too wide a scope. They were, as we have so often had occasion to remark, primarily theological. Hence, if they did not accept Christianity, they must come into a direct polemic with it. The Aristotelian laid down his data on Logic, applied these to the physical universe, admitted a metaphysical world beyond that, believed in a certain divine region which the theoretic man might behold and dwell in. But these last were the mere complements of a system which could exist without them, unless some great moral necessity, which neither Aristotle nor Porphyry, nor for a long time Boethius, seems to have felt, should force them first into the thoughts of ordinary men, and thence into the schools.

Why the question is important for our subject.

22. We are afraid we shall seem to our readers to dwell unnecessarily upon these differences between the two countries, two ages, two methods of thought. But the clearness of our future sketch so much depends upon the acknowledgment of them, that we would rather incur the charge of any amount of repetition than pass by the facts upon which the proof of these differences rests. The question concerning the Christianity of Boethius is important, on this ground especially. It is often supposed that the theology of the Middle Ages, such as we have exhibited it, in connection with the name of Gregory the Great, had not only a very close connection with the logic and the philosophy of the Middle Ages, (which it notoriously had, and which we have already said must be confessed by every one who would engage faithfully in the study of either), but that they grew up together, that they were from the first inseparable, that the theology determined the course which the dialectical studies took, imparting to them its own dogmatical and authoritative character. This opinion we believe to be wholly untenable. It has gained strength from the notion that Boethius being the parent of the Latin dialectics and philosophy, was also a theologian, and took pains to give his philosophy a theological and Christian character. The plain statement which we have made of what he actually did, is the refutation of this theory. We have shown, we trust, that there is not a single element in his scientific teaching which is not derived from teachers of the old world, or from teachers who were adverse rather than friendly to Christianity.

The book De Consolatione Philosophiæ.

23. Notwithstanding this evidence, we are far from disposed to quarrel with our great Saxon king, or with the teachers whom he followed, for discovering a Christian element in the book which records the experience of our statesman's prison houses, nay, for pronouncing it a distinctly Christian work. It must be acknowledged at once, that they had no warrant for taking this course from any phrases which occur in the book, that they put an interpretation upon it which the text does not authorize and which Boethius himself would have hesitated to endorse. An argument even might be drawn, and has been drawn, from this treatise, which is more decidedly adverse to the Christianity of Boethius than any of his other works supply. The man who does not directly allude to the Gospel and Him who is the subject of it, when he is speaking of that which supported him in suffering and in the prospect of death, might seem to afford the clearest evidence of his habitual state of mind, one which no other could equal or contradict. Undoubtedly this presumption does not only *look*, but *is* very strong. We can only explain why we do not yield to it, by giving an abstract of the Consolations.

Boethius a poet.

24. The hard Logician with whom we have been conversing hitherto, presents himself to us at the commencement of this book as a poet. The contrast does not seem to us one which warrants a doubt about the genuineness of his earlier or later writings. There is a freshness and vitality in the style of Boethius when he is writing upon formal and scientific subjects, which would justify us in thinking that there was poetry in his nature, and that circumstances might call it out some day into verse. A man who could combine so much of speculation with the habits of practical business, must have had a mind of wonderful spring and elasticity. His life had been poetical and harmonious. When its outward activity was suspended, it was not very strange that he should begin to sing. It is with an elegy about his griefs that he commences. Then he proceeds to tell us in prose, how there came in upon his meditations the vision of a Woman of very reverent countenance, The vision. with glowing eyes, penetrating beyond the common power of human eyes, of brilliant complexion, and inexhausted strength, though so full of years, that she could by no means be deemed to belong to that age. Her stature was difficult to describe, for sometimes she appeared to retain it within the common human measure, sometimes she lifted her head so high, that it looked into the very heaven, and was lost to the gaze of the beholder. Her garments were of exquisite workmanship, fashioned, as he afterwards understood, by her own hands. Yet there was a look of antiquity, almost of neglect, about them. On the lower skirt of it he saw inscribed Π; on the upper part of it Θ. There seemed letters between them which rose like the steps of a ladder from one to the other. But the garment had been torn, apparently by violence, and some fragments of it carried away. She had books in her right hand, a sceptre in her left. This majestical lady was greatly

displeased by the poetical Muses whom she found waiting upon the prisoner's couch. Is it fitting that he, who had studied under the teachers of the Academy and the Porch, should give himself to these Syrens? They must depart at once, that he may submit himself to his true Mistress, who comes, not to soothe him, but to probe and to cure.

The complaint.

25. The visitor, whose name is Philosophy, notwithstanding this harsh commencement, does not disdain herself to speak to him in song; only it is of a grave and inspiring sort, not tender and pathetic. The sufferer craves her compassion, and wonders at her condescension. When he finds that she has come to him, as she did to Anaxagoras and Socrates while they were labouring under false charges and expecting their sentence, he is emboldened to pour out all his griefs into her ear, proclaiming, not untruly but a little boastfully, the good deeds to his country which had deserved another fate, and affirming his innocence of the crimes which spies and sycophants had imputed to him. The thought is oppressive, not for its immediate effects only or chiefly. He has learnt by heart the Pythagorean maxim, "Follow after God;" he has tried to act upon it; and now he is deserted. Has he not a right to suspect that the world is itself given over to chance?

Invocation to the god of nature.

Then in really noble verse, he invokes the Framer of this globe to tell him how it is that sun, and moon, and stars, obey the eternal laws which He has given them; the lesser lights quietly yielding to the greater, the sister orb increasing or diminishing her horn according to a fixed ordinance, and paling her fires before her brother's brightness; how it is that night and day succeed each other without disturbance and disorder; that the cold of winter yields, at its predestined time, to the fervour of summer; that the leaves which the north wind carries off, the zephyr renews; that, in short, no one thing in all nature breaks loose from its ancient law, or deserts the work that belongs to its proper place; but that He who governs all things with a fixed purpose, leaves the acts of man to the mercy of slippery fortune, which crushes the innocent with the punishment that is due to the guilty; which enthrones perverse manners on high, and enables the wicked to trample on the necks of the just, so that virtue lies hidden in darkness, that lies and perjuries are profitable to those who practise them, that high kings before whom multitudes tremble, own these as their masters. "Look down," he concludes, "on this miserable earth, whosoever thou art that holdest together the bonds of nature. We that are not the worst part of thy great work, are tossed about by every wind and wave of fortune. Mighty Ruler, control these waves, and make the earth firm with that law by which thou rulest the heavens!"

The true cause of lamentation.

26. The divine visitor listens with calmness to this outpouring of grief and indignation, and then begins to compassionate the

Statesman, because he is suffering an exile into which no king or multitude could have driven him, an exile from his own heart's home and resting-place. Seeing that the evil is deeper than she had at first supposed, the gracious physician proceeds to apply such gentle remedies as the weak state of the patient will bear. She brings him to confess that he does not really know what Man is, what he himself is. But he is not to despair. He does recognize at least an order in nature, a Monarch over the world. That is a starting-point of good. From this small spark, true vital heat may be enkindled. Then, in free and lightsome song, she bids him cast away griefs, cast away fears, bid hope and sorrow go together. So will he have a clear eye to see the truth; so will he be able, amidst a multitude of winding paths, to choose the right.

The government of fortune.

27. The next book introduces an ingenious argument to prove that Boethius has no cause whatever to complain of fortune. If he chooses to accept her as a mistress, he must submit to her ordinary maxims and rules. He knew beforehand what she was. What had she done to him which she had not done to every one of her votaries before? She had been wonderfully liberal in her largesses to him, had given him wealth, friends, education, station. Let him count them up and see whether any man had ever a larger measure of the things which men value most. If they were gone, did not he know the tenure upon which they were granted? All this is acknowledged as very reasonable, but it is complained of as quite ineffectual. After all these calculations, the pain of losing is in proportion to the preciousness of the things possessed. Philosophy reminds him that he is not desolate yet of his best treasures. His wife and children are still his, and dearer than ever. It is something to make him confess that he has no right to complain of his whole state. How many are there who would feel themselves almost in Heaven, if they had but the relics of his good fortune? How few things taken from the stock of a man used to all indulgences, will make him miserable! How little added to the stock of those who are unused to it, will make them happy! The result is this: is there anything that is more precious to thee than thyself? Then if thou art master of thyself, thou wilt possess that which neither thou wilt wish to lose, nor fortune will be able to take away. The victim of feeble, faltering, outward felicity, either knows that it is mutable, or does not know it. If he does not know it, how can he be happy, seeing that he is shut up in the prison of ignorance? If he does know it, how can he be happy, since he must be continually tormented by fear? Then comes an analysis of the different elements of this external felicity. Is it money? But that you must part with before it is worth anything; you wish to be rid of it, when you prize it most. Is it the beauty of the surrounding world? But this you cannot

The right to complain considered.

Worth of money, dignities, natural beauty, fame.

appropriate; you may enjoy it, but it is not yours. Is it the dignities and honours of the world? But these come to the greatest villains; and since contraries cannot exist in harmony, it is impossible that they can have any good in themselves. Music belongs to the musician, rhetoric to the rhetorician; there can be no natural good in these things, seeing they have no natural affinity with the good man. Or is it a great name? Boethius confesses this weakness. He wants space and means for action, that the virtue which is in him may not wear itself out and die in silence. Philosophy admits that this is the last infirmity of noble minds. But yet an Astronomer who has taken any account of the vastness of the universe, should consider within what contemptible limits the widest fame circulates. Cicero was born in the very maturity of Roman glory, yet the fame of the Roman Republic had not then passed the Caucasus. How far then could the name of its noblest citizen have travelled? Perhaps, however, it is the fame of being a philosopher that he covets? His monitress can tell him a good story about that ambition. A man who wanted to pass himself for a sage was told by a severe critic, that he should acknowledge him to be one, if he could bear injuries mildly and patiently. The aspirant exhibited patience under some affront, and then exclaimed, "Do you think that I am a philosopher now?" "I should have thought so," said the keen-sighted judge, "if you had held your tongue." But after all, so Philosophy concludes this portion of her lessons, "I have a good word to say for fortune as well as a bad one. There is a time when she acts as a real benefactress to man. When she smiles sweetly upon him, she is a liar; when she changes her tone and proves her instability, she is always true. In her first shape she is tempting men away from the true good; in her second she is bringing them back to it."

The glory of being a philosopher.

28. It will be remembered that there was another letter besides Π upon the garment of Philosophy. She proceeds in the third book to show what was the meaning of that higher and more mysterious symbol. She is not content with showing that there is no satisfaction in those outward things which fortune presents. There is a meaning, and a very deep meaning, in the longing of men after them, in the variety of their longings, in the evidence which one could produce that that of the other is insufficient. There is a craving for Good, for the highest Good, in the heart, and will, and reason of men; nay, all lower things, all the animals and forms of nature, are in their way, looking up to it and sighing after it. All men, all creatures, want happiness. They say happiness is the *good* they want. How many mists are scattered from their minds when they reverse the proposition, when they look upon the Good as itself their happiness, when they look upon that as drawing up all other ends into itself, power, reverence, glory, joy! when

The search for good.

they see that the Good must be One, and that the One must be God? That first confession of Boethius which he could not abandon amidst all his scepticism about the chances of man's life, that there was an order in Nature, and not an order only, but an Orderer, an actual living Ruler,—was not then in vain. That belief was a step towards the solution of his other and practical difficulty. This Ruler of nature, in whom is no disorder, no evil, is the Good of man, that which he is created to seek for and to participate in. And so this book is wound up with a song respecting Orpheus and Eurydice, which concludes with these remarkable words:—

"'We give thee back thy wife,' says the pitiful ruler of the shades,
"'we give thee her whom thou hast won by thy song. But let
"'this law control the gift. Till she has left Tartarus, turn not back
"'thine eyes.' Who can lay down a law for lovers? Love is a
"greater law of itself. Alas! close to the very limits of night and
"day, Orpheus looks upon his Eurydice; he loses her; she dies. To
"you this fable refers, whosoever you are, who seek to draw your
"minds towards the upper day. He who being overcome, shall turn
"them towards the cave of Tartarus, loses the bright thing that is
"attracting him, while he gazes upon that which is beneath."

The good to men is the same with Him who governs the world.

Orpheus and Eurydice; the moral of the tale.

29. All this is beautiful and divine, our prisoner exclaims, and I was not altogether ignorant of it before. But the old doubt and misery recur. There is this good Ruler of the universe. But evil exists, exists unpunished and rewarded. That this should be so, in the kingdom of a God who knows all things, can do all things, and who wills only good, one cannot wonder or lament enough. Philosophy at once grapples with the difficulty, admits that it would be a thing of infinite horror, beyond all conceivable monstrosities, if in the beautifully ordered house of such a parent and economist, vile vessels were honoured, and precious vessels were lying useless and dusty. Once admit that bad men are mighty and good men weak, and you *must* deny a righteous government altogether. But it is not so, says the celestial teacher. I will undertake to show you that the good are always mighty, and the bad always feeble. Once lay hold on this truth and you will have wings which will lift you on high; you will return under my guidance, to your proper country and home. Boethius is astonished at the magnificence of the promise. Philosophy proceeds, by a Socratic or inductive process, to bring him to a perception of her principle. We will give the result. A man is weak who fails of obtaining that which he seeks after; he is strong who reaches it. The appetite for Good has been proved to be in all men. Every man wants Good, wishes to get it. The bad man is frustrated of this aim, by misunderstanding what it is, or by inclinations which draw him aside from it. As we heard just now, the Orpheus, from looking downwards instead of upwards, loses

New doubts.

Evil essentially weak.

his Eurydice. He who seeks Good, gains what he seeks. Can there be a greater test of his power? For what does he seek but Good? Wherein is he good, except as he seeks Good? What reward can be so great as that of finding it? Here, then, is the solution of another difficulty. The evil man is unpunished, the good is unrewarded? No, verily. The evil man has the greatest punishment which it is possible for him to have; he misses Good, he finds Evil. Or, does he find Good? Then that draws him out of his Evil. He has got the thing which, as a man, he was to seek after; but he has got the thing which, as an evil man, he was not seeking after. Any way the evil has been disappointed; that has been punished. The old Platonic principle is true. Only the wise man is able to do that which he wills to do. The bad man does what he has a *liking* for; but his desire is not accomplished; he has not what he wills. Nothing is so mighty, we have agreed, as the highest Good. All that approaches that, and shares in its nature, has a portion of its might; all that recedes from it, is imbecile. In the course of the argument, the great maxim is affirmed; an evil man cannot be said, properly and truly, to be a man. That *is*, which retains its order and preserves its nature. We may call a carcase the remains of a man; we cannot speak of it as if it were one.

Evil always punished, good rewarded.

Reward and punishment.

30. In these words is implied a view of the nature of punishment as well as of blessedness, which the teacher proceeds to develop. It is in perfect accordance with the principle of Plato's Gorgias. For an evil man to escape punishment, is the most terrible of all punishments; to be brought into punishment, that which he should most desire. The fixedness in evil, a permanent continuance in that, is the horror of all horrors. The threefold calamity of evil men, says the teacher, would be this: to have the will to do it, to have the power to do it, to accomplish it. "Granted, says Boethius. But oh that I could see them quickly deprived of this calamity, the possibility of perpetrating their crime!" "They will be deprived of that possibility, sooner than you, perhaps, may think, or than they themselves may think. There is nothing so distant within the short bounds of life, which an immortal spirit can count it long to wait for. Ofttimes the great hope and high machinery of wickedness is cast down by a sudden and unexpected overthrow, whereby the boundary of the misery (*i.e.* the misery of successful wickedness) is determined for them. For if iniquity makes miserable, the iniquitous man must be more miserable the longer he lasts. I should count him to be most wretched, if there were no ultimate death to terminate his wickedness. For if we have come to a true conclusion respecting the misfortune of depravity, it is clear that that which is an eternal wickedness, is an infinite misery." There is one passage in this inquiry which, though it is not much dwelt upon,

The misery of the wickedness to continue wicked.

must be quoted by us, for its connection with thoughts which were to be more developed afterwards. "I pray thee, says Boethius, dost thou admit no punishment of souls after the death of the body?" "Great ones indeed, answers Philosophy, some of which I judge to be exercised with the bitterness of retribution, some with purgatorial clemency." One sentence more we must quote from this part of the treatise. "Hence," says Philosophy, "it comes to pass "that among wise men, no place is left for hatred. For who, but "the most foolish, would hate the good? To hate the evil is irra- "tional. For if, as languor is a disease of bodies, so all vice is a "disease of minds: seeing that we do not consider the sick in body "worthy of hatred but rather of pity, much more are *they* to be "pitied, not pursued with hostility, whose minds that more terrible "disease is tormenting with every kind of feebleness."

Folly of hatred.

31. The remainder of this 4th book is occupied with a discussion on Fate and Providence. The views of Boethius very closely resemble those of Proclus, of which we have given our readers some account. The generation of all things, says Philosophy, the whole progress of natures that are liable to change, derives its causes, its order, its forms, from the stability of the Divine Mind. This, fixed in the citadel of its own simplicity, hath devised a method in the conduct of things, which hath many varieties. When this method is contemplated in the purity of the Divine Intelligence, it is named *Providence;* but when it is referred to those things which it moves and disposes, the Ancients called it *Fate;* which two will be easily recognized as diverse, by any one who has contemplated in his mind the force of both. For Providence is that divine Reason constituted in the highest Ruler, which disposeth all things. But Fate is that disposition inherent in things subject to movement, whereby Providence binds all things together in their own orders. Providence embraces all things equally, although diverse, although infinite; but Fate directs individual things, each to its own proper movement, distributing them in forms and times. "So that the unfolding of this temporal order becomes Providence, when it is harmonized in the perception of the Divine Mind; and that same harmony, when it is distributed and unfolded in times, is called Fate. Which things, though they are diverse, nevertheless, one dependeth on the other." A little farther on she says: "That which departs farthest from the primary Mind, is involved in greater and closer bands of Fate; conversely each thing is free from this Fate in proportion as it approaches nearer to the hinge and centre of things. Whatsoever clings to the firmness of the higher Mind, being freed from motion, rises also above the necessity of Fate. Therefore, what reasoning is to the intellect, what that which is produced is to that which is, what Time is to Eternity, what the circle is to the centre, that is the moveable

Fate and providence.

Fate always subject to providence.

How to rise above fate.

series of Fate to the stable simplicity of Providence." Proceeding from these great maxims, she maintains that however confused and disturbed things may appear to our eyes, nevertheless, there may be a Method which is directing all things to good. "For there is," she says, "a certain order which embraceth all things, so that what hath departed from the course that was marked for it, may, perchance, fall into another order, but still into *an* order, that nothing in the realm of Providence may be left to chance, or wilfulness." But she adds reverently: "It is not right or possible for a man to comprehend in his mind, and explain in his discourse, all the mechanism of the Divine operations. Be it enough for us to have seen just this, that the same God who has called all natures into existence, disposes all, directing them to good; that He is eager to retain in the likeness of Himself, that which He hath produced; that through that very course of fatal necessity, He is driving all evil out of the boundaries of His republic." She draws this practical inference from all that she has said. "All fortune must be good to those who are possessing and pursuing virtue; all must be bad to those who are remaining in wickedness. It is in your hands to make fortune what you would have her be. For all which seems harsh, unless it either exercises or corrects, punishes."

The ends of the divine will may be known; its means we see but partially.

Free-will and prescience.

32. The last book of the Consolations discusses at length the question of free-will and its relation to Prescience. Boethius declares his utter dissatisfaction with the ordinary attempts to reconcile God's foresight with Man's freedom. Once attribute all will and all power to the Foreseer, and it seems to him utterly impossible to suppose that the knowledge of the future does not involve a decree respecting it. We will give a portion of the answer which Philosophy makes, hoping that we may so tempt our readers to study the whole of it:—

Eternity.

"That God is eternal, is the common judgment of all rational "beings Let us consider then what eternity is, for this may show us "both what is the divine nature and the divine knowledge. Eternity "then is the whole and perfect possession of interminable life; which "we may apprehend, by comparing temporal things w[illegible]h it. For "whatsoever lives in time, this being present, proceeds from past to "future; and nothing is constituted in time, which can embrace at "once the whole space of its own life. It hath not yet apprehended "to-morrow, it hath lost yesterday; in the life of to-day you live no "longer than in the moveable and transitory moment. Whatever, "therefore, suffers the condition of time, even though it neither ever "began to be, nor ever should cease to be, (as Aristotle supposed "was the case with the world) and though its life should stretch into "an infinity of time, yet it is not such that it deserves to be called "eternal. For it does not comprehend and embrace the whole at

Difference between eternity and infinity.

"once, even though it be that space of infinite life; the future not "being yet accomplished, *that* it has not." He goes on to vindicate Plato from the charge of making the world eternal, pointing out the difference between the *perpetuity* which he supposed might belong to it, from the *eternity* which he vindicates only for God. And then he goes on: "Seeing then that every judgment takes in "the things that are subjected to it, according to the nature of him "who exercises it; seeing that there is always an eternal and present "state in God; His knowledge also, transcending all motion of time, "dwells in the simplicity of its ever present; He embracing all the "spaces of past and future, contemplates them as if they were now "carrying on in his own simple cognition. Therefore, if you will "weigh that present of His, wherein he knoweth all things, you will "not call it the *pre-science* of the future, but the *science* of that which "never ceases to be before Him. Therefore we do not call His "government *previdence* but *providence*." The conclusion, therefore, is, that supposing we have good reason to speak of anything as necessary, or anything as free, we cannot be diverted from that belief by the notion of God's prescience. His knowledge deals with all things as they are, with those which He has constituted free, as free; and it is only by introducing a notion of time into His knowledge, which is inconsistent with his nature, that we fancy it to be otherwise. And this is the practical lesson from the whole matter, and the noble termination of a noble book.

Prescience cannot be predicated of an eternal being.

"Wherefore the liberty of will remains to mortals unviolated; "nor are those laws unrighteous that hold forth rewards and punish-"ments to Wills that are tied by no necessity. There remains also "a Spectator from on high of all things, and the present eternity of "His vision, concurs with the future quality of our acts, dispensing "to the good, rewards, to the evil, punishments. Nor vainly are "hopes and prayers laid up in God, which, when they are right, "cannot be ineffectual. Wherefore, turn away from all vices, "cultivate virtues, raise your mind to right hopes, send up humble "prayers on high. Great, if you do not wish to deceive yourself, "is the need of a clear and honest heart, since you are acting under "the eyes of a Judge who discerneth all things."

Apparent Platonism of this treatise.

33. Our readers may ask, with some surprise, how it is that the man whom we have described, on what seems good evidence, as the sturdiest of Aristotelians, even more in the habit of his mind than from any sectarian bias, has begun, in his prison hours, to speak the language of a Platonist, as if it were his native dialect. We have already opposed the hypothesis which divides the author of the Consolations from the author of the books on Arithmetic and on the Categories, and we are not disposed to fall back upon it as the solution of this difficulty. We can trace, we think, the same style, the same intellectual peculiarities, the same conscientiousness,

in both classes of writings; sides of the character of the Roman lawgiver and statesman appear in both. If Boethius had again turned his thoughts to numbers or to names, he would have been as much an Aristotelian in his latter days, as he was in his earlier.

His humiliation.

But his practical and honest mind is brought into contact with questions, which predicaments and syllogisms do not help him to settle. He finds that, with all his dialectics, he is still a weak man. He had been more sagacious than his contemporaries. But it seems as if his sagacity had profited him little; it not only had not preserved him from the malice of his enemies; it could not teach him to bear that malice. He has done admirable things as a Minister of the Republic. When he recalls them to his mind, they deepen his despondency. He has been an excellent husband and father, therefore he has to suffer the loss of wife and children. We often fancy that the consolation of Philosophy, means the consoling thought that one is a philosopher and not like other people. That consolation which Boethius may have dwelt upon as much as any one in his sunny hours, utterly deserts him in his dark hours. His discontent and murmurings, his discovery how important external things have been, and are, to him, reduce him into one of the crowd; before he can begin to ascend a step, he must sink lower than it seemed possible he could sink. And so he finds that he needs a hand to raise him out of himself, to set him above himself. He must be catechised, probed, exposed by one who knows him better than he knows himself. He must confess himself, apart from his guide and teacher, as helpless and worthless. He must trust and submit, in order to be exalted. Then, by degrees, he may be able to read the higher letter on the garment, as well as the lower. The teacher, who is with him and knows him, may guide him up to God. Theology cannot be a mere part of a scheme of sciences, something which is wanted for the sublime theoretic man, who has finished his circle of physical and human studies; it is needed for the man himself, for the prisoner, for him who has found that he is not better than his fathers or his neighbours. This is the road by which Boethius arrives at his Platonism, a Roman road cut out of the rock, because it was needed for actual use, for the soldier and the man to pass through. He demands a present Helper, he demands a divine Object, for his hope and trust. Such a One he has acknowledged as presiding over the world; such a One he finds must rule more directly over his own life, and be the end and good of it. The righteousness which the Senator has tried to practise imperfectly, he finds had its root and ground in One who practises it perfectly. The wisdom which he thought belonged to himself, he finds must uphold him, guide him, correct him. He wants some better ideal than those of Genius, and Species, and Difference, and Property, and Accident.

His own philosophy will not profit him.

He needs an ideal and a guide.

An ideal he must have, and a substantial ideal. But the ideal must not be his own. It must come to him, and speak to him. He may escape from all Greek dæmonism as unworthy of his manlier race; but he can only do so by confessing a Being whose substance and eternity are not deduced from time, or negations of time. He may not have consciously changed any old conviction on this subject; but every one that he had before, has received a new character, has been translated into a higher meaning by the new knowledge which he has acquired of himself, of his weakness, of his necessities.

Why the Middle Age doctors thought this a Christian book.

34. The conscience of men in the Middle Ages could not but perceive in this history of Boethius, that moral change, that turning of the heart and will from fleeting and temporal things, to the substantial, the living, and the true, of which the Scriptures spoke, and which all faithful preachers longed to be the instruments of producing in those who listened to them. Boethius described the instrument who wrought this alteration in him, who brought him back from his wanderings to his proper country and home, as Philosophy. The expression was manifestly a wrong one, inconsistent with his own previous belief, still more inconsistent with the processes of his own mind, as he records them. In a passage we have already quoted from his commentaries on Porphyry, he speaks of Philosophy as the love and pursuit of Wisdom, and assumes that there is a Wisdom implied in this pursuit, which is distinct from it. However dim that vision may have been to him whilst he was merely a schoolman, it acquired form and substance in his cell. Though he might represent his visitor and his judge in language drawn from the imagination, the use of that language, and the tenor of his discourse, which is anything but fantastical, which is severely true, shows that he felt that he was not merely *personifying*, but that, in the strictest sense, his heart and mind were laid open to the scrutiny of an actual *person*. It was a timidity, an excusable honest timidity, which made him resort to an unscientific phrase, rather than profess more than he felt he had apprehended or could distinctly affirm. But those who were familiar with the language of the book of Proverbs, and of the Prophets, could not but feel that if he had spoken of *Wisdom* as actually coming to him and holding converse with him, he would have more expressed what he meant, he would better have explained what true Philosophy is, and what the reward of it is, than he could do by appearing to clothe a passion or habit of his own mind, with a substance which does not belong to it. Feeling, therefore, that the process which he described was such as He whom they confessed to be the Divine Wisdom and Word, effects in man, Christian teachers did not hesitate to speak of Boethius as a Christian sage, to sit at his feet and to learn from him as one who could explain

Philosophy a false name, but a real person.

to them divine, as well as human, mysteries. When they imputed to him a distinct recognition of Jesus Christ as the Incarnate Word and the Teacher of men, they distorted his phrases to their own wishes. When they confessed that He in whom they hoped and believed, had illuminated the spirit of Boethius, had led him by the path in which it was most accordant to his previous condition of mind that he should walk, into the apprehension of truths which all men need, and which are near to all; they were rising above their own narrow and imperfect notions; they were bearing one of the highest testimonies they could bear to the truth which they professed. And it is a subject for satisfaction, not for regret, that in collections of Doctors and Saints made in our own day, Boethius is still suffered to stand side by side with Popes, some of whom might not have been willing to stand side by side with him on earth, but who may, perhaps, rejoice if the Judge who discerneth all things permits them to stand with him in the world of light.

Return to Gregory.

35. We hope our readers will not complain of us for violating the strict order of events, that we might introduce them to a figure so remarkable in itself as that of Boethius, and occupying so remarkable a position between the eastern world and the western, between the old world and the new. We shall not detain them with any further notices of the time which elapsed between his death and the Popedom of Gregory the Great, but shall take up the history, where we left it at the conclusion of the last part, with the stirring annals of the 7th century.

CHAPTER II.

SEVENTH, EIGHTH, AND NINTH CENTURIES.

Philosophy the guide to Theology.

1. PHILOSOPHY pointed Boethius to another letter on her vest, different from that which denoted her own name. According to her method, the theologian must rise out of the ethical student; his discoveries are the complement of those which had been made in the Academy or the Porch. The actual order of human training, as the ages which followed Boethius set it forth to us, was the reverse of this. The Π and the Θ were to have the closest affinity with each other, to be woven on the same garment. But that which was hidden from the eyes of Boethius was to make itself apparent before the other; to manifest itself by its own light.

The process reversed.

Constantinople in the age of Heraclius.

2. At the beginning of the 7th century, Constantinople, and its monarch Heraclius, were occupied with a question in which the deepest mysteries of Metaphysics were involved with the deepest mysteries of Divinity. The disputes concerning the two natures of Christ, which had agitated former centuries, had given way to the more awful dispute respecting the two wills which were indicated by His conflict and agony. If we looked at this controversy from one side, we might pronounce it one of the most important and serious in which men were ever engaged—the gathering up of all previous disputes respecting freedom and necessity, respecting the relation of the Divine Will to the human, respecting the struggle in the heart of humanity itself. All these arguments would seem to be raised to their highest power, to be tested by their relation to the highest Person, to have reached the point where profound speculation and daily practice meet and lose themselves in each other. Contemplated from another side, this debate is worthy of all the contempt which indifferent onlookers bestow upon it as upon every other great topic of divinity. For the persons who were engaged in it were utterly frivolous. For them the whole subject involved a theory, and nothing more—a theory in which the most violent passions might be engaged, but which demanded no faith, which led to no moral act; the controversy was the more detestable because such living interests seemed to be concerned in it, while it was in fact but an exercise for the subtlety of an exhausted, emasculated race which had talked and argued itself

The Monothelite controversy.

Its ideal importance.

What makes it actually insignificant.

Rule to be followed in noticing debates of this kind.

into inanition and death. The historian of human inquiries has no right to pause long upon this monothelite controversy, merely because he perceives how much was implied in it. He is to measure debates not by their abstract importance, but by their effects on the world. He must wait therefore in faith, assured that whatever truth is latent in the minds of mere inquirers will come forth with power, possibly in some very startling, tremendous form, to confound all who substitute intellectual conceits for living and personal realities.

Greece and Persia.

3. There were proofs in the reign of Heraclius, that the dormant energies of the Greek people might still be awakened; but that the awakening must come from the battles of the world, not of the schools. Two old enemies were again brought face to face with each other. It was not the dualism of the Magians that struggled with the dualism of the Christians. The actual armies of Chosroes threatened Constantinople. For a while it seemed as if the empire of the East might pass into his hands; in an incredible short time it seemed equally probable that his dominion would be extinguished by the new and miraculous energy which was infused into the representative of old Roman greatness. Both expectations were equally disappointed, by the appearance of a Conqueror whom both despised. But his words and deeds carried out the moral of the previous history. Mahomet proclaimed an actual God to men who were disputing concerning His nature and attributes. Mahomet affirmed that there was an actual will before which the will of men must bow down.

Mahomet the interpreter of the ideal battles of Magians and Christians.

4. It was a tremendous proclamation. Philosophy shrinks and shrivels before it. All ethical speculations are concluded by the one maxim, that God's commands are to be obeyed; all metaphysical speculations are silenced by the shout, first of a man, then of a host; "He is; and we are sent to establish His authority over the earth." Christian Divinity appears to be still more staggered by the message. All that was peculiar in it, all that was universal in it, and had affected the life of the world, had been connected with the announcement of a Son of Man, who was also the Son of God. The new teacher tramples upon that announcement, treats it as part of the old idolatry. If philosophy and Christian divinity have not hitherto been able to unite, have they not at least found a common enemy? Has not that enemy a commission to destroy them both?

Apparently a destroyer of the old faith and philosophy of the East.

Mahomet a restorer of the Greek faith.

5. Mahomet, as we believe, had a commission to *restore* them both. Nothing could have raised the Byzantine Christianity out of the abyss into which it had fallen, but such a voice as that which came from the Arabian cave. That voice proclaimed the eternal truth which Greeks were disbelieving. It presented that truth in the only form in which it could have been practical, in which it

could have told upon people who had talked about the divine and human nature, till they had lost all faith in God or man. Whatever Constantinople has done for the world—and it has done much—since the days when Justinian collected the fragments of the old law together; whatever thoughts Constantinople was able to express—and the forms of her architecture show that these were neither few nor insignificant—she owed to the impression which Mahometan life and zeal made upon her, to the positive instruction which they imparted to her, to the reaction in favour of her own convictions, which was provoked by their denials. The glorious defence of the city at the end of the 7th century is the first great sign of the revival of native strength. The Iconoclast battle of the 8th century is a still more striking evidence of that twofold influence of the prophet's doctrine to which we have referred. The Isaurian monarchs who determined with so much of the resolution of their prototypes, that Christians should no longer have the stigma of breaking the second commandment, and who enforced the decree with so much of the same tyranny and recklessness; the monks and the people, who rose with such passionate ardour to assert their right to their old symbols, and their belief that the human form had been hallowed by its union with the person of the Son of God, were separately and together testifying of the blessing which Mahometanism had conferred upon them. It was nothing like one of the miserable circus-fights of the 6th century. There was intolerance and passion; tyranny and rebellion; but there was faith and earnestness on each side. The conflict, though it bore witness of disease, bore witness also of a stronger health than the Greek empire had known for many centuries.

Revival in the Byzantine Empire after his time.

The controversy concerning Image worship.

Strong feeling and faith on both sides.

6. This collision of active principles was equally needed for the life of Philosophy as of Theology. But the tendency of the Greek to dissever speculation from practice, made it less likely that *for him* the fruits of the conflict in this direction would be very conspicuous, or at least permanent. Constantinople did more for the rest of mankind than for its own subjects in communicating the old lessons of Greek wisdom. The Arabian caught them, mixed them with his ancient lore, and started from a soldier into a scholar. Western Europe, which was much more affected in its political circumstances by the Iconoclastic controversy than the empire in which it arose, also received a decided impression from it and from Mahometanism in the character of its culture, although that culture was destined to be singularly Latin, Gothic, original.

Obligations of Philosophy to Mahomet.

Greece enabled to help others more than herself.

7. Gregory the Great, of whom we have already spoken, may have been said, in one sense, to have anticipated Mahomet in the proclamation of a Will to which nations must submit, and of which armed men must hold themselves the servants. It was as much the thought of his mind to subdue the rude tribes of the West,

How far the idea of Gregory the Great resembled that of Mahomet.

exulting in their strength and in their native traditions, under the divine order and government, which he believed was exhibited in the Son of Man, as it was the thought of Mahomet's mind to make all the established societies and worships of the East stoop to the one Lord, of whom he proclaimed himself the prophet. In carrying out that purpose, Gregory would have been willing to make Rome, in the one division of the earth, what Mecca became for the other; he would have been glad that its decrees should be established as firmly as any which Mahomet said that he was appointed to deliver. Without any scheme of personal ambition, he would have believed that this was the best and safest condition for Europe and for the world. There was much in the condition of the West which favoured his purpose, much to thwart it. It is curious, and worthy of remark, that the helps to it lay in the character of the Gothic tribes which were afterwards to be the great antagonists of Latin supremacy. The Gothic spirit is essentially a kingly one; it rejoices in all exercises of will and authority; it always prefers government to thought. It was equally observable, that the hindrances to Roman rule arose in a great measure from the tendencies which belonged to the Celtic race. There we might have expected sympathy with sacerdotal rule, for the mind of the Celt is cast in a sacerdotal mould; he has far more reverence for the priest than for the king; to priestly influences, in one form or another, he has owed both his civilization and his ignorance, both his freedom and his slavery. But the reflective, contemplative character which is seen in the Brahmin of the East, and the Druid of the West, has little sympathy with laws. Words of command do not speak directly to his conscience, but through his affections and his fears. The Celtic culture, though wanting the freedom and humanity of the Greek, had much of its speculative uplooking quality. It is always in search of an object which is hidden; it does not readily submit to a power which has made itself manifest.

Temper of the races which he sought to subdue.

Goths and Celts.

8. These observations receive one of their earliest and most striking illustrations in our own country. The strength of Gregory's Missionaries lay among our Saxon kings, and in the feelings of the people, which responded to their government. The influence spread downwards from the royal household. English Christianity, from the beginning, was eminently national. Considering how little there was of the national spirit in Augustine and his followers, considering how completely they were the representatives of a man and a Church that would have wished to crush nationality, the result is remarkable. But it must be observed, at the same time, that this very circumstance favoured the ecclesiastical assumptions of the Missionaries and of the Pope. The Saxon wanted such a dominion over the spirit, which he had just

The Saxon Kings and the Roman Priests.

The Saxon asks for spiritual domination.

learnt to consider the mightiest part of him, as he already confessed over his outward acts. He desired that his thoughts should be marshalled as his troops were marshalled. He longed for some one to tell the restless powers within him what the centurion told his servant, to go where they should go, to come where they should come. On the other hand, the Celts of Wales and of Ireland, who were already christianized, who, we might have fancied, would have been eager to fraternize with the new comers, who had so few national prejudices, so little of national order to keep them apart from foreigners, whose sympathies would have so much more inclined them to priestly ascendency than to any other, were utterly unable to recognize the demand which was made upon their obedience, could tolerate no Latin yoke, could not the least understand the arguments by which they were urged to part with old traditions for the sake of Christian unity.

A sacerdotal race not equally disposed to be governed.

9. It is a mistake to suppose that these facts concern only the ecclesiastical or the general historian. The historian of philosophy is especially obliged to take notice of them. There had been, it is evident, a Celtic culture of a curious and interesting kind in the monasteries of Ireland and Wales, long before any Saxon schools were established under the influence of the Roman teachers. Modern French historians have spoken of Pelagius, the Welchman, as a great champion of spiritual freedom. We do not agree with them, if they mean to affirm that the doctrine which has been associated with his name has been favourable to manly strength, or brave resistance to oppression and wrong. With all its fierceness and severity, the Augustinian doctrine seems to us to have been, on the whole, in closer alliance with moral energy, with hope, even with liberty, than its milder opposite. But in so far as Pelagianism is the resistance to the assertion of a dominant will, in so far as it contemplates man as rather climbing up to God than as receiving his state and position from Him, so far it represents very accurately what we take to have been the predominant Celtic tendency, that to which the Saxon and the Latin were for different reasons equally opposed, that which when they understood each other they would conspire in putting down. How far the mere doctrine of Pelagius was diffused among the Celts, how far Celtic influences have conspired to make it the element which it unquestionably became in the after history of Christendom, we may not be able to ascertain. But we may assume that something of the habit of mind which it indicates was prevalent in the schools to which the pre-Gregorian Christianity gave birth. And if so, one can understand very well why that Christianity was not likely to produce any great effect in shaking the old Saxon traditions, however much it might mingle in their faith and leaven their education, after they were converted.

Pelagius.

How far a supporter of moral freedom.

Inefficiency of the Celtic teachers.

The new civilization of England.

10. It was during the time that the Mahometan armies were advancing with their resistless might over the kingdoms of the East and of Egypt, that our island was gradually rising out of its Paganism, and acquiring its second civilization from Roman hands. That second civilization resembled the first, in that it was carried on by a mighty organizing authority, which reduced the different Barbaric elements it encountered into something like coherency.

How far it resembled the earlier Roman civilization.

It resembled the first in that it would never allow native feelings and habits to interfere with the subjection to the central government, in that it dealt cautiously and humanely with all those habits when they accepted that primary condition. But the new civilization, which was conducted by teachers and not legions; which had to subdue a manly and warlike people, possessing convictions and purposes of their own, not an effeminate and degraded people over-ridden by a learned caste; a civilization above all which had the principle of a divine Humanity for its basis; could not be of that external superficial character which the first had been. For the splendid dwellings, and baths and porticos, which had made the British colony one of the most remarkable evidences of what such governors as Agricola could effect among a people ignorant of all the arts and comforts of life, the new Roman cultivators of

Monasteries: Education.

the Saxon soil substituted monasteries and schools in which men and boys were treated as spiritual beings connected with an invisible economy; in virtue of that high calling, able to till the earth out of which they had been taken.

Theology of the Schools

11. The ground of this teaching was unquestionably theological. It was a kingdom of God, into which the scholar was invited to enter. God himself was calling him into that kingdom. The theology was of course essentially Christian; the human studies received their tone and impress from the belief in a Son of Man. But Boethius, whose mind had so little of a theological basis, and was at least three-fourths pagan, supplied the material with which the Church Doctors worked. That scheme of studies which he

The course of studies derived from Boethius.

had wrought out with so much skill and elaboration from Aristotle and Porphyry, and to which he had imparted his own Roman character and force, reappeared in the schools of Britain. Arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy, assumed the places, or very nearly the places, which he had assigned them. Other arts were contemplated in reference to these; their worth and dependence on each other were ascertained by the same rules. It would be unwise to suppose that the monks of the 8th century had any theory about these studies, or that they understood upon what maxims the curriculum had been marked out by the Minister of Theodoric.

How it came to be adopted by a Saxon people.

They adopted it no doubt as a Roman tradition; they carried it to the far West, as they carried other Roman traditions. They found little in the Saxon mind which it was necessary to propitiate, when

this particular form of instruction was proposed to it. There was, we conceive, a suitableness in it to the time and to the previous condition of the people among whom it came. No other discipline would have reduced their minds into form as rapidly or as effectually. It may even be doubted whether any other would have done as much, for the freedom and the energy of their spirits.

Value of Logic in this new civilization.

12. This assertion may sound surprising after what was said in the last chapter respecting the tyrannical ascendency which logic assumed in the mind and in the plans of Boethius. But the whole character of *this* tyranny is changed by the introduction of what, some will call, another and more tremendous tyranny. The assertion of a divine Will which orders all things, but which acts directly upon men, which addresses itself, first of all, to the springs of thought in them—this assertion, so long as it is earnestly believed, makes it impossible for a man to feel himself subject to certain forms of the intellect; he may not have the distinct consciousness of anything in himself which surmounts them, but he cannot bow down before them while he practically confesses a higher and living authority. What purpose, then, does the study of these intellectual terms and conditions serve? It protects him from the suspicion, always ready to start up in his mind, that the divine Will which he confesses is a mere arbitrary power, recognizing no laws, bidding him perform certain services, execute certain commands. The Will which the Mahometan warrior and

How the belief of a Ruling Will conspires with the Logical teaching and tendency.

the Christian warrior, so far as he only adopted the Mahometan principle, felt that he must obey by smiting down the Lord's enemies, became an educating Will, which might be obeyed as reverently and as punctually by the student, while he examined into the modes which it had prescribed for his speech and his thought.

The moral Soldier.

13. The frequenter of the monastic schools, it must not be forgotten, came to them as God's soldier, who was to learn to fight with words, as other soldiers fought with swords. Everything about him suggested the thought of a battle, and led him to regard his peculiar weapons with a reverence which might easily become excessive and dangerous. Whatever he studied had to do

All studies tending to become verbal.

with words; not rhetoric only, but astronomy and geography must be learned through them. No doubt there were counteractions not only in the sensuous worship, but even in these studies themselves. The astronomer could never quite forget that there were actual stars over his head; the still calm evening was felt in the cloister; looked in through the windows of the church. Music spoke of a kind of intercourse for the human spirit to which words might minister, but to which they were not essential, and were always subordinate. Still it can scarcely be said that the lively talking Athenian, in the days when sophistry was most rife—or the grave Roman of the Republic, in the days when the oratory

of the Forum was most effective—was more in danger of becoming the victim of words, than the Christian student who saw all around him the trophies which the speaker had won over the helmet and the spear. If he had not been reminded by his studies that words themselves are subject to laws; if logic and grammar had not become the principal and most characteristic parts of his culture; he would have been more liable than he was, to abuse them as mere instruments of his craft. The protection might be very inadequate, the science itself might help at last to foster the tendency which it was designed to check. Then, we may be sure, there would be a rebellion; it would be, perhaps, hurled with dangerous precipitancy from its throne; that which it had kept down would be exalted. But, in the meantime, let us understand what it did for the education of Christendom, and be thankful.

Passage to the 9th century.

14. The remarks we have made refer especially to our own country, for a reason which we have given already. England participated much more obviously and immediately in what we have ventured to describe as the Christian side of the Mahometan revolution, than the other great countries of Europe. M. Guizot, in his History of French Civilization, has pointed out with admirable fairness how much the efforts of British missionaries in Germany prepared the way for the great political revolution in France, and anticipated the victories over the Pagan Saxons by Charlemagne. With equal truth, he has made an assertion which is less agreeable to our national vanity, that the Anglo-Saxon Church was far more directly under the influence of Rome than the Gallican Church; and that no men contributed to establish that influence over Europe more than Boniface and the other great English Christianizers of the land from which their fathers sprung. Far from dissembling that fact, we would proclaim it, since without it the distinctive character of our Anglo-Saxon cultivation, and its influence upon the cultivation, especially upon the philosophy, of other countries cannot, we think, be appreciated. We use the words *Anglo-Saxon* strictly, because we shall have presently occasion to show that there was another cultivation, another philosophical influence, of a very different kind, which proceeded from one part of our country. But it was *this* of which we must first speak, seeing that it is very remarkably connected with Christendom generally, and with France particularly, in that great crisis when the monarch of the Franks became the restorer of the Roman Empire in the West.

Boniface and the German missionaries preparing the way for Charlemagne.

Influence of the empire of Charles on after times. Guizot, Histoire de la Civilization de la France, v. ii. Legon 20.

15. M. Guizot has shown with great skill and power that the dynasty of Charlemagne, which it has been the fashion to represent as so transitory, did in fact produce the most permanent effects upon the condition of Christendom. At the same time he considers there is a justification of the ordinary opinion in the fact that the most glaring and startling part of his policy, that which

makes most impression upon the imagination, was the part which faded most rapidly away. His victories over German Pagans and over Saracens, his capitularies, his schools, were to affect for ever the civilization of the world; the empire itself was soon dispersed into the elements out of which it was unnaturally compacted. It is not inconsistent with this observation—it is a natural deduction from the observations which M. Guizot has made on Charlemagne as the introducer of the monarchical principle into a society which was utterly loose and disjointed from the want of it,—if we observe that the conception of the empire is almost inseparable from those results which are so justly affirmed to have been a possession for all ages. The fragmentary world which we see in the West before the commencement of the 9th century, could present no front to that Eastern world to which the faith of Mahomet had given organization; no, not even after that world had divided itself into its various portions, after it had been proved that the elements of schism existed in the hearts and the breasts of those who proclaimed the one God and the one prophet. The Abbassides, the Ommyiades, the Fatamites, had each a cohesion, and therefore a strength, which was exhibited in no nation of the opposing faith. The question had to be resolved, whether there could be a bond in any nation, or in all the nations, which confessed the Son of God, as close as that which held the Islamites together. Upon the answer to this question, if we have stated the case rightly, depended not merely the political condition of Western Europe, but quite as much its internal growth and education: the belief of an all-ruling Will was as necessary for the formation of schools as for the subjugation of feudatories. The people would have been as little taught as they would have been governed, if the possibility of such a supremacy had not been asserted. The form which the assertion took, was derived, no doubt, from the self-will and ambition of a man, and therefore could not abide. Yet, as his self-will and ambition served to counteract another which was equally dangerous—as the experiment of an empire at once explained, upheld and checked the experiment of a Popedom—it had its worth, and it survived in new and varying forms after it had been proved to be artificial, and full of danger as well as weakness. While it lasted, it gave a tone to the mind and thought of the age, which remained and became stronger and more distinct in subsequent ages.

The Empire itself necessary to the organization of the West.

The Empire and the Popedom.

16. Charlemagne was in fact carrying out the idea which Gregory had done so much in his day to substantiate—carrying it out in that new shape which the antagonism of Islam suggested, carrying it out with the aid of that country which was the great trophy of Gregory's zeal, and upon which he had impressed so much of his character. We should be suspicious

Alcuin the ally of Charles in the work of organization.

of our own patriotic leanings in the emphasis which we put upon this last fact, if the eminent Frenchman, to whom we have just alluded, had not attached even more importance than we should be willing to attach to the influence of Alcuin of York upon the schools of Gaul; and if we were not conscious of rather a disinclination to celebrate the praises of that worthy ecclesiastic. A man deficient in originality and depth of thought, who incurred little odium, who seems to have suffered little in his own mind, who knew all that was to be known in his time, who wrote graceful prose and tolerable poetry, who had abundance of civil offices and ecclesiastical patronage, who was the tutor of princes and the favourite of monarchs, who lived very comfortably and died very rich—such a man is not one whom we need go out of our way to eulogize, or whom we are eager to reckon in the roll of the heroes whom England has nourished and sent forth. When we speak of him it is not to claim any merit for him or for ourselves, but simply to show why the education he had received prepared him to be the minister of a man immensely his superior in genius; why Charlemagne found in a school of Northumbria a teacher not as able as many in his proper dominions, but far fitter than any of them to give that form and character to the schools of the empire which Charlemagne would have desired that they should assume.

Character of Alcuin.

His influence not due to his gifts.

17. Charlemagne's work was to bring an anarchy into an order, to show the warring races over which he ruled, that they were under a law which could and would be enforced. The education of a devout monk, bent upon subjecting the minds of men or of children to the rule of his order, would not have conspired with this purpose; *that* rule would have been altogether different in kind from the rule or law of the kingdom; the respect for one would have clashed with the respect for the other. The education of a philosopher, making it his primary and definite object to awaken the energies and faculties of his pupils, might have raised up remarkable men, but would not have constructed a school that would have been the model of a state, and the preparation for it. Alcuin had been trained in the schools of Britain; under royal, quite as much as monastic influences; in a Roman discipline. He had been taught first of all that moral laws were to be obeyed because they proceeded from the highest Lawgiver; next he had been tutored in the laws of logic and grammar, as derived from the same authority. He was just enough of a questioner to be able to understand for himself what others imparted; not enough of one to be embarrassed with any serious mental perplexities. He was enough of an Englishman to feel the influence of English government and institutions, and to take an interest in the disputes of the English sovereigns; he was not enough of one to be hindered from receiving a purely Latin culture, or from writing a Latin style, in which are few

Alcuin's idea of education more royal than monastical.

A teacher of laws.

A Latinist, but formed under Saxon discipline.

rugged native idioms: he could dwell happily on a soil remote from that of his birth, and in an empire governed by maxims unlike those under which he had grown up. With nothing irregular or angular in his intellect or character, well-natured, well-nurtured, even and tame, he was the very ideal of a court tutor in the best sense of the word; one who might perhaps have sunk into a mere machine, *in usum Delphini*, in the age of Louis XIV.; but who was quite competent to receive an inspiration from the mind of a Charlemagne, and to fill up the blanks which his sagacity perceived, and his ignorance could not supply.

18. Amidst the mass of Alcuin's writings, in which there is much of grace and little of individuality (even his letters, rather furnishing helps for the study of history than any illustrations of himself), those which relate to the education of the princes and of Charles himself are incomparably the most interesting and the most worthy of study. These exhibit him in his true vocation, not as a respectable theologian or a third-rate *litterateur*, but as an actual doer of work; as training the minds of actual boys, as opening new thoughts to a full-grown man, the most remarkable of his time. When thus brought into collision with life and practice, Alcuin rose to a stature far above his ordinary one; he acquired an insight which no books would have given him; he was able—not certainly to determine but—to point out the course in which his successors for a long time would have to travel. To the children, and to the father alike, he gave lessons in logic. The former may or may not have profited by his instructions. As they took a catechetical form, the dulness of the subject *to them* may have been relieved by the interest of the method. To Charles himself there was probably no dulness in the study which required any such alleviation. It must have been to him like the acquisition of a new sense, or rather like the opening of a new world, to be told what laws he had been unconsciously obeying in his commonest discourse. The wonder to himself would have made him all the more solicitous that such instructions, so invigorating to the faculties and yet so legal, so *capitular*, should be communicated to his subjects. And so the vigorous sense of the warrior quickening the dogmas of the schoolmaster, was the means of giving an intellectual tone to the 9th century, wholly unlike that of the previous one.

As a schoolmaster greater than as a theologian or philosopher.

Logic for boys and men.

19. France, not England, is the country to which we naturally turn in this century, the one especially by which its philosophical character must be judged of. For reasons which we have stated at sufficient length already, the philosophy of that period can in no wise be separated from its theology; less separated even, as we shall have to show presently, than the acutest and ablest commentator upon it has supposed. The great theological subjects that

Controversies of the 9th century.

Paschasius; Godeschalchus; ecclesiastical questions.

were debated in it, were that concerning the Eucharist, which was raised by Paschasius Radbertus, and that concerning Predestination, which was raised by Godeschalchus. With these were mixed the ecclesiastical questions concerning the relations of bishops to the inferior clergy, concerning the relations of national bishops to the bishop of Rome, concerning his relation to the Greek Metropolitan, which are associated with the names of Hincmar, Nicholas I., and Photius. The latter we shall avoid as much as possible, though the historian of philosophical inquiries can never forget that they were pending, and that they stand in close relation to those with which he is more properly occupied. On the questions of divinity we shall touch just as far as it is necessary for our purpose, not seeking them or dwelling upon the history of them at any length; but, on the other hand, not shrinking from them under pretext of their mysterious character, or of the fierce strifes which they have occasioned, when we perceive that by overlooking them we should leave a void in the records of human thoughts and struggles which would make later passages in these records incoherent and unintelligible.

The two Saxons.

20. Godeschalchus was a Saxon by birth. Michelet, who is always quick, sometimes over-quick, in detecting the effect of race upon opinions and habits of mind, has been careful to draw the attention of his readers to this fact. They owe him thanks for doing so. But the biographer of Luther ought not to have suggested a parallel between the Saxon of the 9th, and the Saxon of the 16th century, without pointing out—not the differences only but—the glaring contrast of the two men and the two periods. It may be quite true, as Luther affirmed in his controversy with Erasmus, that the doctrine of the natural slavery of man's will, and of its incapacity to emancipate itself, lay at the foundation of all his teaching, of his whole reformation; that without it his doctrine concerning faith would mean nothing, or mean directly the reverse of that which it signified to him. He may, therefore, have justified his Saxon blood and his relationship to Godeschalchus, by asserting the supremacy of the Divine Will, in terms as absolute as those which he used; with the same indifference to the effect of broad statements upon the minds of his hearers; with the same pleasure in defying their feelings and convictions if they interfered, or seemed to interfere, with the object that was directly before him; with the same recklessness of any consequences that he might draw down upon his reputation or upon his person. But here the resemblance ends. The idea of emancipation of man from bondage was that which was present to Luther in all his fiercest words and acts. In the light of that idea they all have their explanation; separated from it they are unintelligible. No such idea seems ever to have dawned on the mind of Godeschalchus; at all events it can never have been the predominant principle of his life. The

Their resemblances.

Their great differences.

very opposite idea to this, that of a crushing, overwhelming sovereignty, which had a right to lift up itself and to trample on all that opposed it, seems to have governed him, and to have given all the direction to his thoughts. There is a dark sublimity in this idea, a profound meaning in it, as the Islamite had proved: one which can prompt to great acts of daring and endurance. But instead of being connected, as it was in the 16th century, with the victory of the living man over rules and circumstances, with an escape of the heart and spirit from the prison-house of logic in which they had been shut up, the doctrine of Godeschalchus was one of the great symptoms that an age was beginning in which the human intellect, for great and wise purposes, would be permitted to pass through a discipline of rules and formalities, and to enclose itself within those bars which in due time it would take all human and all divine aid to smite asunder.

The Logician and the Man.

21. This difference we have pointed out is in nothing more remarkable, than in the use which the two Saxons made of the illustrious doctor to whom they both appealed. Augustine was to Luther a living man who had under different circumstances fought the battle which he was fighting, who had taken nothing by mere tradition till the necessities of his own being had demanded it. The Confessions, whatever he might think himself, were ten times more to him than all the dogmatical and controversial treatises in which the bishop of Hippo had expounded his maturest conclusions and crushed his opponents. The latter were only intelligible to him through the former. But what had all the Manichean conflicts of Augustine—those in which he had learnt through the mighty pressure of evil in himself, to feel that the Creator and Ruler, whom he was resisting, must be absolutely good—to do with the dogmatists of the 9th century? It was propositions that they wanted, not battles; distinct formulas that could be quoted and pleaded as decisive against all disputants. The anti-Pelagian treatises of Augustine, severed from the context of his life, must be their armoury. If they could fetch from thence phrases—and abundance of such were to be found—which reinvested the Creator with all the attributes of the destroyer, why were such words less useful and available because Augustine might in other days have been led to perceive more profoundly than almost any man, the eternal opposition between them? The older decree of course repealed the earlier. The question whether a man can repeal himself, can repeal the truths in which he lives and moves, was not one which Godeschalchus, or the greater part of his opponents, would be likely to meddle with. It was a war of logic, of formal propositions on this side and on that side. This was the character which the schools of Alcuin and Charlemagne almost inevitably gave to it. But here again, that which seems to make the case

What Augustine was to each of them.

The wrestler for life, and the utterer of dogmas.

Theology and Logic gaining and suffering from each other.

worse, is really the redeeming point in the story. The logical wars of the Christian Latins could never become like the wars of Alexandrian or Athenian sophists—they never could be merely word-fights. The deepest moral interests were felt to be involved in them. Theology received from logic a portion of its dryness and formality; logic received from theology its personality and vehemence. But as the theologian gained from his ally the sense of an order which Omnipotent decrees did not set aside, the logician acquired from the higher science—not exactly humanity,—but some of the precious attributes of humanity, zeal, and self-devotion.

The ecclesiastical debate.

22. What we have said of the 9th century is not therefore spoken in the way of complaint. That century had its characteristic infirmities and its characteristic merits. Both were of an intellectual kind, arising out of the great school movement, which was itself a reforming movement, and connected with reforms of another kind. The logical tendency, as such, was opposed to mere sensualism and the coarser kinds of idolatry, though it might, by accident, give them a strength and fixedness which they could not have had without it. This is a distinction which should be always remembered by Protestants, when they pass judgment upon Paschasius and upon the age which brought forth into definite form the dogma of Transubstantiation. We naturally associate with that name a violent outrage upon the intellect; we look upon it as a reduction of that which is in the highest sense spiritual, under the laws of the senses. There is enough in the controversies to which the doctrine of Paschasius immediately gave rise—in the conclusions which his contemporaries not only deduced from it but readily adopted—to justify all that can be said by divines about the degradation of a mystery, or by philosophers of the frightful demands which authority can make upon the reason. But neither can set aside the plain testimony of history, that the dogma was not forced upon the understanding from without, but was demanded by it; that the restless eagerness of a logical age to get theology represented in the form of logic, its impatience of any principle which it could not so represent; this, and not any popular craving for a more visible embodiment of that which the eye cannot see, made the opinion which Paschasius put forth—without any especial encouragement from ecclesiastical rulers, very much in obedience to an impulse of his own mind—acceptable either to people or priests. It may be said, without any error or paradox, that the categories governed the doctors, and that the doctors governed the bishops and popes. The people might be ready enough to worship and deify symbols; but of the theory they knew nothing. Those who constructed it, believed that they were hindering the idolatry of that which is seen and tangible, by making it inseparable from that which is divine and eternal.

The Intellect, not the Senses, the origin of their Theory.

Not popular, but scholastic.

Not invented by ecclesiastical authorities, but imposed upon them.

Appeal to the old Doctors.

23. When we say that the understanding of Paschasius and his supporters rather led than followed the authorities of the church in his own day, we do not, of course, overlook the fact that they appealed to the authorities of the great church teachers who had preceded them. The appeal resembled that of Godeschalchus to the writings of Augustine, with this important difference. Independently of all opinions on the subject of the Eucharist, contemporary or ancient, there was the festival itself existing in every church. It was the acknowledged witness of the relation in which communicants stood to each other, and to men at the greatest distance from them, with whom they had never conversed, whom they had never even seen. By the men of the earlier time this festival could not be contemplated without reference to the sacrifices which they saw among the Pagans about them, and to the feasts which accompanied these sacrifices. It signified to their minds that what all these services were pointing to, had been effected. It commemorated that deliverance and reconciliation as accomplished for men by God, which they were seeking to procure by their efforts. The missionaries among the Pagans of Germany might still feel the force of this comparison; upon an organized Christian society, like that of France, it was lost almost entirely. The consciousness of deep and permanent necessities in the heart might, to many a humble worshipper, be a substitute—far more than a substitute—for the evidence of them which the inventions of men supplied. But he would be unable to express what he needed or what he received; often he would slide back into the very habits which the old services had embodied, from which the new was to be a deliverance. The schoolman would feel himself bound to make the wayfarer understand himself and his own acts, would try to show him his dangers. To do so more effectually, he would recur to the reverend witnesses of other days; he would quote their words confidently in defence of inferences into which he had been led by processes of his own mind. They would mean something like—perhaps something *very* like—what he meant; nay, he might be sure that the *meaning*, the main sense, was identical. But being entirely unable to put himself into their circumstances, to live their life, that which was practical in them would translate itself into a logical conception in him, while he believed that he was giving the words their natural, their only possible, force. To be sure he might be puzzled when he found his opponents quoting from the same teacher, words that seemed to have an opposite force, that translated themselves into formulas of an opposite kind; he might, we say, be puzzled; as we descend lower in the history of thought in the Middle Ages, we shall discover how much he *was* puzzled, and to what remarkable and interesting speculations the discovery gave rise. But at present

The difference of their positions.

How words are translated from life into formulas

Opposing dogmas in the same writer.

the sheer force of conviction, the assurance of the man, that the sense which he had seen was in the words, and that no other ought to interfere with it, carried him over all such obstacles, and made the controversies of the time very earnest and serious, if they looked also very hopeless. The hopelessness made it necessary that a present authority should interfere. National councils must decree which of the two conclusions was safe, must anathematize the other. Their decisions being sometimes contradictory, sometimes reversed, Popes who held the balance, who if they were judicious decided as rarely as they could, who made the weight of their decisions felt by suspending them, who were swayed by a thousand influences themselves to the right and to the left, at last uttered the word which sometimes destroyed the equilibrium by affirming one opinion, sometimes preserved it by condemning both.

How they affected the disputant.

Reference to Papal authority.

24. These different relations between thought and decrees, reasoning and authority, were illustrated again and again in the ecclesiastical history of the 9th century; in the controversy respecting Predestination, even more than in that respecting the Eucharist. We introduce the subject here, because there is no one upon which writers are in the habit of pronouncing so peremptorily, and none upon which the careful student of the Middle Ages finds it so hard to make up his mind, and yet so necessary to obtain some greater clearness than the commonplaces which are current among us afford him. The notion that, in these ages, authority was everything, and reason nothing, is one which only the most careless retailer of 18th century dogmas can fall into. But the most intelligent and painstaking inquirers are puzzled by the union of restless speculation with servile submission to great names, which they discover in the most eminent thinkers of this time. Sometimes they are disposed to remove the puzzle by describing the schoolmen as a set of men who begged their premises, and then gave themselves unceasing occupation in drawing inferences from them. There is much excuse for this way of stating the case. A logical age is an age of deduction. It is not occupied in seeking the grounds upon which nature or man stands; it is glad to assume them. But we shall have continual proofs as we proceed, how much there was in the minds of the students of this time which thwarted this inclination, how they were driven back upon premises, how very often they sought the teachers of the past not to furnish them with maxims for stopping investigation, but to guide them in conducting it. We are adopting the worst of their habits, forgetting the profitable lessons which they might teach us, if we try to bind the history by any anticipations of ours, if we do not suffer it to tell us the actual road which the men of a past time took, when it seems to us ever so winding, when we can reconcile it ever so little

Reason and authority in the Middle Ages.

Mistakes on the subject.

Search for premises.

How to deal with the question fairly.

with the charts of it which we have been used to consult. They often described wearisome circles, rushed vehemently into *culs de sac*, wandered about a labyrinth, vainly demanding an outlet. But we may surely believe that their way was foreseen, that they had a Guide, that there was a method which all these bewilderments were to help them in finding out. Thus much we may perceive, 1st, That they wanted to discover the ground on which they *were* standing, even when they were building towers high and reaching to heaven upon the ground on which they *supposed* they were standing; 2d, That they could not wait for this discovery, before they acknowledged a present Guide who directed their steps, a present Lawgiver who determined that which was right and wrong in their acts. How to reconcile the search for a law with this recognition of a Lawgiver; how to find a Lawgiver in whose decrees they could trust, and who should not merely decree, but should know them and help them to know,—this is a question which God's history, and not men's conjectures, must resolve.

25. These remarks are a necessary preface to the life and works of a very remarkable man, *the* Metaphysician of the 9th century, and we conceive one of the acutest Metaphysicians of any century. We speak of Johannes Scotus, John the Irishman, who was involved in both the great controversies to which we have alluded, who earned honour and disgrace in both, who was recognized by his contemporaries as a strange and notable figure, but who failed to influence them, and has failed to leave any apparent impression of himself upon after times. He has obtained a distinct recognition from some of the most thoughtful men of *our* time, but has scarcely, we think, been rightly appreciated by them, either in the points wherein he was strong, or in those wherein he was feeble. We have called him a great *Metaphysician*, choosing that word in contradistinction from a great *Moralist*, which we think he was not, choosing it in preference to the title *Philosopher*, which he fully deserves, but which has been bestowed upon him in a sense that seems to us erroneous and misleading. We have referred with so much admiration to Guizot's Lectures on French Civilization, and he is in many respects so much safer as well as so much more attractive a guide into the history of Middle Age Philosophy, as well as of Middle Age Politics, than almost any we can avail ourselves of, that it becomes an especial duty to explain when we are obliged to desert his guidance, when we think it tends to confuse us respecting the history of a particular man, or of an age, or of a series of ages. His 29th lesson on the subject of Johannes Scotus is perilous, we think, in all these respects. We shall make no apology for commencing our observations on that author, by a few criticisms upon this lecture, having a strong persuasion that most of our readers will be already acquainted with it, and urging those who

Johannes Erigena.

His apparently slight influence.

Guizot's opinion of him.

Requiring to be carefully examined; both for the sake of the men and of the time.

are not to read it along with our observations. Though it must influence them, like all the words of so eminent a writer, we believe that the mistakes of a real student of history are more instructive than the accurate statements of inferior observers.

Histoire de la Civilization en France, vol. ii., p. 354.

26. M. Guizot has selected Hincmar and Johannes Erigena as embodying, one the theological, the other the philosophical, tendencies of the time. In his previous Lecture he had, however, shown very clearly that Hincmar has no claim whatever to the position which he has here, for the convenience of finding a "representative man," assigned him. Hincmar is the acute ecclesiastical politician and ruler of his time; almost any of his contemporaries, Paschasius, Godeschalchus, Rabanus Maurus, we should imagine, would have served better to illustrate that "*élément théologique*" which he is called in to show forth. We might therefore be less surprised to find, notwithstanding M. Guizot's ordinary caution, that the other "representative man"—he who is to exhibit the opposite élément to the theologique—does not exactly sustain *his* part. But we will consider the reasons which have determined the able manager to select him for it.

Hincmar était au fond peu theologien; l'esprit de gouvernement, l'habilité pratique dominaient en lui and il n'avait pas fait des pères une étude très attentive, Leçon 28, p. 348.

Arguments brought to prove that Johannes was a Philosopher and not a Theologian.

27. 1st, There is strong evidence that Johannes Erigena was a Greek scholar; was acquainted with the writings of Aristotle, and even Plato, and attached a very high value to them. We certainly are not disposed to gainsay this assertion. But we venture to remark that, to all appearance, Alcuin, who was an orthodox and popular theologian, was better acquainted with Greek, and even with Greek philosophers, than Johannes. The latter was a man of genius, or almost a man of genius, and therefore any remarks he makes upon the ancients are more interesting and suggestive than those of an accomplished pedant; but as far as mere acquaintance with Greek letters goes, there is no question about Alcuin's superiority. We will appeal, therefore, to M. Guizot himself, and the statements in his lectures, whether on this ground any suspicion would have attached to Erigena, whether he might not have quoted Greeks and supported himself by their authority, without being supposed by others, or imagining himself, to be less theological than his neighbours. 2d, The second argument is drawn from an attack made upon Johannes by Florus, priest of the church of Lyons, from a sentence upon him by the council of Valentia in 855, and another of the council of Langres in 859. The passage from Florus, quoted by Guizot, does unquestionably charge our author with opposing the doctrine of Godeschalchus, "*by arguments purely human, or, as he boasts, philosophical.*" This accusation is mixed with others, describing him as a vain coxcomb, who supposed he was saying something new and magnificent, while he was really an object of contempt and ridicule to all faithful readers who were exercised in sacred

His Greek knowledge.

Judgment of his opponents.

learning. What possible inference can be deduced from these commonplaces of controversy which are to be found repeated, with scarcely a variety of expression, by every religious scribe, from the 9th century to the 19th, who has been obliged to eke out a small capital of knowledge with vituperation, or who has found from experience the last to be more available for his purposes than the former? The sentence of the Council which Guizot has produced does not contain any accusation of philosophy, and affects to treat Johannes as really deficient in the secular literature for which his admirers gave him credit. 3dly, A passage is quoted from Johannes Scotus himself, upon which the lecturer grounds this decisive appeal to the judgment of his class. "N'est ce pas là evidemment le langage d' un homme, philosophe bien plus que theologien, qui prend dans la philosophie son point de depart et s'efforce de la confondre, de la concilier du moins, avec la Religion, soit parceqn 'en effet il les considère comme une seule et même science soit parcequ' il a besoin du bouclier de la religion contre les attaques dont il est l'objet?" The class having only the extract which M. Guizot furnished them with, could make but one answer to this demand. We shall endeavour presently to give our readers an analysis of the largest and most elaborate work of Johannes, which will enable them to judge for themselves whether he was more a philosopher or a theologian, whether his starting-point was theology or philosophy, whether he used his philosophy to explain away his theology, or to bring out what he conceived to be the fullest meaning of it.

His own statements.

28. M. Guizot is not sufficiently satisfied with the evidence on this subject which is supplied by his decisive quotation, to dispense with other proofs. The next is drawn from a passage of Johannes respecting the interpretation of Scripture. It is a very short one. How it bears upon the context of the book, we shall have to explain hereafter; but it supplies an ample ground for another of those rapid conclusions to which the lecturer demands the assent of his pupils:—"Qui ne reconnâit là un effort, bien souvent tenté, pour échapper à la rigueur des textes on des dogmes, et pour introduire dans l'étude de la religion quelque liberte d'esprit sous le voile de l'explication et de l'allegorie?" Now, we happen to disapprove very strongly both of the allegorical method of treating Scripture, into which Origen and others have fallen, and of that method which was adopted by Johannes Scotus, and is indicated in the sentence M. Guizot has quoted from him. But we do not admit, 1st, that the allegorical method, much as we dislike it, was devised by Origen or any other person, for the sake of escaping from the rigour of texts and dogmas. It was chosen in hope of arriving at a deeper and more inward sense of texts; from the conviction that they meant more, not less, than the popular expounders had supposed

Another argument.

Mode of interpreting Scripture.

The Allegorical method.

them to mean. And, 2d, we affirm that the method of Johannes Scotus is not this, but is one in all respects most unlike it. He defends with great ability, and for really profound reasons, what has become the most popular, most vulgar, of all schemes of treating the divine oracles, that which supposes the acts and feelings attributed to God in Scripture, to be accommodations to the notions and habits of men. How he fell into an opinion which seems to us philologically, morally, theologically unsound, our readers will discover presently. But we shall have to defend ourselves rather than him from the charge of abandoning a customary and recognized maxim. If we could not trace the existing practice by a clear and lineal descent to other ancestors than Johannes, we should be obliged to retract what we have said about the slight apparent influence which he has exercised upon the thought of the modern world. Half the pulpits in England, and probably in France also, would be liable to the imputation of philosophy if this were one of the signs of it; we should affix that scandalous imputation upon men who are as clear of it, as Florus, the priest of Lyons, himself.

The accommodating method.

29. Our lecturer proceeds with a statement which will be somewhat astonishing to those of our readers who have acquainted themselves with the history of the Alexandrian school. To understand the position of Johannes Scotus, he declares that it is necessary to give a rapid view of the relations between Neoplatonism and Christianity. "Des le second siécle," he says, "il se fit, entre les deux doctrines, entre les deux écoles rivales, quelques tentatives de conciliation ou plutôt d'amalgame. Saint Clément d'Alexandrie (mort en 220) Origène (de 185 à 254) sont des disciples de la philosophie Alexandrine, des néoplatoniciens devenus chrétiens, et qui essaient d'accommoder leurs doctrines philosophiques aux croyances chrétiennes qui se développent et prennent la consistance d'un système." We could scarcely wish for a more remarkable example of the way in which a learned and honest lecturer may mislead his disciples, and convey a totally false impression of facts, when he attempts to gather up into a few sentences the history of as many centuries. To say that Clemens and Origen were Neoplatonists become Christians; when Neoplatonism, as we know it, was only beginning to form itself in the secret teachings of Ammonius Saccas; when it had not yet expressed itself in any of the statements of its real founder Plotinus; when Clemens notoriously derived his direct instructions from Pantænus, who had been brought up a Stoic; when there had been for two centuries a school in Alexandria, deriving its origin from Philo the Jew, whose habits of thought had been adopted by at least one large body of Christians ever since the gospel was proclaimed; is surely to twist dates, events, and the faiths of living men, into the support of a baseless theory.

Historical reason. Neoplatonical Christianity.

Loose statements respecting the Alexandrian Teachers.

30. Starting from such a point of view, it was impossible that the history which follows could be very accurate. The statement that there was a great battle between Neoplatonism and Christianity, that the latter remained master of the field, that many philosophers of the falling school, who had become, or were about to become Christians, sought to mix their ancient opinions with their new faith, is of course, as to its bare outline, indisputable. But what an utterly false notion must the well-informed lecturer have conveyed to his less informed pupils, when he speaks of certain writings in the 5th century, as—"écrits dont le dessein est évidemment de faire pénétrer dans la théologie de Saint Athanase, de Saint Jérome, de Saint Augustin, les idées et la forme de la philosophie expirante qui pouvaient s'y accommoder." Leaving Jerome out of the question, who, however, began by being a disciple of Origen before he was converted into his bitterest opponent, we think we gave our readers proofs in the earlier portion of this treatise that the mind of Athanasius was already *penetrated* with the thoughts which these writers of the 5th century so unnecessarily laboured to infuse into him; that they did not hang loosely about him as an appendage to his theology, but entered into the very substance of it. We hope we have made them perceive also that Augustine, more than any man, had his starting-point in philosophy, and that it was his deep and personal interest in philosophical questions which drove him to Christian theology. These writers of the 5th century, whom we believe, with M. Guizot, to have been very numerous, were therefore undertaking a very superfluous task. They might mean to philosophize Christianity, or to Christianize philosophy. They were in fact doing neither; they were mixing together a weak, miserable compound of their own, out of which all the life both of philosophy and Christianity had been extracted. When this was not absolutely the case, they were at best gathering together some of the higher thoughts and speculations of former days, which they were so conscious did not belong to themselves, and had received from them nothing but corrupt additions, that, with a strange mixture of fraud and honesty, they gave the credit of them to some man of former days, who had considerable celebrity, or had fortunately left no writings with which those ascribed to him could be compared.

Alleged attempts to Christianize Neoplatonism in the 5th century.

Athanasius and Augustine more professedly philosophical than the new Philosophizers.

Plagiarisms and Frauds of the Amalgamators.

31. The great sufferer by this treatment was Dionysius the Areopagite, who is mentioned in one sentence of the Acts of the Apostles. As his history is curiously connected with that of the 9th century, and of Johannes Erigena particularly, M. Guizot devotes some space to the illustration of his life. He makes up for the paucity of his materials by quoting from the 17th chapter of the Acts, the whole narrative of St. Paul's visit to Athens, and of his discourse there, as if it were merely a prologue to the last verse,

Dionysius the Areopagite.

which announces the conversion of Dionysius. No ordinary student or commentator, we believe, has ever read it under that impression. An unknown woman, named Damaris, is mentioned in the same clause with the Areopagite. St. Luke does not appear to have attached more importance to one than to the other; at all events he never alludes to Dionysius again. Lydia, the seller of purple, who was converted at Philippi, is a more conspicuous person in the Apostolic narrative. That Justin, who spent much of his time in Greece, and that Dionysius of Corinth, should refer to him is natural. But the hints respecting him which can be gathered from the Fathers are very few, nor is there the least reason, except the mere fact of his being an Athenian, for supposing that he was looked upon as specially philosophical; whereas Justin himself, and Athenagoras, notoriously had that character. What is more important, the impostor who took his name in the 5th century, does not appear at all to have considered him in that light. The books which he forged, as their very names indicate, have a certain importance for the theologian, though more on account of the influence which they exerted afterwards than for their own sakes. The historian of philosophy, unless he had very great leisure and space at his command, could never find an excuse for dwelling upon them. They are connected, no doubt, at certain points, with Alexandrian or Neoplatonist philosophy, precisely because *that* in its later stages was so identified with theology and theurgy. The fact, then, that Johannes translated these books and that his mind received a powerful direction from them, instead of being an evidence that he was a pupil of philosophers rather than of theologians, makes all the other way. Possessing the knowledge which he had of Aristotle and Boethius, and regarding them with the greatest admiration, he nevertheless resorted as his special teacher to a third-rate writer on the celestial hierarchy and on mystical theology.

The slight notices of him in Scripture, and in the Fathers.

The Pseudo-Dionysius professedly much more theological than philosophical.

32. The fancy that Dionysius was the Apostle of Gaul and the first Bishop of Paris, which was so much diffused in the 9th century, explains, as M. Guizot himself tells us, the importance which was attached to his name in the French church, apart from his merits either in one character or another. In translating him, Johannes was gratifying his patron, Charles the Bald, and the taste of his contemporaries, quite as much as he was following his own instincts. But there is another person accidentally mentioned in this lecture, (merely as an annotator on Dionysius,) to whom he was not attracted by any such motives. This was Maximus, a Greek divine, whose name occurs very frequently in his great work, and for whose opinions he expresses deference. Now, the work of Maximus which he translated, and which he praises, is a commentary on some difficult passages in the writings of Gregory of Nazianzum.

Admiration of Johannes for Maximus, and for Gregory of Nazianzum.

anzum. To him there are very frequent allusions in the books De Divisione Naturæ. But Gregory was κατ' ἐξοχήν, a theologian. No doubt he had a philosophical education at Athens; but the use he made of his philosophy was to refute the Arians, and those who, like his fellow-pupil Julian, deserted Christianity for philosophy. Of this emperor, as the representative of the Neoplatonists, we have always considered that Gregory spoke with an asperity and unfairness which are unworthy of his general character.

33. In spite of this fact, M. Guizot proceeds to prove, by two or three broad statements, that Johannes was really attached to this defunct party in those points wherein it was opposed to Christianity. These statements, as they involve the characteristic signs of a philosophy with which we have been so much occupied in the previous part of this sketch, as well as the characteristics of the faith which all the teachers of the Middle Ages regarded as divine, must needs concern our subject more, even than the conclusion to which they lead. How important they are, and how entirely they contradict some of the facts which it has been our duty to lay before our readers, they will perceive when we quote the following sentences:—"Le Neoplatonisme est une philosophie, le Christianisme est une Religion. Le prémier a pour point de depart la raison humaine; c'est à elle qu'il s'adresse, c'est elle qu'il interroge; c'est en elle qu'il se confie. Le point de depart du second est au contraire un fait exterieur à la raison humaine; il s'impose à elle au lieu de l'interroger. De là suit que le libre examen domine dans le Néoplatonisme, c'est sa methode fondamentale et sa pratique habituelle; tandis que le Christianisme proclame l'autorité pour son principe et procède en effet par voie d'autorité." Now, it appears from the examination which we made of the books in which the genius of Neoplatonism, in its different periods, is most faithfully represented, 1st, That from the very beginning, its teachers appealed to the *authority* of Plato as oracular and decisive. 2d, That the experiment which was made by Porphyry to keep Neoplatonism a philosophy, by appealing to the reason and discarding superstition—an experiment which was most imperfectly carried out by him, which was not incompatible with the most absolute deference to the *authority* of Plotinus, which involved the recognition of miracles wrought by him, and of divine theophanies of which he was the receiver—failed altogether; and that the Jamblichan school which made theophanies and the acknowledgment of miraculous powers, the characteristic features of their system, was, after a short struggle, completely triumphant. 3d, That this school reposed on the traditions of the past, surrounding itself with all the forms and impressions of the old mythology, and denouncing the Christians for their impiety in discarding them. 4th, That the glory, therefore, of being a philosophy and not a religion, was eagerly disclaimed and spurned by the professors

Guizot's Arguments to prove Johannes a Neoplatonist rather than a Christian.

The supposed difference in the starting-points.

Neoplatonism shows at least as much respect for authority and tradition as Christianity.

of this doctrine; and that all the consequences which M. Guizot supposes to flow from it, were unknown to the philosophers of Julian's court, to Julian himself, as well as to Proclus, and the members of the Athenian Succession. 5th, That they felt they had to encounter Christianity as a power which made a *more* direct appeal to the conscience and the inner sense of mankind than they did, and which had obtained most hearing from this conscience and inner sense, when it came with the least apparent weight of prescriptive and external authority. For a parallel investigation into the kind of influence which this rival had exercised in different periods of *its* history, brought us to the conclusion, 1st, That though even a higher pretension was put forward on its behalf than that which is expressed in the vague word *Religion*, viz., that it was a *Revelation*; —this very pretension was admitted by those who acknowledged the justice of it, only because the Gospel appeared to reveal to them the God their consciences and reasons had been feeling after, only because it awakened their consciences and reason out of slumber into activity, or, if they had been at work, satisfied cravings which the existing religions and philosophies had been unable to satisfy. 2d, That so far from imposing itself upon the conscience and reason, instead of interrogating them, this Gospel was never listened to, till it had interrogated them, and had forced them to give an answer, and till by this process it had emancipated them from traditions which had imposed themselves for centuries upon mankind, and had kept the conscience and the reason in chains. 3d, That free examination into the deepest springs and sources of human thought and action was therefore excited by the Christian teachers, whether they desired it or no, whether they appealed to the reasons of men or appealed to prescription or authority, in a degree to which it could not be excited by the Neoplatonist, who confined himself to the schools, and who, even when he spoke most of the ideal of humanity, looked with scorn upon actual men.

Christianity interrogates the Reason and Conscience more than Neoplatonism.

34. Passing from the starting-point of these rival doctrines, M. Guizot goes on to test them by entering "dans le fond des idées." He affirms that the ruling doctrine in the Alexandrian Neoplatonism is Pantheism, the unity of substance and of being; individuality being reduced to the condition of a mere phenomenon, of a transitory fact. "On the contrary," he continues, "individuality is the fundamental article of faith in the Christian theology." . . . . . "Among various other symptoms, the diversity of the two doctrines in this respect is clearly manifested in the idea which they respectively form of the future of man at the termination of his present existence. What does Neoplatonism with human beings at the moment of their death? It absorbs them into the bosom of the great whole, it abolishes all individuality. What, on the other hand, does the Christian doctrine with

Argument from the character of the Doctrines.

Pantheism

Loss of Individuality.

them? It perpetuates individuality even into infinity. For the absorption of individual beings it substitutes an eternity of rewards and punishments."

This passage *has* a direct bearing upon the life and writings of Johannes. The contrast which it exhibits has also a far deeper and truer foundation than the one which we have just been considering. We shall find as we proceed, that this philosopher of the 9th century did, in some of his speculations, approach very nearly to the Pantheism which is attributed to the Neoplatonists. It is also true that the professors of that school were distinguished from the most serious and earnest of the Christian teachers, by their indifference to the personality of men, by their belief that absorption into the Divinity is the termination and reward of earthly virtue and philosophical meditation. The Fathers generally—Augustine especially—were driven by a strong sense of an evil which *could not* be contemplated at a distance from the self of each man—which was realized only in that—into a sense of personality, of an enduring imperishable personality, which the Neoplatonist, though an acute speculator about the nature of evil, never reached. But it was by these conflicts that they came to know what is the "fundamental" individuality of the Christian faith. They did not, could not, receive that as an "article of faith" from any external teachings which did not provoke these internal exercises. And the more the Revelation—what the Fathers called the Catholic Faith as such—was received and asserted by them, the more they were led beyond this individuality, the more they showed that they demanded a rest in God, a loss of themselves in Him, which was very different indeed from the absorption of the Brahmin and the Neoplatonist, but which was as real as that, and might often be expressed in terms that bordered very nearly upon theirs; nay which, when the Christian's fights within and without became fewer, were often, even by himself, confounded with them. Although, therefore, they did dwell much on the individual recompenses of a future life, they would have thought, we believe, that they were dropping back into the old heathenism if they separated the idea of reward or punishment from the fruition of God, and the separation from Him. It is, therefore, a bold inference from M. Guizot's data, that the belief of Johannes—if it verged ever so nearly upon Pantheism—was derived from the Neoplatonists; and still bolder, that the character and tendency of his doctrine proves him to have been a philosopher rather than a theologian. On this last point we must make one or two more remarks before we proceed to our proper business.

The Fathers assert permanent Individuality not as a tenet of Christianity, but as involved in their experience of Evil

Their Catholic ideas led them beyond Individuality; sometimes led them to forget it.

35. M. Guizot must be aware that his eminent cotemporary, M. Cousin, has refused the Orientals any place among philosophers, treating them as merely theologians. We are convinced that his

Pantheism belongs to the Theological, not to the Philosophical side of Brahminism.

exclusion is not justifiable, that it involves the omission of a great chapter in the history of human thought. But we are not prepared to say that he had *no* plea for the severe rule which he has laid down; we cannot maintain that he has adopted a maxim which is exactly the *reverse* of the true one. M. Guizot must maintain this position if he is consistent with himself. For Pantheism, or the doctrine of absorption into the Divinity, is characteristically and originally oriental. It is worked into the very heart of Brahminism. If, then, Pantheism belongs to Neoplatonism *because* it is a philosophy, if this is the philosophical side of the system, we must not only admit philosophy to be mixed with Brahminism, but we must suppose Brahminism to contain the very essence and type of philosophy. This has certainly not been the common opinion. The very name of *Pantheism* has suggested the thought that theological notions and conceptions were at the root of the doctrine, that from them it derived its character. Everything in the history of Hindoo faith and philosophy supports this *à priori* opinion. If Pantheism has passed as a theory into the philosophy of the Brahmin, it existed first in his practice and worship. The difficulty which the Hindoo felt in distinguishing between the priest and the god, and then between the god and the different forms of nature in which he supposed him to be manifested, gave birth, as the Bhagavad Gita so clearly shows us, to the formal assertion of an identity between them. The history of Neoplatonism, we say confidently, points exactly in the same direction. It was not the philosophy which he learnt from Socrates or Plato that contained the Pantheism of Plotinus. It was the theological system in which he sought for a complement to this philosophy; it was in the desire to escape from the Christian idea of the Word made flesh, it was in the desire to escape from the limitations which the ordinary philosophy imposed upon his ideas of divinity, that his necessity for Pantheism arose. What, then, can be so illogical as to assume that, even if Johannes was altogether like the Neoplatonists on this point, he was flying from theology to philosophy? Would it not be a much more natural supposition (since he certainly held the belief of an Incarnation, since it was worked into the very tissue of his theory) that, like them, he was seeking to rid himself of some fetters which philosophy imposed upon his theology?

The same assertion true of Neoplatonism

Country of Johannes.

36. This we believe to be the true state of the case. Johannes was a Celt, born in Ireland, where, that Celtic cultivation to which we have alluded already had its centre, whence for a long time it diffused a refining, if not a powerful, influence over other lands. He had, if we may judge from the reports of him, many of the specially Irish qualities. The paternity of one very good joke, which is attributed to him at the table of Charles the Bald, may be disputed by the archæologists who devote themselves to this

His character and humour.

special subject of inquiry; but he could not have had the reputation of it, if he had not uttered many that were equally clever. We can hardly imagine that a man with so much subtlety of thought, such a quick perception of distinctions, and such a fondness for verbal analogies, as he discovers in his treatise on the Division of Nature, was not a humourist. We can easily imagine that he may have been a very pleasant and genial one, not a stern deliberate Gothic humourist, whose hearty delight in the harmonies of the world is quickened by a painful apprehension of its discords—who is always the Jupiter commanding and directing his own lightnings; but rather a Celt to whom fantastical combinations, grotesque similarities and dissimilarities, are a mere pleasure—whose whole being is phosphoric, throwing off sparks without any intention, not very careful whether one now and then lights upon himself, and singes or even burns him. This feature of the national physiognomy comes out, we think, in all the speculations of Scotus. He is singularly at variance with the spirit of his time, in that the idea of an active energetic working Will is the one which he can least take in, which was most absent from all the habits of his intellect. To this we trace his defects as a moralist; to this his inability to impress his thoughts upon his time on which much less accomplished men could stamp their image. But he was born after the year 800, probably in the early years of the 9th century. Mahomet had wrought his mighty revolution in both worlds. Charlemagne had just effected his in the West. Neither could change the character of individuals or races; that character was compelled, however reluctantly, to receive a direction from both. The age for such a man as Pelagius was past, in one country or another. God must be acknowledged as the root of all things and all thoughts, even by those who shrunk most from contemplating Him as the King and the Lawgiver. John, the Irishman, felt that necessity as strongly as any man could. He did not rise to the theological ground as the Neoplatonist had done, as Pelagius did; that was, whatever any one may say to the contrary, most strikingly his *point de depart*. That ground and substance which has nothing beneath it, was the postulate and preliminary of his mind; all its movements depended upon this. It seemed to him that the logic of his day, the logic which had been brought into all the school teaching, which was implied in all the school divinity, was hemming in this Substance with its accidents and conditions. To proclaim its freedom from such conditions was the work of his life; till he could do this, he had no hope of discovering any safe foundation for human or for physical science.

Without any strong sense of a Will.

But essentially a Divine.

A rebel against the Logic of his day.

37. Hincmar invoked the assistance of Johannes in the battle with Godeschalchus; he seems to have obeyed the call of Charles the Bald when he opposed the dogma of Paschasius. We can easily

Why Johannes eagerly engaged in the Predestination Controversy.

admit, with M. Guizot, that Hincmar did not know what an ally he had chosen, and repented of his rashness when he discovered how much scandal the Irishman brought upon his cause. There could not have been one in which Johannes would more readily take up arms, or one in which he was more certain, both by the profundity of his thoughts, and, as we think, by his want of sympathy with the special truth of which Godeschalchus was spokesman, to offend the prejudices as well as the faith of his contemporaries. He would have explained, in terms which would have seemed to them utterly incomprehensible and monstrous, why he discarded their notions of before and after, when he was speaking of the eternal Mind; he would have given them good excuse for saying, that this eternal Mind was not a power which determined them to right or to wrong, or which pronounced judgment upon their acts. Hincmar, with his worldly prudence, may most naturally have resolved that, little as he was of a theologian himself, he could fight the theological battle against the predestinarian with much greater popularity and success than a man who knew a thousand times more of the Fathers, as well as of the Bible, than he did. Apparently Johannes procured much more odium to himself with doctors and with popes, by the line which he took in this controversy, than by his notions on transubstantiation. Though we have not his treatise on that subject, we may form a tolerable guess as to its character. There will have been the same impatience of dialectical formulæ, the same eagerness to show that the divine substance and the divine communion with man transcended the terms and expressions by which Paschasius was seeking to define it, probably the same indifference to modes of thinking which he found prevalent, the same resolution to follow out his own line of thought without taking the pains to put himself into the position of other men. But it is safer to give our readers positive information respecting a book which we do possess, than to form conjectures respecting one which has perished.

Hincmar's mistake.

Johannes offends his contemporaries more by his treatment of the Controversy than by opposing Paschasius.

38. The leading work of Johannes has a Greek as well as a Latin title, Περὶ φυσέων Μερίσμου, *id est De Divisione Naturæ*. The subject is discussed in a dialogue between a Master and his Disciple. It is right that we should give the opening passage of the dialogue, though we are far from sure that it will make the purpose of the book intelligible to our readers.

The Five Books De Divisione Naturæ.

Master. After thinking and inquiring as diligently as my powers permit, I have come to the conclusion that the first and primary division of all things that can be either perceived by the mind, or which transcend its reach, is into those things which are, and into those things which are not. For all these the general word is in Greek Φύσις; in Latin, *Natura*. Are you agreed?

Statement of the Design.

Disciple. Yes. For as often as I aim at any method of reasoning, I find it so to be.

M. As, then, we are agreed about this word, that it is a general one, I wish you would tell me the method of dividing it, by its differences, into species. Or, if you had rather, I will try to make the division, and you shall pass your judgment upon the parts of it.

D. Begin. For I am impatient to learn from you the true method of proceeding.

The method.

M. It seems to me that the division of Nature is into four species, by means of four differences. The first species is that which creates, and is not created. The second is that which is created and creates. The third is that which is created, and does not create. The fourth is that which is neither created nor creates. Of these the third is opposed to the first, the fourth to the second. But the fourth must be placed among impossibilities; its differentia is that it cannot exist. Do you understand this division?

D. I understand it. Only that fourth species of yours causes me some trouble. About the others I should not dare to hesitate. The first I understand to be the cause of the things that are, and of the things that are not. The second has reference to the primeval causes, or principles of things. The third I perceive must have reference to generations, and times and places, that is, to particulars or individuals.

M. You are right. But in what order we shall proceed, that is to say, what species shall be the subject of our first discussion, I leave you to decide.

D. It seems evident to me that it behoves us to speak first, whatever is permitted us to speak, of the primary species.

39. Then follows a discussion of great importance to the full understanding of our author, and of the later scholastic philosophy, respecting the use and extent of the terms *being* and *not being*, where they can, and where they cannot, be applied. We do not think that we should do justice to the book we are examining if we forced our readers to plunge at once into this metaphysical ocean. After a few coasting voyages we may possibly be more fit to venture upon it. We will give the result so far as it concerns our immediate purpose. God, who creates and is not created, who is the only Being without beginning, who is the cause of all things that were made from Him and by Him, who is the end of all things, whom all things long after, who is beginning, middle, and end—He must not be spoken of merely as Being. He is super-Being, super-Essence. He must not be called merely Good or Wise, seeing that good and wise admit of contraries, that they imply badness and folly. He must be the super-Wise, the super-Good. All being, all goodness, all wisdom, must be regarded only as arising from a participation and communication or manifestation of His being, and wisdom, and goodness. His nature must never

Being and not being.

The Divine Nature Transcendent

be deduced or judged of by any that is below it. This we apprehend is the fundamental principle of Johannes which is worked out in reference to the first and highest nature in the first book. It is here that he comes into conflict with the habits, even more than with the formal maxims of his time. His object in the use of the words super, or transcendent being, goodness, wisdom, is to take the idea of God out of the region of intellectual forms, to show that it includes the affirmation and negation which in earthly logic are opposed, and that the categories of Essence, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Position, Habit, Place, Time, Action, Suffering, fail altogether in the investigation of the divine nature.

Affirmation and Negation included in this Nature.

40. Johannes puts forth no claim to originality in making this assertion. He adopts it directly from St. Augustine. Categories or predicaments he had distinctly said belong to the region of sensible and intelligible things; when you ascend to the consideration of Him who transcends sense and intelligence, their virtue is extinguished. They may, our author says, metaphorically, be applied to the Divine Being. Strictly they cannot be; seeing that God is neither genus, nor species, nor accident. The application of the principle to the categories of Essence, which seems to involve great difficulty, has been made already. *Quantity* is easily disposed of. The doctrine laid down respecting goodness and wisdom has settled the question of *Quality*. But the disciple pauses with anxiety and fear when he approaches *Relation*. The master admits that the difficulty demands the most reverent examination. But the law already affirmed is declared to admit of no exception. It would be blasphemous to impute our association with the names of father and son to the divine nature; these names, therefore, denote that which transcends relation; they cannot be brought under it. Johannes perceives that he is on the edge of a precipice; he passes on somewhat hastily to the six following predicaments. The propriety of a metaphorical use of *Position* in reference to God is at once asserted; seeing that by Him all things hold their position. Its strict or direct application to Him is as strongly denied, seeing the Position involves the notion of Place. The predicament of *Habit* gives rise to a rather long discussion. The master remarks that it is involved in all the rest; Quantity, Quality, Relation, Position, &c., each supposes some habit; how comes it, then, to be distinguished from them? The objection anticipates some of those which have been made in more recent times to the arrangement of Aristotle. It is not, however, introduced here for the purpose of disturbing that arrangement, but rather to show how inevitably any one of these conditions involves the other, and how, nevertheless, each has a sphere and foundation of its own. The effect of the argument is to suggest the thought which Johannes afterwards distinctly enunciates, that the categories exist only in the

The Categories not applicable to the Divine Nature.

Essence, Quality, Quantity.

Relation.

Position.

Habit.

The Categories imply each other.

mind, and that there is that which underlies them all, and is not subject to any of them.

41. When our author approaches the predicaments of Place and Time, we find him asserting very vigorously some of the doctrines which we are wont to connect with more recent philosophies. The disciple raises all the natural arguments in support of the notion, that Place has an existence of its own. What do we mean by a man living in such a place? Do we not speak of water as the place for fishes, the ether of the celestial sphere of stars? The answer of the master is very decisive. There is nothing to be done with people who talk in this way, but to persuade them if they are open to instruction, and to wish them good morning if they are contentious. For true reason ridicules those who speak after this sort. If place is one thing and body another, it follows that place is not body. The air is the fourth part of this corporal visible world; it is, therefore, not place. We all admit that this visible world is composed of four elements, as it were, of four general parts. It is a kind of body compacted of its own parts, out of which general parts, the proper and special bodies of all animals, trees, herbs, adhering with a wonderful and ineffable mixture, are compcsed, and into these they return again at the time of their dissolution. We are bound to show our readers the rashness and imperfection of our author's physical assumptions, not that they may transfer the suspicion of a similar ignorance to his intellectual conclusions, but that they may see how much subtlety, what clear intuitions in one region, are compatible with the most hasty generalizations in the other. Johannes is in the very act of clearing away a very serious impediment to natural as well as to metaphysical inquiries, of removing a confusion which, as he says himself, has been the cause of a multitude of other confusions, while he adopts as the basis of his argument one of those superstitions of his age which partly, perhaps through his own assistance, we have been able to cast off.

Place and Time.

Physical argument against confounding Place with Body.

Intellectual clearness not incompatible with ignorance of Physics.

42. The disciple is anxious to know how this mode of speech has come into ordinary use, if it is so contrary to reason. The answer leads to some interesting remarks on the metonomies with which we are all familiar. A family is spoken of as a house. The eye is confounded with the sight or vision of which it is the organ, the ear with the power of hearing, and so forth. But the discussion is subordinate to the main argument of the book. Space and Time are affirmed, each to imply the other. Without them no generated things can consist or be known. The essence of things must be conceived of under local and temporal forms. And God, when he is spoken of or presented to us, must be presented in such forms, under such conditions. But they must not for a moment be supposed to belong to His nature. He is not under them. Hence

Explanation of common speech.

Necessity of Place for our minds.

the need of the language, however strange and awkward, which was used before to denote Him as transcending even Essence and Being.

Action and Passion.

43. From these hints our readers may easily gather how Johannes could deal with the categories of Action and Passion, in reference to the awful subject which he is considering. It is at this point that the language of Scripture, of necessity, comes into question. How is that action and passion are so continually there attributed to the Divine Being? In strict consistency with the whole course of his reasoning—not the least with the intention of reducing the authority of Scripture, or of evading the force of its statements—our author affirms that all such modes of speaking are justifiable, are inevitable, but that they are metaphorical; that they are applied to God because we cannot write or speak in intelligible language concerning Him without resorting to them; but that they are the conditions of our speech and intelligence, not of His nature. This is, as we said before, the best and most scientific exposition that can be given of what has now become a commonplace, the easy refuge of the most careless interpreter, of the most thoughtless pulpit rhetorician. We could not venture to dissent from the popular practice, if we did not discover a flaw in the theory upon which it is unconsciously grounded. That flaw we think we can trace through all the statements of Johannes. It does not diminish our respect for the man, or our value for much that he has taught us; yet it is, we believe, the secret of the Pantheism which many have charged him with, not altogether unfairly, but without knowing how easily they might be convicted of the same offence, and from the same evidence.

Scripture, Language.

Primary object of Johannes not Pantheistical, but the very opposite.

Objections to his method.

44. We acknowledge the most perfect sympathy with our author in the object which he has at heart. So far from acknowledging that *object* to be pantheistical, we believe that what he desired was to distinguish the Divine Nature from other natures, to prevent that confusion between God and created or generated things in which Pantheism consists. But it appears to us that there is one way, and but one way, in which this end could be obtained without denying the fact that the Divine nature has been revealed to man, and without confining it within the limits of our created intelligence. These forms of the intellect are inadequate to express that Nature assuredly, but are they adequate to express our human nature, our sympathies and joys and tears? Is the category of relation adequate to express the actual human relations of father and child, of brother and sister? Is the category of action or of passion adequate to express any single action or passion as it has been actually realized in life? Is any one of these categories adequate to express a single living operation of nature, the light or movement of any star, the growth of the meanest flower? Is it

impossible, then, because the nature of the Divine Being cannot be presented under conditions which fail equally with reference to the lower natures, that it may be presented or revealed in them and through them? Is it correct to speak of such a presentation or revelation as metaphorical, or merely an accommodation or adaptation to the narrowness of our intellects? Supposing man to be the image of God, supposing all nature to be an exhibition of His acts and operations, are we not bewildering ourselves when we speak of the mirror as merely presenting to us certain optical delusions? Cannot we suppose it to be purified and prepared for the express purpose of delivering us from such delusions? Cannot we suppose that the delusions which must follow, and which have followed, in such fearful and terrible succession, when men have taken the reflection in the glass for the form which was reflected, when they have constructed an archetype out of the image, may be counteracted if He, who has formed man and the world, shows us how he has used them for His own manifestation? Must not a Bible, if it is to be one, do this for us? Is not what we demand from it this, that it should have precisely that character, that human sensible character, of which Scotus, with the best motives in the world, would deprive it? Have not those who have adopted his rules so slavishly, and without his temptations, shown very clearly that by this very course they make themselves, and make the Divine Nature, subject to that logical tyranny against which he revolted?

The human and sensible language of Scripture, that deliverance from the tyranny of Logic which Johannes required.

45. We are not to blame Johannes, that in an age when the sacredness of human relationships was hidden and kept under, by many of the habits and dogmas of the Church which was to illustrate it—living in a scholastic atmosphere into which the breezes of common human life might sometimes penetrate, but mixed with elements that would often lead him to suspect that they were only carrying disease and contagion—he did not enter into a principle which it has required many centuries to give us even that imperfect apprehension of which we possess. We ought rather to be thankful for the glimpses of this truth which we catch in the midst of apparent contradictions of it, and for the courageous testimony which he was able to bear for (that which it is equally necessary we should acknowledge,) the Absolute and the Eternal. If Johannes showed in his bold endeavour to rescue these from the dominion of logical formulas, how much those formulas had got possession of his own mind, so that he crouches to them while he seeks to break loose from them; if it is equally clear that he could not effect the deliverance which he sought without presenting the absoluteness and perfection of the Divine Nature, sometimes as if it were aloof from all human cognizance and sympathy, sometimes as if it were an abyss in which our knowledge, our sympathy, our

Difficulty of obtaining this deliverance in the 9th century.

Worth of the speculations of Johannes.

personality, were at last to be buried; we may surely learn great lessons for our own guidance from these discoveries; we may gather from them comfort and satisfaction in considering the devious paths through which ages and men have been led towards wisdom and truth, without turning them into an excuse for pronouncing judgment upon a man who would have been most willing to learn from us and profit by our advantages, and can help us, if we will, how to recover much that we have lost. The following sentences, in which he gathers up the result of his first book, seem to us, in spite of all the strangeness which may appear in them, worthy of the most serious meditation. We may not adopt the terminology of Johannes, we may adhere to one which strikes us as much simpler and more practical; but in the use of that we may derive hints and instruction from a man whose faith and charity certainly rose above all his conceptions or ours.

Summary of the doctrine of the 1st book.

"God, therefore, in Himself is Love, in Himself is Vision, in Himself Motion, and, nevertheless, He is neither Motion, nor Vision, nor Love; but more than Love, more than Vision, more than Motion. And He is in Himself Loving, Seeing, Moving, yet He is not in Himself Loving, Seeing, Moving, because He is more than Loving, Seeing, Moving. Further, He is in Himself to be Loved, to be Seen, to be Moved; and yet He is not in Himself to be Moved, or Seen, or Loved, because He is more than that. He can be Seen, or Loved, or Moved. He loves, therefore, Himself, and is loved by Himself in us and in Himself, and yet He loves not Himself, nor is loved by Himself in us and in Himself, but more than loves, and more than is loved in us and in Himself, &c."

His defence of his doctrine as Catholic and safe.

This method of speaking by affirmations and negations conjointly, of making each sustain, while it seems to subvert, the other he considers to be the cautious, and salutary, and catholic method. He establishes his proposition thus:—"What, then, God the Word made flesh, said to His disciples, 'It is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you,' true reason compels us, in other similar things, similarly to believe, to speak, to understand. It is not you who love, who see, who move, but the Spirit of your Father, who speaketh in you truth concerning me and my Father, and Himself. He loves me, and sees me and my Father and Himself in you, and moves Himself in you, that you may love me and my Father. If, therefore, the Holy Trinity loves Itself in us and in Itself, and sees and moves Itself, assuredly by Itself it is loved, It is seen, It is moved, according to that most excellent method known to no creature, whereby It loves and sees and moves Itself, and by Itself, in Itself and in Its creatures, seeing that It is above all things that are spoken concerning it, for who can speak of the Ineffable? whereof no fitting name or word,

nor any fitting voice is discovered, nor is, nor can be, who only hath immortality, and dwelleth in light inaccessible."

Illustration of former remarks respecting the foundation of Middle Age Philosophy.

46. We could not omit this passage, since it will show our readers that Johannes is no exception to the remark which we made in the last part of this treatise, that the doctrine of the Trinity was the foundation of all the metaphysical thought and speculation of the ages after Gregory the Great. We shall have an illustration of that fact in the next book of the Division of Nature, which contains what would be called his Anthropology. But we are anxious that our readers should notice it here in connection with a passage of the first book, which, according to M. Guizot, determines the character of our author's mind. "Thou art not ignorant," says the master, "that I think that which is first in nature is of greater dignity than that which is first in time." "This," says the disciple, "is known to almost all." "We have learnt, further," says the master, "that Reason is first in nature, but Authority in time. For although nature was created together with time, Authority did not begin to exist from the beginning of time and nature. But Reason has arisen together with Nature and Time, from the beginning of things." Disciple.—"Reason itself teaches this. For Authority, no doubt, hath proceeded from true Reason, but Reason not by any means from Authority. And all Authority, which is not approved by true Reason, turns out to be weak. But true Reason, seeing that it stands firm and immutable, protected by its own virtues, needs not to be strengthened by any confirmation of Authority. True Authority, indeed, as it seems to me, is nothing else but Truth united by the power of Reason, and transmitted in letters by the holy Fathers for the benefit of posterity. Perhaps, however, you do not agree with me." M.—"Entirely. Therefore, in the subject which is now before us, let us resort, first, to Reason, and then to Authority."

Nature, Reason, Authority.

Their relation to each other.

What is implied in this statement.

Unquestionably we have here a statement which any modern Rationalist may, if he pleases, make use of in proof that Johannes was one of his progenitors. But he will do well to weigh the words, and give them their full force, or he may find that he is committed unawares to opinions which he would most eagerly repudiate. The *Ratio* which was coeval with Nature, and to which all things in Time must be secondary, is that fixed Purpose, that Eternal Reason and Order which man's Reason is created to investigate and perceive. Authority must not be set before this Reason, precisely because it is the result, as Johannes affirms, of a Reason which is working under temporal conditions, though this Authority may be most helpful in assisting the reason of any individual man in its efforts to break loose from its time boundaries, and to enter into the truth of which it is in search. Whether this view is just or absurd, it is that which any careful reader of Scotus will be quite certain was

Not inconsistent with the doctrine of the most Orthodox Middle Age Schoolmen.

his view. That eternal Name which he declares to be at the foundation of all things, and in the image of which he believes man to be created, will not allow him to glorify the opinions or discoveries of any man, or any succession of men. The Light which they perceive is always above that which is in them; it is in God's light only that they see light. Language, therefore, such as Johannes uses, however much it may often have offended Popes, and clashed with many of the Middle Age traditions, is not language which can have sounded strange to any, even the most popular and orthodox, doctors of those ages. They will perfectly have understood it. Nearly all of them, at some time or other, for some purpose or other, will have resorted to this, or to some equivalent form of expression. So far from being a rebellion against their ordinary theology—the effort of a free spirit to shake it off and substitute for it the conclusions of philosophy—it was just when they were most theological, just when they were contemplating the name of God, the Trinity in Unity, as beneath all their thoughts, and implied in all, that they resorted to it most, and that they could least bear the notion that antiquity, or that any cotemporary dogmatist was the measure and standard of truth. Again, and again, we shall see what a protest was borne—now by kings, now by popular teachers and preachers, now by the most systematic doctors, each maintaining their own position, each resisting some intrusion upon their own principle—against the slavery to which they all in turns submitted.

47. The second book opens with some remarks on the original quadripartite division of the subject. We are now enlightened about that last section, of things neither creating nor created, which caused the disciple so much trouble. It appears that the first and the fourth divisions both refer to the Divine Nature, the first to it as the beginning from which all things are derived, the last as the end at which all things are aiming, and in which they are to terminate. "He is said to be the cause of all things," says our author, "seeing that from that Cause the whole circle of things which after it, are created from it, diffuses itself into genera and species, and numbers and differences, and whatever other distinctions there are in Nature, with a certain wonderful and divine multiplication. But seeing that to that same Cause all things which proceed from it, when they shall come to their end, will return, therefore it is called the end of all things, and is said neither to create nor to be created; for after all things have returned into it, nothing further will proceed from it by generation in place and time, in kinds and forms, since all will be quiet in it, and will remain an unchanged and an undivided one." This, which is the most startling announcement of the pantheistical tendency of our author's speculations which we have yet met with, we should not have introduced

Meaning of the fourth division of Nature.

The end of all things.

till it could receive the elucidations and explanations which are reserved for the later books, if it did not seem to us very important in connection with his views of Man upon which we are about to enter. In fact, he felt the necessity for this introduction, since a work on the *Division* of Nature might have seemed not to require any allusion to this final state of things in which all divisions are to cease. But Johannes would have us consider that all division or analysis into parts, involves the idea of a return into the whole from which those parts have issued. And he would have us look upon man, as, in one point of view, the cause of all the partitions and distinctions of the universe; in another, as the reconciliation and meeting-point of them all.

Double sense of Analysis.

48. The principle of the Bible, that man is made in the image of God, is the fundamental one of this book. With great force and ability, Johannes maintains what he believes to be the doctrine of the Scriptures, and of all the great theologians, that the Divine humanity cannot be adequately contemplated in *men*; that there must be a Universal Man; that the divine Word could alone be that Universal Man. It is in the effort to connect this ideal Humanity with actual human beings and human history, that Johannes, as it seems to us, stumbles and falls. He quotes the New Testament in support of the principle that in the Universal Man there is neither male nor female. To reconcile that principle with the distinctions of sex in the actual world, he affirms (in direct contradiction to the text of the Old Testament) *this* distinction to be the consequence of the Fall. Of course the abolition of it, and with it of all other distinctions of which it is the example and type, is looked forward to as involved in the final reward and consummation. Let it be well understood, that this doctrine is logically and consistently carried out in that blank and dreary Unity which Johannes dreamed of, and thought that he hoped for, and let each one ask himself how near he has often been—how near the most orthodox members of the Church have often been—to that heresy which they so reasonably dread. Once admit the thought that evil is productive and creative, not merely destructive; that it establishes an order instead of disturbing all order; that it is not equally the foe of distinction and of Unity, and the inference of Johannes is irresistible. Our only wonder is that with this opinion he could unite so very clear and exquisite a sense of perfection and harmony in the world, the parentage—at least the foster parentage—of which he regarded as so anti-divine.

Man the Image of God.

The Universal Man.

Distinction of Sex attributed to the Fall.

Whither such an opinion leads.

49. The doctrine that Humanity in its highest most ideal sense is the image of the Divinity, is carried out with great consistency in this book. Brahminical, Buddhist, Platonical, and Neoplatonical thinkers, had all spoken of a Trinity in Man. The Fathers had eagerly acknowledged the idea; only they had pointed out

The Human Trinity.

the danger of reasoning from that which we discover in ourselves as our human nature to that which is divine; they had declared that a revelation of God enables us to see what there is corresponding to it in the Creature. Johannes follows out this principle to the utmost. He speaks of a threefold motion or rotation of man about the divine centre. The first or inmost circle is that described by the Nous, which he renders Intellectus, Animus, or Mens. This recognizes God as the Principle of its attraction, the source of its Light, but enters into no thought or conception respecting Him, confessing Him as the Absolute and the Incomprehensible. The second is that of the Reason or Virtue (his translation of λόγος and δύναμις), which acknowledges God as the primary cause of the things which are, and which takes account of those primordial causes or ideas which are implied in His creatures and in all his operations. The third motion is that of the Διάνοια and ἐνέργεια, which takes notice of all distinct operations, and enters into them. In translating διάνοια by senses, he feels that he is open to criticism. He justifies himself by saying that he speaks not of the sense as existing in penetrative organs, but of an internal perception of the mind itself. These three elements of humanity form the Triad of our author, the human Trinity, each of them corresponding to one of the Ineffable Names.

Christian application of it.

Revolutions about the Divine Centre.

50. Our readers will have perceived that this view of Man, or Human Nature, is Platonical, not Aristotelian. Man is not a creature who can be contemplated in himself. His habits, energies, perceptions, intellectual or sensible, cannot be looked upon independently from their centre. From God they have been derived. About Him they revolve. Into Him they return. Nothing can be so adverse as such a representation is to the school doctrines of the time, which were assigning, in true Stagyrite fashion, its own sphere to each science, and were doing their utmost that each, while it did homage to theology as the primary architechtonical science, yet should preserve its due and respectful distance. Johannes does not discuss theology, anthropology, physiology; but he speaks of God, of man, of involuntary things, and their relations to each other. The difference between the two methods is amazing. Each new period, as it introduces new modifications and applications of one and the other, only makes the difference more conspicuous. Nowhere does it appear more remarkably than in the doctrine of primordial causes, as it is set forth by our author. The disciple is desirous to know whether these causes are the same with that dark and formless void of which the sacred historian speaks. Are not, he demands, the expressions convertible? "For formless matter, nay, the very want of form, we may in some sort declare to be a cause of things, seeing that in that they have their beginning, though it be a formless, that is to say, an imperfect, beginning.

The Platonical method alien from all the habits of the 9th century.

The Primordial Causes and the Formless void.

And although they are understood to be almost nothing, yet not absolutely nothing, but a kind of inchoation, aiming at form and perfection." The master bids him to fix his attention, that the mists which are clouding his intellect may be scattered. So far are these primordial causes from being identical with that formless void which is the nearest conceivable approximation to nothing, that in them we discover the true essence of things, the grounds of all life. "Cause, indeed, if it is truly cause, encloses within itself most perfectly all things of which it is the cause, and perfects in itself its own effects before they appear in anything without. And when they break forth into kinds and visible forms by generation, they lose not their perfection in it, but remain fully and immutably in it, and want no other perfection except the perfection of that one in which they together and for ever subsist." . . . . . "The void of things is nothing but a certain motion, an escape from not being, a longing and appetency for being. But primordial causes have been so established in the beginning, that is, in the Word of God, that they have no movement or appetency after perfection in anything save in Him in whom they are unchangeably, and in whom they have their perfect form. For always turning towards that one form of all things which all things desire, the Word of the Father, they first receive their form and never lose it. In them are the causes of places and of times. But those things which are beneath them in the inferior order of things, are in such wise created by them that they attract them to themselves, and aim at the one principle of all things; but they themselves in no wise turn to those things which are beneath them, but ever contemplate that Form of theirs which is above them, so that they never cease to be formed by it. For by themselves they are without form, and in that universal form of theirs they know themselves as perfectly built up. But what reasonable man will dare to affirm concerning that which is without form, this which may be affirmed concerning the primordial causes, especially when that formless matter cannot be believed to have proceeded from any other source but from these causes? For if primordial causes are those ideas which are primarily created by the one creative Cause of all things, and create those things which are beneath them, what wonder if we believe, and have the most certain grounds for maintaining, that formless matter itself was created by the primordial causes?"

They are opposed, not identical.

The formless an appetency or capacity of being.

The divine Word.

Primordial causes identical with the Substantial Ideas.

51. In the final chapter of this book he recurs to the same subject. "Primordial causes, then, being, as I said before, what the Greeks call Ideas, that is, species and forms, the eternal and unchangeable reasons, according to which, and in which, the visible and the invisible world are formed and governed; and, therefore, by the wise men of the Greeks, were rightly called prototypes, that is,

Prototypes.

the primary examples which the Father made in the Son, and by the Holy Spirit divides and multiplies into their own effects. They call them also fore-ordinations, for in them whatever things are coming into existence, or have come into existence, or shall come into existence, are, by the divine Providence, once and at once immutably predestinated. For nothing naturally arises, in the visible or invisible creature, besides that which in them is before all places and times predefined and preordained. Therefore they are further called by philosophers acts or motions of the divine will. Since all things the Lord willed to make, in them He made primordially and causally. The ages which were to be, were created in them before they were. Wherefore they are said to be the principles of all things, seeing that all things whatsoever perceived by sense or intelligence in the visible or invisible creation, subsist by participation in them. And they are themselves participations of the one highest cause of the universe and of the sacred Trinity, and therefore are they said to exist in themselves, because no creature is interposed between them and the one Cause of all things. And while the primordial Causes subsist immutably in it, they become the causes of other causes that follow out to the very extremes of all nature, and are infinitely multiplied; infinitely I mean, not in respect of the Creator, but of the creature; for the end of the multiplication of the creatures is known only to the Creator. The primordial causes, then, which wise men call the principles of all things, are Goodness in itself, Essence in itself, Life in itself, Wisdom in itself, Truth in itself, Intellect in itself, Reason in itself, Virtue in itself, Justice in itself, Health in itself, Magnitude in itself, Omnipotence in itself, Eternity in itself, Peace in itself, and all virtues and reasons which the Father once and at once made in the Son, and according to which is established the order of all things, from the highest to the lowest, that is, from the intellectual creature that is next to God, to the farthest order of things in which bodies are contained."

Movements or energies of the Divine Will.

Derivation and growth of things.

What these causes are.

52. Here is the Christian Platonism of the 9th century in its most complete form, exceedingly unlike the Alexandrian Platonism from which it has been supposed to be derived, equally unlike the pure Socratic Platonism of which that was the corruption, different in most important respects from the Augustinian Platonism, or from that of the Greek Fathers with which it stands in much closer affinity. It was impossible for a man with such an idea of the Godhead, and of the divine humanity of the Word, as Johannes had, to be in sympathy with Plotinus, and with those who derived their lore from him. It was as impossible for him, as it was for them, to place himself in the position and point of view of the elder inquirers. It was impossible for one who started with a theory which made man's *actual* condition dependent on the Fall,

Difference between the Platonism of Johannes and that of Plato himself, of Plotinus and of the Fathers.

even if that theory was in accordance with many of the statements in the writings of the Fathers, or followed legitimately from them, to have the same sense which they had of an evil in himself, which was disturbing all relations with his fellows and with this world. His Platonism, therefore, stands by itself, unintelligible without these previous passages in the history of human thought, but not to be confounded with any of them, interesting as a study for all times, valuable as a protest in his own time, indispensable as an illustration of some of the most perplexing problems in the after scholastical philosophy, but strangely unlike that philosophy in its foundation, even more than in its superstructure.

53. In the third book we enter upon that species which has been described as Created and not Creating. At the opening of it the disciple raises an important question: "How it is that the Being who has been so carefully denied to be included under any of the predicaments, should nevertheless be considered in a treatise on the division of Nature?" The master answers that he would by no means speak of God in any of the terms which belong to a created universe, and which therefore imply limitation; but that the universe itself, and nature, so far as it is identical with the universe, must include the Creator as well as the created, and that without this admission it would be absolutely impossible to treat of the created, which is only participant of the goodness, wisdom, essence, which dwell superlatively and transcendently in Him from whom they have come. Another question springs out of this. The different primordial causes were arranged in a certain order in the last book. Was this order adopted at hazard, or did the writer mean that Goodness is the first of them, Essence the second, Life the third? The answer is, that there is a divine order which dwells only in the mind of God himself, which no creature can dare to look into. Nevertheless, there is an intuition which is given to those who reverently and humbly contemplate the universe, not following their own guesses, but seeking to be led by the higher Wisdom, which enables them to see a sequence in principles, and to trace not perfectly, but with an approximation to certainty, their evolution. On this ground Johannes ventures to affirm, not without the authority of Fathers, and especially of Dionysius the Areopagite, that goodness in itself is the most comprehensive of the divine donations, and in some sense precedes the others. "For the cause of all things, that creative goodness which is God, to this end first of all created that cause which is called goodness in itself, that by it He might bring all things which are from non-existence into being. Essence, therefore, must be considered as following Goodness, not as the ground of it." "And this," he says, "the Scripture openly pronounces, saying, God saw all things, and not, lo they are, but lo they are very good. What," he adds, "would it

The Created and not Creating species.

How far the Primary Cause may be included in the Universe.

The order of causes; how far we can ascertain it.

Goodness before Being.

avail only to be, if the well-being were taken away?" "For in truth all things which are, are in so far forth as they are good; but to whatever degree they are not good, or rather to whatever degree they are less good, to that degree they are not. Therefore if their goodness is altogether taken away, there remains no Being. For simply to be, or to be essentially, the well-being and the essential well-being being taken away, is an abuse of language, as also it is to speak of being and eternal being under that condition." This bold position gives birth to a still bolder. Goodness, he affirms, may be without Being. "Not only the things which are, are good, but even those which are not are called good. Yea, those things are called far better which are not, than those which are. For in so far forth as through their excellence they transcend Essence, they approach to the super-essential Good, but in so far as they participate of Essence, they are separated from the super-essential Good." Here our subtle Celt enters into one of those extravagant and monstrous refinements which give us Goths a right to raise our rough voices against him, and to declare that into such an impalpable cloud world we, for our parts, have no wish to ascend. In fact we see here "the Nemesis of logic." Johannes, the great antagonist of formal distinctions, who has shown that we cannot be consistent with ourselves that we must use paradoxical language when we speak of that which is divine, is driven by the dæmon of logic, by the wildest longing for consistency, into expressions that are almost insane. One must have great faith in his goodness, and some knowledge of our own temptations, not to suspect him of having lost his earnestness when he wrote such sentences as these. We do not, however, entertain any such suspicion. We only read in his rash and wild utterances the attempt of a courageous and really devout mind to utter that which it knew to be unutterable, to clothe in the form of conceptions those thoughts which become safe and practical and the beginning of good deeds, when they take the form of adoration. They show, further, how much the transcendent metaphysics of Johannes needed to be associated with a sound morality, that they might not be made the warrant for conclusions which no one would have abhorred more than himself.

The things which are and are not.

Extravagance of Johannes.

Metaphysics and Morals.

Distinctions.

54. In the following paragraph, the dependence of Life upon Essence is in like manner established. A remark which occurs in the course of the investigation, throws some light upon a distinction which we have already met with in Aristotle, and which is here transferred and adapted to Christian ideas. "Wisdom," he says, "is properly called that virtue whereby the contemplative mind, whether it be human or angelical, considers eternal and unchangeable things, whether it is occupied about the primary cause of all things, or about the primordial causes of things which the

Wisdom.

Father hath formed in His own Word, which species of study is called by the wise Theology. But science is the virtue whereby the theoretical mind, whether human or angelical, treats of the nature of things proceeding out of the primordial causes by generation, divided into genera and species by differences and properties, whether it is subject to accidents or without them, whether it is joined to bodies or altogether free from them, whether distributed in places and times, or beyond places and times, united and inseparable in its own simplicity; which kind of study is called physics. For physics is the science of all natures that are cognizable by the senses or the intellect."

Physics

55. This is in fact the proper subject of our present book. Hitherto we have been occupied with the causes or first principles of things; now we are to consider their effects, how they come forth into forms. We might, therefore, claim a release from our task, on the plea that Johannes was passing beyond our metaphysical and moral region, into one with which we have no direct concern. But we are afraid that this excuse will hardly be admitted by any student of this third book. Our author is never more metaphysical than when he approaches physics. The question which occupied all ancient philosophers so much, how the principles of which the world consists can be said to have come into existence at a certain time, is here discussed at great length, and with courage as well as humility, by Johannes. He admits, in the fullest sense, that all visible effects are connected with time, and have come into existence with time. He does not for a moment suppose anything to exist independently of God. But since he can attribute no accident to God, he believes that creation itself is involved and implied in His Being, or in that which he has told us is higher than being, His transcendent Goodness; that whatever is made has in it a divine principle, apart from which it would not be, and that this principle existed eternally in the Divine Word. So that it is not incorrect to say that all things are made, and that all things are eternal, seeing that that which is the very ground and principle of their being was in Him with whom is no variableness or shadow of turning, who is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. He quotes the words of St. John, using that punctuation which is adopted by some of our most modern commentators,—"What was made in Him was Life," or, as he says Augustine explains it,—"What was made locally and temporarily, in Him was life." "For," he goes on, "the same Augustine manifestly teaches that both places and times, with all things that are made in them, were made eternally in the Word of God. He understood the apostle to speak strictly concerning the Word, in whom are created all things which are in heaven and which are in earth, visible or invisible. Under the word visible we must include places

Forms.

The Creation necessary.

and times, and all things which are in them." The conclusion is, that we must not hesitate to say, that all the causes of all things, and all the effects of all causes, are both eternal, and made in the Word.

The Student's Prayer

56. The book concludes with an examination of the 1st chapter of Genesis, which the writer, carefully considering the opposing opinions of different Fathers, and bringing all the philological as well as physical knowledge he had to bear upon the subject, interprets as exhibiting not the production of visible things, but the gradual unfolding of their different orders and species in the divine mind. However much boldness he may show in his treatment of these and other topics which are handled in this book, however unfortunate some of his phrases may seem to us to be, however widely we may dissent from many of his conclusions, we are bound to acknowledge that the habitual temper of his mind is faithfully exhibited in the inference and the petitions which he puts into the mouth of his disciple. "Assuredly the divine clemency suffereth not those who piously and humbly seek the truth to wander in the darkness of ignorance, to fall into the pits of false opinions, and to perish in them. For there is no worse death than the ignorance of truth, no deeper whirlpool than that in which false things are chosen in place of the true, which is the very property of error. For out of these, foul and abominable monsters are wont to shape themselves in human thoughts, while loving and following which, as if they were true, wishing to embrace flying shadows and not able to do it, the carnal soul falls ofttimes into an abyss of misery. Wherefore we ought continually to pray and to say, 'God, our salvation and redemption, who hast given us nature, grant to us also grace. Manifest thy light to us, feeling after Thee, and seeking Thee, in the shades of ignorance. Recall us from our errors. Stretch out thy right hand to us weak ones who cannot, without Thee, come to Thee. Show Thyself to those who seek nothing besides Thee! Break the clouds of vain phantasies which suffer not the eye of the mind to behold Thee in that way in which Thou permittest those that long to behold that face of thine, though it is invisible, which is their rest, the end beyond which they crave for nothing, seeing that there cannot be any good beyond it that is higher than itself!'"

The Fourth Book.

57. The fourth book brings us a great step forward in the inquiry. The master enters upon it with unwonted trembling; all the storms and quicksands they have encountered already are nothing, he says, to those which they must look for in the remainder of their voyage. They start from the words of Genesis in the record of the fifth day's creation, *Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life; let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind.* He develops this idea, of which he had

The Genesis of things.

given a hint in the former book, that what is here spoken of is not the birth of actual things, but the formation of kinds and orders which had an existence in the Divine Word before they came forth into visible and material shapes; then he proceeds to the great question of all, how man stands related to the rest of the universe. There is no flinching or hesitation here. It is laid down as a principle recognized among the wise, that the whole creation is found in man. For he understands and reasons as an angel; he has senses, and administers a body as an animal. The division of the whole creation is fivefold. Either it is Corporeal, or Vital, or Sensitive, or Rational, or Intellectual. And all these are contained in every man. The extreme of his nature is his body; then comes the Seminal Life governing his body, over which life his sense presides; then the Reason which contemplates the order and arrangement of things; then the Intellect, which is occupied with God. This division, however, is not to be understood as if the Intellect, the Reason, the Sense, the Seminal Life, were separate entities, to which a different region is assigned. The word 'parts,' in reference to man, is ambiguous, though indispensable. Johannes would speak rather of a variety of movements or administrations. "For when the reason carefully contemplates the human soul, it finds that soul to be most simple—a whole in itself—and in no part to be unlike itself, or to have a higher and lower within itself; in any of those things, at least, which constitute its essence. The whole administers the body, nourishes it, causes it to grow. The whole perceives in the senses; the whole receives the appearances of sensible things; the whole remembers, &c. . . . . Whereby it is understood how the whole human soul is formed in the image of God, because the whole intellect is intelligent, the whole reason discursive, the whole sense sentient, the whole life vivifying."

Man the Microcosm.

The different kinds of Life in Man.

The Body.

58. The body, though administered by these powers, is carefully excluded from the idea of man so made in the image of God; and the fall of man is again affirmed to be the sole cause of the division of sexes, and of the multiplication of the species by generation. But the question inevitably suggests itself, Was the body, then, produced by evil? Was it not contemplated in the original creation "Let us make man in our image?" The question is resolved as one might anticipate. The original body is affirmed to have been spiritual and immortal; its corruption to be a supervenient accident, the consequence of transgression. This opinion, which, as far as the bare statement of it goes, does not disagree with the one commonly adopted by divines, is especially necessary to Johannes, since he could not consistently tolerate the notion of the created body being subsequent, in time, to the spiritual or intellectual. The form of the body, its primary spiritual constitu-

The Sexes.

The Body before and after the Fall.

tion, is declared to remain amidst all the changes which it has undergone from its connection with matter, and from subjection to the accidents of matter. Its outward material vesture will fall off, and be mixed with the elements out of which it is formed. But the true native form, the proper body, will be preserved, and recover its relation to the soul which inhabits it.

The Greek and Latin Fathers.

59. On this subject, as always, Johannes is careful to support himself with the authority of the Fathers. Gregory of Nyssa is his main prop; but he is honest enough to perceive and acknowledge that there are passages in Augustine which seem to affirm that an animal, earthly, body belonged to man before his fall, and that the plain letter of the Bible is in favour of that opinion. In the effort to reconcile these statements, he encounters the question of all questions, whether the existence of the evil to come was *present* to the mind of the Creator; the phrase whether He was *præscient* of it, he rejects, as introducing a notion of time into the idea of the Godhead. He disputes the existence of any period of innocence, urging that the Scripture rather compels us to suppose that the Paradisiacal state was lost and the animal condition of man contracted immediately.

Præscience.

Paradise.

60. The discussion on the nature of Paradise which follows, and which is continued to the end of the fourth book, belongs strictly to the province of the interpreter of Scripture. We should gladly pass it over altogether on this plea, were it not necessary for the purpose of our history and for the justification of our objections to M. Guizot that we should show how inseparably the philosophy of Johannes is intertwined with his theology, and how all his considerations respecting man and nature have God for their basis. We are quite aware that we are giving an apparent advantage to the theory respecting our author which we have rejected, when we say that he evidently inclines to the opinion that Paradise is wholly intellectual, and not local; that though he does not positively contradict the opposite doctrine, and admits that there are passages in some of the Fathers in favour of it, he quotes with evident delight and sympathy the numerous sentences from the two Gregories, from Ambrose, and from Augustine, which contain what we call the allegorical sense, and that he looks upon them as governing the interpretation of those which are apparently at variance with them. Considered from our point of view, this evidence would be decisive that he was merely philosophizing away Holy Writ. But he seemed to *himself* to be vindicating the eternal and invisible, which Holy Writ is making known to us, from a carnal philosophy that explains away whatever it cannot reduce under the forms of sense. He protests vehemently against the letter which killeth, and the Jews who rejected Christ because they could not look beyond that letter, at the same time that he takes great pains by

The Bible and the Carnal Philosophers.

all the aids which he possesses, to arrive at the signification of the letter. Our own opinion has been sufficiently indicated already. We feel not the least disposed to resolve actual men and women into Reason and Sense, actual trees into spiritual principles, actual animals into the lower portions of our own nature. All such reductions and translations savour of the close school-room and cell; they do not belong to the open air, to health and freedom. But just as little do we expect to find health and freedom when men and women and trees and animals are reduced into dry skeletons, from which life and motion and mystery have been exhausted. This is *our* temptation. This is what the interpreters and doctors do, who wrap themselves in their insolent and conceited affectation of being the only sensible men that the world has seen, alike despisers of the past and out of sympathy with the future, incapable of understanding their fathers, heartless and indifferent to all the thoughts that are working in their children. They have ceased even to care for the letter of the books which they esteem divine. They worship nothing but themselves and their own wisdom. We are no disciples of Johannes; but we venture to say that any one page, almost any one sentence, of his book, would suggest more subjects for thought, would awaken more reflection, and, above all, would promote more reverence for the Bible, than folios of their flat and dreary repetitions.

Criticism of them and the Spiritualists.

The Fifth Book.

61. The last book of the treatise, "On the Division of Nature," is, in many respects, the most striking of the five. There are passages in it of very high philosophical eloquence. The tone of it is freer and more exalted. There are fewer refinements—a more evident consciousness of the grandeur and awfulness of the subject. Yet, as might be expected, there is more in it to shock the ordinary reader than in the earlier books, seeing that the principles which are latent in them are here expanded and developed. We are come to the full exposition of the doctrine that all things are to return unto God, that He is to be all in all. We are come, therefore, to the point in which we may expect to find the pantheistical seeds which we have detected in our author coming forth into their full flower. There are passages certainly which justify that expectation; there are many more which will *seem* to justify it to a person who has already passed judgment on Johannes, and is seeking for evidence in support of his foregone conclusion. The sentences in the book which we would especially recommend to such persons are those wherein Johannes speaks, as Buddhists of old and some modern Germans have spoken, of an absolute Nothing, in the contemplation of which, if we interpreted him strictly, the pure and perfected soul at last loses itself. Let no one suppose that we are not aware that he has used such language, or that we are not sensible of its exceeding danger, when we say that on the whole this book mitigates instead of increasing the appre-

The Restoration.

The Absolute Nothing.

Unfair inference from the use of this language.

hensions we had formed of our author's tendencies, and enables us to feel what a deep fountain of inward devotion and spiritual life there was in him to counteract them. If we pronounce condemnation upon him for that word about Nothing, Mde. Guion and Fénélon, and many Protestants whose faith no one would dream of suspecting, must be likewise excommunicated. And when Johannes, who is a much more consistent thinker and reasoner than any of them, develops his idea of the return of all things to their original, he carefully guards against the inference for which some of his phrases in the earlier books gave considerable excuse, that any thing or person must lose his or its distinct substance or personality in order that it may re-ascend to that Fount of Being from which, by transgression, or the effects of transgression, there had been a separation. Whatever the apparent necessities of his theory might demand, his moral instincts and his theological instincts also rebel against the decree that the greatest fulness and perfection of life in any creature can involve the loss and absorption of any of the faculties, energies, affections which had dwelt in it, and therefore of that which has been its *characteristic* energy and strength and affection. However hard it may be to reconcile the preservation of every type, and of every individual creature with that fulness of the divine perfection, that indwelling of all in God, which the Scriptures taught him to hope for, and to which he found the most illustrious of the Fathers of the Church continually referring, he still felt that there must be somehow such a reconciliation. His firm and undoubting belief in the Divine Word as Him in whom all things were created, and by whom all things consisted—his equally strong conviction that this Word had been made flesh and dwelt among men, and had redeemed not a part of creation, but the whole of it—offered, as he thought, the solution of the theoretical difficulty, certainly kept him from the practical confusions which it might have engendered. Any one who compares his idea of a return into the divine nature with that of any philosophers or theologians who have never entered into these Christian principles, or have let them go, will feel himself in one case to be ascending through verdant meadows and by sunny slopes, on which cattle are grazing and in which are the habitations of human beings, to the summit of a mountain which may perhaps be covered with snow, which may at times be lost in mist, but from which there is ever and anon, in spite of its own seeming desolation, a glorious prospect of hill, and vale, and river, and from which there is always a descent into the richer and softer regions where breathing is free; that in the other case he is carried at once into a polar region, with scarcely a hope of ever breaking loose from the thick ribbed ice to see once more the face of men, to hear the music of human voices.

The Individual and the Universal.

Difference in the practical result between him and the Plotinian Pantheists.

62. It must, however, be confessed that Johannes asserts a doctrine in this book which we suspect will give far more offence to many of his readers in our day than any of the expressions that savour of Pantheism, and might tempt some readers into that of which the author was himself free. He asserts vehemently that the extinction of moral evil is implied in the order and in the redemption of the universe, as these are set forth to us in holy Scripture. The Master says, "Dost thou then consider that evil and its consequences, death and misery, and the punishments of divers faults were created by God, and are participant of the divine virtue? For when it is written, 'death and life are from the Lord,' I do not think he speaks of that death which humanity dies by sinning, but of that death to which the Psalmist refers when he says, 'Blessed in the sight of the Lord is the death of His saints,' that is, precious is the passage of purified souls into the intimate contemplation of truth, which is the true blessedness and eternity. This is the death which those who live religiously and in chastity of heart seek their God die even while they dwell in this mortal life, seeing what they see in a glass darkly, hereafter to return to the ancient and original glory of the divine image, the seeing God face to face. . . . Where, by face, we are to understand such an apparition of that divine virtue, which in itself is perceived by no creature, as may be comprehensible to the human intellect. Wherefore, if evil, and death, and misery, is repugnant to the nature that has been so formed, neither is constituted in Him who is the cause of all things, I wonder on what principle you deliberate and hesitate, thinking that evil and the death of eternal torments can remain for ever in that humanity the whole of which the Word of God took into Himself and redeemed; whereas true reason teacheth that nothing contrary to the divine goodness, and life, and blessedness, can be co-eternal with them. For the divine goodness will consume evil, eternal life will absorb death and misery. For it is written, 'I will be thy plague, O death, thy torment, O hell.'"

The Termination of Evil.

The Death that is from God the Death of Self.

The Extent of Redemption.

63. Although Johannes appears in this last passage to reason, it will be observed that he appeals to Scripture as the true interpreter of the divine reason to men. Nor does he omit continued reference to Ambrose and Augustine (for his partiality for the Greek Fathers does not make him the least indifferent to the Latin) in support of the principle which he is defending. He was aware, of course, that a number of passages might be produced from them in direct opposition to the sentiments which he was propounding, yet he sincerely believed that if they were allowed to explain themselves, and if their deepest and most deliberate expositions were taken to control those which furnished the readiest materials for quotations, they would be found to accord with him in spirit, if not in letter, and to be at hopeless variance with the popu-

Reason, Scripture, the Fathers.

lar teachers who relied upon them. It is not likely that these arguments would have much weight with the modern English reader. He would assume that Johannes was perverting his authorities to his own use, even when their words seemed to favour him most. Possibly a sentence or two of his own, which express his most inward thoughts and convictions, may leave a pleasanter impression on the minds of our readers, and may lead them to part with him, as we do, not without some respect and tenderness. "Hence," he says, "it most clearly follows that nothing else is to be desired except the joy which comes from truth, which is direct, and nothing else is to be shunned except His absence, which is the one and sole cause of all eternal sorrow. Take from me Christ, no good will remain to me, and no torment affrights me. The loss and absence of Christ is the torment of the whole rational creation; nor do I think there is any other." What else is necessary to be said, on his behalf, he shall say for himself, in the words with which he takes leave of his pupil. "If in this work which I have now completed, any one shall discover that I have written what was ignorant and superfluous, let him impute it to my hastiness and carelessness, and let him, as a humble beholder of man's poverty, weighed down by his fleshly tabernacle, look upon it with a pious and pitiful heart. For I deem that there is nothing perfect yet in human studies, nothing without error in this dark life. Wherefore the Righteous, while they still live in the flesh, are not called so because they actually are so, but because they wish to be so, craving for a perfect righteousness which is to be; the affection of their mind wins them their name. . . . But if any one finds anything in this book that is useful and tends to the building up of the Catholic faith, let him ascribe it to God alone, who only brings to light the hidden things of darkness, and brings those who seek Him to Himself, purged from their errors; and let his Spirit, joined with us in love, render thanks with us to the universal Cause of all good things, without whom we can do nothing; not tempted by the lust of condemning, not kindled by the torch of envy, which more than all other vices, seeks to break the bond of charity and brotherhood. And so, in peace with all, whether they kindly receive that which we have put together, and behold it with the pure eye of their mind, or whether they unkindly reject it, and judge it before they know what and of what kind it is, I commit my work first to God, who says 'Ask and it shall be given you, seek and you shall find,' and next to you, dearest brother in Christ, my fellow-worker in the pursuit of wisdom, to be examined and corrected. . . . Hereafter, when these words shall come into the hands of those who seek wisdom truly, seeing they will conspire with their previous questionings, they will not only receive them with a glad mind, but will kiss them as if they

His practical Truth.

L'Envoi.

were their own kinsmen come back to them. But if they should fall among those who are quicker in blaming than in sympathizing, I would not contend much with them. Let every one use the sense which he has till that light comes which will make darkness out of the light of those who are philosophizing falsely and unworthily, and will turn the darkness of those who welcome it into light."

Concerning the opinions of the man who could speak thus we may form very different judgments; some of them we shall, most of us, probably, agree in condemning. To the man himself, an earnest and charitable student will be inclined to apply the prayer which was spoken of one in the next century, who honoured Johannes and shared his evil fame:

Post obitum vivam tecum, tecum requiescam,
Nec fiat melior sors mea sorte tuâ.

CHAPTER III.

TENTH AND ELEVENTH CENTURIES.

Review of the Ninth Century.

1. THE ninth century has detained us longer, than its importance in the eyes of general readers would appear to justify. But we cannot apologise for the time we have devoted to it, or to the eminent, comparatively unknown, man, whom we have taken as representing some of its deepest thoughts though certainly not its popular opinions. The controversies of this century are the proper induction to the school history of the Middle Ages. In considering how those controversies were involved with the practical life of the period, with its ecclesiastical organization, with the fears, struggles, hopes of its most remarkable men, we learn not to treat that School history as the record of barren and bygone speculations; it is full of enduring, full of present and personal, significance, if we will be at the pains of breaking the rough and hard shell that we may find what is within. There were deep fires burning in the hearts, and not seldom breaking forth in the words of those who, if we judge them from mere reports of their theories, we should suppose were entirely removed from sympathy with us their ordinary fellow-creatures.

Barrenness of the Tenth.

2. The tenth century will afford us no occasion for such explanations. In outward bustle, in the mere number of events, hard to methodize, but stirring enough, so far as secret and open crimes can make them so, this age is far more conspicuous than its predecessor. Nevertheless, the epithet "dark," which has been bestowed upon it, with very little dissension, by historians, is justified, especially by those qualities in which it stands distinguished from the time before it and after it. They are often stigmatized as "dark" because there was so much thought in them of a kind which belongs to the cloister rather than the crowd, which is carried on under ground, and does not, for a long time at least, make itself felt upon the surface of society. The tenth century is dark from its broad and manifest abominations, from the utter absence of principle among Nobles and Churchmen, from the want of any thinking that can be called earnest by its admirers, or mystical and unpractical by its despisers, from all those indications which most betray the worldly character and purposes of the

men who, under one mask or another, were playing their different parts.

Italy and Germany

3. If England presented itself as a kind of intellectual centre in the eighth century, France in the ninth, we may hesitate to what country we should assign that position in the tenth. Italy is, unquestionably, the scene of the most exciting political intrigues of the time; the capital of Western Christendom is the place in which its blackest enormities are gathered up, and from which they diffuse themselves abroad. Italy is the battle-field whereon all the selfish interests of families who claim lands and people for their hereditary possession are engaged. The Popedom becomes the prize for the counts, dukes, and harlots who, by one foul means or another, are enabled to make good their supremacy. But the crimes of Italy call forth an avenger. The tenth century brings the German empire to light. In Germany is the centre of a much more vigorous, and, on the whole, healthy power. The princes and ecclesiastics of Italy are obliged to bow before it, because some of the morality of the north is found in it, and gives it dominion. The world had reason to rejoice when the descendants of Arminius claimed to be the successors of the Cæsars, and to establish or unseat the spiritual fathers at their pleasure. Considering the circumstances of the tenth century, this was a divine boon to the nations. Yet it showed that all but naked despotism was the only possible resource for that wicked time; that the idea of moral and spiritual power was nearly extinct. To call either Italy or Germany, therefore, an intellectual centre of Europe at this time, is an abuse of terms. Possibly we shall be more right if we concede that name to Spain. Humiliating as the confession may be, the sense of a power that was not merely physical or merely artificial, upheld by the strength of the arm or created by man's ingenuity, dwelt with the Saracen. The study of laws of nature, of laws which men could not regulate, but must confess, was pursued more diligently and successfully at Cordova than in any city of Christendom. Thither Christian scholars must resort, if they were not ready to confess that God revealed the secrets of His universe exclusively to the Mussulman, and that those who believed in the Incarnation of His Son were to know nothing but the arts of the basest politicians, or the lies by which the basest churchmen saved them from detection.

Spain.

Christians learning in the Mahometan Schools.

4. It was a perilous alternative doubtless. Those who took what seems to us, on the whole, the more honourable course, who thought that it was safer to seek for truth, whatever guides might show them the way to it, than to remain ignorant of it, exposed themselves to great risks, not only in the opinion of their cotemporaries, but even, we should apprehend, in their own inmost convictions. They were suspected of being magicians by those who

heard of their exploits in Mathematics and Natural Philosophy. Were they quite sure that the accusation was a false one? Had they not some feeling as if their knowledge might have come to them from an unlawful source? In using it, in exercising it as a power over their fellow-creatures, was there not some temptation to keep up an opinion, even to justify it by acts which increased the dread of their influence, and in that way the influence itself?

Gerbert. See Ritter B. 9, c. 1, and Gerbert's Letters.

5. Modern writers have questioned whether Gerbert, the celebrated Frenchman who became the adviser of the Capets, the ally of the Othos, and finally the spiritual father of Christendom, ever studied at Cordova. They say there is no evidence of his going farther into Spain than Barcelona, or of his mixing with the Saracens. Unquestionably his letters do not convict him of any attachment to the Infidels: on the contrary, the first passionate appeal on behalf of the Sepulchre, and of those who visited it, is to be found in them. He may be looked upon as the ancestor, though not the father, of the crusading movement. There is nothing inconsistent in this enthusiasm with the belief that he may have spoiled the Egyptians of some of their treasures in his youth. Nor would it follow that he had the same dislike for the cultivated Moslems of Spain, as for those who were possessing Jerusalem. At all events, his cotemporaries believed him to have been in commerce with those who could teach him the black arts, and enable him to sway for a time the spirits who would ultimately claim him as their prize. His success in political negotiations may have given quite as reasonable a colour to the charge, as his acquaintance with the secrets of nature. A person engaged in many important transactions at such a period, and connected more or less closely with two great revolutions, may not have kept his hands as clean as one might wish a Churchman's to be. But that they were cleaner than those of most men of his order in that period, seems to admit of little doubt. His intrigues, if he was engaged in them, were not for sordid, beggarly purposes; they concerned the change of dynasties and the consolidation of empires. His more private transactions, as we gather from his letters, related to the removal of disorders and of oppressions which the greater nobles or ecclesiastics were perpetrating in their dioceses, or over the monasteries. It may, therefore, be conjectured that he was aiming at the restoration of the Church to something of the moral and intellectual standing which it had lost, and that he was willing, for this end, to avail himself of the aid of German or French Monarchs, who were probably the honestest and the most purpose-like men he could meet with. And it seems not at all unlikely that, for the same end, he should have studied not only the algebraic symbols of the Spanish doctors, but others which were supposed to have a more occult signification and virtue. To keep the two apart at such a time was exceedingly difficult. It is clear that they were not absolutely confounded by Christians. William of Malmesbury at least—who, though he belongs to a different period, when the Norman culture had been diffused, must have taken his statements from those who were close to Gerbert's time, and were most prejudiced against him—recognizes very distinctly the value of the lawful sciences in which the Pope was an adept. But to perceive such mysteries of nature as were discovered in lines and numbers, as were guessed at in the relations of the heavenly bodies, and not to dream of other deeper mysteries which might be dived into; to forget altogether that the persons who had the last kind of learning were dangerous men, who could hardly have received it from a holy teacher,—this was nearly impossible for human nature. What more than this is wanted as a legitimate basis for a number of strange stories which have gathered about the name of Gerbert—stories which conspire with other evidence to make us think of him as a remarkable man, which need not prevent us from considering him, on the whole, a useful and a righteous man, though they may show that he was tempted, as all men are, by a false spirit, and that this spirit took a form suitable to the age to which he belonged, and the debasement (moral even more than intellectual) of those among whom he lived?

His character.

Suspicions of his acts.

His Politics.

His Algebra.

William of Malmesbury Chronicle, Book ii., c. 10

To what degree Science and Magic were confused then and afterwards.

6. Ritter quotes a passage from a letter of Gerbert's to Pope John, which is undoubtedly of great value in determining his position between the ecclesiastics and the statesmen of the time. He is apologizing for the course which he takes in attaching himself to the latter, especially, no doubt, to the German emperors, and he lays down the maxim that though Divinity takes precedence of Humanity in speculation, Humanity must first be considered in action. No doubt this was the principle upon which many eminent men in his own and in subsequent times acted. It would have been Dante's justification for deserting the Guelphic party in the fourteenth century. These Emperors, Gerbert may have said, keep up the respect for human laws; the ecclesiastics transgress human and divine equally, and lead the people to despise both. Very little stress can be laid on the other member of the sentence (even if its meaning were quite apparent), which declares how Divinity was to make its power felt in speculation. Ritter contends that Gerbert anticipated the movement of the next century in favour of logic, and that this is his characteristic in a history of philosophy. It will be evident to our readers that we cannot adopt this statement. Logic, it seems to us, had already established its ascendency in the ninth century. There is no meaning in the work of Johannes Scotus, unless we assume it to be a struggle on behalf of the elder Platonical theology against a usurping and triumphant rival; no explanation of some

Gerbert's defence of his addiction to Emperors.

His Logic supposed to be a novelty.

Objections to that opinion.

of its most remarkable peculiarities, unless we allow him, in spite of himself, to have been overcome by the logical tendencies of his time. If we supposed Johannes to be a legitimate successor of the old Proclus school, and no great Latin movements to have taken place before he flourished, we might say fairly enough that the old philosophy died with him, and that Gerbert, being the only eminent thinker between him and the eleventh century, was the founder, or at least the prophet, of the new. But as Johannes was merely an interloper, and as the theological controversies of the ninth century clearly ascertained its character, we may assume that the papal magician, in his dogmatical treatises, merely travelled in a line which had been already marked out for him, and that any pretensions which he had to originality rested, as the cotemporary authorities would lead us to suppose, upon his physical and demoniacal lore.

The Eleventh Century.

7. Gerbert stood on the threshold of the eleventh century. Possibly the horror of his supposed communications both with visible infidels and the invisible powers of darkness, had an effect upon it, in determining what studies should be avoided; still more in promoting the establishment or consolidation of Christian schools, which should be a substitute for the Saracenic, and a counteraction of them. There were other influences working more powerfully to the same result. The first Millennium of Christendom was concluded. "Was it not to terminate," men asked themselves, "in the destruction of the visible world?" The crimes of all classes made such an expectation reasonable; they were greatest and most abominable in the class which existed to testify of righteousness. This belief gave a solemnity to the minds of the better men. It left its impression upon the age. It became an age of movement, of energy, even of reformation; contrasted in all respects with the base and petty one which had preceded it. The intrigues in dukedoms between ambitious proprietors, made way for the conflict between popes and emperors. Great principles are engaged on each side. The common Christendom life is awakening in the West. The life in the schools will, we may be sure, take its form and colour from that which is passing in the world, and will re-act upon it.

The Thousandth Year

The Central Country.

8. The doubt which we expressed in reference to the former century has no application to this. We can define exactly the centre of the European movements. For a moment, indeed, the great fame of Hildebrand, and the position which he asserted for the Roman See, might incline us to think of Italy. Unquestionably the relation of the Pope to the rest of Europe *is* the great subject of this century. Apart from the fact that this relation assumed a character it had never assumed before, all the records of the time are unintelligible. But the vicissitudes in the

reign of Hildebrand himself, his unpopularity in Rome, his final banishment from it, may show us clearly that it was not to his own country that he owed the greatness which he vindicated for those who preceded, and for those who came after him, as much as for himself. Both of these had to endure the ignominy from which his own magnanimity scarcely protected him. If Leo IX. was saved from it, he owed his deliverance to the *Normans*. The Normans were the real supporters of Gregory's own pretensions. The Normans enabled Urban to become the head of a crusade, and so to unite Christendom under his own authority, when the Germans were making its existence doubtful even in his capital. To Normandy, therefore, we are obliged to turn if we would study the progress of events. To Normandy we are bound quite as much to turn if we would understand the movements in philosophy.

Hildebrand

The Normans.

Normandy draws the Intellect of Europe to itself, but does not supply the intellectual men.

9. When we speak of Normandy as an intellectual centre to Europe in the eleventh century, and when we deny that honour to Italy, we are guilty of an apparent injustice. The most eminent thinkers of this time were Italians. The Frenchmen who were distinguished in the schools did not come from the north. But this is the very point on which we desire to fix our readers' attention. Italians, with the gifts that fitted them to be scholars and philosophers, could not find the kind of culture which they required, the discipline which was fitted to make them great, till they came under the influence of the Normans. This remarkable people, as they diffused their own energy and arms into all countries of the east and west, so also attracted into their own land the foreigners whose qualities and circumstances were the least like their own. They had no national exclusiveness. The indifference to soil and local attachments which had characterized their first emigration never deserted them. Their position in the north of France was only a standing point from which to commence assaults upon the world at large. They belonged to Christendom, not to that place in which they happened to have obtained a settlement. When they invaded England, they were quite willing to have Flemings, or men of any country in Europe, mingling in their hosts. That same temper fitted them to be the prime movers in the Crusades. And so they were also able to organize monasteries, in which young men from all quarters found they could learn the maxims and practice of obedience and government. There they could welcome Latin with as much affection as the language of their adopted country—with more, indeed, as being more cosmopolitan.

The want of nationality among the Normans.

The Monastery of Bec.

10. The monastery of Bec is the great illustration of these remarks. "In the year from the incarnation of our Lord, 1034," writes the chronicler of this society, "in the fourth year of Henry the King of the Franks, Robert, the son of the second Richard, and brother of the third Richard holding the reins of Normandy,

Chron. Beccense appended to Lanfranc's works.

Herluinus, at the inspiration of our Lord Jesus Christ, the author of all good things, casting aside the nobility of the earth for which he had been not a little conspicuous, having thrown off the girdle of military service, betook himself with entire devotion to the poverty of Christ, and that he might be free for the service of God alone, through the mere love of God, put upon him with great joy the habit of a monk. This man, who had been a passionate warrior, and who had gotten himself a great name and favour with Robert, and with the lords of different foreign countries, first built a church on a farm of his which was called Burnevilla. But because this place was on a plain, and lacked water, being admonished in a dream by the blessed Mother of God, he retired to a valley close to a river which is called Bec, and there began to build a noble monastery to the honour of the same Saint Mary, which God brought to perfection for the glory of His name, and to be the comfort and salvation of many men. To which Herluinus, God, according to the desire of his heart, gave for his helpers and counsellors Lanfranc, a man every way accomplished in liberal acts; then Anselm, a man approved in all things, a man affable in counsel, pitiful, chaste, sober, in every clerical duty wonderfully instructed—which two men, through God's grace, were afterwards consecrated Archbishops of Canterbury. And to this same Bec, which began in the greatest poverty, so many and such great men, clerical as well as laymen, resorted, that it might fitly be said to the holy abbot—'With the riches of thy name hast thou made thy house drunk, and with the torrent of the wisdom of thy sons hast thou filled the world.'"

Lanfranc and Anselm.

Lanfranc an Italian. Vita St Lanfranc.

11. The first of the two men with whom our chronicler has brought us acquainted, was born in Pavia. His parents, says his biographer, were great and honourable citizens of that city. His father is said to be of the order of those who watched over the rights and laws of the state. Lanfranc losing his father in early life, left the lands and dignities which might have fallen to him, and devoted himself to the study of letters. He stayed for some time in Italy, till he became thoroughly imbued with all secular knowledge. Then leaving his country, and passing the Alps, he came to Gaul in the time of William, the glorious Duke of Normandy, who subdued England with his arms. Passing through France, having a number of scholars with him, he came to the city of Avranches, and became a teacher there. Afterwards this learned man, perceiving that to catch the breath of mortals is vanity, and that all things tend to nothing, except Him who made all things and those who follow His will, turned his whole mind to obtaining His love. And because he felt it was needful to be humble that he might be great, he would not go to any place where there were literary men who would hold him in honour and

Comes to Neustria.

reverence. Late in the evening, as he was going through a wood towards Rouen, he fell among thieves, who took away all he had, bound his hands behind him, bandaged his eyes, and left him in a dark part of the forest. For a while he bewailed his misfortune; then he tried to pay his accustomed praises to God, but could not. Then turning to the Lord, he said, "Lord God, so much time have I spent in learning, and my body and soul have I worn out in the study of letters, and yet have I not learned how I ought to pray to Thee, and to pay to Thee the duties of praise. Deliver me from this tribulation, and with thy help I will so study to correct and establish my life, that I may be able to serve Thee and to know Thee." In the twilight of the morning he heard travellers going their way, and cried to them for help. When they had loosened his bonds, he begged them that they would point out to him the poorest monastery which they knew in that country. They said they knew of none more vile and abject than that which a certain man of God had built hard by. They pointed him to Bec, and departed.

His Perils and Conversion.

12. Lanfranc found the abbot kindling a fire, and working with his hands. He asked to be made a monk, was shown the rule, promised, with God's help, to observe it, and became a brother of the convent. "Whereupon," continues our author, "the venerable father Herluinus was filled with exceeding joy, because he believed that God had heard his prayers. For, as the necessity of procuring provisions forced him to be often without the cloister, and as there was no one to preside within, and to watch the religion of the household, he had often prayed God for such a one, and now He had granted him the very help which he wanted. You might see, therefore, between them a pious contest. The abbot, lately promoted from an illustrious layman to a clerk, reverenced the dignity of so great a doctor who had become his subject. But he, exhibiting no conceit on the strength of his eminent knowledge, obeyed him humbly in all things, and was wont to say, 'When I wait upon that layman, I know not what to think, except that the Spirit bloweth where it listeth.' The abbot showed to him the veneration which was his due; he paid the abbot the profoundest submission. Each presented to the flock a specimen of a different kind of life, the one active, the other contemplative."

Lanfranc at Bec.

The Norman and the Pavian.

13. For a while Lanfranc devoted himself in the strictest sense to the contemplative and solitary life. "But soon his fame," says the chronicler, "spread throughout the world, and brought dukes, sons of dukes, the most conspicuous masters of the Latin schools, and noblemen in multitudes to the convent." The doctor was not exalted. His biographer relates with much satisfaction how he took care of some land which had been left to the church of Bec, and how he brought a cat under his gown to repress the fury of

Fame of the Abbey.

some rats and mice that had invaded it. He tells another story of his humility, which is considerably more to the purpose, and illustrates the man and the time. While he was reading aloud one day at the table, the presiding monk, who was probably a Norman, and like Herlwin, knew more of swords than of the quantities of words, corrected him for saying docēre. The learned Italian instantly shortened the middle syllable, "knowing," his biographer says, "that he owed more obedience to Christ than to Donatus; that it was not a capital crime to violate prosody, but that not to obey one who commanded him in the name of God, was a serious error."

Docēre, or Docēre?

Obedience.

His life in the Monastery.

14. After a while, Lanfranc grew thoroughly tired of the indolence, irregularity, and immorality of his brethren, and feigned a disorder of the stomach, that he might eat only radishes, and so fit himself to escape from the monastery, and live in the desert, which design was defeated by a vision to the abbot, who brought Lanfranc to confession and submission, constituted him prior, and enabled him to effect a reform in the monastery. Except in this instance, the mispronunciation of *docere* may be taken as a key to our scholar's life. Not but that he was capable of an inconvenient as well as of a successful joke when the temptation offered. When a chaplain of Duke William came to Bec in great pomp to attend the dialectical exercises, which had become famous, Lanfranc having discovered that he was profoundly ignorant, and somewhat presumptuous, requested him, with Italian politeness, to clear up a passage in a logical treatise. The Norman resented the affront, and brought Lanfranc into disgrace with Duke William. He was ordered hastily to quit Normandy, but meeting William on his road, he respectfully requested the Duke, as he had appointed him to take so long a journey, to furnish him with a better horse. He evidently understood the man. He very soon rose into high favour. William revoked a command for laying waste certain lands belonging to Bec, and bestowed fresh lands upon it. Lanfranc was soon able to return the service. Neustria had been laid under an interdict, because the Duke had married the daughter of the Count of Flanders, who was within the prohibited degrees of relationship. Lanfranc went to Rome, and succeeded in persuading Nicholas the Second that it would be much wiser to grant William a dispensation, seeing that he was not the least likely to part with his wife, and that he might easily be induced to build two monasteries if he were permitted to retain her. Caen received the benefit of this arrangement, and Lanfranc proved that Bec was as good a school for diplomacy as for logic and theology.

His introduction to William.

Doing William's work at Rome.

15. Lanfranc's mission to the pope had not only reference to his patron's marriage, he had himself been accused of a heavy offence. He was the friend and correspondent of Berengarius of

Tours. This is a name with which most of our readers are familiar. They associate with it certain notions of independence of thought not to be looked for in the 11th century, and of a feebleness of purpose which may be condemned in all centuries. They probably suppose Berengarius to have been something of a philosopher, who had not courage to stand against the theologians of his time; they suppose those theologians to have been merely defending a coarse and carnal hypothesis by the force of traditions and papal decrees. None of these opinions are exactly in accordance with the facts, though all of them touch so nearly upon the truth as to satisfy the careless students of various parties and communions. The subject is most important to the history of Philosophy, otherwise we should not have meddled with it. The disputes of the next century, which had a formally philosophical character, grew out of the great theological dispute of this. We cannot understand the minds of any of the remarkable thinkers of the age without considering it. All that we have said of the Norman and Italian temper, as they came together in the Monastery of Bec, is illustrated by it. But we should commit a great mistake if we assumed Berengarius to be a philosopher, or those who contended with him to have any horror of philosophy. He was, so far as we can make out from the testimonies of his cotemporaries, and from what is preserved of his own writings, a hard-working, earnest, simple-minded priest, who, instead of cultivating subtleties, had a horror of them. It may seem at variance with this statement that he professed a respect for so subtle a philosopher as Johannes Scotus, and was scandalized at being told that he was a heretic. But he evidently clung to the conclusion of Johannes Scotus without caring very much for his arguments. That conclusion, he said, he found expressed as clearly in the writings of Augustine and Ambrose as of the Irishman. He was probably bewildered by the distinctions and formulas of the Italians, as much as by their diplomacy. A Frenchman, but no Norman, he shrunk from submitting to mere decrees when his conscience went the other way. Yet he had so little confidence in his own judgment, there was in him so little of the desire to be singular, that he accepted again and again formulas which he did not understand or approve. That he was a coward in doing so, no one acknowledged so readily as himself. He did not even avail himself of the half-justification which we have put forward for him; he simply accuses himself of recanting through fear of death. When that terror was removed, and he had time for reflection, he was convinced that it was a solemn duty to retract the retractation, however much opening such a course would give to the ridicule as well as to the grave revilings of his adversaries. Lessing has contended with admirable clearness and force that the charge of

Berenger of Tours.

Common notions about him.

The Eucharistic controversy.

Berengarius not primarily a philosopher.

His mind and country.

His alleged cowardice.

Lessing's Werke, vol. 18. (pp. 19-22.)

intentionally concealing his opinion, which Mosheim brought against him, is absolutely untenable. He might not have courage always to maintain his conviction; he certainly never wished to disguise it.

Gregory VII. and Berengarius.

16. Such a man as this Pope Hildebrand could appreciate. He did not in his heart dislike any one for fighting against authority; great part of his own life was spent in doing so. He vindicated his right to set his feet on the necks of kings. The ambition of setting his feet upon the necks of poor parish priests, because they objected to certain forms of expression, was altogether too mean a one for him. It is evident that he would have sheltered Berengarius if he could; that when he opposed him it was done reluctantly; in spite of the condemnation of former popes, and of the contumacy of Berengarius, he loved him to the last. With Lanfranc it was otherwise. He and the heretic had been friends in youth; he had suffered in reputation at Rome from the intimacy. Not, we believe, from meanness, not because he shrunk from an imputation which he really deserved, but because he never could have had much inward sympathy with a man of a character so unlike his own, because his conscience was of an altogether different quality from that of Berengarius, because it was a conscience which looked upon disobedience as the great sin, and would have parted with the strongest perception and conviction of its own rather than be guilty of it, he at once disproved the calumny against himself by becoming the most vehement champion of the Paschasian dogma against its impugner.

Why Lanfranc was so much less tolerant.

Lanfranci Opera (Dacherius), p. 281. De Eucharisti Sacramento contra Berengarium Liber.

17. His book against Berengarius was for a long time, with the exception of a few letters, the only document from which a knowledge of the doctrines of the offender could be obtained. Lanfranc quotes passages from him at the head of each of his chapters; to which he replies. The supporters of transubstantiation referred to his treatise as triumphant; they even ventured to conjecture that it silenced, humbled, converted Berengarius. An unfortunate discovery made by the keen eye of Lessing in the library of Wolfenbüttel, dispelled these dreams. Berengarius was found to have answered Lanfranc in an elaborate discourse. By the care of Lessing, and of subsequent editors, we now possess it almost entire. A comparison of the two documents does not, however, entitle us to set the intellectual qualities of Berengarius above those of the Prior of Bec. Lanfranc's book is haughty and scornful; that of Berengarius is earnest and vehement. The one writes with all the consciousness of maintaining the maxim which a Council and a Pope had pronounced in favour of; the other writes with a strong assurance that majorities and the existing authorities of the Church may be utterly wrong, that it is impossible to read the Old and New Testament with open eyes and not

See Berengarius Turonensis Lessing's Werke, vol. 18, pp. 1-189.

think so. But if it is a great privilege that we may retain an affection for the oppressed and earnest man,—not shaken in that sympathy by the fact that Luther denounced him as much as any Romanist, and looked upon the denunciation of Pope Nicholas as one of the decrees of the papal synod which might be justified and admired,—it is also a duty to confess the ability of Lanfranc, the skill and neatness with which he arranges his points and constructs his arguments, the advantage which he has often over his fervid antagonist, his avoidance of all that is most coarse and material in the view of Paschasius, the facility and gracefulness of his style, and the comparative moderation with which he asserts the claims of the Roman See, when Berengarius could call it nothing less than antichristian. Those who like to see a true man trampled upon, may enjoy the satisfaction as well in Lanfranc's treatise as in any that we know of. He is very imperious, but far less vulgar and brutal than the majority of polemics. And one feels that he was not merely holding a brief for the papal court, that his heart sympathized with what he was doing, and that having given up the right quantity of a Latin infinitive to preserve his own obedience, having cultivated to the utmost all moral submission and humiliation, he felt he had a right to demand the same of all other divines. He was maintaining not only what seemed to him, but what really was, the great secret of the power which the Norman scholar, as well as the Norman warrior, was exercising in that day. All his victories were owing to his caring more for the commands of the superior than for any judgment of his own. If there had been none to assert that a man has a conscience to which God speaks directly, and which must hear His voice, however other voices may clash with it, the after condition of the world would have been very sad; but one may surely acknowledge that there were to be men who had the opposite habit of mind; that with all their faults the world could not have spared them; that each class had its own humility as well as its own pride; and that even success and contemporary approbation, though they may diminish our interest in those who possessed them, by making us think of the words, "*they have their reward*," ought not to blind us to their positive worth.

D. Martin Luther's Bekentniss vom Abendmahl Christi, an. 1528. Luther's Werke, Walch, p. 1294. "Wollte Gott, alle Päbste hätten so Christlich in allen Stücken gehandelt als dieser Pabst mit dem Berenger in solcher Bekentniss gehandelt hat."

Character of Lanfranc's book.

How he asserts the Norman principle.

Use of the opposing Teachers.

18. We must not suppose that more of dialectical science, either in the larger or the narrower sense, found its way into this controversy in the 11th century than in the 9th. The opposite assertion would be far nearer the truth. The schools were in the first fervour of their qualities and quantities in the age of Charlemagne. This they imported into their theological discussions. With these, old Platonists like Johannes had to do battle, endeavouring as far as they could to supplant the Aristotelian dialectic with a more spiritual one. The first stage of that struggle was over. Beren-

How far Logic entered into the question

garius introduced some logical formulas into his first treatise; Lanfranc ridicules him for his pedantry, and insinuates that he was showing off his learning for the sake of throwing dust in the eyes of simple people. The charge was an unfair one. Berengarius assuredly desired to present the things which he had heard and seen more directly to the consciences of his people than he thought the Paschasian dogma suffered him to do. If he ever resorted to logic unnecessarily, it was through the weakness into which practical men often fall in trying to fight their opponents with their own weapons. Lanfranc takes the school logic for granted. But subjection to *that* was not what he cared to establish. Political order, subjection to the rule of the monastery, the kingdom, the whole church, was the end to be attained. Though he had many of the qualities to fit him for a schoolman, at least for a theological doctor, these were by no means his most conspicuous or characteristic qualities. His genius was that of a statesman, as it was clearly shown to be when he became attached to William of Normandy and accompanied him to England. There all the skill which had been ripened in Bec displayed itself in a larger sphere. His idea of the position of an Archbishop of Canterbury was not at all that he should be setting up the church against the crown, or pushing the maxims of Hildebrand. Obedience, the watchword of his life, was to be manifested in that relation as in every other,—to the near authority first, then, so far as they might be reconciled, to the more distant one. Partly the wisdom and the circumstances of William, partly the sagacity and peculiar temperament of his prime bishop and prime minister, partly the judicious confidence of the pope in the one, and his judicious fear of the other, made this reconciliation in the days of our first Norman sovereign, however difficult, not impossible. Lanfranc could pervert a quantity, or defend a formula, or swallow a mere ecclesiastical scruple, with the same facility, and for the same end. Certainly a very sagacious man! with a wonderful faculty for managing the things of earth, but with little, if any, of the finer sensibility, or of the stern love of truth, which we are taught to look for in one who seeks the Kingdom of Heaven.

Lanfranc far less a Logician than a Statesman.

Lanfranc finding his true position.

Consistency of his character.

19. In these respects, as well as in all the circumstances of their English lives, he stands out in curious contrast to the other ornament of the Monastery of Bec, to the other Archbishop of Canterbury—his friend Anselm. Of him we have a much better right to speak in this treatise than of Lanfranc. For he was a philosopher, *the* philosopher of the 11th century. To understand what position he occupies in philosophical history, we must, however, view him in connection with one whose mind was cast in an altogether different mould from his. Their relation to each other explains the relation in which each stood to his time. We begin

Anselm.

Difference from Lanfranc in character.

to apprehend how Anselm, who is represented in our ordinary English histories as the arrogant and rebellious churchman, is connected with the Anselm, who, to judge from the statements of the man who knew him best, and from the evidence of his own writings, must have been one of the meekest, least assuming, least worldly of men. We discover what were the characteristics of the thinking man of that age, wherein he was strong, wherein he was feeble, how far he was an asserter of liberty for his own times and for the times to come, how far he was bringing in a new bondage upon either.

The opposite reports of him.

20. Anselm was born in Aoste. His father and mother both belonged to Lombardy. The former was generous to prodigality; greatly devoted to the world during the best part of his life; a monk at the close of it. The latter was a prudent housekeeper, of a thoughtful and earnest character. The boy was bred among the mountains; he fancied that the palace of God must be on the summit of one of them. At fifteen he longed to be a monk. The abbot to whom he applied refused him; his health grew weak, which increased his desire for the convent. When he recovered he plunged for awhile into the pleasures of the world, and lost even his taste for letters to which he had been much devoted. His mother's influence restrained him for awhile. On her death he fell under the displeasure of his father. His home became intolerable; he fled from it, went into Gaul, spent three years in France and Burgundy, finally came to Normandy. The fame of Lanfranc drew him to Bec. In a short time his character and work filled him with admiration. He became a student again; he aspired once more to be a monk. For awhile he was haunted by the ambitious feeling that he should be entirely eclipsed at Bec by Lanfranc, and that it would be better to go elsewhere. That temptation being overcome, and his patrimony having fallen in by the death of his father, he laid the question before his spiritual counsellor, whether he should be a monk of Bec, a hermit in the woods, or a landlord distributing his goods to the poor. If Lanfranc, says his biographer, had bid him go into a wood and never come out of it again, he would have done it at once. But it was decided that his early passion marked his vocation, and at the age of 27 he entered the convent of which Lanfranc was prior. Lanfranc was removed to Caen; Anselm became prior of Bec. His loving friend, Eadmer, describes his life in this office as severe to himself, gentle to all around him, as acting with particular force and success upon children, as overcoming those who hated him by laborious kindness. Government, however, was oppressive to him; he was with difficulty prevented from throwing off his authority and reducing himself again to a simple monk. But he did resist this evil thought also, and was able to find time for correcting

Vita S. Anselmi auctore Eadmero Cantuarensi Monacho S. Anselmi, discipulo et comite individuo.

Youth of Anselm, c. 1, sec. 2-6.

His ambition crushed, c. 1, sec. 7.

c. 1, sec 7.

Prior at Bec, c. 2.

His life.

manuscripts and writing books in the midst of his incessant tasks as a counsellor and administrator. It was at this time that he wrote "On Truth," on "The Liberty of the Will," on "The Grammarian," and a book entitled "Monologium," to which he added afterwards "The Proslogium." As we propose to give some account of most of these books hereafter, we would only remark here that they were all suggested by the circumstances of the monastery, and that their form as well as their substance were determined by the questions and doubts of the brethren at Bec.

Sec. 25; his works.

21. Of Anselm's visions and miracles, of the far more interesting stories which are related respecting his management of the children in the convent, of his reluctant appointment to be abbot on the death of Herluin, of his hospitality in that character, we shall say nothing. But we must make room for a conversation which took place between him and Lanfranc when he went to visit his old superior at Canterbury—the business of the convent, which had many possessions in England, having called him thither. Once upon a time, says Eadmer, Lanfranc said to him, "These Angles among whom we are living have fixed upon certain persons whom they shall reverence as saints. I have been considering their claims to sanctity, and I am in great perplexity. For instance, there is one who rests in that sacred place over which we preside, Alphege by name, a good man assuredly, and an archbishop in his time. Him they reckon not only among saints, but even among martyrs; and this though they do not deny that he did not die for the confession of the Name of Christ, but because he would not redeem himself with money. For when, to use the words of these Angles, the Pagans, the enemies of God, had taken him prisoner, they were willing, through reverence for his character, to set him free on the payment of a large ransom. That ransom would have robbed his own citizens of their money, would perhaps have reduced some to beggary; therefore he chose rather to lose his life than to keep it on such terms. What say you, my brother, to this claim of sanctity?" Anselm suggested first, with great deference to Lanfranc, that one who would give up his life to save his brethren from ruin, would certainly have given it up rather than have denied Christ; and then he went on, "There must have been a wonderful righteousness in the heart of that man, seeing that he preferred giving up his life to scandalizing his neighbours by want of charity towards them. Surely he, who for such righteousness willingly sustains death, is truly reckoned among martyrs. The blessed John the Baptist is venerated as a martyr by the whole church, not because he was put to death for refusing to deny Christ, but for refusing to conceal the truth. And what is the difference between dying for righteousness and dying for truth? Christ, says the Scripture, is righteousness and

Eadmer, lib. 1, c. 4 and 5.

Lanfranc and Anselm in England.

In quantum nostra et multorum fert opinio, non erat illo tempore ullus qui aut Lanfranco in auctoritate vel multiplici rerum scientia aut Anselmo præstaret in sanctitate vel Dei sapientia, c. 5, sec. 42.

Claims to saintship.

Alphege the English patriot.

Anselm's decision.

truth. He who dies for righteousness and truth dies for Christ; therefore he is a martyr." Lanfranc was convinced. "Taught by thy wisdom," he said, "I will henceforth, God's grace assisting me, reverence Alphege as a great and glorious martyr of Christ."

The true martyr.

22. Eadmer had a right to consider this dialogue as a proof that, with all his political sagacity, Lanfranc was still young in his knowledge of his adopted country, and that Anselm, through his moral instinct, had arrived at a clearer apprehension of our habits and institutions, and of the way in which the church could most effectually act upon them. On the other hand, there can be no question, that when Anselm actually took the place which Lanfranc's death left vacant, he was far less adapted to it, far less able to reconcile the obligations of a servant of the King of kings with those of the subject of an earthly sovereign. The difference did not arise wholly from the characters of the two ecclesiastics. William the Conqueror was dead, as well as his minister. All the cleverness of the latter might not have enabled him to keep terms with William Rufus. In him we see the worst elements of the Norman character, with only here and there a trace of that which gave it its mighty influence over Europe. He thought of the subject race as of little more than a race of slaves, whom he might now and then turn to account in the quarrels into which he was continually liable to fall with his own barons. The strong hand of law which belonged to his father was changed for the mere strong hand of power. Letters, of which the Conqueror saw the worth, were mere hieroglyphical tricks to his successor, the miserable amusements of those who had not sense and courage enough for the chase. He had met with prelates as unscrupulous as himself; it was an easy inference that every priest was a hypocrite, bent upon advancing his own interests or those of his order, a dangerous though a contemptible rival of the military—for Rufus had no notion of the civil—ruler. Anselm had a reasonable dread of coming into contact with such a monarch. He had also a cordial affection for Bec, and an honest dislike of the grandeur and secularity of the archiepiscopal office. But William had suffered it to be long vacant, and had appropriated the revenues of it. When a temporary sickness had made him penitent, and the accident of a visit of Anselm to the Count of Chester had led him to think that the most eminent man of the day might be the fittest for Canterbury, there was a general call that Anselm, for the sake of the whole church, should not suffer a moment to pass which might never return, and timidly shrink from a work which was divinely imposed upon him. Most reluctantly he suffered the crosier to be thrust into his hand, foreseeing too well, not only that he was parting with a life which had been as dear to him as it had probably been unsuitable to Lanfranc, but that he was entering upon

Erat præterea Lanfrancus adhuc quasi rudis Anglus, sec. 42.

William Rufus.

His theory of the world.

Eadmer, lib. 2, c. 2.

Acclamatur ab universis et dictum regis laudat clerus et populus omnis, c. 2.

Portatur magis quem ducitur, ib.

one in which he should have only the use of his left hand, and would perhaps often have to doubt whether he was using that rightly.

His political life.

23. The remainder of the story belongs partly to ordinary English history, partly to the private biography of Anselm. We have no right here to enter upon the questions which arose between him and Rufus, upon their connection with the general dispute concerning investiture which agitated Europe, upon Anselm's journey to Rome and his adventures by the way, upon his experiences of popes and councils, upon the tears which he shed when he received the news of the death of his great enemy, upon his return to England, and his misunderstandings with the wiser monarch who had at first sought his friendship, or upon the peaceful death which wound up a life of struggles. It would scarcely have become us even to take notice of these facts, if it was not necessary to remove a certain prepossession on the subject of this eminent man, which is likely to interfere with any fair judgment of his philosophical writings. If he had been the turbulent asserter of ecclesiastical rights which Hume and others have supposed him to be, still more if his main crusade had been, as our Scotch historian would have us believe, against long shoes, the portion of his work in the world with which we have to do, would stand strangely apart from the rest of it; since in that, at all events, he is very little occupied with controversies about the respective authority of the ecclesiastic and the civilian, since it is hard to detect in them any lurking signs of prelatical ambition, since he is always earnestly occupied with the serious and moral aspects of the very serious questions which he discusses. The truth is, that Anselm was not too much, but too little of a politician. He could not neglect any of the pastoral duties of his see, any more than he neglected the brethren and children of the convent for the sake of indulging his meditative tastes. But the diplomacy which was attached to it he knew nothing of. He could meet the greatest offender as a brother, and help him in any troubles of conscience. But William had no such troubles. He simply opposed what must have seemed to Anselm a dead weight of ignorance and brutality against everything that was spiritual and humanizing. Under these circumstances the asserter of spiritual rights and powers, even if he did at times infringe upon rights which it behoved the national monarch, if he *had been* a national monarch, to assert, was, to a very great extent, the vindicator of science, of liberty, of the crushed serf. The form which the conflict took was determined by the events and controversies of the time. It happened, unfortunately for Anselm, that he could not maintain his cause except by connecting it with that general cause of the papacy, which was mixed with so much that all kings and all nations, the best as well as the worst

Reason for alluding to it.

Hume, vol. 1, 8vo, p. 203, says that the "noted historian of Anselm, who was also his companion and secretary, celebrates highly the effect of his zeal and piety in decrying long hair and curled locks." He refers to Eadmer, p. 23, not mentioning whether he quotes from the Life or from the Historia Novorum.

The king and priest.

had a right to complain of as essentially oppressive, essentially secular. But there were few men pledged to that cause, fewer still perhaps who were pledged to the opposite cause, that had less of these evil dispositions in their own hearts, or more earnestly desired the extirpation of them, than Anselm.

Anselm's nobleness.

His writings.

24. It is an agreeable characteristic of Anselm's works that a very small portion of them indeed belong to controversy. There is one treatise, written at the instigation of the pope on the Greek doctrine of the procession of the Holy Ghost, and one against Roscellinus on the Incarnation. With these exceptions, meditations, prayers, letters and books written for the solution of difficulties which had actually occurred to some person who had consulted him, generally to some brother at Bec, form his contribution to Middle Age literature. Not more for the honour of Anselm himself than for the comprehension of his books, this last characteristic should be recollected. They were not hard dogmatical treatises written in cold blood, to build up a system or to vanquish opponents. They were actual guides to the doubter; attempts, often made with much reluctant modesty, to untie knots which worthy men found to be interfering with their peace and with their practice.

Anselm's premises.

25. The characteristic of Anselm as a man was, we think, a love of righteousness for its own sake. That noble habit of mind is illustrated in his conversation respecting Alphege, scarcely less in a sentence of his, reported by Eadmer, which has given rise to some very uncharitable Protestant commentaries, that "he would rather be in Hell if he were pure of sin, than possess the Kingdom of Heaven under the pollution of sin." This too is the spirit of his writings. It is from this that they derive their substantial and permanent worth. Right there must be—that is the postulate of his mind. Then, partly for the sake of entering more deeply into the apprehension and possession of that which he inwardly acknowledged, partly for the sake of removing confusions from the minds of his brethren, he undertakes to establish his assumption by proof. Oftentimes we are compelled to doubt the success of these demonstrations. We have an uncomfortable feeling, that the principle which we are to arrive at by an elaborate process of reasoning has been taken for granted at the commencement of it; some of the arguments seem scarcely worthy of their object, some of them seem to interfere with it, by tempting us to accept one mode of contemplating it instead of the object itself. Theology has cause to complain of Anselm for having suggested theories and argumentations in connection with Articles of the Creed, which through their plausibility and through the excellency of the writer have gained currency in the Church, till they have been adopted as essential parts of that of which they were at best only defences and explanations. But viewing him, as we are privileged to do,

His arguments.

See the *Cur Deus Homo.*

simply as philosophical students,—caring less about the results to which his treatises have led dogmatists, than about his principles and about his method of thought,—he offers us a very interesting subject of examination. In Johannes Scotus the metaphysical element was evidently predominant over the ethical; in Anselm the moral absorbs everything into itself. Moral ends are first in his mind; scientific truth he learns to love, because he is too honest a man not to feel that Goodness is a contradiction if it has not Truth for its support. But the difference in the starting-point of these two writers affects all their intellectual habits. Anselm is much more of a *formal* reasoner than Johannes; amongst ordinary school-readers he would pass for a much more *accurate* reasoner. He supplies many more producible arguments; he meets the perplexities which the use of words occasions more promptly; though far enough from a superficial thinker, he keeps much more the high road of the intellect, and is not tempted to explore caverns. For such a person, Logic becomes an invaluable auxiliary; he has not the dread of its limiting the infinite which the other had; he secures his moral truth from all verbal invasions; then he can let verbal refinements have their full swing in the discussing of objections and in the effort to remove them.

Emphatically a moralist.

His difference from Johannes Scotus.

26. Anselm's "Monologue on the Essence of the Divinity" was undertaken, he tells us, at the instance of many of his brethren of the Monastery, he himself shrinking from the task at first, oftentimes feeling disgust at what he had written, but after careful examination finding nothing in it at variance with Scripture or the Fathers, though the nature of his task required that he should not refer to them as authorities, but should consider the question as one who was reasoning it out in his own mind. A passage from the first chapter will show us the course which the Monologue will take. "A person may speak thus with himself in silence. Seeing that there are innumerable good things, the great diversity of which we experience with the senses of our body and discern with the reasoning of our mind, are we to believe that there is some *one* thing, in virtue of which one all good things are good, or are they good, some for this cause, some for that?" To answer this question is the business of the book. We may speak of a good horse, meaning that it is a strong horse or a swift horse; but we may also speak of a strong thief or a swift thief, though we admit the thief to be bad. How is this? For a moment, Anselm would appear to rest in the utilitarian solution of this difference. The strength and swiftness of the horse are beneficial, the strength and swiftness of the thief are mischievous. But he speedily discovers that there is an ultimate end implied in utility, a Good which is presumed in all particular Good. *That* Good is identical with the Divine.

His Monologue.

Object of it.

Process from the finite to the Infinite.

27. A mind which has been led into this acknowledgment will, of necessity, proceed to confess that this Good must *be*, that it must be *perfect*, that it must be *one*. The steps by which these thoughts unfold themselves in the thinker, are full of solemn interest. We should be most thankful for a guide so conscientious as Anselm, in tracing them, if ever and anon, instead of faithfully exhibiting the workings of his spirit, he did not withdraw us into an outer circle where we hear such a disputation as might have obtained laurels for an opponent and respondent in the dialectical exercises of Bec, not such a one as is carried on in the soul's secret chambers. Thus, for example, in the sixth chapter, where the subject is the self-subsistence of the Supreme Nature, we are instructed that "whatever exists by something else, exists either in virtue of an Efficient (cause), or of Matter, or of some Instrument." No doubt these are convenient distinctions for certain purposes. They are legitimate helps in arranging our thoughts; they may be forms of our understanding itself; but if there is a Nature which passes our understanding, which is implied in its operations, but which is not subject to them, surely we cannot hope to climb by any of these ladders to the apprehension of it. What they can bring us to, is but a Negative; that which is *without* matter, *without* instrument, *without* cause. And accordingly Anselm does find himself at once encountered, as so many had been encountered before him, by this frightful spectre of *Nothing*. Like a brave man, as he is, he faces it; he is sure he has no business with it. He treats the possibility of such a difficulty occurring as one of those which, for the comfort of weak brethren, he must not pass over, since he is bound to remove every obstacle, however slight, which may hinder the contemplation of the object that is so habitually present to himself, and that he would lead his readers to behold. Dear devout Teacher and Friend! Is that *a very small* obstacle? For a man who is sure that Good is, whose soul rests on that rock, a very pebble doubtless—a little snow-drift, which the eye hardly discerns, which one may sweep away or pass by. But for the mere logician?—for him who has been working night and day among Efficients, and Instruments, and Materials?—for him who has conceived all the Universe under these heads? Is the abyss of nothingness which lies beyond their clear definite circles not an appalling void to him? Can he find any footing in it? Will you tempt him to try? Had you not better say to him, "After all, brethren! are we not MEN; *must* not we have something to stand upon, that we may live and not die, even though our efficients and coefficients, and all this matter—yes, all that we have thought, and conceived, and imagined, should break to pieces under us!" That Anselm *meant* this, none can believe more firmly than we do; but we should be violating the fidelity of our narrative and

Consequences.

Logical divisions.

They end in a Negation.

Et si forte cui quod speculor persuadere volnero, omni, vel modico, remoto obstaculo quilibet tardus intellectus ad audita facile possit accedere, c. 6.

Anselm's arguments failing of their purpose

confusing the course of it, if we pretended that he always *said* this; that he did not say much which may have led disciples—may have helped to lead a whole generation—along a wilderness in which there was often no water, and sometimes no manna. Yet believing, as we do, that the way to a better land lay through that wilderness, and that freedom could not have been attained without its hunger and drouth, we can never think except with reverence of one of those who was a temporary guide in it, though perhaps not into it, certainly not through it.

The Trinity the ground of Anselm's mind.

28. Upon the technically theological part of this Monologue (*strictly* theological, of course, it is throughout) we shall not enter further than to remark, that it abundantly confirms the observations which we made in reference to the Middle Age period generally, that the Name into which Christians are baptized is the underground of the whole thought and speculation of its eminent men, in fact, of the whole scholastic philosophy. Dogmatism had, no doubt, especially since the 9th century, encroached upon that which, according to Plato's nomenclature, is the direct opposite to it, the acknowledgment of *substance*, of that which is. Men were beginning to think of the Divine Name as a doctrine which they held, not as a reality which upheld them. There were some tendencies in the 11th century which favoured this habit of mind; there were some which counteracted it. Anselm as an arguer and a prover conspired with it. But Anselm as a deep student of himself, and as a practical worker, was resisting it. In this treatise, one discovers both aspects of his character; the higher and more beautiful part comes out more strongly towards the conclusion of it. We will give our readers the titles of a few of the chapters, from which they may gather how much of what would be called in our days (and not wrongly called) the Platonical temper, mixed with the drier Aristotelianism of our Author's mind. The 66th chapter teaches us, that by the rational mind we ascend to the knowledge of the highest Essence. The 67th, that the mind is its mirror and its image. The 68th, that the rational creature is created to love this Essence. The 69th, that the soul which loves it will some time or other be truly and perfectly blessed. The 70th, that this Essence gives itself back to that which loves it that it may be eternally blessed. The 74th, that despising it the soul is eternally miserable. The 76th, that every human soul is immortal, and that it must be either always miserable or some time or other truly blessed. And this is the conclusion. "Very difficult, yea, nearly impossible, it seems for any mortal by reasoning to be able to ascertain what souls may be at once judged to have so loved that which they have been made to love, that they may some time or other enjoy it; which have so despised it that they may deserve for ever to be without it; or

Dogmas and Foundations.

Anselm in heart a Platonist, in understanding an Aristotelian.

Anselm's Transcendental doctrines.

according to what measure, or by what rule, those who seem as if they might be said neither to love it nor to despise it, may be assigned to eternal blessedness or misery. But this are we to hold most certainly, that by a supremely just and supremely good Creator nothing will be unjustly deprived of that good for which it was made, and that for this good every man should strive with his whole heart, and whole soul, and whole mind, by loving it and longing for it. The human soul, however, can in no wise exercise itself in this effort and intention, if it despairs of being able to come at that at which it aims. Wherefore, just so far as the practice of this effort is useful to the soul, just so far is the *hope* of arriving at the end necessary to the soul. But it is not possible to love and hope for that which one does not *believe*. It is fitting, therefore, for the same human soul to believe this supreme Essence and those things without which it cannot be loved, that by believing it may stretch towards it."

Anselm's practical faith.

The reward of Love.

The duty of Hope.

The necessity of Faith.

29. The Proslogion differs considerably from the Monologue, and differs, we think, advantageously; though its merits make it less suitable for our work. Anselm describes the one as a *Soliloquy*, the other as an *Alloquy*, the one as the man's discourse with himself concerning God, the other as a supplication to God to be his teacher concerning Himself. It resembles, therefore, the petitions which constitute so substantial a part of St. Augustine's Confessions. In the old time it would have been most truly considered a philosophical work, the man seeking for wisdom, crying for it as for a hid treasure; in our days it would be described as a devotional treatise, and therefore as having no place in a Philosophical History. But if we may not deal with it directly, certain consequences followed from it, of which it behoves us to speak, as they throw a curious light upon processes of mind that characterized the 11th century, especially its monasteries. Anselm, in his 2d chapter, had used these words,—"O Lord, we believe Thee to be something than which no greater thing can be conceived of. Is there then not a Nature of this kind, as the fool affirms, when he says in his heart 'There is no God'? But assuredly this same fool when he hears this very thing which I say, hears of something than which nothing greater can be conceived of. He understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his intellect, even though he does not understand that it *is*. For it is not the same that a thing should be in the intellect, and that we should understand the thing to be. For when a painter thinks beforehand of that which he is about to make, he has it indeed in his intellect, but he doth not yet understand what he hath not yet made. But when he hath painted it, he both has it in the intellect and understands what he has now made. Therefore the fool also is convinced that there is even in his intellect something than which nothing

The Proslogion.

Is it devotional or Philosophical?

The answer to the Atheist.

Argument from the mind to that which is in itself.

greater can be conceived of, because when he hears this he understands it, and whatever is understood is in the intellect. But assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived of, cannot be in the intellect *alone;* for if it is in the intellect alone, it may be conceived of as being also in reality. If therefore that, than which nothing greater can be conceived of, is in the intellect alone, that very thing than which nothing greater can be conceived of, is where something greater can be conceived of. But this is impossible. There exists, therefore, beyond doubt, something than which nothing greater can be conceived of, both in the intellect and in the reality." He goes on in the next chapter to argue that God cannot be thought not to be, and that the very saying in the heart is thinking, and that the thinking presupposes Him.

Why such an argument, even if sound, ought not to be resorted to in this day.

In the present day, when the arguments for the Divine existence from the constitution of the visible world have displaced all others in the minds of theological advocates, and when these are in their turn exposed to the severest criticism from philosophers, such a subtlety as this of Anselm's would be dismissed by both parties with indifference or scorn. Without participating in either feeling, or prejudging the question whether the argument is tenable in itself, we may express our opinion, that in a time of clubs and newspapers it would be a serious moral offence to introduce into a discussion, upon a subject of the greatest interest to all men, that which must appear to nine out of ten a play upon words, or conjuror's trick. That objection does not apply in the least to the writer of a MS. in a learned language, to be read only by students, whose own minds were habitually turned inwards, and who felt the force of appeals to their consciousness, far more than of any to the scheme of the world and the marks of design in it. We must not, however, suppose that because this was the case, an argument endorsed by the high authority of Anselm, and used to maintain the most sacred conclusions, would pass in the 11th century without examination, or might not find stout and able opponents. Gaunilon, a monk, boldly wrote "a book on behalf of the Fool." He admitted the Proslogion to be full of unction and in general to be soundly reasoned. But he demurred to the statements we have quoted, as detracting from its general truth. Anselm, in an elaborate answer, treats his opponent with courtesy, denies his right to the name which he had claimed, and pronounces him a good Catholic, in spite of his unwillingness to use a particular weapon against Atheism. He maintains, however, that the weapon is a good one; he is not the least prepared to abandon his method of thought; it is evidently very dear and sacred in his eyes. Not from a wish to entertain our readers with a passage of arms between two accomplished doctors of this age, but because we do think that principles, the importance of which

Gaunilon's objection.

would be better appreciated by their successors, were asserted on each side, we shall give a short account of this discussion.

1st objection —Possibility of understanding what is not true.

30. Gaunilon's first objection will suggest itself to most readers. "Do I then never hear *false* words, *false* statements? Do I not understand them? If you draw a distinction in kind between 'understand them' and 'having them in my intellect,' so that you should say, 'I understand what you mean, but as there is nothing answering to it in fact, I cannot entertain it in my mind'—how does the analogy of the picture apply?" For there the having in the intellect, and the understanding, were the same process at different stages or points of time; one before the picture had actually existed, the other when it was produced.

The analogy of the picture faulty.

31. He has another and still stronger complaint against this analogy. The very life of the picture is in the art, that is to say, in the intellect of the painter; the work is the mere expression or embodying of this life. How does this relation resemble that which exists between the word that is heard, or the thought that is understood by my mind, and the reality to which that word or thought corresponds? In one case the mental operation is clearly the first; in the other it presumes a foregone conclusion.

No species to which the name of God can be referred.

32. The third objection has reference to the nature of that which the fool is accused of not acknowledging. There is an *à fortiori* reason against the application of Anselm's argument to the existence of God. If I am told of a certain man, quite unknown to me, I have the general notion of a man in my understanding; so that if my informant has lied and there is not *such* a man as the one he spoke of, still the thought suggested by his words has something corresponding to it. But, by the hypothesis, *this* word is spoken to me concerning GOD, or concerning that which is greater than all things; concerning a Being, that is to say, who can be referred to no species previously known to me; who is not like anything else. Supposing then, and no other supposition will serve to meet the case, the man has not derived his knowledge in some other way previously, what will the announcement that there is such a Nature be to him but a succession of sounds, true no doubt as such, true as making certain vibrations on the ear, but not awakening any thought within to which the reality without can answer?

Why not believe in an Atlantis?

33. The inference follows, that the method of reasoning from the intellectual apprehension to that which is apprehended, is a false one; that I must take the reverse method; establishing the existence of my apprehension by its correspondence with that which is previously ascertained; otherwise, Gaunilon asks, why, if I am told of the lost island, which surpasses in its treasures and beauty all that I have ever seen and dreamed of, is not the possibility of understanding the announcement, which no one will dispute, to

be taken as conclusive evidence that such an island exists? Surely, continues the critic, the man who endeavours to persuade me to believe him on such a ground, must either be joking with me, or must be very simple himself, or must give me credit for being simpler than he is.

If the argument is good, why limit it to the Supreme Nature?

34. With one more argument—a very suggestive one, he concludes. Possibly when you say that the non-existence of this supreme nature cannot be even thought of, you mean that it cannot be understood, because, strictly speaking, that which is false is not, as such, capable of being understood. But if that is your meaning, how is the argument *specially* applicable to the supreme Nature? I cannot *understand* that I myself do not exist, though I can understand the possibility of any one's non-existence, and though I can think of my own non-existence. Is it otherwise in the case of *the* Being?

Anselm's answer.

35. The commencement of Anselm's reply to this skilful reasoner will appear to most readers to involve an awkward *petitio principii*. His opponent and he being agreed in their conclusion, he can ask him triumphantly, whether the denial that the thought in the mind of a supreme nature does not involve a reality corresponding to it, is not at variance with his convictions and conscience, and whether, therefore, he must not suspect a flaw in the process by which he has arrived at it? We have explained already that, in our judgment, this is an apparent rather than a real unfairness. If it is fatal to the probative force of Anselm's arguments upon an impartial judge, that is to say, upon a person who tries to divest himself of his humanity that he may be a logician merely, it is extremely interesting and illustrative of Anselm's character, that he is obviously unable to do this, even when he endeavours it most, and when the logical fever is most strong upon him. And, to do him justice, though he takes this ground at starting, he does not consciously allow it to interfere with his subsequent reasonings. Of these, when they do not bear directly on Gaunilon's, we will give only one specimen. "That, than which nothing greater can be thought or conceived of, must be thought of as without a beginning. But whatever can be thought or conceived of, and is not, can be thought of as having a beginning" (*the thought is the beginning.*) "Therefore such a nature cannot be thought of and not be: therefore if it be thought of, it must be."

The inconceivable cannot have a beginning; therefore, cannot be only in the mind.

36. Anselm insists that every one of Gaunilon's objections turns upon a forgetfulness of the terms of the original proposition. What is the use of talking about a lost island? Is that something, than which nothing greater can be conceived? If it is, unquestionably such an island must be. It exists, and can never be lost again. Is it not? How does it affect the point in dispute? Here, of

The argument from the lost island.

course, the *definiteness* which is presumed in the very name and nature of an island gives the respondent an obvious advantage. Pressing this advantage, he proceeds to dispose of Gaunilon's assertion, that there is nothing in the argument which applies to the denial of the supreme nature more than to the denial of anything else which exists, *e.g.* ourselves. If for the words, "thought or conceived of," Gaunilon was at liberty to substitute "understood," as he proposes, doubtless it might be said that nothing false, strictly speaking, could be understood. But it is, he contends, the peculiarity of this higher nature, that it could not be "thought or conceived of," if it did not exist. "For all those things, and those alone, can be thought not to be, which have beginning, or end, or conjunction of parts, and generally, whatsoever at some time or in some place is not a whole; and that alone cannot be thought or conceived not to be, in which the thought finds neither end, nor beginning, nor conjunction of parts, and which always and everywhere it finds only as a whole,"—a great and pregnant assertion, upon which every earnest man will meditate deeply, but which he must not hope to be made much clearer or more satisfactory to him by the syllogisms of Anselm or any one else.

Why the argument affects the Supreme Nature differently from any other subject.

37. Anselm complains of Gaunilon for substituting the phrase, "that which is greater than all things," for his, "that than which nothing greater can be conceived of or thought of," and of drawing inferences from the one which are quite inapplicable to the other. The distinction is undoubtedly of great importance, and one which throws a valuable light on the subject. The way to the absolutely greatest is through the thought. To spring by a leap to it, is to overlook that very relationship for which our doctor is contending. Another distinction is also asserted. Gaunilon says that we can understand the words which express a false proposition;—undoubtedly; but is that the same thing as understanding or taking into the intellect the assertion that a thing actually exists? Anselm says that the fool does this, even when he says there is no God. He understands or receives into his intellect, of necessity, the assertion that there is that which is greater than he can think of. This is not merely to understand the words of the proposition. It is to confess that which is implied in them, the very sense of them. Not indeed—for this is a point carefully to be noticed—that the argument assumes GOD, as such, to be known by the fool; but only this, that there is such a highest nature, as he seeks to deny, such a highest nature as he should wish, in whatever way that is possible, to be acquainted with.

Anselm's process misunderstood by his opponent.

Why the fool, though he denies *God*, may acknowledge an inconceivable nature.

38. By far the most satisfactory, and as it seems to us, the most practically useful, part of Anselm's answer is that in which he disposes of the objection which is drawn from the absence of any

Ascent from the imperfect to the perfect.

species to which the Divine Being can be referred, of any likeness with which he can be compared. Every lower good, implies a higher one. There is a continual ascent in the thought, from the which it feels to be partial and to have flaws, to that which is full and immaculate. All reasonable people acknowledge it to be so; the Scriptures clearly affirm that the invisible things from the creation of the world are seen through those which we understand; to wit, the eternal power and Godhead. Hence he proceeds to the remark, that to assume that which is greater than our thought as being the subject of our thought, is no greater contradiction than to speak of the ineffable. It is a contradiction implied in the very nature of speech and thought; they lose themselves in that which is deeper than themselves. In concluding the argument, he declares that he looks upon man's thought as necessarily predicating of the Divine essence whatever quality it confesses to be better than the negation of that quality. Eternity is better than non-eternity; goodness than non-goodness; goodness in its very self than that which is not goodness in itself.

Final inference.

Dialogue De Veritate.

39. There are two dialogues of Anselm's — one concerning Truth, one concerning Free-will—of which it behoves us to give our readers some account. The person who represents the scholar in the first dialogue opens with this question, "Seeing that we believe God to be Truth, and seeing that we affirm Truth to be in many other things, I should be glad to know whether, whenever Truth is spoken of, we ought to confess it to be God." A passage in the Monologue, in which Truth is said to be without beginning or end, raises this doubt. The master does not remember to have met with any definition of Truth, but he thinks that by examining the different subjects of which it is predicated, there may be a hope of discovering what it is. He begins with Truth in *Enunciation*. When do we say that Enunciation is true? The inquiry is pursued with minute, and what we should most of us call unnecessary, elaboration. It results in the conclusion, that Truth in enunciation or speech is identical with rectitude. The speech does what it ought to do, imperfectly when it is merely self-consistent, perfectly when besides being self-consistent, it answers to the fact. Next they consider the truth of *Opinion*. The decision here is the same as in the former case. Truth of opinion is identical with rectitude of opinion. The *thought* corresponds to the fact, as the *word* in the other case did. Thence we ascend to the truth of *Will*. The devil stood not in the truth, he did not will what he ought. Rectitude is the truth of Will. Fourthly, how stands it with *Actions?* These are twofold: the actions of voluntary and those of involuntary, creatures. Can we say that the fire acts truth when it warms? It is determined that we can. It does what it ought. But when it is said, "He that doeth the Truth cometh to the light," is the principle different? Only in this, that the action of coming to the light is not necessary. It is an act of will, but it is an act of will doing what it ought, fulfilling its proper function just as the fire does. In this way we may explain a paradox which was spoken of under the first head, that speech may be true even though the proposition which it enunciates is false. The speech fulfils its own natural function, it says what the speaker means to say, but the meaning is falsified by the will. A fifth question follows about the truth of the *Senses*. Do they not deceive us? The answer is "No," the deception is not in the sense but in opinion. The boy fears the picture of a dragon with an open mouth. It is not that his outward sense makes a different report of the picture from that which the outward sense of an old man makes; it is that his inner boyish sense has not yet been able to distinguish a picture from a reality, as that of the other does. All supposed cases, it is contended, of optical deception, or of deception through any sense, may be resolved in the same manner.

Truth in Enunciation.

Truth in Opinion.

Truth of Will.

Truth in Acts.

The necessary and voluntary act.

Speech may be true when it utters a lie.

Truth in the Senses.

The outer and inner sense.

40. We now approach the point which has given rise to these separate investigations. Nothing is true which does not derive its truth from the highest Truth. *Essentially*, everything is true because it derives its essence from that in which there is no falsehood. Truth and rectitude are identical in the highest subject, as they have been shown to be in every subordinate subject. But the grand affirmation, that everything is what it ought to be, of course at once suggests the question, "Are there not then many evil works which it is certain ought not to be?" "Is that wonderful," asks the Master, "if the same thing ought to be and ought not to be?" "How is that possible?" asks the disciple. To the proof of this paradox his companion addresses himself. The general inclusive proposition is, that God permits some to do evil because they will to do evil; that the permission is good and ought to be; that the evil, by the very force of the term, ought not to be. But there are various particular illustrations to show that the principle cannot be gainsayed even by those who refuse to recognize that which is the deepest ground of it. An act may be right in itself; it ought to be; and yet the doer of it ought not to be the doer. There cannot be a blow given which is not received; yet the "ought" may be altogether different in relation to the receiver and the giver. The nail may do its own appointed work upon human flesh; the flesh may do its appointed work in receiving the impression from it; each of these instruments does what it ought to do; but he who drives the nail may be doing that which ought not to be done. Nay, there is a use of "ought" which suggests the very opposite of what it actually means. "I ought to be loved by you," would seem to imply that I owe something to you,

Relation of Truth to God.

Whatever is, is right; how then comes wrong?

The general proposition.

Ought; the power that lies in the word.

A similar ambiguity in "might."

whereas it does imply, that you owe something to me. The Master remarks by the way, that there is a similar ambiguity in the use of the words, "might," "could," "was able." Hector was able to be conquered by Achilles, Achilles could not be conquered by Hector. You would suppose the power was in Hector, whereas in truth the weakness was in him.

Acts and words.

41. The Master proceeds in the next chapter to show, that Truth is at least as reasonably affirmed to reside in acts as in words; and that a true act is nearer to the nature and essence of truth, than even a true word. All this, of course, bears upon the great object of the Dialogue, the identification of *Truth* with *Rectitude*. This identification is traced at last to the *Highest Truth;* there you have a Rectitude not involving obligation but the ground of obligation; the primary Eternal Rectitude which is the cause of all Rectitudes. And so the doctrine of the Monologue, that a truth without a beginning or an end is involved in speech, though it may predicate of this thing that it has been, or of that thing that it is to be, is justified. These very pasts and futures, and the language which denotes them, presume that Supreme Truth which comprehends them in its own eternity.

Rectitude in God, how it differs from Rectitude in the creature.

The Eternal presumed in the Temporal.

Rectitude, how predicated of Things?

42. The way is now open for the definition we sought for. Truth and Rectitude have appeared to be one in all cases. A single difficulty remains. When we speak of a straight twig or stick, do we not ascribe rectitude to it? Must we not, therefore, distinguish between the truth that is cognizable by the eye and by the mind? Or shall we not rather say, that even *this* rectitude is cognizable by the mind, seeing that we should have no reason for calling a particular twig or stick, straight, if we had not in our mind a standard of straightness to which we referred it? May we not then affirm truth to be rectitude perceptible only by the mind? In this sense is *Rectitude* identical with *Justice?* Not surely if we attribute rectitude (as we have done) to natural things, as fire, when they fulfil their functions. Justice must be *voluntary* rectitude.—Is that an adequate definition? May not a man do right acts willingly, without being a just man? Yes! The *Will* must have a *Reason* with which it is in accordance. That only is justice, the Master concludes, which is "Rectitude of Will sustained for its own sake." May this definition be applied to the Highest Being, to the Essential Righteousness? There can be no subject to which it is equally applicable. Rectitude of will in the created, though preserved for the sake of rectitude, yet looks up to a higher Will which is THE Right, which stands in itself and upholds all others. Thus we are drawn on to the final inference that the truth of each subject is distinct, in so far as it is limited by the nature of that subject, but that the very distinctions imply that that Truth is one and the same in all things, and

Rectitude always judged by the mind, not by the eye.

Rectitude and Justice.

The conclusion.

that there is a self-subsisting Truth which is not included in any thing.

Treatise. De Voluntate.

43. We need scarcely point out to our readers how remarkably this treatise illustrates what we have described as the characteristic feature of Anselm's mind. The resolute predominance of the moral over the intellectual in his apprehension of truth, gives all the interest and variety to this investigation. The short book on the Will (Voluntas), which is less theological than the Dialogue (De Libero Arbitrio), brings us by a different road to the same point. He begins by giving a double explanation of the Will. "It is an instrument, as the eye is the instrument of seeing; it is an affection of that same instrument, *e.g.* the mother's love to her child, which is always latent in the will, whether it comes forth into thought or not. The will, then, is the natural instrument of the soul; when the soul thinks, the instrument works. Its affections are two, the affection of willing advantage, and of willing justice. The one is inseparable from the instrument. The other may be entirely absent, or may be present at times and absent at other times. It is only when the will to advantage is absorbed into the will to justice that the man attains his appointed end, and therefore is blessed." This is the substance of his doctrine. But he touches in passing upon the question of the permission of evil, and of God's hardening a man's heart, which belongs more properly to the Dialogue.

The Will an Instrument, and an exercise of the Instrument.

Dialogue De Libero Arbitrio.

44. The principle asserted in this dialogue cannot be new to any thoughtful student of the subject; it is worked out with the logical minuteness which belongs to the time and to the writer. Starting from the maxim that free choice is the same in all beings to whom it appertains, in God and holy angels as in men; he goes on to argue that this freedom is not identical with the power of sinning. Assuredly that power could not have been exercised by any being in whom free choice did not reside; but inasmuch as Sin is the recognition of a foreign, unnatural dominion, inasmuch as it involves slavery, it is a contradiction in terms to speak of it as the proof and token of Freedom. On the contrary, the deliverance from such a power, and from all desire to use it, is the very condition of freedom. The difficulty, that the man retains freedom of choice after he has sinned, is met by a reference to the doctrine of the former treatise. The Will (Voluntas), in the sense of an instrument created to desire Justice and Right, has the freedom of choice (*liberum arbitrium*) conferred on it that it may pursue this end. Forsaking this end, the freedom of choice, the power of embracing and also of recovering the Right, deserts it. But the instrument remains under its original law and definition, just as the power of seeing remains, though the object to be seen may be hidden, or though there may be some obstruction inter-

Free Choice in the Perfect Being.

Why the power of doing evil cannot be identified with freedom of choice.

In what sense choice remains after slavery has begun.

Inferences from these premises.

posed between it and the eye. From these premises, the conclusions are deduced in the subsequent chapters, that no temptation forces any one to sin against his will; that our will, though it seems impotent, has a power against temptations; that the will is stronger than the temptation, even when overcome by it; that God himself cannot take away the rectitude of the will, (since if He did, His will would not be a will to right); that nothing is freer than a right will; that it is a greater miracle when God restores rectitude to a will that has abandoned it, than when He restores life to the dead; that the power of pursuing rectitude for its own sake is the complete definition of free choice.

Dialogue De Concordiâ Præscientiæ Dei cum libero arbitrio.

45. The Discussion on the reconciliation of Præscience and Predestination with Free will, follows naturally upon these two. We shall not enter into it, as we have already given our readers specimens enough to guide them in appreciating the purpose and the method of Anselm. The idea which is so ably worked out by Boethius, that a Being who sees all natures truly, and as they are, must recognize in all his acts of seeing and foreseeing that distinction between voluntary and necessary existences which He has established, and that to speak of his præscience as superseding and abolishing that distinction is a contradiction in terms—this idea is adopted and enforced in his own way by the doctor of the 11th century. He dwells too, as strongly as Boethius, on the difference between the same things considered under the law of Time and under the law of Eternity, "in which there is no past or future, but only present;" "in which all things are contained."

Time and Eternity.

Dialogue De Grammatico.

46. It may seem like a farce after a very solemn tragedy, to pass from debates such as these to the Dialogue on the Grammarian, the genuineness of which has never, we believe, been questioned. But our reader must be content to look at times and at men from all sides if he would understand them. The discussion opens with the appalling doubt whether a Grammarian is a Substance or a Quality. We are in hopes for a moment that this perplexity, in which so many venerable persons are interested, may be set at rest by the timid suggestion of the disciple, that the Grammarian is a man, and that therefore he may share the privilege of a man in not being reduced into a Quality. But we were too hasty. He discovers that this proposition, "A Grammarian is a man," so far from being irrefragable, is scarcely defensible. For a grammarian without grammar is inconceivable, but surely a man may go comfortably through the world without any such addition. How are we to untie this knot? By no means let it be cut; we must proceed very gradually. By perceiving that rationality is predicated of man as man, though man is an animal, and though rationality is not predicated of the animal as an animal, we begin to perceive that the grammarian may require grammar to make him

Is a Grammarian a Substance?

Is the Grammarian a Man?

a grammarian, and yet may be a man, though grammar is not involved in the existence of a man. Hence we can go on to the other argument. It is not necessary to rob our unhappy grammarian of substance, because a certain quality is necessary to make him that which he is; because, apart from that quality, he could not be a grammarian.

Conclusion.

47. All this will, no doubt, appear to the critic of the 19th century purely ridiculous. But it is not ridiculous; not even irrelevant as a treatise on Grammar. In a particular instance, the teacher brings to light a set of verbal confusions into which the men of that time often fell from an excess of subtilty, we perhaps scarcely less often from indolence and contempt of distinctions. The relation between Grammar and Logic is illustrated. The syllogism is vindicated, for its use in detecting confusions of thought as well as of expression. Let it be frankly admitted, that through the meshes of this dialectic, the paltriest trivialities, the most mischievous sophisms may break in; but we must maintain as firmly, that it was the purpose of all righteous men, such as Anselm was, to keep them out, and that if they spent their time in such dialogues as these, it was because they did not see any other way so effectual of accomplishing that purpose. Wisdom is justified of all her children, with whatever weapons they fight; whether the scene of their battle is laid among the cleverest and busiest of all people in the open haunts of Athens during the Peloponnesian war, or among students in the cloisters of Bec in the age of William of Normandy. And Folly is justified of her children, by the contempt she casts upon one as much as the other; these children in each age being incapable of looking beyond its modes and conventions, or of seeing that which time and circumstance cannot alter.

Charge of triviality against the schoolmen.

Wisdom and Folly.

CHAPTER IV.

TWELFTH CENTURY.

The beginning and end of the 11th century.

1. The century, which opened with gloomy visions of coming destruction to Christendom and to the world, closed grandly with the conquest of Jerusalem, and the establishment of European chivalry in the East. From these incidents the 12th century takes its commencement; in a certain sense, they give it its character. The crusading impulse was not felt more by the warriors who went forth with Godfrey, than by the inmates of the most solitary convent. It penetrated the heart of society, it bound together him who wore the helmet with him who wore the cowl. Their characters, their very functions, were scarcely distinguishable. The member of the military order had surely a calling as sacred as that of the priest; they were blended together in the minds of the people. The templar is the brother of a society bound by solemn vows, dedicated to Christ. The cloistered man must be a soldier. Do not talk of his occupations as peaceful. He is sent into the world with a sword; his whole life is to be a fight.

The two orders.

False inference from the spread of Monasteries.

2. This fact must be always kept in mind when we are contemplating this period under any of its aspects. From the amazing power which the monastic life and discipline exercised over the hearts of men, and over the affairs of the world, at all events during the first half of the 12th century, we might easily draw the inference, that we had fallen upon a torpid age, which succumbed easily to those who had spiritual terrors at command, because all other energies were suspended. But read any of the books which exhibit this monkish influence and enable us to judge of the ways in which it exerted itself, and you are struck at once with the various kinds of forces, physical and intellectual, which were acting and reacting upon each other throughout the whole of western Europe.

Influence of the Cloister upon the world.

The acknowledgment of the spiritual ascendency certainly does not come from men who are too weak to resist it, or who do not actually resist it, even while they pay it homage. Counts, kings, bishops, in the fulness of their wealth and barbaric splendour, may be bowing before a monk, who writes them letters from a cell in which he is living upon vegetables and water; it is not that they set no value upon their possessions, or that they are merely in-

fluenced by the dread of exchanging them for sufferings hereafter; it is that there is a power in a man who speaks as if there were a righteous order in the world, and as if they were bound by it, which they cannot gainsay, which rises above all their turbulence and selfishness. If the name and pretensions of the pope, with all the outward grandeur which supported them, had been the sole or the main object of reverence at this time, one might have explained it by superstition, or by an ecclesiastical theory. But that power was often mocked and set at nought, not only by the emperors of Germany, but by the citizens of Rome. Popes themselves were forced to ask the aid of those who had no splendour, no material appliances, no claims to traditional homage. Bernard of Clairvaux had an influence over the councils of Europe which they could not exercise. He could awaken the hearts of men to a crusade, could heal differences, could regulate the transactions of the world, in which he took no personal interest, while bishops of Rome had to beg that he would decide which of two claimants to their dignity ought to be esteemed the vicar of Christ, and the father of the faithful.

The Popes bowing to the Monks.

Bernard of Clairvaux.

Intellectual power in this age.

3. But if an influence such as this was compatible with the kind of might which dwelt in swords and spears, was it equally compatible with the kind of energy which the thinking man puts forth? Was not the spiritual assumption of the monk certain to keep down *this* energy—certain, at all events, to trample it out, if it should anywhere give signs of its existence? These questions must be answered carefully. A hasty resolution of them is sure to be a false one. In truth, they are most different questions, to which history gives most different answers. The facts show clearly enough, that neither the material forces of this time, nor the spiritual, could restrain the exercises of thought in the minds of those who devoted themselves to study, nor could prevent the infection of these thoughts from spreading where one would have supposed there was the least susceptibility of them. The evidence which we shall have presently to produce upon this point is irresistible. If the 12th century was an age of martial prowess, of monastical domination, it was quite as much, quite as characteristically, an age of intellectual vigour and restlessness—an age when intellectual pursuits established themselves as part of the business of the world, and became, in some directions, more strictly popular than they have ever been since. But to determine how these intellectual studies were related to the spiritual thoughts and affections of the religious monk on the one side, and to the impulses and purposes of the statesman and warrior on the other, whether on the whole they were coincident or hostile forces,—how they became one or the other,—what alliances, temporary or permanent, there may have been between either of the two against the third, this is far

How related to the other influences at work in it.

more difficult. To do this effectually would be to write—what has never yet been written—a complete theological, philosophical, and political history of the period.

Cousin's view of this age.

4. Of course we do not aspire to supply this want, but merely to offer a few hints, which may assist the moral and metaphysical student in finding a clue to a labyrinth in which he is very likely indeed to lose his way. If he takes up M. Cousin's preface to the works of Abelard, and surrenders himself to the guidance of a teacher whom he cannot fail to admire for his eloquence, for his learning, and for his sympathy with the subject on which he is writing, he will certainly arrive at the conclusion, that Abelard was the first man, or nearly the first, in modern Europe, who had the courage to think, who believed the intellect was to be exercised upon moral or theological questions, who did not merely shape himself upon the decisions of popes or councils. We have given, in this sketch, some specimens of the writings of the most eminent and the most orthodox Doctor of the 11th century; and we venture to ask, whether these extracts, which we have at all events endeavoured to make faithfully, and which may be compared with the books whence they are taken, bear out M. Cousin's statement? Anselm may have applied his intellect rightly or wrongly to the discovery and enforcement of truth, or to the defence of sophisms,—that is not the point. Clearly he *did* employ it, and that with a very deliberate purpose,—foregoing all advantages which ecclesiastical decrees or the authority of Scripture might give him, appealing to principles of the human mind for his premises, and addressing himself to the conscience and the intellect in his inferences. The intellect, in the ordinary sense of the word, was as much called into play in the discussions of Gaunilon with Anselm, as in any to which the 12th century gave birth. Theology, in its strictest sense, furnished the motive and occasion for this intellectual gladiatorship. Nor can it be said that the gravest objections to a theological statement were not put forth on one side, and tolerated on the other.

Inconsistent with facts already stated.

Reference to Anselm.

Characteristics of the two periods.

Bernard no enemy of worldly business; but a great enemy of school Logic.

5. But though this is not the distinction between the two periods, there is a very marked distinction between them,—a distinction sufficient to explain M. Cousin's opinion, though not sufficient to justify it. One can with difficulty conceive of Bernard, forced, as Anselm was, into an archbishopric. He would have felt the humiliation even more keenly than his predecessor. Probably he might have been involved in fewer conflicts, or in more successful conflicts, with princes; his skill in the management of worldly affairs might have been greater. But one *cannot* conceive of Bernard as writing a logical treatise, even to remove the greatest perplexities from a brother's mind. Such a book as that on Truth, or that on the Will, to say nothing of the Grammarian, would have been abhorrent

from the mind which found nothing inconsistent with its habits or tendencies in preaching a religious war. On the other hand, the temper of Anselm's mind, which is expressed in his Proslogium, the temper which found its most suitable utterance in meditations and prayers, has evidently very little which corresponds to it in the writings of Abelard. These men furnish accurate tests and illustrations of their period. The spiritual and intellectual tendency which had been combined in different measures and degrees during the former time—which had not been formally separated in Berengarius any more than in Lanfranc or Anselm—which had been comprehended in the impartial hatred of William Rufus—were now breaking loose from each other. The Monastery was beginning to be regarded more as exclusively the place for cultivating the divine affections, for seeking inward converse with God, for humbling the flesh. Thoughts, learning, study, though not banished from it, were absorbed, in the stricter societies—in those which gave most the tone to the age—into devotion. The warrior or statesman, exhausted with the outward world, did not want this kind of occupation. The enthusiastic youth who found in the Monastery an employment for his energies, not altogether unlike that which his parent or his brother sought in the field with the Saracen, did not care to mix his direct faith with questions about predicaments and middle terms. Even where the rule was less stringent, where the copying and illuminating of manuscripts, and the studying of classical authors, preserved their reputation, letters rather took the place of logic—the religious man became more of a *scholar*, in the modern sense of the word, than of a *student*.

Anselm and Abelard.

The Monastery more strictly a place of Devotion.

The Student of this time.

6. What, then, were those to do in whom the *student* impulse, which had been awakened in the Monasteries of the last century, was still vigorously at work? It was impossible that there should not be a number of such. Anselm, and many very inferior to him, but still men of note and reputation, had helped to call such a class into existence. Long before their time, theology and logic had been regarded as sisters, if not twins. *A priori*, we might fancy that the rage for dialectics would be extinguished by the rage for Eastern conquest. But experience does not justify such anticipations. When there is fervour in one direction, there is commonly fervour in all. The distinctions of talents and vocations are not lost, but whatever a man sets before him, his pursuit of it becomes a passion. If the religious man disowned the logician, and fraternized with the man of action rather than with him, he would assuredly have his revenge. His mistress might be called by those who did not know her, cold, phlegmatic, repulsive; he would prove that she possessed life, grace, every possible charm. There might be as much of fighting, and earnest fighting, in these lists as in any. What is more, spectators might be as glad to witness such contests,

Dialectical fervour compatible with military fervour.

and might take as lively an interest in the falls and prizes of the combatants. For what if they are called word-fights? Are they less human for that? Is not every man in possession of words, even if other possessions are not very abundant with him? May he not be glad to know the use of them, and the feats that may be done with them? If Monks fancy themselves above such knowledge, may not the people be glad of any teacher who will bring it within their reach? These are the movements in the world and in men's minds, which help to explain how divinity and dialectics acquired that new position in respect to each other which M. Cousin speaks of; to explain why the 12th century became the age in which the Universities of Europe started into life. And all these movements are gathered up and illustrated in the striking and tragical history of Peter Abelard.

The word-fighters.

Life of Peter Abelard.

7. There are very few histories of which we possess so much accurate information as this. That it has been disguised by French and English sentimentalists—scarcely less, perhaps, by Churchmen, who have denounced Abelard as a heretic,—by philosophers, who have exalted him into a hero,—by critics, incapable of looking beyond the habits of their own age, who have questioned the traditions respecting the power of his intellect—is quite true. But it is our own fault if we are misled by any of these partial guides, when we have the autobiography of the person whose position we are studying,—the letters between him and his wife, written with the most perfect freedom, and in the maturity of the character, intellect, misfortunes of both,—the writings, both theological and dialectical, of Abelard, of which quite enough are preserved to guide our judgments about his opinions and his powers,—finally, the letters of his most eminent opponents, with the records and decrees of the councils who were called to pass sentence upon him. Those who suspect all lives which men write of themselves,—that is to say, those who always fancy that they must be cheated by the vanity and partial representations of a fellow-creature, even though they begin with arming themselves at all points against the danger, by divesting themselves of any sympathy with him,—these cautious and sagacious persons may take it for granted that Abelard's Book of Calamities, even with all the aids which we have to qualify its statements, must mislead them. To us it seems a book of transparent fidelity, exposing, both consciously and unconsciously, all that was weakest and worst in the writer; imputing not more injustice to his adversaries than evidence internal and external would lead us to suppose they may have committed, without being worse people than we ourselves are; justifying itself to our judgments and consciences by the very terrible revelations which it makes of dangers to which we are all prone, however the circumstances of different periods may alter their form.

The materials for judging of him.

The Liber Calamitatum a trustworthy book.

8. Abelard was born in the year 1079, at Palais, near Nantes. "I sprung from a country," he says, "of which the soil is light, and the temper of the inhabitants is light; and I had a wonderful facility for acquiring knowledge. My father had some taste for letters before he became a soldier. He wished all his boys to be scholars before they gave themselves to arms. Me, his eldest-born, he was especially careful to educate. But I soon abandoned the privileges of my primogeniture to my brothers, leaving them to follow Mars, and casting myself into the lap of Minerva. And since I preferred dialectical reasoning to all the other documents of philosophy, I changed other weapons for these, and abandoned the trophies of wars for the conflicts of arguments. So, travelling through different provinces, wherever I heard that the study of this art of disputation was flourishing, exercising it also myself as I went, I became a rival of the Peripatetics."

The Breton choosing his profession.

The young Disputer.

9. With this ambition our young recruit comes to Paris. He has heard of the fame of William of Champeaux, who is established there, and at once becomes his pupil in dialectics. William discovers that he has received a most dangerous member into his class. Instead of meekly listening to his lessons, Abelard begins at once to practise them by answering his Master. The elder students are scandalized at the impertinence of the new comer. "Hence," says Abelard, "my calamities began. Presuming on my talents I aspired, youth as I was, to the government of schools. I fixed upon Melun, the seat of a royal palace, as the place in which I would exhibit my powers." William of Champeaux, and the rival students, threw all difficulties in the way. But the Doctor also had his enemies among the powerful of the earth; these became Abelard's patrons. It was only necessary that they should find him a field; he could work it for himself. Soon his dialectical fame began to spread everywhere. The name of William himself quailed before that of Abelard. Bodily sickness, brought on by intense application, drove him back to Brittany. All who were smitten with the dialectical passion, craved for his return. After a few years he was again confronting his old preceptor, now become Archdeacon of Paris, and aspiring to a Bishopric. Though it might have been more seemly for the venerable disputant, now that he had such objects before him, to have abandoned his old pursuits, he could not resist the temptation of descending into the field, even at the manifest risk of being defeated by a disciple, who now added something of experience to his youthful valour.

Paris in the 11th century

The scholar turning Master.

Preparations for war.

10. It must have been a terrible engagement. William of Champeaux had been used to maintain in his school, that the same whole thing dwells essentially in every one of the individual things which are comprehended under it. We shall hereafter

Doctrine of William of Champeaux.

endeavour to make our readers understand what we suppose he meant; now we will only observe, that we enter into the heart of that controversy respecting universals, which was to affect the thought of many centuries consciously, and of many more unconsciously; the controversy which was foretold in the commentary of old Boethius upon his Greek teacher Porphyry. "By most patent arguments," boasts Abelard, "I compelled William of Champeaux to change his opinion; yea, to abandon it." The routed Archdeacon thought to save his reputation by substituting the word *indifferently* for *essentially*, in his original proposition. The change, we shall find, was not an "indifferent" but an "essential" one; nevertheless, such a concession could never save a man who had an opponent so active as Peter at his heels. He affirmed, and Paris seems to have assented, that this is the great question of all in dialectics—in the judgment of Porphyry, the very crux upon which the whole science turns. The lectures, which had been once so popular, were utterly neglected; William was scarcely admitted to read upon dialectics at all. "Those who had most adhered to our Master, and most denounced my doctrine," says our author, "fled to my school. Even his successor offered me his place, and handed himself over with the rest to my teaching where before his master and ours had flourished." Unutterable seems to have been the grief and envy of the discomfited William. Abelard could not be directly attacked, but cruel slanders were raised against the colleague who had been his opponent, and a rival put in his place. Then follows a series of manœuvres, which Abelard describes in the military language, that seemed to him most suitable to the subject. He retreats for a while to Melun, where his influence increases with the enmity of William. The latter hearing that suspicions are circulated about the sincerity of his religious vows and clerical professions, withdraws to a convent of brothers not far from the city. Straightway Abelard descends from Melun to Paris, "thinking that I should now have peace with him." "But," he says, "as my younger rival still held the school at Paris, I placed my camp on the Mount of St. Genoveva, outside the city, with the purpose of besieging him who had taken possession of my place. On hearing which, our Master imprudently returns to the city, bringing his school and his convent of brothers into the old Monastery, designing to relieve his soldier, whom he had deserted, from our blockade." The succour is most unfortunate. William's patronage destroys the school of his friend. "He had had some pupils," Abelard says, "for he was supposed to be a good teacher of Priscian; but now he lost them all, till, despairing of earthly glory, he also betook himself to the monastic life." Then the strife was renewed between the old combatants. "What conflicts," says Abelard, "our scholars

Victory of Abelard.

Consequences of it.

Vengeance of defeated Logicians.

Stratagems of rival Logicians.

The battles of William and Peter.

had after the return of the Master to the city, as well with him as with his disciples, and what results fortune granted to our party in these wars, yea, to me myself in them, facts have sufficiently informed thee. I might boldly, and yet with moderation, use the words of Ajax, 'If you inquire the fortune of this fight, I was not vanquished by him.'"

11. Abelard was recalled from these trials to Brittany by his mother, who was about to enter upon a religious life, as his father had done before her. When he returned into France, it was not to resume his battles with William of Champeaux, who had now attained the object of his life by becoming a Bishop, but to study Divinity. The popular teacher of the day in theology was Anselm of Laon, a very different person in all respects from the Anselm of Bec, who occupied us so much in the last century. We must make room for Abelard's characteristic description of him. "If any one came to him," he says, "in uncertainty of mind to urge him upon any question, he returned more uncertain. He was a wonderful man in the eyes of those who listened to him, but he was nought in the sight of those who asked him questions. He had a wonderful practice of words, but it was a practice that was contemptible in sense and empty of reason. When he kindled a fire, he filled his house with smoke. That great tree of his attracted you by its leaves when you saw it afar off; when you came near and looked carefully at it, you found it bore no fruit. I perceived, when I sought fruit upon it, that it was the fig-tree which our Lord had cursed, or that old oak to which Lucan compares Pompey. Having made this discovery, I did not lie for many days idle under its shadow." Our readers will easily anticipate that the old story is coming over again, but with a more dangerous subject for a contest of wits. It is seen that Peter has no respect for his Master. His brother scholars set them at war. But they do Abelard a greater injury. One day while they are joking together, he expresses his wonder at the barrenness of theologians, who were always merely repeating each other, and following in the track of old commentators; who could never venture to grapple with the text of Scripture, or of the Fathers themselves. He is asked whether he would dare to become an expositor of some book which was not much read, and in which he had not much prepared himself. He undertakes the task. The prophecy of Ezekiel, as being particularly obscure, is chosen for the trial. He is advised that he ought to devote himself to some preparatory studies. He answers with contempt, that it is not his custom to trust to experience, but to intuition; and insists that they shall not evade the trial upon which he is willing to enter. Few came to the first lecture. Those who were present extolled it so highly that numbers appeared at the second and third. He is solicited to

Abelard studying Divinity.

Sketch of a Theologian.

Abelard starts as a Theological Teacher.

The Expositor of Scripture.

transcribe his commentary. Anselm, at the instigation of two of his fellow-students, interferes to prevent it, pretending that his own character might be compromised. In proportion to the opposition which he encounters is his fame. He returns to Paris to the schools from which he had been formerly expelled, finishes the commentary which he had begun at Laon, becomes more popular as a theologian even than he had been as a dialectician. Money, as well as fame, he says, poured in upon him.

Abelard's glory.

Beginning of his fall.

12. "But seeing," says Abelard, "that prosperity always puffs up fools, and that the world's tranquillity enervates the vigour of the mind, and loosens it by the temptations of the flesh, as I fancied I was now the one philosopher that was left in the world, and dreaded no longer molestations from any one, I that had hitherto lived as it behoves a philosopher and divine to live, now began to give the reins to my appetite." Not that it was possible for him to sink into the utter grossness into which so many ecclesiastics and monks of the time were plunged. It was through his intellect that his degradation came. It was through the worship of the intellect that shame and sorrow were prepared for his victim.

Heloisa.

"There was," he says, "in the city of Paris, a young maiden named Heloisa, the niece of a certain canon, named Fulbert, who, as he loved her very dearly, took great pains that she might have all facilities in the study of letters. In face she was not insignificant; in her abundance of learning she was unparalleled. And because this gift is rare in women, so much the more did it make this girl illustrious through the whole kingdom." The clergyman and philosopher tells his story plainly. He attempts to make out no good case for himself. He singled out this girl from the number whom his fame and beauty attracted. He profited by her passion for knowledge, as well as by the covetousness and ambition of Fulbert. He established himself in his house, was intrusted with the entire guardianship of Heloisa, wondered at the simplicity of a man who could trust a lamb to a wolf, and accomplished the ruin which he had purposed. There was no surprise on his part, no sudden gust of passion. He describes it as a deliberate plot; he knew perfectly what he was doing. The story is very frightful, and it has the clearest tokens of veracity. The self-glorifying intellect, the man who had exhausted all dialectical reasonings, and understood all the maxims of theology, could sin in no way but this. The diabolical contrivance must have predominated over passion and appetite, and converted them both into its instruments. It is a proof of the sincerity of Abelard's repentance, that he puts no gloss upon the story, covers it with no veil of sentiment. The effect upon his studies was what might be imagined, "It was horribly tedious to me to go into the schools, and to stay in them." Just what he had scorned his contemporaries for being, he became

Her fate.

Deliberate wickedness of Abelard.

himself. There was no more wit and invention; he was a mere repeater of other men's discoveries and doctrines. He could produce songs now and then, as he had done of old; but they were amatory, not philosophical. They obtained currency, however, and were often sung by those whose practice and discipline had been in the court of love.

13. The scholars mourned the degeneracy of the sage. All knew the cause of it before it was suspected by Fulbert. Heloisa escaped from his house. A child was born, which was called Astrolabius. The uncle dissembled his fury for a while that he might enforce a marriage. Abelard consented. Heloisa alone, with the most vehement arguments, besought him to leave her in her disgrace, and not to sacrifice his position and his future influence by entering into bonds which must be fatal to him. It is wonderful to read these arguments, to see how entirely absorbed she was in affection for him, how perfectly indifferent to her own character and reputation,—still more wonderful to see how little she had lost her faith in him as a philosopher or a divine, how impossible it was for her to impute the evil to him from which she had suffered so intolerably. In spite of her remonstrances the marriage took place. Fulbert proclaimed it; the bride denied it, betook herself to a convent near Paris, where she had been educated, and clothed herself in the garments of a novice. A frightful vengeance followed. Heloisa, at the command of her husband, took the veil, declaring that she did it merely in obedience to him and from no other motive, lamenting his misery and not her own. Abelard himself in shame, as he declares, and not in devotion, entered the Abbey of St. Dionysius.

The catastrophe.

Heloisa opposing a marriage.

14. The broken and crushed man had not nearly sounded the depths of the suffering into which he was to fall, though, in a moral sense, every step of his history from this time is upwards. He had not been long in the Abbey, before a number of clerks implored both him and the Abbot of his convent that he would not hide the great talents that had been committed to him in a napkin, but would do now for the honour of God what hitherto he had done for the sake of money or of fame, would consider himself set apart by the most tremendous discipline to be the philosopher not of the world, but of God. These arguments had all the more effect upon Abelard, because the convent to which he had come was one of the vilest of the time,—the Abbot an example of all corruption to his house. The brothers were rejoiced to be freed from Abelard's presence. He was not less pleased to escape from them, by becoming the lecturer to the multitudes who flocked from all quarters to a cell where he established himself. The crowds there, he tells us, that flowed to hear him, could find neither food sufficient to nourish them, nor places to dwell in. To them he lectured mainly on divine topics, using his human knowledge "only

Abelard after his fall.

His popularity returning

as a hook," he says, "whereby they might be drawn to the study of the true philosophy."

His book on the Trinity.

15. A remark which we have already repeated to weariness, respecting the relation in which the belief in the Trinity stands to all the Middle Age philosophy, must be recollected in the 11th century, or Abelard's life and its connection with his time will be unintelligible. It was during his residence in the Monastery of St. Dionysius, that he composed a book on the Trinity in Unity, which had a most serious influence upon his after fortunes. His account of the matter is this. The scholars begged him to write a treatise on this subject, in which human and philosophical reasons might be adduced, "because," they said, "it seemed to them an idle thing to bring forth a multitude of words which the intelligence did not go along with, and that nothing could be believed unless it was understood, and that it was ridiculous for any one to preach to others what neither he nor they whom he taught could receive with their intellects; the Lord himself saying, that such were blind leaders of the blind." There was a general delight, he says, at the treatise when it came forth, those who had been exercised with questions on the subject finding the solution which they wanted. Thereupon two of his old enemies, pupils respectively of William and Anselm, both of whom were now dead, accused him to their Archbishop, and by his means induced the Bishop, who was then acting as the papal Legate in Gaul, to summon a Council at Soissons. When he came there he found the people much incensed against him, almost ready to stone him, because they heard he believed in three Gods. He presented himself and his book to the Legate, declared that if he had written anything which departed from the Catholic faith, he was ready to retract it and to make satisfaction, then defended his principles so successfully, that the popular feeling and the feeling of the council were inclining in his favour. One of his opponents accused him of denying that God had begotten Himself, which he must hold if he supposed that the Only-begotten Son was God, bidding him at the same time support himself, if he could, not by arguments but by authority. He instantly produced a passage from Augustine which expressly rejected that phrase as unorthodox and monstrous. The opponent replied, that this passage was to be understood in a certain sense. "By all means," said Abelard. "I thought you wanted the *words*. If you wish me to consider the *sense*, I shall be prepared to discuss the question at any moment." The double answer, he says, incensed his rival so much, that he swore neither his reasons nor his authority should be of any avail to him. The threat was fulfilled. The Bishop of Chartres in vain counselled moderation and fairness. The Legate wavered, but was at last overcome. Finally, the book was burnt before his eyes. All his previous disgraces and sufferings, he frankly confesses, seemed to him less than this one. For a time he appears to have been utterly crushed by it; though afterwards he could acknowledge the mercy of God in humbling his intellectual pride, as He had before punished his animal self-indulgence.

Arguments by which he is induced to undertake it.

Abelard before a Council.

The book burnt.

His offence against French traditions.

16. In his own monastery, Abelard had to sustain persecutions for a very different reason. The question, so sacred in the minds of Frenchmen, whether their Dionysius was really Dionysius the Areopagite, was rashly mooted by him while he was lecturing on the Acts of the Apostles. No moral crime or theological heresy could have been so atrocious as this doubt. A solemn meeting of the Brethren was called. It was resolved to deliver up the philosopher to the king of France as a traitor against his crown and dignity. Abelard, almost desperate, fled to the protection of Count Theobald. In his dominions one of the curious vicissitudes of his life occurred. He dwelt like one of the old hermits in a desert. But crowds from all the cities around came to hear him. "We have gained nothing," said his opponents, as he reports, "by persecuting him. His fame is only spreading the wider." His scholars brought him the means of livelihood in return for his spiritual food. He felt that there was consolation in the midst of his troubles. He built an Oratory, and dedicated it to the Paraclete. This act was turned against him. It was not usual, they said, to dedicate temples to the Holy Spirit; it indicated heresy, if it was not heretical.

His Oratory.

His relation with Bernard.

17. It is scarcely possible that such an act as this could have seemed very shocking to the great teacher of the age, Bernard of Clairvaux. It is doubtful whether, of his own accord, he would have meddled with Abelard for any of his offences. He had listened, it would seem, to some of the lectures of the great dialectician when he was in the height of his popularity at Paris, and had not discovered the danger which was lurking in them. Yet the danger could scarcely have been less at that period, when Abelard was revelling in pride and self-exaltation, when he was on the edge of the greatest moral debasement. Possibly Bernard regarded him at that time merely as the most astute of logicians. He may have felt that his own province was entirely different, that he was looking on all subjects from an opposite point of view, that it would not be wise to attempt an estimate of disagreements without discovering first what they had in common. Many have wished for Bernard's sake, as well as Abelard's, that he had maintained the same neutrality to the end; that, content with his own high position and mighty influence, he had left it to a better Wisdom to decide what there was of wheat, what of tares, in the doctrine which his contemporary was sowing. It could not be so, however, at that time, nor perhaps in any time. A man occupying the place which Bernard occupied, is seldom allowed to judge for him-

Bernard of himself disposed to leave Abelard alone.

self whom he shall interfere with or let alone. Some admiring friend, some zealous pupil, is sure to suggest flattering thoughts of his power and the responsibility which it involves, and to rebuke him bitterly for his indolence in suffering dangerous opinions to spread, which a few words from his lips might silence. William, Abbot of Thierry, fulfilled this office on the present occasion. He was one of those who caught so much of the style and expression of the great divine, that certain treatises of his have been mistaken for Bernard's, and included in editions of his works. His letter to the Abbot of Clairvaux, and to Godfrey, Bishop of Chartres, is exactly what one might have expected from so sedulous an imitator, he being also a zealous, somewhat officious, man. It is a fac-simile of hundreds which have been sent forth in different periods. He has lately become acquainted with some of Abelard's views on the Trinity; he collects a series of heretical propositions which he has deduced from his books; he has heard of two others, one called "Sic et non;" he has not read them, but the titles are enough, and he has no doubt the contents correspond to them. He is utterly shocked that the great leaders of the Church, the lights of the age, should allow such heresies to spread and take no notice of them. He alludes to his own insignificance, &c. It is evident from Bernard's answer that he is not much obliged to his correspondent for imposing a new task upon him; he has more than enough on his hands. Still he must not be silent. He has glanced at the offensive book, and thinks that it deserves the censure of the Abbot of Thierry. He will look more at it after Easter.

The remonstrances of the Abbot of Thierry.

His letter. No. 326, in the letters of St. Bernard.

Epistola, 327, S. B.

18. There could be no doubt as to the result. The last infirmity of Bernard's very noble mind was, that he must meddle in all kinds of business, whether it was such as suited his character and his peculiar powers or not. He was evidently very much at the mercy of such men as William of Thierry. Strokes by their rods called forth some of the better springs in his mind, and some of those also which were less pure. He would, we think, have shown more faith in God if he had not believed that he was obliged to write letters to Pope Innocent, or to the Council of Sens, or to different bishops, against Peter Abelard. But it was quite inevitable that if he did once come into contact with the books or with the man, he should be revolted by them. When we assign the reason, we shall surprise some of our readers,—perhaps we shall seem to be uttering a very impertinent paradox. Bernard did not dislike Abelard mainly as a rebel against authority, but as outraging what he conceived to be the divine Charity or Love. Righteousness was not as much the foundation of his mind as it was of Anselm's. He was not nearly so just a man. But no writer of any age has dwelt more upon Love as constituting the very being and nature of God; and as the perfection of man, because he is made in the image of

Bernard obeys.

Why Bernard must dislike Abelard.

God. This is the characteristical feature of his mind; in it, we believe, lay the secret of his power. The idea of the Trinity was in him the idea of the absolute, all-embracing Love. Any other basis of Divinity he abhorred. The intellectual conceptions of Abelard were indifferent to him when they were applied to any other subject, were utterly offensive when they were applied to Theology. The explanations which were welcomed with so much enthusiasm by Abelard's youthful hearers, were to him the dry hard substitutes for a living truth. That which appeared to quicken and inspire them, smelt in his nostrils of the grave and the charnel-house. Was he right or wrong? If we ventured to pronounce on such a subject, which we have no right to do, it must be in the words which gave such offence to poor William of Thierry, *Sic et non*. That Abelard was in the state of mind to enter upon the deepest of all subjects, we do not believe. There never had been, there was not then, the moral basis in his character, apart from which all thoughts and speculations about the Godhead must be unreal and unsatisfactory. And this consideration applies directly to the charge of Tritheism, which was brought against him. Bernard might have a good right to say, that without a foundation of Love there could be no unity, Logic could give only separation. But, on the other hand, we are not prepared to affirm that Abelard was not doing a positive good to all ages in showing how far logic could go and could not go. We are not prepared to say, that he was not meeting a necessity of *that* age when he led the youths, who hung upon his lips, to believe that Divinity was not a mere collection of terms, that God opens a more inward eye in the mind of those who desire to behold Him, but does not put out the eye which He has given them already. Under Bernard's faith and Bernard's love, a set of dry dogmatists who believed nothing and loved nothing, were hiding their own dislike of all thought, their own dread lest God and the universe should prove to be nothing. Could he be right in affording countenance and protection to these?

Bernard's idea of Charity. Read as a specimen of his doctrine and character the 11th Epistle.

His charity makes him intolerant of Abelard's formal distinctions.

But leads him to protect some who were more thoroughly formalists.

19. Whatever we or others may think of Bernard's conduct to Abelard, there was one whose judgment upon it was very decisive. The Theologian had not quite forgotten the woman whom he had so greatly wronged. The mode in which their intercourse was renewed was, perhaps, the best possible. Heloisa and her Nuns were driven from their convent; the husband had left the valley in which he had built the offensive chapel; he gave it up with the buildings adjoining it to their use. But they did not begin a correspondence till the book of calamities had fallen into the hands of Heloise. When she had read it, she could forbear no longer. She poured forth her feelings of indignation against her husband's enemies, of reverence for his gifts, of inextinguishable love for himself, of complaint that he had never written to her, though besides her

Heloise and her Nuns.

Style of her Letters.

own claims upon him, he was bound to act as spiritual adviser to the sisters for whom he had provided a home. With severe but most affectionate faithfulness she expresses her fears that what others have said of him may be true, that his love for her may have been wholly sensual and earthly, and may have perished when the outward indulgence of it was no longer possible. The letter is written with marvellous frankness and carelessness of conventual proprieties, like a person who was by no means sure that she did not love a man better than God, and yet wished Him to read her whole heart. She is entirely free from the affectation which Pope attributes to her. There is no nonsense about writing the name by accident and blotting it out with her tears. She writes it boldly and deliberately, joins with it all the tenderest epithets which any wife could use in addressing her husband, and declares at the same time she had never sought that title, and that he knows she would not have exchanged her former relation to him to be Empress of Germany. The answer of Abelard to this epistle has often been censured as cold, formal, and heartless. Compared with what called it forth, it may merit such epithets. But it does not strike us as on the whole dishonourable to his character. He writes with the constraint of a man who knew inwardly that the heavy charge which Heloise brought against him was true, who under the weight of that consciousness found himself treated as a Confessor and a Divine, who was the author of all that was wrong in the feelings that were laid bare before him, who was obliged to look up with reverence and shame to the revelation of a higher and better mind in her who, nevertheless, accepted him with unfeigned humility as her guide in the right way. A position so strange and anomalous may surely excuse much that may seem to the reader dry and cold. It is evident, we think, that he had more real affection, because more real reverence, for Heloise than he had ever had before. These feelings were in fact just beginning to awaken in his mind. The absence of reverence both towards his fellow-creatures and towards God had been *the* defect in a soul which possessed many rare gifts. If there is an awkwardness and timidity in the expression of this newly-formed habit, we certainly see no cause for wonder, but rather for thankfulness that by any instrument or through any discipline such a treasure should be granted to a man who had reached Abelard's age and fallen into his transgressions.

Abelard's answer.

Strangeness of his position.

Abelard's latest friend.

20. But we must not dwell longer upon these letters, much as they illustrate the tendencies of the period and the relations of the schoolman and the man. What remains of Abelard's present history shall be told in the words of a divine who, in a history of the Church or of Literature, would deserve much more than the transient notice we can bestow upon him. Peter of Clugni, always

Peter of Clugni.

the friend and admirer of Bernard, was not seldom his antagonist, because their views of the cloister life were so widely different. The Abbot of Clugni would have wished the Monk to be rather an example to men of the world of what they might become, than the type of a kind of life which was in opposition to theirs. He feared that a grievously stringent rule would lead ultimately to a terrible laxity. He wished Letters always to be the handmaids of devotion. Though such an idea was not one which naturally belonged to this age of sharp and definite contrasts—though it could not effect what was effected either by the champion of Devotion or of Dialectics, Peter of Clugni did not live in vain. His kindly and Christian spirit could do something to reconcile their opposing claims—at all events to make the grave a bond of peace between those who in life had been bitterly opposed.

21. Our first extract is from a letter "to the Supreme Pontiff and our especial Father Pope Innocent." "Master Peter," he says, "well known as I think to your Wisdom, lately coming from France, passed through Clugny. I asked him whither he was going. He said that being weighed down by the vexations of certain who laid on him the name of Heretic, which was very hateful to him, he was approaching to the Apostolical Majesty, and wished to take refuge with it. I praised his intention, and advised him to flee to that common refuge, and assured him that the apostolical justice, which was never wanting to any stranger, would not be wanting to him. I promised him that its compassion, if there was need of it, would be open to him. Meantime came the Abbot of Citeaux to treat about peace between Peter and the Abbot of Clairvaux. I did what I could for that reconciliation, and urged him to go to Bernard. I added this to my admonition, that if he had written or spoken anything that offended Catholic ears, he should at the solicitation of him (Bernard) and of other good and wise men, remove it from his words and erase it from his books. So it came to pass. He went, he returned, and announced to us that through the mediation of the Abbot of Citeaux he had had a peaceful meeting with the Abbot of Clairvaux, all past grudges being set at rest. Meantime, admonished by us, but rather, as I think, inspired by God, he has dismissed the tumults of schools and studies, and chosen for himself a dwelling in your Clugny. Which desire of his, thinking that it accorded with his age, his weakness, his religion, and believing that his knowledge, which is not unknown to you, might be of the greatest benefit to a multitude of our brethren, I have readily assented to; and if it shall be pleasing to your goodness it will be a delight to all of us, who are, as you know, your care, that he should stay with us. Be pleased then to grant that he may spend the rest of his days, which perchance are not many, in your Clugny, and that he may not be driven by the eagerness

Letters from Clugny.

Reconciliation.

Abelard's desire for rest.

of any from that roof to which as a sparrow he has fled, from that nest which as a dove he rejoices to have found."

The Monk and the Abbess.

22. A much longer epistle is addressed to Heloise. It opens with expressions of the admiration and affection with which the old Monk recollects the lady of whom he had heard in his youth as devoting herself to letters, "wherein she surpassed not only all women, but nearly all men; and who in her later years had given herself to still nobler pursuits, who being now a wholly sacrificed and truly philosophical woman, had chosen the Gospel in preference to Logic, the Apostle to Physics, Christ to Plato, the Cloister to the Academy." Then follows a good deal about Penthesilea and Deborah, which belongs to the time, and which we may pass over; then a wish expressed with much chivalry and brotherly love, that she and her sisters could have taken up their abode in his Clugny.

Last news of Abelard.

"But," he adds, coming to the business of his letter, "this is denied us by that providence of God which disposes of all things, as far as you are concerned; albeit, one great favour has been granted to us. That same divine disposition has sent to us in the last years of his life him who was thine, that ever-to-be honoured servant and true philosopher of Christ, Master Peter. I consider that in him God enriched our Clugny with a treasure above gold or precious stones. How humble, holy, and devoted his conversation among us was, a short letter could not declare. I do not recollect ever to have seen one that equalled him in every indication of humility. . . . . Oftentimes I have wondered,

His final victory.

I have been almost confounded, that a man of so great and so widely spread fame should so despise himself and make light of himself. . . . . He was constant in reading, frequent in prayer, given to silence. . . . . By his mind, by his tongue, by his work, he was ever teaching, manifesting, confessing that which was divine, that which was philosophical, that which tended to edification. As this simple, honest, God-fearing, evil-shunning man was much oppressed by pains of body, I looked out for him a place which excels every other in our part of Burgundy for the amenity of its soil and climate. There, as far as his sickness permitted, recalling his old studies, he was ever devoted to books, so that what was said of the great Gregory may be said of him, that he allowed no moment to pass by him in which he was not either praying or reading or writing, or dictating. In such exercises the coming of the divine Visitor found him, not sleeping but waking, and called him not as a foolish but as a wise virgin to the eternal nuptials, for he had with him a lamp full of oil, that is to say, a conscience which testified of a holy life. How holily, how devotedly, in what a Catholic spirit he first made con-

The Dialectician becomes a little child.

fession of his faith, then of his sins; with what an affection of heart he received the food for his journey, the pledge of eternal life, the

Body of the Redeemer; how faithfully he commended his body and soul to Him; our brothers are witness, and the whole society of that Monastery. Thus Master Peter finished his days, and he who was known throughout the world for an unparalleled master of science, persevering in the learning of Him who said 'learn of Me for I am meek and lowly of heart,' passed, as we have a right to believe, into His presence."

New lights, or Abelard's position and intellect.

23. The Book of Calamities and the correspondence with Heloise were for a long time without any commentary except what was furnished by certain theological writings of Abelard. These were manifestly insufficient to explain the passages in the biography which have reference to his dialectical exploits. They were not even sufficient to illustrate those passages which directly refer to him as a theologian, the other character being, as we have seen, that which was evidently predominant in him. The world is therefore under very great obligations to M. Cousin for the discovery which, either in his own person or through some of his fellow-labourers, he made in the King's library at Paris, of a whole treatise on logic, of various commentaries on Boethius and Porphyry, and above all, of an Essay on Genera and Species, which are probably genuine works of Abelard. The learned exposition and historical sketch with which the Editor has accompanied them, add immensely to their value, and may well secure our forgiveness for any extravagant language in which he has indulged respecting Abelard as the first champion of free inquiry; that praise itself being considerably modified by the remarks which M. Cousin has made respecting Roscellinus and William of Champeaux, when he has descended from the panegyrist into the philosophical historian. No student of Middle Age philosophy ought to overlook this introduction, though no one, we think, should hastily take its statements or its method for granted. The former will sometimes suggest important corrections of the latter. We are not quite sure whether M. Cousin's ingenious and plausible arguments establish the fact that Abelard was the pupil of Roscellinus at a very early age in Brittany, and overthrow the strong negative argument which has been drawn from the omission of his name in the Book of Calamities. But, supposing that point to be proved, it will lead us to conclusions respecting the history of this period which appear to us very sound, but which are not the same with those of M. Cousin.

See the Introduction to Œuvres inédites d'Abelard pour servir à l'histoire de la Philosophie Scolastique en France Publiées par M. Victor Cousin. Paris, 1836.

Great value of M. Cousin's historical Elucidations.

Roscellinus: his connection with Anselm of Bec.

Our first knowledge of Roscellinus is derived from a treatise of Anselm, to which we merely alluded in our sketch of that philosopher, his treatise on the Trinity, and the Incarnation of the Word. It is this treatise, as M. Cousin well points out, which exhibits in an earlier form the conflict respecting Universals, to which Abelard introduces us in his remarks on William of Champeaux. Strict history therefore requires us to consider the controversy as

starting from this point. Abelard may have first separated the dialectics from the theological principles with which they were involved, then in his later days have recombined them; but they had an earlier association, the subject of Universals first became important through its connection with the doctrine about which Anselm and Roscellinus dissented.

In what the heresy of Roscellinus was alleged to consist.

24. It was not any form of Arianism, far less of Sabellianism, which Anselm imputed to his opponent. It was that opinion which is the direct opposite of Sabellianism, which Sabellianism is a contrivance to avoid. Roscellinus could conceive of three distinct persons; their unity he could not conceive of. Was there anything inconsistent with orthodoxy in his saying so? In one sense he was asserting the very maxim of the creed to which Anselm yielded the most hearty assent. The teacher of Bec undoubtedly believed this unity to be *inconceivable*, quite as much as the Breton did. But we have seen how much Anselm built upon the argument, that our power of acknowledging that which is beyond our conception proves it to exist. We have already expressed our opinion that in his discussions upon this point he was on the edge of a precipice, balancing himself no doubt with great skill, walking steadily because his eyes were upwards and not towards his feet, but still marking out a track in which many would try and scarcely any would be able to follow him, without great stumbling. He was appealing to the mind against itself; he was bringing into the strangest juxtaposition the conceiving power with that which is beyond it, and sustaining the last upon the first. The consequence was inevitable. He had no wish to do Roscellinus injustice. But he saw on the one hand that all theology was subverted—he believed that all unity among men would be subverted—if Tritheism came in under the protection of Logic. On the other hand he could not admit the impossibility which Roscellinus proclaimed, though it might be so well justified by principles which he confessed, without injuring the validity of that mode of reasoning which had become almost a part of himself and was blended with his most sacred convictions. He therefore refutes the implicit Tritheism, by a course of reasoning which, as M. Cousin has well remarked, combines the most inconsistent propositions. He treats the question as if it was only between the senses and the spiritual perception. Of course, we only see things in their separate individualities. But are we not obliged to *conceive* of something beyond that—of humanity, for instance, and not merely of a man: of colours, for instance, and not merely of that which is coloured? Plato (in his Republic) had with infinite pains vindicated the doctrine of a substantial political unity underlying the acts and thoughts of individual men. But he had as carefully endeavoured in his Theatethus to prove that colour has *no* such reality, that it is simply

Relation of this argument to that contained in the Proslogion.

The consequence to Anselm's reasoning.

The reality of colours asserted as strongly as the reality of Mankind.

a product of the eye and the object. Here we have Platonism and anti-Platonism in the strangest fellowship; and inevitably. For there is a *conception* of colour as well as a *conception* of humanity; if the reality depends upon the conception, the first is as substantial as the second; nay, it *appears* to be more substantial, because sense lends its aid to the very mental act that is set in opposition to it; the colour *is* seen, though it is never seen in that separate condition under which the mind takes account of it.

Boethius, the Latin Realist.

25. M. Cousin has justified by his high authority the remark which we have so often made in this sketch, that Boethius first dropped that seed in the Latin mind which germinated in the controversies between the Realists and Nominalists. He has vindicated also by his theory respecting the spiritual pedigree of Abelard, what we said respecting the inadequacy of the logic of Boethius to produce such grave consequences, if it had not been combined with more transcendent ideas, of which, in his formal treatises at all events, the Roman statesman appeared to take little account. But M. Cousin has not, we think, perceived how much the after history of this great struggle depends upon the blending of these apparently incongruous elements; how little we can understand what was at issue between the two parties in the schools if we violently separate their controversy from the practical one with which it was mingled and reduce it to the terms in which Porphyry and Boethius would have stated it. Abelard, perhaps warned by the dangers to which Roscellinus had been exposed—perhaps merely influenced by a just opinion that his own genius fitted him far better for dialectical than theological exercises—undoubtedly made the experiment. But we have seen from his own statement that he did not, that he could not, persevere in it. An impulse which he could not resist drew him into the vortex, from which he appeared to have escaped; whatever might be the wisdom of severing his doctrine of Universals from questions directly concerning the faith of the Church, he could not do it justice, or satisfy his own peculiar impulses, without putting forth the statements which exposed him to the indignation of Bernard and the decrees of the Council of Soissons.

Union of Logic and Theology in this strife.

Illustrations from Abelard's life

The two names which the Controversy bears.

26. In truth, the twofold name which this controversy bears is only intelligible when we are content to trace its origin historically. Modern philosophers dwell too exclusively on the words *Realism* and *Nominalism*, as if they were adequate to describe its subject and its issues. Abelard has told us how much more, in his judgment, it deserved to be called a battle concerning Universals. Before he became the pupil of Anselm of Laon,—while he was still the restless hearer or the bold defier of William of Champeaux—the question that was uppermost in his mind concerned the presence of the whole in each individual thing. How did this question arise?

What gave it, even when it exhibited itself in its driest and most technical form, such a personal and human interest? Allow anything you please for the passions of disputants which any big-or-little endian theory may arouse to madness—still the zeal of the bystanders—*their* conviction that heaven and earth were earnest spectators of the combat—demands explanation. If there was a thought—ever so imperfectly realized—that the very nature of the Being whom men worshipped, into whose name they were baptized, was involved in this logical argumentation—if the reasoners, however they might shrink from the reflection or hide it under terms of the understanding, yet ever and anon were tormented with the doubt whether what they were contending for might not contain the assertion or the denial that there was a whole, a unity, at the basis of their idea of God—that he was the All in All—does it require much experience to know that what was strongest in their minds would claim the benefit of the imputation, or would repel it; that what was pettiest would be justified and, in a certain sense, glorified?

Why it became so solemn.

Use of the words Realism and Nominalism. Why perplexing.

Greatness of the Name in divinity.

27. Is the Universal—that whole, that Unity, which we must attribute to a family, a nation, a race, merely *attributed*? is it not there? thus did the controversy respecting Universals become the controversy respecting the Real and the Nominal. But the word Real, though inevitable, was decidedly unfortunate. The argument takes gradually this shape. Is the Universal, the whole, the one, *res* a thing, or is it *nomen* a name? How often must the combatants, when this was the issue, have exchanged their rapiers and each have been wounded by his own! In divinity you must speak of a Name as that with which we are sealed; that which is to be hallowed and which is to make all else holy. This is the language of the Baptismal formula and of the Lord's Prayer.

Comparative Insignificance of the Thing.

On the other hand, thing (from 'think,' as 'res' from 'reor')—(the subject of thought) is opposed in all the highest morality to the Person, the Thinker, the Speaker, the Actor. Yet the necessity of the argument drove him who was vindicating the divine Essence as the foundation of all things to treat it as if it possessed the nature of those things. A consideration of this enormous practical difficulty—for such it was, however much it was a verbal difficulty—may well make us tolerant and kindly to both parties. But it cannot make us think lightly—far less, contemptuously—of that which occupied their whole souls. They were often lost in the smoke which they raised; in the darkness they often struck right and left at friend and foe. But it was absolutely needful that the fight should be fought out; if the dread of killing each other for trifles had led them to conclude a hasty and unsatisfactory peace, all generations would have been the worse for it.

28. The fragment of Abelard on Genera and Species, the most

valuable of all the documents which the diligence of M. Cousin has rescued for us, was written apparently in his later days, when he had leisure to review the whole subject, and when he had learned to do justice to some of the opponents of whom in his Book of Calamities he had spoken hastily. Theology, which he had avoided through preference for Dialectics in early days, into which he had plunged from logical necessity and from ambition in his middle age, might now be regarded more in its moral aspects. He had probably made his peace with the Doctors and the Pope; subdued and humbled he could have had no wish to awaken questions which had caused him so much sorrow. The treatise therefore is purely what it professes to be. But it asserts the doctrines which Abelard had always maintained on the subject of Universals. The habit of his intellect was not changed, however much his temper might be.

Fragmentum Sangermanense de Generibus et Speciebus. Œuvres, pp. 507-550

29. We may speak of a house, he says, either as a disintegrated whole or as a continuous whole. Supposing we speak of it as a continuous whole, some reason thus:—If there is a house there is a wall, and if there is a wall there is a half wall, and if there is the half wall there is the half of the half, and so on to the last stone. Therefore if there is the house, there is this last little stone, and if there is not that little stone, there is no house. State this conclusion in general terms and there is nothing startling in it. Apply it to a particular house and you become sensible of a contradiction. How then are we to get rid of a conclusion that seems inevitable? William of Champeaux, according to Abelard, escaped from it by referring to the definition of a point that has no parts. Supposing, then, you take a line consisting of two points, you may say that the part follows its whole in the first case. But when you have got so far you can proceed no farther. Therefore, generally, you cannot assume that, because a part follows its own whole, the same may be affirmed of a part of that part; in other words, there must be a limit. Without objecting to this solution, Abelard suggests another. The part of every continuous whole is either principal or secondary. The principal part is either principal in quantity or principal in essence. I may destroy more than half of Socrates and he will remain; I destroy his heart or brain, and he is destroyed. Apply this to the case of the house, considered as a continuous whole, and you may go on with your divisions of quantity as much as you please: so long as that which is essential to the house or the wall or the half wall remains, so long the house or the wall or the half wall remains. Contemplate the house again as a disintegrated whole, and then every tile or separate particle being destroyed, destroys the house. Thus, supposing I assume a flock to consist of a hundred sheep, the absence of one of these sheep destroys that flock so contemplated. But here

Disgregatum totum vel continuum.

Necessity of the part to the whole; how far it extends.

William's Solution.

The Essential and the Non-essential.

Disintegration.

again the former law will apply in the case of any particular sheep; to ascertain whether he is wanting to the flock, I must ascertain what is essential to him, what makes him that sheep.

De Socratis destructione.

30. Our readers might have wished that we should have passed over this beginning as well as a subsequent chapter, which is headed "Concerning the Destruction of Socrates," the questions raised in which may seem to them rather fantastic and the solutions unnecessary, and have proceeded at once to the remarks of Abelard on Genera and Species. But we apprehend that the preface is necessary to the right apprehension of the book. The satisfaction of this doubt about the relation of the whole to the part was not so easy in that age, is not so easy in ours, as we may conjecture when it is presented to us in the old formulæ and with the old illustrations. And it is not an insignificant fact in illustration of Abelard's character or of his philosophy, that he mixes so much of the actual house and wall with the terms which represent it, or that he carries us from a wall to a man in order to get some probable and reasonable way of solving the difficulty or even of stating it. It is not a little matter that the accomplished logician is driven so near the outset of his undertaking to talk of that which forms the essence of a building, and thence to proceed to the heart and brain as the essence of the human creature. Let us be thankful for such witnesses that words when they seem most trying to denude themselves of all associations, "do still savour of the realty." That recollection may help us better to understand some of the difficulties of the Middle Ages, when the question at issue was how much or how little of that savour they must retain.

Need of a living example.

The three opinions.

31. This treatise of Abelard explains the point of his differences with his old Master, to which he had alluded in his Book of Calamities as well as the general aspect of the Nominal and Real controversy in the 11th century. He discusses three opinions, against each of which he produces arguments of more or less ingenuity and weight; then he announces his own. The first opinion is, that there are some universal essences which exist in their totality in each individual. He states this opinion, which was the original one of William of Champeaux, thus: "There is a certain species, Man, one thing essentially. To this are superadded certain forms which make the man Socrates. Other supervenient forms, inferencing that same thing essentially in the same manner, produce Plato and other individuals. Nor is there anything in Socrates besides those forms which inform that matter which makes Socrates, which does not at the same time dwell in Plato informed with the forms of Plato." Abelard's objections are of the most plausible and obvious kind. If it is so, why may not Socrates be at the same time in Rome and at Athens? for where Socrates is,

Fingunt Essentias quasdam universales in singulis individuis totas essentialiter esse, p. 513.

Universal form, supervenient form.

there the universal man is informed to the extent of his whole quantity with Socraticity. For whatsoever the universal thing receives, it receives in its whole quantity. Wheresoever the Socraticity is in a man, there is Socrates, for Socrates is nothing but the Socratic man. The next argument is, that since health and sickness belong to the animal, if the whole animal existing in Socrates is sick, it must also be sick in Plato. He disposes triumphantly of the evasion that the universal animal may be sick, but not in so far forth as it is universal, for the singular and the universal according to this scheme become identical. The third objection is, that as the difference added to the genus makes up the species, to the genus animal you may add the difference rationality and the difference irrationality, and these will coexist in the same universal. The fourth argument takes us to a more awful ground, and shows with what tremendous questions these logical subtleties became blended and how easy it was for the disputants on either side to involve their opponents in the charges of blasphemy or of atheism. Abelard distinctly maintains that this theory of Universals involves the co-eternity of form as well as matter with God; nay, that it makes the individual man consist of two co-eternal Gods.

Humanity and Socraticity.

Grave principles involved in the controversy.

Nam æque ut materia ita et forma universalis est et ita Deo coæterna; quod quantum a vero deviet palam est.

The second opinion. p. 518.

Nunc itaque illam quæ de indifferentia est sententiam perquiramus

32. The second opinion which he controverts is that which William of Champeaux adopted after Abelard had driven him from his earlier faith respecting the presence of the universal essence in each individual thing. The new doctrine is that which is described in the Book of Calamities as the presence of the Universal not *essentially* but *indifferently* in each thing. Abelard represents it thus: "There is nothing at all except the individual; but this drawn out or expanded in different degrees becomes species and genus and that which is most general. Socrates in that nature in which he is subject to sensible observation is individual, because there is that belonging to him the whole of which is never found in another. But the intellect may forget that which is denoted by the word Socrates, and think only of that which is denoted by the word Man, that is a rational mortal animal; in this sense he is species. If again the intellect overlooks the rationality and mortality and only contemplates what the word animal denotes; in this state it is genus. But if, leaving all forms, we consider only Socrates in that which denotes substance; here is the highest generality; Socrates, therefore, as an *individual*, has nothing which is not proper to himself; but as *species*, he has that which belongs to him indifferently with all men—as genus, he has that which belongs to him indifferently with all animals. Abelard says that this position is alike inconsistent with authority and with reason. His authorities are Porphyry and Boethius. Porphyry says the species is the collection of many into one nature, and genus of still more.

How the Individual *becomes* Species and Genus.

Arguments against the Doctrine of Indifference.

But how can it be said that Socrates is the gathering up of many into one nature? Neither the man Socrates nor the animal Socrates is in anything out of Socrates. They affirm that Socrates, as man, collects Plato and all men into himself; hence, since the essence exists indifferently in the man, Socrates is Plato and he himself and Plato and a multitude of others go to form himself the species and himself the genus." The argument from reason is stated thus: "Every individual man, in so far as he is man, is affirmed by this doctrine to be a species; whence, it may be truly affirmed of Socrates. This man Socrates is species. If Socrates is species, Socrates is universal; if he is universal he is not singular, whence it follows he is not Socrates." This consequence, he says, they deny, for they affirm that every universal is singular and every singular is universal. In the ashes of Abelard there still lived the wonted fires. This attempt to confound all sacred distinctions awakens the temper which had been so much softened by his residence at Clugny. "What impudence," he exclaims, when he finds that his opponents are escaping from a precept which Boethius had declared to concern all logical divisions by the lying assertion that he only meant it in certain cases. He appears to be still more provoked when he finds them trusting in their formula "in so far forth," as if that could change facts and laws. And though we cannot work ourselves into his passionate feelings against this doctrine of Indifference, we do confess to some sympathy with him in his indignation against this very helpful resource for eluding an opponent and concealing the absence of a meaning.

p. 521. Vide quantæ impudentiæ sint!

Abelard—is he a Nominalist?

33. Abelard proceeds to his third doctrine, which would be commonly represented as the doctrine of pure Nominalism. It is so usual to describe him as the very representative of Nominalism that we must hear what he has to say against the opinion which affirms that Genera and Species are mere universal and particular names and not things. He quotes the passages from Boethius to which we referred at the beginning of this sketch, and then declares that seeing the Nominalists are not able rationally to resist these authorities which make so manifestly against them, they either say that the authorities are false, or labouring to explain them put a skin upon them because they cannot find any way of stripping them of their proper skin. But Abelard, though he may appeal to authorities, seldom rests in them; he must have his own refutation. It is this: "Just as a statue consists of brass, which is its matter, of figure which is its form, so species consists of genus which is its matter, of differentia which is its form." But to reduce these into words is impossible. Animal is the genus of man. But how can the word animal be the matter of the word man, seeing that it neither comes from it nor is in it? They answer, he says,

p. 522. Nunc illam sententiam quæ voces solas genera et species universales et particulares prædictas et subjectas asserit et non res, perquiramus.

The argument against reducing things into names.

that this whole mode of speech is figurative; genus is the material of species, that is to say, that which is signified by genus is the matter of that which is signified by species. But how, he asks, will this work? They admit nothing besides individuals, and these are denoted as well by universal as by singular words. You might just as well therefore say, that which is signified by the species is the matter of that which is signified by the genus. But if this is admitted, the whole principle of logical division, as it is laid down by all eminent authors, is subverted.

34. Having disposed of these theories, he goes on to declare his own. "Every individual is composed of matter and of forms. Socrates is in matter a man, in form Socrates. And as the Socraticity which formally constitutes Socrates is nowhere out of Socrates, so the human essence which sustains the Socraticity in Socrates is nowhere except in Socrates. I say then that species is not that essence of man only which is in Socrates or which is in any other individual, but is the whole united collection of all the distinct elements of this nature. This whole collection, although it is essentially plural, is nevertheless called by the authorities one species, one universal, one nature; as a people, although it is formed of many persons, is called one. So also the essence of this collection, which is called humanity, consists of matter and form—to wit, of the animal as its matter, but of form which is not one but plural, of rationality and mortality and bipedality, and if there are any other substantial qualities requisite thereto. And what is said of man—to wit, that that in man which sustains Socraticity does not essentially sustain Platonicity; this also is true of the animal. For that animal which sustains the form of that humanity which is in me, this is essentially not elsewhere, but dwells indifferently in the particular matter of each individual animal. This multitude then of essences of the animal, which sustains the forms of each species of animal, I would call genus, which herein is diverse from that multitude which forms species; for that is gathered from those essences alone which receive the substantial differences of diverse species. Furthermore, if we ascend upwards to the very first principle, we may assume that every essence of that multitude which is called the genus, animal, consists of some matter that is essential to body and of substantial forms, animation and sensibility, which, as has been said concerning the animal, are nowhere else essentially present; but indifferently sustain the forms of all species of body. These primary essences constitute the matter, which is the genus, as the form corporeity, when added thereto, constitutes the species. These indifferent essences also are the sustaining matter which, united with the form incorporeity, constitute the incorporeal species. And the multitude of such essences is that substance

p. 524. Quid nobis potius tenendum videatur de his Deo annuente modo ostendemus.

Matter and Form.

Essential Forms.

The most General Principle of all.

which is the most general thing of all, which is not, however, simple, but consists of mere essence as its matter and of the susceptibility of contraries as its form." He promises to explain afterwards why this substance is not to be called genus.

Sic et Non. Œuvres, pp. 2-170.

35. As our readers are probably well tired of these quiddities, we shall not trouble them with the authorities or reasons by which Abelard supports his own propositions; but shall endeavour presently to gather up as well as we can the thread of these thoughts, and to show how they bear on the philosophy as well as the life of the period. But we shall be better able to estimate the position of this remarkable man if we give a very brief account of one of his theological treatises, the title of which has already occurred in the course of our sketch. That title, *Sic et Non*, Yes and No, in fact contains the meaning of the book. It contains little of the author himself, and yet, perhaps, it throws more light upon his mind than any of his most elaborate and original works could have done. He states in the prologue that many words of holy men seem not only diverse but contradictory; that, nevertheless, we are not to judge them, seeing that the world is to be judged by them; that we are not to accuse them of being false or despise them as erroneous, seeing that the Lord hath said, "he who heareth you, heareth me, and he that despiseth you, despiseth me." They have the Spirit, he says, we have not. Their words are often unfamiliar to us and puzzling; they were often taught to vary them, that the repetition might not produce satiety. He proceeds to state many other causes of perplexity, which are well worth the reader's consideration, but which do not directly concern us, and then concludes. "These things premised, we have thought it good to collect the divers sayings of the Holy Fathers, as they have occurred to our memory, containing some question which they appear to raise by their dissonance, so that the reader may be excited to the greater energy in inquiring for truth, and may be made more acute in the pursuit of it. For this is the first key to wisdom, assiduous and frequent interrogation." He supports himself by the authority of Aristotle, then proceeds. "By doubting we come to inquiry; by inquiry we perceive the truth, as He who is the Truth said, 'seek and ye shall find, knock and it shall be opened to you.' Which lesson he also confirmed by his own example, at twelve years old sitting in the midst of the doctors asking them questions, rather assuming the form of a disciple by questioning than of a Master by preaching, albeit there was in Him the full and perfect wisdom of God."

Preface. Reasons of the Treatise.

Doubt and Search.

Subjects of Sic et Non.

36. We shall simply enumerate the heads of some of the chapters of this book, which are not only curious in themselves, but which will prepare us for the form into which some of the most orthodox writings of the following century were cast. The first

chapter contains a series of testimonies from the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, apparently favouring the position that Faith is to be sustained by human reason and apparently contradicting it. The second contains a similar balance of opinions on the question whether faith is wholly conversant with things that do not appear. The third proposes statements *pro* and *contra* the maxim that our faith is to be in God only. The fourth is on the point whether knowledge as well as faith, or only faith, has reference to things that do not appear. The articles from the fifth to the twenty-fifth contain different, apparently adverse, propositions concerning the Trinity, the points which drew so much obloquy on Abelard being dwelt upon, but not with any seemingly controversial design. The twenty-sixth gives conflicting judgments on the question whether the old philosophers believed in a Trinity and a Divine Word. Propositions concerning prescience and predestination occupy the chapters from the twenty-sixth to the thirtieth; the origin and nature of sin and its relation to God, the two following; the possibility or impossibility of resisting God's will, the relation of His will to His power and His acts and His knowledge, several more.

Object of Abelard in this Treatise

37. If Bernard's friend and counsellor had possessed even the slight knowledge of this book which our readers may obtain from these specimens of its topics and its design, his judgment would probably have been at least as severe as the one which he arrived at from merely hearing its name. Nevertheless we must not conceal our opinion that the intentions of the writer were strictly honest; that he had no secret purpose of undermining the reputation of the Church teachers by making a display of their seeming contradictions; that he did believe they were not at variance with themselves, and that the truth which they desired to enforce would be more thoroughly and practically embraced, if a student would give himself the trouble of considering how two clashing assertions can have dwelt together in the mind of the same man, than if he hastily rejected either and took the one which was most convenient for some temporary service. That there was a characteristic rashness in this course we do not deny; if Abelard had pretended that he himself had found out the receipt for solving all puzzles, we must have used a harsher word and spoken of a self-conceit which also may be called, at least in one stage of his life, characteristic. But we are not sure that his rashness did not on the whole conduce to safety and prevent, instead of foster, the tendency to incredulity which the disputatious temper of the times was encouraging. And we are not sure that such a collection may not serve much better to keep an earnest seeker humble, self-distrustful, eager for divine help, than a collection of phrases from high authorities, adduced to sustain some conclusion which

Boldness of the plan.

the student boasts of as his, and in which he may trust much more than in God Himself.

Abelard's disclaimer of Spiritual Illumination.

38. The greatest blot in this treatise is, it seems to us, to be found in that passage of it which the Author regarded, and many of his readers probably will regard, as the most modest which he ever wrote. When he declares that the Fathers of old had the Spirit of God, and that he and his contemporaries were bound to pay them reverence because *they* had not, we believe he made a disclaimer which no Christian man has a right to make—one which involves at the same time an abject slavery to the past, and an incapacity of appreciating the treasures of the past. If the Fathers wrote whatever was good and universal in their works, whatever was not the result of the crudities of their minds or of their age, under the guidance of a higher Spirit than their own, Abelard could only divine their meaning, could only enter into sympathy with them, in so far as he was illuminated by that same Spirit. Without this aid, he could only listen to the sounds which came from their lips, read the letters which were shaped by their pens, not understand the men who uttered the sounds, and wielded the pens.

False Modesty the cause of Arrogance.

In this fatal mock humility lay, we conceive, the secret of much of his arrogance. He was conscious of a discernment which was far beyond that of the majority of the men around him, a discernment of the sense that was in books, of the laws of the intellect by which books are composed, and to which they address themselves. It would have been a lie to pretend that he had not this discernment. He had not the courage to attribute it to a higher Wisdom than his own; he, therefore, gave himself credit for it. And so, as we have seen, he came, sometimes deservedly, sometimes undeservedly, under the censure of men like Bernard, who, whatever their theory on the subject might be, whatever their deference to the Doctors of other times, acted on the conviction that they had a Divine Spirit with them, and attributed all the true operations of their minds to His agency. Because they had that faith, there was a unity in their deeds and lives which Abelard was seeking for, but can scarcely be said to have found. He had a subtlety in distinction which did not belong to them; but he did not find how distinctions are reconciled, what truth lies beneath them and justifies them.

Abelard's knowledge of Aristotle.

39. Abelard's skill in distinguishing, great as it was, suffered seriously from this want. We have allowed him to explain for himself the doctrine by which he hoped to escape from the errors of several classes of Realists as well as from those of the Nominalists. If our readers should be able to recall the passages which we quoted from the Metaphysics of Aristotle respecting Matter and Form, they may fancy that they have detected the teacher from whom the Breton derived his solution. But they must beware

how they hasten to that conclusion. It is exceedingly doubtful whether Abelard possessed even an indifferent translation of the Metaphysics, whether he knew the great master at all, except through Boethius and Porphyry. Perhaps a more careful comparison of their opinions on this subject may greatly strengthen that doubt. At all events, if Abelard read Aristotle, he must either have misunderstood him or have deliberately departed from his instructions. For it cannot escape any thoughtful reader, that the Greek and the Latin are directly opposed to each other as to the relation between the two constituents which they assume in every subject which we contemplate. *Form* is with Aristotle the ground of the house, the tree, the man—that which makes it what it is; *Matter* is that which is necessary to make it actual, to bring it into the circle of other existences. With Abelard Matter is the essential, Form is superinduced upon it. A more striking illustration can hardly be found of the contrast between the greatest logician of the Greek and the greatest we have yet met with in the Latin world. The one, though the opposer of ideas in the Platonical sense, yet must have the invisible incorporeal Eidos at the root of all his conceptions; the other when he is most aiming at intellectual subtlety must still base his thoughts upon that which he can see and handle. *A priori*, one would have expected that the Christian divine, in whatever other respects he was inferior to the Pagan philosopher, would have more easily and immediately acknowledged a spiritual substance, a spiritual foundation. It is not so. And we think Abelard's confession in the preface to the *Sic et non*, has shown us why it is not so. The Greek could see that there was implied in the very existence of everything visible, an invisible; without which it would *appear* only and not *be*. The Christian, not acknowledging a spiritual bond between the Divine Creator and himself, is driven by his very belief in a Maker of the world to regard Him first of all as the Maker of what is visible and tangible; so this becomes unawares the first in his own conception. Though he feels that his own thoughts are higher than the things that they deal with, he cannot persuade himself that these things have not an older and a more substantial being than those thoughts or than whatever is homogeneous with them.

Abelard reverses Aristotle's doctrine respecting Matter and Form.

Why Abelard's Christianity did not assist him in understanding Aristotle's dogma.

40. In these remarks we have said all that it is needful to say here respecting Abelard's mode of cutting the knot which his different contemporaries had not been able to untie. The experiment was of real worth. The man who made it, showed that he had a far keener intellect than had been granted to his opponents or to any of his fellow-workers. His solution was one which affected all the after history of scholastical philosophy, which was adopted consciously or unconsciously by many who regarded him as a heretic, which is recognized in the speculations and in the practice of

Worth of Abelard's solution of the Realist and Nominalist difficulty.

many in later times who despise him as a mere word-fighter. But it entirely failed to terminate the controversy; it could not satisfy the minds of those who accepted it. There were truths and principles involved in the strife upon which all the skill of a series of dialecticians would be exercised, and which dialecticians would at last be found utterly unable to vindicate or to overthrow.

Ritter Geschichte der Philosophie v. 7, p. 362, note 2

NOTE.—[It ought not to be concealed from the reader that Ritter attributes the treatise, "De Generibus et Speciebus," which Cousin claims for Abelard, to Joscelin, Bishop of Soissons, or to one of his disciples. The grounds for this positive conclusion appear to us very weak. They rest upon a passage in John of Salisbury who, with Gauslenus, the Bishop of to this effect:—"There are some, moreover, Soissons, attribute universality to things collected into one, and take it away from individual things." This Ritter maintains to be the doctrine of the treatise, and thereupon refers it to a person or a school, otherwise very little known to us. His arguments against M. Cousin's conclusions have more weight, though he has not stated his opponent's case fairly. It is admitted that there is no name of an author on the manuscript. The assignment of it must therefore depend upon little points of evidence chiefly internal. Cousin rests too much perhaps upon the allusions which are made in it to William of Champeaux, and takes too much for granted a very ingenious emendation of his own of *Indifferenter* for *Individualiter*, in the passage in the Book of Calamities which describes the controversy between Abelard and his old master. But that correction, to say the least, is exceedingly plausible, and if it is admitted, the statement of William of Champeaux's views in the treatise on Genera and Species, throws wonderful light upon what was before an obscure and scarcely intelligible statement. To say, as Ritter does, that Cousin has no better plea for his opinion than the notion that there are but three possible doctrines—Nominalism, Realism, and Conceptualism—and that since Abelard did not embrace either of the two former, he must have embraced the last, which is the one defended in this treatise, is to caricature the love of system, which is no doubt the infirmity of all clever Frenchmen, but which does not display itself with any peculiar extravagance in this instance. For Cousin distinctly affirms, on the plain evidence of the treatise itself, that there were several different modes under which Realism could be contemplated, and merely maintains, what Ritter himself is obliged to confess, that Abelard was not, as is vulgarly supposed, a Nominalist. The evidence which the German critic deduces from a comparison of the style in which Abelard ordinarily wrote with that of the treatise, will have little effect upon an English reader who has been sated with that kind of argument in the case of Junius and a hundred other authors. When scales are nearly balanced, a feather may make one of them sink; but suggestions about style are lighter than feathers. An author changes his style with the changes of his subject, of his temper, of his digestion. Each reader changes his opinion about the resemblances of the style in one book and another, as he is inclined to establish the identity or the diversity of the authors. In fact, style must have reference to some accidents without or some principles within. And in this and in all cases, we shall judge about it correctly or incorrectly as we judge correctly or incorrectly of the spirit of the person who uses it. We do not hesitate to say, that we think Cousin has entered more into the spirit of Abelard than Ritter has done,—that he knows the man better, partly because he loves him better. Though we have presumed to differ from him in several points, and though we accept his authority with some hesitation on this, we are inclined to think and hope that he may have divined rightly the source from which the book on Genera and Species proceeded. If not, we trust our readers will judge us tolerantly for having fallen into this error, rather than into the more wilful one of ascribing the book to the Bishop of Soissons].

Why Bernard cannot strictly be compared with Abelard.

41. Abelard has been always supposed to present one phase of this period, Bernard the opposite phase. This is, on the whole, a true statement. Yet Bernard, if we take in his relations with Dukes, Kings, Popes, Crusaders, is too busy a man to be exactly compared with a student, however much that student may have influenced his time, and however much his personal life may be mixed with his philosophical. The most direct opposite of Abelard is perhaps Hugo de St. Victore. It is common to speak of him as a mystic, and the head of a mystical school. These words will not perhaps convey any very distinct impression to our readers, as they do not to us. They are the cold formal generalizations of a later period, commenting on men with whom it has no sympathy. They scarcely help us more than the distinctions which are sometimes drawn by philosophical historians between the Platonists and Aristotelians of this and the contiguous centuries. Our readers will have seen that the same man was oftentimes by turns an Aristotelian and a Platonist, that it was inevitable that he should be so, because his logical impulses were drawing him in one direction, his Christian theology in another. To which side any inclined most, depended much upon the conditions of their practical life; Boethius was one man in his study, another in his prison. And even when they were very strongly determined either way, the habits of the Latin mind were so unlike those of the Greek, that we are liable to continual blunders in our efforts to bring them together. These very habits, as we have endeavoured to show, unconsciously influenced the middle-ages doctor to fall into the harder, more formal line of thought in which the Stagyrite had been, and always will be, the great guide; but, at the same time, as the book on Genera and Species has taught us, they led to the obscuration and even the reversal of some of Aristotle's most precious and vital maxims. If, therefore, we are compelled to use these modes of defining particular teachers, they should be applied with the greatest caution; the historian and biographer should be less afraid of appearing to contradict himself than of consistently adhering to a formula which at some point or other is sure to break down. With even more caution, if it is possible, he should resort to the words mystic and anti-mystic. They do point to certain undoubted tendencies in the minds of thoughtful men, tendencies which have never been wanting in any age, which are not more characteristic of the eleventh century than of the nineteenth. But we are in continual danger of confounding the manifestations of those tendencies in one state of society with those in another, and of making our own experiences the rule for the periods that are gone by. We are in equal danger of not perceiving what was in a man because we have begun by putting a label upon him, which, if there was anything in him worthy to be remembered, must be

Hugo de St. Victore.

Mystics.

Aristotelians and Platonists.

The historian must break through classifications.

utterly inadequate to describe him. The student, therefore, who wishes to apply Bacon's maxims respecting Nature to the history of man and his thoughts, will do well to distrust these convenient modes of arranging phenomena before they have been investigated, just as vigorously and conscientiously as he does parallel modes of anticipating and circumscribing the discoveries and laws of the external world.

Hugo's country.

42. The opposition between Hugo and Peter Abelard is, however, remarkable and worthy to be considered, though we shall not arrive at the true nature of it by calling one a master among logicians, and the other a master among mystics. Their countries were different, a circumstance which we have already discovered to be of great importance. Abelard has described to us the tendencies of his Breton race, which he exhibited in such perfection. Hugo was a German, apparently connected with some of the noble families of Germany. Nevertheless, he, as much as the Frenchman, came to that which was then, as since, the chief intellectual

At Paris.

mart of Europe; not, indeed, to hold disputations with William of Champeaux, or to establish a reputation in the University of Paris, but to dwell in a cloister of St. Victor, whose name he assumed. Little is known of him further as a man, but his influence in that and subsequent ages appears to have been deep and extensive. The book which unquestionably produced this effect, and which we may fairly take to be the most characteristic of himself, is that on *Sacraments*, though there is another, the *Didascalon*, which

His book De Sacramentis.

perhaps more strictly belongs to our subject. Perhaps we shall put our readers in the best position for understanding Hugo's place in a history of philosophy, and the relation in which his thoughts stood to those of questions respecting things and names with which we have recently been conversant, if we extract a passage from the eleventh part of his first book on Sacraments, a chapter which bears the title, "Concerning the Sacrament and virtue of Faith." If it should seem at first that we have merely chosen a striking theological statement—for striking most will allow it to be—we think we shall be able to show hereafter that it touches upon the very heart of all the moral and metaphysical speculations of that time, if not of later times.

Images in a Mirror.

43. "First let us consider in what wise, Faith itself is called a Sacrament, and of what thing it is understood to be a Sacrament. The Apostle says, 'We see now through a glass in an enigma, then face to face.' That is to say, now while we are seeing by faith, we see through a glass in an enigma; but then when we shall see by contemplation, we shall see face to face. To see in a glass is to see an image; to see face to face is to see the thing. Suppose some one to be behind you or above you, you are turned from him, you do not see him face to face. And if he looks at *you* it does not

therefore follow that you can look at *him*. Bring out the glass, place it before you, straightway you will see the image of him who is at your back or is over your head; you will say, 'I see thee.' What is it you see? You see something doubtless, but an image only, you see him but in his image. Not yet in his own face. You do not yet know as you are known, you do not see as you are seen, you are seen in yourself, you see in an image. He looks at you, you are turned from him. Turn yourself to him, oppose face to face, now you will see not an image, but the very thing. You saw him before, but you saw him in his image only, now in his face . . . That which is seen in an image is a sacrament, that which is seen in the thing (in reality) is the thing (the reality) of the sacrament. What therefore we now see through a glass in an enigma, is the sacrament to that which we shall see face to face in open contemplation. But what is the enigma in which the image is seen until the thing itself may be seen? The enigma is the Sacred Scripture. Why? Because it has an obscure signification. And the glass is your heart, if so be it be pure, and cleansed, and clarified. The image in the glass is the faith in your heart, for faith itself is an image and a sacrament; but the contemplation that is to be, is the thing, and the virtue of the sacrament. Those who have not faith see nothing; those who have faith are beginning to see something, but the image only. For if the faithful saw nothing, there would be no illumination for faith, nor would the faithful be said to be illuminated. But if they saw the very thing, and did not expect anything more that is to be seen, they would not see through a glass in an enigma, but face to face. If then the highest good for a man is the contemplation of his Creator, that faith by which he begins in some way to see Him who is absent, is rightly spoken of as the initial good, the beginning of his restoration. This restoration grows as faith itself grows, he is more and more illuminated by knowledge that he may know more fully, and is influenced by love that he may love more ardently. If then the righteous man, as long as he is in this body, is away from his Lord, here he has the life of faith. But so soon as he is brought out of this prison-house and brought into the joy of his Lord, he will have the life of contemplation. . . . . In the Sacraments, as has been said, arms are supplied to this man whereby he may protect himself in good works, as well as weapons wherewith he may overthrow his enemy, so that charity and hope being joined to faith, he may have an ever renewed and renewing strength, and life."

The Image and the Archetype.

Application of the illustration.

That which is and is to be.

The renovation of Man by Faith.

Things and Signs.

44. It will be obvious to the reader of this passage that in it *Things* are not opposed to *Names* but to *Signs*. He will perceive too that things here stand for invisible substances, the objects of spiritual apprehension, and that the visible universe is regarded chiefly as furnishing instruments whereby the man is educated for this con-

temptation. Nothing can be further from Hugo's disposition than that kind of Mysticism which glorifies sudden apprehensions or intuitions of individual men respecting the invisible world. His book is an orderly exhibition of the different Sacraments which the Creator has used in different stages and dispensations of history; it assumes the knowledge of the invisible to be the proper and legitimate condition of the human creature, the one from which it is his fall and evil to have departed, and to which the grace of the Creator would restore him. Assuredly there is nothing novel in these opinions. They were the commonplaces of the old theology; no divines in any age have wholly lost sight of them. But it makes all the difference whether they are the governing thoughts in a man's mind or only the subordinate; whether they determine his view of life and studies or only qualify it. In the case of Abelard and the Logicians, they were clearly *not* the governing thoughts. Even in their theology the idea of sacraments was not a cardinal but an accessory one; their dialectics and even their ethics were quite independent of it. The Didascalon of Hugo shows that with him the case was altogether otherwise. His conception of all other subjects is moulded by his theology, and that theology is throughout sacramental.

The Education of Man by His Creator.

Characteristic difference between Abelard and Hugo.

45. Our readers will have put a very wrong construction upon our last words, if they suppose that Hugo was either indifferent to human learning, or that he supposed Theology was to contract its sphere and fix limits to its progress. He lays it down in the commencement of his first book, that "of all things to be desired, Wisdom is the first, wherein the form of the perfect Good consists. Wisdom illuminates the man, that he may know himself." He is full of admiration of Pythagoras for calling the searchers for truth not wise men but lovers of wisdom. He would have the mind burn with the love of it, exercise itself to the search of it, and feel how difficult it is to embrace it in its own very nature. He recognizes the threefold division of the soul into the crescent or vegetative, the sentient and the rational. The last belongs specially and characteristically to man. It occupies itself with inquiring concerning any subject, whether it is, what it is, of what kind or class it is, finally, why it is. He affirms that it is not inconsistent with the etymology of philosophy, to which he has already attached so much value, to define it as the discipline which investigates fully the reasons or principles of all things human and divine. He vindicates this definition from the charge to which its comprehensiveness would naturally expose it, by saying that certain acts belong to philosophy in respect of their principle, and must be excluded from it in respect of their administration. Agriculture, in so far as it is occupied with laws of nature, falls within the province of philosophy—so far as concerns its operation, within the province

Hugo's idea of human learning. Didascalon, lib. i. c. 2 & 3.

Division of the Soul, c. 4.

Definition of Philosophy, c. 5.

of the labourer. He explains how the necessity for pathology as well as for physiology arises. "There are two things in man," he says, "good and evil, nature and vice. Our business is to repair nature and to banish, as far as in us lies, that which has corrupted it. The integrity of human life," he says, "requires for its fulfilment science and virtue, wherein consists our only resemblance to the superior and divine substances. For," he goes on, "man, —seeing he is not a simple nature,—in one aspect of his being, which is the better, and that I may speak more openly what I ought to speak, his very self, is immortal; but on the other side, which is weak and fallen, and which alone is known to those who have no faith except in sensible things, he is obnoxious to mortality and mutability." He divides all things into those that have neither beginning nor end, and which are called eternal, those which have beginning but no end, which are called perpetual, those which have both beginning and end, which are called temporal. "Two things there are," he says, "which repair the divine likeness in man, the beholding of truth and the exercise of virtue. God being *the* Just and *the* Wise immutably, Man being just and wise mutably." He distinguishes three kinds of works, the work of God, the work of Nature, the work of the artificer imitating nature. The work of God is indicated in the words, "In the beginning He created heaven and earth;" the work of Nature in the words, "Let the earth bring forth the green herb;" "the business of the artificer," he says, "is to unite things which are separate and to distinguish things that are joined." He then discusses the faculties of man as exercised in different acts of production and imitation. The statue, he says, comes from the contemplation of a man, the house from the contemplation of a mountain which is a protection against the tempest, the invention of clothes from the observation of the bark of trees and the feathers of birds and the scales of fishes. He inquires into the true definition of Nature, acknowledges the difficulty of the question, and proceeds to show the different senses that have been given to it, that they may not be confounded. First, it has been taken for the archetypal example of all things in the divine mind; then it is defined as that which assigns to each thing its own; secondly, Nature has been called the property of each thing or that which informs each thing with its proper differentia; in this sense we speak of all things by nature tending to the earth, of its being the nature of fire to burn, &c. A third definition is that Nature is the internal fire which penetrates all sensible things and causes them to bring forth. The last subject in his first book is the origin and purpose of Logic. He places this study last, he says, because it was discovered last; other things had been found out, then it was necessary that logic also should be found out, because no one could properly speak of things unless

Curative processes, c. 6

The Temporal, the Perpetual, and the Eternal, c. 7.

The work of the Creator, the Artificer, and of Nature, c. 10.

What Nature is, c. 11.

Logic, c. 12.

he first recognized the method of speaking rightly. In treating this subject he does little more than quote certain passages from Boethius, which we have already brought under the notice of our readers. Hugo is chiefly useful for the pains which he takes in pointing out the truth, obvious enough but likely to be forgotten in that age, that the practice of all arts, of speaking and reasoning especially, must have preceded the discovery of the maxims and principles which regulate them.

Hugo's place in Philosophical History.

46. We think our readers will agree with us that we have here an interesting specimen of a 12th century student and religious philosopher. If Hugo was, as is alleged, a Mystic, it can hardly be denied that a Mystic is capable of exhibiting practical sense and considerable erudition. Indeed, after all that has been said about Abelard's spirit of investigation—and we certainly have shown no wish to disparage Abelard—it might fairly be contended that there is more of the spirit of progress in Hugo than in his contemporary, that though he might dispute less ably, he would also be less likely to limit knowledge by the rules and terms of dialectics. The theology of Hugo compels him to be a continual searcher, the ever expanding knowledge of the infinite and eternal God is the only ultimate end he can think of, as it is the only reward after which he aspires. A man with such aims and with so much diligence and courage in carrying them out, must have given a powerful impetus to the minds of his cotemporaries. His name has been less remembered in later times than it deserves, because it has been overshadowed by those of other men who met some of the tastes of the age more successfully, though their actual power was not greater than his, perhaps not equal to his.

Arnold of Brescia.

47. Peter Abelard had an eminent pupil, of whose projects, whose failure, and whose death it is the business of the political not of the philosophical historian to speak. But we have so often broken through the limits which it becomes us, according to precedent, to observe, that we shall make no excuse for at least mentioning the name of Arnold of Brescia. How the speculations on dialectics, or even on theology, in which Abelard indulged, can have borne fruit in a scheme for restoring a Senate and Tribunes to Rome, for making the ecclesiastical world give place to the classical, it is not easy at once to conceive. And any theories about the links between the two sets of thoughts are nearly sure to be hasty and unsatisfactory in proportion to their ingenuity. Much might be said of the way in which a spirit of inquiry when it has commenced in one direction, spreads into another. But though Abelard was a vigorous and even a restless inquirer, one does not perceive how his investigations should have led any one to disturb the peace of cities, far less to organize a society by restoring older forms than those which were displaced. It is only in

How Abelard influenced him is not obvious.

connection with the general movements of the time that one can understand how Abelard drew such audiences to his lectures on Universals at Paris, and it is only by attention to the same movements that one can understand how the acts of an enthusiast like Arnold should have become serious in the eyes of Popes and Emperors, and should have reacted on the philosophy of the schools.

The Pope, the Emperor, and the Cities.

48. Arnold sought the assistance of Frederick Barbarossa in suppo[illegible] of his popular movement against the Pope, or rather offered to fraternize with him. Though his proposals were received with little respect, they proved that there was a new element at work in the world, and that henceforth the conflict would not be merely between the civil and ecclesiastical heads of the Roman empire. The memorable struggles between the Italian cities which brought the Popedom into the new and curious position of a champion of freedom against the German despotism, revealed still more clearly the existence of this third power, and showed that it would have an increasing influence on the destinies of Europe. It is evident that the question of Unity, what it means, how it was to be preserved under its present conditions, or under what new conditions it was possible, had been debated elsewhere than in the University of Paris, between other combatants than William of Champeaux and Abelard or even Bernard. The failure of the second crusade, which had been so powerfully advocated by the Abbot of Clairvaux, showed that the unity of Christendom, even when it was represented by powerful kings, was still an imperfect one, scarcely able to match itself against the unity of Islamism. Evidently its spiritual centre was not firm. Italy felt its weakness even more than the rest of Europe. But all felt it, Churchmen as well as Statesmen, Becket as much as Henry II. How was Unity to be maintained? Who were to discover the secret of it? Might not the Doctors do what the Popes were failing to do? Might not they lay bare the very principle which could keep the minds of men as well as societies together? They believed that they could. The secret of all strifes and discoveries lay, as it seemed to them, within. Heresies and evil opinions were the radical causes of them. To extirpate these was the great work of which the world was in need.

Question of Unity in the Schools and in the World.

The war with Heresies.

The Saint and the Doctor.

49. Such became the leading characteristical thought of the latter part of the 12th century. Was it not also the thought of that earlier half which Bernard represented? Not precisely in the same sense. Bernard had a horror of heresies as foes to practical life, as disturbers of the devotion of Monasteries, as hinderers of the common action of the Christian nations against the Infidels. But he was, as we have seen, a Saint and not a Doctor; with little skill in tracing the rise and growth of an opinion, however he might

wish to drive it away; much more capable of pouring forth earnest exhortations than of giving learned solutions of difficulties. Another kind of man was needed when dialectical skill had established itself in the Universities as part of the profession of those who taught in them, and when political rebellion had gone so far in shaking the prestige of Papal dominion.

Peter the Lombard.

50. Peter the Lombard, though of Italian birth, got his learning where almost every one else got it at this time, in Paris. He had profited by the teaching both of St. Bernard and of Hugo de St. Victore. In 1159 he became Bishop of Paris. He died, according to some authorities, in 1160, according to others, in 1164. Perhaps it was fitting that the Master of Sentences should have a scanty personal biography, that he should be known to us almost entirely through a book. That book has an oracular form and character which does not belong to any earlier composition of the Middle Ages. Oracles were what people who had been wearied of Abelard's continual questioning were longing for. But such oracles would have been less satisfactory to the spirit of this age, perhaps would have been rejected by it, if they had proceeded from an authoritative tribunal like that of Rome. A Bishop had less chance of being listened to than a simple Doctor. The Master of Sentences did not create his fame or increase it by his mitre. His decrees came forth in the shape of 'Distinctions;' he paid reverence to the intellect even while he was uttering decrees to which it bowed.

Cry for Oracles.

Character of the Sentences.

51. This remark must be remembered by every reader of the Sentences. Though they were the foundation of a number of anathemas against Heretics which issued from Paris and are commonly appended to Peter's four books, they themselves were not received at first without suspicion. They contain a careful examination of opinions and a statement, generally an honest statement, of the perplexities of the student's mind out of which they have arisen. The teacher does not forbid but encourages the diligent weighing of words, the following out acts and thoughts to their principle. He complains of those whom he calls Heretics rather for precipitation in their decisions than for too much hesitation. He believes that there is certainty at the root of all things; but he allows for the thorns and thistles which oppose themselves to him who is digging down to it.

Things and Signs, lib. 1, dist. 1.

52. The first distinction of Peter the Lombard is between *things* and *signs*. His inclination to make this contrast the ground of his whole treatise may be traced probably to the influence of Hugo. Things, are with him, as with the writer on Sacraments, eternal realities: Signs, the tokens by which they make themselves known in the outward world. But the mind of Peter is far less historical than that of Hugo. He does not trace the use

Likeness to Hugo.

of these signs in different periods, but he advances at once to the heart of the mystery which was occupying the whole thought of the Middle Ages from whatever point that thought might start, in whatever direction it might seem to be moving. The first book of the Sentences is professedly on the mystery of the Trinity. The other three books are derived from this; implicitly their subject is the same.

Use and Enjoyment. lib. 1, dist. 1, c. (2—10.)

53. He begins with Things. Of these some are to be enjoyed, some are to be used; there are some which both enjoy and use. Those things which are to be enjoyed make us blessed. By those which are to be used, we are assisted in tending to blessedness, so that we may come to the truly good things and dwell in them. *We* are the things that both enjoy and use: placed between the two, as the saints and angels are also. To *enjoy* is to dwell in the love of anything for its own sake; to *use* is to turn to account that which is presented to us for this end. All other use is named abuse. The things, then, which we are to enjoy are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The Trinity is that supreme thing, common to all who enjoy it, if, indeed, it may be called a thing, and not rather the cause of all things, nay, if the word *cause* itself is not too mean. The things we are to use are the world and the creatures in it. The invisible things of God are to be understood through the things that are made, the use of the world is, that out of temporal things eternal things may be taken in.

The Fathers; what use Peter Lombard made of them.

54. The last of these sentences is taken from Augustine, who is the great authority for both the distinctions which we have touched upon; indeed, for the whole treatise. Peter Lombard avowedly builds his book upon the Fathers. He wishes rather to be considered a collector of their judgments than an utterer of his own. Still he is not a copyist or a plagiarist. The Fathers have cultivated in him the power of original thinking and of methodizing his thoughts. When he quotes them, it is not as a slavish repeater of their words, but as a student and interpreter of their sense. It is otherwise, we think, when he appeals to the Scriptures. There he often does catch at mere sounds; the historical spirit of the Scriptures puzzles him; he cannot deduce formulas and maxims from them so quickly as from Augustine, therefore they are introduced rather to sustain a conclusion he has already formed than to suggest one. When they are troublesome, and do not bear out his conclusion, he treats them much as other commentators do. For instance, St. Paul's sentence, "God will have all men to believe and come to the knowledge of the truth," strikes him as perilously comprehensive; he therefore proposes the very simple expedient of inverting it; it means only that "all come to the knowledge of the truth whom God wills to do so."

His use of the Bible. Distinction. 46 c. (He treats the words in John, c. i. v. 9, upon the same principle.)

55. It is not for the pleasure of pointing out a weakness in our

Inconsistency in his view of the Divine Nature.

eminent schoolman that we have alluded to this monstrous interpretation. It illustrates a contradiction which was not confined to him, which he inherited in part from his master, Augustine, and which has descended upon some who have known little either of the master or the pupil. Contemplated as an object of trust and delight to the purified spirit, the Divine nature always presents itself to him as essential Charity. Each Person exhibits some aspect of that love, which he regards as only another name for the holy and undivided Trinity. But when the Being whom he has spoken of in this rapturous language, presents himself as an originating Will, another thought intrudes itself—Omnipotence takes the place of Charity. If the two seem to come into collision, the second must be sacrificed to the first. It is supposed to be an act of reverence to confess absolute power; merely an act of self-indulgence to believe in an absolute love. And this, through the very condition of a heavenly spirit, is declared to be that it should enter into this absolute love, and should refer all powers to it. Or else our finite faculties are called in to justify our attempting to grasp the one kind of infinity instead of acknowledging the other. The philosophy, as much as the theology of Peter Lombard is affected by this inconsistency; we could not, therefore, pass it over. But we must do justice to the strength of his philosophy as well as of his theology. No student of divinity can read his first book, we should conceive, without acquiring a deeper and clearer conception of principles in which he has implicitly believed, without cultivating the precious habit of distinction. And we doubt whether any student of philosophy can read large portions of that book and of the three following, without acquiring a new sense of the dignity and responsibility of the name which he has taken upon him; without confessing that the dogmatist has taught him to be more of an inquirer than he was before.

Omnipotence and Charity.

His great merits.

Influence of Augustine.

56. It will be evident from the hints which we have given already that Augustine not only influenced very powerfully the mind of Peter Lombard, as he did the whole mind of the Middle Ages, but that he imparted to his pupil that habit of thought respecting the will of God and His determinations, as to the well-doing and well-being of His creatures, which we ordinarily associate with the Bishop of Hippo. Perhaps the 38th Distinction of the first book, which relates to this subject, may be as helpful as any we could select, in enabling the reader to understand the tendencies and the method of our author.

Prescience and Science.

"It has been said above that the prescience of God is only of future things, but of *all* future things as well good as evil. Knowledge or wisdom, on the other hand, has respect not only to future things, but also to present; not only to temporal things, but also to eternal, seeing that God knows himself. Hence arises a question which cannot be evaded—whether divine knowledge or prescience is the cause of the things, or the things are the causes of the knowledge or prescience. For it would seem as if the prescience of God were the cause of those things which fall under it, seeing that they would not have come to pass unless God had foreseen them, and it was impossible for them not to happen, seeing that God did foresee them. . . . . The same also must be affirmed of knowledge, to wit, that because God hath known certain things, therefore they are. Which sentiment Augustine seems to support, saying, God knew not these things from a certain time, but all temporal things that were to be, and among these what and when we should beg from Him, and when and concerning what things He would hear or not hear; this he foresaw without beginning. For He did not know all creatures because they are, but they are because He knew them." . . . . And again, in the 6th book of his Ecclesiastes—"When times depart and succeed, nothing departs or succeeds in the knowledge of God wherein He knew all things which He made by it." Peter Lombard then goes on to point out the inconveniences which would follow if this doctrine were admitted. "If the knowledge or the prescience of God is the cause of all things, it is the cause of all evils; therefore God would be the author of evils, which is altogether false. But again, there is equal inconvenience in assuming that the things which are to be, are the cause of the knowledge or prescience of God. Were this so, then something would exist as the cause of that which is eternal, something alien and diverse from it; the knowledge of the Creator would depend upon the creatures; the created would be the cause of the uncreated. How is this contradiction to be cleared up? Identify knowledge with acquaintance (Scientia with Notitia), and we may say boldly, the Science or Prescience of God is *not* the cause of things that come to pass in any other sense than that without it they do not come to pass. But if under the name of knowledge, you include good pleasure and disposition, then it may be rightly called the cause of those things which God creates. In this way perhaps we may understand Augustine, 'they are because He knew them;' that is, because knowing, He was satisfied, and because He disposed them according to His knowledge. This sense is the more probable, because Augustine is there speaking only of things that are good, of the creatures which God makes, all which He knows, not simply, but with a knowledge which includes satisfaction and disposition. But evil things God knows and foresees before they come to pass, by simple acquaintance or external understanding. God foresees and predicts that which He will not produce, as He foresaw and predicted the infidelity of the Jews, but did not produce it. He did not force them

Whether the necessity of acts is involved in the divine prescience or knowledge of them

The consequences of each alternative.

Solution. Notitia et Scientia.

Beneplacitum et Dispositio.

into the sin of infidelity because He foresaw it, nor would He have foreseen or predicted their evils unless those evils were to be actually in them. Augustine says, He did not therefore force any one to sin because He foreknew what would be the sins of men, for He foresaw *their* sins, not His own. Therefore, if those things which He foresaw were not theirs, He foresaw what was not true. But seeing His prescience cannot be deceived, beyond a doubt it was not another sinned, but *they* sinned—this God foreknew. And therefore, if they had wished not to do evil but good, it would have been foreseen that they would not do evil by Him who knew what each one would do." There is still a difficulty which our author thinks it his duty to state, "Either, it is said, things happen otherwise than God foresaw them, or not otherwise. If not otherwise, then all things happen by necessity; if otherwise, the prescience of God may be deceived or may be changed. But they may happen otherwise, because they may happen otherwise than they do happen; but they do happen as has been foreseen, therefore they may happen otherwise than was foreseen. The answer is: All such phrases as these, *it is impossible that that should not be which God has foreseen, it is impossible that all things should not be foreseen that come to pass*, may be taken conjunctively or disjunctively. For if you understand it thus, 'It cannot be otherwise than God hat. foreseen,' that is to say, it cannot be that God has foreseen it one way and it comes to pass in another way, you understand what is true. But if you say 'This cannot happen otherwise than it does happen, and in another way than that in which God foresaw it would happen,' that is false. It might have happened otherwise than it did, and God saw it would happen as it did. The same distinction applies to the other saying, that it is impossible that that should not happen which God has foreseen, or when God has foreseen it. To say that it is impossible that all which comes to pass should not be foreseen, that is to say, that it should come to pass and not be foreseen, is true. To say that it was impossible for God not to foresee everything which comes to pass, is false. For He might cause that it should not come to pass, and so that it should not be foreseen."

Dis. 38 c. The Dilemma.

The Solution.

57. Every reader will perceive how easily the habit of word-splitting, in its worst form, might be cultivated by such teaching as this. And when word-splitting went along with stringent dogmatism, when men were condemned for not apprehending the accurate terms which the doctor had used to guard against errors on the right or the left, there would be great danger lest the student, having first become the slave of words, should afterwards make them the excuse for establishing a tyranny over his brethren. We have some sense of the greatness of these perils, and we are sure that they were greater in reality than they can be in our

Dangers in the Sentences.

apprehension. Yet we must maintain that such writers as Peter Lombard were doing something to counteract this danger, if by accident they may have promoted it. The cure for the extreme lust of distinction certainly is not found in overlooking distinctions or denying their importance. It is not found by shrinking from the severe examination of words and of their shades of meaning. The more carefully that examination is pursued, the more we are led to feel the significance and sacredness of words, the less are we likely to play dishonest tricks with them. That words are things, mighty and terrible things, was the special lesson which the middle ages had to learn, and which they had to impart. Many superstitions they indulged unquestionably concerning these words, many magical arts were practised by means of them. But when they descended into the subterranean world and discovered in what vulcanian fires their weapons were fashioned, they were more on their guard against those above ground who gave them an unnatural sharpness or used earthly herbs and medicaments to make them poisonous. If there was mischief in connecting them with the deepest principles of theology, there was also the benefit of making the use of them more cautious and earnest. He who speculated or traded with them might win unusual profits by his venture; but the risks were also terrific

The Compensation.

58. Those who have gone with us so far, will not need to be told what we suppose these schoolmen needed, to make their distinctions effectual for their own age and for other ages, even when they worked them out most honestly and most diligently. The old Socratic commerce with facts and nature, was required by the craftsmen in the University of Paris, as it had been by those in the School of Alexandria, to prevent refined investigations into the force of words from becoming embarrassing to the intellects which they might have helped to make clearer. This evil was greater in the twelfth century than it had been in the eleventh. When scholarship belonged to the monasteries, there was a homely life of digging, draining, building, managing accounts, punishing the refractory, teaching the children, which helped to make study practical, or to remind students that *they* ought to be so. The Universities were more exclusively word-laboratories. There was a likeness of the family in the first, if family ties in their ordinary sense were renounced. In the other, the tie was almost exclusively that between teacher and disciple; often, it may be, a very cordial and affectionate one, but in its nature temporary, liable to be determined by changes of place and changes of opinion; if prolonged beyond a certain time, often prolonged to the injury of the pupil's growth; wanting therefore the stability of the other more general relations. It was advantageous, we conceive, to Hugo and to Peter Lombard, that their University experience was in a considerable

Words and Facts.

The Universities less in commerce with life than the Monasteries.

degree founded upon and blended with their Monastic, so that they did not set up the latter against the former, as Bernard did, or merely resort to it in hours of sorrow and exhaustion, as Abelard did. Still both of them belong, Peter Lombard especially, to what we may call the University age, an age which had not begun in the days of Anselm, and which underwent great changes, if it may not be said to have passed into another, before the days of Aquinas. It was a very critical moment in the history of European culture, not altogether unlike the one in individual life when the boy leaves the school forms for a more elaborate and systematic course of instruction. In both there is the danger that what was vital and energetic, however immature, in the first stage, should be exchanged for formality in the second; the equal danger that there should be a reaction against this formality, and that a stormy life should take the place of a calm one.

The University age.

59. Europe in the twelfth century had no exemption from this last hazard more than from the other. We have spoken of the Distinctions and the protests against heresy in Peter the Lombard, as indicating what confused elements there were in the world around, and how little the schools could preserve themselves from the turmoil. It must not be forgotten that the time in which he wrote was not merely the time of the struggles of the Italian Republics with each other and with Germany, but also of those battles of our Henry II. and his Archbishop, which form so memorable a chapter in English history. It is a countryman of our own who, better perhaps than any one else, makes us feel the relation between the outward and inward life of the time. John of Salisbury, the friend of Becket, before the end of his life the Bishop of Chartres, was not perhaps a philosopher in the strict sense of the word. Like most of his countrymen he was, by nature, less of a metaphysician than of a politician. It was in the business of the world that he learnt what inner lore is needful to direct it. For that very reason he was more competent than those who were immersed in school pursuits, to make observations upon their influence and their connection with other very different influences. A few of the hints which his *Polycraticus* supplies on this subject may afford much help to the student of middle age philosophy in understanding the kind of atmosphere by which the schoolmen were surrounded, and which even in their cloisters and closets they were forced to breathe.

John of Salisbury.

60. We should especially recommend our readers to look at the 18th Chapter of the Second Book, wherein the author treats of "the foundation of Mathematics, and the exercise of the senses and the energies of the soul, and the profit of reason, and the efficacy of liberal arts." The main object of the chapter which bears this comprehensive title, is to distinguish between the Mathēsis and Mathēsis, the first being, as he says, "founded in nature, proved

Mathesis with the short and the long penultima.

by reason, confirmed by experience; the other, its pernicious and reprobate counterfeit." Starting with this design, he touches upon the investigation of nature, which he distinguishes into the inquiry that is conducted by the dissection of things into their parts, and that which refers the whole to its two elements of Form and Matter. "Here," he says, "the heaviness of the senses makes itself manifest, seeing they can only deal with the nature of corporeal things, and with this nature divided into portions, the eye only reporting of colour, quantities, figures—the ear of sounds," &c. Touch, he looks upon as a kind of connecting link between body and soul. Thence he passes to the power of Imagination in presenting absent forms; thence to the Reason or Intellect, "which can deal with the incorporeal, which now looks upon things as they are, now otherwise than as they are; which now unites things distinct, now severs and disjoins things united." He regards the "power of Abstraction in the intellect, that which conceives Form apart from Matter, and Matter apart from Form (though they do not actually exist apart), as the very instrument of philosophy, the workshop of all liberal arts, without which nothing could be rightly held or rightly taught." He traces clearly and gracefully the process of abstraction; how it excludes whiteness and blackness, and the other accidents of particular men from the general notion of a man; "the reason defining what the intellect conceives, and treating all particular cases as comprehended under the general title, mortal—rational—animal. Whilst, therefore, the intellect collects likenesses and unlikenesses, while it carefully scrutinizes the agreement of things that differ and the differences of things that agree, while it diligently investigates what each thing has in common with many things, what with fewer, while it penetrates into that which is necessary to each thing, it discovers many conditions,—some universal, some individual. Which conditions, defining and dividing in various ways at its pleasure, the glance of the mind is sent into the very secret of nature itself, so that nothing natural may be hidden from it." Our excellent critic, who had a great dread of presumption, and was very anxious to cultivate humility, was quite unaware of the arrogance of this statement, and would have been startled if he had been told how much of nature was hidden, and must for ever remain hidden, from those who were using this method of divining its secrets, who were permitting the intellect to prescribe and teach, when its business was to obey and learn. Still nothing can be better and more felicitous than John of Salisbury's account of the order and derivation of sciences as they then existed. "How magnitude and multitude circumscribe the whole world; how by the abstracting intellect the soul ascends through different degrees of honourable arts to the throne of perfect philosophy; how arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy, constitute

Investigation of Nature.

The Senses.

The Imagination.

Abstraction

The anti-Baconian method.

The Quadrivium.

the true Mathēsis: how by them the height of earthly wisdom is attained," he describes in words which he had partly learnt from Boethius, but which he had understood and made his own. Thence the transition is natural to the false Mathēsis, or the doctrine of the astrologers, which is not so much ridiculed for its folly as denounced for its impiety. Unquestionably there was ground for both charges. The astrologers were substituting audacious guesses for science; they were practically setting up the government of the stars in place of the government of God. Nevertheless, we may believe that they too had a work for mankind which they were performing, however rashly and ignorantly, and which in due time they would leave to worthier hands. While the rigid forms of logic were controlling the free dynamics of nature, they were bearing witness that there must be some way of entering into dynamical secrets, that there must be a knowledge of laws by which man is governed and which he does not create out of the forms of his own mind. The explorers of planetary influence, though in one respect the most unscientific of all men, were in *this* sense the harbingers of a truer and more living kind of science than any which it was possible for the schools to engage in or to recognize.

Astrology.

How they served the cause of Truth in spite of their falsity.

61. The Seventh Book, however, is that which most concerns us. About this part of our learned countryman's writings we can scarcely be expected to speak without some jealousy, seeing he assumes our office, and becomes the historian of Metaphysical and Moral Philosophy. We hope we are not betraying our bad motives if we say, that the opinions of John of Salisbury respecting Epicureans, Stoics, and Academicians, respecting Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and respecting the whole course of later studies in the east or west, are more valuable as illustrations of the mind of the 12th century, represented in one of its most accomplished men, than for any special light which they throw on the times before him. Most of his remarks are judicious and practical, and marked by some of the characteristics of an English mind. He dislikes the dogmatists, he dislikes the extreme of scepticism. He values Socrates, because he looks upon him chiefly as a moralist. He has the respect for Plato which might be expected from an admirer of Augustine, without any very accurate conception of what he thought or did. Practically obeying Aristotle in the whole habit of thought and study which he had inherited from him through Porphyry and Boethius, he yet entertains us with extremely uncertain legends about the man, and had probably a very second-hand acquaintance with his books. He makes, as Ritter has remarked, the most curious mistakes in the names of the philosophers whose opinions he describes.

Policraticus, Book seven.

His outline of Philosophical History.

Tone of his criticism on the Ancients.

62. John of Salisbury becomes very valuable when he tells us what was passing around him. His words are not indeed to be

taken for Gospel on this subject more than upon the history of the past. His tendency is to be over-critical; and since he sets up philosophy as the proper refuge from the trifles of the Court, he is apt to be particularly impatient when he supposes that it is beginning to trifle itself. Nevertheless he is always lively, and generally fixes his mark on things and persons which really deserve ridicule or reprobation. The following observations refer to all times, but have a special bearing on his own. "They err impudently who think that philosophy consists only in words. . . . . Those creatures who live in words had rather seem wise than be wise. They go about the streets; they besiege the thresholds of men more learned than themselves; they stir up little questions; they make words into nets that they may catch the sense of other men and their own; they are always more ready to raise a wind of arguments than to winnow a question if any difficulty hath arisen. These boasters of wisdom, not lovers of it, are afraid to betray their want of knowledge; through base shame they had rather be ignorant of that which they are ignorant of, than seek it out and learn it, especially if others are present who have the information. They talk hastily upon every subject, they judge all, they blame some, they glorify themselves; they boast that they have found out fresh what has been well rubbed by the ancients and has been handed down for many ages by the testimony of books to our times. They succeed in making themselves not understood rather from the weight and multitude of their words than from any difficulty in the things, and when they have accomplished this high object, they think they deserve to be reckoned philosophers above all others. . . . . Sometimes they wind and wind and reproduce the same things, drawing wonder to themselves from the very labours and tortures to which they are reduced by the ignorance which prevents them from turning in any new direction. Yet the would-be sage has no one profession or art. Like the hungry Greek in Juvenal, he is everything,—grammarian, rhetorician, geometrician, painter, athlete, augur, rope-dancer, physician, astrologer; his knowledge is universal. And like that same Greek, if you bid him, he will go off to Heaven, and wiser than Dedalus will bear you whithersoever you wish, safe through the empty air. If you crave modestly that you may be taught what authors have meant in their writings, which you hope to discover by penetrating through the letter of them, he will tell you that you are duller than an Arcadian ass. Who but a fool would trouble himself about the letter which kills? who but a serpent would go upon his belly and eat dust all the days of his life? Play with words, tell stories with words, dispute with words, that is the business of the learned man. So long as he can speak, it is no matter where he gets his thoughts, or what they are, or about what."

His notices of contemporary philosophy.

Lib. vii. c. 12.

The Sophists of the 11th century.

Ashamed to seek knowledge by owning ignorance.

Passing off old words for new.

Wilfully unintelligible.

Quack arts.

Contempt of the Letter.

The Sophist of Christendom unlike the Sophist of the age of Pericles.

63. Our author proceeds for some pages in this strain, describing the rhetorician and sophist of the Middle Ages, whose features, as we hinted in the first part of this treatise, may be compared but must by no means be confounded with those of the rhetoricians and sophists who called forth the wit and wisdom of Socrates, seeing that these latter had always a practical field for the exercise of their powers, could influence multitudes and govern commonwealths; while those whom John of Salisbury described dealt in words for the words' sake, and could hope to do little more than raise up a set of pupils who should enlarge or refine the quibbles which they were to inherit. The dialectics of this time, therefore, unless when they became involved with theological controversies, were always liable to be regarded as exercises of skill apart from any result. Logic *threatened* to occupy the whole field of science, and those who resisted its incursions were not unfrequently driven to ineffectual complaints or to ridicule, because they could not tell themselves where they should fix the limits which the usurper might not transgress. To this subject John of Salisbury addresses himself, and in the course of his criticisms gives us some valuable hints respecting the condition of Nominalist and Realist controversies in his time. "Many," he says, "dress themselves in some few fragments or rags of the garments of philosophy and boast among the unlearned as if the whole of it was within their jurisdiction. . . They bring forth, perhaps, some new opinion about genera and species, which had escaped Boethius, of which Plato knew nothing, but which they by wonderful luck have extracted from the mines of Aristotle They are prepared to solve the old question, in working at which the world has grown old, in which more time has been consumed than the Cæsars consumed in acquiring and governing the universe, more money spent than Crœsus ever possessed. Long has this question exercised numbers through their whole life; this one discovery has been the object of their search; they have at last arrived at no result at all. The reason I suppose was that their curiosity was never satisfied with that which alone could be discovered. For as in the shadow of any body the substance of solidity is vainly sought for, so in those things which belong to the intellect and which can be only conceived as universals but cannot exist as universals, the substance of a more solid existence is nowise traceable. To wear out a life in things of this kind is to work, teach, and do nothing. For these are the clouds of things which are always in flight, and which vanish the more quickly the more eagerly you pursue them. Authors solve this question in many ways and in various discourses; and since they have used words which are capable of different senses, they have left to men of a litigious temper plentiful material for contention. Thence it comes to pass that, when

In what respect the study of Words signified more to the one than to the other.

Sneers at the Nominalist controversy

Realism practically denied.

things that are objects of the senses and other individual things have been apprehended, seeing that these only are said truly to exist, the intellect transfers them into different conditions, in respect of which the individuals become specifical and general. There are those who after the manner of mathematicians abstract forms and refer to these whatever is said concerning universals. Others analyze our intellects themselves, and would have them invested with the names which denote universals. (They would refer universality to the intellect itself.) There have been those who said that Genera and Species were the very names which represent them. But their opinion is now exploded and has disappeared with their author. There are, however, those who may be caught treading in their footsteps, though they blush to confess either their leader or his doctrine, teachers who, adhering only to the names, ascribe to the nature of language that which they would withdraw from the things and the intellects. Each appeals to the authority of some great judge, sustaining the doctrine or their error by the opinions of authors who have indifferently used names for things or things for names. Hence spring up great seminaries of disputants, and each one collects the sentiments whereby he can establish his own heresy. There is no getting away from Genera and Species. From whatever point the discourse begins, thither you will find it turning. . . . . Whatever Rufus is doing, there is nothing but Nevia for Rufus. If he is glad, if he weeps, if he is silent, he speaks only of her. Does he sup, does he drink, does he ask, does he refuse, does he nod assent, it is only Nevia. If there is no Nevia, he is dumb." John of Salisbury is fond of poetical quotations, and often applies them wittily. This perhaps is one of his happiest, and illustrates well the absorbing passion of the Middle Age doctor; with the insanity to which he was liable both in the presence and absence of its object.

The believers in Universal Forms.

The Conceptualists. Alii disciuliunt intellectus et eos universalium nominibus censeri confirmant.

Ultra Nominalists. Quod rebus et intellectibus subtrahunt nominibus ascribunt.

64. Such were the opinions of a man of letters, who had been also a man of the world and was a man of the Church, about the great philosophical argument of his day. His division of the combatants into the champions of substantial forms, of the abstracting intellect and, under some modification or other, of pure Nominalism, is one which the latest historians have followed. That he himself inclined to the second class appears tolerably clear from his language; though he is evidently not a dogmatical sectarian, and felt that there was something in each of the opinions to which he did not subscribe, which ought to be confessed and accounted for. His statement respecting the *indifferent* use of the names Words and Things by the greater writers, who felt that each did involve the other, and that an absolute separation between them was impossible, while the sects or heresies which bore their name were founded on that separation, is of high practical worth and of wide

The Lesson to be drawn from this criticism.

application. The reader must not, however, suppose that this equitable solution of the difficulty relieves him of any further concern with the question out of which it arises, so that he may henceforth part company with Genera and Species, and devote himself to some more agreeable topic. The thirteenth century will present us with another phase of this Realist struggle. It will tell us whether the science of words was able to come to any understanding and reconciliation with those which concern the life of nature, the doings of man, the being of God.

CHAPTER V.

THIRTEENTH CENTURY.

Innocent III.

1. If the 11th century has deserved to be called the age of Hildebrand, it is difficult for the student of the first sixteen years of the 13th century not to name it the age of Innocent III. Those years certainly passed quickly away. The popes who succeeded occupied a very different position from that which the grand politician filled, and were men of far inferior ability. Yet the temper and spirit of Innocent survived in their battles with Frederick II. and the Swabian family. Their triumph was indeed preparing the way for calamities, not for Italy only but, for the popedom. The wicked policy which brought Charles of Anjou into Italy as a counterweight to the Imperialists, was avenged when Philip le Bel hurled Boniface from his throne. But even in the midst of Innocent's tyranny, there were indications that the national kings —that the French kings especially,—might one day break the ecclesiastical yoke from their necks. The events which introduced the 14th century, were not in themselves proofs that the 13th century may not be claimed for the man of many devices, who combined so remarkably the power which belongs to this period with that which characterized Italians in the more refined time of Machiavelli.

The 13th century not the age of Innocent III.

2. But this title, however plausible, cannot be supported by the analogy which suggests it. Mere skill in managing the wires of a machine, however consummate, indicates nothing but the talent of an individual. The age may be affected by it in its inward life, as well as in its outward condition; but it cannot represent the thought which is at work in an age. Hildebrand's conception of the popedom indicated that striving after unity which could be traced equally in the union of the west against the east, in the efforts after spiritual concentration by the Norman divines, in the effort after civil concentration by our Norman conqueror. The heart of the 13th century must be sought for elsewhere than in a heartless man and in a heartless scheme of policy. These might produce whirlwinds, and fires, and earthquakes, but the Lord was not in them. The still small voice which really rules the conflicting elements of thought in any period, must be listened for somewhere else than in the Vatican.

Mendicant Orders.

3. The rise of the Mendicant Orders will be regarded by every sound thinker as immeasurably more important to Europe than the negotiations, legations, and bulls of Innocent. These orders arrived apparently at the same result which he was compassing by his stratagems. To bring all men in all nations into one, to make them feel that they had a centre of unity, this was the design equally of Francis, the lover of the poor,—and of Dominic the underminer of heresy. Each sought the aid of the papal court to legitimate his scheme. When that aid had been reluctantly granted, each returned the service by doing more for the papacy than it had ever been able to do for itself. But the means which conduce to an end, prove not seldom greater than the end itself; sometimes they counteract it in one way, as they contribute to it in another. Jesus Christ, as the friend of the poor, was the watchword in the early preaching of Francis. His human sympathy and human sorrow were to be the lodestone of all hearts. The exclusive exaltation of His Humanity, led to the exaltation of the female qualities of Humanity. The idolatry of the Virgin became extravagant. That idolatry passed into the idolatry of the leader himself; in whom so much of actual compassion and self-sacrifice had been manifested. In each of these tendencies, there was something that clashed with the respect for the papal throne, which, nevertheless, it was the business of the Order to exalt. Where there was no knowledge of its actual nature, where it was merely the shadow of a name, it might stand as the representative of Apostolical poverty, in opposition to the splendour of the kings who ruled in the different lands. That vision was always liable to be scattered by the news which sometimes reached even peasants through some returning pilgrim or crusader, that money-getting by all means fair or foul was the especial characteristic of the Holy See. The exaltation of poverty and the poor man, while it was honest, was most mighty; but it threatened dangers to those whom for the present it upheld. The corruptions, divisions, heresies in the Franciscan Order, if they weakened itself, may have been the means of saving Rome from the terrors of its patronage.

The Franciscan Order.

The papal influence, how affected by it.

The Dominicans.

4. The Dominican Order may have seemed less likely to produce these results, seeing that from the first it contemplated the extinction of heresy as its ultimate end, fellowship with the poor and abandonment of wealth as means to that end. But Dominic, even more than Francis, proclaimed the wealth of the clergy to be the great stumbling-block to the spread of Catholic doctrine, and the society which called itself by his name became formidable to the papacy by drawing to itself the functions and the power of the papacy. To explain how it did so is to explain one of the curious phenomena of this century. The Mendicant Orders seemed as if they were appealing to the conscience and the sympathies of the

Influence of their order upon learning, how far consistent with its original intention.

unlearned, as if they existed to draw those who could understand nothing but sensible representations and popular legends into the church's net. The Mendicant Orders actually became the guides of European thought, the directors of school speculations. If we studied merely the life of St. Francis, such a change in the direction of their duties and powers would appear simply miraculous. But the starting point of the Dominicans was intellectual; the intellectual doubts and controversies in the south of France called them into being. That they should become connected with the Universities was but the fulfilment of their original design. Had they confined themselves to popular appeals, that design could never have been accomplished. They may have risen by levelling themselves to the position, to the habits, even to the apprehensions of common people; they could only maintain their ground by showing themselves ready to encounter the most cultivated, by using the leisure and the power which their indifference to money and sensual gratifications gave them, in acquiring all the knowledge which it was possible for any of their day to possess. That men having so definite an object, and being so clear about the way in which it might be attained, should have triumphed over all obstacles, and should, at last, have stamped their own image upon the intellect of those times, is no cause for wonder; or at least that wonder must be renewed in each successive age because success is in every age the reward of the like devotion.

Their success certain.

Change in the Universities.

5. It is not our business to relate the steps of the conflict by which the Mendicant Orders acquired dominion in the Universities, which, in the last century, as we have seen were the centres of much independent thinking; which even might be called anti-monastic; which had nourished a Peter Abelard, and only with reluctance—never, perhaps, completely—yielded to the sentences of Peter Lombard. The history would be very interesting, but we should have to trace it through details which would withdraw us unreasonably from the main business of this treatise. It should always be remembered that Paris was the grand battle-field on which the old and the new powers tried their strength, and that many local and national questions, as well as ecclesiastical, were involved in the struggle and the decision. It should also be understood that when once the Dominicans had asserted an authority over what appeared in some sense *their* destined province, the Franciscans were under a kind of necessity to labour in the same sphere. It was a clear sign of a divine Providence that they did. The habits of the two orders, great as were their outward resemblances, were essentially and radically different. To organize and systematize was the taste and business of the one. To bring out the human, sentimental, individual aspects of theology and of humanity was the characteristic effort of the other. The Dominican was

Action and reaction of the Orders upon each other.

always verging upon the hardest intellectualism; but he was exempt from much of the superstition to which the Franciscan yielded. *He* was liable to all the diseases which assault men of spiritual aspirations, to much of the sensualism into which they fall, through a desire of finding outward images by which they may represent their deeper intuitions; but he could not be withheld by mere maxims and formulas from tracing the windings of a thought, or from following nature into her hiding places. Both were dangerous, each would have been terrible without the other. Together they served to show forth the counteracting tendencies of a very memorable period. If each held down some truth, each brought some side of truth into light which its rival would have crushed. If they left many pernicious influences to after ages, they awakened a spiritual and intellectual energy, without which those ages would have been very barren.

Rebellion of Common Sense against School trifling.

6. The passages which we extracted from John of Salisbury at the close of the last chapter will have shown that intelligent men were beginning to be impatient of the disputes in the schools on another ground than their tendency to produce heretical speculations. The practical sense of those who had seen something of the world, the moral sense of those who had felt the grand issues to which Philosophy should lead, was scandalized by these disputes. What link was there between them and human action? Must they not end at last in mere conjuring tricks? So great a movement as that which gave birth to the Mendicant Orders indicated that this feeling was awake, and added enormous strength to it. In every age the impulse to bring forth the under strata of society, to address the hearts and understandings of those whom the rich suppose only to have hands for raising the fruits of the earth, and stomachs for receiving a small portion of them, arises from a disgust at the trifles of the court and of the schools, from a belief that the upper classes and the learned classes must die of inanition if they do not receive a quickening impulse from the clods. "God is able out of these stones to raise up children:" this has been the trumpet note of reformers in all ages. With this they have shaken the self-conceit of the rulers of nations, and the rulers of sects, of the religious Pharisee and the intellectual Sadducee. And there never has been a movement of this kind which has not done more to save the upper classes, and to save learning, than all the feeble experiments of statesmen and scholars who mistake the upholding of privileges for the preservation of power, or who think that there can be progress where there is no great and common goal on which the eyes of all runners may be fixed. A dreary, hopeless period had succeeded to the living energies which were at work in the commencement of the 12th century. Thought was awake, but it

The poor prove the revivers of learning, and saviours of the upper classes.

was restless thought revolving continually about itself. There was enterprise; but instead of being connected with any great Christendom object, it was turned like the Venetian crusade to commercial aggrandizement, or at best to the extension of Latin dominion. There was the most skilful diplomacy, but its highest end was to outwit monarchs, traffic with the life of nations, identify the Churchman with the man of cunning. To give thought an object beyond itself, to make the plots of kings and states contemptible beside the great interests of humanity, to show that spiritual power is mightier than all material power, and can cause dry bones to awake and arise,—this was the effect of the new inspiration of the 13th century. It is for these reasons that the names of Dominic and of Francis, in spite of their own errors, and of the sins of their followers, must be always venerable and precious to mankind.

Theology and the other sciences

7. Peter the Lombard, as we have seen, had done much to reduce dialectics into a minister of theology. What more, it may be asked, did the doctors of the 13th century accomplish than this? We do not wish to anticipate the answers to this question, which ought to be gained from the writers themselves, and which we hope will come out with sufficient clearness in the extracts which we shall make from them. But as a notion has gone forth that Aquinas and his fellow-workers achieved this victory, and established the perpetual dominion of divine lore over every other in the schools, we wish to explain in what sense we assent to this statement, and how we believe it has led the writers on the Middle Age philosophy astray. It is unquestionable that a much vaster domain of thought is embraced by the eminent teachers of this age, than by the one who uttered his sentences in the last. It is equally unquestionable that over the whole of this domain, theology became at last the absolute ruler. She does not merely assert a reserved dominion, she does not merely hold a court to which a few of the initiated are admitted, while her distant provinces are managed by satraps and pachas. She comes forth into open day, legislates, not indeed without consulting the other estates of the realm, but still in an altogether princely manner. She takes the highest judgment-seat, decides personally in all greater causes, regulates the principles upon which every minor controversy is to be determined. So far the claim which has been urged on behalf of this age or the crime which has been imputed to it, must be fully acknowledged, and the consequences of the acknowledgment are manifold and important. But it should be also recollected that theology is not in this age what it was before the appearance of the Mendicant Orders. That which claimed dominion over humanity, had first stooped to humanity. To the Franciscan, most conspicuously, but practically also to the Dominican, doctrines had presented themselves as precious for the sake of the life of the wayfarer. The

The Victory of Theology

Theology far more human than heretofore.

Dominican could even boast that his zeal against heresy was prompted by the interest which he felt that all should share that which was intended for all, that the poor should not be stripped of his inheritance by the tricks and subtleties of disputants. This was evidently a new state of things. Other sciences might less reluctantly consent to receive the yoke of one which could assert a closer relation to the student than all others and could vindicate for the student the higher glory of being a man.

The Arabian learning.

8. Other circumstances with which this change in the bearing and temper of the theologian had greatly to do, were powerfully affecting the general thought and the technical philosophy of this period. In a former chapter we hinted at the influence of the Saracenic teaching, especially in the schools of Spain, upon the mind of Christendom, or if that is too strong an expression, upon some minds in Christendom. In the 10th century this influence was discernible chiefly in the vague impressions which prevailed respecting the sorcery of Pope Gerbert. Such impressions were due partly to his superior acquaintance with physical science, partly to his imperial tendencies; there is no proof that he or his contemporaries had been affected by any metaphysical doctrines which prevailed in the Arabian schools. Metaphysics, however, had even then a great hold on the Arabian schools; they were touching the heart of Moslem orthodoxy,—they often mingled in curious combination with the political strifes which led to the great changes in Moslem history. We have deliberately determined that we will not attempt to furnish our readers with any account of the philosophical sects which arose in the centres of Islamite cultivation, because we could at best only give them second-hand reports, and because those from whom we should derive our information appear to be uncertain whether they have understood the authors, whom they quote, correctly. To follow the mere Arabic scholar, who has no knowledge of philosophy, is unsafe, for he may overlook shades of meaning, and put a popular sense upon technical words which would often lead us into gross misunderstandings and misrepresentations. To follow the modern interpreter, who comes armed with all the philosophical apparatus of the last hundred years, is more unsafe still, for he reads himself into the old times, and finds Kant or Schelling in El-Farabi or Ibn Sina. Nevertheless the subject is evidently of great importance for the history of Christian Europe, and especially for the history of the 13th century. And without entering into any particulars respecting the Mahometan sects, we think that it is not difficult to discover what the subject of all their inquiries was, what principal aids they resorted to in pursuing them, how both the end they were setting before them, and their methods became interesting to the students of a different faith.

Reasons for not entering on the specific doctrines of the Arabian schools.

Ground of Islamite thought.

9. God, in His own naked majesty and power, separated from all the creatures He had made, but ruling them, communicating His mind through angels, prophets, and kings, at last, through *the* Prophet, the ruler of kingdoms, the destroyer of idols; this was the ground of all Moslem action and obedience. Whenever Moslem action and obedience should be mixed with or should give way to Moslem speculation, this must be its starting point. The invisible Being was there—the object and the foundation of belief. The world was there which He had made, revealing its outward surface to the eye, discovering some of its secret powers to the intellect. How the different portions of it were related to each other, what kind of dynasty the heaven and the luminous forms that appeared in it exercised over the earth, had been the question of questions for the Magian of Persia. They who succeeded to his dominions inherited also his curiosity. Astrology could never be indifferent to any oriental, whether Zoroaster or Mahomet was the teacher from whom he received his first lore. If he trembled lest he should fall back into the worship of the Sabean whilst he was busy with his observations, so much the more was he disposed to seek for the laws that govern the motions of the bodies which others had made into gods. But, in pursuing these inquiries, what had become of *the* God, the one God in whose Name the hosts of the faithful had triumphed? How was He related to this earth, those stars, the laws which governed either or both? He had created them, of course. Moses said so; Mahomet had adopted the words. They were enough for the simple warrior. How did they satisfy the reflecting sage? What *was* creation? What was that word which had called all these creatures into existence? How were they preserved in existence? What meant the secret life that was in them? What meant the renewal of that life from age to age? What had the life of each particular thing to do with the great whole to which it belonged? How did each thing sustain its own distinctness in the midst of that whole? Whence had that whole come? Were there elements of matter out of which it had been generated? Had it some mysterious relation to its Author? Could it in any sense have flowed forth from Him?

Astrology.

Creation.

The puzzles of the Islamite.

10. Such seem to have been, so far as reports may be relied upon—such, we might almost say, *must* have been—the questions that forced themselves upon the Islamite so soon as he began to be a thinker. Thus would he become involved in those perplexities which the Hindoo, starting from the very opposite point to his, had for so many ages been involved in. The conquest of Hindostan may have brought to light a world of thoughts and speculations. But the commencement of the Mahometan movement towards philosophy seems to have preceded that event, and

may at first have been retarded rather than accelerated by it. The disciples of the Prophet must have felt the strength of arms, of action, of Monotheism, and may have renewed their old contempt for dreamers and idolators. Nevertheless the same world surrounded them as the races which they had subjected, and the very Koran compelled them to ask questions as well as to smite down infidels. Presently they learnt that Pagans had discovered, many centuries before, the puzzles which were tormenting them. With the Brahminical Theists or Atheists, world worshippers or priest worshippers, they might have little sympathy even if they ever learnt what had been passing in their minds. But the stately calmness and exquisite clearness of the Greek writers awed and fascinated them. Plato's love of geometry was attractive; there were thoughts which he awakened that could not be put by. But Aristotle soon became their favourite guide; for he had dealt with every portion of that universe which the Koran had not dealt with, while there was nothing to shock them as students of the Koran in his thoughts respecting the Divine nature. If he was a pagan, his paganism was most unobtrusive. Fables and traditions did not interfere with his careful observations of nature; interfered as little with his ethics, his politics, and his metaphysics. Here seemed to be a man who might be safely trusted to fill up the gaps in their knowledge. Here was a sage of the most comprehensive character and intellect who could meet them at all points, who seemed to have anticipated all questions, and yet who never claimed that sort of inspiration which would have jarred with their reverence for *the* prophet or for the elder prophets whose mission he acknowledged.

Their acquaintance with Greek teachers.

Aristotle.

The Koran and Aristotle.

11. Once embarked on this sea, the Islamite student was involved in perils which he had not looked for. It was easy to settle that the visible world should be given to Aristotle, the revelation of the unknown to Mahomet; but as the relation between the two had been the original cause of their perplexity, as the desire of investigating this relation had driven them to seek for Greek aid, it was not possible to prevent a continual intermingling of the provinces in fact, however accurately the charts might assign their limits. The Arabian teachers of philosophy exposed themselves to the continual suspicion of slighting the words of the Koran, of departing from its principles. Sects arose which attempted to bring the maxims they had learnt from Aristotle into accordance with the popular faith,—sects which strained the popular faith to meet the Aristotelian logic and physics. Theology and nature, as one might expect, were the two grand subjects of Arabian contemplation; they were not, however, the only subjects.

The Arabian sages, Physicians,

Many, perhaps the greater part, of the Islamite doctors were physicians in the double sense of the word—healers of the human

body as well as investigators of nature. They were commonly, also, mixed up in civil affairs, often, it would appear, accomplished statesmen. There were the widest differences between them in moral practice; Avicenna, if reports may be trusted, was extravagantly dissolute; Averroes was a strict observer of the law, and had no notion that men could attain to any philosophical insight without obedience and self-control.

And statesmen.

12. The last mentioned name is the one most familiar to western ears. The comments of Averroes upon Aristotle exerted a great influence upon the Christian schoolmen of the 13th century. The time had evidently come when these schoolmen must make up their minds about their own position in reference to the great teachers of antiquity. The names of Plato and Aristotle, as we have seen, had been mighty names for the Latin world. They had been referred to with honour by orthodox divines as well as by heretics. It was impossible to set aside the claims of a man whom the Bishop of Hippo revered. It was impossible not to suppose that there was some transcendent wisdom in a man to whom Boethius traced the greater part of his wisdom. But was not the Tritheism of Abelard in some sense connected with lessons which he had learnt from one of these teachers—it was not always easy to say which? Were not they beginning, one or both, to be regarded as authorities in a sense which must interfere with the authority of the Church? Might not the porch or the academy in which Heloise had first studied become, even for women, more attractive than those sacred cloisters in which she had finally sought her wisdom? Was not this the tendency of the university culture of the 12th century? Did not Arnold show how that culture might affect ecclesiastical order and government? Such questions were for Popes to consider gravely. And now came an alarming addition to all these perils. Not only Pagan lore was matching itself with Christian, Pagan lore was combined with Mahometan lore. Aristotle was presented surrounded with Mahometan commentaries, rendered probably as well as the Greek text into the language of Christendom by Jews. What could be expected from such an infusion? Must not this intercourse with the East bring in a moral plague worse than any bodily plague with which the hosts of the crusaders had infected Europe?

Averroes; the Christian Schoolmen.

Church suspicions of heathen teachers.

The new peril.

13. It is clear that the answers to these questions which the Vatican sent forth were taking the form that was most natural and customary. Aristotle was, what Tertullian had described him, the parent of heresies. You could not destroy the brood if you left the bird from which they sprang. It was idle to plead that he had the misfortune of being a Pagan, when he was in fact doing the work of leading baptized men into apostasy. Let censures then go forth against him; let him be cast out of the schools—

Inclination of the Popes to anathematize Aristotle.

him and all his commentators! The bolt was evidently aimed at the right man, that is to say, at the one whom experience taught the Papal court to dread. It had the instinct to perceive that Plato was not then likely to do any mischief; that his day was passed; that the stream was setting in another direction. He might be left to enjoy the honours which Fathers of the Church had bestowed upon him. The present danger was to be guarded against. The rival authority to the Popes was clearly the Stagyrite.

How the Mendicant Orders changed this policy.

14. It is one proof among many how much greater was the strength of the Mendicant Orders than of him whom they exalted as the head of Christendom, that their doctors were able not to modify this decree, but to reverse it. The principle of these orders was to understand the time, to sympathize with all its movements, intellectual as well as popular, that they might direct them to the end of which they never lost sight. The Dominicans saw clearly that neither Aristotle nor his commentators could be put down in the schools. It was quite as clear to them that the Church would suffer grievously if they were. Was it an heretical instinct that led men to select a guide for their footsteps in any path which they might tread? Was it not the safest of all habits and tempers, the most counteractive of self-will, that there should be such a guide, provided he could be found? Or had the age been misled in thinking that precisely such a guide might have been vouchsafed to them in the Encyclopædist of the old world? If he had meddled less with theology than his master, was not that a conspicuous merit? Did it not leave one field, and that the highest of all, on which the banner of the cross might be planted, and on which it might be seen waving above the world below? And then his method of dealing with other subjects, how accordant was it with the maxims which you would wish to prevail on this highest ground! Each subject viewed as perfect in itself, carefully distinguished from every other; premises which, if they could not be got from experience, must be given by authority, at the foundation of all; conclusions deduced by an accurate, indisputable process from these. Talk of Aristotle as the author of heresies! What was wanting but the full application of the principles of Aristotle to make heresy, so far as it could be in this evil world, impossible?

Motives for supporting Aristotle.

Were not the Christian Schoolmen encountered by the same dangers as the Arabian?

15. The consequences which followed from this conviction, when adopted by men so resolute and so intelligent as the great Dominicans of the 13th century, we shall have to trace as we proceed to notice the lives and works of *Albertus Magnus* and *Thomas Aquinas*. But after what we have said, we must be prepared with an answer to a question which will certainly occur to the mind of the reader. The Christian schoolmen might hope to reconcile Christian orthodoxy with Aristotelian physics or metaphysics, just as the Arabian schoolmen had hoped to make the doctrine of the

Koran accord with them; but why should the success be greater in one case than in the other? Would not the same startling questions present themselves to the Western student as to the Eastern? Would not he, too, have either to meet boldly, or to evade ignominiously, the old enigma respecting the relation of the world to God? Less acquainted with the world, less engaged in civil transactions, than the sages of Persia or Spain, would he not be less competent to understand the difficulties which troubled those who looked at this inquiry from the mundane side? Less severe in his condemnation of all mixtures of the creature with the Creator, would he not be more unable to understand the reluctance of the theist to confess a relation between visible things and their Author? Supposing these commentators had forced themselves upon the attention of the teachers in the last century, we cannot help thinking they would not have found either their theological or their general knowledge at all adequate to the encounter of such practical enigmas. But a change, which we cannot attribute wholly or chiefly to the Dominican order, had given the new student a courage that did not belong to his predecessor. Merely as a doctrine, the Incarnation of our Lord had held at least as prominent a place in the Sentences of Peter Lombard as it could occupy in any Summa Theologiæ of the next age. But as a practical belief, it had assumed altogether a new position and was spreading its influence into regions that were least conscious of it. The feeling of a human Mediator between God and Man was the ground of all the Franciscan movement; without it, the words of the Friars would have been dead words. Herein consisted what in the religious phraseology of a later time would have been called the *Revival* of that age. The characteristic Christian conviction, that which denoted the difference between Christendom and Islam, had started into a new life, had made itself felt in the heart of the nations with more might and energy than when it inspired the heroism of Leo IV. or the *Dieu le veut* of the Council of Clermont. Therefore the philosophers of Christendom felt that they had no cause to tremble at the difficulty which scared the philosophers of the other faith. There was a bridge between God and man, and therefore between God and the world, which Avicenna and Averroes did not confess. Why then might not the Teachers of the West boldly profit by all the wisdom which these teachers could communicate, confident that they could supply exactly what both they and their Greek master had wanted?

Why the Arabian commentators were less alarming to the 13th century than they would have been to the 12th.

The effect of a belief in the Incarnation.

16. The teacher of the 13th century who did most to promote the reaction in favour of Aristotle, and who resorted most courageously to his Arabian expositors, was Albertus Magnus. Ritter earnestly protests against the injustice of those who have called this eminent

Albertus Magnus.

man "the ape of Aristotle." He asserts, and we should conceive with excellent reason, that Albert understood his master as no mere imitator ever can understand the writer whom he dishonours by his mimicry; that, in fact, he contrived to arrive at a greater knowledge of his meaning through all the disadvantages of a Latin translation, than almost any modern has done with the aid of sound Greek philology. This is a very high testimony to the genius, as well as the industry of the 13th century doctor. Both, it seems to us, are abundantly attested by his fame among his contemporaries, and by his actual labours. Before we speak of these, we will tell what we know of the man himself. It has been often remarked that the physiognomy of all the Middle Age writers is, in essentials, the same, that the marked individuality which belongs to the Greek sages and even to their Roman admirers, is entirely wanting in the schoolmen. We dissent from this remark, and have taken some pains in previous chapters to show that it is at least inapplicable to the most conspicuous men in the 11th and 12th centuries. If it appears to have a better justification among the students of this time, we believe the difference is owing partly to the overwhelming amount of their books, which have left their biographers scarcely time to speak of anything else, partly to the dulness and affectation of those biographers themselves. Their desire to glorify their order and to give us portraits of heroes and saints who adorned it, leads them to conceal or varnish over the most characteristic human features of the men whom they are describing. Albert has suffered as much from this error as his contemporaries. A Dominican editor, Peter Jammy, has done his best to disguise what we are inclined to think might be the story of a very interesting life with vulgar rhetoric and reports of marvels, which, if they had happened, would not be the least worthy of record. Still there come out through his narrative distinct indications of a man who thought and did as well as wrote, of one who may have been very dear to his own disciples, may have been feared as a magician among those who judged of his knowledge by their ignorance, and may excite scarcely less astonishment among us if we compare his diligence with our indolence.

Ritter, Geschichte 8. Theil, Buch 12, p. 189. Zur Beschämung späterer Jahrhunderte welche auf dié Scholastiker mit Verachtung herabsehen, wird man gestehen müssen dass im 13 Jahrh, die Aristotelische Lehre zwar nicht ohne Vorurtheile, aber doch besser erkannt wurde, als noch in unserm Jahrhundert.

The lives of the Schoolmen, how far dull or uniform.

His history.

17. Albert was born in Swabia, probably in the year 1205, though there are some who place him six or seven years earlier. If the date fixed by Jammy is the true one, he was only sixteen when he joined the Dominicans. That order was still in its first youth, full of attraction for the ardent and the meditative, full of terror to parents and guardians, who saw their children yielding to an unaccountable influence and enclosed within a charmed circle. There is no reason to doubt that Albert felt the religious movement of his time; but he thought himself called, as soon as he became a member of the order, to grapple

with the problems of philosophy. The Virgin, we are told, favoured the intention, and assured him of her help, warning him at the same time, that a day would come when her power would desert him, and he would feel himself again a child. He went to Cologne, and was soon recognized as the most profound of teachers. Among those who listened to him, there was a youth, whose dull countenance led his companions to call him the Ox. Albert considered the face, and the student whose mind it expressed. "That Ox," he said, "will make his lowings heard throughout Christendom." It was Thomas of Aquino, who, from that day till the day of his death, became united to Albert in a friendship that was never disturbed by differences or rivalries. Albert loved Cologne, but he must of course visit Paris. There he became known, and thence it was proclaimed through Europe, that a Dominican had appeared who knew more of Aristotle and the subjects which Aristotle treated of, than any who had been before him. But the sage was still the member of an order. The rules of it gave him no exemption from the tasks which seemed least connected with his philosophical consecration. In 1254, he was made a Provincial, and an immense circuit was put under his superintendence. His biographer assures us, that he was a Mendicant in the strictest sense, and determined to vindicate the dignity of poverty against all opposers and all hypocrites. In the course of his inspections, he found that a lay brother had died with some unconfessed wealth; he ordered that his body should at once be removed from the consecrated ground in which it had been laid, that his judgment even in this life might be manifest. Shortly after he was at Rome, defending the Mendicant Orders against one of their most vigorous assailants and astonishing the Cardinals with his theological insight. In 1260, he consented most reluctantly to become the Bishop of Ratisbon; he preserved, his Dominican panegyrist assures us, the strictness of a Mendicant in private, while he fulfilled all the functions and maintained all the dignity of his new office. He managed his revenues of the see admirably, relieved it of a heavy debt, yet contrived to write a lengthened Commentary on St. Luke. After three years, he succeeded in persuading the Pope to emancipate him from these toils. He resigned his bishopric, but he was not allowed to be absent from a Council at Lyons. He was resting at Cologne on his way to Lyons, when he was overwhelmed with a sudden sorrow. He became conscious by some second-sight, that Aquinas was dying at that time, and mourned over the loss of the great light of the age. The Master retained his vigour for some years after the death of his friend. But in the midst of a lecture his memory forsook him. It was the sign that the Virgin had given him. He acknowledged

Aquinas and Albert.

At Paris

Rome.

A Bishop

that his work was over, and waited calmly for his end. He died at Cologne in 1280.

His powers of arrangement

18. That the composer of twenty-one folios upon every subject except the management of revenues, should have brought order into the accounts of the Ratisbon See and should have removed incumbrances accumulated by those whose minds were not distracted by Aristotle or Averroes, does not seem to us at all incredible. We should find it hard to understand how these twenty-one folios could have been produced if their author had not possessed the business-like habits for which the narrative gives him credit. The mere time spent upon them may not be so astonishing; but precisely the power which such books seems to have demanded was a power of arrangement; in which is included assuredly the skill to disentangle that which had been complicated. Our readers must try to understand the problem which the men of the 13th century felt they had to work out. Aristotle's books came to them not now in fragments, not a few scraps of logic or ontology which they might speculate upon and compare with the hints they could get about the Dialectics of Plato or of the Stoics. A complete cycle of Logical Treatises, his Ethics, his Politics, his Physics, his Metaphysics, all offered themselves at once to their contemplation—not in naked vastness, but in the midst of interpretations which a series of ingenious Arabian teachers of different schools had been heaping around them. Albertus was not to choose to which of these subjects he should devote himself. Having dedicated himself to Philosophy, having believed that the Queen of Heaven had accepted the dedication, he was pledged to grapple with every subject which the master had handled; he was to explain what the worth of each study was in itself; what its relation to every other. Even then his work was not accomplished, not perhaps half accomplished. He was to contemplate Aristotle from the Christian point of view, as the Arabians had contemplated him from the Mahometan. He must consider therefore how every subject had been affected by the new revelation. He must consider how far that revelation had itself given birth to a new and distinct science. And let it be remembered that our philosopher had expressly to inquire about *Sciences* and *the Science*. In our days we speak—intelligent men speak with a just contempt—of those who profess acquaintance with *omne Scibile*. To gather together bits of information upon all possible subjects, is no very hard task for a man who has the gifts of a compiler or a book-maker, and who has been left conveniently barren of any others. If he undertakes by order of the publisher or the religious society that employs him, to contemplate subjects from a Christian point of view, he fulfils his contract and clears his conscience by appending to the facts of nature or the events of history which he has gathered

The work of the age.

The Universal Commentator.

Science and omne Scibile.

together, some texts of Scripture or edifying reflections in a modern style. The schoolmen had no such facility. Aristotle had endeavoured to bring every subject he had treated of into an organic whole. His marvellous success in this enterprise is the secret of the power which he has exerted over many generations. In this organic state his students must deal with the treasures he had bequeathed them. If Albertus had to remove any stones from the symmetrical buildings he had raised, to introduce any new stones into them, there was need of the most careful attention to the laws of this architecture, or the edifice would certainly fall to pieces. We can do the schoolmen no justice if we forget that this was the task which they had imposed upon themselves. It is not therefore fair to select passages which express their particular opinions or even which indicate their method irrespective of this consideration. We believe we shall best fulfil our duty to Albertus, without affecting a knowledge of him which we do not possess, if we endeavour to point out how a few of the cardinal doctrines of Aristotle on those subjects which we have undertaken to speak of were modified in the hands of his eminent disciple.

Aristotle and Albert, organic writers

19. The question, what Science is and what may or may not be called Science, seems to have occupied the mind of Albert more than it had done any of the Latins, Boethius not excepted. He may not discuss the subject with all the subtlety which the Greeks brought to bear upon it. But he seems to have felt the kind of interest in it that they did, to have felt that what could not be claimed for Science was left to the vagueness of Opinion. Instead therefore of being jealous of the word, as modern divines often are, he seems to have felt it a part of his business as a Churchman no less than as a philosopher, to extend the domain of laws as widely as possible, to confine within the narrowest possible limits the realm of chance and chaos. In the beginning of his treatises on Logic, which occupy one of the largest of his folios, he inquires whether Logic is a distinct science or no? He states the objection which he seems to think was supported by the authority both of Aristotle and of Averroes, that that which is the mode of arriving at Science cannot be Science. But he disposes of the objection, affirming that there is a science of Method. There being one common mode of arriving at all knowledge, Logic may be defined the science of that mode, or the science by which one proceeds from the knowledge of the known to the knowledge of the unknown. This point being settled, it still is to be determined whether Logic can be reckoned a part of Philosophy. The reason for excluding it, which seems to have had great weight with the thinkers of that day and some with Albert himself, was that all philosophy is either physical, mathematical, or metaphysical. In other words, it is either conversant with things that are susceptible

Science.

Albert's love for it.

Definition of Logic.

The three divisions of Philosophy.

of movement and which fall under the senses, with the laws and principles of these things, or with things unchangeable and eternal. If Logic cannot be referred to one of these divisions, what relation has it to philosophy? The answer is, *non constat* that it does not belong to either the second or the third. If it is the process of passing from the known to the unknown, it must be connected with the laws of the intellect even more directly than Mathematics are. It must be therefore an organ or method which is indispensable both to the mathematician who is investigating the principles of moveable and sensible things and to the metaphysician who is investigating that which is immoveable and above sense. What then, asks Albertus, is the subject of Logic? He discusses the opinion of those who, following the etymology of the word, affirm all language or discourse to be the subject of it. He rejects that opinion as too vague, and concludes that reasoning or argumentation is that with which it is strictly and exclusively conversant.

Universals, how arrived at; what they are.

20. After these preliminaries, Albertus finds himself involved in the great controversy of the last century. Having shown what the syllogistic process is, he is encountered with the question, "But you start from a universal. Where do you get it? What is it? All your individuals are included in some comprehensive genus. How do you arrive at the knowledge of *this*?" Our author declares that the question does not properly belong to logic. *That* assumes these premises. It is the function of the primary philosophy to tell us how they are obtained. He admits, however, that the controversy has become so mixed with logic, that he must not avail himself of this plea in practice. He addresses himself therefore courageously to the debate, though he is determined it shall not interfere with the main business of his treatise. He states the question, it seems to us, very fairly, and does justice to the reasoners on both sides. It appears to him to be between those who assert that premises or principles lie in the naked intellect, meaning by naked intellect that which is divested of all appearances, accidents, sensible or material admixtures, and those who maintain that they have a substantial pre-existence and are nowise created by the abstracting powers of the intellect. He does not dissemble that his master, Aristotle, is in favour of the first doctrine, and that many distinguished Arabians had defended it by plausible arguments. His own conclusion he states to be this. Every universal is capable of a three-fold consideration,—(1.) in itself; (2.) in the intellect; (3.) in this thing or that. When he views it in itself, he is a realist; he contemplates it as a substance. When he speaks of it as in the intellect, he distinguishes between the original or archetypal intellect and the abstracting intellect. To the former, it presents itself as it is in its own proper nature. To the latter, it presents itself as the result of those processes to which the Nominalist ultimately refers it. Viewed in *this thing or that*, it becomes subject to the conditions of division and multiplication, which belong to the sensible world.

Nominalist and Realist arguments.

Dissent from Aristotle.

Physics.

21. These may suffice as specimens of the way in which Albert regarded that which had been to his predecessors the all-absorbing science. The Physics of Aristotle opened to his contemporaries an almost new world. He undertook his treatise, or rather his series of treatises upon this subject, he tells us, at the desire of the brethren of his Order, who felt that they had no satisfactory guide to a knowledge of it. He announces his determination to follow Aristotle in all the general divisions as well as the particular titles of his works on nature, introducing digressions when he thinks them necessary for the removal of any difficulties or the clearing of any points which had been overlooked. Here a similar question occurs to that in the opening of the treatises on logic, and we are again introduced to the threefold division into primary philosophy, mathematical and physical. The first, which is the metaphysical and theological region, he regards, of course, as chief in the order of dignity. But physics, he says, is first in the order of teaching; because the senses are first awakened in us and are in contact with outward things. Thence he would ascend to the mathematical or purely intellectual study, thence to the divine and absolute. Physics, therefore, had a significance in the mind of Albertus which they certainly possessed for none of his predecessors. One may understand why he obtained that reputation which has made him the hero of so many legends. His devotion to the natural caused him to be suspected of unlawful communication with the supernatural. He did, however, his best to take physical observations out of that domain in which they are the prey of the enchanter. He grapples boldly with the arguments, popularly attributed to Heraclitus of Ephesus, against the possibility of a science of that which is moveable and changeable. Bodies which are susceptible of motion, he allows are the subject of physics. Science, he allows, in itself implies the fixed and the certain. But, then, he contends that the moveable body may be contemplated in itself, that we may understand its principles and laws apart from the material accidents to which it is exposed, and then that we may discover principles regulating those very accidents. Presently, as we might expect, he finds himself obliged to distinguish between elementary and compound bodies, and so becomes involved with all those assumptions, anticipations, contradictions, which we must leave to the mercy of the modern investigator.

The order of Sciences.

How Physics can become scientific.

22. But there is one point at which the physical speculations of Albert came into close contact with the subjects of this treatise. It is all very well to talk of bodies and moveable bodies; but the

Life.

motion of bodies implies something more than external impact. Some of them are animated,—have *life*. The physical student, our author says, must examine the conditions and kinds of life, or he must abandon his task altogether. There is no subject on which Albert seems to have entered with more earnestness than this. To distinguish between the vegetable, the sensual, and the intellectual life, he feels is a great necessity. But he is almost equally anxious not to separate them rudely from each other, as if there were no relation between them. One of the thoughts which seems to have taken greatest hold of him, is the thought of an inchoation of the higher forms of life in the lower, so that the vegetable shall always be the prophecy of the sensible, the sensible of the intellectual. There is, perhaps, no belief connected with the natural world and with our own selves which has been so dear to the devout student, who has kept his heart warm and hopeful, as this; none of which he has had a stronger external and internal evidence; none which he has at times perceived to be susceptible of more dangerous abuses, to be pregnant of greater phantasies and superstitions. It is a loving link to the old schoolman of the middle ages, to see that in his monastery he was cherishing this genial faith, that he was preserving in his mind a sense of the harmony which there is through all creation, of a golden chain which unites the insect to the archangel. And we may easily guess from the knowledge we have of ourselves, how disciples of the teacher, who had neither his reverence for God nor his conviction of the truth of science, may have become seekers after some secret spring of life,—may have dreamed of one when they did not find it,—may have passed off upon the world some unworthy substitute for it which they had invented.

Inchoative life.

His earnest studies and their perversion.

Psychology.

23. The treatise of Albert upon the origin and nature of the soul, and several others, not very long, which illustrate it, might, we should imagine, be worthy of a study and exposition which we have not time to give them. One, especially on the unity of the intellect against Averroes, touches upon a subject in which we are perhaps even more interested than his age was,—a subject which we may have often occasion to speak of when we approach the history of later schools. In what sense the intellect of each man is distinct, in what sense there is one in all, is a question which has tormented Greek, Arabian, and Latin thinkers alike. A Christian divine would, of course, feel that he had a deep concern in it, and that on many points he could speak a language which the Mahometan could not speak. It is, we think, very greatly to the credit of Albertus, that he enters upon it with a full sense of its importance but with perfect philosophical fairness, introducing no arguments from any source which was not common to him with his opponents, discussing it simply on grounds of reason. In the

course of the discussion, points arise about the connection of the *Anima* with the *Intellectus*, which bear upon the history of philosophical nomenclature as well as of philosophical thought. But we must pass to another subject.

Ethics.

24. The full triumph of Aristotle over the mind of the 13th century is indicated in Albert's treatise upon Ethics. In the opening of the book he assigns his reason for choosing this master in preference to all others. Socrates spoke well of morals, but Aristotle has written upon all things that can be known. Plato speaks nobly of virtue as purgative, purgatorial, and belonging to a purified soul; but he does not speak concerning all Virtue, according to genera and species. Aristotle distinguishes all qualities according to their antecedents, their consequents, their works, their properties, their effects. This is, no doubt, a very honest account of the charm which the great Grecian exercised over his Latin disciples. They were longing to have all their subjects of thought arranged and ticketed. The purgatorial effects of virtue they could discuss in their pulpits. In the schools they wanted accurate definitions. Everything must be subjected to the categories, or it wanted the test of soundness.

Albert's failure from over love of arrangement

25. This desire to bring Ethics within the sphere of logic, involves our author in two difficulties. Aristotle tells us at the commencement of his ethics that we are not to demand mathematical accuracy in moral subjects. He himself is always clear, sharp, precise in his language, never pedantical. He is an observer and experimentalist even more in his treatment of morals than of physics; he deals with facts as a man of business. He is too much a master of logic to be embarrassed with logic. With his commentator it is otherwise. He is a subtle logician, he draws distinctions finely; he knows how to put all subjects into their proper compartments. But the faculty of handling ordinary facts, which he must have possessed, is crushed by his passion for arrangement. His pupils must have forgotten that they were speaking of the things which most nearly concerned themselves, while they were admiring how well all these things were exhibited in their relations to each other. The other difficulty more affects his consistency as a systematizer. Plato's assertion of an absolute and primary good, in virtue of which all other things are good, could not possibly be disputed by a Christian divine. Albert accordingly Platonizes through a great part of his introductory treatise. He disposes of all mere dialectical objections to the belief in the primary essential good. He distinguishes that which is highest in order, highest in comparison, highest in quantity. God himself is the highest in order. That is highest in comparison which most approaches to His nature. That is highest in quantity which most gathers up distinct forms of good into itself. He affirms that there can be no

Platonism.

Aristotelianism.

evil in itself, no essential evil. He affirms good to be implied in the nature of everything. But the moment we pass beyond those preliminaries we find ourselves within the meshes of the categories. Albert returns to his allegiance. The Platonic ideas he denounces in Aristotle's terms, sustained and illustrated by a diffuse commentary. That which is the good of man is carefully separated from the absolute good. Happiness, with Aristotle's definition of it, is accepted as that good. The object of the civilian is said to be altogether different from that of the ontologist. The Platonic principle, we are told, requires that there should be one science. How can that be when there are so many distinct sciences, each with its own aim and its own method?

Politics and Ethics inseparable.

26. There is one characteristic of the Ethics which the reader might fancy would prove a stumbling-block to a friar. The doctrine that ethics are dependent upon politics, the acknowledgment of that as the architectonical study, because its objects are comprehensive, because the life of the citizen must be superior to the life of the single man; this, we might suppose, would be more popular in the 19th century than in the 13th, with a disciple of Paley, than with a disciple of Dominic. The notion is a plausible but an unsound one. No life is more contrasted with the hermit life (that is to say, with the *monastic* in the strict sense of the word) than the cœnobitic life—the life of an order. The brotherhood, by its name and principle, is a testimony for society,—for a polity. No doubt one all-important element of society is wanting, and that is one to which Aristotle does special honour in his master-work. But Albert was prepared to go along with him even here. He admits the conjugial domestic life to be the ground-work of civil order. He even admits man to be a conjugial domestic being. The civil life he represents as rising above this family life. No doubt he looked upon the ecclesiastical, what he would have called the highest type of social life, as dispensing with it. It was most happy, however, for the Christian world at this time that the Aristotelian polity was better understood than the Platonical. The healthy reverence for relationships was kept alive, at least in theory; the schools assented to that as a dogma which in practice was most needful for the world. We have no right, however, to detain our readers with the politics of Albertus, which are more obviously and confessedly than his other writings dilutions of the pure Stagyrite wine.

Political tendencies of the order.

His Metaphysics.

27. It would be inexcusable in a treatise on the history of metaphysical thought, to pass over without notice the books of Albertus which bear directly upon this subject. As we have already noticed his psychology in connection with his speculations on physics, we need scarcely say that this is not included under the more august name of metaphysics. That confusion belongs

almost exclusively to our own time, or at least to the time since Descartes. In all the school period, metaphysics were recognized as nearly identical with Ontology, and as, therefore, being unlike in subject and in treatment to that which has so fluxional and varying a character as the life either of mere animals or of intelligent creatures. The whole first book of Albertus is concerning the stability of this science. All physical things, he says, are connected with matter, which is subject to motion, or mutation, or both. They cannot be conceived, therefore, apart from Time. Therefore these are much mixed with opinion, and would never arrive at the constant, confirmed, and necessary habit of science, if there were not some essential principles discovered in physics which are not dependent upon matter. The circle, the square, even and uneven, all numerical proportions, the diatessaron in music, and the like, are certain stable forms, in themselves free from motion and change; and, therefore, give rise to a study which is not mixed with opinion but contains in it the elements of a necessary science. This is disciplinary science. It wants not experience as physics do; a youth may know as much of it as a doctor. But these speculations are steps and entrances to divine speculation. The capacity of our intellect for this does not exist in virtue of its being human, but because there is in us something that is divine. This divine or metaphysical knowledge is implied in both the others. But they are not the foundation of it; it is the foundation of them.

Physics.

Mathematics.

The highest science.

Theology and Ontology.

28. Theology and Ontology, according to this statement, would seem to be identical; and that opinion, our readers may remember, is maintained by some of the early scholiasts upon Aristotle. Nevertheless, when Albert proceeds to more exact definitions, he rejects the two opinions, that Cause as Cause, or God as God, is the subject of the highest science, and maintains that strictly Being as Being is its only subject. He also rejects what he says is a common notion of the Latins, who fancy they have discovered a solution when they have invented a distinction, that a subject in science may be regarded in three modes, as that which is more common, that which is more certain, that which is more worthy. The more common they would call Being, the more certain, Cause, the more worthy, God. But in sciences concerning things, says Albertus, I abhor all such logical consequences, seeing that they lead to many errors. This science of Being, then, is the primary philosophy. It is a science in itself. For though all other sciences refer to Being, they refer to it analogically; this treats of it in itself. He proceeds to trace the generation of this science from the natural desire of knowledge in man, which desire is not perfected in the gratification or exercise of any sense, or in the understanding of the laws of material things, but seeks for the foundation of this knowledge and for knowledge itself. In pursuing this subject

he necessarily recurs to some of his psychological maxims. Sense, memory, reason, he decides, are the principles of knowledge considered in the knower. Here we again find ourselves completely Aristotelian. Visions of Hermes about the nexus between the soul and God floated before us at the beginning of the treatise. It seemed as if we were scaling heaven, or as if heaven was coming to meet us upon earth. But the passion for a definite science overcomes every other. *The* Being becomes Ens or entity. The primary philosophy may be very stable and original; but it has practically its circumscriptions just like every other.

Transition from Albert to Aquinas.

29. The strictly theological treatises of Albertus we shall not touch upon. In fact he is not at all the specimen of that tendency of the 13th century to which we alluded when we spoke of it as labouring to bring all subjects under the government of theology. He was, as we have seen, formally and characteristically a philosopher. His position as one of the order of preachers, when that order was in its youthful vigour, sufficiently attested the predominance of divine studies over all other studies in his mind. The disciple of Aristotle never for a moment forgot that he was the disciple of Dominic. But he felt it as his function, his brethren recognized it as his function, to assign to every branch of human learning its proper place, to vindicate for it a distinct work, and then to show that it could only subsist in connection with the studies that directly relate to the being and nature of God. He was in his way a very great organizer. Nothing was out of place in his mind; each study fitted into that which lay next to it.

The characteristic distinction between them.

Yet he was not an organizer in the sense which his pupil and friend Aquinas deserved that name. No two men living in the same age, and having continual intercourse with each other, are so unlike in the habits and constitution of their minds; no two have left a more different impression of themselves upon history. Albert's name is surrounded with a traditional haze. Most people have a vague notion that he was half schoolman, half magician; they scarcely know whether he passed among his contemporaries for a servant of God or of the evil spirit. On the contrary, Thomas Aquinas has abundantly fulfilled his master's prophecy of him. The bellowings of that bull have been heard through all countries and in all generations; there is more than a feeble echo of them in our own. He has governed the schools, moulded the thoughts of nearly all Roman Catholic students, given a shape to the speculations of numbers who have never read any of his writings and to whom his name is rather a terror than an attraction. Why this is so we shall endeavour to explain as we proceed. First, it behoves us to give some account of the Angelical Doctor himself.

Greater power of Aquinas.

30. His father and mother were both of splendid Sicilian families. His two brothers were distinguished Generals in the army of

the Emperor Frederick; three of his sisters were married to Counts, one became an Abbess. Some assign the birth of Thomas to the year 1225, some to 1227. An uncle of his was an Abbot in the Monastery on the Monte Casino; there he received his first elements of knowledge between his fifth and tenth year. In consequence of this circumstance the Benedictines have made out a kind of claim to the great Doctor, which is certainly unfounded. The Dominican biographer has produced many substantial arguments against the notion that he ever professed in the Benedictine convent, or was intended to profess. One of great weight is derived from a passage in his history to which we must presently advert. He studied philosophy and letters at Naples in the year 1243; there he assumed the garb of a Dominican. The brethren, fearing the influence of his mother, who was vehemently opposed to this step, sent him privately to Rome. When she had tracked him there, they despatched him with four companions into France. On their way, while they were resting beside a well, soldiers sent by his brothers in Frederick's army surprised them and carried off the novice to his father's castle. There every influence was used to persuade him to abjure his profession; especially a very beautiful woman was introduced into his room and left to try the effect of her persuasions. Such an attempt upon the constancy of a young man who had not yet bound himself by vows, was unrighteous enough. But, asks the Dominican advocate, would even the soldiers of Frederick have dared to place such temptations in the way of one who had already become a Monk at Monte Casino, with the approbation of his kinsfolk? Clearly it was in the order of preachers that he first sought a refuge from the world. From that order no threats and no attractions could withdraw him. His parents saw that the struggle was fruitless. They connived at his escape through a window. He rejoined his companions at Naples, was embraced by the head of the order at Rome, and was sent by him first to Paris and thence to Cologne to be under the guidance of Albertus. According to the constitution of the Dominican order, every one who was to profess theology must pass four years in hearing lectures upon it. These four years were spent by Aquinas partly in Cologne, partly in Paris.

Life of Aquinas by Echard, Opera, vol. i.

A Dominican.

His perils.

State of the University of Paris. Fleury, liv. 79, § 51.

31. It was a critical moment in the history of the Paris University. In the year 1229 a drunken body of students had done some acts of great violence to the citizens; complaint was made to the Bishop of Paris and to the Queen Blanche; the members of the University who had not been guilty of the outrage were violently attacked and ill-treated by the police of the city. The Professors suspended their lessons and demanded satisfaction. When they were refused it, masters and scholars dispersed; some went to Angiers, some to Orleans, some were invited by Henry III. to

England; the great school of Europe was practically at an end. The preachers were sure to benefit by such an occasion. When all other chairs were vacant, they established in Paris a chair of theology. Meantime the Pope was very vigorously urging the restoration of the University to its old privileges. The Bishop, the Chancellor, and the Chapter of Paris, who had found these privileges interfere with their own jurisdiction, were doing their utmost to thwart him. A Bull dated April, 1231, reconstituted the University, established rules for the management of it, and laid down some curious maxims which show that the Dominican influence was beginning to be felt by the Holy See, though it had not yet become triumphant. In 1215 the Papal Legate had positively prohibited the Physics of Aristotle; now only those books of Physics were denounced which had not been examined and purged of all suspicion of error. The general direction was given that the masters and scholars of theology should not pride themselves upon being philosophers, and should only treat in the schools of those questions which could be decided by theological books and the treatises of the Fathers.

Fleury, liv. 71, § 3.

Change in the treatment of Aristotle.

32. The restoration of the University had no direct reference to the Dominicans. They were now firmly established in Paris. They had acquired a name from the position they occupied which they were to bequeath hereafter to an equally democratical, not equally religious, order. They had become the great theological teachers. In 1252, the body of theological doctors became jealous of their influence, and enacted a statute ordaining that no member of a religious order should be admitted to their society who did not belong to a College, and that each College of the religious should be content with a single regent Doctor and a single school. In the following year another dispute between the civil authorities and the University occurred. The doctors of the University adopted their former plan of abandoning their lessons; binding themselves by oath not to resume them till they had obtained redress. Two of the Jacobins refused to take this oath. The University decreed that no one should be received as master or doctor in any faculty who had been recusant. The war was now openly commenced. The University made a long complaint to Innocent IV. against the pride and intrusiveness of the Mendicants. A Bull *Et si animarum* went forth from him to restrain their influence and to support the authority of the learned body that was opposed to them. It was the last act of Innocent IV. The whole policy of the Court was changed in the days of his successor Alexander IV. One of his earliest acts was to revoke the last Bull. Three months after he issued one announcing that the school of Paris was like the tree of life in the Garden of Eden, and then proceeded to alter the shape and growth of the said tree, the

Fleury, liv. 83, c. 54.

The Jacobins.

Matthew Paris (see the Hist. Angl. under the different years) refers often to this quarrel, and speaks severely of the Mendicant Orders.

The Popes against and for the Preachers.

Dominican doctors who had been suspended being restored, and the limitations which had been imposed upon their numbers removed. The doctors of Paris resisted the execution of this decree, and refused to receive the Jacobin brothers. The Pope's two commissioners excommunicated the University. The result was that the Paris doctors appealed to the Pope, declared that the University was dissolved, and that there was consequently no body to which his decrees applied. Alexander treated their dissolution with contempt, and desired the Chancellor of St. Genevieve not to grant the license of teaching in any faculty to those who resisted the Bull. A council which was held in Paris appointed arbiters to decide the controversy. Their decree was a mild and equitable one; but it had scarcely issued before Paris received a Brief from Alexander, denouncing as children of the devil all doctors and schools that opposed themselves to the preachers, threatening the University, and calling upon St. Louis to deal strongly with a Bishop who had attacked the Mendicants. This Bishop was the Guillaume de St. Amour, whom we have heard of already as opposing Albertus at Rome. The victory of the Dominicans there, as we have mentioned, was complete. In 1256 the book against them was formally condemned. In the same year the University submitted to the Pope, and agreed to receive into its body the brothers of the Dominican and Franciscan orders, Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura being expressly named as representatives of each.

War between the Pope and the University.

33. This digression has been inevitable, however much we might wish to pass by the disputes between the University and the Orders. The effect of them was to keep Aquinas for ten years from being admitted master in the faculty of theology; it will appear presently how much the character of his books was influenced by this circumstance. He celebrated his triumph in 1257 by delivering an apology for the Mendicant orders. He had already written tracts upon Being and Essence, and upon the principles of Nature, and had been reading lectures upon the Sentences. Now he held general disputations on six *quod libeta*, *i. e.*, upon questions of any sort that might be proposed to him. In 1258 he was primary regent, and it became his business to expound some book of Holy Scripture. In 1259 he was attending to the business of his order, and in conjunction with Albertus and others drew up a complete scheme of studies for the members of it. In 1260 he was at Rome, where he wrote commentaries on the Physics, Ethics, and Metaphysics of Aristotle, his Argument against the Gentiles, his Exposition of Job, his Questions on the Soul, and some other works. He undertook his Catena at the request of Pope Urban, but did not complete it till after the death of that Pope in 1264. In 1265 he formed the plan of his Summa Theologiæ. In four years, which were not, however,

Influence of these disputes upon the life of Aquinas.

His labours.

The Summa.

exclusively devoted to this great work, he had completed the first part and the first part of the second. A portion of these years was spent in Rome, a portion in Paris. Ultimately, at the urgent request of Charles of Anjou, he settled at Naples, positively declining the Primacy of that city, and adhering strictly to his office as a theological doctor. He had brought his Summa to the 90th question of the third part in the winter of 1273; after that a presentiment of his end seems to have kept him from proceeding farther. The following year he was summoned to the Council of Lyons and was about to stay for a while on his journey with one of his noble relations, when feeling that sickness had seized him, he begged that he might be carried to a monastery of the Cistercian order, near the castle of his niece. There he lingered for a month and died in his forty-ninth year.

His youth.

34. The reader may be surprised to hear how much was accomplished in these forty-eight years. To us it is a greater surprise that any body should have been strong enough to endure the presence and the working of such an intellect as that of Aquinas for so long a time. If we are asked why we should say this, when his master and contemporary, Albert, lasted to old age in the fulness of his faculties and some time after they were departed, we should answer that the sword which was wearing out the sheath in Aquinas, was one of an altogether different temper and edge from that which we have been describing in the former part of this chapter. Thomas, as we have seen, by a curious fate, was restrained from becoming a doctor, was obliged to continue a bachelor in divinity, at a time when these degrees imported the most real differences in the position and work of him who attained them—when the one was expected to be the lawgiver and the other the disputant. Thus our author was a trained arguer; by degrees he rose to the office and station of a judge; but the old habits remained with him when his decisions were most accepted as authorities. From first to last he was thinking of all that could be said on both sides of the question he was discussing; chiefly of what might be said in favour of the opinion which he did *not* hold, and which he was ultimately to annihilate. Those who suppose that he was afraid of approaching heretical or infidel opinions, can have very little acquaintance with him. His books are a storehouse of arguments for such opinions. The reasoner against almost any tenet of the Catholic faith may be furnished at a short notice with almost any kind of weapons out of the armoury of *the* great Catholic doctor.

Aquinas primarily a Disputant.

His doubts chiefly intellectual.

35. We are far from saying that all these doubts had actually tormented the inner soul of Aquinas, that he had wrestled with them and overcome them there. Had this been the case, we should think the term of his life, instead of reaching fifty years, could not have reached thirty. Perhaps, no doubt had ever penetrated into the inmost sanctuary of his being; nearly all may have dwelt in the outer court of the intellect; he may have known them only through its forms. The name which his contemporaries gave him, and which he has borne ever since, indicates that this was their opinion. The "Angelical Doctor," standing in contrast with the "Seraphic Doctor," which is the title given to the Franciscan Bonaventura, denotes that the one was regarded as a pure Intelligence, the other as a being in whom the heart and affections were vastly predominant. But even thought of in this way, the multitude of plausible reasons assigned by Aquinas for every opinion which it behoved a faithful reader of the fathers in theology and of Aristotle in philosophy to reject—against every opinion which it behoved the same faithful reader to receive—are enough to bewilder any man's brain, and to leave him doubtful after a while, whether he is standing on the ground or suspended in the air, nay, whether there is any ground to stand upon, or any air to be suspended in.

Effect of Aquinas upon his readers.

36. Perhaps, after a series of trials, the reader becomes thoroughly convinced that the Doctor will bear him aloft through all the perplexities which he has himself raised. He begins to say with triumph, that the more he knows of such objections the better, because they are sure to be effectually solved. Everything, he thinks, has been anticipated; no new arrows can pierce him; he has been dipped in Styx; not even the part by which he was held during the process is vulnerable. What a number of students of theology in the schools where the Angelical Doctor reigns must have adopted this comfortable conviction! With what security they must have ventured into the lists with opponents! But what an awakening has been reserved for some, who have discovered that knowing all questions, they knew none; that one actual experience of the world, one terrible internal temptation, might tear the logic of the schools to pieces, and leave them feeble, helpless, hopeless. What anguish must there be in such a revelation, yet what a blessing!

The two characteristics of Aquinas, how reconciled.

37. Some of our readers may have been more prepared for our first statement respecting Aquinas, that he was the great organizer of the 13th century, than for our second, that he was the great disputant or arguer of the 13th century. They may even find it hard to reconcile the two characters, to conceive how the same man should have the subtlety of the objector and sceptic and the power of reducing all things and thoughts into one perfect comprehensive system. To understand properly this union of powers, and how the last was trained and matured by the exercise of the first, the reader ought to examine some of the smaller treatises of Aquinas, those in which he treats of specific questions arising in the domain of theology or philosophy, and then to contemplate the full flowering of his intellect in the *Summa*. We

propose to give them a specimen of the earlier class of his writings, that they may enter into his method of reasoning; afterwards to show how the philosophical or properly human part of his scheme is linked to the diviner part, by giving something like a view of the course and distribution of his subject in that book upon which his glory in the schools mainly rests.

D. Thomæ Aquinatis Opera, vol. 14. Venetiis, 1781, pp. 6-9.

38. We cannot perhaps take a better specimen of the manner of Aquinas than from one of his questions on POWER. There are seven articles on the first question concerning the Power of God. The third of these articles is, "Whether those things which are impossible to Nature, are possible to God." He gives nine reasons for the negative opinion. The first is, that since God is the Mover of nature, He cannot act contrary to nature. The second is, that the first principle in all demonstration, that affirmatives and negatives are not true at the same time, applies to nature, and that God cannot cause that a negative and affirmative should be true at the same time. The third is very like the second. There are two principles subject to God, Reason, and Nature. But God cannot do that which is impossible to Reason, therefore He cannot do anything which is impossible to Nature. The fourth is, what the false and the true are to knowledge, the possible and the impossible are to work. But that which is false in nature, God cannot know, therefore what is impossible in nature God cannot work. The fifth sounds rather more subtle, perhaps more quibbling. What is proved of any one thing is understood to be proved of all similar things; as if it is demonstrated of one triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles, it is proved concerning all. But there is an impossibility to God, to wit, that He should be able to do a thing, and not be able to do a thing, therefore, if there is some impossibility in nature which He cannot do, it would seem that He can do no impossibility. The sixth is derived from the words of Timothy, "God is faithful; He cannot deny Himself." If He could do anything against Truth He would deny Himself; He would do something against truth if he did anything that was naturally impossible. The seventh is little more than a repetition of the second. The eighth is, no artificer can work against his own art, because art is the principle of his operation. But the order of nature which makes anything naturally impossible is the consequence of the divine art. The ninth rests upon quotations from Jerome, Augustine, and Aristotle, all proving that there are certain impossibilities by accident which cannot be set aside by any power. But that is more impossible which is impossible in itself than that which is impossible by accident. Here the case for one side closes.

Arguments to prove that what is impossible to Nature is impossible to God.

Arguments on the opposite side.

39. There are eight reasons on the opposite side. The first is drawn from St. Luke's words, "No word shall be impossible with

God." The second is, all power that can do this and not that, is a limited power; but God's power is unlimited. The third is, hindrances to acts by anything imply the limitation of power by that thing. The power of God is not limited by anything—not by the principle that affirmatives and negatives cannot consist, or by any other—therefore neither that principle nor any other can hinder the acts of God. The fourth is, privations do not admit of degrees. The impossible is a privation of power. If God is not deprived of power in one naturally impossible case,—*e.g.*, the making a blind man to see, He is not deprived of it in any other like case. The fifth is, whatever resists any power resists it in virtue of some opposing principle within it; but there is no such principle opposed to the divine power. The sixth is, as blindness is opposed to vision, so virginity is opposed to bringing forth. But God could cause that one remaining a virgin should bring forth. Therefore He can cause that one being blind should see while he remains blind, and so can cause that affirmations and negations should be true at the same time. The seventh is, it is more difficult to unite substantial forms which are disparate than accidental forms. But God united into one the substantial forms that are most disparate, to wit, the human and divine, which differ as created and uncreated; much more then can He unite two accidental forms into one, so as to cause that the same thing should be white and black. The eighth argument we should have some difficulty in making intelligible to our readers; and there are other reasons for which it may be better omitted.

The Solution.

40. Now then, the Doctor himself appears. He has, in this instance, which is one of our motives for selecting it, to reply both to the defendant's counsel and the plaintiff's, so that his judicial character is more than commonly brought out. He begins with affirming after Aristotle that the words Possible and Impossible are used in a threefold sense. We may speak of them first in respect of some active or passive power, as when we say, it is possible for a man to walk, but impossible for him to fly. Secondly, we speak of them not in respect of any power but in respect of themselves, as when we call that impossible which is necessarily not to be, and that possible which is not impossible to be. The third sense is in respect of mathematical power, as when you speak of a line being commensurable or incommensurable, that is of having the possibility or impossibility of being measured. Passing over this last, he considers the other two kinds of possibility. It must be understood, he says, that that which is impossible in itself, is so named in virtue of an incoherency of its terms,—*i.e.*, it affirms the co-existence of an affirmation and a negation. But this cannot be attributed to any active power, for every active power implies actuality, and actuality implies existence. Every action of an active power produces something; it has its result in that

The threefold meaning of Possible and Impossible.

Why it is no detraction from Power to say it cannot transgress a Law.

which is. And though there seems to be an exception to this rule in the case of corruption or dissolution, yet this is only because something is generated which is incompatible with that which was before,—*e.g.*, the existence of heat is not compatible with the existence of cold. That which is called impossible in respect of any power may arise either from some defect of internal force, or from some accident or impediment. Now, those things which are impossible in nature, for either of these last reasons, God can effect. For His power, seeing it is infinite, suffers defect in nothing. Nor is there any matter which he cannot transmute at pleasure, for there is no resisting His power. But that which is called on the third ground impossible, God cannot do, for the very reason that all active power is in Him and that He is the Being of beings. When we say He is not able to do this, we indicate not a defect in his power, but a defect inherent in the very principle of possibility, or, as some express it, God can do it, but it cannot be done.

The refutation.

41. These general principles are then applied to the specific arguments on each side of the question. A few specimens may serve as illustrations of his method. When it is said that God, because He is the Mover of nature, cannot act against nature, it is not meant that He cannot act otherwise than nature does, since He frequently acts against the accustomed course of nature; but that whatever He does in anything is not against its nature, but is its nature inasmuch as He is the former and ordainer of nature. An instance is taken from the tides. The water has a movement of its own, which may be called natural to it; but surely the influence of the moon upon it is not to be called unnatural. Again, it

What is above Nature is not against Nature.

is impossible for a man who is blind to see through any power of nature; this does not imply an impossibility in itself; it implies that second or third kind of impossibility, which has been decided not to interfere with the divine energy. On the contrary, the impossibilities of rational philosophy, are not impossibilities

Essential Impossibility.

with respect to any power, but are those essential impossibilities which if we supposed God to transgress we should impute to Him weakness and not power. To the objection that God does not destroy that which is true, the answer is, He does not cause that what was true should not have been true, but He causes that something should be true which would otherwise not be true. In raising the dead, He does not interfere with the fact that he who is raised was dead. To the arguments from the constancy of God as an artificer, the answer is, that the art of God not only extends to those things which have been made, but to many other things. To change the course of nature, is not to act contrary to His art, but to bring out a new exhibition of it. To the argument on the other side, which is drawn from the words of St. Luke, that no word is impossible with God, it is answered that a word is not only uttered with the

mouth, but is conceived with the mind. That an affirmation and negation should at the same time be true, cannot be conceived of by the mind. To say that God cannot hold contraries in His mind, is not to contradict the saying of the Angel. To the objection that is drawn from the Omnipotence of God, the answer is, that it is no hindrance upon His free will that He cannot do that which would imply the absence of active power. To the argument respecting the virgin, it is answered, that virginity is not opposed to bringing forth as blindness is opposed to sight, but is opposed to the union of the sexes, without which nature cannot produce a birth, but God can. The answer to the argument from the Incarnation is, that the union of opposites, the Created and Uncreated in Christ, had respect to the two different natures that were in Him; from whence it cannot be inferred that God would blend together two opposites, as black and white, so that they should become the same.

The Incarnation.

42. We have finished our quotation. The judgments of different readers upon it will be assuredly most different. Every one of us has perhaps passed through stages in his own mind which can enable him to understand these differences and to be not altogether intolerant of them. The first impression probably upon a young man, used to the style of writing in our day,—used to find the meaning of words taken for granted, which are here laboriously weighed and analyzed,—is one of astonishment and confusion. He does not know whether it is utter nonsense, as some will tell him it is, or the most profound sense which it would be well to exchange for much of the lore that makes us proud. In a later period, as the importance of facts grows upon him, as he aspires after the real and becomes disgusted with the verbal, he may be more inclined to accept the judgment of his own time, and to fall into its contempt of the mediæval doctor. But as his experience expands and deepens, he may discover how many verbal perplexities are continually haunting those who are most busy about things, how often they start unawares the questions which Aquinas started deliberately, how they try to cut knots which he endeavoured to untie, and do not cut them after all, but make them more embarrassing, how disagreeable their off-hand dogmatism is while they are in the very act of censuring his painful and conscientious dogmatism; such reflections may lead him to place the schoolman upon even a higher pedestal than that from which he had fallen. Again, there may be a rebellion against this reverence. He may think over one such passage as that which we have presented to our readers, he may consider that that extract is contained in about two pages of a volume of 286 pages, that volume being one of the smallest in a set of at least thirty, from which the spurious treatises have been eliminated with tolerable care. To think of a human soul

Vicissitudes of opinions respecting this style of writing.

being the store-house of such a collection of doubts and decisions as that statement implies, to think of a multitude of human souls from the 13th century downwards having all this mass of opinions floating about them or crammed into them, is very appalling. A cry for light and air rises out of his heart. He begins to dwell kindly upon the legend of Caliph Omar, or to construe the promise that Babylon the Great shall some day sink like lead in the mighty waters, as applying to the Babel of human notions, to the folios in which they are built up a column reaching to heaven.

Aquinas may yet have a work to do.

43. We hope and believe that it is not necessary to settle down in any of these conclusions or positively to reject any of them. A time may be coming when it will be possible to derive more good from Aquinas than any age has owed to him, because we are free from his trammels and have learned to walk at liberty under higher guidance. Protestant Europe may even yet do him a justice which cannot be done him by those who dread lest he should make them sceptics, or who sit at his feet and receive his words as those of one who understood all mysteries and all knowledge. Meanwhile, we will do what in us lies to give our readers some conception of the comprehensiveness of his intellect, as we have already attempted to give them a glimpse of its subtlety.

The Summa Pars Prima.

44. The first part of the *Summa* of Aquinas is the purely theological part. The first question is, What sacred Learning is, and how far it extends? Within this general title are included ten articles, or minor questions. They are these: "Whether theological doctrine is necessary beyond other sciences, whether it is a science, whether it is one science or more, whether it is speculative or practical, whether it is worthier than other sciences, whether it is wisdom, whether God is the subject of it, whether it is argumentative, whether it may use metaphorical or symbolical forms of speech, whether sacred Scripture under the same letter has more than one sense." We merely enumerate titles; each, the reader will understand, is treated after the same method, and with the same fulness as those questions respecting power of which we have given a specimen. It is very desirable to understand the starting point of the Angelical Doctor. He begins, it will be perceived, with theology considered as a science, then he proceeds to speak of God as the subject of that science. This is Aristotelianism carried to its highest point. Aquinas may become Platonical as he proceeds; often we shall find that he does, that he assumes God to be at once the ground and object of man's contemplation, and builds much upon the assumption. But beneath all this lies the conception of a science which *includes* Him, and which is to determine our judgments respecting Him. It is needful to keep this characteristic of the Teacher continually in our mind, whilst we are studying any portion of his writings. More

The method of Aquinas wherein Aristotelian.

perhaps than any other writer, he always recollects that the specific subject he is occupied with has to do with the general subject of his treatise. The whole is always present to him in each part. And the main cause, we shall find, of his difference from his Franciscan contemporaries lay in this, that in each department of study they were aiming successfully or unsuccessfully to keep a living object in sight, and were therefore impatient of the wonderful efforts of skill by which the Dominican brought it within what seemed to them the enclosure of a dead system.

General Titles in the first Part.

45. We may proceed more rapidly with the other titles of this part. The second question is of God, whether He is; the third, of the Simplicity of God; the fourth, of the Perfection of God; the fifth, of Good universally; the sixth, of the Goodness of God; the seventh, of the Infinity of God; the eighth, of the Existence of God in Things; the ninth, of the Immutability of God; the tenth, of the Eternity of God, the eleventh, of the Divine Unity; the twelfth, of the Knowledge and Vision of God; the thirteenth, of the Names of God; the fourteenth, of the Knowledge which is in God Himself. Then follow three on Ideas, on Truth, on Falsehood; then eight more on the Life of God, the Will of God, the Love of God, on the Justice and Pity of God, on the Providence of God, on Predestination, on the Book of Life, on the Power of God, on the Blessedness of God. Questions concerning the Persons of the Trinity engage us till the end of the forty-third title. The forty-fourth discusses the primary cause of all Entities; the forty-fifth, Creation; the forty-sixth, the beginning of the duration of things created. The forty-seventh is on the distinction of things in common, *i.e.*, concerning plurality as such. The forty-eighth is on the distinction of things in special, and primarily concerning evil. The forty-ninth is on the cause of evil. From the fiftieth to the sixty-fifth, all bear upon the subject of Angels. Those from the sixty-fifth to the seventy-fifth have reference to the order and works of Creation. At the seventy-fifth we enter upon a class of subjects which would seem at first not to belong to theology, but to Anthropology. In them we have discussions about man, as to the essence of his soul, about the union of the soul to the body, about things pertaining to the powers of the soul in general, about the powers of the soul in special, about the intellectual powers, about appetite, sensuality, will (*voluntas*), free-will (*liberum arbitrium*), how the soul united to the body understands the corporeal things that are beneath it, the mode and order of understanding, what the intellect of man knows in things corporeal and material, how the intellectual soul knows itself and the things that are in it, how the human soul knows those things that are above it, what is the knowledge of the soul separated from the body. Then we come, at the ninetieth question, to the production of man as far as con-

Pure Theology.

Mixed Theology.

Spiritual Nature.

Human Nature.

Historical questions.

cerns his soul, to the production of the body of the first man, to the production of the woman, to the end of the production of the man as expressed in the words "made in the image of God," to the state and condition of the first man, to things which relate to the will of the first man, to the dominion which belonged to man in the state of innocence, to the things which concern the state of the first man as far as the preservation of the individual, to that which concerns the carrying on of the species; to the condition of the race that might have been produced in the state of innocence, to the meaning and nature of Paradise. Then commence questions on the government of the world by God, the effects of the divine government, the alteration of things created by God, the offices of Angels in carrying out the purposes of the divine government. In the course of these questions we have a discussion respecting evil Angels, their orders, and their assaults upon men. The five last titles in this part are on the action of the corporeal creature, on Fate, on some secondary influences of the action of man, on the derivation of man from man in reference to the soul, on the propagation of men in reference to the body.

Order of the Treatise.

46. There are two or three of the manifold subjects discussed under these heads upon which we may feel desirous to learn our author's sentiments. But we would advise the reader, first of all, to make an effort at understanding the order in which they follow each other. At first, it may be, this order will seem perplexed. Do not divine and human subjects run strangely one into another? Why should a discussion upon Ideas or upon Truth come in between discussions about the knowledge and the life of God? Why should Angels be treated of first before man and then after him? Why do so many psychological and physiological controversies mix themselves with the history of the Genesis of man? Perhaps the consideration of these apparent inconsistencies of the great Schoolman might help us much in apprehending the difference between his mode of thinking, and our own, as well as in tracing the course and development of his speculations.

Aquinas on Ideas.

If we turn to his fifteenth question upon Ideas, we shall at once understand why it follows upon the very elaborate inquiries in the preceding title respecting the knowledge of God. After stating rather more shortly than he commonly does the reasons for thinking that there are and that there are not ideas, he delivers his conclusions in these terms:—"It *is* necessary to suppose ideas in the Divine mind. What is called *Idea* in Greek, is called Form in Latin. Wherefore by ideas are understood the forms of certain things over and above the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing over and above the thing itself, may be either the exemplar of that thing, or the principle of the knowledge of it in the

mind of the knower. It is necessary to assume ideas in both senses. For in all things that are not generated by chance, the Form is the end of the generation. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the similitude of it is in him. The similitude exists *naturally* in those agents that act by nature, as man generates man, and fire fire. The similitude exists *intellectually* in those agents which act by intellect. Thus the similitude of a house pre-exists in the mind of a builder, and this may be called the idea of the house, because the artificer *intends* to assimilate the house to this form. Seeing, therefore, that the world is not made by chance, but is made by God acting through intellect, it is necessary there should be in the Divine mind a Form after the similitude of which the world has been made." Then, in disposing of some of the objections to the existence of Ideas, he says that "God does not understand things according to an idea existing without Him," and therefore that Aristotle was right in denouncing the opinion of Plato concerning ideas, inasmuch as he made them self-existing, not existing in the intellect. And, finally, he determines that the "idea in God is nothing else than the essence of God." We have introduced this passage partly as a justification of the method which Aquinas has adopted, and partly as an illustration of the way in which his Aristotelian Metaphysics blended themselves with his Christian theology, and led him to reject the *purely* ideal philosophy which had been associated with it by Augustine.

Ideas involve Intelligence.

Plato seen through Aristotle and denounced.

Distinctions

47. If we turn to the forty-seventh and forty-eighth questions we are able to account for some of the other apparent anomalies which we have noticed in his arrangements. After considering the Persons of the Godhead—all that is uncreated—he goes on to Creation. The production of creatures in *esse* leads him on to the distinction of creatures. That distinction is threefold: first, the distinction of creatures generally; secondly, the distinction of Good and Evil; thirdly, the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature. In reference to the first subject, he has to inquire whether God is the Author of the plurality of creatures, or whether as He is one they must not be one so far as they proceeded from Him, and must not owe their division to the presence of matter, or at all events to some secondary agency. He decides against this last opinion, and lays down the doctrine that "God produced things in *esse* for the purpose of communicating His goodness to the creatures and that it might be represented through them. And because it cannot be adequately represented through one creature, He produced many and diverse creatures; so that what is wanting in one for the setting forth the divine goodness, may be supplied from another. For the goodness which in God is simple and uniform, is in the creatures divided and multiform." We must not be tempted to pursue this ques-

Plurality of Worlds.

tion by the third article wherein the modern controversy on the plurality of worlds is entered upon, Aquinas appearing as a supporter of Dr. Whewell's hypothesis; but we must pass to what strikes us, for people at large, as a more important subject, Good and

Evil.

Evil. Here the great point to be settled is, whether Evil is a distinct nature, a positive existence. Our Author decides that "one of two opposites is known by another, as darkness by light; therefore we can only understand what is evil by understanding what is good. But seeing that good is what is to be desired and that every nature desires its own being and perfection, the being and perfection of

No Substance.

every nature must involve goodness; therefore evil cannot signify a certain existence or a certain form or nature. It follows that it can only signify a certain absence of good." Hence is deduced the decision of many other points, all of great interest and continually recurring in human experience, as whether evil is in good as in its subject, whether evil corrupts the whole good to which it attaches itself, whether evil is sufficiently divided into punishment and fault, whether good can be ever the cause of evil, whether there is a perfect evil in the same sense as there is a perfect good. On all these points Aquinas has something to teach us which it might be well worth our while to learn. Our wish, however, is rather that the reader may understand how all these points arise out of the subject of distinctions in created things, and how an investigation respecting the angelical orders as representing the spiritual or intellectual creation and respecting man as representing the union of the two, fairly and logically appears as another division of the same head. Seeing, moreover, that the nature and position of man cannot be fully discussed without considering the mode of God's government over him, and seeing that that government, as Aquinas thought, was carried on through angelic agents, he was obliged to introduce them again in their relations with our race, at the end of this part. Nor was it possible to ascertain in what sense the action of man is free, without considering what is meant by Fate, although the subject of God's predestination as bearing upon the life of man and the principles of his being had been discussed in some of the earlier titles.

The Prima Secundæ.

48. It is commonly said that the second part of the *Summa* contains the Ethics of Aquinas. The second portion of this second part is generally that from which the student of Aristotle is told that he may derive most help. There is excuse for this statement. But any one will fail to understand the position and work of the Angelical Doctor, who tries to contemplate the ethical questions upon which he enters, apart from the subject which gives its title to the whole work. To take that course with Albertus was easy, with Aquinas it is destructive. An attempt, as brief as we can make it, to give some notion of the subjects

embraced in this part, will sufficiently establish our proposition. That man, in so far forth as he is man, acts with reference to some End, that there is therefore one ultimate end for all men, that this end is Blessedness, we might conclude would be the starting points of an Aristotelian Anthropologist. But then the question, what is

Blessedness.

Blessedness, carries us into a region into which Aristotle never soared. After a number of negative conclusions as to what it is not, we come at last to the decision that ultimate and perfect blessedness can only be in the vision of the Divine Essence. Then follows the inquiry, what things are required for blessedness. Whether delight is required for it, whether Vision, Comprehension, Rectitude of Will are required for it? All which points being settled in the affirmative, the question of the necessity of the Body and of the Society of friends to it, is examined and answered in the negative, it being, however, admitted that a creature endowed with a body cannot attain the full end of his being till the body is perfected.

Will.

49. The next series of questions, from the sixth to the seventeenth, refers to the Will. The distinctions of voluntary and involuntary, the circumstances of human acts in respect of the will, the motive of the will, the mode in which the will is moved, fruition, intention, election, deliberation, consent, custom, in their different bearings upon the will, finally, the acts commanded by the will, are titles which include a multitude of points with which the ethical philosopher of the old world was in some degree familiar, but which assumed a new character, importance, and complexity, in the mind of the Christian divine. Thence we proceed to the goodness and evil of human acts—these being distinguished as acts of the internal will—and to the result of these acts in virtue of their goodness and evil, a subject involving of course their merit or demerit in the sight of God. Next come the Passions of the soul in general, their

Passions and their distinctions.

distinction, their order, their relation to good and evil; love, hatred, concupiscence, joy, sorrow, the effects of both, the remedies of sorrow. These fall under the head of the passions which have to do with appetite or desire. Hope, fear, anger, are referred to another class. Thence we go on to that great subject of the Aristotelian ethics, Habits. It is thus introduced:—"After acts and passions, it

Habits.

behoves us to consider the principles of human acts—first, intrinsic principles, then extrinsic. An intrinsic principle is a power and a habit. Enough has been said of powers in the first part: now is the time for treating of habits. First, they are to be considered in general; secondly, in reference to virtues and vices and other habits of the like kind which are the principles of acts. There are four things to be considered in reference to habits generally,—first, their substance; secondly, their subject; thirdly, the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption; fourthly, their distinctions. In refer-

ence to the substance, four questions arise. First, whether habit is a quality; secondly, whether it is a determinate kind of quality; thirdly, whether it imports the direction towards an act; fourthly, on the necessity of habit. "It would seem," thus he begins, according to his usual method, the article on the first of his hints, "that habit is *not* a quality. For Augustine says, that this name, habit, is derived from the verb to have. But having belongs not only to quality, but quite as much to quantity. We speak of having so much money. Moreover, habit is one category and quality another, and one is not contained under another. Moreover, habit is a disposition; but disposition belongs to the category of position." Of course, all these difficulties are triumphantly settled. But that they should occur in this place, that it should be necessary to deal with them at all in an ethical discussion, is one example, perhaps the most striking that can be given, of the embarrassments into which Aquinas was led by his determination to bring the whole Aristotle, Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics, into his *Summa Theologiæ*. We do not complain of his design, but we cannot help thinking that it was frustrated by the complicated machinery which he invented for the accomplishment of it. There is, it seems to us, a very natural transition from the language of Aristotle respecting Habits, to the language of St. Paul, concerning the putting off of the old man, and the putting on of the new. The imagination, using language as its instrument, supplies the link. The experience of life, to which Aristotle is always so glad to appeal, and to which, when he is speaking of habits and energies as correlatives, he so honestly and courageously sacrifices the formalities of logic—preferring the appearance of a circle in reasoning to the denial of a fact—explains how the philosophical observation falls under the Christian law. Aquinas, overlooking *this* passage between the two sciences which he desired to associate and harmonize, is forced to flounder among the predicaments, to raise a number of difficulties (each of which cuts the throat of the other, and yet each of which remains a difficulty, if we must seek in *Habitus*, *Situs*, *Qualitas*, *Quantitas*, and their comrades, the standing points for moving the world), and then, finally, to draw a line between habits considered as *in* us and habits considered as put upon us, which is so sharp and deep that we lose all feeling of the relation between them. Logicians often commit a perilous violence to words, in their efforts—honest though they are—to rid them of their equivocations. The double meaning which the punster and the knave play with for their respective purposes have a real inward sympathy which we should seek to bring out, not to destroy. Had Aquinas succeeded in preserving it in the case of habits, he would, we think, have done a greater service than he has done both to morals and to theology.

Habit a quality.

The perplexities of a Logician.

Equivocations not to be rashly got rid of.

50. From Habits, Aquinas proceeds to Virtues. Human Virtue is determined to be a Habit; to be an operative Habit; to be a Habit operative of good. A definition of it is at length worked out. Virtue is a good quality or habit of mind; upon which right living depends; which cannot be turned to evil use; and which God without us, works in us. The Aristotelian Energy is here subjected to the Christian Law "He worketh in us to will and do of his good pleasure." After what we have just said about the treatment of Habits, we are bound to welcome such an illustration of the link between the Ethics of the Stagyrite and of the New Testament. But we cannot think that Aquinas has been very felicitous in combining the two elements of which his definition is composed; it will strike most readers as overloaded and clumsy. Some will feel strongly that the whole force is gone out of the word, when its connection with *manliness* is forgotten. The Latin of the Middle Ages might be excused for forgetting that classical etymology. The energies of the Monk were great and vigorous; they were not exactly the energies of the Man. From Virtues in respect to their essences, we pass to the subject in which virtue dwells; then to the intellectual virtues; then to the moral virtues as distinguished from the intellectual; then to the distinction of the moral virtues in reference to each other; then to an article to which there is nothing corresponding in Aristotle, the *Cardinal Virtues*. As this is one of the characteristic points in the School ethics, the reader may be curious to know how it is discussed by the greatest of the Schoolmen. First, we have to ascertain what the meaning of the epithet is. There is a perfect and an imperfect virtue. The imperfect virtue implies only the faculty of doing well; the perfect virtue implies a rectitude of appetite or desire. Those virtues which involve this higher idea are called principal or cardinal. The intellectual virtue of Prudence is included among them, because it is in a certain sense moral. They are not the theological virtues, for those are super-human or divine. Of the cardinal virtues there are four: Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude. Cicero and Gregory the Great are the authorities for reducing all moral virtues under these as their chiefs and directors. There are two ways of considering them which have led to some confusion. Some suppose that they signify certain general conditions of the human mind which are found in all virtues. In this sense each may almost be taken for the other, rectitude and self-government being implied equally in all; and so justice in the Aristotelian sense might include them. But others, and in the opinion of Aquinas, with greater propriety, take these four virtues according to the subject matter of each. Then they become of course distinct. Another division follows upon this. Of the cardinal virtues some are political, some

Virtues.

Virtue not manliness in Aquinas.

Cardinal Virtues.

are purgatorial, some belong to the purified soul, some are exemplary. This is our Doctor's explanation. The exemplar of human virtue must pre-exist in God. Virtue must therefore be considered first as it is exemplarily in God. In that sense the Divine Mind in God is called Prudence; the turning of the divine intention upon itself is called Temperance; the immutability of God is His Fortitude; the observation of the eternal law by God in His works is His Justice. As man, according to his nature, is a political animal, there must be virtues which have to do with him in this relation. But since man is intended to be perfect as his Father in Heaven is perfect, these properly human virtues must be connected with the divine or exemplary virtues. Between the Exemplary virtues and the political, there must be an intermediate class, of such as raise a man above mundane tendencies, and enable him to contemplate the divine standard. These are the *purgatorial*. But there are some who have already received the fruit of such exercises. Their Virtues are those of the *purified mind*. But all these are included with the term Moral, and so are distinguished from the Theological Virtues, which are Faith, Hope, Charity.

The Purgatorial and Complete Virtues.

51. Whatever our readers may think of these divisions, as bearing upon practice, and as helps to the conscience, they must at least admit, that Aquinas is consistent with himself, and that no part of his book brings out more clearly than this his sense of the connection between Ethics and Theology, of their distinction, and of the subordination of the one to the other. The sixty-second question of this part, and especially the third article of it, concerning the propriety of reckoning Faith among virtues, involves some of the points which were most debated between the Reformers of the 16th century, and the School Divines. But the student will not discover the grounds of that controversy, or its immense significance for the history of the world and for personal life, by poring over these passages in the great Doctor. Sometimes he will think he has detected a flaw in him, and can trace the whole pontifical doctrine of Merit in his statements. The next moment he will perceive some careful qualification in those statements, some enunciation of the ground and object of Faith, which he thinks might satisfy the most scrupulous Protestant. As long as scholasticism is encountered by scholasticism, the puzzle continues, and we may be driven into the position which Melanchthon seems to have occupied in his latter days, of half wondering how the dispute could have assumed such a world-wide importance, when the change of a phrase or two, perhaps the transposition of a particle, might bring about a compromise. It is when scholasticism is brought face to face, as it was in Luther, with a strong swimmer in his agony, with a human being wrestling for life, that we begin to understand what the war means, and why protocols and paper treaties must be always ineffectual to terminate it.

Is Faith a Virtue?

Schoolmen against Schoolmen.

Men against Schoolmen.

The following question on the cause of virtues, embracing the articles, whether virtue is in us by nature, whether any virtue is produced in us by the repetition of acts, whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion, whether the virtue which we acquire by repetition of acts is the same with the virtue that is infused, gives us a glimpse into another long vista of controversies; all connected with the primary one of which we have just spoken. To all, we believe, the observation we have just made is applicable. So long as we meet Aquinas on his own ground he is invincible. When you pass from him to the actual tumults of the conscience, and to the living facts of Scripture which respond to them, you are inclined to pronounce him utterly feeble.

52. We must stop a moment at the next question, which bears upon the Aristotelian doctrine of the Mean. Are moral virtues, as the old philosopher affirmed, in a Mean? Aquinas states the obvious objection, that virtue is always pointing to that which is highest and ultimate. But he disposes of it, affirming that the highest excellence consists in the adherence to measure and rule: that a measure or rule implies an excess or defect, each of which it forbids: that it must, therefore, be conservative of the Mean, and that virtue must be in that mean. The following article determines that though the mean, in the case of Justice, is a mean in the thing itself (because Justice consists in assigning to each person that which is neither less nor more than what is his), yet in the moral virtues which concern the passions, the mean has reference to *us*, the liability of one man being to excess or defect in *this* passion, of another to excess or defect in *that*. A third article brings the intellectual virtues under the same law with the moral. The end of Intellectual Virtue as such is Truth. But Truth consists in the affirmation, that that which is, is; that that which is not, is not. To affirm that to be which is not, is excess; to affirm that not to be, which is, is defect. Between them lies the mean. Nothing can be more strictly Stagyrite than this conclusion. But in the next article we are carried into another region. Theological Virtues are determined to consist in a mean, only by accident. In themselves, Faith, Hope, and Charity admit of no excess, because the measure of them is the transcendent excellence of God. But considered in reference to our condition, Hope may be the mean between Despair and Presumption; Faith may be the mean between opposing heresies.

The Mean.

The absolute Mean, and the Mean as to us.

Theological Virtues under a different Law.

53. In one, at least, of his decisions respecting virtues, Aquinas has, we think, sacrificed the interests of morality and theology, not to save the uniformity of his system, but at the expense of it. The doubt is started, whether virtues can exist apart from Charity. The difficulty is, that certain moral virtues must be attributed to the Heathens, and that Charity being a divine gift, cannot be

Relation of Charity to the Virtues.

attributed to them. The only escape is in the distinction between virtues acquired by human industry, and virtues infused into us. Aquinas is obliged to admit that the latter only possess the proper conditions of virtues. Yet, if he excludes the former, the very teacher whom he is following in his scheme of Ethics, and whose fundamental principle is, that the practice of virtues precedes the knowledge of them, must have been absolutely ignorant respecting their nature. We rejoice to expose this inconsistency, because in doing so we are gratifying no party animosity or predilection. Protestants have inherited the contradiction from the Schoolman. In many of their statements, it is far less disguised than in his. And it involves consequences to them which it does not to him. If they allow the acquisition of virtues in any sense by human industry, they relinquish the fundamental principle about which they are at issue with the Romanists. And they have no way of saving it, except either by resorting to phrases respecting Heathen virtues which identify them with vices, so shaking the foundations of all moral order, calling good evil, and evil good; or else by giving up the atheistical doctrine—which the creeds of the church, which every page in the Bible refutes—that the world, for four thousand years, with the exception of one little corner of it, was a Christless and a Fatherless world.

Inconsistency of Aquinas.

And of Protestants.

54. We must not be detained by the questions on the equality of virtues, and the duration of virtue after this life; on gifts, on beatitudes, on the fruits of the Spirit, nor even by the very important articles upon sins and vices which bring us down as far as the ninetieth. Then we enter upon the subject of LAW. It is thus introduced:—"Next, we must treat of the exterior principles of acts. The exterior principle which inclines us to evil is the Devil. The exterior principle which moves us to good is God, who instructs us by Law, and assists us by Grace. Wherefore, we must first speak of Law, secondly of Grace. About law, it behoves us first to consider law itself in common; secondly, its portions. About law in common, there are three points to be considered. 1st, Its essence. 2d, The difference of laws. 3d, The effect of law. On the first point (the essence of law), four questions arise. 1st, Whether the law has anything to do with reason. 2d, Its purpose. 3d, Its cause. 4th, Its promulgation." There are three arguments which may be brought to show that law has not anything to do with reason. 1st, The apostle speaks of a law in his members; but reason has nothing to do with the members of the body. Moreover, in Reason there is nothing but power, habit, and act; but Law is confessedly not a power, or a habit, for then it would fall under the class of intellectual virtues; not an act, for then it would be suspended when reason is suspended, as in sleep. Again, Law moves those who are under it to right action. But to move to action,

Law.

Law and Reason.

Why they seem alien from each other.

belongs to will, not to reason. Hence the foundation for the assertion of jurists, "that which has pleased the prince, has the power of law." To all these arguments Aquinas makes answer. The use of the phrase, *Law in the Members*, is itself a proof that there is a dominant Law in the Reason. For since Law is a measure and rule of human acts, you are forced to speak of it not only in that which rules and measures, but in that which is ruled and measured. Thus an inclination, even when it is a rebellious one, acquires the quality and character of a Law—not essentially indeed, but by participation, and a kind of necessary abuse. The second point introduces a curious and not uninteresting inquiry as to what it is in practical operations which answers to the definition proposition and syllogism in intellectual exercises. The Law which determines acts, and leads them to their issues, is this correlative. Both a potency and habit, and an act of Reason are therefore implied in it. The third argument is more important. The very exercise of Will points to an end, and implies the co-operation of Reason as the means of attaining it. The Will of the Prince, if it has the vigour of Law, implies a Reason directing it; otherwise it is iniquity, and not Law. The next article affirms against all disputers, that Law is ordained for the common good, and not for any special good. The following carries us a step farther, Seeing that Law directs man to a common good, it is only the Reason of the multitude, or of a prince representing the multitude, which can make a Law. A fourth declares, that before a Law can have a binding force, it must be promulgated and brought within the knowledge of those who are subjected to it.

Meaning of a Law in the Members.

Confutation of Absolutism.

The Common Good.

55. That propositions of this *quasi* democratical kind should be enunciated by a Catholic Doctor will only surprise those who have taken up their notions of the middle ages from hearsay, and have not attended to some of the most important facts from which judgments of them must be collected. The superiority of Reason to mere Custom or Decree, the necessity of asserting a Law of Reason as one to which an ultimate appeal might be made, were commonplaces which were continually urged in opposition, *e.g.*, to such Constitutions as those of Clarendon, or to the '*Nolumus leges Anglicanas mutari*' by which our barons resisted the Canonists. And these were not dishonest *argumenta ad hominem*, such as they may have become in later times, when Reason is habitually pleaded against Church authority. They were the protests which men who really felt that there was a higher judgment seat than that of the local or temporary prince, raised against him; they were capable of being used—soon (as the *Divina Commedia* teaches us) they were actually used—by the most devout Theologians, against the occupant of the chair of St. Peter itself. That Aquinas should have anticipated Locke in asserting the dominion and the legislative authority

Feelings of the Middle Ages about Reason and Custom.

Aquinas a predecessor of Locke.

of a multitude or majority, and should have considered the Prince only as its mouthpiece, may appear more strange. It *is* strange—not because Aquinas was a Dominican, but—because he was a Philosopher. The disposition to magnify popular suffrage was one which he was not at all unlikely to acquire from his order; (the Dominicans were not only Jacobins in Paris), nay, it was one which even Bishops sometimes encouraged before Mendicancy began; as we may learn from the speech of the Primate of England at the coronation of our John. The limits under which such an origin of Laws can have been conceived by one who goes on to assert an *eternal* Law, a *natural* Law which is the child of that, a Law enacted to meet *human* necessities, and a *divine* Law by which man is directed to supernatural ends—it is less easy to conjec-

If they allow the acqui[illegible]commend these questions, which extend as [illegible]ture. But we must [illegible]hose on Grace, which conclude the book, far as the 108th, and that [illegible]which they abundantly deserve; and to the study of the reader, to [illegible]us into the region of the theo-proceed to the *Secunda Secundæ* sha[illegible]ith as to its object.

The object of Faith.

56. This part of the treatise carries good; [illegible]hether the object logical virtues. The first question treats of Fa[illegible]means of the The first question debated under this head is, wh[illegible]material. If of Faith is primary Truth. The point is settled by [illegible]h assents usual school distinction between the formal and the m[illegible]rially we consider the object formally, it is primary truth, for Fa[illegible]quality to nothing except because it is revealed by God. But mate[illegible]on Faith is directed to many things besides God, which, however, do not fall under its assent, except as having some bearing or relation to God; inasmuch as by certain effects of divinity, the man is assisted in tending towards the fruition of God. No doubt, this statement has proved exceedingly satisfactory to a number of the students of our Doctor. So clear and subtle a distinction, what may not be accomplished by the help of it? Everything till a man wants to believe, and begins to believe. Then the formal and the material are forgotten: he must have a living object, a Person who is directly recognized, not a series of propositions which may lead to Him eventually. Distinctions, then, indeed, are not obliterated; the self-knowledge, and the divine knowledge, of women and children point to distinctions too subtle for words. Afterwards, by reflecting upon these, we may understand the meaning, and even acknowledge the worth, of the logical divisions. If we confess that they can never help us to faith, or determine its ground, its nature, or its end, they may assist us in observing how the intellect confuses itself when it ventures beyond its province, and tries to comprehend what can be only apprehended. A Logician by pointing out the limitations of the intellect, and telling us when it forgets them, may help to deliver us from the trammels and usurpations of Logic. More commonly, he does

The Formal and the Material.

that work by the ambition which overleaps itself and falls on the other side.

Analysis of Faith, its operations and relations

57. We have made these remarks at the outset of the *Secunda Secundæ*, that we may not be forced to repeat them at every turn of it, and that we may, without much commentary, trace the method of it. Faith having been considered as to its interior act, which is Belief; as to its exterior act, which is Confession; as to its habit in reference to itself and to those who possess it; as to its divine cause; and finally as to its effects; we then proceed to the relation between the Intellect and Faith, to the relation of Knowledge to Faith, and to the vices that are opposed to Faith. Under this last head, we have two or three questions about which our readers may be glad to know the opinions of a 13th century doctor. The first is, whether infidels are to be compelled to faith. He considers various objections to compulsion: among others, a saying of Augustine, that a man may do other things unwillingly, but that he can only believe willingly, and that the will cannot be compelled. Still, it is written, "go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled." The final conclusion is, that Jews and Gentiles who have never professed the faith are not to be compelled to believe, and that wars against them are lawful only as means of preventing them from impeding the progress of the faith. But those who have taken the faith upon them, or who still profess it, becoming heretics and apostates, are in a different condition. On such, corporal compulsion is to be exercised, that they may fulfil what they have promised, and hold fast what they have undertaken. This is true Dominican doctrine, the formal apology for the persecutions of which that order was the instrument. The argument from Augustine is soon disposed of. To vow is an act of the will, to perform the vow is an act of necessity; to accept a faith is voluntary; to hold it, if once accepted, is a thing of necessity. These sentences are worth all the more startling sentences which are sometimes culled by Protestant orators out of the schoolmen to excite the rage of Protestant mobs. The true virus of persecution is in them; the Atheism which is at the root of persecution. After the man has once believed with his will, he becomes a creature of necessity, not of God: Man is to compel him to hold fast something, *not* with his will, which God has led him to acknowledge with his will. Did Aquinas really mean this? The reply is easy. As a theologian, as a philosopher, he denies such a proposition again and again; he refutes it by unanswerable evidence. The Spirit of God he holds to be the giver and the upholder of faith in every man. So far as he was a defender of Dominican persecutions, he *did* mean this. And we, every one of us, who persecute under any pretext, however we may hate Dominicans, mean it also. The notion that

Are Infidels to be forced into Faith?

Defence of Persecution.

What it implies.

we are to keep a man to a profession when it is no longer the expression of that which he wills or which he is, because we have lost all influence over his will and over himself, and because we suppose that God has lost His influence also, this is the defence of all Protestant as much as of all Romish attempts to punish Apostates from the true God by compelling them to serve the Spirit of Lies.

Treatment of the children of Infidels.

58. In the same spirit, the question of holding any communication with infidels is settled; the questions whether infidels may have any jurisdiction over Christians, and whether the rites of infidels are to be tolerated, in a more compromising and utilitarian spirit; the question whether the children of Jews and of other infidels are to be baptized against the will of their parents upon the nobler and more Christian ground, that the custom of the Church never sanctions any departure from natural justice, and that this is violated if any boy is withdrawn from the care of his parents before he has the use of his reason. At the seventeenth question, we pass

Hope.

from Faith to Hope. Hope is considered in itself, in its subject, in its reference to fear, to despair, and to presumption. Then we pass at the twenty-third question to Charity. Under the article which

Charity.

refers to Charity in itself we inquire whether charity is friendship, whether it is something created in the soul, whether it is a virtue at all, whether it is a special virtue, or the one virtue, whether without it there can be any virtues? Under the next article, we consider whether Charity is in the will, its possible augmentations, its possible diminutions, its commencement, progress, and perfection. In reference to its object, whether God alone or our neighbour also is to be loved from charity, whether irrational creatures, sinners, enemies, angels, dæmons, are to be loved from charity? Then comes the debate whether there is any order in charity, whether a greater or less is to be admitted into it? The twenty-seventh article brings us upon some of the questions which were debated in the 17th century between Bossuet and Fénélon. We pass at the thirty-sixth to the vices opposed to charity, whence we are led into controversies about schism, about the lawfulness of war, about sedition, and about scandals.

Prudence.

59. At the forty-fifth question there is a transition from the theological to the intellectual and moral virtues. We discuss first the gift of wisdom in its relation to charity, then the folly which is opposed to wisdom; thence we pass to Prudence. Here several topics occur in which psychology and logic are curiously intermingled. We are told that we may divide any subject integrally, subjectively, and potentially. *Integrally*, the wall, the roof, the foundation, are parts of the house. *Subjectively*, the ox and the lion are parts of animal nature. *Potentially*, nutrition and sensation are parts of the soul. In like manner the portions of any virtue may

be determined in three ways. 1st, The integral will be those parts of any virtue which must concur in any perfect act of that virtue. In the case of Prudence these integral parts are eight: Memory, Intelligence, Docility, Quickness of perception, Skill in comparison, Foresight in the arrangement of means to an end, Circumspection, or the acute observation of circumstances, Caution in distinguishing counterfeits of good from the real good. 2d, The parts of Subjective virtue are its different species. In the case of Prudence, there is the prudence by which any one rules himself, and the prudence by which one rules a multitude of other men. This again admits of division according to the nature of those who are ruled. You require military prudence for an army, economical prudence for a family, directive or political prudence for a state. 3d, The potential parts of any virtue are those virtues which are directed towards some secondary or subsidiary acts necessary to its completeness. The parts of prudence contemplated in this way are denoted by Greek names—*Eubulia*, which has reference to counsel; *Synesis*, which has reference to the decision of those cases which fall under common rules; and *Gnome*, which has reference to the decision of those cases wherein it is necessary to depart from common rules. This subject, therefore, the readers will perceive, is treated by our author with even more than his wonted diligence and elaboration. There are also minute observations included within his general survey which exhibit the mind of Aquinas in a new phase. Take for instance these rules for the acquisition and maintenance of a good memory. The first is, that we should call up some likenesses of the things we wish to remember, which shall not be too familiar, because those which are rarer excite our admiration more, and so the mind dwells in them more fixedly: the explanation, he judiciously adds, of the tenacity with which we recollect what we have seen in boyhood. The adhesion of the memory to sensible objects, which justifies this maxim, leads him to place the memory in the sensitive part of our nature. The second art of memory is, to dispose the things which we wish to preserve in order, so that one may immediately suggest another. The third is, to connect whatever things we wish to remember with our affections, so that we may in very deed learn them by heart. The fourth is, that we shall be frequently meditating upon them, so that they should become first habits of our own mind, and at last parts of its very nature. A more rational system of Mnemonics was perhaps never put together than this. It is unpretending and apparently common-place; yet it touches all the essential points of the subject, and gives us what no artificial, technical rules can give, hints how we may turn incidents and observations into fixed intellectual capital, not merely into a floating capital for the commerce of society.

Integral portions of Prudence.

Species of Prudence in reference to its subjects.

Memory and the cultivation of it

Political Prudence, &c.

60. There are a number of other remarks of much fineness and subtlety under this title; still more perhaps under that which belongs to the second head of Political Prudence. The following passage in illustration of the maxim that political government is a part of prudence, may strike some of us as very obvious; yet, how many dogmas in support of absolute government does it throw down, what a protest does it bear against some of the practices which Aquinas himself has sanctioned! "The servant is moved by a command proceeding from his master, the subject by a command proceeding from his prince. But this movement is of an altogether different kind from that which determines irrational and inanimate things. For these are acted upon solely by another. They do not act upon themselves. They have not the dominion of their own act through free choice. Therefore, the rectitude of their government is not in any sense in them, but only in their mover. Servants, on the contrary, and any human subjects whatsoever, are so acted upon by others through precepts that they nevertheless act for themselves through free choice. Therefore, in them is required self-government; and in this, political prudence, so far as they are concerned, consists." It is of course implied in this statement—it has been directly asserted before, that the *regnative* prudence, that which belongs to the ruler, is essentially of the same quality with the obedience which responds to it With equal wisdom and superior eloquence Aquinas goes on to connect that counsel which is the gift of the Holy Spirit with the prudence which he has treated as so specially human a quality. It is manifest, he says, that the rectitude of the human reason has that relation to the divine Reason which every inferior motive principle has to its superior, which last is its ultimate standard. For the eternal Reason is the supreme rule of all human rectitude. And, therefore, prudence, which imports the rectitude of reason, is helped and perfected in proportion as it is regulated and moved by the Divine Spirit. This gift and direction, and consequently the continual growth of the prudence which is the fruit of it, is to be looked for in the future world, which is the continuation and unfolding of the present.

It implies Free Choice in the subjects as well as in the rulers.

The Divine gift.

The rectitude of man's will—on what it rests.

Justice.

61. Leaving this subject, we come to Right and Justice. There are four points, he says, to be considered about justice,—1st, Right, (jus); 2d, Justice itself; 3d, Injustice; 4th, Judgment. Right is affirmed to be the object of justice. Right is divided into natural right and positive right, both of which are treated by Aquinas in a somewhat utilitarian spirit. It is affirmed that there is a distinction between natural right and the right of nations, inasmuch as the one belongs to all animals, the other only to man. He distinguishes further between paternal right, and magisterial right; the right of the husband over the wife is declared to be more a

Kinds of Right.

relation of equality, and less of dependence than either of the others. This recognition of the difference between family law and other law, though it may have been strengthened by Christianity, is confessed to come from Aristotle. Aquinas adopts the definition of justice, that it is the perpetual and constant will, purpose, and habit of giving to every one that which is his due. He determines that justice has always reference to a man's dealings with his neighbour that justice does not reside in the Intellect as its proper subject, but in the Will, that there is a sense in which Justice may be identified with any virtue whatever; that it is also a special virtue distinct from others; that there is a distinction between general justice and particular justice; that the special matter of the particular justice are the exterior actions of men, that it has not reference to the passions, that it is a mean between two extremes, and that it is, as Aristotle affirms, the queen of the moral virtues. The distinction of distributive and commutative justice is affirmed in the sixty-first question. There we have the treatment of various vices which are opposed to each; finally, we come, at the eightieth question, to the separate virtues which are annexed to Justice, its attendant satellites.

Object of Justice.

Distinctions.

62. Our readers will be surprised to hear what these annexed virtues are. They are Religion, Piety to parents, Respectfulness, Truth, Gratitude, Vindication of right, Friendship, Liberality. What relation, it may be asked, is there between these and the principal virtue to which they are referred? This, that they all imply an effort imperfectly realized, to render that which is due to another. The 15th psalm is quoted, "What shall I render unto God for all that He has given to me?" Religion is thus rendering to God, the attempt to pay a debt which never can be paid. Piety, or the rendering of duty to a parent, is the same in kind, and has a corresponding imperfection. The Reverence which is paid to worth belongs to the same class; all these three being defective from the very nature of the relation between those who render and those who receive them. The other six are defective, inasmuch as they are merely moral recompenses, and do not come up to the notion of a full legal requital. We should wish our readers carefully to consider these arrangements. They are very instructive. Much, it seems to us, of what has been most mischievous in the school morality and the school theology may be traced to them, much of what we have inherited from both.

Curious arrangement of Virtues under Justice.

Religion.

Piety.

Reverence.

63. In the questions which follow, down to the hundred and twentieth, we have discussions upon these annexed virtues, upon circumstances appertaining to them, and upon vices that are opposed to them. Then we are again reminded that all of them have been treated with an ultimate reference to justice, and the author winds up that topic by considering the precepts of the

Fortitude. decalogue as precepts of justice. Then we pass to Fortitude; under which are considered, Martyrdom, as the highest act of fortitude, Fear as the defect of fortitude, Audacity as the vice which is the counterfeit of it. Then we are surprised by the information that Parts of Fortitude. Fortitude consists of four parts, Magnificence, Confidence, Patience, and Perseverance. This strange division is justified by an allusion to our old friends the integral, the subjective, and the potential. We come to understand it rather better when Magnanimity, which is the other name for confidence, takes its place above Magnificence; so that all these qualities appear to represent different forms of internal strength, Magnanimity referring especially to honours, and having presumption, ambition, and vain-glory for its attendant vices; Munificence being occupied with outward wealth and dignities, and implying the power of sustaining them. From fortitude we go on to temperance, the integral parts of which are modesty and a sense of honour, one subjective part of which is abstinence, leading of course to questions about fasting, gluttony, sobriety, drunkenness, chastity, virginity, indulgence, continence, incontinence. Then to clemency and mildness, both of which are considered as parts of temperance, and to anger and cruelty, which are their respective opposites. The consideration of modesty, which belongs to temperance, leads us to Pride; this to the sin of the first man, consisting in pride; then to its punishment. Aquinas winds up this subject with the general laws of temperance contained in the Scriptures.

Temperance.

Prophecy. 64. The last nineteen questions of this part lead us into an entirely new region. They are on Prophecy as to its essence, the cause of prophecy, the nature of the prophetical intuition, the division of prophecies, concerning raptures, concerning the different graces and gifts spoken of in Scripture, the grace of tongues, of miracles, of speech. Finally we enter on the division of life into active and contemplative, into the different offices and conditions of men generally, and then into the state of ecclesiastics, and of members of religious orders particularly. Into these and the questions discussed in the third part of the *Summa*, which are in the strict and formal sense the theological, we do not propose to enter. We have given our readers some taste of the book. We hope we may have led them to think of it and of its author respectfully and justly. The great influence which both have exerted, has made us anxious not to indulge in any hasty and superficial condemnation of them, not to pass over what seem to us the radical diseases of his system, especially when they may possibly infect our own generation.

Transition to the Franciscans. 65. The philosophy of the 13th century is nearly comprehended in the two Mendicant orders. We have spoken enough of the

Dominicans; it remains that we should allude to two or three eminent Franciscans. First in order of time, would stand our countryman Alexander of Hales; we cannot doubt that in order of worth he must yield to Bonaventura. It is difficult to extract the particulars of his life from the florid, classical, intolerably tedious biography which is prefixed to the Roman edition of his works published in 1588. The writer, as he informs us again and again, has taken Gregory of Nazianzum for his model. He does not venture to state any fact about Bonaventura for which he cannot produce a parallel in the biography of Basil. Proceeding in so absurd a theory of his duties, it can be no surprise if he has all the faults of his prototype with very few of his excellences, and if he has contrived to diffuse an inconceivably small amount of information through an incredible amount of words. But the reader will be unwise if he allows the inanity of the panegyrist to prejudice him against the victim. Bonaventura must be judged by his own words, and by the opinions of the wisest men of his time and of subsequent times respecting him. He was regarded, and deserves to be regarded as the true spiritual heir of Francis of Assisium. The main facts of his life may be stated very briefly. His father, Johannes Fidantius (or Fidanza), and his mother Ritelia, were both of noble families, rich, and devoted, it is said, to good works. He was born in Tuscany in 1221, two years before the death of Francis. When a child, he had an illness which threatened his life; his mother, despairing of help from the physicians, fled to Francis. His prayers consoled her and restored the boy. She devoted him to the order: as soon as he was of age to understand it, he fulfilled the vow. He had none of the early struggles therefore of Aquinas, little perhaps of his intellectual robustness. He seems to have passed a remarkably pure and innocent boyhood, to have early interested himself in the sick and the poor, and to have given himself no credit for his virtues. His religious life exhibited the characteristics of his order in the highest degree. His contemplations turned much on the Passion of Christ. He had the tenderness of Francis, his fervency, his humanity, his inclination to idolatry. The Virgin, with him even more than with his master, became the main object of that idolatry. It was not an age, however, in which even the most exalted devotion was accepted as a substitute for learning, or was thought to interfere with it. Bonaventura worked hard in the study of the Fathers, framed a collection of their sentences, made two copies of the entire Scriptures with his own hand, and many times, it is added, wrote out the History of Thucydides and the Orations of Demosthenes, no doubt in a Latin version; though his biographer, who lived after the revival of letters, talks of his imbibing the juice of the Attic eloquence. At Paris he studied perhaps under Albertus Magnus, certainly under Alexander of Hales.

Bonaventura.

Life.

His childhood.

His devotion.

His learning.

Whether he frequented the lessons of a Dominican or not, it seems clear that Thomas Aquinas was his friend, and that Bonaventura paid him the honour which was due to his wisdom, and might be expected from his own humility. He pursued the usual course of study in Paris, soon became the first teacher among the Franciscans, lectured on "the Sentences" and on the Scriptures, and declined the Archbishopric of York which Clement IV. had offered him. Having overcome this temptation or delivered himself from this responsibility, he devoted himself to literature, wrote twenty-three discourses on that favourite subject of the Fathers and the Schoolmen, the work of the six days, expounded the four books of the Sentences, took part in the defence of the Mendicants against Gulielimus de St. Amore, and composed a Life of St. Francis. Several pleasant stories are told of his intercourse with Thomas Aquinas; one of them must have been always a favourite with the Franciscans. The Angelical Doctor is said to have asked to see the library from which he had derived his remarkable stores of knowledge; Bonaventura pointed to the Crucifix, and said he had learnt all that he knew there. He was appointed Minister General of his Order at a time when the greatest prudence as well as the greatest gentleness were needed to preserve it from the factions which had begun to start up within it. Questions about poverty, which rent the order in pieces afterwards, were already mooted. The strange doctrine of the Everlasting Gospel, had been circulated and was gratifying all those who were jealous of the success of the brethren. No one probably could have encountered such difficulties better than Bonaventura. His life was the best witness for the stricter principles of his master. His gentleness was the most effectual means of retaining those whom the mere rule might have alienated.

His books.

Where he studied.

66. Two books which Bonaventura composed while he was General of the Order, will indicate by their very titles the spirit of the man who so well represented its spirit. One was the "Itinerary of the Mind towards God," the other the "Itinerary of the Mind towards itself." As it is from another book that we shall draw our examples of this author, we may take John Gerson's account of these. "Herein," he says, "the progress to divine knowledge is exhibited in two different methods. The first of these treatises proceeds from God as its principle, and goes down to other truths believed and held in subordination to Him. The other takes the opposite course, and ascends as by six steps of a ladder from the creatures even to the most transcendent knowledge of the Creator. And I will confess," adds Gerson, "in my folly, that for thirty years and more I have had these treatises by my side reading them often, meditating on the very words, to say nothing of the sentiments, and now at my age, with all my leisure, I

The Itinerary.

can scarcely boast that I have got the first taste of their sweets which have always something fresh and delightful to me, as often as I recur to them." Among Bonaventura's practical labours, we are to reckon the influence which he exerted in putting an end to a papal interregnum after the death of Clement IV., when he was the means of electing Gregory X., the best prelate unquestionably of that period, above all his efforts in the Council of Lyons to bring about a reconciliation between the Eastern and Western churches. It was by this Council that he was induced, we may believe with real reluctance, to accept the dignity of a Cardinal. With far greater satisfaction he took leave of that and of all other earthly dignities in the year 1274, when he had reached the age of fifty-three. His miracles, canonization, and the influence of his relics will be found duly recorded by his biographer.

67. There is a short work of Bonaventura's concerning "the Reduction of Arts under Theology," which exhibits, it seems to us, very remarkably the character and the genius of the man, and the highest tendencies of his order. Instead of plunging into the more directly mystical and spiritual works, we believe we shall fulfil our duty to our own subject best if we translate the greater part of this treatise, which contains as much matter as most long treatises that we know. The arbitrariness and absurdity of some of its divisions will be obvious to the reader without any suggestions of ours. But we shall be disappointed if he does not find something in it which is not absurd but very instructive.

De reductione Artium ad Theologiam. Opera Romæ, 1596, tom. 6, pp. (1-4.)

68. "Every good and every perfect gift is coming down, saith St. James, from the Father of lights. In this language he hints at the origin of all illumination, and insinuates at the same time how manifold is that light which flows freely from the fontal light. But although all illumination becomes ours by internal cognition, we may fairly distinguish and say that there is an *exterior* light, to wit, the light of mechanical art; a *lower* light, to wit, the light of sensible cognition; an *interior* light, to wit, the light of philosophical knowledge; a *superior* light, to wit, the light of grace and of the sacred Scriptures. The first illuminates in respect of artificial form, the second in respect of natural form, the third in respect of intellectual truth, the fourth and last in respect of saving truth. The first kind of light, having respect to those forms which are without us, and which have been invented to supply the wants of the body, is in a certain sense servile, and degenerates from the true philosophical cognition. It has a sevenfold division in respect of the seven mechanical arts which Hugo de St. Victor speaks of; which are Manufacture of Clothes, &c. (Lanificium); the making of Instruments, especially warlike (Armatura), Agriculture, Hunting, Navigation, the Theatrical Art, Medicine. The com-

Different Illuminations.

The seven Mechanical Arts.

pleteness of which division is understood thus. Seeing that every mechanical art is either for consolation, whether that be for the banishment of sorrow or of poverty, or else is for advantage, they fall generally under the heads of utility or gratification, as Horace says

Aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetæ.

And

Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci.

If it is for comfort and delectation, it is comprehended in the theatrical which includes every kind of entertainment, whether it be in songs or in instruments, in fictions written or pictorial, or in bodily gestures. If again the art has reference to utility or profit, this may consist in the covering of the body or in the provision of food, or in something which is ministerial to both. If it consists in the covering of the body, that is either with a soft and flexible material or with a hard and stiff material; the first will fall under the general head of wool-work (Lanificium), the second under the general head of Armour, including therein whatever is fabricated from iron or from any metal whatsoever, or from stone, or from wood. But if it consists in something alimentary, this may be of two kinds, because we feed upon vegetables and upon things that have sense. All aliments of the one kind are included in agriculture, all of the other in hunting. Take it in another way; whatever contributes to the generation and multiplication of food, is included under the common name of Agriculture; whatever contributes to the preparation of the food so multiplied, may be included under hunting: under which is contained whatsoever belongs to the trade of bakers, cooks, and butchers; the denomination of these different arts being taken from that one which has a certain excellence and superiority to the rest. That which is ministerial either to food or clothing may be so either by supplying a defect or by removing a hindrance; Navigation, under which is included all merchandise as the exchange of either food or clothing, supplies defects; Medicine, consisting of the putting together of electuaries, or potions, or unguents, or in the cure of wounds, or in the cutting off of limbs, removes impediments. The division is therefore satisfactory.

Provisions of bodily clothing.

Provision of nourishment.

69. "The second light that illuminates us so that we may apprehend natural forms, is the light of sensitive cognition, which comes to us by the aid of corporeal light. There is a fivefold division of this corresponding to the five senses; the completeness of which Augustine explains according to the nature of the elements in this wise. Seeing that light serves for the distinction of corporeal things, it either stands in its own eminency and purity, and then it is the sense of sight; or it is mingled with the air, and then it is hearing; or it is mingled with vapour, and then it is

The Lumen Cognitionis Sensitivæ.

The Senses and their relation to each other.

smell; or it is mingled with moisture, and then it is taste; or it is mingled with terrestrial grossness, and then it is touch. For the breath hath the nature of sensible light and lives in the nerves whose nature is bright and transparent, and in these five senses is multiplied, there being in each a greater or a less degree of purity. Therefore, seeing there are five simple bodies in the world, to wit, four elements and an essence, man, in order that he may be able to perceive all corporeal forms, hath five senses corresponding to them, for there cannot be an apprehension except through some similitude and suitableness of the organ and object. There is another way of proving the completeness of the senses; but this is the one which Augustine has approved, and it seems reasonable, seeing that there is a concurrence of correspondences in the organ, the medium, and the object.

70. "The third light which illuminates and which enables us to investigate intelligible truths, is the light of philosophical cognition which is called interior, because it searches for interior and latent causes. This search it pursues by means of principles that are arrived at by learning, though they are the principles of natural truth and are naturally sown in man. This truth is threefold; it may be distinguished as *rational, natural, and moral.* For there is a truth of words, a truth of things, and a truth of manners. The rational deals with the truth of words; the natural with the truth of things; the moral with the truth of manners. Or, to state it otherwise, as we contemplate in the Supreme God an efficient cause, a formal cause, and an exemplary cause, inasmuch as there is in Him the cause by which we subsist, the reason by which we understand, the order by which we live, so the illumination of philosophy pertains either to knowing the causes of being, and then it is *Physics*; or the method of understanding, and then it is *Logic*; or the order of life, and then it is *Morals.* Or, to take it in another way still. There are three modes in which it is possible for the intelligence to be illuminated by this light of philosophical cognition. It directs the motive powers, and then it is moral; it governs the intellect itself, and then it is natural; it governs interpretation, and then it is verbal. So that man is illuminated to the truth of life, to the truth of science, and to the truth of doctrine. And seeing a man may use discourse for three purposes. 1st, That he may make known the conceptions of his own mind. 2d, That he may lead others to belief. 3d, That he may incite others to love or hatred; therefore, this discursive or rational philosophy has a threefold division, into Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric. The first of these serves for expression, the second for teaching, the third for moving. The first respects the reason as apprehensive, the second as judicative, the third as motive. And because the reason apprehends through discourse that is congruous, judges by discourse

Lumen Cognitionis Philosophicæ.

The truth which is its object—how divided.

Physics. Logic. Morals.

Grammar. Logic. Rhetoric.

that is true, moves by discourse that is ornate, hence it comes to pass that this threefold science takes account of these three passions in reference to discourse. Again, seeing that our intellect must have certain formal principles to direct us in judging, these also have a threefold aspect, in relation to matter, in relation to the soul, and in relation to the Divine Wisdom. Natural Philosophy, therefore, is divided into physics proper, into mathematics, and into metaphysics. *Physical Philosophy* is conversant with the generation and corruption of things in respect of their natural powers and their seminal principles. *Mathematics* are conversant with forms which are capable of being abstracted according to principles of our intelligence (*e.g.*, with special triangles from which a law may be abstracted that is true of all triangles). *Metaphysics* is conversant with all entities which it reduces to one primary principle, from whence they have proceeded according to ideal principles (as distinguished from natural and from intellectual principles). This primary principle is God as beginning, end, and exemplar. About these ideal principles there has been some controversy amongst metaphysicians. *Moral Philosophy* has also a threefold division. It concerns the governing or motive virtue in respect of individual life, in respect of the family, in respect of a multitude, or general society. It is therefore *monastic*, *economic*, and *political*. [We have already warned the reader against the notion that the word monastic has any special reference to the cœnobitical or conventual life, which is much more nearly akin to the political.]

Division of Natural Philosophy.

71. "The fourth light is the light of sacred Scripture, which is called superior or transcendent, because it leads us to the things which are above our reason by first manifesting them to us. And also because this light descends from the Father of lights, not through induction but through inspiration. Besides the literal sense which is single, there is a spiritual sense of Scripture which is threefold. 1st, The allegorical sense, which teaches what is to be believed concerning divinity and concerning humanity. 2d, The moral, wherein we are taught how to live. 3d, The anagogical, whereby we learn how to adhere to God. Therefore the whole of sacred Scripture teaches these three things, to wit, the eternal Generation and Incarnation of Christ, the Order of life, and the union of God and the soul. The first respects faith, the second manners, the third the end of both. The doctor is conversant with the first, the preacher with the second, the contemplative student with the third. Augustine has most to tell us about the first, Gregory the Great about the second, Dionysius about the third; Anselm follows in the steps of Augustine, Bernard of Gregory, Richard de St. Victore (not Hugo) of Dionysius.

The Lumen Sacræ Scripturæ.

The allegorical, moral, and anagogical view of Scripture.

72. "You may gather from the foregoing statements that though in our primary division we spoke of the light which descends from

The six Days.

above as fourfold, yet that there are in fact six portions of it, to wit, the light of sacred Scripture, the light of sensitive apprehension, the light of mechanical art, the light of rational philosophy, the light of natural philosophy, and the light of moral philosophy. There are these six days in this life of ours; and they have an evening, for all this knowledge will vanish away. Therefore there succeeds to them a seventh day of rest which has not an evening, to wit, the illumination of glory. Wherefore these six illuminations may be referred to those six days of the world's creation; so that the knowledge of the sacred Scripture may respond to the first formation, the formation of light, and the others in their order. And as all these had their origin from one light, so all these kinds of knowledge are referred to the knowledge of sacred Scripture, are closed up in that, are perfected in that, and through that as a medium are directed towards the eternal illumination. Wherefore all our knowledge ought to have its ground in the knowledge of sacred Scripture, specially so far as it bears upon the understanding of that upward road (anagogia) by which our illumination is carried home to God, from whom it had its birth. Then the circle is complete; the six days are finished.

The seventh day.

73. "Let us go on then to consider in what way the other illuminations may be reduced to this. First, let us examine that illumination which is wholly occupied with the cognition of sensible things. Wherein there are three things to consider, the medium of cognition, the exercise of the cognition, the delight or reward of the cognition. First, as to the medium of cognition, no sensible thing exercises its power except through the mediation of some likeness which goes forth from the object as the offspring from a parent; and this is necessarily its being in every sense. But this similitude does not complete itself in the act of perception till it is united with a certain organ and with the power of dwelling in that organ; and when it is united, there arises a new perception, and by that perception there is a return through the medium of the similitude into the object. And thus I understand that from that highest Mind which can be known in the interior senses of our mind, there hath eternally flowed out a Similitude, an Image, an Offspring, and that He, when the fulness of time came, was united to the mind and flesh, that is, to the man whom He had formed and who never had been before that formation, and that by Him all our minds are brought back to God if we receive that likeness of the Father by faith in the heart. If, again, we consider the *exercise* of the senses, we shall perceive here the right order of life. For each sense exercises itself about its proper object, avoids that which is hurtful to it, and does not intrude upon the office of any other sense. In like manner the sense of the heart lives according to order when it energizes towards that for which it is made, overcoming sloth;

The reduction of Sensitive Cognition.

The Law of Sensible Perception, how related to the Spiritual Law.

The Exercise of the Senses how related to the Exercise of Spiritual Life.

when it shuns that which is hurtful to it, overcoming concupiscence; when it arrogates nothing which is not its own, overcoming pride. For all disorder hath its root either in sloth with respect to things that are to be done, in concupiscence in regard to things that are to be desired, or in pride with regard to things that are transcendent. If next we consider the delight which results from the use of the senses, herein we shall behold the union of God and the soul. For every sense seeks that object of sense which is appropriate to it with longing, finds it with delight, recurs to it without weariness; for the eye is not satiated with seeing, nor is the ear filled with hearing. In the same manner, the sense of our heart ought longingly to seek, joyfully to find, incessantly to demand again whatever is beautiful, whatever is harmonious, whatever brings to it the true perfume, whatever is sweet, whatever is softening. See how the Divine Wisdom lies wrapped and hidden in the sensitive apprehension, and how wonderful is the contemplation of the five spiritual senses in their conformity to the corporeal senses.

The delight resulting from Sensible Perception.

The reduction of the Light of Mechanical Art.

74. "Let us turn next to the light of mechanical art, the whole object of which is the production of artificial things. Consider here the starting point, the result, the benefit which follows. If we consider the starting point, we see the work going out from the artificer, an intermediate similitude existing in his mind in virtue of which the artificer thinks before he produces and then produces as he had determined. The artificer produces a work out of himself, a work as nearly assimilated as may be to the exemplar within. And if he could produce a result which would love itself and honour itself, doubtless he would do it. And if that effect could know its own author, this must be through the medium of the similitude in the mind of that author to which it corresponded. And if it had a darkened vision, so that it could not raise itself above itself, need would there be, if it was to be brought to the knowledge of its author, that the similitude by which it was produced, should condescend into that nature which he had first known and conceived. Understand thus how no creature has proceeded from the supreme Artificer except by the eternal Word in which He disposed all things that they might be assimilated to Him by knowledge and love. And since through sin the rational creature had the eye of contemplation darkened, most comely it was that the Eternal and Invisible should become visible, that He might bring us back to His Father. . . . . If again we consider the effect, we shall perceive here the order of life. For every artificer intends to produce a work that is beautiful, and useful, and stable, and it is then a clear and acceptable work when it unites these three conditions. Knowledge renders a work beautiful, the will renders it useful, perseverance renders it stable. If we consider the benefit which results from the work, we shall discover here the union of God

The similitude in the Artist.

Bonaventura adds *non solum creaturas habentes rationem vestigii sed etiam imaginis.* We think we perceive his meaning, but cannot venture upon a translation.

Conditions of a perfect work.

The Result.

and the soul. For every artificer who makes any work does it either that he may be praised for it, that it may procure something for him, or that he may simply delight in it. For these three ends God made the rational soul, that it might praise Him, that it might serve Him, and that it might delight and rest in Him by virtue of that Love in which he who dwells dwells in God and God in him. See then how the illumination of mechanical art is a way to the illumination of sacred Scripture; and there is nothing in it which does not predict and foreshadow the true Wisdom. Hence it comes to pass that the Scripture so continually uses similitudes which are drawn from this art.

75. "If we turn next to the rational philosophy which is mainly occupied with discourse, we have three things to consider, the utterer of the speech, the mode of its utterance, and the hearer. If we consider the speaker, we shall see how every discourse signifies a conception of the mind; and that inward conception is the word of the mind, the offspring of the mind which is known to the conceiver. But to the intent that it may be made known to the hearer, it puts on the form of voice, and that which was a word belonging to the intelligence, with that clothing for its medium, is brought within the region of the senses and is heard without, and is taken into the listening heart, and nevertheless does not depart from the mind of the utterer. So we see in the eternal Word that the Father eternally conceived Him, as it is written, 'Before the abysses I was brought forth.' But to the end that it might be brought within the knowledge of man who has senses, it puts on the form of flesh, 'the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us,' and yet remained in the bosom of the Father. But if we consider discourse in its own nature, then we shall discover in it the order of life; for the congruity, truth, and ornament which are demanded in speech have their counterparts in the rectitude of intention, the purity of affection, and the modesty or comeliness of operation which together constitute the right order of life. Consider discourse in respect of its end or object, and we discover that a man never expresses himself except through the mediation of form, never teaches except through the mediation of a light that convinces, never moves except through the mediation of a power or virtue within. He only is the true doctor, saith Augustine, who can impress a form upon the heart of his hearer, who can pour light into it, who can give strength to it. Therefore He who teacheth the heart within hath His seat in Heaven. And so here too the truth of the union of the soul with God is latent, for that the mind should be instructed in the knowledge of God by His internal speech, it is needful that it should be united to Him who is the brightness of His glory and the form of His substance and who upholds all things by the word of His power."

The Rational Philosophy.

Sermocinalis.

The Discourse.

The Method of Discourse.

The Hearer.

Natural Philosophy.

76. [The next chapter, which is on the illumination of Natural Philosophy, we shall not attempt to translate. It would be difficult to convey an exact impression of the author's meaning to a modern reader, and very few modern readers indeed would be able to restrain a certain feeling of contempt for the physical blunders as well as for the mystical conceits of the writer, which might be more injurious to them than to him. The general course of the argument will be understood from the passages which have preceded. Here, as elsewhere, it is shown that there is a threefold way of considering the threefold division of Natural Philosophy, and that under its first aspect it involves the truth of the eternal life of the Divine Word and of His Incarnation in time; under its second the true order of life; under its third the union of the soul with God. The illumination of Moral Philosophy follows. Here again Bonaventura seems to us to repeat himself and rather to disappoint the expectation we had formed of him from his treatment of this subject at the commencement of the Essay. He follows Anselm in assuming that rectitude of will is the subject and aim of Moral Philosophy; but he investigates the idea of rectitude and right far less seriously and successfully than his guide. And he brings out that which is the conclusion of the whole matter with both, that the rectitude of God is the under-ground of the rectitude of man, far more feebly than either Anselm or Aquinas. Rectitude and Justice it is clear are not the words which were dearest to the Franciscan. If Aquinas enlarges unreasonably the ground which they cover, the seraphic wisdom would be inclined to limit it, at least as dangerously, by substituting spiritual affections and states of mind for fixed and eternal laws. Our author concludes his treatise in these words.]

Feebleness of Bonaventura.

Moral Philosophy.

The Conclusion

77. "Thus it is manifest in what wise the multiform Wisdom of God, which is clearly delivered to us in sacred Scripture, is hidden in every kind of knowledge and in all nature. It is manifest also how all forms of knowledge minister to Theology. And therefore she assumes examples and makes use of words that belong to every part of knowledge. It is manifest also how large is the path of light and how in everything which is felt or which is known, God himself is latent. And this is the fruit of all sciences, that in all, Faith should be built up, God should be honoured, manners should be softened and harmonized, and those consolations should be imbibed which come from the union of the Bridegroom and the Bride. Which union takes place only through Charity, towards which all Holy Scripture tends and in which it terminates, which is the end consequently of that illumination which descends from above, without which all knowledge is vain, for there is no coming to the Son save through the Holy Spirit, who teaches us all truth, who is blessed for ever and ever. Amen."

The Franciscan at peace.

78. Bonaventura is the specimen of a Franciscan at peace. The friendship which he felt for Aquinas as a man, is not qualified by any discussions with him as a philosopher. There is no reason to suppose that he was conscious of any important divergence from the general system of one who, like himself, aspired to reduce all arts and sciences under Theology. The essential Aristotelianism of the Angelical doctor, the essential Platonism of the Seraphic, discovers itself to *us* as we read and compare them; but may have been scarcely known or confessed by either. In due time doctors were to arise who would have a very thorough consciousness of these differences, and would take pains to bring them into the fullest manifestation. The principal of these we must now introduce to our readers. We must transport them from the south to the north, from Italy to Ireland. And the change will not be merely a geographical one. The differences of climate and race were perhaps never more vividly displayed than in Bonaventura and Duns Scotus.

Duns Scotus —his birthplace.

79. The Franciscans dwell upon it as a singular providence that Duns Scotus was born in the year in which Bonaventura died. Where he was born has been, as one biographer after another informs us, a question not less interesting than where Homer was born. Seven cities, they tell us in their magnificent way, claimed the one, three countries the other. Some have referred him to a village in Northumbria near Warkworth. The countrymen of David Hume and Sir W. Hamilton, of course, think that the only proper home for a metaphysician is on the other side of the Tweed. But Ireland has been a much bolder and more resolute claimant, and treats our pretensions and those of Scotland with equal disdain. *Wadding*, the laborious biographer of the Franciscan worthies, is full of arguments geographical and philosophical on behalf of his country. The name of Scotus being confessedly indecisive, that of Duns at once fixes the doctor to an Irish village. How dearly he prized the distinction is manifested, Wadding thinks, by his paying St. Patrick the somewhat doubtful compliment of putting him in the place generally occupied by Socrates of an Ens Logicum (the John Styles or Richard Roe of Philosophy). He is more fortunate in alleging the vehemence with which Irishmen have fought not only for their own right in Duns, but for his general reputation. Wadding might, without arrogance, quote himself as an instance. Yet, for vituperative eloquence, he must yield the palm to a more recent Franciscan. Colganus or Callaghan, deals out the epithets, "liars" and "apostates," against the impugners of the fame of Scotus as well as against the wicked assertors of his English parentage, with a freedom and boldness which effectually vindicate his order from the imputation of undermining national sympathies and antipathies. Thus much, at least, as Englishmen, we may boast of; Duns was

Zeal of the Irish for him.

At Oxford.

educated at Oxford, and at Oxford he had already displayed the learning and the faculty which became afterwards still more illustrious in Paris. He was there in the year 1304 defending various theses, and opposing some of the positions which had become generally received in the schools on the authority of Aquinas. But

The Immaculate Conception.

the year of his glory was 1307. Then he maintained in 200 distinct propositions the immaculate conception of the Virgin. An image of Mary, we are told, inclined its head in answer to a prayer for aid in pleading her cause. Paris bestowed on him the title of the Subtle Doctor, and established a festival to commemorate the victory of his opinion. That year he was sent to Cologne by the General of the Order, whether because the heretical Beghards and Beguines in that quarter had need of a corrector, or to establish the position of the Minors more firmly, or for some more recondite cause, his biographer cannot determine. It is clear, however, that he gave an example of true Mendicant obedience by at once forsaking the scene of his triumph without even taking leave of his friends. The year after, when he was not more than thirty-five years of age, he had to take a longer leave of them; report said in

Traditions concerning his death.

a strange and fearful manner. One of his detractors affirms that for some crime known only to God, he was allowed to fall into a swoon, and to be buried alive, and that he died in his efforts to break the lid of the coffin. A Franciscan admirer explains the event by affirming that he was in a rapture. More reasonable historians of the Order discredit the story in both its forms, maintaining that the special cautions which were observed by the ecclesiastics of Cologne respecting funerals, make it incredible.

Subtlety of Scotus.

80. The name with which the Parisians endowed Duns Scotus was, it seems to us, the happiest that could have been selected for him. And whatever we may think of the particular controversy in which he won his laurels, we believe that his subtlety was not in general used to confuse principles and to make the worse appear the better reason, but to bring out distinctions which are of real value, and which the metaphysicians of the latest periods cannot afford to overlook. Such, at least, is the inference we draw from

His book on the First Principle of Things.

his treatise on "the First Principle of Things," a book which appears to contain in an organic form most of the doctrines that are scattered through his other writings. An account of some of the principal questions resolved in it will, we believe, on the whole be more useful than a collection of extracts in our author's language. Not that we have found that language so entirely rugged and uncouth as it is often represented to be. Aquinas is in many ways less difficult; all who desire to have their intellectual food cooked for them will resort to him. Those who like to prepare it, and even now and then to hunt it for themselves, will find their interest in accompanying Duns.

The Original in itself and as a Cause.

81. The first question discussed in the Treatise is, whether there is one principle of all things simply and absolutely? Duns proposes 1st, To remove an ambiguity from the word Principle. 2d, To state different opinions on the subject. 3d, To defend the Catholic truth upon it. We must distinguish between the original *in itself* and the original in relation to other things as their cause. Not that they are different, but that it is a different process to contemplate the principle *à priori*, and to ascend to it from that which we see. Duns remarks, that the *plurality* of effects led some, as Pythagoras,

Plurality, Duality, Contrariety.

to the supposition of a *number* of different causes or principles; that the *contrariety* of effects, and again the combination of opposite effects led others, as Empedocles, to think of *two* Principles, one the principle of strife, the other of Unity or Reconciliation; that the existence of *Good* and *Evil* effects led a third class (the Manicheans) to imagine one cause of spiritual and incorruptible things,

The Manichean Theory

another of earthly and corruptible. To the first, our author answers, 'You cannot infer a multitude of causes from a multitude of effects. The instance of the sun teaches us that from the vigour of a single agent may proceed results the most numerous and various.' To the argument from contraries, it is answered, that in works which proceed from a human mind and will, we continually observe a perfectly harmonious result brought to pass through agencies which are in themselves warring and contradictory. To the Manichean argument it is answered, that Evil implies not efficiency, but deficiency. It is detraction from some power or virtue; as *e.g.*, lameness from the power of walking. The positive doctrine which Duns undertakes to prove in opposition to these three doctrines, is—1, That there is one efficient Principle of all things; 2, That this efficient Principle is the exemplar of all things; 3, That it is their final end.

Unity of Genus and Unity of Proportion.

82. The arguments in proof of a one efficient Principle, involve a doctrine which metaphysically is more important than themselves. In it lies the Realism of Duns, about which we often hear much, but which is perhaps not always well understood. He starts from the assertion of Aristotle, that Genus is not Being (Ens.) The Genus Animal, as such, *excludes* its differences. It is *neither* rational nor irrational. But a Being must be one or other of these. Therefore, besides the Unity of Genus, which is a unity of *predication*, there must be a unity of *analogy* or *proportion*. In the first unity,

Negative and Positive Universality

that which is most comprehensive, is most negative. In the other, that which is most comprehensive, is most positive. I attribute health primarily to a man, I attribute it secondarily or by analogy to food, calling that healthy which contributes to health. There is a perfect unity in these two uses of the word; but it is the unity of proportion. It is the unity which has to do with being, as distinguished from my statements or affirmations about being.

Ascending by this scale you do not seek in the primary Being for the last negation: you seek in it that which explains the being of all other things. Assuming this distinction, Duns goes on to argue, that if you take any two beings whatsoever, and affirm that they are primary, you must say that being is predicated of them equally, not of either in reference to the other, or of both in reference to some third. But in so doing, you take being as identical with genus, which is contrary to our hypothesis.

Platonism of Duns.

83. An earnest consideration of this statement might, we think, bring us into the very heart of the Scotian philosophy as well as remove many perplexities from our own minds. Bonaventura shows us the spiritual and theological foundation of the Franciscan Platonism; Duns justifies it from the scholastical side. We need scarcely say how much was wanting to bring this Platonism into contact with the facts of earth; what an absence there is in it of the purely Socratic element. Still we must accept it as a most valuable counteraction to the Encyclopedic tendencies of the Dominican; as a great vindication of the personality of Man and of God against systematic anthropology and theology. On the second point, that the one efficient Principle is the exemplar of all forms, Duns is

Form and Matter.

still Platonical. He preserves the terminology respecting Form and Matter which the Schoolmen chiefly derived from Aristotle, but that terminology acquires a new meaning in his hands. Forms, he observes, which are united to Matter, are the more perfect the more particular they are. Separate the Form from the Matter, and the case becomes reversed. Then the more universal the forms are, the more simple they are; the more simple they are, the more they have of action and perfection. The highest form is the simplest, for it includes all others within itself. The perfect Being

The Efficient cause the end which all things aim at.

is the self-existent Whole. All other beings exist by participation of His being. The doctrine, that the efficient cause is the end which all beings are created to seek, is deduced from the effort of the soul itself. That, Duns here and elsewhere, describes as the ground of all *our* certainty. Our aspiration after an infinite Good is the witness to us that that good is, that it is the cause of our existence, that we are meant to participate in it. To speak of the Infinite as the finis or end which we are seeking, is contradictory in sound, not in fact. The τὸ πέρας and the τὸ ἄπειρον might be hopeless opposites for Pythagoras and Anaximander; the Catholic Faith reconciles them.

Aristotle's difficulty.

84. The second question which Duns discusses in this treatise, whether plurality, *i.e.*, a multitude of creatures, can proceed from a single principle, would seem to be included in the first. Nevertheless, it introduces us to some new topics, and especially to an argument with Aristotle, and with his Arabian commentator Avicenna. Aristotle, he thinks, did not feel so much difficulty in connecting *Plurality* with a one divine Creator, as in supposing that

Intelligence of Avicenna.

anything could proceed from Him which was not *eternal*, not essentially like Himself. He attributes to his Mahometan critic the doctrine, that the production of multitude presupposes an intelligence besides the one; the Creation of all distinct things being attributed wholly to this intelligence. Duns takes these distinctions: 1st, He would have us think of the production of that which is the

Possible Media in Creation.

same in substance as taking place by *intrinsic* communication; of that which is diverse in substance by *extrinsic* communication. 2dly, He would have us observe that there is a plurality which includes and involves unity (*e.g.*, the existence of a number of men involves a humanity), and that there is a plurality which excludes unity; (*e.g.*, two souls cannot exist in the same man.) 3dly, He declares that there are contraries of which the same subject is susceptible, and that there are contraries which destroy each other. With respect to the first distinction, it is only extrinsic production which can be supposed to require *Media*. The possible media may be of three kinds, either (1.) A *Medium totaliter operans*, *i.e.*, the Intellect of Avicenna, which is in fact the Sole Creative Power standing apart from the one Principle. (2.) A *Co-operative* medium, such as the nature of the soil is in the production of a plant. (3.) An *assisting* Medium, such as is the eye to the mind in the producing of impressions. These maxims being premised, Duns ultimately

Conclusion.

affirms, "That the first Principle produces Plurality in the sense in which plurality does not exclude unity; contraries in the sense in which contraries do not destroy each other; *immediately*, that is to say, without the necessity of either the Intelligence the Mahometan speaks of, or of the co-operation of the Nature of any existing secondary agent." Nevertheless, Duns admits, that there is a sense, or rather that there are two senses in which Avicenna's doctrine holds good. Contemplate the divine order merely as an expres-

How God's works are one.

sion of the divine purposes (*Ordo Rationum*); contemplate it as an expression of the ultimate results of those purposes (*Ordo Perfectionum*); and it is right to say that the Unity of God is producing Unity; that all which He does tends to Unity. But contemplate this order in reference to the Means by which these results are wrought out (*Ordo Agentium*), and then the conclusion is false. Plurality comes in, and plurality involves that fresh and ever teeming production which Aristotle knew not how to extract out of his idea of a one first cause.

Forms and their distinctions.

85. The acknowledgment of God as the Form which is assumed in all created forms; of Form as in its essence living, and active, the spring and source of Acts; of a gradation of Forms; of each higher Form as requiring less to sustain itself and its acts than the one that is subordinate to it; of the highest as demanding no aid at all to its acts, its strength being wholly self-derived—this is the fundamental and divine part of our author's Philosophy. To con-

nect this with the actual things, to bring the divine Will into con-
Contingency. nection with the contingent and the Material is, with him as with others, the great problem. In his treatment of contingencies and their ordination, he follows in the track of Boethius; and we are not sure that he adds much to what is said on this subject so finely in the Consolations. Duns dwells much upon the sense in which it may and may not be affirmed that God determined from Eternity what should or should not be. His statements on this point could hardly be made intelligible, unless we went at length into his opinion
Matter. respecting Time which is developed in a subsequent question. It is more in order that we should speak now of his doctrines respecting *Matter*, which are naturally suggested by the doubt whether it may not be required as the Co-operating Medium, the co-efficient, in
Matter cannot be eternal. Creation. Before he develops his own theory, he addresses an *argumentum ad hominem* to those who assume that matter cannot have been created, that it must be assumed as necessary to the production of creatures. You hold Matter to be simply a potency, the very antagonist of form; not partaking of being at all. It is easier for you to suppose *anything* original than this; for by your very hypothesis it has no strength, no element of power in itself. *It* must be created, whatever is not created.

Matter in what sense connected with being. 86. Duns himself does not think so meanly of Matter as some of those do who would set it beside God and suppose it necessary to his operations. Matter, according to him, is not a mere potency, a mere negation of Being. Apart from Form, it is not quick and vital. But Being is implied in it; it is the passive receptive female, without which no form except the highest and most perfect is conceivable. This he affirms again and again; it is perhaps his
Matter implied in Spiritual existence. most characteristic dogma. Matter is just as much supposed in all spiritual existences, God only excepted, as in those which we oppose to spiritual. The Spiritual Form has its corresponding Matter just as the Corporeal Form has that which appertains to it and brings it into reality. The doctrine is philosophically consistent in spite of its paradoxical appearance: we do not see how any schoolman could escape from it: yet we are not aware that any one has affirmed it with the same breadth and courage as our
Is Matter general or distinct? author. With equal resolution, he faces the question whether there is a specific matter appropriated to each form, or whether Matter is in its nature general and indeterminate. The answer is, Matter as such is indeterminate and chaotic. But the distinct Forms coming into contact with it give it a distinctness; Matter united with a form becomes as separate from that which is united to any other as the forms themselves are. Hence, says our Duns, rising for the moment into poetry which we may believe is always latent in him though buried for the most part under quiddities of the understanding—"Hence, it appears that the world is a very

beautiful tree whereof the root and seed store is this primary
Idea of the Universe. matter; the moving leaves are accidents and contingencies; the boughs and branches are all things which are liable to decay; the flower is the rational nature; the fruit is that same in its perfection, the angelical nature. That which alone forms this seed, and directs its unfolding from the beginning is the Word of God, either by immediate operation as in the case of the Heavens, the Angels, and the rational soul, or mediately through such agents as work in the production of whatever is subject to birth and to death. True it is, that in the first root of this primary matter, nothing is distinct. Then at once the root is divided into two branches, the corporeal and the spiritual. The spiritual branch is distinguished into three hierarchies; each of these into three orders, each order into thousands of thousands of Angels. A portion of these branches being shaken by a blast of pride, was dried up at the beginning of the world. The corporeal creation contains two branches, the corruptible and the incorruptible, each of which has manifold offshoots. Thus the unity of the universe in its various elements is evolved at last out of this indeterminate matter."

Duns as a Psychologist. 87. In many parts of this treatise we think we may trace the action of the theological tenet which procured Duns his Parisian reputation upon his philosophy, as well as the steps by which that philosophy might have prepared him for receiving the tenet. The ontological and theological discussions respecting a first principle, lead us to questions respecting the soul and body of man. No writer has expressed himself with more reverence than Duns for the corporeal part of man's nature. Proceeding from his general maxim that all act and energy belong to forms, all passivity to matter, he affirms that the intelligent soul is the true and specific form of the body. The sensitive part, he says, has no active energy, therefore it cannot be this form. The rational soul considered metaphysically apart from the body, is composed of form and matter, *i. e.*, of an active and passive principle. But the body is
Dignity of the human body. more glorious than the mere matter (the mere receptivity), of the soul separately considered, inasmuch as it is receptive of the whole power of the soul, uniting both its elements. The whole man thinks and feels; but the root and groundwork of thought and feeling is in the intellect, and the immediate agent through which the thought and feeling fulfil themselves is the body. The intelligent
The Relation of the Intellect to the Body soul is more truly and properly united to the human body than any other form is to its own materia. Our Doctor therefore arrived directly or indirectly, by one process or another, at a very high idea of Manhood in its composite condition. Man, he maintains, is more truly man in his original, than in his lapsed condition, in his heavenly country than in his earthly pilgrimage. The intellect of man, he declares, is wholly from God, not generated by the

human parent. But he bestows a quasi super-naturality on human generation, to which, though we may not attribute form, we may attribute the educing of that compound which consists of both matter and form. The soul, he affirms, is wholly in the whole body, and is present in each part. He traces the steps of knowledge, beginning at the lowest, which is the sensitive apprehension of a sensible object. This apprehension is not scientific; for science concerns the truth or substance of things, not the mere outside of them. Nevertheless, this particular sensitive apprehension he distinctly maintains to be the foundation of all science. Through the apprehension of particulars, we must rise to the knowledge of that which is universal.

Scale of Perceptions.

Inductive tendencies of Franciscans.

88. Such a sentiment as this the reader might perhaps have listened to without great surprise from Roger Bacon, whom he has heard of as the intellectual forerunner of his great namesake. But he may be startled that it should proceed from a man like Duns—a schoolman emphatically, not an experimentalist; one of those whose dominion the scientific revolution of the 17th century is supposed to have overthrown. In what respects Roger Bacon was peculiar, how he offended the prejudices of his order, we shall have soon to explain. But we must in justice to that order say that the first maxim of experimental philosophy could never have appeared heretical to its most illustrious members. Their tendency was towards induction; the inductive minds were those which fell naturally within the circle of their influence. Duns undoubtedly knew much less of physics than Albertus Magnus; but we suspect that he had more of the characteristics which would be demanded of a physical investigator in modern times than could be found in Albert or in his illustrious friend. And we do not think that the passages in the Treatise "De Principio Rerum," which most convict him of being a Realist at all weaken the force of this assertion. Supposing he assumed the reality of those kinds or classes into which existing naturalists had distributed the subjects of their observations—we admit at once that he would have fixed a fatal limit to investigation. But as his previous assumption is that Being and Genus are not identical, he is not open to this charge. Nor can he be accused of bringing in decrees and traditions to check courageous inquiry. He is no rebel against authority; but he knows that when words are given, the force of those words requires to be ascertained. He firmly believes that a divine authority is a guide to Truth, not a dispensation from the effort of pursuing it. *Scotists* no doubt become the slaves of Scotus, as *Thomists* became the slaves of Aquinas; each repeated the dicta of a master. But the disciple of the subtle doctor must have been half conscious that he was missing his sense when he was not thinking for himself. It was far easier to be a clever

Induction and Realism not necessarily hostile.

Duns not a slave of Tradition.

adept in the other school, without doing much more than commit to memory the angelical arguments and conclusions.

89. In his thirteenth question, Art. 3, Duns enters upon the long controversy, which will meet us again so often, whether the apprehensions of the Intellect respecting things without are direct like those of the senses; whether if so they are identical with the apprehensions of the Senses; whether an image or likeness of the thing seen is presented to the intellect, or formed by it, not the actual thing; whether the intellect merely abstracts and knows only by this abstracting faculty; whether the power of direct vision can only belong to the intellect in some other state of being. The conclusion at which our Doctor arrives is that the apprehension of the Intellect differs in this from that of the Senses; that whereas they *experience* the actuality of the thing under which they are exercised, the intellect simply *knows* its actuality. The knowledge is higher than the experience, and in fact includes it, but each inferior faculty or capacity has something belonging to itself which does not belong to the higher. But the Intellect loses nothing of the reality; it is not farther from the actual truth of the thing than the Sense is; it does not substitute an abstraction of its own for that which the eye beholds or the ear hears; it rather enters more into the truth of the thing, into its essential reality than the Sense does. A fruit growing on a tree, says Duns, I attribute to the tree, the particular agent; not to the sun, the universal agent. It is not that I deny the action of the sun in producing that fruit. It is not that I think the tree can produce anything without the sun. It is not that I regard the sun as less directly productive than the tree. Such is the relation of the Intellect to the Senses. They know nothing, realize nothing apart from the Intellect. I ascribe to them a certain contact with the things which I cannot ascribe to the Intellect; but that is all. The living apprehension is *in* it only *through* them.

Opera Omnia Wadding, vol. 3, pp. 113-118.

Sensible Species or Likenesses.

Intellectual apprehension how it differs from Sensible.

Sensible apprehension more immediate—not more real than Intellectual.

90. The Intellect, then, is not dependent upon any appearance which an object makes to the senses. It gets rid of these appearances, and so arrives at the reality. But are there any *species* impressed on the Intellect itself? Does it owe to them its knowledge of that which is universal? Duns considers at length the arguments of those who say that the Intellect moulds Species, that they are the effects of its abstracting power; and of those who say that Species is only *ratione speculi*, a mirror in which the particular object is presented to the Intellect. He treats the words Abstraction, and the like to which the supporters of the first hypothesis resort, as terms to express processes which themselves demand an explanation, or as dishonest subterfuges for getting rid of the whole difficulty. Phantasies, he argues, can never supply the place of Species. A deliverance from sensual phantasms is what the

Species impressed on the Intellect.

Argument for the reality of Species.

Intellect desires. That deliverance becomes possible for it, if it has the power of turning itself to certain pure and real Species; not on any other condition. But to do so is possible for the Intellect even now. It must not be content to wait for this as its ultimate and heavenly perfection; for what is that perfection but the state for which God created it; that which it is to attain when it is purged from anomalies and contradictions? A Species, then, he concludes, the Intellect demands both for visible and invisible things. When the things are present, then this Species is that which prevents the Intellect from being seriously disturbed by the want of proportion in those phantasms which the Sense or the Imagination brings before it. When the object is absent, then this Species sustains and supplies the Memory. It is determined in the following question (the 15th), that the Mind knows itself and its own operations, not by a Species impressed upon it (as in the case of things without it), but by a Species *expressed* from it; in other words, it has an *intuitive* knowledge of its own habits.

How the Mind knows itself.

Species and Ideals.

91. We have been careful to use the word *Species* in all these disquisitions, often as we have been tempted to substitute for it Form or Ideal; because it is a first duty in a historian not to sacrifice the strictness of language and the order of times to his own convenience or to that of his reader. That Duns Scotus meant *something like* what Plato meant, or what we might mean, by the word Idea or Ideal, when he spoke of Species, we of course believe. What the resemblance is, where the divergency begins, must be ascertained by careful reflection, which is greatly helped by the consideration of the differences of language that became necessary either from the use of Latin instead of Greek, or from the habits of the age, or from the opinions of the particular thinker. The chance of making this discovery is diminished just in proportion as the words are confounded or assumed to be identical. The whole Nominalist controversy of the 13th century, and of that which follows, becomes a hopeless riddle, if we lose hold of the phrases which were either the catchwords of the opposite parties, or which were common to both. And this consideration is far more important in this period than it would have been in the last, since the debate is no longer about trifles, as it was in John of Salisbury's day. All the most serious feelings of the most serious men are involved in it, there is no topic of Morals or Theology with which it is not directly connected.

Necessity of adhering strictly to Latin words.

Time, is it only in the Mind?

92. We must pass over several questions, not without great interest to the modern metaphysician respecting Number, to touch upon one which he sometimes fancies is specially his own; that which is discussed in the eighteenth question of our Treatise, "Whether Time and Motion are the same in reality; whether Time is only in the Mind?" On this subject, Duns expresses himself with moderation as well as decision. Time, he affirms to be Motion *plus* a certain notion of before and after which is derived from the mind itself. To say that Time is only in the Mind, if thereby it is implied that Motion is only in the mind, is false. That belongs to things, to the world which is outside of us. But it is equally false to say that Time is in the things in any other sense than Motion is in them. Time thus, as Time, is simply from us; it is a condition of our minds. But since we should know nothing of it, since this condition of our mind could have no application or meaning if the fact of Motion were not presented to it,—we must beware of using language, which, though formally right, is materially wrong. We need scarcely tell our readers that Augustine's Confessions is the treasury of thought to which Duns and all other schoolmen resorted when their minds were exercised on this question of Time, or how many other still profounder questions respecting Eternity and the nature of God Himself were closely intertwined with it in the mind of the Bishop of Hippo and in theirs. We can only commend the passages upon this subject in the latter part of the Treatise 'De Rerum Principio,' to those who are earnestly occupied with it; still more to those who see nothing in it which can furnish them with any occupation; who fancy that they have fathomed it with their plummets; or who put it aside with the sage determination that what is unfathomable cannot concern them. To hold that opinion, seems to us like making our whole stay upon earth that live burial, that striking against the coffin lid, which the enemies of Duns Scotus imagined to be his punishment after his earthly work was over.

Time, how connected with Motion.

Eternity.

Conclusion.

93. When Duns Scotus came to Oxford, he must have heard strange reports respecting a brother of his own order, who was perhaps a magician, though he had written against magic, and perhaps a heretic, though he had been the friend of at least one distinguished pope. Whether the subtle Doctor may ever have conversed with the wonderful Doctor, Roger Bacon, while he was meditating at Brazennose on "the means of avoiding the infirmities of old age;" whether the youth, whom all Franciscans were to honour as the champion of orthodoxy, would have consorted with the old man whom Franciscans were told by their Superior to abhor, and whom he had cast into prison—we have no means of ascertaining. Bacon must be dearer to us than Duns can be. For he was an Englishman, not only in virtue of his birth-place, which no one disputes, but in virtue of gifts and of a character which we may boast of as specially national. Moreover, he was a martyr of science, and we should certainly be disposed to enlarge the canon which Anselm established in the case of another English divine by contending that the martyrs of science are the martyrs of God. This claim might perhaps stand good

Roger Bacon.

Contrast to Duns.

Claims of Bacon on our reverence.

on other grounds in the eyes of us Protestants. At all events there is so much in his position and circumstances which is deeply and vitally important to the students of Philosophy generally, that we must defy the plausible objection which might be raised against our right to speak of an investigator of Nature in a treatise on Moral and Metaphysical inquiries.

His birth.

94. Roger Bacon was born at Ilchester in the year 1214. He sprang, like Aquinas and Bonaventura, from the upper classes; he belonged to an excellent Somersetshire family. He may always have been destined to be a monk, but he appears not to have taken the Franciscan vow till he was twenty-six years of age, after he had already passed some years at Oxford as well as at Paris. The direction must have been given to his mind during those years; he must have had made many an observation, perhaps many an experiment, on the mysteries of the world about him, before he devoted himself to a society which was occupied with the mysteries of the kingdom of Heaven. By the year 1240, he may have been well able to judge in either university which of the orders was most likely to favour the bent of his genius; certainly we should say that he chose wisely, however little the events which followed may have appeared to justify the resolution. How well the special meditations of the Friar could blend with the favourite studies of the Naturalist, our poet has taught us in a well-known passage which may have been suggested by the traditions (so rife among the dramatists of this period), of one who had learned his lore not in Verona, but among the fields and woods of England:—

At Oxford and Paris.

The natural and spiritual.

Friar in Romeo and Juliet.

"I must fill up this osier cage of ours,
With baleful weeds, and precious-juiced flowers.
The earth, that's nature's mother, is her tomb;
What is her burying grave, that is her womb:
And from her womb children of divers kind
We sucking on her natural bosom find:
Many for many virtues excellent,
None but for some, and yet all different.
O mickle is the powerful grace that lies
In herbs, plants, stones, and their true qualities;
For nought so vile that on the earth doth live,
But to the earth some special good doth give;
Nor aught so good, but strained from that fair use
Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse:
Virtue itself turns vice, being misapplied;
And vice sometimes by action's dignified.
Within the infant rind of this small flower
Poison hath residence, and med'cine power;
For this, being smelt, with that part cheers each part;
Being tasted, slays all senses with the heart.
Two such opposed foes encamp them still
In man as well as herbs—grace and rude will;
And where the worser is predominant,
Full soon the canker death eats up that plant."

We have not made this extract chiefly to relieve a dull narrative with exquisite poetry. It explains more perfectly than any language we know, the processes which must have passed in a thinker who felt that he had need of external objects to sustain him against the pressure and tumult of thought; to whom these objects imparted ever fresh delight on their own account, and contained ever fresh parables concerning the regions which lie beyond the senses. Bacon, above all men, seems to have been surprised, perhaps overwhelmed, with the mysteries of nature. To dispose them under heads, as a learned Dominican would have done, could not satisfy him. There was a teeming inexhaustible life in nature and natural things, a productive power, which he must come directly into contact with; which he could not be content to learn at second-hand from Aristotle or from any one else. The Franciscan habit was favourable, as we have seen, to this kind of investigation. Bacon might persuade himself that he was only following the maxims of his order when he entered upon it. And he might have a still clearer conviction that he was obeying a call in his own soul which ought not to be resisted, and that the richest rewards of moral clearness and even perhaps of spiritual discoveries, might be looked for if he walked valiantly on in the path which had been marked out for him.

Bacon a true Franciscan.

95. And valiantly indeed must a man in the 13th century have followed out his purpose, who contrived to spend £2,000 in his experiments. Such expenditure on collections may not have been without precedent, or at least without contemporary justification, in the monasteries. Albertus, with all his zeal for poverty, must have considered it legitimate. But the use of a sum of this kind might have created astonishment in any society; it may have furnished very plausible arguments to those who already regarded Bacon with hostility. What could it be for? Most astonishing processes of nature he spoke of—processes which laughed the doings of the ordinary conjuror to scorn. But he spoke not only of processes in nature. He declared and proved that, having a knowledge of these he could exercise the strangest power over nature. He seemed not to be able to measure the range of human power; he told of arts which might be tremendous to mankind if there were not the greatest care and self-restraint in the use of them. Who could tell that he had these? Was he not wandering into a new untried region, the reports of which, if they might be trusted, showed that it was full of perils to the first explorer and to those who should venture to follow in his footsteps; perhaps, to the vast majority which could not follow him at all. What if he said he hated magicians? Does not every one hate the rival whom he hopes to supersede? Might not this be a much more alarming kind of magic, than any which had yet

His expenditure.

Scandals.

been practised; all the more dangerous because it assumed another name, and put on the air of a religious investigation? Shall the order sanction it? Has it not had enough of dangerous speculations already? Here might be another everlasting Gospel under the disguise of physical philosophy. Evidently Bacon was a doctor of Theology, acquainted with all its turnings and windings. Heresies. What new heresies might not be brought in from the laboratory! What a destruction of existing formulas and methods! Surely there is nothing singular in this course of thought; nothing which it is very hard for students in the reign of Victoria to conceive of; nothing which they can impute as an example of special ignorance to Oxford in the days of Henry III. And there were circumstances in the history of the Franciscans in England, just at the time which might make its members particularly anxious to avoid any new imputation; particularly jealous of those brethren who were spending money on science, though they might be departing from the maxims of the founder far less than some of the respectable.

96. Matthew Paris tells that, in the year 1249, two messengers arrived in England, armed with authority from Innocent IV., to extort what money they could from her dioceses for the use of our Lord the Pope. The King, the historian says, was deluded by their humble manner, the bulls with which they were armed, and their bland discourse, into granting them license to wander through his kingdom; under promise that they should ask gifts only for love, and should use no unlawful methods of persuasion. With this double power they proceeded to the most eminent prelates of the land. Grosseteste and the Franciscans. At Lincoln they met with an unexpected rebuff. Grosseteste, the Bishop, was probably not astonished at the Papal demands. To these he was tolerably accustomed, for Innocent had been a greater plunderer of our island than all his predecessors. But the prelate was utterly confounded at the persons through whom the commands were transmitted; for they were Friars Minors, to whom he had been greatly attached and into whose order he had once desired to enter. The dress which these men had assumed was not what he had expected: they rode on horseback—their whole appearance was secular—their errand, and the amount of their claim utterly confounded him. He declared, in plain terms, that the exaction was unheard of and dishonourable; he His treatment of the Mendicants. believed the money could not be raised. The whole kingdom, clergy and laity, were interested in the question. He could give no answer on his own responsibility. From that time the opinion of Grosseteste respecting the mendicant orders seems to have been changed. He had looked upon them as reformers; now they appeared to him agents of tyranny; money getters; wolves in sheep's clothing. His thoughts on the condition of the Church; on the crimes of its chief rulers; on the hopelessness of improvement

from those who merely took a vow of poverty, appear to have deepened continually. It ended with his pronouncing Innocent to be Antichrist, and the members of the orders which connived at his covetousness implicit heretics. To numbers of the clergy, and some of the Prelates, this *monachorum corrector, Romanorum malleus et contemptor* may have recommended himself by the sanctity of his life, his genial honesty, and his thorough English sympathies. But his old Franciscan friends would surely be obliged to renounce him? One certainly did not—Roger Bacon, Bacon a friend of Grosseteste the seeker of truth in physics, could not desert the defender of truth in morals. He seems to have gone far with Grosseteste in his desires for clerical reformation; perhaps he may have mourned even more than his friend that Christ's mendicants should think it their chief duty to beg for the satisfaction of Papal rapacity and nepotism. How much more terrible will his magic then have appeared! What pretexts will there have been for charging him with any waste of money, when this suspicion mingled with the other! What need can there be to determine which was the chief count in the indictment? Strange sounds were heard in the Constructive Heresy. laboratory; perhaps they might be explained without supposing that the friar had wicked designs against Brazennose or Oxford. Strange words have been repeated by a brother as spoken about simony, and Innocent IV., and our order, as if they might have something to do with each other. Perhaps it was only a text in the Bible, or a passage from St. Augustine that was uttered. Strange hints have been propagated about things that Nature may be doing in her recesses, and also about reforms that might take place in the Church. To be sure Aristotle spoke a little of one; St. Francis of the other. But then, what a weight of evidence lies in the accumulation of charges, each of which is nothing! Assuredly the superior did what most superiors would have done who had the same power, and only a distant responsibility to a Punishment Pope or Legate whose approbation in such a case might be fairly counted on. He forbade the reading of Bacon's writings, and apparently without the intervention of the Ecclesiastical Courts, in virtue of the dominion committed to him, cast the Friar himself into prison.

97. Such events were natural in that age; with some variations Clement IV they might have happened in any. The next point we have to speak of was, it seems to us, far more remarkable. Guy Falcodi, a Cardinal Bishop, was sent as a Legate to England chiefly to settle, as far as the Church could settle, the disputes between Henry and his revolted Barons. We cannot pretend to admire his summary and yet very ineffectual methods of arranging our internal politics, either while he was the minister of Urban or when he became Clement IV. Still less can we applaud his policy

respecting Italy, seeing that he adopted all the pontifical traditions respecting the family of Frederick II., and invested Charles of Anjou with the Kingdom of Sicily. It is all the more pleasant, as we have these reasons for disliking him, to find how much of worth and honour there was in him on points upon which Popes are wont to be most deficient. A letter which he wrote to his nephew when he was made Pope, ought to be written in golden letters, not only in the Vatican, but in the palace of every Bishop throughout Europe. He tells him plainly that he does not wish to see his relations much about the palace; that they are not to look for places from him; that if his sister marries the son of some simple gentleman, he will give her a fair dowry; if she aspires higher because her uncle is the father of Christendom, she shall have nothing. Such good and honest words, not being written to be seen by the world, but in secrecy and confidence, prepare us for another and still nobler instance of Clement's righteousness. In all Roger Bacon's experiments and in all his difficulties, he stood his friend. He was evidently convinced that the Friar was a faithful and religious man, who was doing his Master's work, if not just in the way that the Order approved or that he understood, yet in a way that was for the honour of God and for the good of man. There has been much fine talking about the patronage of literature and art by Popes who lived when literature and art were fashionable, and who simply glorified themselves and averted inquiries into their scandalous promotions of nephews and sons by occasionally diverting a portion of the revenues which they had obtained from the plunder of Europe upon sculptors and painters. The simple and unostentatious friendship of Clement IV. for our oppressed man of science, in an age when science was mistaken for conjuring, will perhaps begin to be spoken of when the builder of St. Peter's is only remembered as the hawker of indulgences. But Nicholas III. succeeded Clement IV. The Superior became more ardent than ever, and his sentences were confirmed by the head of the Church. The Franciscan was himself the next Pope. Of course the philosopher remained in his prison. At the intercession, it is said, of some English noblemen, he was set at liberty. He returned to Oxford, and died in 1292 or 1294. His Order had persecuted him but never quite disclaimed the honour of his name; the people of England felt that he belonged to them. They cherished traditions of the wonders which he wrought, they believed that he had maintained the honour of his country against the magicians of Germany. His fame lived on to the Reformation: then it took a new spring. The dramatists of Queen Elizabeth's time seem to have had an instinctive sense that, in seeking for the secrets of nature he had been a witness for the freedom of man, and that he had marked out a course into which it was the special

His freedom from Nepotism.

His support of Bacon.

Clement and Leo.

Bacon's death.

His English fame.

calling of English students to follow him. Our own conviction is, that the moral and metaphysical student is not under less obligations to him than the physical, and that he helped to teach theologians the worth of their own maxim, that the greatest rewards are for those who walk by faith not by sight. We should have liked to give our readers some specimens of his interesting little treatise against Magic; but perhaps we should be entering upon a region in which we should betray our weakness. We must leave him, therefore, and pass to one more notable Franciscan, Raymond Lully.

98. Raymond Lully has claims to be esteemed a martyr as well as Roger Bacon, a martyr of the more usual and recognized kind. Nevertheless Wadding the Biographer of his order admits him with great hesitation into the roll of his heroes. The Bollandists give him a day (the 30th of June) in the Acts of the Saints, but not without an elaborate apology. Proofs are accumulated of the reverence which was paid him from the time of his death in his own island of Majorca. A bull of Urban VIII. is produced which tacitly acknowledges that reverence as immemorial, while other illustrious children of the soil who could not plead the same prescription were deposed from their honour. This high patronage may perhaps protect Raymond not only from the imputation of being an Alchemist, which he seems to have incurred through a confusion of names, but from the dangerous admiration of Giordano Bruno, who, in later days believed himself to be a Lullist and whom Rome burnt as an Atheist. Be his reputation what it may, Raymond's life, so far as it can be extracted from the different records of it which are preserved to us (and the Jesuit editors give great help in this work), is full of an interest which does not usually belong to the biographies of schoolmen.

Raymond Lully.

Acta Sanctorum, Dies 36, Junii 30, p. 639.

99. Raymond was born in 1235, at Palma, the capital of Majorca. The condition of the Balearic islands at the time of his birth must have had great effect upon his thoughts and character. They had been in the possession of the Saracens; in 1229, they were conquered by James I., king of Arragon. The father of Raymond was engaged in the battle with the Mahometans: a portion of the island was bestowed on him for his services; the boy grew up in the midst of wealth and luxury. He had some considerable office to which the name of Seneschal is given by his biographers, about the nature of which the Jesuit editor indulges in a learned disquisition. At all events it is clear that Raymond lived in the heart of an aristocratical, if not a courtly circle, and that he plunged more deeply into the vices of such a circle than most of his companions. His libertinism seems to have been very vehement and reckless; one biographer speaks of it as arrested by a frightful discovery made to him by a lady of whom he was insanely fond;

Majorca.

His early years.

others tell of a vision of the cross which was five times presented to his eyes and to his mind. Both stories may in substance be true. A character like his would require some outward event to stop him in his career. Such an event would have been powerless if it had not been attended by a sense of the love which caused the Son of God to become a sacrifice. A profound impression followed that the convert had a call to become the converter of others. It was most natural in his age and country that he should think first of the Saracens.

His Conversion.

His projects.

100. Raymond belonged to what may be called a literary period. But the habits of his youth had estranged him from literature; he had less than the ordinary knowledge of grammar. His first thought was to write a book against Mahometanism; his second was that he had the slenderest possible apparatus for such an undertaking and that his ignorance of Arabic put a hopeless barrier between him and the objects of his interest. Raymond wept and prayed. At last he became filled with the design of going to the Pope and all the princes of Christendom, that he might persuade them to found monasteries in which the Eastern languages should be studied and from which well trained missionaries should go forth. Strongly as he was possessed with these thoughts, he was still, says his biographer, far too much imbued with his secular tastes and habits, till he heard a sermon on the festival of St. Francis. That at once determined him to leave all that he had, to join the order, and to walk as nearly as he could in the steps of the founder. He visited various holy shrines to seek strength for his purpose, then he desired to go to Paris that he might commence his studies in earnest. He was persuaded, however, rather to return to his own home, where he bought a Saracen slave and commenced the study of Arabic under his direction. A story is told of them which bears internal evidence of truth, and which appears to us very instructive. The slave once was heard to blaspheme the name of Christ. The crime was reported to his pupil. He struck the man on the face. The Saracen meditated vengeance, and seized an opportunity of stabbing Raymond. Though severely wounded, he was able to throw the infidel down and snatch the weapon; servants presently came to the rescue and bound him. Then Raymond's mind was greatly exercised. Should he let a man loose who was sure to complete his crime; should he punish a man who had taught him what he cared most to know? He retired to the hills for meditation and devotion, but gained no light; on his return, he found that the slave had strangled himself in prison; which discovery, we are told, gave him great relief and much occasion for thanksgiving!

Studies Arabic.

The Slave.

The Vision.

101. But he had soon a greater cause for gratitude. He had ascended a hill not far from his house for quiet contemplation.

After he had stayed there a week, it came to pass on a certain day as he was looking up to Heaven, that his mind became illuminated respecting the form and nature of the book which he was to write against the Mahometans. This illumination had not reference to the argument or the style of a single treatise. It was the discovery to him of an universal art of acquisition, demonstration, confutation; an art which expanded more and more in his mind, till the defence and illustration of it became the end of his life, though never to the neglect or forgetfulness of the other earlier object. In one sense, the whole art was to be ministerial to the special work of convincing the Saracens; in another sense, it was to cover the whole field of knowledge; to supersede the inadequate methods of previous schoolmen. The vision and blessing of a mysterious Shepherd on the mountains having strengthened the purpose of Raymond, he was able to meet the king of Majorca who had heard of his zeal and desired to see him; to endure an examination from a brother of the order of the Minors respecting his art; to publish his method of demonstration and to lecture upon the same—making it manifest, says his biographer (who we suspect, did not very well understand Lully or himself) "how the primary form and the primary matter constitute an elementary chaos, and how the five Universals and the ten Predicaments descend out of this chaos and are contained in the same, according to Catholic Theological truth." Raymond might afford the same excuse for a Poem on the "Loves of the Predicaments," which Darwin did for one "on the Loves of the Triangles;" but he never quite talked the nonsense which is imputed to him here.

His Art.

How Raymond taught in Majorca.

102. With some difficulty Raymond succeeded in persuading the king of Majorca to found and endow a Society of fifteen Franciscan Friars who were to be trained in Arabic and fitted for Saracen warfare. Why might he not hope that the Pope and the Cardinals should be willing to institute similar monasteries throughout the world? He went to Rome full of this expectation. Honorius IV. was dead; every one was occupied about his successor; that was not precisely the moment in which he could hope for success. Unhappily the moment never came. Again and again the biographer presents to us the indefatigable Lully beseeching the Vatican for help; again and again we are told that certain impediments in the Papal Palace obliged him to return without accomplishing the least part of his purpose. He tried Rome; he tried Avignon; he besieged Celestine V.; he tormented Boniface VIII.; he hunted Clement V. to Lyons: the story is the same in every case. He profited nothing; Popes and Cardinals cared about none of these things. Meanwhile he was working in other ways. He went to Paris, read in the University there his book upon the Ars Generalis, produced another book on the art for the discovery

The King and the Pope

Quæ quidem supplicatio tam Domino Papæ quam Cardinalibus modicum fecit curæ Vita B. R. Lulli ab anonymo coævo Scripta c. 3 Acta Sanct ubi sup., p. 661.

of Truth, "having," says the narrator, "on account of the weakness of the human intellect which he had experienced in Paris, reduced his sixteen figures into twelve." We shall hear more of these figures presently; perhaps our experience of the weakness of the human intellect in London may tempt us to reduce them still farther. The use of them he determined to put to an immediate test by sailing from Genoa to Africa, that he might manifest to the Saracens, according to the art given him by God, the Incarnation of the Son of God and the Trinity of divine Persons in a blessed and perfect Unity. Great confidence seems to have been in the brother's own mind, great expectation among the Genoese. All his books and goods were on board. A sudden panic overtook him. He could not encounter the probable risk of death; he remained on the shore. His cowardice and the scandal he had brought on his cause filled him with horror, he was attacked with violent illness, heard of another galley which was going to Tunis, roused himself, and ill as he was, went on board. His friends seized him and carried him home; he escaped from their hands entered half dead into a third ship; and speedily recovered.

His revulsion of feeling.

Raymond among the Saracens.

103. When Raymond had arrived at Tunis, he gathered about him, we are told, the more learned Mahometans. He informed them that he understood all the doctrines which were held sacred among Christians and that he was very anxious to know what they had to say for their faith, to the end that he might embrace it if he found it better than his own. The Dervises accepted the challenge and defended vigorously their Monotheism. Raymond, adopting their premiss, maintained that every wise man should hold that faith which attributes to the eternal God in whom all wise men believe, the greatest goodness, power, glory, and perfection, and all these in the greatest equality and harmony. Then he went on to point out to them that they were in fact only acknowledging two active principles in God, Will and Wisdom; that Goodness and Greatness were, in their faith, indolent qualities, which might exist in the Divine Being but of which there was no exercise. That the ground of this defect was, that they did not acknowledge any internal intrinsic communication, such as that between the Father and the Son, which Christians believed; and that the idea of Divinity, that which expresses the fullness of the Divine perfection and shows how that perfection can be manifested and can be operative, is the idea of a Trinity of Persons, the Father the Son and the Holy Spirit in one most simple nature and essence. Proceeding from this ground, he went on to announce that a certain art had been revealed to him, a poor Christian hermit, whereby he could demonstrate to them these truths by the most evident reasons if they would confer with him about them for a few days with a quiet mind. "For it will appear to you," he

Subject and method of his discourse.

The divine art.

said, "if it pleaseth you to listen, most rationally by this same art, that in the Incarnation of the Son of God, by the union of the Creator and the creature in the one person of Christ, the primary and highest cause is in most intimate and rational accordance with its effect. This harmony of cause and effect moreover shines forth in the Passion of Christ the same Son of God which He fitly sustained in the humanity He had assumed of His own voluntary and most pitiful condescension to redeem us sinners from sin and the corruption of our first parents and to bring us back to the state of glory and divine fruition which was the final object of the blessed God in the Creation of us men."

How the Mahometans behave.

104. Without this discourse, which must, we conceive, have been on the whole faithfully reported by the anonymous biographer, it would be difficult for our readers to perceive the connection between the Art of Raymond of which we must speak presently, and the practical object of his life. The result which the biographer speaks of is at least internally probable; and is not so discreditable to the Saracens that we need suppose it to be invented. One of his auditors, it is said, perceiving the intention of Raymond, earnestly besought the king that he would give orders that the man who was endeavouring to subvert the nation of the Saracens and the law of Mahomet should lose his head. But another prudent and scientific counsellor represented that, though Raymond was a Christian advocate, he was, nevertheless, evidently a man of goodness as well as of sagacity; and that it would be a virtuous act in any Saracen to propagate his own lore among Christians, as this Christian was propagating his among the Mahometans. The king, it is said, was so far swayed by these arguments, that he changed the sentence of death, against Raymond, into one of banishment; with the addition that he should be stoned if he were found any longer in that country. There seems to have been a great conflict in the mind of the missionary whether he ought not to stay in spite of this edict, for the sake of those whose minds seemed inclining to embrace his doctrine. But ultimately, finding that he could do nothing for the service of Christ there, he availed himself of a ship which was bound for Naples. Thenceforth all his time was spent in fruitless missions to popes and kings respecting his college, in the incessant writing of books, and in journeys into the land of the infidels. Once he appears to have spent a considerable time in a Saracen prison, and to have resisted promises of wives, honour, a house and money, if he would embrace the Mahometan faith. Once he succeeded at Pisa in establishing a military order to accomplish, by material arms, what he was endeavouring to accomplish with spiritual. Finally (as two of his biographers tell us, Bovillus and Nicolaus de Pax), when he had become an old man,—old in body but still strong and growing

His sentence

His Martyrdom.

every day stronger in mind,—he passed over once more from Majorca to Tunis for the purpose of preaching the Gospel. Where, when he had come, being straightway recognized by the inhabitants, a concourse of people cast him out of the city, stoned him, and buried him under the stones. The following night it pleased God, that certain merchants of Majorca, as they entered the port of Tunis, perceived afar off an immense pyramid of light, proceeding from the heap of stones under which the body was lying. Wondering at the novelty of the appearance, they turned in without delay, removed the stones, discovered the body, recognized their fellow-citizen, brought his remains to Majorca, and placed them in a ground on which many illustrious miracles were afterwards wrought. If we gave the whole list of his works, as it is given in one of the sketches of his life, our readers would think any enumeration of marvels at his tomb very superfluous. We shall only speak of two of them, one called the Ars Brevis, a compendium of the Ars Generalis, which is the foundation and key to all Arts,—the other a tract on the Principles of Philosophy, which was addressed to Philip the Fair against the Averroists.

The Art not a new Art of Memory.

105. The Lullian Art may seem to those who look at it carelessly, a kind of *Memoria technica*, or a logical short-hand. They will find nine letters of the alphabet, each of which stands for certain principles, subjects of thought, forms of the understanding. They will meet with a number of figures, circles, and triangles, which may seem to them more or less useful, more or less clumsy, expedients for suggesting certain distinctions to the mind, or for preserving them in the recollection. But they will wonder how an earnest and devout man, such as Raymond certainly was, can have supposed that these were special communications from above during his watches on the Majorcan hill, or can have mingled them, almost identified them, with the great Catholic doctrines, of which he felt that it was his calling to bear witness in Tunis. That he overrated the grandness and value of the discovery, we make no doubt; that he was in the peril, in which we all are, of confounding methods which he had found serviceable with the ends which those methods were to attain, seems to us also unquestionable. Whatever stones any of us being consciously free from these sins may think fit to cast at him, may wound his fame, as much as the stones which the Africans cast at him wounded his body. But we are not inclined to call him either presumptuous or foolish for tracing any light which made the passages of his own mind clearer, to a divine source, and we cannot blame him for thinking that there is a link, however often we may fail in tracing it, between the deepest, most universal principles, and those forms which we discover either in our own minds or in the natural world. All philosophers in ancient times suspected that there must be such a connection; they thought that

The Art, and what the Art was to do.

The Forms of Thought, and the realities to which they correspond.

it was the very business of philosophy to find out what the connection was. If the brave Lully was one of those who stumbled in the search, we may at least honour the experiment more than we denounce the failure, and may perhaps believe that no experiment seriously conceived and faithfully followed up, does fail. It must leave seeds behind when it dies, which bear much fruit.

Ars Brevis, Opera, Argent, 1617. pp. 1-42.

106. Lully wishes us to learn his alphabet by heart before we proceed with the rest of his grammar. It seems a reasonable request, and yet it is one which we find it hard to comply with. Why *B* should signify Goodness, Difference, Whether or no, God, Justice, Avarice—awakens questions which somewhat interfere with the process of learning by heart. Before we arrive at *K* we discover that there is a consistency in his scheme,—that each letter does the same kind of office as its predecessor,—and that there must be some reason for what strikes us at first as a mere wilful classification. But we do not feel that we know much of the reason till we have paid some attention to his figures, his rules, and his definitions; and have seen what part the alphabet plays in expounding the purpose of each of them.

The Alphabet.

The Figures.

107. The first figure is called the figure of Absolute Predicates. It is a circle, of which the centre is *A*. About it revolve nine principles, — Goodness, Magnitude, Duration, Power, Wisdom, Will, Virtue, Truth, Glory. These we are told are subjects, each of which may be converted into a predicate of the other; goodness is great, greatness is good, &c. The second figure is the figure of Predicates denoting Relation. It consists of three triangles. The first triangle has the three angles of Difference, Agreement, Contrariety. The second triangle has for its three angles, Beginning, Middle, and End. The third has for its three angles, the Greater, the Equal, the Less, or as Raymond says, Majority, Equality, Minority. When we descend farther into the properties of these figures, we find that there may be a difference, agreement, or contrariety between two objects of sense, as between a stone and a tree; between an object of the intellect and an object of sense, as between soul and body; between two objects of the intellect, as between God and an Angel. We find that beginning includes the efficient, formal, material, and final cause; that there is a mean between the subject and the predicate, as between man and animal; a mean of *mensuration* between the agent and that which is acted upon (thus love is the medium between the lover and that which is loved); and a medium of *extremities*, as a line between its two points. We find that there are three ends, the end of *privation*, the end of *termination*, the end of *perfection*. We find that Majority, Equality, and Minority may have place between substance and substance, between substance and accident, between accident and accident. This second figure, *T*, is subordinate to the first

Absolute Predicates.

Predicates of Relations.

Combination of the First and Second Figures.

figure, *A*. By the union of them science is acquired. The third figure introduces us to their combination. It consists of thirty-six chambers or compartments. The letters which have already been defined distinctly are united, BC, BD, BE; then CB, CD, CE, and so on; expressing in their combination a vast number of predications which are to serve as the next step in our logical education.

The fourth Figure.

The fourth figure introduces us into a wider exercise of the intellect. Three circles are revolving within each other: in tracing their revolutions, we learn the interdependence of all those principles which have been previously brought out, upon each other; our study has become more intricate, but also more harmonious and more available for practice.

Definitions.

108. Then follow a set of definitions not very numerous, in reference to the nine principles of A. Among them stands conspicuous the doctrine that Good is Being, Evil not Being, which most of the schoolmen, whether Dominicans or Franciscans, assumed almost as a starting point of philosophy.

Questions.

Next we have the ten possible questions, Whether a thing is? What it is? Whence it is? Why it is? How great it is? Of what kind it is? When it is? Where it is? How it is, and With what it is? After this we discuss the mode of working out the third figure, and the mode of multiplying or spreading into different applications the fourth. Next we come to the nine subjects of which anything can be predicated; God, Angels, Heaven, Man, the imaginative principle, the sensitive principle, the negative, the elementary, the instrumental. Our former inquiries have given us so much aid in clearing up the whole method of reasoning, that we can now proceed to the investigation of each of these subjects, and may understand how they are related to each other, and how the higher is implied in the lower.

Subjects.

109. We cannot go at large into these subjects, but we may glean a sentence here and there which will illustrate the mind, if not the art, of Lully.

Man.

Man is more general than any other created being.

Heaven.

He is the greater part of the world. *Heaven*, we are told, is the first invisible substance. Its motion is its end and rest. It has natural goodness, magnitude, and duration.

The Imagination.

The *Imaginative* faculty abstracts species from those things which are perceived by the particular senses. It has the power of magnifying (*e.g.*, of creating a golden mountain), and of minifying (*e.g.*, of conceiving a point without parts or magnitude). It has an instinct of its own, just as a kid has an instinct to avoid a wolf. The principles of Vegetative life are more condensed than the principles of Sensitive life; and the principles of Sensation than those of Imagination. What Elementation is we shall learn better from another Treatise. There is no part of the *Ars Brevis* in which we feel so utterly at a loss as this. Why

these nine subjects should be considered satisfactory and exhaustive we are unable to pronounce. Occasionally we fancy we have a glimpse of their order and interdependence, but we lose it again. We dare not assume how far Heaven, according to Lully, was sensible or spiritual, or both or neither; we only presume, from its "natural goodness," that it must have something to do with personal being, or with moral objects; but we are not the least sure. We would willingly allow the author to be at a loss on this question, as so many have been, and to make it the business of his philosophy to search it out. But we are afraid the Universal Art will tolerate no such allowances. If all things can be demonstrated there is no breathing room for discussion.

Questions which Lully's Method excites.

110. The 100 intellectual formulas which Lully devises for the purpose of connecting these subjects with the intellect, and the various questions which he propounds in reference to them, give us a great feeling of the vivacity of his mind, and of its power of sustaining itself against a weight of system by which most minds would have been crushed. In his conclusion he declares that his Art has three friends: to wit, Subtlety of Intellect, Reason, and Good Intention. Without these, no one, he affirms, can learn it.

Lully's three Friends.

With respect to the first, we may be permitted to doubt whether Lully possessed it in anything like the same degree as some men of his time; certainly he could stand no comparison with Duns Scotus. With Reason, if by that is understood a pertinacious desire to find a reason for everything, or to make one, he was most liberally endowed. If it implies a capacity of looking into principles and ends, we should hesitate before we applied it to him;—he was too often entangled in the machinery of his art to be in a condition of competency for seeing clearly that which is independent of all art.

His good intention.

But good intention he had a right to claim in a high, almost in a supreme, measure. And this great gift glorified his intellect; glorified even what would else have been mere technical refinement. He might have been a better philosopher if he had not always been seeking for middle terms with which to confound the Saracens. But, on the other hand, his eagerness to convert them made him feel that nothing was good, except as it contributed to the elucidation and discovery of fixed and eternal verities.

Faith and Reason.

It made him impatient of the thought that anything could ever be true for faith, which was not true for reason. At first we may be startled to hear a maxim on which the stamp of heresy is often affixed, connected with a man of even supercilious orthodoxy. But these contradictions are not rare in the Middle Ages, or in any ages. The opinion that what may be quite true under one name is quite false under another was intolerable to Raymond. He found it prevalent in the University of Paris. The Averroists, he complains, had gained

Paris. The Averroists.

a complete ascendency over Catholic doctors. None thought it was any harm to hold a doctrine which had been imported from the Mahometan schools, provided he could pass it as an intellectual opinion, and could keep his faith for other uses. There might, we suppose, be much good practice and even sincere belief amongst those who used this language. But a man who had been all his life exercised in finding an intellectual weapon for propagating the faith, was not likely to regard them with much toleration; and it is without surprise that we hear him meditating the entire overthrow of such compromisers. He always designed to fight Mahometanism on Christian ground as well as in its native dominions; here he had a field prepared for the purpose.

Duo decim Principia Philosophiæ quæ et Lamentatio et expostulatio Philosophiæ contra Averroistas dici possunt Opera Raymundi, Argent, 1617, pp. 112-147.

111. He was aroused to the combat by a very august personage. He had strayed, it appears, out of the city of Paris with two companions, who perhaps were never much attached to that locality, Contrition and Satisfaction. Raymond and these ladies were mourning together over the degeneracy of the world, under a certain tree in a very delicious meadow, when they found that they were not alone in their grief Listening to the songs of the birds, and apparently deriving some consolation from them, as well as from the shadow of the tree and the sight of a beautiful fountain hard by, stood Philosophy with twelve attendants. She was complaining piteously of the Averroists who had spread cruel reports about her which had divided her from Theology, whose handmaid she had always believed herself to be. She does not speak merely for herself. She can appeal to her twelve principles, whether this is not the light in which they always regarded her. Eleven of these, to wit, Form, Matter, Generation, Corruption, Elementation, Vegetation, Sense, Imagination, Will, and Memory instantly express their assent. *Intellect* remains silent. On being directly appealed to, he declares that he is wholly perplexed and perverted. Paris is his dear and proper home. There his light ought to shine with especial brightness. But it is so dimmed with the errors of philosophy, that all power—even the power of breathing, has forsaken him. He and his mistress seem entirely agreed about the only feasible remedy. Our readers may be at a loss to guess it. Their help lies in the most Christian King, Philip the Fair! To this king, Intellect would resort as his defender, for all Parisians talk of the Intellect; to him Philosophy would go, because she has heard of his great zeal, and faith, and charity. But who shall carry her petition to the throne? other religious and literary men have failed her; will Raymond undertake the cause?

Her Companions.

Philip the Fair.

The Speeches.

112. That our advocate may be furnished with his brief, the twelve Principles come before him and deliver their testimony in turn. The doctrine which all aim to express and illustrate is, that there is one Goodness, Greatness, Eternity, Power, Wisdom,

Will, Virtue, Truth, Glory, Perfection, Justice, and Piety, presupposed in all their functions and exercises; of which they cannot be the authors and producers; to which they, and Philosophy, their mistress, alike do homage; on which she bestows her golden crown, though each of them may have a silver crown. Having this general purpose, it behoves each of the twelve to show how each is related to the other, and to her. We must, we fear, commit various blunders of sex in speaking of these personages. Raymond describes them generally as ladies, but when he comes to Intellect, he is naturally puzzled. *Our* puzzle begins sooner. *Form* should be feminine, and yet there is a very masculine tone about the speech. In the course of it, she or he says: "I am the likeness of God, Matter is the *un*likeness. It follows that I am more good, great, durable, intelligible, loveable, true, perfect and glorious than Matter; therefore I can act more upon Matter, than Matter can suffer from me. That *more* dwells in me potentially; it cannot be brought into act by reason of the incapacity for it in Matter." This language may sound disparaging. But when Matter takes up the argument, she sufficiently justifies her own dignity and position without claiming what has been denied her. "I," she says, "am *passively* good, great; powerful, virtuous. I am the potency of iron to become a sword; of Grammar, in one who is not a Grammarian. . . . . God can act by my nature or above my nature, that his own great power, and infinite virtue, and infinite liberty may be made known." *Generation* follows at great length, and with much learning, claiming a high function in vegetable natures, animal natures, and finally in moral virtues. "Justice is a habit (saith Generation), implied in the just doing of the just man, and it is brought by me, first into potency, secondly into act." The like is affirmed of Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, Hope, Charity. *Corruption* announces herself boldly and eloquently as the contradictory of generation, and traces her influence in all the subjects treated of by the previous speaker. *Elementation* declares herself to be a natural virtue proceeding from elementary forms as well substantial as accidental. She is constituted of the four *substantial* elements, Earth, Air, Fire, and Water, together with the four qualities, Warmth, Cold, Moisture, Dryness. *Vegetation* speaks of herself as that in virtue of which any plant grows and brings forth. "I have," she says, "an instinct in me whereby each particular rose in a rosary acquires its own special figure, leafage, colour, odour. These come from me as much as the figure, leafage, and colour of painted roses proceed from the intellect of the painter." *Sensation* then explains with much subtlety *her* function; how it cannot be understood alone in the things seen, heard, tasted, or alone in the sense of hearing, seeing, tasting; how the organ of sense implies a sense to use it; how a common sense is implied in each

Their general object.

The discourse of Form.

Of Matter.

Of Generation.

Of Corruption.

Of Elementation.

Of Vegetation.

Of Sensation.

particular sense; how all its senses imply that which is above themselves. *Imagination* shows how she is connected with Sense, how she too is not subject to Sense, how she abstracts from Sense. *Motion* declares himself to be that virtue by which latent heat passes into actual warmth, by which smoke ascends, water descends, &c. *Intellect* observes, in the course of his able apology, "It is my condition to be busy in collecting species, in distinguishing, harmonizing, opposing. By accident, therefore, I may be strongly positive. I may demand belief. There is a time when I am occupied with opinions, and doubts, and am restless. My toil may issue in a true or a false conclusion. If it is true, I am at peace: if it is false, ignorance becomes a habit with me." *Intellect* observes further, "In two methods I produce science; the first method is by Sense and Imagination, from inferior things, as in the liberal, mechanical, and moral arts; the other is altogether different—through God, and through separate substances (substances unmixed with accidents). Both inferior and superior science I create by applying tests of possibility and impossibility. But these tests I can use more loftily and securely in reference to the superior than to the inferior. I know that God with His goodness and greatness *must* do well and greatly. I know that He cannot do ill. I confess that God is a higher object than I can take in. His goodness and greatness are intelligible by themselves. Even intrinsic and extrinsic actions are more intelligible in that way than by my exercises, seeing that He is a superior power, I an inferior. But with the inferior science, which comes into existence through the Sense and Imagination, it is not so. For seeing I am spiritual, I am more disposed and prepared to understand the superior than that the Sense and Imagination which partake of corporeity should be sufficient for me." WILL speaks next. There is a fraternal bond between Intellect and Will. They demand the same object; neither can be satisfied without the other. Will produces love, as Intellect produces science by the Sense and Imagination, when dealing with lower things, participant of body: in another method, when seeking fellowship with the Divine Will and Reason. Will is subject to the same kind of peril as the Intellect. It may embrace an evil object, and become evil; it may rest in a good object and be satisfied. Moral goodness in man, is the choice of good by the Will; moral evil is the choice of evil by the Will. Will declares itself to be higher and more spiritual than Sense and Imagination; to be at once optative and imperative, inasmuch as it bids the Intellect and Memory desire that which they desire. *Memory* says it belongs to her by nature to recollect; by accident to forget. She is in a direct relation to Intellect and Will; they work together; their union is the evidence that the soul is immortal. She takes the species that are given to her by the Intellect and Will. How

Of Imagination.

Of Motion.

Of Intellect.

Science of that which is above, and of that which is below the Intellect.

Of Will.

Of Memory.

essentially goodness is implied in her nature and being appears from this,—If the Intellect and Will bid her recall the name of a man, she is often at a loss; but if she can recover some good deed done by the man, something which takes hold of the heart, then the probability is very great that she shall be able to do their bidding, and to find the title which had been lost. The conclusion of Raymond's book is not one in which nothing is concluded. We are assured that he and philosophy, and her twelve Principles actually obtained an audience of the king; that the king, because he was humble, true, and devout, received what they spoke benignantly, and was evidently much moved. He left Raymond and the ladies confident that he would do some useful work.

Conclusion.

113. Raymond may well terminate a sketch of Middle Age Philosophy which Boethius commenced. The same lady who visited the Roman statesman in his cell met the Spanish devotee as he was musing in his meadow. She came to the first as a guide and judge; to the other, as a mourner and a petitioner for help. She was cheering the one against the injuries of kings; the other she was conjuring to ask the aid of a king for her protection. The first she pointed to the letter on her vest, which told her of a higher Teacher to which she could lead him, and of which as yet he was ignorant. To the latter she complained that her ministries to that higher Teacher had been interrupted and that they had been changed into rivals. The comparison is curious, and suggests many thoughts of what has been passing in the busy interval between the 5th century and the 14th. Other portions of Raymond's work and life lead to the same reflection. The struggle of Christian and Saracen has been *the* struggle of the Middle Ages. From the hour when Mahomet returned from his exile, a monarch and a conqueror, to the hour in which Louis IX. breathed out his noble soul on the African coast, it had been a battle for life and death, with actual swords and spears. The best and holiest men, recluses who lived only for the unseen world, like Bernard of Clairvaux—righteous Kings who cared for the well-being of their subjects, and would not willingly spill their blood, like St. Louis,—yet felt that wars for the Sepulchre were the bonds of Christian faith and fellowship; the securities against the indifference which would cause all moral energies to rust. That day was past. The Divine sentence had gone forth against the bravest of all these enterprises, undertaken by the best and most single-minded of all the champions that had worn the Cross. The clergy and the people of the 13th century who, in a former age, would have cried with all their hearts, "God wills it," had begun, in audible murmurs, loud sometimes as well as deep, to declare that the religious wars had become a pretext to Popes for irreligious and dishonest extortion. And now came forth our Lully,

Boethius and Raymond.

Relation of Philosophy to Theology.

Christians and Mahometans.

The new warfare.

to avouch that a divine art, taught him in the hills, and monasteries, for learning Arabic, and, what is more than both, a bold proclamation by a man of that which he believes and for which he is ready to die, will conquer the Saracens better than the hosts of the West. It is a great change—the sign that other changes have taken place—or are at hand.

The Pope and the King.

114. One of them which has been hinted at, we might be less prepared for. How comes Philip the Fair, the overthrower and enemy of Popes, to be the champion whom Raymond and Philosophy seek in their deep distress? Of old, religious men fled from those whom they called civil Tyrants, to the Spiritual Rulers. By the one they expected that all thoughts concerning the invisible would be scorned; the others were the natural protectors of intellectual force as opposed to material, especially when that intellectual force, as in Raymond's treatise, renders such willing and eager homage to Faith. Philip certainly was no paragon of monarchs; in nearly every respect he was the very reverse of that predecessor, who was canonized, and deserved to be canonized. Philosophy was not happy in her choice of a patron. But experience had taught her votaries that, whatever was earnest and strong, might *possibly* find sympathy from those who were doing the work of the world, but could expect only rebuffs, indifference, or positive obstructions from the chair which some held to be the chair of St. Peter, and by some of Simon Magus. Raymond did not turn to Philip till he had tried the Popes.

Louis IX., and Philip the Fair

The Divina Commedia.

Dante's treatment of Popes and their enemies.

115. There was another far grander spirit than Raymond's which was passing at the same time through a very similar crisis. Dante Alighieri was changed from a Guelph into a Ghibelline. Dante Alighieri, the most earnest Theologian of his time, found the persecuted Manfred in Purgatory, and some Popes in one of the hopeless circles of the world below. Yet no one more thoroughly honoured the founders of the Mendicant Orders. The Dominican Aquinas in the Paradiso, celebrates the praises of St. Francis. He himself proved his claim to be the Angelic Doctor by untying, there as here, the most complicated knots of the intellect. But the poet who listened with delight to these solutions is the poet of Florence and of Italy; the transcendental Metaphysician never for an instant forgets the sorrows of the actual world in which he is living; the student sustains the patriot. Drenched in the school lore, it is still the vulgar eloquence—the speech of the people that is dear to him. Virgil is his Master, because Virgil was a Mantuan, and sang of Italy. And neither Theology, Politics, nor the study of ancient Song, crushes the life of the individual man. Fervent human love was the commencement to the poet of a new life. Through the little child of nine years old he rises to the contemplation of the Divine charity, which governs all things in heaven, and subdues earth to itself.

Of the Mendicant Orders.

His patriotism and love.

Reasons for choosing his time to make an epoch.

Indications of it.

116. Wise men of our own day have said that Dante embodies the spirit of the Mediæval time, and is a prophet of the time which followed. We testify our assent to that remark by accepting his poem, coeval as it is with the great judgment of the Papacy under Boniface, with the practical termination of the religious wars, and with the rise of a native literature, not only in the south but the north—as a better epoch from which to commence the new age of European thought, than the German Reformation of the 16th century. That we do not think less of that mighty event than those do who suppose that it winds up the scholastic period, we trust we shall be able to show hereafter. But its real importance for philosophy as well as humanity we think is imperfectly appreciated, when it is looked upon as a new starting point in the history of either. There is a danger also lest our northern and Teutonic sympathies, which ought to be very strong, which cannot be too strong if they do not lead us to forget that God is the King of the whole earth, may make us unmindful of the grand place which Italy has occupied, and we trust is one day again to occupy, in the annals of mankind. We have no disposition to set Thomas of Aquino above Albert the Suabian, or Roger Bacon of Ilchester; still less have we any disposition to exalt the 14th century above the 16th. But the Florentine poet may be taken as a hopeful augury that better things are in reserve for the 19th century than for either;—that in place of the false universalism which he felt inwardly to be an incubus upon his country and upon mankind—a true universal society—such as he longed for on earth, and had the vision of in heaven,—may yet include England, Germany, and Italy within its circle.

The North and the South.

The natural and the universal.