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NOTES
ON
THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

J. A. STEWART

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NOTE

ON THE

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

OF

ARISTOTLE

BY

J. A. STEWART, M.A.


STUDENT AND TUTOR OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD

VOLUME I


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PREFACE

In the following *Notes* I quote the text of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as it is given in Mr. Bywater's Edition (Clarendon Press, 1890); and it is to be understood that I approve Mr. Bywater's readings and punctuation throughout, except in the (comparatively few) places where I express doubt or dissent.

Mr. Bywater's *Contributions to the Textual Criticism of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Clarendon Press, 1892) unfortunately did not appear till the first four Books of my *Notes* were already in print; but in preparing the subsequent Books for the press I have taken account of the explanations and valuable suggestions contained in this brochure.

To Prof. Susemihl's critical edition of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, not to mention his edition of the *Eudemian Ethics* and his edition of the *Moralia Magna*, I am deeply indebted. On almost every page of these *Notes* I have to acknowledge something which I owe to Prof. Susemihl's industry and suggestive treatment of the text.

Before leaving the subject of the text, I ought perhaps to apologize for pretty often referring to the readings of certain inferior manuscripts—Cambr., CCC, NC, B¹, B², B³—which I happen to have examined. I quote these readings, not as being valuable in themselves, but—sometimes as enabling me to illustrate from my own observation the operation of causes which we have to take account of in

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estimating the readings of the important manuscripts—sometimes simply as not having been hitherto published. So far as the problem of establishing the text of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is directly concerned, Mr. Bywater is undoubtedly right in leaving as our recognised sources K^b and L^b, with r and Aspasius.

These volumes contain only 'Notes.' I have not written 'Introductory Essays,' partly because the brilliant and instructive 'Essays' contained in the First Volume of Grant's *Ethics* hold the field—partly, and chiefly, because I think that junior students—to whom I hope these *Notes* may be useful—can master the *Ethics* only by fighting their way through the problems and difficulties of the Treatise, as these start up—sometimes for the first time, sometimes again under altered forms—in the Greek text itself.

Having, for these reasons, dispensed with 'Introductory Essays,' I have been obliged to make a good many of the 'notes' somewhat long; and being anxious that every important passage, as it occurred, should there and then impress the student with its full weight—its weight being often the weight of Aristotle's whole Philosophy brought to bear through some technical term—I have not been very careful to avoid repetitions.

The quotations from other works of Aristotle, and from Plato, have been printed in full, in order that the junior student may be able to read conveniently, within the limits of these volumes, what he certainly must read, if he is to understand the *Ethics* in a concrete way as part of Aristotle's entire Philosophy.

In writing the 'arguments' I have allowed myself considerable liberty. In some cases it seemed that the student would be best introduced to the particular context by an epitome, in some cases by a paraphrase and explanation, in other cases again by a more or less free translation.

In composing the 'notes' I have of course had a great

mass of material to draw upon in the works of the many scholars, ancient and modern, who have commented on the *Ethics*. The Greek Scholiasts—Aspasius (*Heylbut*, 1889), the Paraphrast Heliodorus¹ (*Heinsius* and *Heylbut*), Eustratius, Michael Ephesius, and the other Scholiasts printed in the Aldine Collection² (1536)—I have used carefully throughout; and among the modern commentators I owe much, in different ways, to Zell (1820), Coraes³ (1822), Michelet (1848), Fritzsche (for v, vi, vii—1851, and viii, ix—1847), Grant (last edition, 1885), Ramsauer (1878), and Jackson (for v—1879).

My largest debt is to Grant, whose *Ethics* I wish to mention here with the greatest respect, as an edition the value of which has steadily grown on me. For help, indeed, in certain classes of detail difficulties, I have had most often to turn to other authorities; but no other edition have I found so fertile in philosophical suggestions. These suggestions, I would remark, are to be found in unobtrusive notes, as well as in the Introductory Essays.

I must not omit to acknowledge my indebtedness to the modern translators—Stahr, Williams, and Peters—especially to the last. Here and there I have felt bound to say that I do not agree with a rendering given by Mr. Peters; but his Translation, taken as a whole, I have found an able and trustworthy assistant.

¹ We seem to have no good reason for believing that this was his name: see L. Cohen in the *Berl. philolog. Wochenschr.* Nov. 9, 1889, p. 1419, and cf. Val. Rose in *Hermes*, vol. ii. p. 212.

For the Greek Scholiasts on the *E.N.* generally, see Val. Rose, *Hermes*, vol. v. pp. 61 sqq. *über die griechischen Commentare zur Ethik des Aristoteles*; and cf. Bywater in *Hermes*, vol. v. pp. 354 sqq.

² This collection is composed as follows according to Rose (*Hermes*, vol. v, article referred to in foot-note above)—Book I Eustratius, II–IV Anonymus, V Michael Ephesius, VI Eustratius, VII Anonymus rec., VIII Aspasius, IX–X Michael Ephesius.

³ For the circumstances attending the publication of this interesting edition see ΑΔΑΜΑΝΤΙΟΣ ΚΟΡΑΗΣ *ἔπι* Δ. ΘΕΡΕΙΑΝΟΥ (Trieste, 1890), vol. iii. pp. 47 sqq.

My separate debts to predecessors I have tried to acknowledge in all cases as they were contracted; but it may well be that, in annotating a Treatise on which there are so many Commentators, I have sometimes put down, from ignorance or forgetfulness, as my own, what ought to have been credited to another.

There is one writer, not yet mentioned, to whom I wish to express special indebtedness. Dr. Rassow's *Forschungen über die Nicomachische Ethik* (1874) have been always before me in writing these *Notes*. I suppose all who know Dr. Rassow's little work will agree entirely with me when I say that very few works of the kind contain so much valuable matter in such small space. It would be a great gain if the *Forschungen*—a model of critical method—were made more accessible by means of an English translation.

It is not necessary to refer here, except generally, to the assistance—acknowledged in detail—which I have derived from the editors of other works of Aristotle, and from the editors of other authors, quoted in these *Notes*.

In conclusion—a few lines about 'interpolations,' 'dislocations,' and 'duplicate passages.' The subject is an interesting one, and I have touched it in some of my notes on Book v and Book vii, in connexion with the views of Dr. Jackson and Prof. Cook Wilson—also in other notes referring to the views of Dr. Rassow; but it properly lies beyond the scope of these volumes, which aim chiefly at helping readers of the *Ethics* to get hold of the philosophical doctrine of the Treatise. I feel sure that the scholars just mentioned agree with me in thinking that the philosophical doctrine, in its broad outlines and more important details, stands out with such evidence and actuality, that it is impossible to conceive our view of it as having to be appreciably altered in consequence of discoveries which may hereafter be made as to the condition of the text before the age of Andronicus. To take up the subject of 'interpolations,

dislocations, and duplicate passages'—even if I had been competent to do so—would therefore have been beside the aim of these *Notes* as concerned with the philosophical doctrine of the *Ethics*. Of course it would be a matter of extraordinary *philological* interest, if an Egyptian papyrus were found, old enough to decide for, or against, the ingenious speculations of the modern *χαρξίστες*.

The Index added to these *Notes* does not profess to be complete. It is designed mainly to help the student by bringing together selected notes on some of the more important topics. To find his way in the Greek text, the student must turn to Mr. Bywater's Index.

J. A. STEWART.

July, 1892.

MANUSCRIPTS

K^b = cod. Laurent. 81. 11 (10th cent.).

L^b = cod. Par. 1854 (12th cent.).

M^b = cod. Marc. 213 (15th cent.).

N^b = cod. Marc. append. iv. 53 (14th cent.).

O^b = cod. Riccard. 46 (14th cent.).

H^a = cod. Marc. 214 (14th cent.).

P^b = cod. Vat. 1342 (14th or 13th cent.).

Γ = Vetusta translatio (13th cent.).

Cambr. = University Library 1879 I i. v. 44: the Eliensis of Wilkinson, Zell, and Michelet, the O² of Susemihl (13th cent.).

CCC = Library of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, 112: the O¹ of Susemihl (15th cent.).

NC = Library of New College, Oxford 227: the O² of Susemihl (15th cent.).

B¹ = Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 14080 (15th cent.).

B² = Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 6790 (15th cent.).

B³ = Brit. Mus. Royal MS. 16 C. xxi (16th cent.).

Par. 1853 = Bibl. Nat. Paris: (part containing E. N. 15th cent.).

[For Bekker's MSS. of the *E. N.* see Susemihl, *Die Bekkerschen Hss. der N. E. Neue Jahrbücher für Philol.* 1878, p. 625 sqq.; and Bywater's *Contributions to the Textual Criticism of Aristotle's Nic. Eth.* For the English MSS. of the *E. N.* see *Anecdota Oxon.*, Classical series, vol. i. part 1. For Γ, the Vet. tr., see Newman's *Politics*, vol. ii. pp. xli sqq.]

CORRIGENDA

- Vol. I, p. 5, foot-note, *read καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός.*
 „ „ 81, thirteenth line from top, *for 'is used' read 'is used.'*
 „ „ 169, heading of note on § 2, *read ἀρετῶν.*
 „ „ 329, tenth line of note on § 2, *read ἀρχιτέκνος.*
 „ „ 496, ninth line from top, *for 'whole section' read 'clause.'*
 „ „ 496, tenth line from top, *for οὐ φέσει read μέντοι πάν.*
 „ II, p. 133, heading of note on 1146 a. 22 *read παράδοξα ἐλέγχεν.*
 „ „ 148, top line, *for 'acts also against his consciously realised knowledge of the including universal' read 'at the same time consciously realises the including universal.'*
 „ „ 178, sixth line from top, *for 'in' read 'is.'*
 „ „ 181, fourth line of note on a. 3, *read ἀκρατής.*
 „ „ 264, sixth line from top, *for 'imply' read 'implies.'*
 „ „ 295, seventh and eighth lines of note on a. 26, *for ἔτι καὶ αὐτοῖς read καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς.*

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

Every art, every science, every action, every act of choice, aims at some good. Hence they have well defined The Good as 'the end which all things aim at.' But ends differ. Sometimes our end is the mere performance of a function; sometimes, something substantive beyond the performance of the function—in which case the something substantive is 'better than,' i.e. is the raison d'être of the function by which it is produced.

There are as many ends as there are arts, sciences, and forms of action. There are certain leading arts, sciences, and forms of action, under which certain other arts, sciences, and forms of action group themselves in various grades of subordination. The end of a leading art, science, or form of action is always more choiceworthy than the ends of the subordinate arts, sciences, or forms of action belonging to the group. Thus Generalship is an art, whose end, 'victory,' is more choiceworthy than 'riding,' the end of the subordinate art of horsemanship; as 'riding,' in its turn, is more choiceworthy than 'the bridle,' the end of the still more subordinate art of bridle-making. This example shows that an art whose end is, and an art whose end is not, a substantive product may belong to the same group of subordinate arts. A bridle is a substantive product, riding is the mere performance of a function; but the art of bridle-making and the art of horsemanship both fall under the same leading art.

§ 1. πᾶσα κ.τ.λ.] Eustratius, and other commentators after him, 1094 a. 1. have noted that many of Aristotle's great philosophical treatises begin with a universal proposition. In the universal the cause is contained (*An. Post.* i. 24. 85 b. 26 τὸ δὲ καθόλου πρῶτον αἴτιον ἄρα τὸ καθόλου): science explains things by their causes (*An. Post.* i. 2. 71 b. 9 ἐπιστάμεθα δὲ οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον ἀπλῶς. . . . ὅταν τὴν τ' αἰτίαν οἰόμεθα γινώσκων δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐστίν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστίν, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν); hence the propriety of beginning a scientific treatise with a universal proposition, rather than with a particular statement. The opening words of the *Politics* are ἐπειδὴ

1094 a. 1. *pāsan pōlun órōmen koinōnían twà oúsan, kai pāsan koinōnían áγαθοῦ twós êneken sunestēkaián (toῦ γάρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος áγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δήλον ὅς πάσαι μὲν áγαθοῦ twós στοχάζονται: the *Metaphysics* begin—*pántes ánthropoi toῦ εἶδέναι δρέγονται φύσει: the *Post. Anal.* begin—*pāsa didaskalía kai pāsa máthēsis diánohtikḗ ek prōuparchoúsēs gínetai gnōseōs: similarly, the treatise *de Partibus Anim.* and the *Physics* begin with universal propositions. On the other hand the later *Eudemian Ethics* begin as Grant says (*Ethics: essay i. vol. i. p. 23*) ‘without any scientific preface, but rather in the form of a literary essay, with the sentence: “In the temple of the God at Delos some one . . . has inscribed the following verses on the vestibule of the shrine of Latona.”’***

The exordium of the *E.N.* (taken in connexion with the similar exordia of the *Politics*, *Metaphysics*, *Posterior Analytics*, and other treatises mentioned) thus indicates, by its form, the logical method which Aristotle regarded as proper to ‘a scientific treatise.’ Demonstrative science in the strict sense (*ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη—ἡ ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος An. Post. i. 2. 71 b. 20*) is possible, indeed, only in the regions of metaphysics and mathematics, where the mind confronts truths which are abstract (*ἀνευ ὄλης*), eternal (*αἰδία*), and necessary (*μη ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως εἶχειν*). In these regions principles are apprehended by the eye in diagrams, or by the mind’s eye in speculation, with perfect clearness and distinctness, and consequences are evidently seen to flow necessarily from principles¹. In the concrete enquiries, on the other hand, of the natural and moral sciences, there is no such clearness of principles, or evident consequence of conclusions. *Health, Liberty, Temperance, Utility*, and all other ‘mixed modes,’ as Locke would call them, in themselves as principles, and in their relations to their consequences, stand on a very different footing from an intuition like that of *circle*, and a law of thought like that of *contradiction*. Yet, in his concrete enquiries, Aristotle is so far influenced by the analogy of *ἐπιστήμη*, in the strict sense, that he constantly refers his most particular observations to general principles of a highly abstract and formal character, and often symbolises the primary importance of these principles by the position which he assigns to them at the beginning of an enquiry, as if to show that the conclusions

¹ On space intuition as the ground of apodeictic science, see Lange, *Logische Studien*, p. 9 sqq.

reached in the enquiry flow from these principles, as the geometer’s 1094 a. 1. conclusions flow from the visualised definitions, or diagrams, which he posits as his starting-points. This penchant for the ‘geometrical method’ in concrete enquiry sometimes leads Aristotle far astray, where ‘verification’ does not force itself upon him, as it does in *Ethics* and *Politics*.

So much for the general logical significance of the exordium of the *Ethics*, as one of a class. Its special logical significance in relation to the Treatise which it introduces may now be indicated.

The cause assumed in this section is the Final Cause; and the leading doctrines of the Treatise may be shown to follow as conclusions from the universal proposition in which this cause is assumed.

The good which every being, consciously or unconsciously, strives to realise is not something external to itself (*χωριστόν* i. 6. 13), but *its own* good (cf. i. 5. 4 *τάγαθὸν δ’ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσσάφαιρον εἶναι μαντεύμεθα*), the perfection of its own nature, whatever that may be. The oak, which, springing from the acorn, grows according to the law of its nature, and becomes a perfect tree, realises the end of its existence, and attains ‘its own good.’ The final cause of an organism cannot be distinguished from the organism itself at its best. The final cause, or good, of the tree is the tree itself. Hence, for the term *good*, we may substitute the term *existence*. All beings, Aristotle might have said, struggle for existence according to their kinds. *Φύσις*, which in its strict sense is biological law—the law determining the growth of organised beings, is antagonistic to the *ἄπειρον*, or that which is indefinite and shapeless: see *περὶ ζῳῶν γενέσεως* i. 1. 715 b. 14 *ἡ δὲ φύσις φεύγει τὸ ἄπειρον τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄπειρον ἀτελές, ἡ δὲ φύσις αἰεὶ ζητεῖ τέλος*. The *φύσις* of the acorn produces the oak, and only the oak, an organism realising a definite shape, or *πέρας*, in which no one part, or function, is developed out of due proportion¹. Such an

¹ Cf. *de Part. Anim.* i. 1. 641 b. 25 *ὥστ’ εἶναι φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν, φύσιν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν ἐξ ἐκάστου γίνεται σπέρματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐκ τοῦδε, οὐδὲ σπέρμα τὸ τυχόν ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος σπέρματος· ἀρχὴ ἄρα καὶ ποιητικὸν τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ σπέρμα· φύσει γὰρ ταῦτα· φύεται γοῖν ἐκ τούτου. Cf. *Met.* Δ. 16. 1021 b. 21 *ἐκαστον τότε τέλειον, καὶ ἡ οὐσία πᾶσα τότε τελεία, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μηδὲν ἐλλείπη μέρων τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους. Cf. Themistius on the *Physics*, vol. i. pp. 170, 171 (ed. Spengel)—τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τούτέστιν ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι. παράδειγμα δὲ εἶπον οὐχ ὅς οἱ πᾶς ιδέας λέγοντες αὐτό τι καθ’ αὐτὸ ὑφ’ ἑστώως καὶ χωριστόν εἶδος, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ὄρισται τὸ εἶδος ἐκάστου τῶν ὑπὸ φύσεως γινομένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἵππου**

1094 a. 1. organism is essentially itself, containing in itself its own ἀρχή and τέλος, i.e. growing in its own way, and for its own sake¹. In these respects natural organisms differ from the products of workmanship (τέχνη), which have an external ἀρχή—are shaped by another, and for some end towards which they are merely means. A house exists for the sake of those who inhabit it, but a plant or animal exists for its own sake. Τέχνη is accordingly related to the good in a very different manner from that in which φύσις is related to the good. Τέχνη is a means towards the attainment of the good, whereas φύσις is the realisation of the good. Now, since the subject of the *Ethics* is the Life of Man at its best (τὸ εὖ ζῆν), it is easy to understand that the relation of φύσις, rather than that of τέχνη, to the Good will be present to Aristotle's mind throughout the Treatise. Human life at its best is no mere device, or means, adopted by man for the sake of something beyond itself and better. The εὐδαίμων lives, and there is nothing better than his life. His nature is a λόγος, or organism, ὁρθός, balanced in all its parts, and containing, like the nature of a tree, its own ἀρχή and τέλος within itself—freely initiating functions, in the performance of which it treats itself 'always as an end and never merely as a means.' So far, there seems to be no essential difference between the Tree and the Man: the λόγος, or organism, of each affirms itself. Whether the fact that in the man the self-affirmation takes the form of *consciousness* of self makes an essential difference, is a question which need not be discussed here. As it is, the εὐδαίμων, in affirming himself, *knows himself*—takes a survey of human nature as an εἶδος, or organic whole, consisting of mutually related parts and tendencies.

But why related as they are, and not otherwise? Because 'it is best' that they should be so related—because 'Deus sive Natura' requires them to be so related. Hence the complete knowledge of human nature, as an εἶδος, requires a knowledge of God, and demands θεωρία strictly so called, or the contemplation of that which

βοὸς ἐλαίας σικκῆς πλατάνου, καὶ ἡ ταῦτα δημιουργοῦσα ἀρχὴ μέχρι τοσοῦτου πρόξεισι κινῶσα τὴν ὕλην μέχρις οὗ τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο καὶ τὴν μορφήν τελείως ἐναρμόσει τῇ ὕλῃ.

¹ For its own sake as representative of an immortal type. As individual, it sacrifices itself to the perpetuation of this type: see Aspasius on this §—ἕκαστον γὰρ ἔγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως σπουδῇ ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδίαν τελειότητα ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτην ἄγεται διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο νενειμέναι, ὃ πάντων ἐστὶ τελειότατον (i.e. τὸ θεῖον).

is eternal. Accordingly, we find Aristotle defining εὐδαιμονία as 1094 a. 1. θεωρία τις (x. 8. 8). And this is the formal definition, not only of the εὐδαιμονία of the Thinker (the subject of the context in which this definition occurs), but also of that of the moral agent—ἡ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς: for the latter exists for the sake of the former, and must be defined in accordance with it. The city exists for the sake of its thinkers. A materially prosperous city without thinkers would be ἀτελής, like the body without the life. Political institutions and moral rules are what they are, because the end of the city is to be the home of a few thinkers. The moral life, which bulks so largely in the city, is τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ ἰποθέσεως in relation to the μορφή which the life of the thinkers—τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν—realises. Σοφίας ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει ἡ φρόνησις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνη (E. N. vi. 13. 8). Hence it is in the θεωρητικὸς βίος that the ultimate standard of all conduct is found. The ultimate ὄρος or σκοπός, according to which the moral μεσότης is fixed, is given not by the practical, but by the speculative reason. Without the speculative ideal of τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν (E. E. 1249 b. 20), or τὸ ἀθανατίζειν (E. N. x. 7. 8), man's moral life would be meaningless. Why should he restrain his desires for the mere sake of restraining them? Εὐδαιμονία, then, even when realised in the performance of moral actions, is θεωρία, or contemplation of the eternal: for the εἶδος of human nature, which must be known, if moral conduct is to be achieved, cannot be known except in view of its end—τὸ ἀθανατίζειν, τὸ τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν¹.

The ultimate good, then, which man seeks after is the consciousness of his own εἶδος as θεῖον. It is only the 'Thinker,' as such, in the θεωρητικὸς βίος, who has this consciousness clearly (see E. N. x. 8. 8). The morally excellent man, however, acts in a manner which would be inexplicable unless the εἶδος of Human Nature were such as the 'Thinker' is conscious of it. The morally excellent man may be said to have a practical, as dis-

¹ It is interesting to note that Plotinus (quite as much a Neo-Aristotelian as a Neo-Platonist: see Hegel, *Vorles. über die Gesch. d. Philos.* vol. 3, p. 9) actually describes as θεωρία τοῦ εἶδους the effort of plants and animals to preserve and perpetuate their various types (Enn. iii. 8, vol. i. 333 sqq. ed. Kirchhoff), just as Aristotle often describes it as a striving after τὸ δεῖ καὶ τὸ θεῖον. So also the *Scientia intuitiva* of Spinoza's wise man is a θεωρία of Human Nature *sub specie aeternitatis*, or as related to God. With *scientia intuitiva*, a man forms clear and distinct ideas of his passions, and so regulates them, just as the καλοκἀγαθός of Eudemos (E. E. H. 15) finds in his θεωρία of the Divine Nature, and of Human Nature as divine, the ὄρος τῶν μεσοτήτων.

1094 a. 1. distinguished from a speculative knowledge of it. He knows it as an *ὀρθὸς λόγος*, or organism maintaining itself with difficulty in an environment—liable to be disturbed by sensations and passions; and his ‘unconscious metaphysic’ consists in his strong *interest* in its maintenance, which causes him to reject the solicitations of the senses and passions, and ‘choose the mean,’ as the Practical Reason (acting in the service of the Speculative Reason) directs.

The morally inferior man, on the other hand, allows external influences to interfere with the steady operation of the internal organising principle of Reason. He allows himself to grow in this direction or that, out of due proportion (*παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*), in the interest of ends foreign to his nature, as an harmonious organism. He devotes himself to pleasure (*ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος*), or wealth (*χρηματιστικὸς βίος*), or social success (*τιμὴ*—see *E. N.* i. 5), objects which a turn of fortune may remove from his grasp, leaving him without any ‘good of his own.’ He fails in life, because he ‘makes himself a means and not an end.’

Thus from the Principle laid down in the first section of the *Ethics* the whole teaching of the Treatise may be deduced: that the Practical Life consists in the maintenance of the Mean, or organic balance, in action and feeling, for the sake of the Speculative Life, which is supreme, and furnishes the Practical Life with a *σκοπὸς*.

τέχνη] The habit or faculty of making (*ἔξις μετὰ λόγον ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ E. N.* vi. 4. 3). It is external to the thing made, and, as such, is distinguished from *φύσις*, which is an immanent formative principle (*Met. A.* 3. 1070 a. 7 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ: and cf. *E. N.* vi. 4. 4). Although *τέχνη* aims at the good in a very intelligible sense, its relation to it, as has been pointed out above, is not that in which Aristotle is concerned to show that the rational agent stands to his good. The rational life is not a process, producing beyond itself something which may perhaps in turn be employed for some further purpose; it is good and beautiful in itself, like an organism, and not useful as a means.

μέθοδος]: see the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant, and *Index Arist.* s. v. Literally it means ‘way to knowledge’: here it stands for ‘knowledge’ or ‘science’ itself (*ἐπιστήμη*).

πράξις] as used in the *Ethics* properly means ‘moral action’: cf. vi. 2. 2 ἡ αἴσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πρᾶξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πρᾶξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. *Πρᾶξις* expresses reason

(*λόγος*), or what the man is as an indivisible *εἶδος* or person, just as 1094 a. 1. the place of the hands on the dial at a given time expresses the whole mechanism of the clock. As such, *πράξις* is distinguished from reactions in immediate response to isolated stimuli of sense.

προαίρεσις] defined in *E. N.* iii. 3. 9 as *βουλευτικὴ ἄρεξις τῶν ἐφ’ α. 2. ἡμῖν*. It also is peculiar to man as possessing reason. It is the ‘choice’ of means to some end, the end being distinguished by reason from the pleasure of the moment—the object of *ἐπιθυμία*. It is good when it is the exponent of the whole man as perfectly apprehended by his reason; bad, when the end with which the agent ‘identifies his good’ falls short of being ‘the whole man,’ or is merely a phantastic image of him. Mere *ἐπιθυμία*, on the other hand, expresses only the reaction of the sensibility in relation to an isolated stimulus. It involves no conception of a *good*. Something is *pleasant* at the moment, and *ἐπιθυμία* rushes without reflection to the enjoyment of it. *Προαίρεσις* therefore, as implying the conception of an end different from present pleasure, is placed here with technical correctness in a list of faculties and functions which aim at ‘a good.’ Even ‘bad choice’ involves the notion, however imperfect, of ‘a good’: as Aspasius says *ad loc.* *καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μοχθηρὰ πράξεις καὶ μοχθηρὰ προαιρέσεις ἐφέσει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γίνονται, ἀλλὰ πεπληρωμένων τῶν πραττόντων ἢ προαιρουμένων*.

διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφῆγαντο τὰγαθὸν οὐδὲ πάντ’ ἐφίεται] cf. *E. N.* x. 2. 4 *οἱ δ’ ἐριστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ πάντ’ ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν*. Cf. *Rhet.* i. 6. 1362 a. 23 *ἔστω δὲ ἀγαθὸν ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα ἢ αἰρετὸν καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα ἄλλο αἰρούμεθα καὶ οὐ ἐφίεται πάντα ἢ πάντα τὰ αἰσθησιν ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἐκάστῳ ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἑκάστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἐκάστῳ, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθόν*. Cf. *Themistius, Περὶ Ψυχῆς*, fol. 92 (vol. ii. p. 208, ed. Spengel) *ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ αἴσθησις ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι οὐχ οἷα τε οὐδὲ κακοῦ, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοῦ τέρποντος ἢ ἀνιώντος, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦ νοῦ μόνον κρίνειν ἐστὶ*. But if *αἴσθησις* and *ἐπιθυμία*, as such, are not directed to ‘the good,’ how can the lower animals, which have only *αἴσθησις* and *ἐπιθυμία*, be said ‘to strive after the good’? Because their *αἰσθήσεις* and *ἐπιθυμίαι* have, like their protective colours and other bodily adaptations, assumed a definitely fixed character in relation to an orderly (i.e. rational) environment. Their organisms, which their *αἰσθήσεις* and *ἐπιθυμίαι* subserve, are embodiments of reason adequate to the conditions of the

1094 a. 2. environment in which they survive: cf. *E. N.* vii. 13. 6 οὐδ' ἠδοῖν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἠδοῖν μέντοι πάντες· ἕως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἦν οἴονται οὐδ' ἦν ἂν φαίεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν πάντα γὰρ φέσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. Man's ὀρέξεις conflict with his 'good,' because by his θεωρία he has risen into a sphere in which his merely animal adaptations are inadequate.

a. 3. § 2. Διαφορά . . .] There are two kinds of ends. Some are immanent, being identical with the ἐνέργεια, or functions, which constitute the essence, or perfect being, of the things of which they are said to be the ἐνέργεια. A physical organism, and the noble life, are ends of this first kind. Some ends, however, are not immanent, but exist beyond the functions or operations which produce them. The products of τέχνη are ends of this second kind. They continue to exist after the processes which have produced them have ceased; whereas a physical organism ceases to exist, as such, when its vital functions cease. The end of τέχνη is an ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Hence the ἐνέργεια, or operations as such, of τέχνη are said to be ἀτελεῖς, and are more properly called κινήσεις than ἐνέργεια. Cf. *Met.* Θ. 6. 1048 b. 28, &c. πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχυραῖα, μάθησις, βαδίσις, οἰκοδόμησις· αὐτὰ δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γὰρ· οὐ γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβαδίκει, οὐδ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ οἰκοδομηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν, ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηκεν· ἀλλ' ἔτερον καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται· ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὀρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκε. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν. Cf. *Met.* K. 9. 1066 a. 20 ἢ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τις, ἀτελής δέ. But *Life*, whether viewed as an organised system of various functions, or as mirrored in one high function such as sight or thought, is ἐνέργεια in the strict sense, *i. e.* contains its own end in itself. Such ἐνέργεια, as Aristotle puts it, 'resides in' that organism of which it is said to be the ἐνέργεια, being indeed identical with the οὐσία or εἶδος of the organism; whereas the so-called ἐνέργεια of the builder or weaver, *quā* builder or weaver, passes out into the house or web, which is 'better than' the builder or weaver, *quā* builder or weaver. See *Met.* Θ. 8. 1050 a. 23, &c. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἔσχατον ἢ χρῆσις, οἶον ὄψεως ἢ ὄρασις, καὶ οὐδὲν γίνεται παρὰ ταύτην ἕτερον ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως ἔργον· ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ γίνεται τι, οἶον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδομησῶν . . . ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἕτερον τί ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γινόμενον, τούτων μὲν ἢ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιούμενῳ ἐστίν, οἶον ἢ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ἢ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὕφανομένῳ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν

ἄλλον, καὶ ὅπως ἢ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ· ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλο τι 1094 a. 3. ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἵπάρχει ἢ ἐνέργεια· οἶον ἢ ὄρασις ἐν τῷ ὀρώντι καὶ ἢ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἢ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· διὸ καὶ ἢ εὐδαιμονία· ζωὴ γὰρ καὶ ποιὰ τις ἐστίν· ὥστε φανερόν ἐστι ἢ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν. With the doctrine of this passage we may compare Aristotle's theory of the relation of the ψυχή to the σῶμα. The ψυχή is the *function* of the σῶμα, its *form*, or *essence*. A dead body is a body only in an equivocal sense, as a marble hand is a hand. It is life which constitutes the body; and the living body does not exist for the sake of any end external to itself. See *De Anima*, ii. 1. 412 a. 19 ἀναγκαῖον ἔρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι, ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντες—and *Met.* H. 3. 1043 a. 35 ψυχὴ γὰρ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια σώματός τινος¹. As the whole body exists for the sake of, and is constituted by its life, so an organ like the eye, taken by itself, may be said to exist for the sake of, and be constituted by its special function—sight. The end, good, or being of the eye is sight. This end or good is not something which can exist apart from the eye; and an eye which does not see is not really an eye. Cf. *De Anima*, ii. 1. 412 b. 18 εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῶν, ψυχὴ ἂν αὐτῷ ἦν ἢ ὕψις· αὐτὴ γὰρ οὐσία ὀφθαλμοῦ ἢ κατὰ λόγον· ὁ δ' ὀφθαλμὸς ἔλη ὄψεως, ἢ ἀπολιπούσης, οὐκ ἐστὶν ὀφθαλμὸς, πλὴν ὁμοιῶνως, καθάπερ ὁ λίθινος καὶ γεγραμμένος. The noble life (εὐδαιμονία—τὸ εὖ ζῆν) is the function or ἐνέργεια of Human Nature as sight is of the eye.

§§ 3, 4] Τὸ εὖ ζῆν, the noble life, is the chief end of man, and all a. 6. his actions and pursuits are for the sake of this. But every one of these actions and pursuits has its own immediate end, which, in its turn, is a means to the end of some more comprehensive pursuit.

¹ Cf. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* third ed. p. 487 (Aristot.).—'Besteht nun das wahre Wesen jedes Dings in seiner Form, und das Wesen alles Gewordenen in seinem Zwecke, so wird diess auch von den lebenden Wesen gelten müssen. Jedes lebende Wesen ist eine kleine Welt, ein Ganzes, dessen Theile dem Zwecke des Ganzen als Werkzeuge zu dienen haben. (Phys. viii. 2. 252 b. 24 εἰ δ' ἐν ζωῷ τοῦτο δυνατόν γενέσθαι, τί κωλύει τὸ αὐτὸ συμβῆναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν; εἰ γὰρ ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ γίνεται, καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ). Jedes Werkzeug ist aber von der Verrichtung abhängig für die es bestimmt ist; der Körper ist mithin um der Seele willen da, und die Beschaffenheit jedes Körpers ist durch die seiner Seele bestimmt; (de part. animal. i. 5. 645 b. 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν ὄργανον πᾶν ἕνεκά του, τῶν δὲ τοῦ σώματος μέρων ἕκαστον ἕνεκά του, τὸ δ' οὐ ἕνεκα πράξις τις, φανερόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ σύνολον σῶμα ὑπεστήθηκε πράξεώς τινος ἕνεκα πλήρους . . . ὥστε καὶ τὸ σῶμα πᾶς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεκεν, καὶ τὰ μέρη τῶν ἔργων πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον. Cf. *Met.* vi. 10. 1035 b. 14.)'

1094 a. 6. We thus find in life many ἀρχιτεκτονικαὶ δυνάμεις, so called however in a relative sense only, because the ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ δύναμις *par excellence* is the art of living nobly. All other ends—Health, Wealth, Victory—are subordinate to, and good only in relation to the noble life. Although some of the special operations of man, such as walking, riding, dancing, differ from the τέχνη proper in not resulting in ἔργα or things made, still they resemble them in looking beyond themselves, as *e.g.* to health, business, or amusement. On the metaphor implied, in the use of the term ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ here, the Paraphrast has the following remarks: ἡ δὲ στρατηγικὴ ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ πρὸς αὐτὰς [*i.e.* ἵππικὴν κ.τ.λ.] καλεῖται δύναται γὰρ ὅτι ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων ἐν τοῖς τέκτονσι καθίπτε γὰρ ἐκείνος ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας ἐκείνα κελεύει ποιεῖν τοὺς τέκτοντας ἃ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο φέρει τὸ εἶδος, οὕτω καὶ ἡ στρατηγικὴ, καὶ εἴτις ἄλλη τοιαύτη, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου τέλους ταῖς ἄλλαις δίδωσι τοὺς κανόνας.

a. 10. § 4. δύναμιν] ‘faculty,’ in the sense in which we speak of the Faculty of Arts or Law at a University.

a. 11. χαλινοποιική] Accepted by Bekker and Bywater on the authority of pr. K^b alone, for the χαλινοποιητική of rc. K^b, and apparently all other MSS.

a. 13. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον] Bywater introduces κατὰ into the text from K^b, M^b, (and Cambr.). For δὴ read here by Bekker and Bywater, Susemihl gives δέ. The best MSS. seem to have δὴ, while δέ is given by CCC, B¹, B², and Ald. Where δέ and δὴ are concerned, however, MS. authority is not of much account. I prefer δέ.

a. 14. ἐν ἀπάσαις δέ] δέ is the reading of all MSS. apparently except M^b and Γ, which have δὴ. Δέ and δὴ are constantly interchanged in the MSS., and the best of them have not much authority in the matter. Zell, Grant, and Ramsauer read δέ, and explain it as an instance of ‘δέ in apodosi.’ The law of ‘δέ in apodosi’ in Aristotle is thus formulated by Eucken (*de Arist. dicendi ratione: pars prima: de particularium usu*, p. 31)—‘δέ in apodosi usurpatur aut ita ut repetatur apud demonstrativum cum antecesserit apud relativum, aut post demonstrativum, cum non antecesserit, sed enuntiatio demonstrativa quodam modo opponatur relativae, aut post particulam ei, ubi apodosis opposita est protasi.’ It seems natural then to bring the ἐν ἀπάσαις δέ of the present passage under the first

clause of the law for ‘δέ in apodosi’ as formulated by Eucken. 1094 a. 14. Michelet, however, reading δέ, prefers to speak of an anacoluthon here. He follows Kriche (*Jenaische allg. Literaturzeitung: December, 1835: no. 230, p. 403*) in thinking that the ὅσα δ’ εἰσὶν with which the sentence begins is, after the parenthesis, changed *per anacoluthiam* into ἐν ἀπάσαις δέ, the δέ being simply repeated. The words of Kriche (quoted by Eucken, p. 25) are: ‘ὅσα δ’ εἰσὶν kündigt den Satz an, der durch die Vergleichung, welche aber von ihm nicht zu trennen ist, unterbrochen wird; mit ἐν ἀπάσαις δέ wird der unterbrochene Gedanke, der nun auch die Vergleichung in sich schliesst, wieder aufgenommen, so dass δέ nach ἐν ἀπ. das wiederholte erste δέ ist, und nimmermehr statt δὴ die Apodosis bildet:’ on which Eucken remarks—‘cujus sententiae assentire, si Aristoteles scripsisset ἐν ταύταις δέ, sed cum ἐν ἀπάσαις legatur, quo verba omnia quae antecedunt comprehenduntur, nescio an cum codice M^b (cujus auctoritas in talibus rebus summa est) Korae, Bonitzio δὴ legendum sit.’ I am inclined to follow Eucken in preferring δὴ to δέ here, on the principle which he lays down in substituting δὴ for δέ in *E. N. iii. 11. 4. 1118 b. 24*—‘post πάντα non particula δέ, quae opponit, locum habet, sed δὴ, quae ea comprehendat quae antecedunt’—and quite independently of the authority of M^b. M^b notoriously abounds in unique readings, which have no genealogical significance, and can only be regarded as the conjectures of a scribe: see Susemihl’s Pref. to his edition of *Eth. Nic.*, Teubner, 1880, p. viii.—‘Cum inter peculiare M^b codicis lectiones haud paucae sint sine dubio e mera conjectura modo falsa modo recta haustae, summa in eo adhibendo cautione opus neque Bekkerus¹ ubique satis ea usus est.’ Eucken therefore seems to me to take up a peculiarly untenable position, when he maintains (p. 40) not only that we must go to the MSS. to decide between δὴ and δέ, but that on this particular point M^b is to be preferred to all others: ‘in Ethicis Nicomacheis ubicunque agitur utrum δὴ an δέ scribendum sit codex M^b ceteris omnibus praefendus est.’

§ 5. διαφέρει δ’ οὐδέν κ.τ.λ.] It does not affect the subordina- a. 16.
tion of ends described in § 4, whether the subordinate ends are ἔργα, like a bridle, or ἐνέργειαι, like riding. Both fall under the end

¹ According to Rassow (*Forsch. über die Nic. Eth.* p. 8) Bekker has altered the text on the authority of M^b unique in about twenty places.

1094 a. 16. of generalship—victory. Again, an *ἐνέργεια* like walking may be subordinated to an *ἐνέργεια* the end of which is an *ἔργον*, as when a builder walks to his work; just as, on the other hand, an end which is an *ἔργον*, like a bridle, may be subordinated to one which is an *ἐνέργεια*, like riding. The *ἔργον* is indeed ‘better than’ the *ἐνέργεια* which produced it, but not better than *any* *ἐνέργεια*. Thus a substantive *ἔργον* may be subordinate to a *πράξις* which results in no *ἔργον*. So the Paraph. *ad loc.* εἰ δὲ καὶ μὴ πράξεις εἶεν τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων, ἀλλὰ ἔργα, οὐδὲν κωλύει βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ αἰρετώτερον καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων τὸ τῆς ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς τέλος καὶ πράξις ὄν ὥσπερ χαλμοποιητικῆς μὲν τέλος ἔργον ἡμιουργίας δὲ τέλος πράξις· νίκη γάρ· καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει τὴν νίκην βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ αἰρετώτερον τοῦ χαλμοῦ τὸ γὰρ ἔργον βέλτιον τῆς πράξεως, οὐ πάσης, ἀλλὰ μόνης ἐκείνης ἧς ἀποτελεσμά ἐστι, διότι τέλος ἐκείνης ἐστί.

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

Now, if all forms of human endeavour have ultimately one and the same end, this end being sought after for its own sake, while all other ends are chosen as means towards its attainment—and this must be so, for, if all our ends were but means to further ends, human endeavour would be an endless and vain process—this one ultimate end will be the Chief Good.

The knowledge of the true nature of this ultimate end of all human endeavour must evidently have great influence on the conduct of life. If we possess the knowledge of it, we shall be more likely always to do the right thing in particular circumstances. We must therefore try to get at least a general idea of its nature, and to determine the science or art of which it is the object.

It must surely be the object of the science which rules all the other sciences, and supplies the plan which they all subserv. Such Statesmanship—the science or art of social life—manifestly is. All other sciences and arts exist and are cultivated subject to the provisions which this supreme science or art lays down for them. It uses the other sciences and arts for its own practical end: it determines authoritatively what we shall do, and what we shall not do. Its end therefore, including as it does the ends of all the other sciences and arts, will be man’s Chief Good. When we say ‘man’s Chief Good’ it is eminently the citizen’s Chief Good that we have in view; for although ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ are essentially one, and their good therefore essentially the same, the accidents of concrete life may partially isolate the individual from the society of his

fellow-citizens, and the good which he attains to in his partial isolation will differ in degree, though not in kind, from that which men in full rapport with the best social influences realize for themselves and their city. The former good is one which indeed we are often fain to acquiesce in, but the latter is far better—a more divinely beautiful thing to lay hold of and keep.

§ 1.] As Grant says, this is ‘the argument upon which the whole system of the *Ethics* is based.’ We cannot always desire means; there must be an end desired for its own sake alone; for human nature, like the physical organism of an animal or plant, must have a limit or definite form. This limit or definite form will be the *summum bonum* (τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον) of man. As the functions of a physical organism do not build up an indefinitely increasing mass without constant shape, but result in a structure definite both in size and form, so man’s desires do not follow one another endlessly, giving rise to conduct which has no plan, but conspire (with success proportioned to the rationality of the agent) towards the maintenance of a definite system of life. The irrational man, as such, loses sight of this end. He is dominated by the *ἐπιθυμία* which happens at the moment to engage him. This is succeeded by another *ἐπιθυμία*, perhaps in no way related to it. His life is thus not one, but many; it is a mere succession of episodes like a bad play. It has no object: ἄπειρος γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις (*Pol.* ii. 4. 1267 b. 3). But the rational man has a definite object—the maintenance of the *εἶδος* of human nature. This *εἶδος* he apprehends as an organism which must ‘correspond with a social environment,’ because it cannot otherwise take its appointed place in the *κόσμος*, or realise itself as ‘divine.’ That harmonious play of all the functions of his nature, which enables man so to ‘correspond with his social environment’ that he may realise himself as ‘divine,’ is the End or Good of human nature. This ‘correspondence’ is the function of *νοῦς*, the synoptic faculty, which views everything in its relations to all other things, *i.e.* not as *phaenomenon*, but as *noumenon*, or *sub specie aeternitatis*. In the *πρακτικὸς βίος*, with which the main part of the *Ethics* is concerned, the synopsis is less perfect than in the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*; hence, as everything is defined in accordance with its perfection, we find man’s chief end defined at the close of the *Ethics* as *θεωρία*. For the present, however, it will be enough to regard it as ‘correspondence with the social environment.’

In connecting the *ἀγαθόν* with the *πέρας*, Aristotle follows the

1094 a. 18. Pythagoreans and Plato. *E. N.* ii. 6. 14 τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπειροῦ, ὡς οἱ Ἰνθαγόρειοι εἶκαζον, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου. Plato, *Philebus*, 27 B Σω. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἀπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ πέρασ, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν. τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τετάρτην λέγων ἄρα μὴ πλημμυροῦν ἂν τι; The good and beautiful are realised in the *μίξις*. Cf. *Phil.* 64 D Σω. καὶ μὴ ξυμπάσης γε μίξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν . . . ὅτι μέτρον καὶ τῆς ξυμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τυχοῦσα ἤτισον καὶ ὄπωσον ξύγκρασις πᾶσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τὰ τε κεραυνύμενα καὶ πρώτην ἑαυτήν . . . νῦν δὴ καταπέφενγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τὰγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. μετριότης γὰρ καὶ ξυμμετρία κάλλος δῆπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι. Aristotle's view of the relation of *πέρας* to the *ἀγαθόν* is very clearly stated in *Met. a.* 2. 994 b. 9 ἔτι δὲ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα τέλος τοιοῦτον δὲ ὁ μὴ ἄλλον ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκείνου. ὥστε εἰ μὲν ἔσται τοιοῦτον τὸ ἔσχατον, οὐκ ἔσται ἀπειρον. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα. ἀλλ' οἱ τὸ ἀπειρον ποιούντες λανθάνουσιν ἐξαιρούντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν. καίτοι οὐθεὶς ἂν ἐγγιχρήσειεν οὐθέν πράττειν, μὴ μέλλων ἐπὶ πέρας ἦξεν' οὐδ' ἂν εἴη νοῦς ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις: ἔνεκα γὰρ τῶς ἀεὶ πράττει ὁ γε νοῦν ἔχων' τούτο γὰρ ἐστὶ πέρας' τὸ γὰρ τέλος πέρας ἐστὶ. The *ἀγαθόν*, or *πέρας*, at which *νοῦς* aims, both in science and in the conduct of life, is order, system, *κόσμος*. *Νοῦς* combines separate facts into a theory, separate actions into a life, just as, according to Anaxagoras, it brings order into the material universe. No single desire or act can be properly said to be good. The good, like the beautiful, is realized only in the orderly arrangement of parts: see *Poet.* 7. 1450 b. 3 τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστὶ. 'The relation of parts in a definite organism,' is what Aristotle means by the *ἀγαθόν*, the *πεπερασμένον*, the *καλόν*. This relation is the object and realization of *νοῦς*. It is the *νοητόν* which exists only for *νοῦς*. Hence it is said, as in *Met.* λ. 9. 1074 b. 33, to be identical with *νοῦς*. The object of *νοῦς* is *νοῦς* itself. *Νοῦς* is therefore dominated by nothing external to itself, and better than itself, as *αἴσθησις* is dominated by τὸ αἰσθητόν. It is therefore absolutely good—*κράτιστον*:—αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις: φαίνεται δ' ἀεὶ ἄλλον ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὐτῆς δ' ἐν παρέργῳ. The true personality of the *εὐδαιμών* is his *εὐδαιμονία* or rationally ordered life (*E. N.* ix. 7. 4. 1168 a. 6 ἐσμέν δ' ἐνεργείᾳ), or perfect correspondence with his environment. It is the law of his own nature to correspond perfectly. We must not abstract him from his environment, as if he were one thing, and the environment another thing, and thus

represent him as dominated by something alien to, or external to 1094 a. 18. himself. In the life of reason he is a 'law unto himself.'⁶ He understands and desires everything as it stands related to the great whole of which it is a part. His knowledge is 'adequate,' and his desires are according to his knowledge—*i. e.* his knowledge is equal to what can be known in his sphere, leaving no residuum of the unknown, and his desires give rise to no conduct which can ever become matter for regret. In the life of sense, on the other hand, a man perceives only the superficies of things, and fails to grasp them in their essence as parts of the whole. His desires too, following the superficial information supplied to them by sense, lead him to perform acts which he afterwards wishes undone. The world is wider and more complex than himself, and has many surprises and retributions in store for him. The life of sense is thus one of subjection, or passivity; while the life of reason is one of freedom, and supremacy (*cf.* the term *κράτιστον* applied to *νοῦς*). This life of reason, in which there is no ignorance or error is, it will be easily understood, an ideal, like Spinoza's *cognitio adaequata*, which no man ever actually reaches. Yet some men approximate to it more nearly than others; and in the beautiful structures of plants and animals we have a physical rendering of it which, save for the death of the individual, is perfect.

τῶν πρακτῶν] *i. e.* 'rerum agendarum,' Michelet rightly, who finds fault with Muretus for supplying *τελών* with *πρακτῶν*, and distinguishing between *τέλη* which are *πρακτά* or attainable by man, and those which are οὐ πρακτά—ideal ends. But Aristotle cannot admit such a distinction; see x. 7. 8 *χρη* δὲ οὐ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπων ὄντα, οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν. Τὸ πρακτόν is the result or object of *πράξις* (as τὸ ἐπιστητόν is of *ἐπιστήμη*, τὸ αἰσθητόν of *αἴσθησις*) and as such may signify either 'something done' as a means to an end, or the end itself: see *E. E.* 1. 7. 1217 a. 35 διχῶς λέγεται τὸ πρακτόν. καὶ γὰρ ὄν ἔνεκα πράττομεν, καὶ τὰ τούτων πραττόμενα χάριν, which Grant refers to as 'a sort of scholium' upon the term *πρακτόν*.

βουλόμεθα] employed here with technical correctness, *βούλησις* a. 19. or wish being directed to ends. See *E. N.* iii. 2. 9 ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μάλλον, ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος. Similarly *αἰρούμεθα* implies *προαίρεσις* or choice of means.

πρόεισι] impersonal. For examples see *Ind. Arist.*

1094 a. 21. **ματαίαν**] Cf. *Phys.* ii. 6. 197 b. 25 *ὡς τοῦτο ὄν τὸ μάτην, τὸ πεφυκὸς ἄλλθν ἕνεκα ὅταν μὴ περαινή ἐκείνο οὐ ἕνεκα ἐπεφύκει*—*i. e.* where a means misses its end, *i. e.* is no means at all, we have τὸ μάτην. But no part or function of a physical organism is thus useless. All parts conspire to the life or good of the organism. See *De Coelo* i. 4. 271 a. 32 *μάτην γὰρ ὑπόδημα τοῦτο λέγομεν οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ὑπόδεισις ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν ἀλόγως οὐδὲ μάτην ποιεῖ*, where ἀλόγως means without λόγος, or definite structure and ratio of parts. Cf. *De Partibus Anim.* iii. 1. 661 b. 24 *μηδὲν μάτην ποιεῖν τὴν φύσιν μηδὲ περιέργον*, and other places noted in the *Ind. Arist.*

a. 22. § 2. **ἄρ' οὐν**] Zell and Michelet quote Muretus—'Mos hic est Aristotelis, ut saepe, quae affirmare instituit, ea interrogando efferat.' Cf. the common use of ἤ in Aristotle introducing as a question the writer's own opinion, *e. g.* *E. N.* v. 9. 9 ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν;

a. 23. **ρόπήν . . . σκοπόν**] There is a mixture of metaphors here, *ρόπή* suggesting a balance, *σκοπός* being a target. On *ρόπήν* Eustratius says—*ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τῶν ζυγῶν οἷς ἐν τοῖς βάρεισι χρώμεθα*. The metaphor of the *σκοπός* occurs, as Zell and Grant notice, in Plato *Rep.* 519 B, C, where it is said of the *ἀπαίδευτοι καὶ ἀληθείας ἄπειροι* that *σκοποῦν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἓνα, οὐ στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ*.

a. 24. **τοῦ δέοντος**] Grant says:—'not "our duty" in the modern sense, this conception not having been as yet developed¹, but more generally "what we ought to do" from any motive. The word *δέον* was a received term with reference to moral subjects. Cf. Plato *Rep.* p. 336 D, where Thrasy-machus, calling upon Socrates to define Justice, says "Mind you don't tell me that it is the *δέον* or the *ὠφέλιμον*, or the *λυσιτελοῦν* or the *κερδαλέον*, or the *ξυμφέρον*." Cf. also *Charmides* p. 164 B; Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 22. But the exact import of the term was not fixed. Aristotle in the *Topics* ii. 3. 4 mentions among the *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα, οἷον εἰ τὸ δέον ἐστὶ τὸ ξυμφέρον ἢ τὸ καλόν*.'

The fundamental meaning of *δέον*, or *ὡς δεῖ*, seems to be indicated by the conjunction which occurs in *E. N.* iii. 7. 2. 1115 b. 12 *ὡς δεῖ δέ, καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ὑπομενεῖ (ὁ ἀνδρείος τὰ φοβερὰ) τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα*. That is *δέον*, which is necessary as a means to the main-

¹ I cannot assent to the view (apparently held by Grant) that the Greeks had not developed the conception of 'Duty,' as we find it—to take a typical modern instance—in Kant.

tenance of the organism of man's moral nature—an organism 1094 a. 24. which realises an *ὀρθὸς λόγος*, or just proportion of parts, and is therefore *καλόν* and *ἀγαθόν* in the eye of *νοῦς* which contemplates it. The same reference to a just proportion may be noticed in the use of τὸ δέον in *E. N.* iv. 2. 13 *διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει προπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἡλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθὸς*. Cf. *E. N.* iv. 2. 20 ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον καὶ βάνανσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει. Similarly, the passage before us (*E. N.* i. 2. 2) means that, if a man knows the *ἀγαθόν* of man, *i. e.* the *εἶδος* or organisation of man's nature as a system of harmoniously balanced parts, and if he keeps the thought or perception of it always before him in all that he does, he will not fail to do, at the proper time, what is necessary (*δέον*) to its maintenance.

§ 3. **τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν**] A frequently recurring metaphor, a. 25. derived from the practice of the sculptor, who makes a *τύπος* or rough clay model before he begins the statue in stone. Before we begin our elaborate treatment of the chief good, we will try to form a rough general idea of what it is, and of the conditions under which it can be realised. See Zell and Michelet *ad loc.*, and Schwegler *Met.* vol. iv. p. 42, and *Index Arist.* s. v. *τύπος*, for such phrases as *παχλῶς καὶ τύπῳ, καθόλου λεχθέν καὶ τύπῳ, τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγειν, τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς λέγεσθαι, τύπῳ διελθεῖν, τύπῳ διοριστέον*. The *ὑπογραφή* in painting answers to the *τύπος* in sculpture. In *de An.* ii. 1. 413 a. 9, we find the metaphor from painting mixed with that from sculpture—*τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ταύτη διορίσθω καὶ ὑπογεγράφθω περὶ ψυχῆς*. In *E. N.* i. 7. 17 there is the same mixture of metaphors. We must suppose that the sources of the metaphors have at last ceased to suggest themselves distinctly. Both metaphors occur in Plato, *e. g.* *Rep.* 414 A *τοιαύτη τις δοκεῖ μοι ἢ ἐκλογή εἶναι καὶ κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ φυλάκων, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας εἰρησθαι*, and *Rep.* 548 D *ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι*.

ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων] *δύναμις* is the generic term, and includes, a. 26. as species, *ἐπιστήμη* and *τέχνη*: but here *δυνάμεων* seems to stand for *τεχνῶν*.

§ 4. **κυριωτάτης**] Grant remarks that here '*κυριωτάτης* seems partly to mean "most authoritative" or "absolute," partly "that which is most absolutely a science." *Κύριος* is (1) 'sovereign over'

1094 a. 26. (2) 'in the strict sense,' *i. e.* in the sense which has the authority of 'usage in its favour, and consequently 'prevails over' other senses of a term: cf. *E. N.* i. 7. 13 *κυριώτερον γὰρ αὐτῆ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι* = 'for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term': cf. also *κυρία ἀρετή* vi. 13. 1, where *κυρία* has probably both the meanings mentioned above—'virtue, in the strict sense of the term—sovereign virtue.' The present section may be rendered thus: 'It would seem to be the object of the science *par excellence*, the science which is mistress and directs (*ἀρχιτεκτονική*) all the other sciences.'

a. 27. §§ 5-7. *τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται, κ.τ.λ.*] It is man's nature to be a citizen—*φύσει ἄνθρωπος πολιτικὸν ζῶν*. Severed, if that were possible, from the body politic, the individual would be like an amputated hand, which is no longer a hand except in name, for it is the performance of its function in the economy of the living body which constitutes it a hand. The *ἀπολις* would be either a beast or a god; not a man, for he would have no distinctively human function: see *Pol.* i. 1. 1253 a. 19 *καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ ὄλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὄλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμώνυμος, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὄρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος δῆλον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ὄλον, ὃ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός. Cf. *Met. Z.* II. 1036 b. 30 *οὐ γὰρ πάντως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος ἢ χεῖρ, ἀλλ' ἡ δυναμένη τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖν, ὥστε ἔμψυχος οὐσα· μὴ ἔμψυχος δὲ οὐ μέρος.**

Man realises his true personality as man, when he becomes conscious of the manifold relations in which he stands to his fellows in that final social system which is distinguished as the *πόλις* from the *κώμη* and *οἰκία*; and when, in consequence of having become conscious of these relations, he acts, not to please or profit himself, but to show himself worthy of the civilization permanently embodied in his *πόλις*. Then his life is the chief good of man as man. Hence *πολιτική*, the science of the plan (*ἀρχιτεκτονική*) according to which the *πόλις* is constituted, will be the science of the chief good of man as man, *i. e.* of man as a 'social being'.¹ Ac-

¹ And as a 'thinker': for it is only in the *πόλις* that thinkers are found.

cordingly all man's special pursuits, such as warfare, household management, and public speaking, so far as they may promote or prevent the realisation of this 'plan,' are regulated by *πολιτική*.

The subordination of *στρατηγική* to *πολιτική* does not need much explanation. The true function of the *στρατηγός* is to conduct successfully the wars which are necessary to the maintenance of the *πόλις*, as a home of the peaceful virtues and arts: *πολεμοῦμεν ἵ' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν E. N.* x. 7. 6. It is for *πολιτική* therefore to see that the military spirit is kept within just limits. The main point in Aristotle's criticism of the Spartan constitution is that, by the exclusive attention it paid to military excellence, it produced a state of society which could not last, no place being left for the peaceful virtues. See *Pol.* ii. 6. 1271 b. 2 *πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἢ πάντα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστί, τὴν πολεμικὴν αὐτῆ γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τοιγαροῦν ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπάλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν, μηδὲ ἡσκηκεῖν μηδεμίαν ἀσκησιν ἐτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς.*

The subordination of *οἰκονομική* to *πολιτική* is a point of great importance in Aristotle's system. The *πόλις* is composed of *οἰκία* which, though chronologically prior, are logically posterior to the *πόλις*, *i. e.* they exist for the sake of the *πόλις*, as the members for the sake of the body. Hence *πολιτική*, which sees to the good of the *πόλις*, or whole, will regulate *οἰκονομική*, which sees to the good of the *οἰκία*, or part. The true function of the *οἰκονόμος* is so to rule his household consisting of wife, children, and slaves, and so to provide for their material wants, as to make his 'home life' such that he, and his sons when they grow up, can, without encumbrance or distraction, devote themselves to 'political life,'—that is, to the leisured life of culture which the society of the *πόλις* offers. In providing, in this 'political' spirit, for the material wants of his family, the *οἰκονόμος* is engaged in ἡ κτητικὴ ἢ κατὰ φύσιν, and the capital which he accumulates and administers is ὁ ἀληθινὸς πλοῦτος, an amount definitely limited in relation to the end which it, as ὄργανον, subserves. But the *οἰκονόμος* may forget that 'political life' is the end, and 'home life' or 'private life' only the means. He may

The final cause of civilization, as developed through the stages of *οἰκία* and of *κώμη*, is the production of the small band of thinkers who, when the stage of the *πόλις* has been reached, illuminate each generation. Averroes rightly interpreted Aristotle's thought with the dictum 'necesse est ut aliquis philosophus semper sit in gente humana (Commentary on *de An.* iii).'

1094 a. 27. make 'home life' or a 'private career' his end. He may make it his end to have a luxurious establishment, or to accumulate wealth for its own sake by trade (*χρηματιστική*)—an unnatural thing to do, for wealth is naturally a means, and the man who makes its accumulation his end is engaged in an endless undertaking.

It is for *πολιτική*, therefore, as the science of the social organism, to see that the spirit of self-aggrandisement in *οικονόμοι*, or private persons, does not make the parts useless or even dangerous to the whole. See *Pol.* i. 3. 1256 b. 27 *ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οικονομικῆς μέρος ἐστίν· ὃ δὲ ἦτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχει, ὧν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ γ' ἀληθινὸς πλούτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἢ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Σόλων φησὶ ποιήσας.*

*πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κείται. κείται γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἄπειρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει οὔτε μεγέθει, ὃ δὲ πλούτος ὀργάνων πλήθός ἐστιν οικονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἐστὶ τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν δῆλον· ἐστὶ δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, *χρηματιστικήν*, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέραν εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως.*

The 'political' *raison d'être* of 'home life' is nowhere seen more plainly than in Aristotle's theory of slavery (*Pol.* i. 2). The institution of slavery is supported on the ground that the slave is necessary to 'political life.' He exists not to contribute to the personal comfort or luxury of the master, but to give him that *σχολή* without which 'political life' is impossible. A free-man, who is obliged to be, as it were, his own slave, or, like the *βάνανσος*, to do slave's work, is naturally excluded from 'political life.' This defence of slavery, as necessary to 'political life,' becomes intelligible when we recognise the 'gentlemanly' and even 'academic' character of Aristotle's 'political life.' In supporting the institution of slavery as he does, and in excluding the *βάνανσος* and *χρηματιστής* from 'political life,' Aristotle merely gives expression to the truth, or truism, that refined culture and social brilliance are found only within the circle of the leisured class. A 'good man,' according to the modern view, is a man who leads an upright and useful life in his sphere, whatever that may be. Aristotle's 'good man' (*σπουδαῖος*) is, above all, a connoisseur of life, a man of the world, educated, magnificent, fortunate. Slavery or

some analogous institution is obviously necessary to the existence of a caste of men of this sort. See *Pol.* Γ. 3. 1277 b. 35 *καὶ τοὺς βανάνσους πολίτας θετέον; . . . 1278 a. 8 ἢ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βανάνσον πολίτην . . . a. 20 οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τ' ἐπιτηδεύσαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίον βανάνσον ἢ θητικόν: Z. 2. 1319 a. 26 ὃ γὰρ βίος φανύλας, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔργον μετ' ἀρετῆς, ὧν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τε τῶν βανανύσων καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τὸ θητικόν.* Aristotle's *ἀρετή* is essentially the quality of the gentleman.

The subordination of *ῥητορική* to *πολιτική* is an interesting point. In Plato's *Gorgias* 452 sqq. we find the sophist Gorgias attempting to identify them, maintaining that *ῥητορική* is the true art of government, and is concerned with the greatest good of man—with 'that which gives men freedom in their own persons, and to rulers the power of ruling over others in their several states,' viz. 'the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly or at any other political meeting' (Jowett). Socrates maintains against this view that 'rhetoric is the shadow of a part of politics: *Gorg.* 463 D *ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ῥητορική κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἶδωλον.* It is the art of flattery, and the simulation of justice. Similarly in the *Politicus* 304 *πολιτική* and *ῥητορική* are carefully distinguished, and the subordination of the latter to the former insisted upon. Public speaking was so essential to the exercise of political influence in a democratic state that the temptation to regard rhetoric as the highest art was very strong. Aristotle follows the example of Plato in strenuously opposing this view, and we cannot be wrong in supposing that it is his sympathy with Plato's opposition to the professional teachers of public speaking which makes him select *ῥητορική* here as one of his instances of an art subordinate to *πολιτική*. See *E. N.* x. 9. 20.

An orator is too apt to speak so as to obtain applause or benefit for himself, whereas his speaking ought to be a means to the good of the state. This it is for the state to see to. Aristotle obviously considered the art of public speaking as one requiring considerable regulation, for in *Rhet.* i. 1. 1354 a. 11-26 he says that in the best ordered states speakers are not allowed to make appeals to the emotions of the judges, but are confined to the facts of the case—a restriction, he dryly adds, which would reduce many speakers to silence. To appeal to the emotions of a judge is to bend the rule you are about to use. In the interest of the community at large it would seem that oratory ought to be regulated even in private cases

1094 a. 27. between citizens; but where the speech is addressed to a sovereign people to determine their policy, the responsibility of the speaker is much greater. It is very little however that statute can do, in the absence of good sense and good feeling, to curtail the licence of public speaking. The institution of the γραφή παρανόμων at Athens was an attempt in this direction, but does not seem to have been very successful. Its effect was evaded by the passing of ψηφίσματα (as distinguished from νόμοι), in force for one year, and annually renewable.

The relation of πολιτική to public speaking suggests, through the sophists the great teachers of rhetoric, the general subject of the relation of πολιτική to education. We are told in § 6 that πολιτική determines what sciences and arts shall be taught in the city, and to what extent, and to whom, and in the *Politics* (H. 13—O. 7) a sketch of the education which it is desirable that the state should provide is given. Again, in the last chapter of the *E. N.* (x. 9), the question whether education ought to be private or public is discussed (to a certain extent dialectically), and the conclusion reached that it ought to be public. The private point of view, even if it were backed by sufficient authority to enforce its particular system (which it is not), is too narrow.

It has been pointed out above that the difference of opinion between Plato and the sophists seems to have caused the selection here of ῥητορική as an instance of an art subordinate to πολιτική. The selection of στρατηγική seems also to be due to the influence of Plato, who, in *Politicus* 304, 305—a passage from which the present may very well have been borrowed—describes πολιτική as the sovereign (βασιλική) science which regulates ῥητορική, στρατηγική, δικαστική, as well as μουσική and ἄλλως αἰ περί χειροτεχνίας ἐπιστήμαι. The selection of οἰκονομική is not accidental either, but is determined by Aristotle's peculiar view of the evil of χρηματιστική (see *Pol.* i. 3. 1256 b. 41), as well as by his theory of the origin of the πόλις (see *Pol.* i. 2. 1253 b. 2 ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν: πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκῶν).

b. 4. § 7. χρωμένης] *i. e.* using as means to its own supreme end; cf. the use of χρήσιμον = 'the means,' as *e. g.* *E. N.* i. 5. 8 καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθὸν χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. *Pol.* ii. 6. 1271 b. 3 χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. *E. N.* viii. 6. 5 χρῆσιμους εἰς τὰ καλὰ.

χρωμένης . . . νομοθετοῦσης] Cf. the division of ἡ περὶ πόλιν φρόνησις

(*E. N.* vi. 8. 2) into (1) νομοθετική, (2) πολιτική, *i. e.* into that which 1094 b. 4. lays down general rules of life, and that which deals, in the assembly and the law courts, as well as in the various executive departments, with the details of public business.

ταῖς λοιπαῖς [πρακτικαῖς] τῶν ἐπιστημῶν] Bywater brackets πρακτικαῖς.

§ 8.] The words ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ are a little startling, b. 7. but must not be understood to mean that the individual is in any sense self-subsisting, and able to realise his good independently of the state. We have seen that Aristotle's doctrine is that the individual has no existence apart from the body politic. No man who is not a πολίτης can attain to the ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθόν. Indeed this doctrine is implied in the words ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει. Accordingly when Aristotle goes on to distinguish the good of the πόλις from that of the εἰς μόνος, as κάλλιον καὶ θεότερον, he must be understood merely to distinguish between πολῖται in different social circumstances—between the πολίτης who, like Solon or Pericles, is surrounded by all that is best in civil life, and the πολίτης who lives in exile, with a memory or a hope instead of a city, or is placed in social circumstances which are mean and unworthy of him, like 'the great soul in a small city' spoken of by Plato (*Rep.* 496). Plato indeed regards exile and a small city as distinctly favourable (in existing circumstances) to philosophy—man's highest occupation; but Aristotle takes the more concrete view, that with mean social surroundings, a man cannot perform his highest function well, although he may perform it in a way. It would be a misapprehension of Aristotle's teaching to suppose that the distinction drawn in this section is that between the good of the community at large—'the greatest good of the greatest number,' and the private good of a single member of the community. No such distinction could be made by Aristotle. The good of the εἰς μόνος, in which we must sometimes 'acquiesce,' is still his good as a 'social being'; it is not a κτῆμα of which he may be the solitary possessor, but an ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς which can only be manifested in a social environment, unsatisfactory though that environment may be in a given case. A man's social environment may be fitted to call forth his noblest energies, or it may be such as to impede them without entirely destroying them: this is the distinction which Aristotle draws. His social energies impeded, a

1094 b. 7. man is apt to fall back upon the abstraction of the individual *per se*—to live for himself, and forget that he is a member of the body politic; when his noblest energies are constantly called forth by brilliant social circumstances, he identifies himself with the body politic, which is no longer for him an abstraction, but his own concrete life. The true self is a noble life in a great city. The terms κάλλιον and θεϊότερον are applied with technical correctness to this life, which is, in the highest degree, one of definite order and form. The term καλόν, as we have seen, is applied where there is μέγεθος καὶ τάξις (*Poet.* 7. 1450 b. 3); and the term θεῖον marks the εἶδος which φύσις, whether in the natural or in the moral world, strives to perfect, by purifying from the influence of ἕλη. Θεός is pure form without matter (see *Met.* A. 7, and, for the expression ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως *De Interp.* 13. 23 a. 23.); φύσις is a principle which, by producing ever more and more definite forms (εἶδη), strives to approach the ideal of the divine immaterial form. Plants and animals, which perpetuate their species (εἶδη) in young individuals unaffected by the decay of age, are thus said to strive after τὸ θεῖον in so doing: *De Anima*, ii. 4. 415 a. 24 φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσι . . . τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἶον αὐτό, ζῶον μὲν ζῶον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχωσιν ἢ δύνανται. *Oeconom.* i. 3. 1343 b. 23 ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἀναπληροῖ ταύτη τῇ περιόδῳ τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι· ἐπεὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν οὐ δύναται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος· οὕτω προφανομένῃ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκατέρου ἢ φύσις τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν. Similarly, in following pleasure, which is the symbol of functions tending towards the good of the organism, all animals follow a divine instinct: *E. N.* vii. 13. 6. 1153 b. 30 οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες· ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἢν οἶονται οὐδ' ἢν ἂν φαίεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. Τὸ θεῖον, then, being the principle of *form*, or *organisation*, in plants and animals, it is easy to understand how, apart from any special motive to use an ornate epithet, νοῦς should be described as θεῖος, as in *E. N.* x. 7. 8, and many other places. Νοῦς is the principle of form and order in man, *quod* man; the faculty whereby he abstracts his attention from the separate presentations, as such, of sense and feeling, and regards the relations in which the presentations stand to one another in an orderly system of science or life. To be able to *identify oneself* with such an orderly system may well be characterised as καλόν and θεῖον. The identification of νοῦς and τὸ νοητόν is a doctrine of the

greatest importance in Aristotle's philosophy, enabling him to 1094 b. 7. reconcile the opposition (which Grant finds so conspicuous in his system: see Grant's *Ethics*, vol. i. pp. 412-413) between 'the end for the state' and 'the absolute worth of the individual consciousness.' Only that 'individual (*sc.* human) consciousness' has 'absolute worth' which has for its object, and identifies itself with, 'the end for the state.' The true self is the consciousness of social duty. Ἡμῶν μὲν τὸ εἶ κατ' ἕτερον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ (*sc.* θεῷ) αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶ ἐστίν (*E. E. H.* 12. 1245 b. 18.).

The Paraphrast shows little appreciation of the philosophical import of the passage: he says ἔστι μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διασῶσαι ἀγαπητόν (ἂν τε ἐν ἐτέρῳ τις, ἂν τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δυναθῆ φυλάξαι) κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θεϊότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν, ὅσον ἡ τῶν πολλῶν εὐδαιμονία τῆς ἐνὸς ἀμείνων ἐστίν.

ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν] The Hellenic race with its various states as b. 10. distinguished from non-Hellenic races is doubtless foremost in Aristotle's mind here.

ἡ μέθοδος] 'This enquiry.'

b. 11.

πολιτικὴ τις οὐσα] Michelet says, 'tis nihil aliud indicat, nisi quod praeter moralem sint adhuc aliae scientiae quae politicae subjiciantur, ut οικονομική. Inferiores scientiae autem a nobiliore cui subjectae sunt denominantur.' Perhaps it is better to avoid committing Aristotle to the view that 'moral philosophy' falls under 'political philosophy' as species under genus. He can hardly be said to distinguish the two.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

Our Subject then is the Chief Good, our Science a kind of Statesmanship. Exactness of scientific treatment, it must be premised, depends on subject-matter. Some subjects do not admit of being treated very exactly, just as some materials do not lend themselves to very fine workmanship. Now, the science of society is not an exact science, because its subject-matter, Conduct, is a very complex one—indeed so full of inconsistencies and perplexities, that to some people it seems an arbitrary system, without foundation in the nature of things. On such a subject, then, we shall be satisfied with rough indications of the truth; with probable conclusions from probable premisses: with which the 'educated' reader will also be satisfied; for the educated man looks always in a science for that degree of exactness of which its subject-matter admits: he does not allow a mathematician to give him merely probable conclusions, or demand strict demonstration from an orator.

1094 b. 12. A man may be 'educated' in some particular branch, or in the general sense of the term. In either case, he is a 'good judge,' as far as his education extends. Hence a youth is not a fit student of the science of society. He is not a 'good judge' of doctrines belonging to a subject—the conduct of life—of which he has no real experience: moreover, he is so prone to be led away by his feelings, that doctrines have no influence over his conduct: and it is influence over conduct, not inculcation of doctrines, that is the *raison d'être* of our Science. What has been said regarding the youthful in years is true also of the youthful in character. There are men who at mature age still live under the rule of their passions. Their knowledge does such men no good. But if a man rule his desires aright, and act according to the dictates of his reason, knowledge of the truths of our Science will be of great use to him.

This chapter is devoted to the logical method of Ethics,—a subject which is taken up again in ch. iv. §§ 5–7, and in ch. vii. §§ 17–23.

b. 12. § I. ὑποκειμένην ὄλην] The ὑποκειμένη ὄλη is the matter, as distinguished from the form. See *Met. Z.* 3. 1029 a. 3 λέγω δὲ τὴν μὲν ὄλην, οἷον τὸν χαλκόν, τὴν δὲ μορφήν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ιδέας· τὸ δ' ἐκ τούτων τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸ σύνολον. This ὄλη (sometimes called τὸ ὑποκείμενον) is, in itself, formless, and therefore not an object of knowledge; see *De Coelo*, iii. 8. 306 b. 17 αἰετὶς δὲ ἄμορφον δεῖ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι, and *Met. Z.* 10. 1036 a. 8 ἢ δ' ὄλη ἄγνωστος καθ' αὐτήν. It is, however, receptive, in various degrees, of form, and, together with a given form, constitutes a concrete thing (τὸ σύνολον): see *Met. Δ.* 4. 1015 b. 13 ἢ πρώτη φύσις καὶ κυρίως λεγόμενη ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία (i. e. τὸ ἔνυλον εἶδος, Alex.) ἢ τῶν ἐχόντων ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ αὐτὰ· ἢ γὰρ ὄλη τῷ ταύτης δεκτικῇ εἶναι λέγεται φύσις. *Quā* receptive of the forms which φύσις or τέχνη may impose upon it, ὄλη is τὸ δύναμει ἕκαστον (*Met. N.* 4. 1092 a. 4), i. e. the potentiality of a definite form. Cf. *Met. Z.* 7. 1032 a. 20 ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ γινόμενα ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἔχει ὄλην· δυνατὸν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐν ἕκαστῳ ὄλη. Cf. *Met. H.* 2. 1043 a. 24 τί ἐστι γαλήνη; ὁμαλότης θαλάττης· τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὄλη ἢ θάλαττα· ἢ δὲ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἢ μορφή ἢ ὁμαλότης. Cf. *Pol.* i. 3. 1256 a. 8 λέγω δὲ ὄλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐξ οὗ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον· οἷον ὑφάνη μὲν ἔρια ἀνδριαντοποιῶ δὲ χαλκόν.

b. 13. τὸ ἀκριβές] ὄλη being the rough material which has to be brought into shape, the finish or perfection (τὸ ἀκριβές) of the shape will largely depend upon the nature of the material operated on; e. g. a figure carved in wood will differ in artistic character from one cut in marble. The facts dealt with by a science constitute its ὄλη, the science being the εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις (Eustratius) of the ὄλη.

As various materials, wood and stone, lend themselves differently 1094 b. 13. to the efforts of the artist who gives them shape, so various subjects of enquiry admit of different degrees of definiteness in their scientific treatment: οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητεῖν τὸ ἀκριβές, ὡσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις: e. g. in medical and sociological enquiries the facts which science has to reduce to order, or λόγος, are so numerous, and their relations to one another so complicated, that probable conclusions, i. e. expectations which are more or less likely to be realised, are all that we can hope to reach. We can never be sure that we have taken into consideration everything affecting a social question or a medical diagnosis. In geometry, on the other hand, the influence of ὄλη is reduced to a minimum. All other qualities of bodies except their spatial, diagrammatically-representable qualities are ignored by geometry; and of the diagrams, as drawn, all actual irregularities are ignored. In nature there is no such thing as a circle with all its radii absolutely equal; but geometry assumes such a circle, and its deductions are true on the assumption. The first principles of geometry are so clear to the eye in the diagrams which represent them, and the reasoning, guided at every step by the eye, is so obviously affected by nothing save these principles, that we feel sure that our conclusions 'cannot be otherwise.' Geometry is thus the type of ἀπόδειξις, or necessary reasoning, because it has to do with εἶδη as such, i. e. with abstractions, τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως—τὰ ἀνευ ὄλης; cf. *An. Post.* i. 13. 79 a. 7 τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα περὶ εἶδη ἐστὶ, κ.τ.λ. Abstractions, or pure εἶδη as such, from their very nature are incapable of change, change being incident to concrete things which grow and perish. The plan of a house, as such, i. e. the conception of certain architectural relations, is unaffected by the γένεσις and φθορά which alter a structure of bricks and mortar. Where λόγος is σὺν τῇ ὄλη συνειλημμένος, there γένεσις and φθορά obtain: τοῦ δὲ λόγου οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὥστε φθίρεισθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ γένεσις· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται τὸ οἰκία εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆδε τῆ οἰκία (*Met. Z.* 15. 1039 b. 21). Cf. *Met. Z.* 8. 1033 b. 16 φανερόν ἐστι τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος ἢ ὡς οὐσία λεγόμενον οὐ γίνεται, καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ γενομένῳ ὄλη ἔνεστι, τὸ μὲν τῷδε τὸ δὲ τῷδε. The εἶδος, as such, is indivisible (*Met. Z.* 8. 1034 a. 8 ἄτομον τὸ εἶδος): κίνησις and γένεσις belong only to τὰ μεριστὰ καὶ μὴ ὄλα (*E. N. X.* 4. 4. 1174 b. 11), i. e. to material things, or the formations of matter; their 'matter' being the element of divisibility, confusion, and change in them. Cf. *de Gen. et Corr.* i. 4. 320 a. 2 ἔστι δὲ ὄλη μά- λιστα μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὸ ὑποκείμενον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς δεκτικόν. Form,

1094 b. 13. or *εἶδος*, then, as such, being *ἀκίνητον*, *ἄδιον*, and *μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν*, constitutes the object of *ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη*. Geometry is the type of *ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη*; for, although it is impossible for man to apprehend form without a certain admixture of matter (cf. *de Memor.* I. 449 b. 31 *νοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος*), still, in geometry, the matter, *i. e.* the irregularity due to the actual presentation of the form, is so slight, and so easily eliminated by an effort of imagination, that Aristotle is practically justified in speaking of the objects of the science as being *ἄνευ ὕλης*. See *Met.* a. 3. 995 a. 14 *τὴν δ' ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀπαιτητόν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν ὕλην. διόπερ οὐ φυσικὸς ὁ τρόπος· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἴσως ἢ φύσις ἔχει ὕλην*; and *Met.* Z. 15. 1039 b. 27 *τῶν οὐσιῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα οὔτε ὀρισμὸς οὔτε ἀπόδειξις ἐστίν, ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὕλην, ἧς ἢ φύσις τοιαύτη ὥστ' ἐνδέχεται καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ. διὸ φθαρτὰ πάντα τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἦ τε ἀπόδειξις τῶν ἀναγκαίων, καὶ ὁ ὀρισμὸς ἐπιστημονικός, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπιστήμην ὅτε μὲν ἐπιστήμην ὅτε δ' ἄγνοιαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δόξα τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οὕτως οὐδ' ἀπόδειξιν οὐδ' ὀρισμὸν, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῶν οὔτε ὀρισμὸς οὔτε ἀπόδειξις.* Cf. *Met.* K. 3. 1061 a. 28 *ὁ μαθηματικὸς περὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται· περιελθὼν γὰρ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ ὅσον βάρος καὶ κουφότητα, κ.τ.λ. . . . μόνον δὲ καταλείπει τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές.* Simple spatial forms, always the same, and spatial laws or conditions, never counteracted by unforeseen influences, explain for Aristotle, as they do for Dugald Stewart (*Elements of the Phil. of the Human Mind*, Part II. ch. i and ch. ii. § 3), and J. S. Mill (*Logic*, Book II. chs. v and vi) the necessity and universality of the truths of geometry.

On *κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην* Eustratius has the following note: *ὕλη δὲ ἐφ' ἑκάστης μεθόδου καὶ τέχνης λέγεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτῆς περὶ ὃ καταγίνεται, ὑποκείμενον δὲ τῇ ἠθικῇ καὶ πολιτικῇ τὰ ἐν βίῳ ἐστὶ πράγματα καὶ αἱ περὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράξεις τε καὶ ἐνέργειαι, ἅτινα τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐνδεχομένων εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἀποπίπτοντα.* [Cf. *Phys.* iv. 9. 217 a. 22 *ὕλη μία τῶν ἐναντίων.*] *καὶ ἐπεὶ τοιοῦτον τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, καὶ οἱ λόγοι οἱ παραδιδόντες περὶ αὐτοῦ. διὸ οὐδὲ χρὴ ἀναγκαίως τινας ἀποδείξεις περὶ τῶν οὕτως ἐνδεχομένων ἀπαιτεῖν· ὥσπερ γὰρ μέτρον οἱ λόγοι τῶν πραγμάτων εἰσὶ περὶ ὧν λέγονται, καὶ δεῖ τὸ μέτρον ἐφαρμόξον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ μετρούμενον. οὐ δύναται δὲ τὸ αἰεὶ ἔχον ὡσαύτως τῶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτως ἔχοντι ἐφαρμόζεσθαι.* The Paraphrast says: *οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν ἐπὶ πάσης ὕλης ὁμοίως τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἀλήθειαν εὑρεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς, ἅτε ἀναγκαίαν*

ἔχουσιν ὕλην καὶ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν. [cf. *Met.* Δ. 24. 1023 b. 2 *ἐκ 1094 b. 13. τῆς αἰσθητῆς ὕλης ἢ σύνθετος οὐσία· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ εἰκῶς ὕλης*; and *Met.* Z. 10. 1036 a. 9 *ὕλη δὲ ἢ μὲν αἰσθητὴ ἐστὶν ἢ δὲ νοητὴ.*] *ἀμυγῆς ἢ ἀλήθειαι καὶ οὐδὲν ἢ ὕλη κωλύει τὸ ἀκριβές· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα οὐδὲ αἰεὶ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀρκετός ἐστι λόγος ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον συνάγων.*

§ 2. *τὰ δὲ καλὰ, κ.τ.λ.*] The subject-matter of moral or political science is right conduct,—that which men, being such as they are, ought to do, in the various circumstances in which they are placed. But the notions comprised within this sphere—*Justice, Temperance, Courage, &c.*—are constituted by relations which vary (within limits) or are 'contingent,' not 'necessary' or immutable, as are those perceived in mathematics. It would, therefore, be absurd to demand 'demonstration' in such a subject. When Locke (*Essay*, iii. 11. 16) maintained that morality might be made 'capable of demonstration as well as mathematics,' if ethical terms, such as *Justice*, were carefully defined once for all, and the definitions used as first principles, he failed to see the full import of the circumstance that there are no diagrams in morals, and to appreciate the difference between a 'mixed mode,' however carefully defined in words, and a spatial form clearly represented to the eye in a diagram. But, even were it granted that, with definitions of its 'mixed modes' as principles of deduction, moral science, notwithstanding the absence of diagrams, might be made as 'accurate' as geometry, it would still be true that such an abstract system would be practically useless, being inapplicable to the varying contingencies of life; and indeed might become positively injurious, by stereotyping the conclusions of imperfect enlightenment, and handing them down in an authoritative form to times which might be profited by a change of conduct. Moral rules must suit themselves to the varying exigencies of life (so far as they do vary), and ethics cannot be made an 'exact science' without ceasing to be a practical system. According to Aristotle, however, ethics is essentially a practical system: *E. N.* i. 3. 6 *τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πράξις*; and *πράξις* is concerned with the contingent and variable; see *E. N.* vi. 5. 3. Demonstration can be looked for only where the subject-matter is abstract, *i. e.* where it is possible, and convenient, to ignore all actual irregularities and contingencies. But in ethics it would be as absurd to ignore the irregularities and contingencies in circumstances and

1094b.14. conduct, as in the art of navigation to ignore the variations of the weather. A science which is concerned with things as they present themselves concretely in nature can never attain to exactness, *ἀπαντα γὰρ ἴσως ἢ φύσις ἔχει ὅλην Met. a. 3. 995 b. 17.*

Yet, although *Right* and *Wrong* are not abstract and immutable *εἶδη* like the principles of geometry, they are not the arbitrary creations of mere convention (*νόμος*), but have a definite nature of their own (*φύσει*). There are certain actions which, except under the most extraordinary circumstances, must be performed, as there are certain which must be avoided by all men, if human society is to maintain itself. We must not be misled by conceivable exceptions, or by the numerous cases of actions which do not involve the very existence of human society, and therefore would be indifferent but for fashion or some local and temporary utility, into supposing that *all* actions are indifferent. Man's nature is of a certain kind on the whole, and his circumstances are of a certain kind on the whole; and if he does not act in a certain way on the whole he will perish. This is the *φύσις* in the distinction between right and wrong. There is a 'natural' distinction between right and wrong as there is between food and poison¹.

The question as to whether the *δικαίον* exists *φύσει* or *νόμος* is a prominent one in the history of Greek ethical speculation. It is fully discussed by the writer of the fifth book of the *Ethics* (ch. vii), and the *Theaetetus* of Plato is chiefly devoted to it. Protagoras, we are told in the *Theaetetus*, maintained that 'man is the measure of all things,'—that is, that things *are* what they *seem to him*. By 'man' Protagoras did not understand 'the human faculties as such,' but 'every individual man for himself.' *Theaet.* 152 A φησὶ γὰρ που [ὁ Πρωταγόρας] πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπου εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γὰρ που; Θεαιτ. ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις. Σω. οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δ' αὖ σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ; Θεαιτ. λέγει γὰρ οὕτως. Hence nothing has a nature or essence of its own, but exists only in relation to the mind which happens to perceive it: *Theaet.* 157 A οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τι αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον. Hence (*Theaet.*

¹ Cf. *Rhet.* i. 1. 1355 a. 20 χρήσιμος δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ῥητορικὴ διὰ τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσήκον αἰμίσεις γίγνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἠτῆσθαι . . . 37 αἰεὶ τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῆ φύσει ἐπιλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανώτερα ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

167 C) οὐδ' ἂν ἐκάστη πόλις δίκαια καὶ κατὰ δοκῆ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆ 1094 b.14. ἴσως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζη: and (*Theaet.* 172 A) οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, κατὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οὐδ' ἂν ἐκάστη πόλις οἰθηθεῖσα θῆται νόμῳ ἑαυτῆ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῆ ἀληθείᾳ ἐκάστη, καὶ ἐν τοῦτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πῶλον πώλεως εἶναι . . . (B) ἐν τοῖς δίκαιοις καὶ ἀδικοῖς καὶ ὄσιοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις ἐθέλουσαν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῆ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξη καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῆ χρόνον. This view, which was obviously fitted to recommend itself to professional teachers of rhetoric or the art of 'getting on,' seems to have been held by many of the sophists, as also by the Cyrenaics (*e.g.* Theodorus; see Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil. Theodorus*), and, after Aristotle's time, by the Epicureans. For a criticism of the view *νόμος μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή*, see Cudworth's *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, Books II and III.

§ 3. καὶ τἀγαθὰ]. 'Good things' also, as well as τὰ κατὰ καὶ τὰ β. 17. δίκαια, are of a mutable nature, and cause many perplexities. The Paraph. has—οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐξ ὧν δοκεῖ συνίστασθαι ἢ εὐδαιμονία (ἀνδρείαν λέγω ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτον τι) καὶ αὐτὰ ἔχει πλάνην πολλήν, κ.τ.λ. Although this section is thus primarily a statement about τἀγαθὰ, it may perhaps be regarded also as conveying, by its position, a refutation of the immediately preceding *νόμος μόνον εἶναι φύσει δὲ μή*. 'The argument from variability proves too much, viz. that good things *also*, such as wealth, have no quality of goodness in themselves independently of opinion and fashion. If right and wrong are indifferent, then riches and poverty are also.' Rassow conjectures *φιλίαν* for *ἀνδρείαν* (*Forsch.* p. 88). He says, 'Dass die Tapferkeit unter die ἀγαθὰ gerechnet wird, und nicht unter die κατὰ καὶ δίκαια, steht in auffälligstem Widerspruch mit den Grundanschauungen und dem Sprachgebrauche der Ethik. Der Scholiast [Eustratius] nimmt ἀνδρεία in der Bedeutung von ἰσχύς, aber diese Aushilfe ist unzulässig [the *Index Arist.* gives no instance of ἀνδρεία=ἰσχύς]. Ich vermuthe daher: διὰ φιλίαν Vgl. 9. p. 1099 a. 31 φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ βέβαιον τὰ κατὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως.' The assumption which underlies Rassow's objection to ἀνδρείαν seems to be that τἀγαθὰ here, as distinguished from τὰ κατὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, must be τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. I confess that I cannot see why Aristotle

1094 b. 17. should not be allowed, even immediately after the mention of τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, to take τὰγαθὰ in its generic sense, and, having given πλοῦτος as an instance of τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ, to add ἀνδρεία as an instance of τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ (see *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 26); cf. Eustratius, εἰ δὲ τὴν κυρίως ἀνδρείαν (as distinguished from ἰσχὺς: Eustratius is here offering an alternative explanation for the ἀνδρεία=ἰσχὺς explanation which he seems to favour), εἰεῖς ὅτι ἐν πρὸς ἐν ἀντέθηκε, πρὸς τι τῶν θυραίων καὶ ἔξωθεν, ἐν τῶν ἐντὸς καὶ κατὰ ψυχῆν ἀγαθῶν.

b. 19. § 4. περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων] A common Aristotelian expression, περὶ τοιούτων referring to the matter of the enquiry, and ἐκ τοιούτων to the principles available for the establishment of scientific conclusions relating to this matter. See *Rhet.* ii. 1. 1377 b. 16, quoted by Zell—ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ ἐπαυεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεως ταῦτ' ἐστίν· περὶ γὰρ τούτων (i. e. τὸ προτρέπειν κ.τ.λ.) καὶ ἐκ τούτων (i. e. αἱ δόξαι καὶ αἱ προτάσεις) τὰ ἐνθυμήματα. Cf. *Top.* i. 8. 103 b. 39 περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ λόγοι καὶ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα καὶ τοσαυτὰ ἐστὶ: *de Part. Anim.* i. 5. 644 b. 23, sqq. συμβέβηκε δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐκείνας (i. e. τὰς ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους οὐσίας) τιμίας οὐσίας καὶ θείας ἐλάττους ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν θεωρίας (καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ὧν ἂν τις σκέψαιτο περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι ποθοῦμεν, παντελῶς ἐστὶν ὀλίγα τὰ φανερά κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Hist. Anim.* i. 6. 491 a. 13 περὶ ὧν τε γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἐκ τούτων γίνεται φανερόν. Add to these examples given by Zell, *E. N.* i. 3. 5 οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. *E. N.* vi. 11. 6 ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων.

In *Anal. Post.* i. 7. 75 a. 39, sqq. Aristotle says—τρία γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν ἐν μὲν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον συμπέρασμα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον γένει τινὶ καθ' αὐτό· ἐν δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα· ἀξιώματα δὲ ἐστὶν, ἐξ ὧν τρίτον τὸ γένος τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὗ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ συμβεβηκότα δηλοῖ ἡ ἀπόδειξις: and *An. Post.* i. 10. 76 b. 11 πᾶσα γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπισημῆ περὶ τρία ἐστίν, ὅσα τε εἶναι τίθεται ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ γένος οὗ τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ παθημάτων ἐστὶ θεωρητικῆ· καὶ τὰ κοινὰ ἃ λέγομεν ἀξιώματα, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων ἀποδεικνύουσι· καὶ τρίτον τὰ πάθη ὧν τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον λαμβάνει:—and in the same chapter, 76 b. 22 τρία ταῦτα ἐστὶ, περὶ ὅ τε δεικνύσι, καὶ ἃ δεικνύσι, καὶ ἐξ ὧν. On the passage 75 a. 39, sqq. Themistius (vol. i. p. 28, ed. Spengel) writes—τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν, ἐν μὲν δὲ δεικνύται ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατηγορούμενον ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι, ἐν δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα ἐξ ὧν δεικνύται,

αὐτὰ δ' εἶσιν αἱ προτάσεις ἐκ τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ὑπαρχόντων, τρίτον δὲ τὸ γένος 1094 b. 19. τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἡ φύσις ἧς τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ὑπάρχοντα δεικνύουσι αἱ ἀποδείξεις, οἷον ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέγεθος: and on 76 b. 11 he writes (i. 36 Spengel) τρία ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐκάστη πραγματεύεται ἐπισημῆ, τὸ τε ὑποκείμενον γένος οἷον ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέγεθος, καὶ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ὑπάρχοντα τούτῳ, οἷον τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν, ἢ τὸ δύο ὀρθὸς ἔχει, ἢ τὸ συμπίπτειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰ ἀξιώματα, οἷον ἐὰν ἴσα ἀπὸ ἴσων. It is to be noted that the analysis given in these passages (*An. Post.* 75 a. 39—76 b. 22) is introduced in order to expose the illogical procedure of applying the principles and method of one subject (γένος) to the explanation of another subject—75 a. 38 οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐξ ἄλλου γένους μεταβάττα δείξαι, οἷον τὸ γεωμετρικὸν ἀριθμητικῆ· τρία γὰρ ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. The conclusions (ἃ δεικνύσι) of a given science are proved within the sphere of its own subject matter (περὶ ὃ δεικνύσι, γένος), by means of certain formal principles (ἐξ ὧν), available within that sphere. The expression περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων evidently contains a reference to this analysis, περὶ τοιούτων relating to the γένος or ὑποκειμένη ἀληθ of moral science, viz. τὰ πρακτικά, and ἐκ τοιούτων to the principles available in such an enquiry. We must remember that these principles do not resemble either the axioms or the definitions of geometry, which are 'eternal and immutable,' but rather embody 'tendencies.'

ἐνδεικνύσθαι] Eustratius has—ἀποδείξεις μὲν καθυρῶς καὶ βεβαίως τὸ b. 20. ζητούμενον παριστᾷ, ἐνδείξεις δὲ διὰ τινων ἐκτυπώσεων καὶ μιμήσεων καὶ ἐμφάσεων. According to the *Ind. Arist.* Aristotle does not use the verb elsewhere, and nowhere uses the noun (ἐνδείξεις). In Athenian law ἐνδεικνύειν means 'to inform against, lay an ἐνδείξις against' anyone for illegal conduct. Cf. Plato, *Apol.* 32 B καὶ ἐτοιμῶν ὄντων ἐνδεικνύειν με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων. The 'probable' nature of the evidence upon which an ἐνδείξις relied may have suggested to Aristotle the employment of ἐνδεικνύσθαι in the present connexion. The author of the *ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον* 38. 1445 b. 8, speaking of the ἐξεταστικὸν εἶδος, uses the verb with what certainly seems to be a reference to its legal use—ἐφεξῆς ἕκαστον προτιθέμενοι τῶν ῥηθέντων ἢ πραχθέντων ἢ διανοηθέντων ἐξετάσομεν, ἐνδεικνύντες αὐτὰ καὶ τοῖς δικάοις καὶ τοῖς νομίμοις καὶ τοῖς ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ συμφέροισιν ἐναντιούμενα. At any rate, in the present passage ἐνδεικνύσθαι may be rendered by 'indicate' (as distinguished from 'demonstrate'—ἀποδεικνύειν).

τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] That which generally takes place. It is b. 21. distinguished from τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης on the one hand, and τὸ

1094 b. 21. *συμβεβηκός* καὶ τὸ *τυχόν* on the other hand, see *Met.* K. 8. 1064 b. 32, sqq. Πᾶν δὴ φάμεν εἶναι τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης [*e.g.* the angles of a triangle are = 2 right angles], τὸ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ [*e.g.* perseverance is rewarded by success], τὸ δ' οὐθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐτ' αἰεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν [*e.g.* when a man digging his vineyard, finds a treasure] . . . ἔστι δὴ τὸ *συμβεβηκός* ὃ γίγνεται μὲν οὐκ αἰεὶ οὐδ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐδ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. Cf. also *Topics* ii. 6. 112 b. 1 τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τὰ δὲ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν. Hence Deliberation is concerned with τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, for τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης and τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης are equally removed from the sphere of man's influence: *E. N.* iii. 3. 10 τὸ βουλευέσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἀδήλους δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον: and cf. §§ 1-9 of the same chapter. In *E. N.* v. 10. 4 τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν is used in the same sense as τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. On the distinction between ἐπὶ πολὺ (=far) and ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (both ὡς and the article with πολὺ are essential to the expression) see Eucken, *über den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles* (1868), p. 55, sqq. Thuc. (ii. 13) has θαρσύνε τε ἐκέλευε προσιόντων μὲν ἑξακοσίων ταλάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φόρου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν: and Isocrates *περὶ εἰρήνης* 166. b καὶ ταῦτ' εἰ μὴ κατὰ πάντων οὕτως εἰδισται συμβαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τό γ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦτον γίγνεται τὸν τρόπον. A fragment apud Meineke *Fragm. Com.* vol. iii. 469 has ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ πολλὰ τοῦτο ποιῶ.

b. 22. *τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι*] From probable premisses only probable conclusions (*συμπεράσματα*) can be drawn; cf. *E. N.* vi. 5. 3 εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν τούτων μὴ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν) κ.τ.λ.

τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένων] The Paraphrast gives the right sense,—ὡς περὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς λέγων οὐ δύναται ἀκριβεστέραν ἀλήθειαν εὔρειν ἢ ὅσην ἡ ψὴν διδῶσιν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κρίνων τοὺς τοιοῦτους λόγους καλῶς ἂν κρίνοι εἰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον μὴ ἀκριβεστέραν ἀλήθειαν ἀπατεῖ ἢ ὅσην ἡ ψὴν διδῶσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἀποδέχεται. For ἀποδέχεσθαι in its present meaning of 'accipere cum assensu, probare,' see *Index Arist.* Peters brings out the point of the remark well—'The reader, on his part, should take each of my statements in the same spirit.'

b. 23. *πεπαιδευμένον*] The *πεπαιδευμένος* is the man whose culture (*παιδεία*), whether special or general, enables him to criticise and estimate fairly scientific methods and results. His familiarity with the general principles of the 'logic of the sciences' leads him to

expect differences of treatment, as the ὑποκειμένη ψὴν differs in 1094 b. 23. various departments; and his acquaintance with the precise character of the ψὴν of a given department, aided by his knowledge of logic, enables him to judge whether a certain method of dealing with that ψὴν is appropriate or inappropriate. See *E. E.* i. 6. 1217 a. 8 ἀπαιδευσία γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κρίνειν τοὺς τ' οἰκείους λόγους τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους: *Met.* Γ. 4. 1006 a. 6 ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γινώσκειν τίνων δέι ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ τίνων οὐ δέι' ὄλως μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι. Cf. *Met.* Γ. 3. 1005 b. 3 ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη· ὅσα δ' ἔχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὃν τρόπον δέι' ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρᾶσιν δέι' γὰρ περὶ τούτων ἦκειν προεπισταμένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν. With this last passage cf. Aristoxenus, *Harmonica* p. 30 (ed. Marquard)—βελτίον ἴσως ἐστὶ τὸ προδιελεῖν τὸν τρόπον τῆς πραγματείας τίς ποτ' ἐστίν, ἢ αὖ προγινώσκοντες ὥσπερ ὁδὸν ἢ βαδιστέον ῥῆδιον πορευόμεθα εἰδότες τε κατὰ τί μέρος ἐσμὲν αὐτῆς καὶ μὴ λάθωμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παρπολαμβάνοντες τὸ πρᾶγμα καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης αἰεὶ διηγείτο τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἀκουσάντων παρὰ Πλάτωνος τὴν περὶ τὰγαθοῦ ἀκρόασιν παθεῖν προσεῖναι μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον ὑπολαμβάνοντα λήψεσθαι τι τῶν νομιζομένων τούτων ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν οἷον πλοῦτον ὑγίειαν ἰσχὴν τὸ ὄλον εὐδαιμονίαν τινα θαναμαστήν· ὅτε δὲ φανείησαν οἱ λόγοι περὶ μαθημάτων καὶ ἀριθμῶν καὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἀστρολογίας, καὶ τὸ πέρας ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἔν, παιτελῶς οἶμαι παράδοξόν τι ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς· εἶθ' οἱ μὲν ὑποκατεφρόνον τοῦ πράγματος, οἱ δὲ κατεμέμφοντο. τί οὖν τὸ αἴτιον; οὐ προῆδσαν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ἐριστικοὶ πρὸς τοῦνομα αὐτὸ ὑποκεχηνότες προσήεσαν· εἰ δὲ γέ τις οἶμαι προεξετίθει τὸ ὄλον, ἐπεινώσκεν ἂν ὁ μέλλον ἀκούειν καὶ εἴπερ ἤρεσκεν αὐτῷ διέμενεν ἂν ἐν τῇ εἰλημμένη ὑπόληψει. Προέλεγε μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης δι' αὐτὰς ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας, ὡς ἔφην, τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἀκροᾶσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ, περὶ τίνων τ' ἐστὶν ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τίς. Cf. *Met.* a. 3. 995 a. 6 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐὰν μὴ μαθηματικῶς λέγη τις οὐκ ἀποδέχονται τῶν λεγόντων· οἱ δ' ἂν μὴ παραδειγματικῶς· οἱ δὲ μάρτυρα ἀξιούσιν ἐπάγεσθαι ποιητῆν· καὶ οἱ μὲν πάντα ἀκριβῶς, τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνείρειν ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν [*i.e.* the minuteness of such enquiries, which seems to them tedious], ἔχει γὰρ τι τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοιοῦτον· ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβολαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθερον εἶναι τισὶ δοκεῖ· διὸ δέι' πεπαιδευθῆναι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτέον. Cf. *de Part. Anim.* i. 1. 639 a. 1 περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν, τε καὶ μέθοδον ὁμοίως ταπεινωτέραν τε καὶ τιμωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἔξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγο-

1094 b.23. *ρεύειν, τὴν δ' οἶον παιδείαν τινά. πεπαιδευμένον γὰρ ἔστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρίναι εὐστόχος τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων. τοιοῦτον γὰρ δὴ τινα καὶ τὸν ὅλως πεπαιδευμένον οἰόμεθ' εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαιδευθῆναι τὸ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον. πλὴν τοῦτον μὲν περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικόν τινα νομίζομεν εἶναι ἕνα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα, τὸν δὲ περὶ τινος φύσεως ἀφορισμένης· εἴη γὰρ ἂν τις ἕτερος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῶ εἰρημένῳ διακείμενος περὶ μῦριον· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσιν ἱστορίας δεῖ τινὰς ὑπάρχειν ὄρους τοιοῦτους πρὸς οὓς ἀναφέρων ἀποδέχεται τὸν τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων, χωρὶς τοῦ πῶς ἔχει τὰληθές εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως.* In the last passage ὁ ὅλως πεπαιδευμένος (cf. ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος of the *Ethics*) is one who is remarkable for his grasp of the general principles of logical method, and for his delicate appreciation of the applicability to various subjects of the notions defined in a work like the *Metaphysics*; while ὁ περὶ τινος φύσεως ἀφορισμένης (cf. ὁ καθ' ἕκαστον πεπαιδευμένος of the *Ethics*) is one who is distinguished for his appreciation of the method proper to a particular department, of the details of which he happens to have special knowledge, although his knowledge may be that of the *amateur*, as distinguished from the expert—a point made plain in *Pol.* iii. 11. 1282 a. 1 ὥσπερ οὖν ἱατρὸν δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνas ἐν ἱατροῖς οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις· ἱατρὸς δ' ὁ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας· ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἦπτον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς εἰδόσι. But, after all, the περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος and the καθ' ἕκαστον πεπ. are not so much separate persons as personifications of two elements in παιδεία. A man cannot show special παιδεία in a particular department with the details of which he has at least an amateur's acquaintance, without possessing a certain amount of the general παιδεία which consists in knowledge of the principles of logic as they apply in other departments; nor, on the other hand, can a man be said to realise the true meaning of these principles unless he has applied them for himself in a particular enquiry. Naturally, however, critics of science differ according as they present the one or the other of these two elements of the critical habit with the greater prominence. The difficulty raised by Eustratius regarding the possibility of ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος, 'the man who knows everything,' is thus irrelevant. Aristotle does not imagine the existence of a man who knows the details of all the sciences, as well as each specialist knows the details of his own department. The περὶ πᾶν

πεπ. is, as has been just said, the man who is familiar with the logic of the sciences, and the notions more or less applicable in all departments; who brings, in short, to his criticism of the method of a given enquiry familiarity with the doctrines of the *Organon* and the *Metaphysics*; his habit realising the requirements of παιδεία specified by Alexander on *Met.* 995 a. 6 (p. 126 ed. Bonitz) δεῖ πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς ἐγγυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τοῖς λογικοῖς ὅλως, καὶ εἰδέναι τοὺς τρόπους τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ τὰς τῶν λόγων συναγωγὰς. In many respects the distinction between the περὶ πᾶν πεπ. and the καθ' ἕκαστον πεπ. is the same as that marked by the terms λογικῶς and φυσικῶς respectively, on which see *Phys.* iii. 5. 204 b. 4-10 λογικῶς [κοινῶς τε καὶ οὐ φυσικῶς, Themistius *ad loc.*] μὲν οὖν σκοποῦμενοις . . . φυσικῶς δὲ μᾶλλον θεωροῦσιν κ.τ.λ., i. e. looking at the subject (1) in the light of the general formal conceptions which dominate all science, and (2) more concretely, in connexion with its own special proximate principles; cf. *Phys.* viii. 8. 264 a. 7 οἷς μὲν οὖν ἂν τις ὡς οἰκείοις λόγοις πιστεύσειεν οὐτοὶ καὶ τοιοῦτοί τινές εἰσιν· λογικῶς δὲ ἐπισκοποῦσι κ.τ.λ. It will evidently be one of the most important functions of παιδεία to see that each of the two points of view—the formal (λογικῶς) and the concrete (φυσικῶς)—has its proper place assigned to it in a given enquiry, according as that place is determined by the nature of the ὑποκειμένη ὕλη. On the πεπαιδευμένος see the excellent notes of Michelet and Grant, to which I am largely indebted.

γένος] 'is with Aristotle the object of a single science: *μία* b. 25. ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν ἢ ἐνὸς γένους (*An. Post.* i. 28 [87 a. 38]). Cf. the whole of *Met.* ii. 3. Grant. See also *Met.* Δ. 6. 1016 a. 26 for the identification of the γένος with the ὕλη.

μαθηματικῶ τε πιθανολογούντος ἀποδέχεσθαι] Taken from Plato, b. 26. *Theaet.* 162 E, as Zell and Grant point out—ἀποδείξει δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκη οὐδ' ἦντοιῦν λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῶ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, φ' εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χράμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιός οὐδ' ἐνὸς μόνου ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκότι περὶ τῆλικούτων λεγομένους λόγους. Ἀποδέχεσθαι takes the gen. of the person, like ἀκούω, generally, however, with a participle such as λέγοντος, εἰπόντος. See *Liddell and Scott*, s. v.

ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν] The orator uses ἐνθυμήματα (*Rhet.* b. 27. i. 1. 1355 a. 6) which are arguments ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων (*Rhet.* i. 2. 1357 a. 32).

1095 a. 1. § 5. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος] καθ' ἕκαστον must be supplied after ὁ, and κρίνει καλῶς understood from the preceding sentence. Coraes reads in his text ἀγαθὸς κριτής. Ἐκαστον ἄρα ὁ καθ' ἕκαστον πεπαιδευμένος ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος, a reading supported by the version of Aretinus, *singula igitur is qui in singulis*. The μὲν inserted after καθ' ἕκαστον by Bywater, is given by Mb; rc H^a and pr K^b.

ἀπλῶς] means 'simply,' 'without qualification' (distinguished from κατὰ πρόσθεσιν *E. N.* vii. 4. 3), 'universally.'

a. 2. διὸ . . . περὶ τούτων] Whatever his proficiency in logic, as such, may be, the youth is deficient in the other element of παιδεία, viz. special acquaintance with the material details of moral science, should he pose as a critic or connoisseur of it. The matter of moral science is life, with its circumstances and actions, of which he has as yet no sufficient experience. On account of his ignorance of life he will be likely to regard ethical problems as being more simple than they really are. His ignorance of the moral ὄλη will be practically tantamount to a denial of its existence. He will treat Ethics as if it were an abstract science like geometry. He will apply a few hastily assumed and arbitrarily defined principles to circumstances of all kinds. The author of the Sixth Book of the *Nic. Ethics* (ch. 8, §§ 5, 6) remarks that boys may succeed in mathematics, because the abstractions of that science (τὰ δι' ἀφαιρέσεως) do not need much experience for their acquirement; but that they do not show prudence, and are unfit students of natural science, because experience produces prudence, and the principles of natural science are not easily apprehended spatial relations, but generalisations, the results of long and careful inductive enquiries. *E. N.* vi. 8. 1142 a. 12 γεωμετρικοί μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστὰ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις, ἢ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἐμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλήθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἂν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὐ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεως ἐστὶν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄδηλον; As a critic of moral science, then, the youth will demand more elegance and exactness than the ὄλη (of which he is ignorant) admits. Geometry will supply him with his conception of what moral science ought to be. Not realising the endless

complexity of every moral and social question, he will admire a 1095 a. 2. system in proportion to the 'lucidity' with which it pushes a few 'clear ideas' to their logical issues. Cf. in this connexion Mill's *Logic*, book vi. ch. 8, on the 'geometrical method' of reasoning in morals and politics.

ἀκροατής] Michelet says 'Cum auditore, non cum lectore rem habet Aristoteles. Illa igitur vox luce clarius facit hoc opus Aristotelis, ut pleraque, ex praelectionibus in Lycaeo habitis ortum, ab ipso Aristotele vel etiam a proximis ejus discipulis hunc in ordinem redactum atque editum esse quem hodie servat.' It seems better to suppose that the *critical function* of the πεπαιδευμένος has suggested the word ἀκροατής, it being customary for Aristotle to think of κρίσις as the function of listeners (in the law courts or elsewhere) who follow a speech intelligently; see *E. N.* vi. 10. 2 ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον, and vi. 10. 3 ἐν τῷ χρησθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησις ἐστίν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς [ἐστὶν ἡ σύνεσις]. Cf. *Philemon* apud Meineke *Fragm. Com.* iv. 46 χαλεπὸν γ' ἀκροατής ἀσύνητος καθήμενος, | ὑπὸ γὰρ ἀνοίας οὐχ ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται.

§ 6. ἔτι . . . πράξις] Not only is the youth too inexperienced in a. 4. the difficulties of life to appreciate a science attempting to deal with them, but even such knowledge of the principles and rules of conduct as may reach his understanding will be practically useless to him, because he allows his passions rather than his knowledge to determine his actions. This circumstance—that his knowledge will be practically useless to him, is conclusive against the attempt to impart it, the end of the science of life (πολιτικὴ) being conduct and not mere knowledge. It is one of the most distinctive points in Aristotle's ethical teaching—that it is useless to address the understanding (λόγος) until the passions (πάθη) have been brought into order. So long as a youth is passionately fond of a certain course of conduct, it is vain to tell him that it is *wrong*. He will not understand what you mean; he will only feel that the course of conduct styled *wrong* is *pleasant*. *Right* and *wrong* have definite meaning only for one who is detached from the sway of his passing passions, and can regard them, and their objects, coolly in relation to life conceived as an organic whole. 'Affectus, qui passio est, desinit esse passio, simulatque ejus claram et distinctam formamus ideam.' (Spinoza, *Eth.* v. 3.) When the passions

1095 a. 4. and desires have been *organised*, as it were, by the moral training which the state supplies, *i. e.* when *λόγος*, or proportion, has been thus effected among them, then the time has come to appeal to the consciousness of this *λόγος* which has now dawned in the man's mind, and to instruct him in the *rationale* of that conduct to which he has been imperceptibly habituated by influences operating from without upon his sensibility to pleasure and pain. Cf. *E. N.* ii. 3. 2 διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. When he has come to *like*, and *habitually do* what his moral instructors think *right*, then, but not till then, it will be useful to explain to him *how* and *why* it is right. The *λόγος*, or moral understanding, appealed to by a theory of Ethics, does not come into existence till the desires have been reduced by moral training to *λόγος*, or order. The youth who acts *κατὰ πάθος*—on the stimulus of present feeling, cannot realise the truths of ethical science, which are recognised as such only by the calm survey of the man in whom the *λόγος* or moral order is assured. The youth, like the *ἀκρατής*, may possess a precarious *λόγος*—a fine system of generous aspirations and good intentions, in relation to which moral truths may have some sort of vague meaning for him in his calmer moments; but this *λόγος*, and the vague *γνώσις* which it renders possible, cannot withstand the assault of *πάθος*: τοῖς γὰρ τοιοῦτοις ἀνόητος ἡ γνώσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν (§ 7)—‘their knowledge, such as it is, turns out profitless for them.’ The *ἀκρατής* or ‘incontinent man’ knows (after a fashion) that it is wrong to yield to *πάθος*, but nevertheless yields. He possesses a *λόγος* which opposes itself unsuccessfully to *ἐπιθυμία* (see *E. N.* i. 13, §§ 15, 16, and vii. 3)—not the *λόγος* which amounts to *φρόνησις* (for that resists *ἐπιθυμία* successfully), but merely the faculty of posing dramatically, as a temperate man, in his intervals of reflection: see *E. N.* vii. 3. 8 τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν τοῦτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λόγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνέρουνσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ’ οἴπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφυῆναι, τοῦτο δὲ χρόνον δέεται· ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ἵποκρωμομένους, οὕτως ἵποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατερομένους.

To sum up—The *νέος* is an incapable student and critic of moral philosophy, because he is unacquainted with the facts, a knowledge of which it presupposes. His ignorance is due (1) to the short time he has lived, (2) to the strength of his passions,

1095 a. 4. which do not allow him to see even the facts, which he has had opportunities of observing, in their true light—*i. e.* as involving the distinction of *right* and *wrong*, rather than that of *pleasant* and *unpleasant*. He has not yet acquired the faculty by which the truths of moral philosophy can be apprehended, *viz.* the *λόγος* which neglects the pleasure or pain of the present, and regards the relation in which the pleasant or painful action stands to the whole life. Such knowledge of moral philosophy as the *νέος* acquires is but ear and lip knowledge, of no influence upon his conduct. The moral faculty (*λόγος*) must be evolved as the result of the right ordering of his *ὀρέξεις* by moral training, before it becomes profitable for him to study the theory of morals. If the end were merely to construct a speculative system, perhaps a youth might be able to appreciate such a system, as he appreciates the elements of geometry; but conduct is the end; and conduct requires knowledge of the perplexities of life, and a settled character directed towards a high ideal.

§ 7. τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι a. 10. πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι.] To the man of settled moral character a knowledge of the principles of moral philosophy will be very useful, just as a clear and methodical statement of the principles hitherto unconsciously followed is always useful to the artist or enquirer of practical experience. The Logic of a science is of very little use to one beginning the science; but may prove an invaluable guide to the experienced enquirer. A ‘critique’ may be meaningless to one who has not studied the picture or statue carefully for himself: but may become instructive after he has done so. Moral philosophy is useless to one who has no experience of life, and no faculty to discriminate between right and wrong, only a feeling for what is immediately pleasant or painful. Some of the Sophists, Aristotle says, (*E. N.* x. 9. 20), thought that it would be easy to legislate by making a collection of the most approved laws in existence, and selecting the best of them—as if the selection of the best required no judgment—as if the whole difficulty did not lie in judging correctly, as in music all depends upon the musical ear. Similarly (*E. N.* x. 9. 21), medical reports are useless to non-professional readers, but useful to men of professional experience.

The description of the *παιδευμένος* given by Isocrates (*Pana-*

1095 a. 10. *Ihenaios* 239), although differing from that given by Aristotle in not involving a technical specialisation of the term, is interesting as bringing into clear light the combination of experience and ethical moderation which Aristotle regards as essential to *παιδεία* in relation to the science of *πολιτική*. *Τίνας οὖν καλῶ πεπαιδευμένους, ἐπειδὴ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδοκιμάζω; πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς καλῶς χρωμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκάστην προσπίπτουσι, καὶ τὴν δόξαν εὐτυχῆ τῶν καιρῶν ἔχοντας καὶ δυναμένην ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ συμφέροντος· ἔπειτα τοὺς πρεπόντως καὶ δικαίως ὁμιλοῦντας τοῖς αἰετῶσι πλησιάζουσι, καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀηδίας καὶ βαρύτητας εὐκόλως καὶ βραδίως φέροντας, σφᾶς δ' αὐτοὺς ὡς δυνατὸν εὐφροσύνης καὶ μετριότητος τοῖς συνοῦσι παρέχοντας· ἔτι τοὺς τῶν μὲν ἡδονῶν αἰετῶν τούτων, τῶν δὲ συμφορῶν μὴ λίαν ἠττωμένους, ἀλλ' ἀνδρωδῶς ἐν αὐταῖς διακειμένους καὶ τῆς φύσεως ἀξίως ἧς μετέχοντες τυγχάνομεν· τέταρτον, ὅπερ μέγιστον, τοὺς μὴ διαφθειρομένους ὑπὸ τῶν εὐπραγιῶν μηδ' ἐξισταμένους αὐτῶν μηδ' ὑπερηφάνους γιγνομένους ἀλλ' ἐμμένοντας τῇ τάξει τῇ τῶν εὐφρονοῦντων, καὶ μὴ μᾶλλον χείροντας τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρξασιν ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς διὰ τὴν αἰτῶν φύσιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομένοις.* The *πεπαιδευμένος* is thus described by Isocrates as the man of experience and moderation, who knows how to deal with the circumstances of life as they occur. In the *Ethics* the *πεπαιδευμένος* is the *critic* of the science of life. But it is only the man of the world described by Isocrates, who fulfils the conditions, moral and intellectual, which Aristotle regards as essential to *παιδεία* (in his technical sense of the term), when it is engaged in the critical estimation of *πολιτική*. It is only the man of experience and moderation who can know what is meant by right and wrong. As the man of experience and moderation knows how to live, he is also the only competent critic of the science of life. His critical faculty, like his practical judgment, has become an instinct in him. See *E. N.* vi. 11. 6 *ὅστε δὲ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπειρῶν καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτους φάσεις καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἦττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὁρθῶς.*

The ethical and political doctrines of Aristotle are thus, we see, *φωνῶντα συνετάσι*: hence the difficulty which we, at our distance from the ancient Greek life, experience in the study of them.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

What then is the Chief Good which is the object of our Science? Most people, cultivated and uncultivated, agree as to its name and call it Happiness: but here the agreement ends; for some make Happiness consist in Pleasure, others in Wealth, others in Social Recognition; and often a man's view of it changes with his circumstances, e. g. when he falls sick, he thinks that it is Health, and when he is poor, that it is Wealth. Others again, conscious of their own ignorance, identify it with the Wisdom and Learning which they admire from afar: lastly, it has been held to be Something by Itself, apart from all particular good things, but the cause of their being good. It would take too long to examine all these views: it will be enough to notice those which have the greatest vogue, or most to say for themselves as theories of Life.

But before we begin an examination of these views, and thereafter attempt to set forth a view of our own, it is important that we should be clear about the method proper to the Science of the Chief Good. Where ought the enquiry to begin? With general principles? or with particular facts? Evidently with something known: but when we say 'known', we may mean either known in the strict acceptance of the term, known for what it is, i. e. known scientifically as a general principle is known; or known from our point of view, i. e. known as a particular fact presented to the senses. It is with the 'known' in the latter acceptance that our present enquiry must begin. This is why it is so important that the student of the science of conduct should bring to his study of the subject a good moral character. Without this, he cannot 'know' the elementary facts with which his study must begin, i. e. cannot understand a teacher who begins by pointing to certain concrete examples of Virtue or Vice, or by quoting certain popular sayings, or by taking for granted that this thing is wrong and that thing right. Indeed this elementary 'knowledge' is so important in itself that it does not matter much if the average man never proceed from it to the knowledge of principles, or of the reason why.

§ 1. *πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις*] 'The original four terms *τέχνη*, 1095 a. 14. *μέθοδος*, *πράξις*, *προαίρεσις* are here reduced to two.' Grant.

Γνῶσις has for its object, or 'good,' the reduction of the data of experience to form, law, or theory; *προαίρεσις* aims at the preservation of the moral organism amid the dangers to which it is exposed in its environment.

1095 a. 18. § 2. εὐδαιμονίαν] It is Aristotle's object, in the *Ethics*, to give a new meaning to this accepted term. The popular view regarded 'Happiness' as consisting in the favour of Heaven and Fortune, and in the multitude of a man's possessions. Aristotle shows that it consists, not in what a man *has* or *receives*, but in what he *is* and *does*. It is an active function (ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς), not a condition of passivity. It is 'noble living'—τὸ εὖ ζῆν in the active sense. Cf. the remarkable fragment of Aristotle preserved by Stobaeus, *Flor.* Γ. 54. vol. i. p. 78, ed. Meineke (assigned by Rose, *Frag. Arist.* 89 to the dialogue *περὶ πλούτου*),—νόμιζε τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἐν τῷ πολλὰ κεκτηῖσθαι γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ τῇ ψυχῇ εὖ διακείσθαι καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα αὐτὸ τὸ λαμπρῶ ἐσθῆτι κεκοσμημένον φαίη τις εἶναι μακάριον ἀλλὰ τὸ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἔχον καὶ σπουδαίως διακείμενον, κἂν μηδὲν τῶν προειρημένων αὐτῷ παρῆ' τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ψυχὴ εἴη ἢ πεπαιδευμένη, τὴν τοιαύτην καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον εὐδαιμόνα προσαγορευτέον ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἢ λαμπρῶς κεκοσμημένους, αὐτὸς μηδενὸς ἀξίος ὦν οὐδὲ γὰρ ἵππον, κἂν ψέλια χρυσὰ καὶ σκευὴν ἔχη πολυτελῆ φαῖλος ὦν, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀξιότιμος νομιζόμενος εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅς ἂν διακείμενος ἢ σπουδαίως, τοῦτον μᾶλλον ἐπαυνοῦμεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις τῶν οἰκετῶν αὐτοῦ χείρων εἴη, καταγέλαστος ἂν γένοιτο, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἷς πλείονος ἀξίαν τὴν κτήσιν εἶναι συμβέβηκε τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως, ἀθλίους τούτους εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τοῦτο κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὕτως ἔχει· τίκει γὰρ, ὥσπερ φησὶν ἡ παροιμία, κόρος μὲν ὕβρι, ἀπαίδευσία δὲ μετ' ἐξουσίας ἄνοιαν· τοῖς γὰρ διακείμενοις τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς, οὕτε πλούτος οὕτε ἰσχύς οὕτε κάλλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ὅσῳ περ ἂν αὐταὶ μᾶλλον αἰ διαθέσεις καθ' ἕπερ βολὴν ὑπάρξωσι, τοσοῦτῳ καὶ πλείω καὶ μείζω τὸν κεκτημένον βλάπτουσι, χωρὶς φρονήσεως παραγενόμενα.

χαρίεντες] 'Cultivated'—synonymous with τοῖς σοφοῖς three lines below. Cf. *E. N.* i. 13. 7 τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες, an expression regarded by Zell as equivalent to τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφωτέρας τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες, *de Sensu*, i. 436 a. 21. Cf. *de Divinat.* i. 463 a. 4 λέγουσι γοῦν καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες ὅτι δεῖ σφόδρα προσέχειν τοῖς ἐνυπνίοις· εὐλογον δὲ οὕτως ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ τοῖς μὴ τεχνίταις μὲν, σκοποῦμενοι δὲ τι καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. For other references to the use of *charis* see *Index Arist.*

a. 19. τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν] 'εὖ πράττειν is an ambiguous phrase. In its usual acceptation it would rather mean "faring-well" than "acting-well." Grant. It is Aristotle's object to give

an active instead of a passive sense to these commonly accepted 1095 a. 19. expressions for the Chief End.

τί ἐστιν] *Tis estin* is the reading of Ob, CCC, NC, adopted by a. 20. Zell, Coraes, Michelet, and Ramsauer. The Paraph. and Aspasius seem to have read *τί ἐστιν*. Eustratius distinguishes between the two readings: ὦν τὸ μὲν (*i. e.* *tis*) τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸ δὲ (*i. e.* *ti*) τοῦ οὐσιώδους λόγου δηλωτικόν: *i. e.* *tis estin* relates to a thing looked at in the concrete with all its material qualities, while *τί ἐστιν* (as=τὸ *τι ἦν εἶναι*) is the technical expression for the essence (οὐσία ἢ ἐν ὄντι) or form (εἶδος), declared in definition (ὀρισμός, ὄρος, or λόγος). Michelet argues that *tis* is the better reading here, since Aristotle is about to state, not the definition of εὐδαιμονία, but popular opinions regarding it. See the notes of Zell and Michelet. The weight of MS. authority is in favour of *τί*, and *τί* seems to be required to bring out with sufficient sharpness the antithesis between the clauses beginning *ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν* and *περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας*.

§ 3. ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν] Eudemus (*E. E.* i. 2. 1214 b. 24) a. 23. explains the identification of εὐδαιμονία with *τιμὴ*, *δόξα*, *πλοῦτος*, or *παιδεία*, by the fact that these are *conditions* of Happiness, and there is a natural tendency to identify the conditions of the existence of a thing with the thing itself: *ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτ' αἴτια τῆς ἀμφωβητήσεως περὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τί ἐστι, καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων· ὦν ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ οὔν τε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἔνοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσιν.*

συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν] 'Conscious of their own ignorance.' a. 25. They answer to those who make *παιδεία*, 'superior attainments,' the *σκοπὸς* τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν, in the list given by Eudemus, i. 2. 1214 b. 8.

ἔνοι] The Platonists, whose view is examined in chapter 6. a. 28. Aristotle formulates the doctrine of ideas in the expression *ἐν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ* (*i. e.* a single 'universal substance,' *καθόλου οὐσία*, in which the particulars, *τὰ πολλὰ, τὰ αἰσθητά*, 'participate'—*μετέχει*, but which is nevertheless separate from them—*χωριστόν*). His own view opposed to this doctrine he formulates in the expression *ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν* (*i. e.* that in which the particulars are seen to resemble one another, which is predicated of—*κατηγορεῖται κατὰ*—any one of them, as a quality—*ποιόν τι*—possessed by it. See *An. Post.* i. 11. 77 a. 5 *εἶδη μὲν οὖν εἶναι, ἢ ἐν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται· εἶναι μέντοι ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ καθόλου, ἂν μὴ τοῦτο ἦ· ἐὰν δὲ τὸ καθόλου μὴ ἦ, τὸ μέσον οὐκ ἔσται, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἀπόδειξις.* *Met. Z.* 13. 1038 b. 35 *φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν*

1095 a. 26. τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων τὸδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιούδε.

Spengel (*Aristotelische Studien I. Nic. Eth.* p. 203) conjectures γάρ for δ' after ἐνιοι: 'Es folgen nämlich die Philosophen, welche etwas von den gewöhnlichen Ansichten weit abgehendes sagen, und dadurch dem Volke imponirten, das waren aber jedenfalls die Idealisten. Aristoteles ist damit in den Gegensatz von den πολλοί zu den σοφοί übergegangen, und hat zugleich den Platonikern einen Schlag gegeben; ihre Lehre werde von der Masse nur angestaunt, weil sie gar zu frappant und eigenthümlich scheine. Ich halte γάρ für nothwendig.' Spengel's γάρ would certainly convey a very pretty 'hit' at the Platonists; but I think that δέ is needed to answer to μέν, line 22.

a. 29. § 4. τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινα λόγον] Views which 'lie on the surface' and are therefore popularly accepted, or views which, as 'involving a theory of some kind,' are more recondite, and are therefore confined to philosophers. Cf. *Rhet.* iii. 10. 1410 b. 22 ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα καὶ ἂ μηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι, quoted by Zell and Grant. Cf. Aristotle's *Fragm.* 470. 1555 b. 12 sqq. διὸ καὶ τὰς κόπας αὐτῶν ἐλεφαντίνας ἐποίησαντο καὶ τῷ μεγέθει περιττάς· ὅθεν ἢ Κορκυραία ἐπεπόλασε μάλιστα καὶ εἰς παροιμίαν ἦλθε. The Paraphrast's note is ἰκανὸν δέ ἐστιν εἰ ἐξετάσομεν τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείων νομιζόμενας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινα λόγον. The principle of selection laid down here is that of *Top.* i. 12. 105 a. 34, referred to by Zell after Muretus: τὰς μὲν οὖν προτάσεις ἐκλεκτέων, ὁσαυτὸς διαρίσθη περὶ προτάσεως, ἢ τὰς πάντων δόξας προχειριζόμενον ἢ τὰς τῶν πλείστων ἢ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν καὶ τούτων ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων ἢ τῶν γνωριμωτάτων.

a. 30. § 5.] 'From hence, to the end of the chapter, follows the second digression on the method of Ethics.' Grant.

Before beginning the examination, promised in § 4, of the popular views (examined in chap. 5), and of the philosophical views (examined in chap. 6), Aristotle enters upon a παρέκβασις concerning the method of moral science and the previous training which the student of the science must have received. The παρέκβασις seems to suggest itself suddenly in connexion with the mention of τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας δόξας, as distinguished from τὰς δοκούσας ἔχειν τινα λόγον. The former δόξαι are of inductive origin, based on observation, however onesided, of the circumstances of life; whereas

the latter recommend themselves on *a priori* and abstract grounds. 1095 a. 30. Hence the words μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

In every enquiry a beginning must be made from what the enquirer 'knows.' Cf. *An. Post.* i. 1. 71 a. 1 πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προὑπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως. The enquirer's 'previous knowledge' may be either of abstract formulae generally applicable to the explanation of particular cases, or of particular concrete phenomena requiring explanation. Thus in Geometry he starts from the axioms and definitions,—certain abstract principles which are 'known,' and proceeds from them to the various more particular truths of the science. In the science of Medicine, on the other hand, the knowledge with which he begins is of symptoms—certain particular concrete phenomena of health and disease, from the observation and comparison of which he proceeds to the discovery of the hitherto unknown general laws of life, on which they depend. Where a few abstract forms of great simplicity, and therefore easily 'known,' can be applied to the resolution of particular problems, the enquiry is deductive. Geometry, which makes complex spatial relations plain to the eye by breaking them up into simple spatial relations already 'known,' (*Met.* θ. 9. 1051 a. 21, &c. εὐρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργεῖα· διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὐρίσκουσιν· εἰ δ' ἦν διηρημένα φανερά ἂν ἦν· νῦν δ' ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει· διὰ τί δύο ὀρθαὶ τὸ τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἱ περὶ μίαν στεγμὴν γωνίαι, ἴσαι δύο ὀρθαί· εἰ οὖν ἀνήκτο ἢ παρὰ τὴν πλευρὰν, ἰδόντι ἂν ἦν εὐθὺς δῆλον) is the perfect type of deductive reasoning. But where the enquiry is concerned not with abstract spatial relations, or with the development of mere notions, but with the behaviour of real phenomena in nature, no such simple formulae capable of explaining the phenomena are 'known' to the enquirer from the first. The concrete phenomena themselves are 'known,' and the formulae have to be abstracted from them. The falling of bodies to the earth, the swinging of the pendulum, the tides, the orbit of the moon, and the orbits of the planets, had all been separately 'known' before Newton evolved the great generalisation which explains them. An enquiry concerned with the behaviour of real phenomena in nature is (in its earlier stages at least) inductive.

Having alluded to the distinction between Deduction and Induction, and indicated, by the expressions γνώριμα ἀπλῶς and γνώριμα ἡμῖν (of which more hereafter), the ground on which the

1095 a. 30. one or the other of these two methods is adopted in a given enquiry, Aristotle asserts that moral science must be prosecuted on the inductive method, because particular cases of conduct are at first 'better known' to the enquirer than the general principles of conduct which give them significance. These particular cases, however, which must be known to begin with by the student of morals, will be entirely beyond the experience of one who has not been habituated to perform right actions and avoid wrong actions, and therefore has no stable moral character. Moral science assumes that the student has learnt practically to discriminate in his conduct between right and wrong actions, or, to use the technical language of the present passage, that he 'knows' that such and such actions are right, and such and such others are wrong; it then proceeds to show him *how* and *why* they are right and wrong—*i. e.* to discover their law. But the man of unstable moral character does not 'know' that such and such actions are right or wrong, because these terms have no meaning except in relation to a definite system of life, and his life is conducted on no system, but is obnoxious to the temptation of the passing moment. The present παρέκβασις, then, in which it is thus stated that the method of Ethics is observational and inductive, prepares us for the use which Aristotle afterwards (*E. N.* i. 8) makes of the popular views, which embody at least a certain amount of true observation, and explains the contempt with which he treats the *à priori* system of the Platonists.

a. 31. οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι] Deduction, συλλογισμός, *E. N.* vi. 3. 3
ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου.

οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς] Induction, ἐπαγωγή, *Top.* i. 10. 105 a. 13
ἐπαγωγή δὲ ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν καθέκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔφοδος.

a. 32. ὁ Πλάτων] Bekker and Sus., following L^b, omit ὁ. Bywater, following K^b, M^b, Cambr., restores it to the text. Grant, omitting ὁ, remarks that 'the use of the word Πλάτων here, without the article, shows that a personal reference to the philosopher is intended': see also Grant's note on vi. 13. 3, where it is remarked that Aristotle uses the article when he speaks of characters in books (*e. g.* of the Socrates of Plato's Dialogues), but gives the names of real persons without the article, except in cases of renewed mention. But, as Plato is not a character in a book, like ὁ Σωκράτης, but always a real person, it is difficult to see what we gain by being told here 'that a personal reference to the philo-

sopher is intended.' Grant continues, 'The use of the imperfect ἠπόρει shows that the reference is *general*; when Aristotle quotes from a particular passage in the *Laws* (653 A) of Plato (*Eth.* ii. 3. 2) he says ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν.' It will be observed that in ii. 3. 2 the article appears (in apparently all MSS., and yet the reference to Plato as the writer of a particular passage is as much 'a personal reference to the philosopher' as the 'general reference' to him in the present section. It seems to me to be unsafe to attach importance to the presence or absence of the article before Πλάτων here or elsewhere, more especially where, as here, the MSS. are divided. Σωκράτης, of course, is in an entirely different position. As regards the reference in ἠπόρει being 'general,' not (as Michelet and Heylbut, *Asp.* p. 9, suppose) to the passage on the dialectical method at the end of *Rep.* vi. 510 sqq., I think that this may very well be so. Muretus, failing to find any discussion of the ἀπορία in the writings of Plato, suggests that the reference is to his ἀγραφα δόγματα.

ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων] Cf. *An. Post.* i. 1. 71 a. 1 b. 2.
πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως: *Top.* vi. 4. 141 a. 28 γνωρίζομεν δ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων *ε. . .* οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ μάθησις ἔχει.

ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς] 'Απλῶς attached to a term indicates that the term is to be taken in its *strict sense*: cf. the ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής of *E. N.* vii. 4. Γνώριμα ἀπλῶς, then, are objects which are *known* (*nota* not *scibilia*: see the notes of Zell and Michelet), in the strict sense of the term *known*. According to Aristotle the pure form (εἶδος, οὐσία ἄνευ ὄλης) is known in the strict sense of 'known.' Where the form is with difficulty recognised, or not at all, on account of its implication with ὄλη in a σύνολον, or concrete material object, there is *knowledge* only in a secondary and qualified acceptance of the term. This inferior kind of knowledge, however, is given in experience before 'knowledge' strictly so called. Concrete objects of sense are πρότερα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, or γνωριμωτέρα ἡμῖν, while the εἶδη are πρότερα φύσει or γνωριμωτέρα φύσει, *i. e.* although not first known by us in *the order of time*, the εἶδη are *logically* first, inasmuch as the knowledge of them is necessary to the right understanding of the material objects in which they are embodied; and they are 'naturally better known,'

1095 b. 2. because knowledge realises its true 'nature,' or reaches its goal, when it apprehends the *εἶδος* without admixture of matter. Cf. the use of *φύσει* in the statement, *Pol.* i. 1. 1253 a. 19 *πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους—i.e.* although the family existed before the *πόλις* was evolved by the *συννοικισμός* of *κῶμαι*, yet the *πόλις* is the goal towards which the *φύσις* of man tends from the very first; he is *φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον*, and we cannot properly understand him in his earlier phases, unless we keep in view the final goal of his *φύσις*. Man moves towards the *πόλις*, in which individualism gives place to the consciousness of social relations, as the whole natural world moves towards the perfect form of the *πρωτὸν κινούν*, attracted, as it were, by its beauty. See *Met.* A. 7. 1072 a. 24 *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινεῖ μίσην* [see Bonitz *Met. ad loc.* on the text], *ἔστι τοίνυν τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ αἰδίων καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὐσα. κινεῖ δὲ ὡς τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον . . . 1072 b. 3 κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον.* Similarly, knowledge advances from the confused data of the senses to the clear perception of relation or form. Form is the goal of knowledge, and is therefore *φύσει γνώριμον*. It is the *ἀπλῶς γνώριμον*, that which is known in the true sense of 'known.' See *An. Post.* i. 2. 71 b. 33 *πρότερα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ γνωριμώτερα διχῶς. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτον πρότερον τῇ φύσει καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον' οὐδὲ γνωριμώτερον, καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερον λέγω δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἀπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ πορρώτερον' ἔστι δὲ πορρωτάτω μὲν τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα' ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἀντίκειται ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοισι.* 'Quamvis,' says Michelet, p. 21, 'cognitio rerum sensibilibus sit facilius nobis et primi ad eam feramur, vulgusque ipsum ea non careat (*Met.* i. 2): tamen minus scientiae et veritatis in rebus sensibilibus inest, et tum demum scire putamur, si universalia, difficillima cognitu et a sensibus remotissima, perceperimus; quo fit, ut principiorum, quippe quae non ἡμῖν γνωριμώτατα sint, etsi ἀπλῶς ἢ φύσει γνωριμώτατα, admodum pauci, ii nempe, qui divinam quaerunt beatitudinem, i.e. sapientes participes fiant. Principia vero ideo γνωριμώτερα sunt, quod ipsius animi naturam efficiunt, singularium autem rerum cognitio ex fortuitis uniuscujusque perceptionibus pendet . . . p. 22, Attamen si semper singularia nobis essent notiora, semper in scientiis ab singularibus ad principia ascendere deberemus; et Aristoteles prorsus, ut putant, esset empiricus qui analytica sola utatur methodo (i.e. induction). Sed

hoc loco Paraphrastes et Eustratius recte scientias distinguunt. 1095 b. 2. Sunt enim scientiae in quibus, naturali rerum ordine servato (i.e. the order of our knowledge is, as it were, that of φύσις), ἀπλῶς γνώριμα et nobis sunt γνωριμώτερα, ita ut ex causis (αἰτίων) utpote plus perspicuitatis habentibus ad effectus (αἰτιατά) digrediamur; ex gr. in mathematica et metaphysica, in quibus hanc ob causam a principiis et universalibus ad reliqua descendendum est. In quibusdam vero aliis scientiis effectus manifestiores nobis quam ipsae causae apparent, ubi, naturali rerum ordine mutato, nobis notiora non simpliciter sunt notiora. Quamobrem hisce in scientiis viam alteram ingredi oportet, non ex principiis, sed ad principia.' The difficulty of this ascent from the particular to the universal, from the effect to the cause, from the concrete to the abstract, from the matter to the form, is noticed in an interesting passage in *Met.* Z. 4. 1029 b. 4, sqq., where it is said that, as in moral education, the problem is to make that which is really or 'naturally' good also good for the individual, so in science, the problem is to make that which is really or 'naturally' known or true, also known or true for the individual student: ἡ γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἡττων γνωριμῶν φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον' καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθῶν, τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθὰ, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῶ γνώριμα. The 'ordinary way of knowledge' from the concrete effects to the general law is described in *Top.* vi. 4. 141 b. 5, sqq., and illustrated by the manner in which we acquire our knowledge of the *στιγμῆ*, or mathematical point. The solid is more evident to the senses than the plane, the plane than the line, and the line than the point. This is the order of our knowledge, but the order of natural production is in the opposite direction. The motion of the point generates the line, of the line the plane, of the plane the solid. The point is *φύσει πρότερον* to the line, plane, and solid; but the solid is *πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον*, i.e. more obvious to our senses. *Τὸ φύσει πρότερον* is the source from which the sensible particulars flow, as it were, and, though last to be known by us, is the first principle of natural generation. We can gather from Aristotle's theory of Definition *διὰ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων*, or *à priori*, which is stated in *Top.* vi. 4, as well as from his theory of *ἀπόδειξις*, that he found it more difficult than we do now to distinguish between a principle of actual generation, and a principle of clear explanation. He concludes the passage in the *Topics* (vi. 4) with the words

1095 b. 2. (141 b. 15) ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῶν προτέρων (i.e. φύσει πρ.) τὰ ὕστερα πειρᾶσθαι γνωρίζειν· ἐπιστημονικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τοιούτων ἔστιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδυνατοῦντας γνωρίζειν διὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διὰ τῶν ἐκείνους γνωρίμων ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον. . . 142 a. 9 ἴσως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς γνωρίμων οὐ τὸ πᾶσι γνωρίμων ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῖς εὖ διακειμένοις τὴν διάνοιαν. Cf. *E. N.* vii. 3. 13, 14, where the καθῶου is distinguished as ἐπιστημονικόν from the ἔσχατος ὄρος of sensation.

Our knowledge of concrete objects, then, coming before our knowledge of the forms or general laws which they realise, the method of all the concrete or natural sciences will be (at least in the earlier stages) observational and inductive: see *Phys.* i. 1. 184 a. 16 πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἢ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφέστερων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἀπλῶς· διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφέστερων μὲν τῇ φύσει, ἡμῖν δὲ σαφέστερων, ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. ἔστι δ' ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον ὕστερον δὲ ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα. But in mathematics the case is different. Here there are no concrete objects, in which the εἶδος is obscured by the ὄλη, and has to be abstracted from it by a toilsome process of comparison and generalisation. The objects are εἶδη pure and simple, or abstractions—τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, *ab initio*; and among these abstractions the simplest and most easily 'known' are those of the widest application. The axioms and definitions are more easily 'known,' than the particular properties of the various figures which are shown to involve these axioms and definitions; hence the method of mathematics will be deductive. This does not, of course, affect the truth of the position (on which Aristotle is quite explicit: see *An. Post.* i. 18) that our knowledge of mathematical, as of all other ἀρχαί, is derived from the materials presented in sense-experience. The experience, however, required for the acquisition of mathematical principles is much *slenderer* than that necessary for the attainment of the principles of a concrete science like medicine or politics. In other words—where we deal with diagrammatically representable relations of space we can begin the deductive method almost at once; where we deal with concrete phenomena, the deductive stage, if reached at all, must be preceded by a long period of inductive enquiry. Νοῦς—the faculty of specially attending to that which is common in a multitude of sense-presentations, and of abstracting it as a point of view—perceives the form in the

matter supplied by induction, easily, or with difficulty, according to 1095 b. 2. the nature of the matter. Spatial forms are easily abstracted, but 'kinds' or 'metaphysical notions' with difficulty; and when abstracted 'kinds' and 'notions' are not the lucid principles of deduction that spatial forms are, because their application is not diagrammatic, but to concrete phenomena. On τὰ φύσει γνωριμώτερα and τὰ ἡμῖν γν. see Michelet's note *ad loc.*, Trendelenburg's *Elementa Logices Aristoteleae*, § 19, and his *De Anima* ii. 2, § 1, note.

ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων] 'Perhaps then b. 3. we at all events must commence with what we know? Aristotle was probably unconscious of the sort of pun in this sentence. He merely asserts that we (*i. e.* ethical philosophers) must start from a basis of personal experience.' (Grant.) The gist of the present παρέκβασις may be given as follows. Εὐδαιμονία is the ἀρχή, or first principle of human life. Are we in possession of the knowledge of this ἀρχή *ab initio*, as we are in possession of the principles of geometry, and will moral science consist merely in the deductive application of it to explain the details of conduct; or will the science not rather consist mainly in the attempt to abstract this ἀρχή from the ὄλη of our particular experience, *i. e.* to *find* it? Aristotle, as Eustratius and the Paraphrast (the latter with a certain qualification) interpret the present passage, decides here in favour of the second alternative. How far he is true to his decision we shall see. The Paraphrast's words are—ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ καὶ αἰτία ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων δι' ἐκεῖνο γὰρ τι πράττομεν) ζητητέον, πῶς δεῖ ποιήσασθαι τὸν περὶ αὐτῆς λόγον· ἔχει γὰρ διαφορὰν καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν μικρὸν διαληψόμεθα· τῶν γὰρ αἰτίων τὸ μὲν τελικόν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ εἰδικόν τὸ δὲ ἰλικόν τὸ δὲ ποιητικόν· καὶ ποιητικὸν μὲν ἢ ἐνέργεια τοῦ τεχνίτου· ἰλικόν δὲ τὰ ξύλα καὶ οἱ λίθοι ἐξ ὧν ἡ οἰκία. εἰδικόν δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας· τελικόν δὲ δι' ὃ ἡ οἰκία γέγονεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα αἰτία εἰσὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τοῦ εἶναι, ἴττια εἰσὶ καὶ τῆς γνώσεως αὐτῶν καὶ δι' αὐτῶν δύνανται ἐκεῖνα γνωσέσθαι. εἰάν γὰρ τις εἶδῃ τὴν τέχνην τοῦ τεχνίτου καθ' ἣν τὴν οἰκίαν ἐδημιούργησεν, εἴσεται τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἀγαθὴν ἢ φαύλην, ὅσον τῇ τέχνῃ προσῆκε. καὶ ὁ τὴν ὄλην εἶδῶς καὶ ὁ τὸ εἶδος ὁμοίως. πάλιν δὲ γνώσκοντες τί τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς εἰσόμεθα ἢ ἀγαθὴν ἢ φαύλην. Συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀνάπαυον ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναί τὸ ἀποτελεσματὰς αἰτίας γνωσέσθαι· ὁ γὰρ εἶδῶς τὴν οἰκίαν, [v. l. αἰτίαν] τὴν τέχνην εἴσεται τοῦ τεχνίτου, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως. ὥστε τοὺς λόγους διχῶς ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι· ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀποδεικνύειν, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰ ἀποτελέσματα

1095 b. 3. *χρήσιμα δὲ ἑκάτερα τῶν μεθόδων κατὰ καιρὸν.* [This is the qualification, alluded to above, with which the Paraphrast seems to accept the present passage as pledging Aristotle to an inductive method in Ethics.] *καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀποδείξομεν ὅταν αὐταὶ δῆλαι ὦσιν· τὰ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ὅταν τὰ ἀποτελέσματα φανερώτερα ᾖ.* διὰ τοῦτο καὶ Πλάτων καλῶς ἐξίτηι τοῦτο καὶ ἠπόρει, ὡς οὐκ ἀδιάφορον ὄν ἐπὶ παντός, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ προσήκουσα τῆς ἀποδείξεως ὁδός, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· ὥσπερ ἐν σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ ἢ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν, διττῆς οὖν οὐσης τῆς ὁδοῦ, πόθεν ἡμῖν ἀρκτέον; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων δηλονότι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων, ὧν ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον τὸ πολιτικὸν τέλος ἐστί; δεῖ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων ἄρξασθαι, οὐ τῆ φύσει, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ γνωρίμα λέγονται αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ ἢ φύσει πρότερα παρίστησι, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα πρώτως ὁρᾷ ἡμῖν δὲ τὰ ἀποτελέσματα γνωρίμα· ὅθεν ἀρκτέον οὕτω γὰρ σαφῆς ἔσται ὁ λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων γνωόμενος. Eustratius explains as follows—*ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἀρχὴ μὲν τελικὴ ἢ εὐδαιμονία, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τέλος ἄγουσαι αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰσι πράξεις, αὐταὶ δὲ ὕστεραι μὲν τῆ φύσει ὡς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἰτιαταί, ἡμῖν δὲ σαφέστεραι καὶ γνωριμώτεραι, ἐκ τούτων ἡμῖν ἀρκτέον καὶ ἀντίον δι' αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ αἴτιον—i. e. εὐδαιμονία is the Final Cause of Life. The various ἀρεταί are naturally subsequent to it, as being its effects—i. e. as being what they are in virtue of it, just as the hand is a hand in virtue of the body; but they are more evident to us than it is—i. e. we learn (under the influence of moral training) to discriminate practically, or in our habitual conduct, between good and bad actions, before we can form a notion of life as a great whole, and understand why and how they are good and bad; accordingly, we must begin our study of moral science with this merely empirical 'knowledge of the ἀρεταί,' and rise from it to the knowledge of their cause, εὐδαιμονία.*

b. 4. §§ 6, 7. *Διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἠχθῆαι καλῶς . . . τοῦ διότι.* [The connexion here may be exhibited as follows. Moral science must begin with moral facts—with particular moral actions. The student of moral science must be able to see for himself that a particular act is good or bad. (Ἀρχὴ τὸ ὅτι . . . ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων). It will be useless to *tell* him that such and such an act is good or bad; he must have a tendency to think it good or bad. He cannot manifest this tendency unless he has often performed, or abstained from performing, the act in question—i. e. unless he has acquired a *habit* in relation to it. When he has once acquired good habits,

he may derive profit from the study of moral science; for then 1095 b. 4. he knows what it is about—he then realises what is meant by calling such and such actions good or bad. Habit makes him think a certain act good: moral science explains to him why it is so. Thus ἀρχή here means 'what we start with'—the particular in this case: whereas ἀρχάς in the next sentence (§ 7) is to be understood in the technical sense of 'universal principles' (see Grant *ad loc.*). At the same time we cannot help seeing that in using ἀρχή popularly, Aristotle is not uninfluenced by the associations connected with its technical meaning. The perception that a particular act is good or bad, which is an ἀρχή, in the sense of being simply the beginning of the study of moral science, itself involves a universal principle. The universal principle is the tendency to regard the act as good or bad, derived from the habit of performing it or avoiding it. The habits are thus ethical ἀρχαί, or first principles, or, at least, *media axiomata* under the supreme ἀρχή—εὐδαιμονία. Without the habits, the moral perceptions have no existence. Accordingly we cannot be said to start from the moral perception in the popular sense of 'starting' (ἀρκτέον, ἀρχή), unless we have already a habit which is a 'starting-point' in the technical sense as being a general principle. This seems to be the implication of the passage before us; and our interpretation of it is borne out by passages elsewhere in which habit is actually described as a sort of universal, viz. *E. N.* vi. 11. 4 ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα (i. e. the habitual motive or aim), αὐταὶ (i. e. particular acts)· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου—where καθόλου describes the habit which has been acquired by repetition of particular acts: and again *E. N.* i. 7. 20 τῶν ἀρχῶν δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῶ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως—'we perceive our starting-point, sometimes by induction, sometimes by simple sensation, sometimes by habituation. . . '—where ἐθισμός is presented as a sort of 'moral induction,' which puts us in possession of 'moral principles,' just as scientific induction gives us the principles of deduction.

There is no moral ὅτι, then, unless there are good habits. We begin our ethical studies with the ὅτι (ἀρχή τὸ ὅτι); but we should not perceive the ὅτι at all, unless we possessed the ἀρχή of habit. Our perception of the ὅτι is thus a sort of deduction from the principle of habit. So far as the conduct of ordinary men is concerned, the perception of the ὅτι supersedes the necessity of the knowledge

1095 b. 4. of the *διότι*—*i.e.* the fact that they perceive a certain act to be good (it being really good: this the *νομοθέτης* has seen to), implies that they are so habitually disposed towards it, that, from a practical point of view, speculative reasons, proving that it is good, may be dispensed with. Ordinary men, who act virtuously from habit, do not need to know, and perhaps could not understand, *why* they ought so to act. Their *Habit*, with the accompanying *Opinion* that the things habitually done are good, is a sufficient substitute for the *why*, *ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις*. The *νομοθέτης*, however, who is the author of the habit, must possess the *why*—he must know why certain acts are good. In his case, at least, it cannot be said, that the *ὅτι* is enough without the *διότι*. He must be able to show how the law of the habit (which is merely ‘empirical’ to the ordinary citizen) can be ‘derived from’ the Supreme Law (τὸ *διότι*) of Human Nature—*εὐδαιμονία*.

So much for the meaning which the immediate context undoubtedly gives to the present passage. But we must remember that *ὅτι* (as distinguished from *διότι*) has a special application, which could not fail to make itself felt to Aristotle’s mind here. *τὸ ὅτι* is that which is accepted without *ἀπόδειξις*: it is τὸ *ἀναπόδεικτον*. Hence it is a term specially applicable to the *ἀρχαί* or universal principles of *ἀπόδειξις*, which of course would not be *ἀρχαί* if they admitted of deductive proof—*i.e.* if they could be explained by means of a *διότι*. Thus we find *E. N.* i. 7. 20. 1098 a. 33 οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ’ οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ’ ἱκανὸν ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ’ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. Accordingly, the words before us—*ἀρχή γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι*—if abstracted for a moment from their context¹, mean that *ἀπόδειξις* must start from an *ἀρχή ἀναπόδεικτος*; and that, if this *ἀρχή* is self-evident, it is unnecessary to attempt to make it more evident by trying to find some higher *ἀρχή* (*διότι*), which may explain it. The Paraphrast actually speaks of the *ὅτι* of the present passage as *ἀρχή ἀποδείξεως*. He says—*εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀπεδείκνυμεν τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις ἀγαθὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὸν μὴ πεπαιδευμένον ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐπιβόμεν ἄν, λόγων ἀνάγκη δῆσαντες· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰστέρων τὴν ἀρχὴν βουλόμεθα ἀποδεικνύειν τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων δηλονότι, καὶ δεῖ ὑποκείσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν καθάπερ ἀρχὴν ἀποδείξεως ὅτι ἀγαθαί,*

¹ The passage would run very well with the clause *ἀρχή . . . διότι* omitted.

φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ δύναται πεισθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ὁ πείρα καλὰς καὶ δικαίας τὰς 1095 b. 4 τοιαύτας πράξεις εἰδῶς.

ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως] ‘*i.e.* ὁ καλῶς ἡγμένος. b. 7. Such a one is in possession of moral facts, which either stand already in the light of principles, or can be at once recognised as such ὄν the suggestion of the Philosophers.’ Grant. The Paraphrast’s comment is—*εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι ἀγαθαὶ αἱ πράξεις ἀρκούντως δέξαιτό τις οὐδὲν δεησόμεθα τοῦ διότι· τὴν δὲ αἰτίαν, τὸ τέλος δηλονότι, ἢ γνώσκει ἤδη, ἢ ἀκούσας ῥαδίως γνώσεται· ὅς δὲ οὐδ’ ἕτερον ἔχει τούτων, καὶ μήτε αὐτὸς γνώσκει, μήτε παρ’ ἑτέρων δύναται μαθάνειν, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου: Stahl’s note (*Aristoteles’ Nic. Eth. übersetzt und erläutert*) on this passage is good: ‘Aristoteles will also dass die *Erkenntniss der Principien der Sittlichkeit beim Menschen hervorgehe aus der thatsächlichen Erfüllung der Sittlichen Pflichten.*’*

μηδέτερον] neither ἔχει, nor λάβοι ἂν ἀρχάς.

b. 8.

οὔτος μὲν κ.τ.λ.] Hesiod, ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι 291–295. The sentiment expressed in these verses became proverbial, and reappears frequently in literature: see the notes of Magirus, Zell, Coraes, Michelet and Grant, who refer to Herod. vii. 16, Soph. *Antig.* 720, Livy xxii. 29, Cic. *Pro Cluentio* 31. The words of Sophocles are—

φήμ’ ἔγωγε πρῆβέειν πολὺ,
φύναί τὸν ἄνδρα πάντ’ ἐπιστήμης πλέων
εἰ δ’ οὖν, φιλεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο μὴ ταύτη· ῥέπειν,
καὶ τῶν λεγόντων εἶ καλὸν τὸ μαθάνειν.

and Livy’s words are—‘Saepe ego (*i.e.* Minutius addressing the soldiers) *audivi, milites, eum primum esse virum qui ipse consulat, quid in rem sit, secundum eum qui bene momenti obediat: qui vero nec ipse consulere nec alteri parere sciat, eum extremi ingenii esse.*’

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

It is quite natural that men's views about the Chief Good, or Happiness, should be determined by the manner of their lives. There are three prominent lives, and, corresponding to them, three leading views about Happiness.

(1) *The life of sensual enjoyment. The votaries of this life make Happiness Pleasure. This view has received more attention than it deserves, because the life of which it is the theory—the life of a brute beast—is that led by many persons of high station.*

(2) *The life of the man of affairs. He makes Social Success the Chief Good. But Social Success is too superficial a thing to be the Chief Good. It has its being rather in the applause of others than in the nature of the man himself; whereas the Chief Good must surely be something in a man—something which is his own, and not easily to be taken away from him. Moreover, those who seek the applause of their fellow citizens, seek it that they may have the satisfaction of believing in their own Goodness. Thus they put Goodness above applause. But even Goodness falls short of being the Chief End, for a man may 'have Goodness' and yet spend his whole life without doing anything worth doing—nay, may be involved in the greatest misfortunes, notwithstanding his Goodness: and it would be paradoxical to call such a man 'Happy.'*

(3) *The life of the thinker. This we shall examine afterwards. As for the life of money-making, it is contrary to nature. Its end, money, is obviously but a means, unnaturally converted into an end. Although the same is true of the other ends examined above, it is not so obviously true.*

1095 b.14. § 1. ἡμεῖς . . . ὑπολαμβάνειν] Let us return from this digression and examine men's ὑπολήψεις concerning the chief good, for (γάρ) these ὑπολήψεις are worth examination, being derived, as is only natural, from their own experience of life (οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκόσων ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν). Incorrect as these ὑπολήψεις are, they are not without a certain foundation in experience, and will embody part of the truth which we are in search of. They place happiness in the satisfaction of one side of human nature; a review of them will bring to light how many sides human nature has, and will enable us to fill in the details of our own theory of life, which, stated in outline, is that all the sides of human nature ought to be duly satisfied under the synoptic eye of νοῦς. The subject of εἰκόσων is οἱ μὲν πολλοί in § 2, and οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες in § 4, the words διό § 2 . . . Σαρδαναπάλλω § 3, being parenthetical. Peters does not bring out the force of οὐκ ἀλόγως correctly; he translates—'As to men's notions of the good or happiness, it seems (to judge, as we reasonably may from their lives) that the masses, who are the least

refined, hold it to be pleasure.' Οὐκ ἀλόγως relates not to our 1095 b.14. inference, but to the derivation of ὑπολήψεις from βίοι by those who live the βίοι; the ὑπολήψεις so derived are pronounced 'natural' or 'not unreasonable.' Williams falls into the same error as Peters; he translates—'the many and baser sort give by their lives a fair presumption that their conception of the chief good and of happiness is that it consists in material pleasure.' Stahr is right—'Wir kehren jetzt zu dem Gegenstande zurück, wovon wir abgeschweift sind. Es scheint mir nämlich, dass die Menschen nicht ohne eine gewisse Berechtigung ihre Ansichten über das was gut und was Glückseligkeit sei, nach ihren verschiedenen Lebensarten bilden.' So Lambinus—'Sane vero summum bonum et beatitudinem non sine ratione ex variis vitae generibus existimare videntur.' The Paraphrast takes too narrow a view of the scope of the clause τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν . . . ὑπολαμβάνειν, when he understands it merely to give a reason why men's views of the chief good vary so much—viz. because their lines of life (βίοι) vary—ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρέξέβημεν. ἦν δὲ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος περὶ τοῦ ὅτι διαφόρους οἱ ἄνθρωποι περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἔχουσι δόξας. Ἐκαστος τοίνυν ἀκολουθῶν τῷ οἰκείῳ βίῳ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὀρίζειται. This takes no account of οὐκ ἀλόγως, which prepares us for the importance which is attached below in chapter 8 to the ὑπολήψεις of the various classes of men.

§ 2. διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι] Ἀγαπῶσι means that they acquiesce b. 17. in, or look no higher than; καὶ means that their life is in accordance with their theory, or ὑπόληψις.

τρεῖς γὰρ εἰσι κ.τ.λ.] In the ἀπολαυστικός βίος a man sacrifices the λόγος, or harmony of his nature as a whole, to the ἐπιθυμητικὸν μέρος—to his desire for pleasure; in the πολιτικός βίος (as the term πολιτικός is used here) he sacrifices it to the θυμοειδὲς μέρος—to ambition, or love of social success, and the applause of others; but in the θεωρητικός βίος human nature is not treated as a means, but revered as an end. To be revered as an end it must be seen *sub specie aeternitatis* as divine, and this involves θεωρία. Hence human nature cannot be maintained as a λόγος in the πρακτικός βίος, except by one who has the σκοπός (see vi. I. §§ 1, 2, 3, notes) which θεωρία gives. To have this σκοπός, it is not indeed necessary to be oneself a 'philosopher' or 'thinker,' or actually to lead the separate θεωρητικός βίος strictly so called; but it is necessary to live in a city which has 'thinkers,' and is regulated for the sake

1095 b. 17. of them. In such a city *θεωρία*, which appears in the professed 'philosophers' or 'thinkers' as the clear consciousness of speculative truth, manifests itself in the men of affairs as a spirit whereby they are enabled to detach themselves somewhat from the influence of merely personal pleasures and ambitions—'material grounds of action,' and take a 'formal,' 'theoretic' view of life, comprehending it in its *μέγεθος καὶ τάξις* as a system of *καλαὶ πράξεις*. This is the spirit of the 'true politician,' as described by Eudemus—*E. E.* i. 5. 1216 a. 23 *οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γὰρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἐστὶ πράξεων προαιρετικὸς αὐτῶν χάριν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἕνεκεν ἄπτονται τοῦ ζῆν οὕτως.* The 'true' *πολιτικὸς βίος* is thus, in a sense, a *θεωρητικὸς βίος*, even in the case of the man of affairs who is not a professed philosopher or thinker. More literally, of course, it is a *θεωρητικὸς βίος* in the case of the man of affairs who not only lives in a city which exists for the sake of 'philosophers' or 'thinkers,' but is himself also a 'thinker' in the strict sense, and enjoys moments of inward philosophical *σχολή* in the course of his 'political' career. It is not necessary to be a professed 'philosopher' or 'thinker,' and to abstain from active participation in affairs in order to lead the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*. Perhaps the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* is most successfully realised, not as a separate life, but as the *form* of the *πολιτικὸς βίος*.

The three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three classes of men distinguished by Plato (*Rep.* 581)—*τὸ φιλοκερδὲς γένος, τὸ φιλόθειον καὶ φιλότιμον*, and *τὸ φιλόσοφον*, in the first of which *ἐπιθυμία* has the mastery, in the second *θυμός*, in the third *λόγος*. These three types of individual character are exemplified on a large scale in *πολιτεία* (*Rep.* 544, sqq.). In *ἀριστοκρατία* there is *ὁμόνοια*, 'one mind' extending throughout the whole body politic: all classes cheerfully conspire to maintain the good of the state, each performing its own function under *λόγος* or 'the constitution.' In *τιμοκρατία* order and discipline are confined to one class—the military class, representing *θυμός*, or the pushing self-asserting principle in human nature. In *ὀλιγαρχία* the principle of *ἐπιθυμία*, represented by a wealthy clique, takes the place of *θυμός*, and for a time, by adopting the maxim of 'cool self-regard,' manages to ward off anarchy. Finally, in *δημοκρατία* anarchy prevails, every individual doing what pleases him best at the time—till the *τύραννος*, representing the supremacy of some one *ἐπιθυμία* in

the individual character, puts an end to the licence of the many, 1095 b. 17. that the licence of one—the worst anarchy—may reign. So, in the *ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος* some tyrant *ἐπιθυμία* may determine conduct, or many *ἐπιθυμία* may have their turns; in the *πολιτικὸς βίος* ambition is the master-passion, and keeps order to a certain extent, but not in the interest of the whole man, only in its own interest; while in the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* all the functions of man's nature are exercised duly.

Michelet and Grant point out that this three-fold division occurs in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heraclides Ponticus (apud Cic. *Tusc.* v. 3), in which life is compared to the concourse at Olympia—some come to contend for prizes, some to buy and sell, some—the noblest sort—to look on as spectators: '[Pythagoran] ut scribit auditor Platonis Ponticus Heraclides vir doctus in primis, Phliuntem ferunt venisse; cumque Leonte principe Phliasiurum, docte et copiose disseruisse quaedam; cujus ingenium et eloquentiam cum admiratus esset Leon, quaesivisse ex eo, qua maxume arte confideret: at illum, artem quidem se scire nullam, sed esse *Philosophum*; admiratum Leontem novitatem nominis quaesivisse quinam essent Philosophi, et quid inter eos et reliquos interesset: Pythagoran autem respondisse—Similem sibi videri vitam hominum et mercatum eum qui haberetur maxumo ludorum apparatu totius Graeciae celebritate: nam ut illic alii corporibus exercitatis gloriari et nobilitatem coronae peterent, alii emendi aut vendendi quaestu et lucro ducerentur: esset autem quoddam genus eorum, idque vel maxume ingenuum, qui nec plausum nec lucrum quaererent; sed visendi causa venirent, studioseque perspicerent quid ageretur et quo modo: ita nos quasi in mercatus quandam celebritatem ex urbe aliqua sic in hanc vitam ex alia vita et natura profectos, alios gloriae servire, alios pecuniae; raros esse quosdam qui, ceteris omnibus pro nihilo habitis, rerum naturam studiose intuerentur: hos se appellare sapientiae studiosos: id est enim philosophos: et ut illic liberalissimum esset spectare nihil sibi adquirentem, sic in vita longe omnibus studiis contemplationem rerum cognitionemque praestare.' Iamblichus (*vita Pythag.* § 58) preserves the story in the following words—(see Cic. *Tusc.* v. 3, ed. Davisii, note) *εὐκείναι γὰρ ἔφη (Πυθαγόρας) τὴν εἰς τὸν βίον τῶν ἀνθρώπων παράδοτον τῷ ἐπὶ τὰς πανηγύρεις ἀπαντῶντι ὁμίλῳ· ὡς γὰρ ἐκείσε παντοδαποὶ φοιτῶντες ἄνθρωποι ἄλλος κατ' ἄλλου χρεῖαν ἀφικνεῖται, ὁ μὲν χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ κέρδους χάριν ἀπεμπολῆσαι τὸν φόρτον ἐπιειγόμενος· ὁ*

1095 b. 17. δὲ δόξης ἕνεκα ἐπιδειξόμενος ἤκει τὴν βίωμιν τοῦ σώματος ἔστι δὲ καὶ τρίτον εἶδος καὶ τό γε ἐλευθεριώτατον, συναλιζόμενον τόπων θέας ἕνεκα καὶ δημιουργημάτων καλῶν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἔργων καὶ λόγων· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ βίῳ παντοδαπούς ἀνθρώπους ταῖς σπουδαῖς εἰς ταῦτ' συναθροίζεσθαι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ χρημάτων καὶ τρυφῆς αἰρεῖ πόθος, τοὺς δὲ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἕμερος, φιλονεκία τε δοξομανεῖς κατέχουσιν· εἰλικρινέστατον δὲ εἶναι τοῦτον ἀνθρώπου τρόπον τὸν ἀποδεξίμενον τὴν τῶν καλλίστων θεωρίαν ὃν καὶ προσονομάζειν φιλόσοφον.

The Neoplatonic rendering of the θεωρητικὸς βίος, which makes it an ecstatic life of entire freedom from bodily influences, is quite foreign to the concrete view of human nature taken by Aristotle. Aristotle's θεωρητικὸς βίος is the *raison d'être* of the πόλις, in the same sense that the ψυχή is the *raison d'être* of the σῶμα. We know of no ψυχή except as correlated with a σῶμα; so we know of no θεωρία except as manifested by a civilized man, or πολίτης. It is true that in the Tenth Book of the *Ethics* he uses language which may seem to lend itself to a Neoplatonic rendering; but his object there is to abstract, and present clearly, the formal principle or theoretic element in actual life, and we must be careful not to make 'a material use' of this merely 'formal principle,' and suppose that he asserts the possibility or desirability of an actual life of pure θεωρία for man, in which the ζῶν πολιτικόν should be transformed into the θεός. The σοφός, as distinguished in the Tenth Book from the πολίτης, is as much an abstraction as θεός considered apart from the κόσμος. Hence we must not accept as a correct account of Aristotle's view the mystical comment of Eustratius on the θεωρητικὸς βίος of this passage—διακόπτων τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ σαρκινὸν τοῦτο νέφος καὶ προκαλύμμα θεῶ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς δι' ἀπάθειαν συγγίνεται. Aristotle himself was no believer in such a Nirvana, whatever influence he may have had on the evolution of the mystical doctrines of which this note of Eustratius is a reminiscence.

b. 19. § 3. ἀνδραποδώδεις] Zell and Michelet compare *E. N.* iii. 10. 8 περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῆα κοινῶν, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀφή καὶ γεῦσις. Magirus connects the contemptuous character of Aristotle's criticism of the ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος in this section with the remark made in *Tóp.* i. 9. 105 a. 3 οὐ δεῖ δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα, οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκοπεῖν· ἀλλ' ἦν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις τῶν λόγων δεομένων, καὶ μὴ κολάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως. The 'castigation,' as distinguished

from 'argument,' is contained here in the terms φορτικώτατοι and 1095 b. 19, ἀνδραποδώδεις, and in the comparison with βασκίματα.

τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου] 'Obtain consideration.' Grant compares *x. 6. 3. b. 21.*

τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις] Zell compares *viii. 6. 5 οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις.*

Σαρδαναπάλλω] Cf. *E. E.* i. 5. 1215 b. 36 ὁ γοῦν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βοῦς *b. 22.* ὃν ὡς Ἄπιον τιμῶσιν ἐν πλείοσι τῶν τοιούτων (*i. e.* τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν) ἐξουσιάζει πολλῶν μοναρχῶν . . . 1216 a. 16 οἱ δὲ Σαρδαναπάλλον μακαρίζοντες ἢ Σμυρναίην τὸν Συβαρίτην ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰς τῶν ζώντων τὸν ἀπολαυστικὸν βίον, οἳ δὲ πάντες ἐν τῷ χαίρειν φαίνονται τάττειν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. See *Cic. Tusc. v. 35* (among *Rose's Fragments of Aristotle, No. 77*) 'Quo modo igitur jucunda vita potest esse a qua absit prudentia, absit moderatio? Ex quo Sardanapalli opulentissimi Syriae regis error agnoscitur qui incidi jussit in busto,

Haec habeo quae edi, quaeque exsaturata libido

Haesit: at illa jacent multa et praeclara relicta.

Quid aliud, inquit Aristoteles, in *δουῖς* non in regis sepulchro inscriberes? Haec habere se mortuum dicit, quae ne vivus quidem diutius habebat quam fruebatur.' Cf. also *Cic. de Fin. ii. 32. 106* quoted by *Rose Fr. No. 77*. Had Eudemus, when he wrote ὁ γοῦν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βοῦς *κ.τ.λ.*, the work (*Dialogue περὶ δικαιοσύνης* according to *Rose*) to which this fragment belongs before him? The verses translated by Cicero are given by *Athenaeus viii. 14. 335* τί γὰρ τῶν ἐπιτρέψαι δυναμένων παρέλπει ὁ καλὸς οὗτος ἐποποιὸς (*i. e.* *Archestratus*, author of *γαστρονομία*) καὶ μόνος ζηλώσας τὸν Σαρδαναπάλλον τοῦ Ἀνακονδάραξω βίον, ὃν ἄδιανοητότερον εἶναι κατὰ τὴν προσηγορίαν τοῦ πατρὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἔφη. ἐφ' οὗ τοῦ τάφου ἐπιγεγράφθαι φησὶ Χρυσίππος τάδε

εὐ εἶδὸς ὅτι θνητὸς ἔφυς τὸν θυμὸν ἄεξε,

τερπόμενος θαλίῃσι· θανόντι τοι οὕτις ὄνησις.

καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ σπαδὸς εἰμι, Νίνου μεγάλης βασιλεύσας.

κεῖν' ἔχω ὅσ' ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ σὺν ἔρωτι

τέρπην' ἔπαθον· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὄλβια πάντα λείπειται.

ἦδε σοφὴ βιότιο παραινέσις, οὐδέ ποτ' αὐτῆς

λήσομαι. ἐκτίσθω δ' ὁ θέλων τὸν ἀπείρονα χρυσόν.

Athenaeus (*xii. 38. 528, 9*, apparently quoting *Ctesias*) and *Nicolaus Damascenus* (*ed. Tauchn. p. 251*) describe fully the luxurious habits of *Sardanapalus*. The latter writer says οἴκησιν ἔχων ἐν Νίνῳ, ἔνδον τὸ σύμπαν ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις διατρέψων, ὅπλων μὲν οὐχ ἀπτόμενος, οὐδ' ἐπὶ θήρῳ ἐξιών, ὥσπερ οἱ πάλαι βασιλεῖς, ἐγχρίμενος

1095 b. 22. δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον, καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὑπογραφόμενος, πρὸς τε τὰς παλλακίδας ἀμιλλώμενος περὶ κάλλους καὶ ἐμπλοκῆς, τό τε σύμπαν γυναικείῃ ἦθει χρώμενος. Cf. Athenaeus xii. 39. 530 Ἀριστόβουλος (served under Alexander, and wrote a history of his wars, which was Arrian's chief authority) δ' "ἐν Ἀγχιάλῃ ἦν ἐδείματο (φησὶ) Σαρδανάπαλος, Ἀλέξανδρος ἀναβαίναν εἰς Πέρσας κατεστρατοπεδεύσατο. καὶ ἦν οὐ πόρρω τὸ τοῦ Σαρδαναπίλου μνημεῖον, ἐφ' οὗ ἐστάναι τύπον λίθινον συμβεβληκότα τῆς δεξιᾶς χειρὸς τοὺς δακτύλους, ὡς ἂν ἐπικροτοῦντα. ἐπιγεγράφθαι δὲ αὐτῷ Ἀσσυρίοις γράμμασι: 'Σαρδανάπαλος, Ἀνακυνδαράξου παῖς, Ἀγχιάλῃν καὶ Ταρσὸν ἔδειμεν ἡμέρη μῆ. ἔσθιε, πίνε, παῖζε' ὡς τᾶλλα τούτου οὐκ ἔξια'—τοῦ ἀποκροτήματος ζουκε λέγειν." Sardanapalus (Asshur-bani-pal), son of Esarhaddon, reigned from about 667 till about 647. His reign marks the culmination of Assyrian power and civilization.

b. 23. § 4. τιμῆν] On τιμῆ as the end of 'political' life, see *E. N.* v. 6. 7 μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος (i. e. to the ἄρχων), τοῦτο δὲ τιμῆ καὶ γέρας. Cf. *Pol.* ii. 4. 1266 b. 38, where the πολλοί are said to be satisfied with κτήσεις, but the χαριέντες to strive after τιμαί, honores—ἐτι στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀπιστότητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν τοῦναντίον δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον: οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἄνισον, οἱ δὲ χαριέντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν ἕαν ἴσαι.

b. 24. ἐπιπολαιότερον] 'Too superficial for that which we are in search of.' Grant. Honour is not the nature and life of the person honoured, but a merely superficial and transitory reflection on him of the opinion of other people.

δοκεῖ . . . μαντευόμεθα] Honour depends on those who give it, not on him who receives it. It therefore cannot be the chief good, which is 'one's own' and depends on oneself; cf. *Met.* θ. 8. 1050 a. 34 sqq., from which we can understand how εὐδαιμονία, being an ἐνέργεια which contains its own end in itself, must be οἰκείον τι—i. e. something which resides wholly in the man who realises it—ἔσων δὲ μὴ ἔστων ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια: οἷον ἡ ὄρασις ἐν τῷ ὀρώντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ: διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία: ζωὴ γὰρ ποιά τις ἐστίν. On the other hand, where a result different from the ἐνέργεια is produced by its operation, i. e. where the ἐνέργεια is not its own end, but has an external end, the ἐνέργεια (consummation) is in the result—1050 a. 30 ἔσων μὲν οὖν ἕτεράν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γινόμενον, τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιομένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφανομένῳ: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ὅλος ἡ κίνησις

ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ. As ὕφανσις then is ἐν τῷ ὑφανομένῳ, so τιμῆ is ἐν 1095 b. 24. τοῖς τιμῶσι: it does not reside ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ as θεωρία resides ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι. The good opinion of others is an ἔργον, as it were, which a man produces, like a web or a house; it is not *his own life*.

The notion of *inherence*, which is doubtless the one primarily attaching to ἐν in the present case, does not of course exclude that of *being in the power of*, into which indeed it easily passes.

μαντευόμεθα] Zell quotes *Schol. Par.* μαντευόμεθα εἴρηται διὰ τὸ b. 26. μήπω τι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀποδειχθῆναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν εἰκασμῷ οὕτω λαμβάνεσθαι, στοχαστικῆ γὰρ τέχνη ἡ μαντικῆ. Cf. *De Gen. Anim.* iv. 1. 765 a. 27 μαντευόμενοι τὸ συμβησόμενον ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων καὶ προλαμβάνοντες ὡς οὕτως ἔχον πρὶν γινόμενον οὕτως ἰδεῖν. May not the term have a special appropriateness in connexion with τὰγαθόν, or the true Form of human life—τὸ ἐν ἡμῶν θεῖον, which man 'divines,' just as all plants and animals after their kinds instinctively, by a kind of natural divination, find their good—succeed in maintaining and perpetuating their various types, and so realise τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ θεῖον? See note on i. 2. 8 b. 7. All life—moral and physical—is a striving after Form, a divination of τὸ θεῖον.

§ 5. ἔτι . . . κρείττων] The editors refer to viii. 8. 2, where τιμῆ is said to be sought κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

πιστεύσωσιν] K^b, M^b, O^b, H^a have πιστεύσωσιν, which ought to b. 27. be restored to the text for Bekker's πιστεύωσιν. See Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 53: 'der Aorist hat inchoative Bedeutung.'

καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῆ] Epexegetical—'i. e. for their virtue.' b. 29.

§ 6. ἀτελεστέρα] ἀρετῆ is a mere ἔξις, or possession of the power b. 32. of acting well, not an ἐνέργεια or act; see ii. 5. This ἔξις may subsist without going forth in action. It is therefore ἀτελεστέρα—'falls short of being the τέλος' (Grant)—which is τὸ εἶ ζῆν in actuality, not in mere potentiality. Εὐδαιμονία is the manifestation of ἀρετῆ, and is defined in i. 7. 15 as ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετῆν. Thus ἀρετῆ is to εὐδαιμονία as δύναμις to ἐνέργεια.

καθεύδειν] is opposed to ἐνεργεῖν x. 8. 7 ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπελήφασιν αὐτοὺς [τοὺς θεοὺς] καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα: οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὡσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα.

ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετῆν] i. e. with the mere ἔξις of ἀρετῆ. 'Past merits,' b. 33.

1095 b. 33. says Grant, 'or the passive possession of qualities whose existence depends on the attestation of fame, cannot be thought to constitute the chief good. Very different from this is *ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν* an actual life of virtue in the present.'

1096 a. 1. *κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν*] cf. i. 9. 11. The good things of body and estate are the *ἄλη* in which the *εὐδαιμόν* realises the form of his nature. Without this matter the form cannot be realised; but the form is not to be confounded with the matter. *Εὐδαιμονία* is a certain manner of life. This manner of life requires certain conditions, as the art of Phidias required marble or ivory. As Eudemus puts it (*E. E.* i. 2. 1214 b. 16), we must be careful to distinguish between *τὸ ζῆν καλῶς* and *ἔν ἄνευ οὐ δυνατὸν ζῆν καλῶς*. Cf. Didymus, 'Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν περιπατητικῶν περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν δόγματα apud Mullach. *Fragm. Phil.* vol. ii. p. 90 *τοὺς δὲ νομίζοντας τὰ τοῦ εὐδαιμονία βίος ἔστιν, ὃ δὲ βίος ἐκ πράξεως συμπληροῦται τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πράξιν εἶναι κατ' ἑαυτό, οὔθ' ὅλως ἐνέργειαν . . . τὰ ἔν ἄνευ πράττειν ὀτιοῦν ἀδύνατον μέρη τῆς ἐνεργείας λέγειν οὐκ ὀρθόν.*

a. 2. *εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων*] For the meaning of *θέσις* as an *ἀρχή ἀποδείξεως* see *An. Post.* i. 2. 72 a. 14 sqq. where it is distinguished as *ἀρχή ἢ μὴ ἔστι δείξει, μὴδ' ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν μαθησόμενόν τι from ἀξίωμα*, which is an *ἀρχή ἢ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν ὀτιοῦν μαθησόμενον*. Here (*E. N.* i. 5. 6) however we are concerned with the *dialectical* (as distinguished from the apodeictic) *θέσις*, which is described in *Top.* i. 9. 104 b. 19 (quoted by Eustratius and the commentators after him) *θέσις δὲ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἔχουσα ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης ἢ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται καθ' Ἡράκλειτον ἢ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ὄν, καθάπερ Μελίσσος φησὶ τὸ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφηναμένου φρονιτίζειν εὐθές ἐστι. Ἄ θέσις, then, is a paradox maintained on the authority of some great philosopher. An exception is made in its favour in the application of that rule of Dialectic by which only *ἐνδοξα* are admitted as premisses, and *παράδοξα* as such excluded.*

In Aristotle's time the Cynics maintained the paradox indicated in the present passage, and after his time the Stoics, contending *ὅτι αὐτάρκης ἢ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν*—that the mere consciousness of virtue, even though its manifestation 'in works' be prevented by external circumstances, constitutes Happiness. (See Zeller's *Stoics*,

Epicureans, and Sceptics, pp. 224, 225, Engl. transl.) Cicero (*Paradoxa*, 2) defends the *θέσις*—*ὅτι αὐτάρκης ἢ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν*, 'arguing,' as Grant remarks, 'the greatness of Regulus in his misfortunes, as though that were identical with his happiness'; or perhaps rather identifying his 'idea of happiness' with 'the consciousness of happiness,' to borrow a delicate distinction drawn by Prof. Jowett (*Plato*, Introduction to the *Gorgias*). 'Nec vero,' says Cicero, 'M. Regulum aerumnosum nec infelicem nec miserum unquam putavi. Non enim magnitudo animi ejus cruciabatur a Poënis, non gravitas, non fides, non constantia, non ulla virtus, non denique animus ipse: qui tot virtutum praesidio tantoque comitatu, quum corpus ejus caperetur, capi certe ipse non potuit . . . bonus vir et fortis et sapiens miser esse non potest. Nec vero, cujus virtus moresque laudandi sunt, ejus non laudanda vita est, neque porro fugienda vita est quae laudanda est. Esset autem fugienda, si esset misera. Quamobrem quicquid est laudabile idem et beatum et florens et expetendum videri debet.' 'Plato,' says Prof. Jowett (l. c.), 'does not mean to say that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience, or that the sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than of the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. . . . What then is his meaning? . . . He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that physical suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them as happy. . . . We are not concerned to justify this idealism by the standard of utility or by the rules of logic, but merely to point out the existence of such a sentiment in the better part of human nature.'

Aristotle was not deficient in appreciation of the part which the idea of happiness plays in life; but his idealism was not of the kind to express itself rhetorically, and seem to have always in view some heroic figure of the tragic stage. His idealism consisted in his profound recognition of the fact that man has aspirations which can never be satisfied; which, nevertheless, must be fostered, because they give *élan* to those functions which are capable of actual fulfilment. The *αἰρετώτατος βίος* is indeed unattainable by man; but if he ceased to aspire to it, the good life, which is actually within his reach, would become, in its turn, an impossible ideal. See *E. N.* x. 7. 8. 1177 b. 31 *οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας ἀνθρώ-*

1096 a. 2. *πινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπων ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ.*
The account given of the spirit of the *ἀνδρείος* in *E. N.* iii. 9. § 3-5 shows us how well Aristotle understood the place of 'the idea of happiness' in life—not as a 'constitutive principle,' and equivalent to an actual 'consciousness of happiness,' but as a 'regulative principle.'

a. 3. *ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίους εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν*] It is often assumed that τὰ ἐγκύκλια are the same as ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι. One of the reasons for holding that the reference of the latter expression is to commonly accepted views, not necessarily embodied in any written work, is that the present tense is invariably (or almost invariably) used with it. But here, the perfect seems to indicate a special reference to a definite class of written works, or it may be to a definite course of lectures. See note on ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι i. 13. 9.

a. 4. § 7. ὑπὲρ οὗ] *περὶ* is Bekker's reading against the MSS., which all apparently give ὑπέρ. Susemihl and Bywater accordingly read ὑπέρ. Ὑπέρ with the genitive is so characteristic of the *M. M.*, and the Aristotelian commentators, that its reception into the text here (justified by the MS. authority) raises the question, whether the clause in which it occurs should not be bracketed as an interpolation. See notes on iii. 3. 2, and iv. 2. 4.

a. 5. ἐπομένους] x. 7.

§ 8. ὁ δὲ χρηματιστῆς (sc. βίος) βίαιός τις ἐστίν] The money-getting life is contrary to nature, for nature has always a definite τέλος, whereas money-getting goes on *εἰς ἄπειρον*, see *Pol.* i. 3. 1256 b. 41 *χρηματιστικὴν, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας εἶναι πλοῦτου καὶ κτήσεως . . .* 1257 b. 19 *ἔστι γὰρ ἑτέρα ἢ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ κατὰ φύσιν.* The term βίαιος is to be taken in its technical sense = *παρὰ φύσιν*: see *de Coelo* 300 a. 23 *τὸ δὲ βία καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ταυτῶν*: *Met.* Δ. 5. 1015 b. 14 *εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἄττα αἰδία καὶ ἀκίνητα, οὐδὲν ἐκείνους ἐστὶ βίαιον οὐδὲ παρὰ φύσιν*: *Met.* I. i. 1052 a. 23 *φύσει . . . καὶ μὴ βία*: *Phys.* iii. 5. 205 b. 5 *εἴη γὰρ ἂν τί που βία καὶ οὐχ οὐ πέφυκεν*: *Phys.* iv. 8. 215 a. 1 *πᾶσα κίνησις ἢ βία ἢ κατὰ φύσιν . . . ἢ μὲν γὰρ βίαιος παρὰ φύσιν ἐστίν*: *Phys.* viii. 4. 255 b. 31 *πάντα τὰ κινούμενα ἢ φύσει κινεῖται ἢ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βία.* Newman (note on *Pol.* i. 3. 1253 b. 18) remarks that the connexion which Aristotle traces between τὸ βίαιον and τὸ παρὰ φύσιν is inherited by him from Plato (*Tim.* 64 D), and from still earlier inquirers (cf. *Protag.* 337 D, for the words of the

Sophist Hippias). Eustratius interprets the passage incorrectly. 1096 a. 5. He says that the *χρηματιστῆς βίος* employs violent means to make money. Dante (*Inf.* xi. 109-111, quoted by Michelet) had this interpretation in view when he placed usurers among the 'violent' in Hell: although it is to be observed that the 'violence' consists in 'setting Nature, in herself, and in her follower (Art), at nought.' Grant translates—'But the life of gain is in a way compulsory,' and remarks that βίαιος 'is to be taken in a passive, not in an active sense. It is the opposite of ἐκούσιος, meaning "forced," as in *Eth.* iii. 1. 3. It implies that no one would devote himself, at the outset, to money-making, except of necessity, "parce qu'il faut vivre" . . . It is true that in several places βίαιος is opposed to κατὰ φύσιν, and in such contexts means "unnatural"; . . . But without such a context, it cannot simply stand for παρὰ φύσιν.' To this it may be answered that the term *χρηματιστῆς* of itself supplies the context required. That *χρηματιστικὴ* is ἄπειρος and παρὰ φύσιν is a common-place in the Aristotelian system.

For βίαιος we have the conjectures βίος ἄβιος, or ἄβιος (Muretus), and οὐ βίος (Coraes); but no correction is necessary. Aspasius has τὸν δὲ χρηματιστὴν βίαιον λέγουσι, τουτέστι μικρόν, ὡς πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν βίαιον λέγοντες τοῦτον—as if he read βαιός.

χρήσιμον] useful as means to end: see *Index Arist.* s.v. The a. 7. term is technically employed (alone or with εἰς τι and πρὸς τι) to denote the means. The life of money-making is concerned only with means, and has no limiting conception of the end of human endeavour. This the life of θεωρία has, and with this end identifies itself. The θεωρητικὸς βίος is Life, and exists for its own sake (see x. 7. 5); whereas the *χρηματιστῆς βίος* is not Life, but undue care for one of the material conditions of Life.

καταβέβληται] The editors quote *Pol.* Θ. 2. 1337 b. 22 αἰ a. 10. *καταβέβληται μαθήσεις*, 'the ordinary branches,' and *Pol.* Θ. 3. 1338 a. 36 *τῶν καταβέβλημένων παιδευμάτων*—where the notion of the fundamental character of these branches is conveyed. Here we may render—'and yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them,' thus bringing out the idea of a *foundation laid* for the claims of ἡδονή and τιμὴ and at the same time indicating that *labour has been wasted* on the attempt to lay such a foundation. I think that πρὸς αὐτὰ obliges us to take account of this latter point by suggesting *κατηράλωνται πρὸς αὐτὰ*.

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

Now let us examine the opinion of those who make the Chief Good a Universal Essence, or Idea, existing apart from all particular good things. It is an unpleasant duty to have to criticise this opinion, which is that of men who are our personal friends; but the philosopher is bound to prefer truth to friendship.

(1) Objects conceived as members of a sequence (e.g. numbers), where the subsequent depends upon the prior, they do not bring under a common Idea. But good is a conception which appears in the Category of Substance, and also in the Categories of Quality and Relation, which are subsequent to the Category of Substance, i.e. presuppose it as their ground. How then, on their own principles, can they bring these various appearances of Good under one common Idea?

(2) If all good things fall under one common Idea, i.e. have all one and the same Essence, or Form of Being, how comes it that, there being ten Categories, or Forms of Being, we find good things in all the ten, and not in one Category only? Thus, in the Category of Substance we find God and Reason, in that of Quality, the various Virtues; in that of Quantity, the Moderate; in that of Relation, the Useful—and these are all 'good things,' although the 'Form of their Being,' or 'their Essence' is not the same.

(3) Since things that have the same essential nature, or fall under one Idea, are all objects of one Science, good things ought all to be objects of the same science. But this is not so. Ever good things in the same Category are objects of different sciences—under the Category of Time, the science of the favourable opportunity in sickness is Medical Science; that of the favourable opportunity in warfare is Generalship.

(4) What do they gain by the prefix real by which they mark their Ideas? Real-man, and man, have the same essential nature, viz. that of 'man,' which is common to both. Similarly the real-good, and a good thing, are both 'good.'

(5) If they reply that real means everlasting, we ask, How can mere duration enhance Essence, and put the real-good in a higher position, qua good, than a good thing? If the Idea of the Good is good, it is so independently of time, and if a particular thing is good, it also is good independently of time, just as a thing is white, whether it be white for a day, or a thousand years.

A more plausible position than that before us is the position of the Pythagoreans, who give us a column of good things, within which, not outside of which, they place the Principle of Unity. Even Speusippus, it would appear, follows the Pythagoreans rather than the Platonists here.

But it may be objected to the foregoing criticism—'you have ignored the distinction between things good in themselves, and things good as means to these. It is only things good in themselves which the theory professes to bring under one Idea.'

Let us then confine our attention to things good in themselves.

If it be asked What things may be so described?—there are two alternative answers possible, viz. They are things such as seeing, or thinking, or as certain

pleasures and honours—or The Idea of the Good is the only thing good in itself. If the latter alternative be accepted, the class of things good in themselves will be left empty, for the Idea is not in the class. If the former alternative be accepted—i.e. if it be admitted that seeing, thinking, &c., are also good in themselves, as well as the Idea, then the same essential nature of Goodness must be apparent in them all, as the same quality of whiteness is apparent in snow and white paint. But as a matter of fact the 'goodness' of thinking differs essentially from that of seeing, and has its own definition. For the same reason the goodness of each of the pleasures and honours referred to has its own separate definition.

When we call a thing 'good,' then, we do not mean that it participates in common with all other good things in one Idea of the Good. What then do we mean? We mean something: for the same epithet is surely not applied by mere accident to all these things, without there being some common characteristic in them all justifying its application. What is this common characteristic? Perhaps the fact that they 'belong to the same department,' or 'contribute to the same end'—i.e. they are perhaps called 'good,' as a knife and a bandage are both called 'surgical,' because they belong to the same department—surgery, or as cleanliness and exercise are both called 'healthy,' because they contribute to the same end—health: or perhaps it is safer to say that things are called 'good' 'on the ground of identical relations'—e.g. the relation of the eye to the body is the same as that of reason to the soul; if we call the eye 'good' in its relation, we must call reason 'good' in its also. But the discussion of these matters belongs properly to another part of our system, and need not detain us further, especially as the Universal Good, apart by itself, even if it exist, is evidently a thing which man cannot make the end of his action, and lay hold of: and it is an end which he can lay hold of that we are now looking for.

But it may perhaps be said that a knowledge of the Idea of the Good helps us to perform those good actions which we can perform, and to lay hold of those good things which are within our reach, by giving us an 'example or standard of goodness' to serve as a test of the goodness of our conduct. This is a plausible view; but it is not supported by what, as a matter of fact, is the procedure of the sciences and arts. They all try to realise a good, and to supplement what is lacking to them, but it is never 'the knowledge of the Idea of the Good' that they make their desideratum. If this knowledge were really useful, is it likely that all men of science and artists would thus neglect it? But the chief argument against this view that a knowledge of the Idea is useful, is that derived from the difficulty of explaining to oneself how it can be useful—how it can be useful to a weaver or carpenter in his trade—how it can make a man a better general or a better doctor. So far, indeed, is a doctor from troubling himself with such wide 'knowledge,' that he does not take a wide view even of 'health,' the final end of his own profession. It is not Universal Health which he considers, but man's health, or rather his patient's health.

Introductory Note.] The 'Ideas' of Plato answered, in part, to 1096 a. 11. what we now call 'Laws of Nature.' As distinguished from particular phenomena which come and go, the 'Ideas are fixed'; hence are the objects of scientific knowledge, as distinguished from

1096 a. 11. mere sensation. Particular men are men, because they 'participate in,' or are 'copies of' the 'Idea of Man'; as we should say—because they are common results of that fixed Law of Nature which brings forth such beings as men. Particular things are beautiful, because they are 'copies of the Eternal Beauty'—as we should say—because there is that in the fixed constitution of the universe which determines the production of things so characterised. To give force to his assertion that the 'Ideas' are fixed, Plato was accustomed to speak of sensible things as fluctuating, and even unreal¹. Such reality, at any rate, as they possess they derive from the 'Ideas' in which they 'participate.' We must not, however, take Plato too literally. He speaks of the unreality of particulars, in much the same way as we speak of the impossibility of an uncaused phenomenon,—a phenomenon which is not part of the universe of Natural Laws. The language at his disposal for expressing the 'reality' of the Ideas was not adequate to the task. He was obliged to say that the Ideas have more *οὐσία* than the particulars, or that the particulars derive such *οὐσία* as they possess from the *οὐσία* of the Ideas; thus seeming to make the Ideas separate *things*. But how can the particulars 'participate in' the *οὐσία* of a thing separate from them? This was the question which Aristotle put to Plato, or the Platonists. The *οὐσία* of a thing must belong to itself; a thing cannot have its *οὐσία* outside itself in another *thing*. This difficulty, raised by the inadequacy of the word *οὐσία* for the task assigned to it, was felt by Plato himself (see the *Parmenides*), and was probably brought home to him, as to Aristotle, by the literal interpretation which pupils of the Academy gave to the doctrine of the Ideas, not only speaking of them as separate *things* (that was almost unavoidable), but thinking of them as such.

The 'Ideas' then answer, in part², to our 'Laws of Nature,' the objects of scientific knowledge. But these 'Ideas' are members of a system, in virtue of belonging to which they are what they are. This system is the Universe—the One, or the Good. If the 'Ideas,' are *οὐσίαι*, or 'fixed Laws of Nature,' the Universe of which they are the fixed Laws, is *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*—is not itself

¹ Modern Biology seems to enforce Plato's doctrine of the unreality of the particular. We see the life of the individual shortened by natural selection for the sake of the Race. See Weismann, *Essays upon Heredity* (Clarendon Press), Essays i and iii.

² In part they answer to the 'Categories of the Understanding' in modern philosophy. The *ἰδέα τῶν ἀγαθῶν* answers to the 'Ideas of the Reason.'

a Law of Nature, but higher. How this doctrine of the Idea of 1096 a. 11. the Good was misunderstood—by the Platonists, we may suppose, rather than by Aristotle—is best shown in the chapter now before us. There is nothing, I venture to think, in the Dialogues of Plato to justify the interpretation which Aristotle's criticism assumes: we shall accordingly follow the line of least difficulty, if we suppose that the Platonists are mainly responsible for the misunderstanding. In all likelihood too they are responsible for the popular ridicule which seems to have been bestowed on the doctrine—see *Diog. Laert.* iii. 26 and 27 quoted by Meineke, *Fragm. Com.* vol. iii. 302 τοιοῦτος δ' ὄν (Πλάτων), ὁμως ἐσκόφηθη καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν κομικῶν—'Ἀμφίς Ἀμφικράτει—

τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν, οὐδ' οὐδ' τυγχάνειν.

μέλλεις διὰ ταύτην, ἦτρον οἶδα τοῦτ' ἐγώ,

ὃ δέσποτ', ἢ τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθὸν πρόσεχε δῆ.

It will now be convenient to place by the side of Aristotle's criticism, analysed above in the *Argument*, Plato's own account of the Idea of the Good as given in *Rep.* 506 sqq. The Guardians of the State must know the nature of the Good, for if they have not this knowledge, they cannot know the real nature of the Just or the Beautiful. What then is the Good? Socrates can answer only by a simile. The Sun, the Eye, and Visible objects, are in the sensible world, what the Good, Reason (*νοῦς*), and the Ideas (*τὰ νοούμενα*), are in the intelligible world. The *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* is that which gives their truth (*ἀλήθεια*) to the objects of real knowledge, as the sun gives visible colour to the objects of sight. It is the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* which also gives the power of apprehending this truth (*ἐπιστήμη*), as the sun gives the eye the power of seeing. As light and sight are not identical with the sun, so *ἀλήθεια* and *ἐπιστήμη* are not identical with the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, but only *like* it; moreover as the sun causes the *γένεσις* of all things but is not itself *γένεσις*, so the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* imparts *οὐσία* to the objects of real knowledge, but is itself something higher than *οὐσία*—*οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρῶβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχουτος* (509 B).

"Good," says Plato, "is the cause of existence and knowledge." This opens a sublime conception, on the one hand, of a world in which all things are very good; on the other hand, of a philosophy whose method of the deepest knowledge consists in no mere abstract investigations, nor any mere accumulation of

1096 a. 11. experience, but in apprehending with enthusiasm and joy the all-pervading idea of good, as it manifests itself under the three forms of beauty, symmetry, and truth [*Philebus* 65 A.] Grant, *Ethics*, Essay iii. vol. i. p. 205.

It is difficult to understand a man of Aristotle's calibre attacking, as he does, a theory like this; especially as his own philosophy of human life, with its ideal of the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*, and its doctrine of *εὐδαιμονία* as something not to be counted among particular good things (*E. N.* i. 7. 8.), is in entire sympathy with it. 'Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut zu leben,' is the ideal for Aristotle's *εὐδαιμόν*, no less than for Plato's *φιλόσοφος*. We are tempted to believe that it is not Plato's theory which Aristotle attacks here, but the formalism of the Platonic school; at any rate, the criticisms contained in this chapter are entirely beside the mark, as directed against the theory which is exhibited in *the Republic*. 'Ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος is the man who, after a long education, has risen to the speculative height from which he can see, like Spinoza's wise man, all things as belonging to a single system, in relation to which they 'have existence,' 'are good,' and 'are known.' The *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* is not a separate *thing*—*χωριστόν τι*; it is the system to which 'things' belong, and by belonging to which (or 'participating in' which) are 'things'—it is the One, *Deus sive Natura*¹. If the Platonic school had confined itself to presenting, as Plato does in *the Republic*, the conception of τὸ ἔν, or τὸ ἀγαθόν, as a great 'regulative principle,' probably no objections would have been raised by Aristotle. But the Theory of Ideas tended always to become more and more a Theory of Ideal Numbers, lending itself to obscurantism; it also stood in the way of the acceptance of that critique of the forms of speech (as epoch-making as Kant's deduction of the forms of thought) which it was Aristotle's greatest service to European culture to have begun and carried so far. It is therefore not entirely surprising to find the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, notwithstanding Plato's presentation of it (an unexceptionable presentation of it, one might have supposed, from Aristotle's point of view), coming in for a share of the opposition which the *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί*, and *χωριστὰ εἶδη* of the school naturally roused in the author of the doctrine of Categories.

¹ There is a very interesting passage in Teichmüller's *Literarische Fehden*, pp. 232, 233 (to all the views contained in which I do not however wish to pledge myself) which may be consulted in this connexion.

It is in the distinction drawn between *πρώτη* and *δευτέρα οὐσία* in 1096 a. 11. *Cat.* 5 that the doctrine of the *χωριστὸν εἶδος* or 'universal thing,' as held by the Platonists, is most effectively met. That doctrine, like the paradox of Antisthenes (see Plato, *Soph.* 251 A, and Arist. *Met.* Δ. 29; cf. also Mullach, *Fragm. Phil.* vol. ii. 270 and 281, 2) and Stilpo (see Plutarch, *adv. Colotem* 23), practically assumed that all words stand for *things*. Antisthenes consistently denied the possibility of predication, because each thing, marked by its own name, is itself. The thing marked by the word *Kallias* is itself, and the thing marked by the word *man* is itself. You cannot predicate *man* of *Kallias*, for that would be to change *Kallias* into *man*, and *make him another individual*. The Platonists, on the other hand, affirmed the possibility of predication; but it was only by the *tour de force* of their dogma of *μέθεξις* that they were able to do so. *Man* was indeed the name of a thing separate from the thing of which *Kallias* was the name; but somehow the thing called *Kallias* 'participated in' the 'Substance' of the other thing called *man*.

In opposition to Antisthenes and the Platonic *χωρίζοντες*, it is pointed out in *Cat.* 5 that, although the term *man* looks like the name of a separate thing, it is really indicative of an aspect or attribute of a thing: see 3 b. 10 ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστίν ὅτι τὸδε τι σημαίνει . . . τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τὸδε τι σημαίνει, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῶον, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει, οὐ γὰρ ἔν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὡσπερ ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλῶν [as distinguished from the ἐν παρὰ πολλὰ of the Platonists] ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζῶον. The distinction drawn here is, in grammatical language, that between the proper name and the common term, practically amounting to that between the 'reality of existence' and 'the reality of validity' noted by Lotze, *Logic* p. 441 Eng. Tr.

'Among all the reasons,' says Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 302) 'with which Aristotle opposes the theory of Ideas, there are two which rise into prominence, and to them all the others may be mediately or immediately reduced, (1) That the universal notions . . . posited in the Ideas are not substances, but mark only certain properties and relations—at most, genera and species, not things themselves. (2) That the Ideas lack moving force, and that they not only do not explain, but render impossible, the change of

1096 a. 11. phenomena, creation and destruction, alteration and movement, and the natural properties of things thereon dependent.'

The position taken up by Aristotle against the Platonic *χωρίστους* in objection (1) is that of the critic of the forms of speech, or thought (the two are inextricably connected in Aristotle's mind), who distinguishes τὰ γένη τῶν ὄντων—the various senses in which Kallias *is* something, *is* a man, *is* good, *is* a father. Unless these distinctions were kept steadily in view (and the 'realism' of the Platonists was the great obstacle to their recognition) it was vain, Aristotle rightly thought, to hope for advance in the sciences.^o As for objection (2), it comes from the man of science, who is not satisfied unless he has *efficient* causes. But, as Lotze says (*Logic* p. 447), 'The fact that they supply no beginning of motion proves little against the doctrine of the Ideas . . . As concerns Aristotle's criticism let us turn to the sciences of our own day. What shall we say to our Laws of Nature? Do they contain in themselves a beginning of motion? On the contrary, they all presuppose a series of data which they cannot themselves establish, but from which *once given*, the necessary connexion one with another of the phenomena which ensue is deducible. No natural law ordains that the different bodies in our planetary system should move, or that their course should be directed towards one and not another quarter of the heavens, or that the acceleration which they impose on each other by the force of attraction should have the particular amount which it has and not a different one. But is the whole system of mechanical truths useless and mere empty babble (*κενολογίῳ*) because it leaves these first beginnings of motion to be explained from some other source, and starting from the fact of motion as it actually finds it, is satisfied with explaining its different phases in their necessary connexion with each other? . . . To see in the world of Ideas the patterns to which all that is, *if* anything is, must conform, was a thought of which the importance is unfairly ignored by Aristotle.'

The doctrine of Ideas, as Plato himself sets it forth in his Dialogues, was, it must be admitted by the reader of Aristotle's criticisms in the *Metaphysics*¹, misunderstood—but probably more by the Platonists than by Aristotle. Be that however as it may, Aristotle's criticisms have done much to give currency to false

¹ It is in *Cat.* 5, as it seems to me, that we have the really valuable results of the Aristotelian opposition to the doctrine of Ideas.

views regarding the doctrine, as held by Plato himself. For the 1096 a. 11. doctrine, as held by Plato himself, we must go to Plato's own writings: and if we sometimes find statements there which seem to imply the *χωριστὸν εἶδος*, we must remember that Plato could hardly help using language which might be interpreted as implying it. He wished to describe the relation of Laws of Nature to particular things, and the Greek language almost obliged him to speak of these Laws as 'things.'

On the Platonic 'Ideas' generally see Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* (Plato), Grant's *Ethics*, Essay iii. vol. i. p. 200 sqq., Jowett's *Introduction to the Parmenides*, Lotze's *Logic* Book iii. ch. 2—the *world of Ideas*; for Aristotle's general criticisms see *Met.* A. 6, Z. 13, 14, 15, M. 4, 5, 9, 10, and *Cat.* 5, Zeller's *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 293 sqq. (3rd German ed.), Zeller's *Plat. Studien*, pp. 232, 3, Grote's *Aristotle*, appendix i and appendix iii.

Keeping in view the account of the *ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* given in *Rep.* 506 sqq. and remembering that Plato himself, as distinguished from weak disciples, did not regard—could not have regarded—'The Good' as a 'Thing' separate from 'particular good things,' we may go on to examine Aristotle's criticism in detail.

§ 1. τὸ δὲ καθόλου] *sc.* ἀγαθόν. Eudemus introduces his dis- a. 11. cussion of the Idea of the Good (*E. E.* i. 8. 1217 b. 1) as follows—*σκεπτέον τοίνυν τί τὸ ἄριστον, καὶ λέγεται ποσαχῶς. ἐν τρισὶ δὴ μάλιστα φαίνεται δόξαις εἶναι τοῦτο. φασὶ γὰρ ἄριστον μὲν εἶναι πάντων αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸ δ' εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾧ ὑπάρχει τό τε πρῶτον εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ αἰτίον τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι.*

§ 2. ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον]. Things related to one a. 18. another as the terms of a series were not brought by the Platonists under one Idea. Where one thing grows out of another thing, the two things cannot be regarded as coordinate impressions of a single type. Aristotle recognises this in *Pol.* iii. 1. 1275 a. 34 (see Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. p. 295 n. and Jowett, *Pol.* ad loc.) where he notes the impossibility of finding a common definition for the *πολίται* of the various states, which he distinguishes as *ὀρθαί* and *παρεκβεβηκῦναι*, the latter being subsequent to, or degenerations of, the former.

I understand Aristotle in the present § to refer, not to the *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ* of the Platonists, but to the *μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί*. The distinction between these two is given in *Met.* M. 6–8. The

1006 a. 18. *μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ* are the 1, 2, 3 of ordinary numeration; the *μονάδες* of which these *ἀριθμοὶ* are composed are all *συμβληταί*, being homogeneous. The *μαθηματικὸς ἀριθμὸς* 3 arises out of 2 by the addition of 1, and is thus subsequent to 2 (*ὑστερον*), or implies 2. The *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ*, on the other hand, are *ἀσύμβλητοι*: ἡ δὺς αὐτή, and ἡ τριάς αὐτή, (Duality and Trinity as notions), cannot be added together: the *μονάδες* of which ἡ δὺς αὐτή is composed are not homogeneous with those of which ἡ τριάς αὐτή is composed: the *τριάς αὐτή* is not the *δὺς αὐτή* + 1: it is independent of the *δὺς αὐτή*. Thus the *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ*, with which the Platonists identified the *ιδέαι*, are distinguished from one another not as the term *ἀριθμοὶ* naturally implies—quantitatively, but qualitatively. They are *ἀσύμβλητοι*, which means that they are not quantitatively comparable. Accordingly, when they, equally with the *μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ*, are described as involving *πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον* (see *Met. M. 6. 1080 b. 12*, and Bonitz's note, p. 542 sqq., on *τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον τὰς ιδέας*—Trendelenburg's conjecture, *μή* before *ἔχοντα*, accepted by Zeller, *Platon. Stud.* p. 243, rejected *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 1. p. 433, is wrong), the description is to be taken as one awkwardly transferred from the *ἀριθμητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ*, which are not independent entities, to entities which, though called *ἀριθμοὶ*, are yet regarded as independent of one another. The phrase *ἀσύμβλητοι ἀριθμοὶ* really involves a contradiction. As Bonitz says, *Met.* p. 540: 'Plato enim licet ex Aristotelis testimonio dixisse videatur τὰς ιδέας εἶναι ἀριθμούς, tamen hos numeros, qui idearum exprimerent naturam, a mathematicis ea distinxit ratione, quae revera ipsam numerorum naturam penitus tolleret. Hos enim numeros dixit esse ἀσύμβλητους, consociari non posse nec computari alterum cum altero. Sed quum numeris abstractis, upote magnitudinibus ejusdem speciei, id necessario tribuendum sit, ut incrementa ac decrementa inter se et efficiant et patiantur, hoc qui negat, is numeros manifesto non quantitates definitas esse dicit, sed qualitates definitas, quas quum ipsas describere non possit, ad numerorum imaginem confugit.' The *πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον* of the *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ*, in short, is *their being qualitatively distinct*. Alexander on *Met. M. 6. 1080 b. 12* accommodates himself so entirely to this strained use of *πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον* as to say (*Alex. in Met.* p. 722 ed. Bonitz) *τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὰς ιδέας τὸν εἰδητικὸν ἀριθμὸν, τὸν δὲ μὴ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον ἔχοντα μὴδὲ κατ' εἶδος διαφέροντα τὸν μαθηματικὸν εἶναι ἐτίθετο.*

We may safely assume, I think, that for Plato himself the 1006 a. 18. *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ* were rather symbols of the fixity, separateness, and, as it were, impenetrability of the qualitatively distinct *ιδέαι*, than the *ιδέαι* themselves: but it is evident from Aristotle's criticism in *Met. M. 6-8* that Pythagorizing followers confounded the symbols and the things symbolised.

I take it, then, that the reference in the present § is to the *μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ* and not to the *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ*: and I understand Aristotle to remind his Platonic opponents that, according to their own view, the *μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ* do not involve a common *ιδέα*, because they are not mutually exclusive *εἶδη* independent of one another, (like the various species under the genus *animal*), but are so related to one another that the prior is included, as condition, in the subsequent. That the *ιδέαι* themselves are *ἀριθμοὶ* is another entirely different opinion of the Platonists, not, as I think, alluded to here. It would not be true to say *οὐδὲ τῶν (εἰδητικῶν) ἀριθμῶν ιδέαν κατεσκεύαζον*, for the Platonists certainly posited *τὸ εἶν* as the supreme *ιδέα* or formal principle which produces the other *ιδέαι* (called *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ*), in the matter of the *δὺς*, *τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν*: see *Met. A. 6. 988 a. 10*.

The parallel passage in the *E. E.* runs as follows, i. 8. 1218 a. 1 *ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον, οὐκ ἔστι κοινόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστόν. Εἴη γὰρ ἂν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον πρότερον γὰρ τὸ κοινόν καὶ χωριστόν διὰ τὸ ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρώτον. Οἷον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον πρῶτον τῶν πολλαπλασίων, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῆ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν ἔσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλάσιου πρότερον, εἰ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινόν εἶναι τὴν ιδέαν, οἷον εἰ χωριστόν ποιήσειέ τις τὸ κοινόν. Fritzsche (followed by Grant) makes the *ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον* of this passage the *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ*, and compares *Met. B. 3. 999 a. 6* *ἔτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷον τε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων εἶναι τι παρὰ ταῦτα οἷον εἰ πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ δὺς, οὐκ ἔσται τις ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ εἶδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ σχῆμα παρὰ τὰ εἶδη τῶν σχημάτων.* I agree with Bonitz (*Met.* pp. 153 and 154) against Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 1. p. 434), and Schwegler (on *Met. Δ. 11. 1019 a. 3*) that the *μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ* are intended in *Met. B. 3. 999 a. 6*. If so, the presumption is strong that they are intended in *E. E. i. 8. 1218 a. 1*, and if in the latter passage, then in *E. N. i. 6. 2*. It ought to be mentioned that Zeller's opinion in the *Platonische Studien* (p. 239 sqq.) was that the reference in *E. N. i. 6. 2* is to the *μαθηματικοί*, not to the*

1096 a. 18. εἰδητικοί ἀριθμοί: but that in his *Ph. d. Gr.* (ii. i. p. 433 second edition) he reverses this opinion.

a. 19. τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται κ.τ.λ.] The category of substance—τὸ τί ἔστιν¹, τὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἢ οὐσία, is naturally prior to the other categories: *i. e.* the various relations and qualities recognised under the other categories presuppose *Things* to be related and qualified. 'Being white,' and 'being small,' are kinds of 'being' (γένη τῶν ὄντων), dependent on 'being a thing.' 'Being a thing' is the strict and primary sense of 'being.' If, then, the subsequent or dependent kinds of 'being,' on the one hand, and 'being' in the primary and fundamental sense, on the other hand, are equally described as 'good,' it is plain that the term 'good' cannot represent a generic notion. Substance and its accidents or offshoots are not independent εἶδη, to be brought under 'good' as their γένος.

Two points are to be noted in this argument, (1) It seems to assume that the Aristotelian doctrine of the Categories had come to be so far accepted by the Platonists that the inconsistency of their theory of Ideas with it was worth pointing out to them. (2) In laying stress upon the *dependence* of the other categories on the first category it certainly makes a point against οἱ μὴ κατασκευάζοντες τῶν ἀριθμῶν ιδέαν, but at the expense of somewhat staggering the reader when he comes to § 3, where the *independence* or separateness of the categories is assumed, and it is contended that, since θεός as substance, and ἀρετή as quality, fall under different κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος, or differ τῷ εἶναι (see *Met.* Δ. 7. 1017 a. 23 ὁσαυχῶς γὰρ λέγεται [*sc.* κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας] τοσαυταχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει: and cf. note on *E. N.* v. 1. 20), they cannot both be called 'good' *quā* having one common nature. In § 2, line 22, τοῦ ὄντος is the 'being,' or τὸ εἶναι, of the first Category, and the other Categories are presented as related to it as *accidents*, συμβεβηκότα; whereas in § 3, line 24, τῷ ὄντι is used generally for the 'being,' or τὸ εἶναι, which is found in ten distinct kinds corresponding to the ten Categories.

¹ ἔστιν is omitted by K^b M^b O^b and CCC in l. 20, and apparently by all MSS. in l. 24. See Bonitz's note on *Met.* E. 2. 1026 a. 36. In enumerating the Categories it would appear that Aristotle sometimes writes τὸ τί for τὸ τί ἔστιν. Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* p. 203) argues that the writer of *M. M.* must have found no ἔστιν here in line 20, for he has i. 1. 1183 a. 10 καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ. In *E. E.* i. 8. 1217 b. 27, however, we have τί ἔστιν. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 53) would omit ἔστιν both in line 20 and in line 24.

§ 3. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.] The argument in § 2 was that 'good,' 1096 a. 23, when applied to a substance, and to a relation respectively, is not applied to two things belonging to mutually exclusive classes, capable of being brought under a higher class notion: the argument in § 3 is that substances and relations belong to mutually exclusive classes—these classes, however, are not εἶδη, but ultimate γένη incapable of being brought under one common γένος or ιδέα. The categories are τὰ γένη τῶν ὄντων, and τὸ εἶναι οὐκ οὐσία οὐδενί: οὐ γὰρ γένος τὸ ὄν *An. Post.* ii. 7. 92 b. 13. Cf. *de An.* i. 5. 410 a. 16 οὐ δοκεῖ κοινὰ πάντων [*sc.* τῶν γενῶν τῶν κατηγοριῶν] εἶναι στοιχεῖα.

τάγαθὸν ἰσαυχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι] 'The use of the term *good* is coextensive with that of the word *is*.' The categories, as αἱ κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος, are the various senses in which the word *is* is used: see *Met.* Δ. 7. 1017 a. 22 καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ εἶναι λέγεται ὅσαπερ σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας: ὁσαυχῶς γὰρ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν τί ἐστι σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ ποίων, τὰ δὲ ποσόν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι, τὰ δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, τὰ δὲ ποῦ, τὰ δὲ πότε, ἐκάστῳ τούτων τὸ εἶναι ταῦτο σημαίνει. Οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαίνει ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαίνει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζει ἐστὶν ἢ τέμνων τοῦ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζει ἢ τέμνει.

ἐν τῷ ποιῷ αἱ ἀρεταί] see notes on ii. 5.

a. 25.

δαίτια] 'residence.'

a. 27.

§ 4. τῶν κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη] cf. *Met.* I. 4. 1055 a. 29. a. 31 καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ ἓν γένος ἢ μία. 'This argument,' says Grant, 'is certainly unsatisfactory if applied to Plato's point of view. Plato would say dialectic is the science of the Idea of good, and in this all other sciences have their meeting-point. Even of the *πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν* it might be said that according to Aristotle's own account it falls (in all its manifestations, whether as means or ends) under the one supreme science—Politics.'

§ 5] Susemihl brackets this § and § 6 as 'inserta ab editore a. 34. antiquissimo.' I do not think that bracketing is safe or helpful in a chapter like the present.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον] Grant compares *Met.* A. 9. 990 a. 34 οἱ δὲ τὰς ιδέας αἰτίας τιθέμενοι πρῶτον μὲν ζητοῦντες τῶνδε τῶν ὄντων λαβεῖν τὰς αἰτίας ἕτερα τούτοις ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἀριθμησαὶ βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἶτο μὴ δυνησθεσθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοῖν. The ιδέαι are merely the doubles of the particulars, and do not help us to explain them.

1096 a. 34. This criticism is valid against those Platonists who regarded the *ιδέαι*, or laws which explain particular things, as themselves also *things*; but does not affect Plato who, in the *Parmenides* 132 A–E, anticipates it in its most telling form—in the form of the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* refutation. (For this refutation see Bonitz. *Met.* pp. 111, 112 on A. 9. 990 b. 17.)

1096 b. 1. ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος] The same definition, expressing the same essence or nature.

b. 2. οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν] *sc.* αὐτοῦ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος.

b. 3. οὐδ' ἢ ἀγαθόν] *sc.* διοίσει ἀγαθόν τι καὶ αὐτοαγαθόν.

§ 6. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέ κ.τ.λ.] The connexion between this and the preceding section is well brought out in the parallel passage *E. E.* i. 8. 1218 a. 10 ἔστι τοίνυν, φασίν, αὐτό τι ἀγαθόν τὸ οὐκ αὐτὸ πρόσκειται πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν κοινόν· τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη πλὴν ὅτι αἰδίων καὶ χωριστόν. 'This prefix αὐτο-, the Platonists are supposed to answer, 'is not mere surplusage: αὐτο- = αἰδίων.' Aristotle replies—'mere duration does not enhance essence. The nature of whiteness is as perfect in a snowflake, which falls into the river, as in a block of Parian marble.' I cannot agree with Grant (*Ethics*, Essay iii. p. 210), who sees in Aristotle's argument merely a 'confusion between length of duration (*πολυχρόνιον*) and eternity (*αἰδίων*).¹ According to Aristotle's doctrine the οὐσία, or τί ἦν εἶναι, immanent in particulars is αἰδίων, in the sense of being independent of the accidents of γένεσις and φθορά, which take place in time—ἐν χρόνῳ. It is the Platonists who confuse *πολυχρόνιον* and αἰδίων, by making their *ιδέαι things* separate from the particulars—χωριστὰ εἶδη, thus placing them in space and time—in space as *τρίτοι ἄνθρωποι* somewhere, in time as *πολυχρόνια*. I therefore understand the 'confusion between αἰδίων and *πολυχρόνιον*' to be due to the Platonists, not to Aristotle. Aristotle says to them—'You make the *ιδέαι*, or notion, which is αἰδίων, or independent of the accident of time, a thing among things in space and time. Your αἰδίων is, after all, only *πολυχρόνιον*. You have not grasped the distinction between a law which is eternally valid, and a thing which comes into existence and perishes.'

The statement εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ *πολυχρόνιον* τοῦ ἐφημέρου I take to mean that the accident of time does not affect the τί ἦν

¹ Grant here follows Eustratius.

εἶναι of λευκότης. Cf. Themistius *περὶ ψυχῆς*, fol. 69 a (vol. ii. pp. 1096 b. 3. 38, 39, ed. Spengel), where λευκότης, as such, is said to be independent of μέγεθος or space, and in this respect is compared with νοῦς—ᾧ γὰρ οὐδὲν συντελεῖ τὸ μέγεθος εἰς τὴν φύσιν, τοῦτο ἀμέγεθες καθ' αὐτό, εἰ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς διαιροῖτο· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ πηχναῖον λευκὸν μᾶλλον τοῦ ποδιαίου . . . διὸ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ταῖς ποιότησιν οὐ συντελεῖ, ἀλλὰ ἀδιαίρετος ἡ λευκότης ὡς λευκότης καὶ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς τούτου δυνάμεως εἰ τοῦ κύκλου καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους τό τε μείζον, ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ μικρότερον μῦρον νοήσει, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ νοῦ τὸ μέγεθος, εἴπερ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια. οὕτω γὰρ τινα καὶ ἀχρόνως γίνεσθαι λέγομεν, οἷς οὐδὲν ὁ χρόνος πρὸς τὴν τελειώσιν συνεισφέρει, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς τέλεια καὶ δλόκληρα γίνεται ἐν ὁφθαλμῷ μορφῇ τοῦ χρόνου.

I conclude this note with an extract from Michelet *ad loc.*, to whom, it will be seen, I am much indebted—'Hoc loco pugnat Aristoteles adversus eos, qui ideas separant a singulis. Ii, qui ideas vel formas rerum ut ipsarum substantias ipsis rebus insitas esse putant, jam, etsi pereant singulae res, aeternitatem formarum adseverant, sive in hac exstent sive in illa re caduca: est enim aeternum immutabile aliquid, in quolibet temporis momento totum existens; singulae igitur res ipsae aeternae, quamvis caducae. Qui vero ideas separant a rebus singulis, illis aeternitas nihil aliud est atque infinitum temporis spatium, quod, cum percurri reque existere nunquam possit, idem est ac diuturnitas. Itaque non ex vera Philosophi sententia, sed ex falsa istorum opinione αἰδίων et *πολυχρόνιον* idem est.'

§ 7. This brief and obscure jotting, which is not reproduced b. 5. either in the *E. E.* or in the *M. M.*, may be taken as a sort of *argumentum ad homines* addressed to the Platonists—'Your doctrine of the αὐτοαγαθόν is not held even by Speusippus, the head of your own school: he agrees with the more plausible view of the Pythagoreans.' The ἀρχαὶ αἰ κατὰ συστοιχίαν λεγόμεναι of the Pythagoreans, or rather of a section of the Pythagoreans, are given in *Met.* A. 5. 986 a. 23 as—πέρας ἄπειρον, περιττὸν ἄρτιον, ἐν πλήθει, δεξιὸν ἀριστερόν, ἄρρεν θῆλυ, ἡρεμοῦν κινούμενον, εὐθὺ καμπύλον, φῶς σκότος, ἀγαθὸν κακόν, τετράγωνον ἑτερόμηκες. Here τὸ ἐν appears in the column of good things—*i. e.* in the *στοίχος* in which τὸ ἀγαθόν occurs. Taking this circumstance in connexion with the fact mentioned in *Met.* A. 6. 987 b. 27 that, while Plato regarded τὸ ἐν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς as παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, the Pythagoreans regarded them as immanent in

1096 b. 5. particulars—οἱ δ' ἀριθμούς εἶναι φασιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, we may perhaps venture to explain the section before us as praising the Pythagoreans at the expense of the Platonists, because they—the Pythagoreans—'make the One good, instead of making the Good one': *i.e.* they do not make the Good an abstract unity separate from things; they find it immanent in things in various forms which they enumerate; unity is only one of the forms of its immanence—being a united whole is one of the ways in which a thing is good. The Pythagoreans, in fact, are praised for drawing up a list of good things. τὸ ἓν, τὸ πέρασ, &c., may each be called good. There is no good separate from the things enumerated in the column: see Plut. *Is. et Osir.* (quoted by Zell) ch. 48 (ed. Parthey)—οἱ μὲν Πυθαγορικοί διὰ πλείωνων ὀνομάτων κατηγοροῦσι τοῦ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἓν τὸ πεπερασμένον τὸ μένον τὸ εὐθὺ τὸ περισσὸν τὸ τετράγωνον τὸ ἴσον τὸ δεξιὸν τὸ λαμπρὸν, τοῦ δὲ κακοῦ τὴν δυάδα τὸ ἄπειρον τὸ φερόμενον τὸ καμπύλον τὸ ἄρτιον τὸ ἑτερόμηκες τὸ ἄνισον τὸ ἀριστερόν τὸ σκοτεινόν.

As regards the precise nature of the agreement of Speusippus with the Pythagoreans we are left pretty much to conjecture. It is not unlikely, however, that Aristotle is contrasting with the one ἀρχή of the Platonists the πολλαὶ ἀρχαί of Speusippus: see *Met. Z.* 2. 1028 b. 21 Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης οὐσίας ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν, ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς· καὶ τούτων δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας. These ἀρχαί or οὐσίαι derived from τὸ ἓν, Speusippus held to be *better than* τὸ ἓν, because (as may be seen from a comparison of the seed with the adult form) τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον is not in the Beginning but in the End. τὸ ἓν, then, although the first beginning of things (cf. ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνός), is not, for this reason, in an exceptional position as regards goodness. *Quia* good, it is only one among many good ἀρχαί, and indeed the least good among them, as being the most remote. It is to this doctrine, then, that Aristotle probably refers when he says here that Speusippus is one of οἱ τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἓν: see *Met. A.* 7. 1072 b. 30 ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὡσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν ταῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἰοῦνται. The reason which Aristotle gives for this judgment is τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἐτέρων ἐστὶ πρότερον τελείων καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον. The *First Cause* is the *Best*—God, who is ζῶν αἰδίων ἄριστον (*Met. A.* 7. 1072 b. 29). It is plain then that, in

the section before us (*E. N.* i. 6. 7), Aristotle must not be understood to approve the doctrine of Speusippus when he describes it as *πιθωότερον* than that of the Platonists criticised. He merely uses the name of Speusippus as a controversial weapon against the Platonists. On the doctrine of Speusippus see Grant, *Eth. ad loc.* and Essay iii. pp. 217-218.

§§ 8-11] See *Argument.*

b. 7.

§ 8. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος] I agree with Grant that 'we need not confine the reference of περὶ τούτων to the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, or refer it, with some commentators, to the books mentioned in the list of Diogenes (v. 25) περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἀ' περὶ Σπευσίππου καὶ Ξενοκράτους ἀ'. The reference is rather to 'the whole subject of the good in its relation to unity—to existence—to the world'; *i.e.* to 'the scope of Aristotle's entire *Metaphysics*.'

διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρησθαι] τοὺς b. 9. λόγους is the theory of the Platonists. Coraes gives the sense of the clause well—ἀντειπεῖν τις ἂν ἔχοι μοι τούτο, ὅτι Πλάτων οὐ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ κυρίως καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθοῦ πεποιήται τὸν λόγον. The Platonic theory does not bring *all* good things (things relatively good included) under one Idea, but only things absolutely good. The omission of μὴ in CCC and Ob seems to be a mere blunder.

καθ' ἐν εἶδος] 'Assigned to one species.' εἶδος is here, as Grant b. 10. remarks, the Aristotelian *species*, not the Platonic *idea*.

§ 10. ἢ ὅσα . . . ἢ οὐδ' ἄλλο] These are alternative questions. b. 10. The latter is disposed of first by ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος, and the former is dealt with in § 11. If the ἰδέα τῶν ἀγαθῶν is the only thing absolutely good, the class (εἶδος) of things absolutely good, which the Platonists ask us to distinguish, will be void of contents, for the ἰδέα is not *in* the class; as Michelet says—'Distinxerat Noster in genere duas bonorum species (εἶδη): bona per se et propter aliud. Iam si omnia vere bona, tanquam non existentia per se, ab idea excluderimus, et alteram speciem tantum ideam esse voluerimus, haec bonorum species erit vana, omnique carebit argumento; nec essent duae species, generi coordinatae (id, quod tamen supposuimus), sed idea vana et multitudo existentium bonorum.'

1096 b. 21. § 11. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτά] If, on the other hand, the things enumerated also (καί, *i.e.* as well as the Idea) are absolutely good, and, as such, are λεγόμενα κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν, how are we to account for the fact that they do not all exhibit a common nature or essence of goodness capable of identical definition like the whiteness of white things?

b. 25. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν] 'The application, then, of the term "good" (cf. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; in the next sentence) to things does not imply that they all participate in a common "idea."'

b. 27. § 12. ὁμωνύμους] ὁμώνυμα are things which have the same name without having the same nature (*e.g.* κλείς, a key, and the collar-bone), as distinguished from συνώνυμα, things which have the same name and the same nature (*e.g.* ox and horse, which both not only are called animals, but are animals): see *Cat.* i. 1 a. 1. When such very different things as *e.g.* a knife, a dinner, a field, and a horse are all called 'good,' they surely cannot get this common name by accident (οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις). There must be some reason why they are called 'good.' That reason, we have seen, does not lie in their participation in one Idea, or universal substance; nor does it lie in their having a common inherited nature, like the members of a biological class, which are συνώνυμα. What, then, is the reason of their being called 'good?'

ἀλλ' ἄρα γε . . . ἀναλογίαν;] τὰ ἀφ' ἐνὸς λεγόμενα and τὰ πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα (the two phrases are practically equivalent) are technically distinguished by Aristotle from τὰ ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενα on the one hand, and τὰ συνωνύμως or καθ' ἓν λεγόμενα on the other hand. Τὰ ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενα have their common name ἀπὸ τύχης: τὰ συνωνύμως or καθ' ἓν λεγόμενα have it because they belong to the same εἶδος or γένος, whereas τὰ ἀφ' ἐνὸς, or πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα, are things which do not necessarily belong to the same εἶδος or γένος, but agree in contributing to one end, in relation to which they are regarded as belonging to one department—as, *e.g.* a knife and a lecture may both be called 'surgical.' They are both called 'surgical,' not as an ox and a horse are both called 'animals,' nor yet as a key and the collar-bone are both called κλείς. See *Met.* K. 3. 1060 b. 37 τό τε ἰατρικὸν καὶ ὑγιεινὸν . . . πολλαχῶς λέγομεν . . . ἰατρικὸς γὰρ λόγος καὶ μαχαίριον λέγεται τῷ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι, τὸ δὲ

ταύτη χρῆσιμον. Cf. *Met.* Z. 4. 1030 b. 2 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἰατρικὸν σῶμα καὶ 1096 b. 27. ἔργον καὶ σκεῦος λέγεται οὔτε ὁμωνύμως οὔτε καθ' ἓν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν—on which Alex. (*in Met.* p. 441, l. 13, ed. Bonitz) has οὔτε καθ' ἓν καὶ συνωνύμως, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν, ἡγουν ὡς τὰ ἀφ' ἐνὸς τε καὶ πρὸς ἓν. Cf. also *Met.* Γ. 2. 1003 a. 33 τὸ δὲ ὄν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τιὰ φύσιν, καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ τῷ σημείον εἶναι τῆς ὑγίειας, τὸ δ' ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς. Καὶ τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικὴν τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν λέγεται ἰατρικόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ εἶφύες εἶναι πρὸς αὐτήν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ἔργον εἶναι τῆς ἰατρικῆς. Ὁμοιοτρόπως δὲ καὶ ἄλλα λεγόμενα λεγόμενα τοῖτοις. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μὲν, ἀλλ' ἅπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ' ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας, τὰ δ' ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν, ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ στερησεις ἢ ποιότητες ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰ οὐσίας, ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγομένων, ἢ τούτων τινὸς ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίαις διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι μὴ ὄν φαμέν. Καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ἀπάντων μία ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν, ὁμοίως τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν καθ' ἓν λεγομένων ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι μίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρὸς μίαν λεγομένων φύσιν καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τρόπον τιὰ λέγεται καθ' ἓν. Δήλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ὄντα μίαν θεωρῆσαι ἢ ὄντα: on which Alex. (p. 199, l. 20) has—καθ' ἓν μὲν λεγόμενα λέγει τὰ συνώνυμα καὶ ὑφ' ἓν τι κοινὸν τεταγμένα γένος. οὐ μόνον δέ, φησί, τῶν οὕτως ἐχόντων πρὸς ἀλληλα μία ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀφ' ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἓν . . . ἐν πᾶσι πῶς αὐτοῖς ὁράται ἢ φύσις αὐτῆ ἀφ' ἧς καὶ δι' ἣν οὕτως καλεῖται . . . καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ φυλακτικῷ τῆς ὑγίειας καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιητικῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ δεκτικῷ ὑγιάει ἐστὶν ἢ θεωρουμένη. There is μία ἐπιστήμη of all ὄντα ἢ ὄντα, just as there is μία ἐπιστήμη τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ἀπάντων: for not only τὰ καθ' ἓν λεγόμενα (τὰ συνώνυμα), but τὰ πρὸς μίαν λεγόμενα φύσιν fall under 'one science.' The term τὸ ὄν is used in many senses, but in all πρὸς ἓν, just as ὑγιεινὸν is always used πρὸς ὑγίειαν, whether it be used to qualify something which produces, preserves, declares, or is receptive of health; thus food, exercise, and a good complexion are all called ὑγιεινά. Similarly τὸ ὄν is always used in reference to (πρὸς) one object, viz. οὐσία, sometimes marking οὐσία itself, sometimes its πάθη, sometimes ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν, sometimes φθορὰ οὐσίας. Cf. also *M. M.* ii. 11. 1209 a. 23 οἶον φαμέν ἰατρικὸν τὸ μαχαίριον, ἰατρικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἰατρικὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ταῦτ' οὐχ ὁμοίως λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν μαχαίριον τῷ χρῆσιμον εἶναι πρὸς ἰατρικὴν ἰατρικὸν λέγεται, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος τῷ ποιητικὸς εἶναι ὑγίαιος, ἢ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῷ αἰτία εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή: *E. E. H.* 2. 1236 a. 16 ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φίλια εἶδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ' ἓν ἀπάσας μήτ' ὡς εἶδη ἐνὸς γένους μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως. Πρὸς μίαν γὰρ τινα λέγονται

1096 b. 27. καὶ πρώτην, ὡς περὶ τὸ ἱατρικόν. Καὶ ψυχὴν ἱατρικὴν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ ὄργανον καὶ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ κυρίως τὸ πρῶτον. Πρῶτον δ' οὗ λόγος ἐν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. Οἷον ὄργανον ἱατρικόν, ᾧ ἂν ὁ ἱατρός χρῆσταιτο· ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἱατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ ὄργανου. Ζητεῖται μὲν οὖν πανταχοῦ τὸ πρῶτον :- and for other references see note on v. 1. 7.

We can now see that the distinction made above in § 8 between τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διακόμενα, as καθ' ἐν εἶδος λεγόμενα, and τὰ ποιητικά τούτων καὶ φυλακτικά ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικά, as διὰ ταῦτα λεγόμενα is really that between the συνώνυμα, οἱ τὰ καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα, and the τὰ πρὸς ἐν καὶ ἀφ' ἐνός of § 12, and the other passages quoted. The Platofists assert that there are ἀγαθὰ so called συνωνύμως, i. e. ἀγαθὰ which are members of a true εἶδος (or γένος), their membership being explained as their μέθεξις in one ἰδέα; Aristotle's refutation consists in showing that no ἀγαθὰ are συνώνυμα, but are τρόπων ἄλλον λεγόμενα.

b. 28. ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν;] This is Aristotle's final answer: Different things are called ἀγαθὰ on the ground of identical relations (ἀναλογία is defined in *E. N.* v. 3. 8. as ἰσότης λόγων). Thus the relation in which sight stands to the body is the same as that in which reason stands to the soul. If sight is 'good' in its relation—i. e. contributes to its particular end, the welfare of the body, reason is 'good' in its like relation to the welfare of the soul: see Alexander in *Met.* p. 550, l. 17 (ed. Bonitz) τὰ ἀνάλογον λεγόμενα . . . ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ, οἷον ὡς ὄψις ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ, and p. 329, l. 13 τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἐν ὁρίσαστο ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο. Different things are called 'good,' not because they all contribute well to one end, but because they all contribute well to their respective ends. Τὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν λεγόμενα may be represented by parallel, τὰ πρὸς ἐν by converging, lines.

b. 31. § 13. ἄλλης ἂν εἴῃ φιλοσοφίας] πρώτη φιλοσοφία, as distinguished from the present enquiry which is πολιτικὴ τις. Ὑπέρ for περί, however, makes me suspect the whole clause from ἐξακριβοῦν to τῆς ἰδέας as an interpolation. On this late use of ὑπέρ see notes on i. 5. 7, iii. 3. 2, and iv. 2. 4.

b. 32. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τι τὸ κοινῆ κ.τ.λ.] Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 53. 54) defends καί, the reading of K^b, M^b, and Camb. against τό.

b. 35. §§ 14, 15, 16.] The χωριστὸν ἀγαθόν is not only an unrealisable good, but it is also useless as an ideal—παράδειγμα. Grant has a good note on these sections: 'It has been objected that Aristotle

fixes on too mean specimens of the arts, and that he might have 1096 b. 35. spoken differently if he had adduced the fine arts. But the question is whether, for practical life, the Idea, that is, a knowledge of the absolute, could be made available? This forms a great point of divergence between Plato and Aristotle. The latter seems to regard the Idea as an object of the speculative reason alone, something metaphysical and standing apart; and between the speculative and practical powers of man he sets a gulf. Plato, on the other hand, speaking without this analytical clearness, seems to think of the Idea as an object for the imagination, as well as the reason, as being an ideal as well as an idea. In this its many-sided character he would make it affect life as well as knowledge; for by contemplation of it the mind would become conformed to it.'

§ 16. ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων . . . εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν] This is 1097 a. 8. not a fair criticism of Plato. He does not represent the knowledge of the ἰδέα τὰγαθοῦ as attainable by artisans, but only by those exceptional natures who, having gone successfully through a long course of scientific training, are found capable of διαλεκτικῆ, and, as philosopher-kings, are to be entrusted with the management of the State. See *Rep.* vii. In the *E. E.* i. 8. 1218 b. 7-24 the uselessness of the knowledge of the ἰδέα τὰγαθοῦ is demonstrated from the fact that this ἰδέα is not an αἴτιον ὡς κινήσαν; it does not produce motion, either as the efficient cause at the disposal of an artificer produces it, or as the τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν, which calls forth the energies of the πολιτικός, produces it. Aristotle and Eudemus, when they criticise Plato, seem to forget their own great philosophical principle—that the τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν is not ultimate, but sought for the sake of the θεωρητικὸς βίος, in the σκοπός of which—θεῖον θεωρεῖν καὶ θεραπεύειν, τὸ ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν—the ὄρος τῶν μεσοτήτων is to be ultimately found. Aristotle with his ὁ τὸν σκοπὸν ἔχων ὀρθόν, and Plato with his ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος, are at one in making *amor intellectualis Dei* the ultimate spring and coordinating principle of all man's varied activities, scientific, moral, and artistic.

τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν] (the reading of K^b restored to the text by a. 9. Bywater for the αὐτὸ τὰγαθόν of L^b and Γ preferred by Bekker) is equivalent to τοῦτο τὸ αὐτοαγαθόν. Instances of the separation of the prefix αὐτο- from its word, are given in the *Index Arist.*, e. g. *Met.* M. 8. 1084 a. 21 αὐτὸ ἕκαστος ἄνθρωπος.

CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

But to return now from the Good of the Platonists, which, to say the least, is unattainable, to the attainable good, the object of the present enquiry—we see that this attainable good is something which differs in different actions and arts. But can we find no general term to characterise it in every case? Surely in every case the good is that for the sake of which is done what is done—health in medical practice, victory in warfare, the house in building—in short the End, whatever its special nature, in every case. So, if we have always ultimately one end in all our actions, this one end will be the good attained by man in action; if more than one end, then these will be the forms in which good is attained in action. Thus we are led again to our old conclusion, which it is now time to explain more fully.

There are many so-called ends which are not really ends, but only means to something else. Money, e.g. and tools are ends which are not really ends. But the Chief Good must be really an end. Now that which is sought for its own sake is more really an end than that which is sought for the sake of something else; and that which is never sought for the sake of something else is more really an end than that which is sought both for its own sake and for the sake of something else; while that which is always sought for its own sake and never for the sake of something else is most really an end, i.e. is an end without qualification. Now Happiness is such an end without qualification. Honour, pleasure, understanding, and the virtues, we seek both for their own sakes and for the sake of the Happiness which we suppose they will bring. But Happiness no man seeks as a means to these, or to anything.

That Happiness is the Chief Good may be inferred also from the fact that Happiness is self-sufficient. The Chief Good is self-sufficient: its possessor lacks nothing; and with Happiness a man lacks nothing—when we say ‘a man’ we mean not ‘the solitary individual,’ for he is an abstraction, but the real man—the citizen, whose concrete personality is constituted by the manifold relations in which he stands to kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens, within a definite circle. Such a man, then, with Happiness, lacks nothing: he has that which is the best of all good things—not best, however, in the sense of being one of them, for if it were one of them, it could be made better by the addition of the least one of them.

But ‘Happiness is the Chief Good’ is, after all, a truism which throws little light on the real nature of Happiness or the Chief Good. Perhaps we may reach something more definite by determining ‘the function of man.’

Every artist has his peculiar work or function. Surely man, as man, has his peculiar function also. What is it then? Let us review the vital functions in order. It cannot be taking in nourishment, and growing, for plants and animals, as well as man, live this kind of life, and we are looking for his peculiar function. Nor can it be perceiving with the senses, and feeling, for

this kind of life he shares with all animals. We are left then with the conclusion that man's peculiar function is the rational life—that is, rational conduct. The good man will perform this function well, i.e. so as to realise the end of his being in the manifestation of his own peculiar excellence. The end or Chief Good of man may then be defined as ‘vital function manifesting the excellence which is highest and most perfect in human nature.’ But it is only ‘in a perfect life’ that this end can be realised; ‘for one swallow does not make a spring.’

Let this serve as a ‘rough sketch’ of the Chief Good. If the outline is right, it will be easy to fill in the details afterwards. But our former warning must not be forgotten—the same exactness must not be looked for in all enquiries; for exactness varies with subject-matter, and with the nature of the particular enquiry or art. Nor must we always demand syllogistic antecedents. First principles have no such antecedents, but are data of sense perception, induction, or habit. We must try then to look for our principles in the place natural to each kind, and be careful to define them well when we have got them: for good definitions, to begin with, have great influence on what follows: ‘the beginning is more than half the whole.’

§ 1. ἐπανεέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν.] See i. 5, 8, where the 1007 a. 15. expression τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν occurs, immediately before the digression of chapter vi.

φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ] This result has been a. 16. reached in ch. vi. § 12—καὶ ἄλλο δὲ ἐν ἄλλῃ. The γὰρ introduces a clause which gives direction, as it were, to the question τί ποτ’ ἀν εἶη τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν; What is good, we have just seen, differs in different arts and pursuits, but is always the end of the art or pursuit in question; τέλος is the most general description which can be given of ἀγαθόν. Hence the ἀγαθόν, i.e. τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν must be τελειότατον—the end par excellence. Accordingly, if all πρακτά have ultimately one τέλος, or certain assignable τέλη, this, or these, will be τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν.

§ 2. μεταβαίνων δὴ κ.τ.λ.] Michelet has ‘haec aberratio ipsa a. 24. Philosophum jam ad ea quae sibi proposuerat reduxit’; Stahr translates ‘So ist denn auf ihrem Umwege unsere Untersuchung doch zu demselben Resultate gelangt’; Williams, ‘Our argument has now returned to the question from which it originally digressed’; and Peters, ‘Our argument has thus come round by a different path to the same point as before.’ I do not think that μεταβαίνων here implies digression, but rather advance step by step, through the particular cases of ἰατρική, στρατηγική, εἰκοδομική, &c., to the generalisation ἐν ἁπάσῃ πράξει τὸ τέλος: cf. Met. Z. 4. 1029 b. 1–12, where

1097 a. 24. τὸ μεταβαίνειν expresses the inductive process by which τὰ φύσει γνώριμα are reached through τὰ αὐτῷ γνώριμα: πρὸ ἔργου γὰρ τὸ μεταβαίνειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμώτερον. ἡ γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἤττων γνωριμῶν φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον· καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστω ἀγαθῶν τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἐκάστω ἀγαθῶ, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῷ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῷ γνώριμα. τὰ δ' ἐκάστοις γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ἡρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα, καὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ ὄντος· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐκ τῶν φαύλως μὲν γνωστῶν, αὐτῷ δὲ γνωστῶν, τὰ ὅλως γνωστὰ γίνονται πειρατέον, μεταβαίνοντας, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τούτων αὐτῶν. Eustratius evidently understands μεταβαίνειν here (*E. N.* i. 7. 2) to mean gradual advance—μεταβαίνων ὁ λόγος ἀφ' ἑνὸς πρὸς ἕτερον, καὶ τοῦ μὲν τελειότερου ἀπτόμενος αἰεὶ, τὸ δὲ ἀτελέστερον ὑπερβαίνων εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ζητούμενον τὸ κοινὸν ἀπάντων τέλος, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφίξεται.

εἰς ταῦτόν] *i. e.* to the same result as that reached in i. 2. 1.

a. 27. § 3. αὐλοῦς] Zell ejects αὐλοῦς as due to the following ὄλως. Ἄγρους, φίλους, and δούλους have been conjectured by Coraes, Bonitz, and Bywater (*Journ. of Philol.* vol. xvii. p. 68) respectively. I confess that I do not see any objection to retaining αὐλοῦς.

a. 28. τέλεια] 'Ends in themselves.'

a. 30. § 4.] 'The conception of ends was not fully developed in Plato; at the beginning of the second book of the *Republic*, those are said to be the highest goods which are desired both for themselves and for their results.' Grant. It is misleading, I think, thus to compare directly what Plato says about δικαιοσύνη, at the beginning of *Rep.* ii, with what Aristotle says here about τὸ ἄριστον. Plato merely says of δικαιοσύνη what Aristotle himself says of ἀρετή in § 5, —that from one point of view it is an end, from another point of view a means; and Aristotle would certainly not dispute the statement that its being a means, as well as an end, makes it more valuable than it would be if it were merely an end. On the other hand Plato would agree with Aristotle in regarding the εὐδαιμονία, or noble life, of the indivisible organism of the πόλις, as an end which is never a means. It must be carefully noted that when Plato says, in the passage referred to by Grant, that δικαιοσύνη, as both end and means, is better than things which are merely ends, the ends which he has in his mind are τὸ χεῖρειν καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς. He is not thinking of τὸ ἄριστον—the noble life, which the διαλεκτικός alone grasps in its unity. Perhaps we may say that

δικαιοσύνη has two senses with him—that, as one of the virtues, it is 1097 a. 30. both end and means; but, in its highest sense, as equivalent to Aristotle's εὐδαιμονία, it is an end, never a means.

§ 5. νοῦν] Not 'Reason' in the highest sense, but 'intelligence' 1097 b. 2. or 'prudence' as in vi. 11. 6 καὶ ἦδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην. Those who systematically make τιμὴ or ἡδονή their end, *i. e.* choose it δι' αὐτό, are those who identify it with εὐδαιμονία, as they are described in ch. v. The truly good man chooses τιμὴ, ἡδονή, νοῦς, and ἀρετή, for the sake of εὐδαιμονία: *i. e.* in all his special pursuits he is regulated by the ideal of the noble life.

§ 6. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν] 'The b. 6. same conclusion (*viz.* that εὐδαιμονία is the *summum bonum*) follows also from the consideration of its self-sufficiency.'

τὸ δ' αὐταρκές κ.τ.λ.] 'The term "self-sufficient," however, b. 8. we do not apply to the life of the *mere* Self—the solitary Self, but to that of the Self realised in association with others—with parents, children, and wife—with friends and fellow-citizens.' In this rendering I have tried to bring out the *logical* construction of the sentence, according to which αὐτῷ, the *logical* subject of αὐτάρκεια, is qualified (1) by μόνω, and (2) by γονεῦσι . . . πολίταις: *i. e.* the Self may be regarded either (1) in isolation, or (2) as constituted by social relations. In the first case it is a mere abstraction, and its self-sufficiency is only nominal; in the second case it is concrete and real, and self-sufficient in virtue of the presence of those relations which constitute its concrete reality.

According to the *grammatical* construction, however, γονεῦσι and the following datives are *coordinate with αὐτῷ*. The dative αὐτῷ depends on the verbal notion in αὐταρκές, as Ramsauer points out: 'Egregia brevitate,' he says, 'per solam dativi casus vim tota enunciatio confecta est. Nobis magis perspicuum esset, si in eandem sententiam legeremus: αὐταρκές δὲ λέγομεν οὐχ ὁ αὐτῷ μόνω ἀρκεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσιν ἀρκεῖν δεῖ κ.τ.λ.' Cook Wilson (*Transactions of Oxf. Philological Society*, Feb. 3, 1888) calls attention to the words of the Paraphrast as giving 'the right explanation of the dative'—αὐταρκές δὲ ὁ ἀρκεῖ οὐ μόνον τινὲ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι κ.τ.λ. Of course properly αὐταρκές (neut.) cannot govern αὐτῷ (masc.), much less γονεῦσι: the only proper construction is αὐτάρκης αὐτῷ (cf. *M. M.* ii. 15, 1212 b. 26 αὐτὸς ἐαντῷ αὐτάρκης ἔσται): αὐτάρκης ἄλλοις (γονεῦσι . . . πολίταις) is a contradiction in

1097 b. 8. terms. The grammar therefore of the sentence is loose: we ought to have had something like this—*τὸν δ' αὐτάρκη λέγομεν οὐχ αὐτῶ, ἢ μονώτης, αὐτάρκη, ἀλλ' αὐτῶ, ἢ οἰκονόμος καὶ πολίτης*. The singular *γυνακί* (K^b and M^b however have *γυναίξί*), among the plurals, points to *αὐτῶ* as the logical subject of the clause *ἀλλὰ . . . πολίταις*.

b. 11. φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 54) defends the reading *πολιτικόν* given by K^b against the *πολιτικός* of L^b M^b, and compares ix. 9. 3 *πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός*.

Man realises his true nature or personality in the *πόλις*. The true 'self,' to which 'self-sufficiency' is ascribed, is that which consists in the clear consciousness of manifold social relations, and of the duties which they entail, as distinguished from the 'self' which is made up of the sensations and feelings, as such, of the individual: see *Pol.* i. 1. 1253 a. 1 *φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῶν, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἦτοι φαῖλός ἐστιν ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος*.

§ 7. *τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὕρος τις*] Social life, the realisation of which by the individual constitutes his true personality, is, so to speak, a natural organism (*τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ Pol.* i. 1. 1253 a. 2), and must be *definite*—*ὁρισμένον*: cf. ix. 10. 3, 4, a passage which seems to redeem the promise *ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαΐθις ἐπισκεπτέον*.

b. 12. *γονεῖς*] = *προγόνους*. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 111) suggests that after *γονεῖς* a genitive, *τῶν γονέων*, may have fallen out, but does not press the suggestion.

The true self, described as 'self-sufficient,' is constituted by the consciousness of relations to others—ancestors, contemporaries, and descendants, within a definite, and comparatively narrow, circle. The self, like the state, must be *εὐδύνοτος*. The *σπουδαῖος*—the man who is earnest about the performance of duty, will not allow himself to be influenced in his daily life by the supposed wishes of very distant ancestors, or by the supposed wants of very remote posterity: nor will he try to adapt himself to a very wide and miscellaneous body of contemporaries.

b. 16. § 8.] All the editors have long notes on this section, which, after all, is not very difficult. 'Moreover we take (supply *οἴμεθα*) Happiness to be the most choiceworthy of all good things—not "most choiceworthy" in the sense of being itself one of them, for (δέ as introducing this apagogic proof is practically equivalent to *γάρ*,

which Susemihl, following Aretinus, indeed reads) plainly, if it 1097 b. 16. were counted together with them as one of them, it would be made *more* choiceworthy by the addition of the least of them—the addition would cause an overbalance of good, and the greater good is always the more choiceworthy.' Cf. the Paraphrast's very clear note—*ἔτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ λέγομεν συναριθμεῖσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς· τῶν γὰρ αἰρετῶν ἡγοῦμεθα εἶναι τὸ ἄκρον καὶ εἰ σύστοιχον αὐτῇ τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήσομεν ἀγαθοῖς, φανερόν ὅτι, εἰ προσθήσομέν τι τῶν ἄλλων αὐτῇ, αἰρετωτέραν ποιήσομεν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῇ τὸ ἄκρον τῶν αἰρετῶν*. Eustratius, on the other hand, absurdly interprets the passage as meaning that *εὐδαιμονία*, though *πάντων αἰρετωτάτη* without addition of minor good things, is nevertheless made *αἰρετωτέρα* *ἑαυτῆς* by the addition of them—*οἷον τὸ εὐτρίχον ἴσως, ἢ τὸ ἐπιδειξίως βαδίζειν, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, ὃ προστιθέμενον τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ μηδενὸς λειπαμένη τῶν κυριωτέρων πρὸς σύστασιν αἰρετωτέραν αὐτῇ ἑαυτῆς ἀποτελεῖ*. I will not trouble the student with the other views of the interpretation of this passage. A statement and criticism of them will be found in Rassow's *Forsch.* pp. 112-115. Rassow interprets as I have done above, following the Paraphrast. So also do Coraes, Michelet, and Grant; Zeller, however (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. pp. 610, 611, third ed.), at the end of a somewhat puzzling note, suggests that the words *συναριθμουμένην δὲ . . . ἀεί*, or at least *ὑπεροχῇ . . . ἀεί* are an interpolation. But it is difficult to suppose that the writer of the *M. M.* i. 2. 1184 a. 15-25 had not the words suspected by Zeller before him when he wrote—*μετὰ ταῦτα τοῖνυν πῶς τὸ ἄριστον δεῖ σκοπεῖν; Πότερον οὕτως ὡς καὶ αὐτοῦ συναριθμουμένου; Ἄλλ' ἄτοπον. Τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶ τέλος τέλειον, τὸ δὲ τέλειον τέλος ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν οὐθὲν ἂν ἄλλο δόξειεν εἶναι ἢ εὐδαιμονία, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν συντιθεμένη; εἰν δὴ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ συναριθμῆς, αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔσται βέλτιον· αὐτὸ γὰρ βέλτιστον ἔσται. Οἷον τὰ ὑγιεινὰ θεῖς καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν, σκοπεῖ τί τούτων πάντων βέλτιστον. Βέλτιστον δ' ἐστὶν ὑγεία. Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο πάντων βέλτιστον, καὶ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ βέλτιστον ἄτοπον δὴ συμβαίνει. Οὐ δὴ ἴσως οὕτω γε σκεπτέον τὸ βέλτιστον*.

The doctrine of the present section may be explained as follows—*εὐδαιμονία* is Life, and, as such, cannot be classed among the 'good things' of life. It is the Form and organisation of man's powers and opportunities. To suppose it possible to add one of these powers or opportunities to the already perfect Form, would be to suppose that the power or opportunity in question

1097 b.16. has not been already organised in the Form¹, and that consequently the Form is imperfect. The absurdity of such a supposition would equal that of representing a perfectly healthy man as made more healthy by the addition of a heart. As the various organs of the body have no function, and therefore no real existence, apart from the living body, so particular good things (virtue, health, beauty, wealth) have no existence, except as elements of the noble life.

In this section Aristotle virtually maintains all that Plato contended for in his doctrine of the Idea of the Good. As the Idea of the Good is the unity of good things, and that by reason of which they are good—in other words, as it is that definite system, or order, by belonging to, and subserving which, particular things are said to be *good*, rather than pleasant, or otherwise attractive to mere sense; so *εὐδαιμονία* is that orderly and beautiful life in relation to which, and only to which, man's powers and opportunities have any significance. The man who has no rational conception of the greatness and beauty of Life, as a system, will cherish, instead of that conception, an image borrowed from sense; he will identify Happiness, or Life, with pleasure, or honour. Having made this identification, he will easily persuade himself that 'Happiness' may be enhanced by the addition of particular good things; for *his* 'Happiness' is itself only a particular good thing. But Happiness, as the rational man conceives it, is not a *thing*—not something that a man receives passively and possesses (*κτῆμα*), but the *use* (*χρήσις*) which he makes of the things he has received and possesses. So, a tree is not the inorganic elements into which it may be analysed, but the use, as it were, to which the organising principle puts these elements. *Noûs* in man, like *φύσις* in the plant and animal worlds, recognises and imposes definite limits. Particular details are valued by it, not for themselves (if they were, no limit could be assigned to their desirable multiplication), but for the sake of the beautiful Life which transforms them. But the man who lives by 'sense and imagination' is immersed in these details. Life, or 'Happiness,' is for him a mere succession of particular experiences—an indefinite sum of good things which never satisfies him. To the external view

¹ Cf. *Met. Z.* 17. 1041 b. 11 sqq., where it is shown in the case of *σάρξ* that the *οὐσία*, or organic whole, is not co-ordinate with its *στοιχεῖα* or elements, and cannot be added to them.

he may seem to be *εὐδαιμών*, because the material conditions or 1097 b.16. elements of *εὐδαιμονία* are separately present; but the transforming spirit is inwardly wanting—

‘Er hat die Theile in seiner Hand,
Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band.’

He is receptive of isolated impressions; he lives *κατὰ πάθος*; he does not assert a personality in active function. Cf. *Poet.* 6. 1450 a. 18 ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστί, καὶ τὸ τέλος πράξις τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης.

§ 9. ἀλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν β. 22. τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δέ κ.τ.λ.] According to Ramsauer τὸ ἄριστον is the subject and τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν the predicate, and τὸ ἄριστον must be understood after τί ἐστιν. The accepted name *εὐδαιμονία* and the desiderated *definition* are thus contrasted by μὲν and δέ. But, if this were the construction, should we not have ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δέ κ.τ.λ.?

§ 10. ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ] whether the ἔργον β. 26. be a substantive result *παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*, or simply the *ἐνέργεια* itself (see *E. N.* i. 1. 2 and *Met.* θ. 8. 1050 a. 22-b. 3). In the former case the ἔργον is better than the ἐνέργεια, in the latter case than the ἔξις. Cf. *E. E.* ii. 1. 1219 a. 13 τὸ ἔργον λέγεται διχῶς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἑτερόν τι τὸ ἔργον παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν, οἷον οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκοδόμησις καὶ ἰατρικῆς ὑγίεια ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑγιάνσις οὐδ' ἰατρεισις, τῶν δ' ἡ χρῆσις ἔργον, οἷον ὕψους ὄρασις καὶ μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης θεωρία. Ὅσπ' ἀνάγκη, ὃν ἔργον ἡ χρῆσις, τὴν χρῆσιν βέλτιον εἶναι τῆς ἔξεως. Of this latter kind is the ἔργον ἀνθρώπου of the present passage: cf. *Met.* θ. 8. 1050 a. 34 ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ἡ ὄρασις ἐν τῷ ὄρῳ καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία· ζωὴ γὰρ ποία τις ἐστίν. Cf. also *M. M.* i. 3. 1184 b. 9 τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἀλλὰ διπλόν· ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος αἰτὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ χρῆσις, οἷον τῆς ὕψους· καὶ ἔστι γε ἡ χρῆσις αἰρετωτέρα τῆς ἔξεως. Τέλος δὲ ἡ χρῆσις· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν βούλοιοτο ἔχειν τὴν ὕψιν μὴ μελλῶν ὄραν ἀλλὰ μένειν. Ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ ἐπ' ἀκοῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. Ὅν ἄρα καὶ χρῆσις καὶ ἔξις ἐστίν, αἰεὶ βέλτιον καὶ αἰρετώτερον ἡ χρῆσις τῆς ἔξεως· ἡ γὰρ χρῆσις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τέλος, ἡ δ' ἔξις τῆς χρήσεως ἔνεκεν.

§ 11. πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ.] The editors point out that this passage β. 28. is taken from *Rhet.* i. 352 E δοκεῖ τι σοὶ εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον; ἐμιγε. ἄρα

1097 b. 28. οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὄνου ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἡ μόνω ἐκείνω ποιῆ τις ἢ ἄριστα; . . . ἔσθ' ὅτ' ἂν ἄλλω ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; οὐ δῆτα, τί δῆ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλω ἢ ὠσίν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν ταῦτα τούτων φαίμεν ἔργα εἶναι; . . . οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἐκάστον, ὅπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται; . . . ἴθι δῆ, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι . . . ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι; μάλιστα γὰρ, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴν φαίμεν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι; φαμέν.

b. 33. §§ 12, 13.] The following extracts give in outline the psychology of these sections—viz. that living beings (τὰ ζῶα), possessing the power of nutrition and growth, are either sentient (ζῶα) or non-sentient (φυτά). Sentient beings either combine their separate sensations into a rational experience (ἄνθρωπος), or they do not (τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα). *De An.* ii. 2. 413 a. 20 Λέγομεν οὖν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τῆς σκέψεως, διωρίσθαι τὸ ζῶον τοῦ ἀψύχου τῷ ζῆν. Πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, κἂν ἔν τι τούτων ἐνυπάρχη μόνον, ζῆν αὐτὸ φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς, αἴσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἢ κατὰ τόπον, ἔτι κίνησις ἢ κατὰ τροφήν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αἰθέσις. Διὸ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα πάντα δοκεῖ ζῆν φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, δι' ἧς αἰσθῆσίν τε καὶ φθίσιν λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους· οὐ γὰρ ἄνω μὲν αἰσθεται, κάτω δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἐπ' ἄμφω καὶ πάντῃ ὅσα καὶ τρέφεται, καὶ ζῆν διὰ τέλους, ἕως ἂν δύνηται λαμβάνειν τροφήν. Χωρίζεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τῶν ἄλλων δυνατὸν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῦτου ἀδύνατον ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς. Φανερόν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν φυομένων οὐδεμία γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει δύναμις ἄλλη ψυχῆς. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῶσι, τὸ δὲ ζῶον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως· καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ κινούμενα μὴδ' ἀλλάττοντα τύπον, ἔχοντα δ' αἴσθησιν ζῶα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆν μόνον. Δισθήσεως δὲ πρώτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἀφή. Ὡσπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ἀφῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἢ ἀφή τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. Θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα μετέχει· τὰ δὲ ζῶα πάντα φαίνεται τὴν ἀπτικὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα. 3. 414 a. 29 Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἰ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη. Δυνάμεις δ' εἶπομεν θρεπτικόν, ὀρεκτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, κινητικόν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν. Ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικόν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τοῦτο τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν· ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, τὰ δὲ ζῶα πάντ' ἔχουσι μίαν γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἀφήν· ἢ δ' αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τοῦτα ἠδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἠδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἠδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη: . . . Ἐνίοις δὲ πρὸς τοῦτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἰ τι

τοιοῦτον ἑτερόν ἐστιν ἢ καὶ τιμιώτερον. . . . οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει 1097 b. 33. λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τοῦτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, οἷς δ' ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμὸς, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτῃ μόνῃ ζῶσιν. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ ἕτερος λόγος.

§ 13. πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος] Grant translates, 'a moral 1088 a. 3. life of the rational part,' and compares vi. 2. 2 τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχουν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. This translation is somewhat misleading. Man's highest function is not *πρᾶξις* in the sense of moral, as distinguished from speculative 'action'—*θεωρία*: nor do the words *πρακτικὴ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος* really limit us to the 'moral life.' See *Pol.* H. 3. 1325 b. 14 'Ἄλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εἰδαιμονίαν εἰπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινὴ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός.' Ἄλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἴονταί τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποθαινόντων χάριν γιγνομένης ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεως· ἢ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ *πρᾶξις τις*· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις ἀρχιτέκτονας. It is better then to translate the words *πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος*, 'a life consisting in the action of the rational part.'

τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον] a. 4. 'With regard to the present passage,' Grant says, 'Bekker exhibits no variation in the MSS., and the Paraphrast evidently had it in his text. All that can be said therefore is that the present sentence interrupts the sense and grammar of the context, and that it is conspicuously awkward in a book which for the most part reads smoothly.' Rasso (*Forsch.* p. 72) brackets the sentence, pointing out that *ἐπιπειθὲς* does not occur elsewhere in the Aristotelian canon, and appears only in very late Greek. While the sentence itself, then, is doubtless an interpolation, its doctrine is strictly Aristotelian, being, in fact, that laid down afterwards in ch. 13, § 19 of this book. 'The rational part' is (1) Reason proper, *τὸ λόγον ἔχον κυρίως*—that which 'has reason' in the strict and proper sense of 'having,' i.e. 'has it *in itself*;' (2) the appetites *qua* obedient to reason, *τὸ μετέχον λόγῳ*—that which 'has reason,' not in the strict and proper sense of 'having,' but in the sense of 'participating in, or benefiting by, what another has.'

διτῶς κ.τ.λ.] 'But, as this "rational life" may be understood in a. 5.

1098 a. 5. either of two senses—either as a state, or as a function, we must take it in the latter, which seems to be the more proper sense.’ I am inclined to agree with Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 72) that *καί* before *ταύτης* ought to be omitted. He supposes it to have been inserted after the clause *τούτου δὲ . . . διανοούμενον* had been interpolated. After *λεγομένης* Rassow conjectures that such words as *τῆς μὲν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν τῆς δὲ καθ’ ἑξῆς* have fallen out (*Forsch.* p. 73).

a. 7. §§ 14, 15.] The apodosis begins with *τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν* § 15, where *γίνεται*, as Grant remarks, ‘is used as denoting a deduction from premisses’ [cf. i. 8. 3 for a similar use of *γίνεται*], and may be rendered ‘it results that the good for man, &c.’ Eustratius, however, gives a different force to *γίνεται*: *οὐκ εἶπε δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ γίνεται, διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ἴσασθαι ὀφείλειν τὸν τέλειον ἄνθρωπον ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ διὰ παντὸς ἐμμένειν αὐτοῦ ἀντεχόμενον . . . ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως εἰπεῖν τὸ γίνεται: ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τινα ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ὡς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ἀγῶν καὶ ἡμέρα καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτός: τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστον ὅλον μὲν ὡς ὅλον οὐκ ἀπρητισμένον ὑφίσταται, κατὰ μέρος δὲ γινόμενον ἀποτελεῖται παρερχομένων τῶν μερῶν οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια: καὶ γὰρ αὐτῆς τὸ μὲν γεγονός ἤδη παρήλαθε, τὸ δ’ ἐπιγίνεται μετ’ ἐκείνο, καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως, καὶ οὐδέποτε ὀλοκλήρως ἴσασθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μικρὸν ἀπαρτίξεται: διὸ καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκείον εἶναι εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι.* Is Eustratius thinking of *E. N.* ix. 9. 5 *ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἢ δ’ ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτήμα τι?*

Grant’s explanation of *γίνεται* is of course correct.

§ 14. *ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια*] The term *ψυχή* has not been actually used above, but is naturally suggested by the divisions enumerated in §§ 12 and 13, which are those of the *ψυχή*.

κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου] The Paraphrast explains rightly, I think, the distinction intended here: *κατὰ λόγον, ὅταν διανοῆται, ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ λόγου, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος κινῆται μετὰ λόγου*¹. The expression *κατὰ λόγον* at the beginning of this section is followed, it will be observed, by the expression *μετὰ λόγου* at the end of the section; but the technical opposition between *κατὰ λόγον* (where *λόγος* is a principle governing life mechanically from without), and *μετὰ λόγου* (where *λόγος* regulates life from within: see notes on vi. 13. 5) does not seem to me to be raised in the present passage,

¹ So also Eustratius—*τὸ μὲν κατὰ λόγον περὶ τῆς οἰκείου ἐχούσης λόγον καὶ διανοομένης ψυχῆς θέμενος: τὸ δὲ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου περὶ τῆς λόγῳ ἐπιπειθοῦς.*

although the two expressions occur in it. The expression *μετὰ λόγον* often stands merely for ‘rational,’ instead of *λογικός*, which Aristotle does not use in this sense—or hardly ever: cf. *Met.* θ. 5. 1048 a. 3, where *δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγον* are opposed to *ἄλογοι δυνάμεις*. Here, then (*E. N.* i. 7. 14), I think, the phrase *πράξεις μετὰ λόγου = πράξεις λογικός* (as a later writer might employ the adjective); and expresses shortly what has been set forth more fully in the words *ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου*, understood as by the Paraphrast¹. Perhaps, however, it may be thought that *ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου* is = *μετὰ λόγον* in the technical sense of the latter expression (*i.e.* where *λόγος* is an immanent principle regulating life), and that *ἢ* thus introduces a correction of the inadequate formula *κατὰ λόγον*, which accordingly is not repeated, the more correct *μετὰ λόγου* being used. But it does not seem likely that Aristotle would introduce such an important distinction by means of the merely negative expression *μὴ ἄνευ λόγου*. On the other hand, such a negative expression is well fitted to designate the obedience of the passions to reason, as distinguished from the spontaneous activity of reason itself in the sphere of thought.

τῷ γένει] qualifies *τὸ δ’ αὐτό*.

a. 8.

§ 15.] *The Definition of εὐδαιμονία.* Muretus quotes Cicero’s neat rendering of Aristotle’s definition of *εὐδαιμονία*, ‘Aristoteles virtutis usum cum perfectae vitae prosperitate conjunxit.’ *De Fin.* iv. 7.

κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην] *i.e.* *κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἀρετήν*. Reason is the Form of man which is impressed on the matter of the lower nature which he shares with the brutes. This Form (identical with the *τέλος* or *ἔργον*, cf. *E. N.* iii. 7. 6 *ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει: Met.* θ. 8. 1050 a. 21 *τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τέλος*) is the *ἴδιον* (§ 12) which is the object of the present enquiry. In seeking to discover the definition of a thing (and Aristotle is here really seeking to discover the *definition of man*), we always look for the characteristic Form irrespective of the matter in which it is realised. Hence here, when Aristotle identifies Happiness with the *ἐνέργεια* of Reason, he is considering it *formally*—as something which admits of *definition* (see note on vii. 13. 2 b. 10). But

¹ This was written before I became acquainted with Bywater’s view that *ἀνθρώπου* 1098 a. 12 . . . *οὕτω* 16 is a repetition of what has gone before. This view explains the conclusion which I had reached that *μετὰ λόγον* and *κατὰ λόγον* are not distinguished here, as they are in vi. 13. 5.

1098 a. 17. it must not be forgotten (and Aristotle, unlike the Neoplatonist exponents of his system, never forgets this) that Reason, or the Form of Happiness, is only realised by man in a given matter, vegetative and sensitive. Accordingly, when Happiness is said to be an *ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην ἀρετήν, ἰ.ε. κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ*, it is understood that *all* the functions, vegetative and sensitive, of man as a composite being are exercised in a harmony characteristic (*ἴδιον*) of man alone. This harmonious exercise of all his natural faculties is the 'exercise of Reason' in which man's chief good consists. The exercise of Reason is *best* in the sense of being the co-ordination of all other functions, not in the sense of being itself a function abstracted from the others, capable (in man as distinguished from God) of operating without a material basis laid in the *ψυχή* qua *θρεπτική* and *αἰσθητική*. See Laas (*εὐδαιμονία, Aristotelis in Ethicis Principium quid velit et valeat*, Berlin, 1859), pp. 10 and 11: 'In hac definitione non omnia plana sunt: mirum est quod hominis munus in sola ratione versatur, quia ejus propria sit; quasi non sentire et vivere, quamvis non proprium, tamen hominis munus sit. . . . Ut igitur cur rationi humana omnia tribuantur noscas, memineris quaeo Aristotelem hominis proprium quaesivisse; est igitur hoc potius anquirendum cur alicujus rei vis in ejus proprio solo sit non in toto. . . . Cum Platoni omnis essentia vertatur in universali, *illi* (*i. e.* Aristoteli) generalis definitionis pars nihil est nisi materia in qua vera essentia specificae differentiae exprimitur. . . . Ac si omne genus materia est, quo mersa differentiae forma, ut ita dicam, sola vim totius exprimit, etiam in rerum natura omne eatenus existit quatenus materiae forma est impressa: conditiones igitur necessariae ut forma possit comparere pro materia habentur; ut, cum primum illud forma definitum prodiit, eae ad rei vim perspicendam nullius sint momenti. Itaque si ex Aristotelis sensu omnis plantarum vita animalium propriam existentiam tempore praecedat tanquam conditio sine qua non, est ea in ipso animali materia, vera autem essentia in proprio est quod in ea exprimitur. Quare verum munus hominis non in vivendo, non in sentiendo seseque movendo—sed haec sunt conditiones in quibus rationalis hominis vita efflorescat.'

a. 18. § 16. *ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ*] Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 116, &c.) discusses the question whether these words mean, as generally supposed, 'das volle menschliche Leben bis zum Tode'—*i. e.* a complete life spent prosperously up to the day of death. He begins by

admitting that there is much in favour of the view that such is their 1098 a. 18. meaning: *first* the passage *E. N.* i. 9. §§ 10 and 11 οὐδὲ πᾶσι εὐδαιμόν ἐστιν οὐπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γὰρ, ὥσπερ εἶπόμεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐθηνούonta μεγάλας συμφορὰς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γῆρας, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρῆσάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει: *secondly*, the circumstance that the later Peripatetics undoubtedly took the words in this sense—*E. E.* ii. 1. 1219 b. 6 διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζειν, ἀλλ' ἅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὐδαιμόν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο: *M. M.* i. 4. 1185 a. 4 οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ γε ἀτελεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν τελείῳ· τελείος δ' ἂν εἴη χρόνος ὅσον ἀνθρώπος βιοῖ. There is nothing, however, in the expression *βίος τελείος* taken by itself, Rassow thinks, to warrant us in assuming that Aristotle—as distinguished from his followers—makes a long continuously prosperous life a necessary condition of Happiness. The phrase *βίος τελείος* taken by itself means simply a life that reaches its end or aim. Of course to reach its end or aim a life must have a reasonable duration, and a reasonable amount of prosperity; but the question still remains, Did Aristotle, like his successors of the Peripatetic school, identify this reasonable duration and prosperity, necessary for the attainment of the end, with a long life continuously prosperous up to the day of death? To answer this question, Rassow appeals to *E. N.* i. 10. 14 οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥαδίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἕκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαιμόν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τι καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος. Thus, while Solon will allow the title of 'happy' only to the man who possesses Happiness without interruption to the end of his natural life, Aristotle does not regard it as impossible to regain a Happiness which one has lost. If then it is conceivable that a man may possess, lose, and then regain Happiness, how can the *βίος τελείος*, in the sense of 'das volle menschliche Leben bis zum Tode,' be the necessary condition of Happiness? We shall have to return to this subject in ch. 10.

§ 17. *περιγεγράφθω . . . ἀναγράψαι*] The editors compare *de a.* 20. *gen. anim.* ii. 6. 743 b. 20 *ἅπαντα δὲ ταῖς περιγεγραφαῖς διορίζεται*

1098 a.20. πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ λαμβάνει τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰς μαλακότητας καὶ τὰς σκληρότητας, ἀτεχνῶς ὡς περ ἂν ὑπὸ ζωγράφου τῆς φύσεως δημιουργούμενα· καὶ γὰρ οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράφαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῶον. The meaning of ὑποτυπῶσαι is to 'mould slightly or roughly,' then to 'outline' = περιγράψαι, which is opposed to ἀναγράψαι, to 'fill in in detail.'

In this (the third) digression on the logical method of Ethics (§§ 17-23), Grant remarks (*Ethics* vol. i. p. 394) that 'Aristotle points out his definition of the chief good as a "sketch to be filled up"; and also, it would appear, as an ἀρχή or leading principle, which in importance amounts to "more than half the whole" science. In filling up the sketch, he again cautions us that too much ἀκρίβεια is not to be expected. But it is plain that he has deserted his former view of the science as inductive [*i. e.* in i. 4. 5]; he now makes it depend on a general conception of the chief good which is to be applied and developed.' See generally Grant's Appendix *A on the Ethical method of Aristotle*. Grant seems to me to go too far when he says that, in the passage before us, Aristotle 'has deserted his former view of the science as inductive.' The opposition between induction and deduction is not an absolute one. In a concrete enquiry, of the complexity of that pursued in the *Ethics*, the phenomena could not be grouped and handled, as 'induction' requires, without the aid of 'deduction.' 'A general conception of the chief good,' framed in anticipation of the evidence to be afterwards fully adduced in support of it, is essential at the outset, as 'throwing the light of science' (to use Mill's expression) upon phenomena which would otherwise baffle knowledge by their complexity and apparent inconsistency. Aristotle's method in Ethics is thus 'inductive,' or 'deductive,' according to the point of view from which we choose to regard it. He starts with a 'general conception,' framed in advance of the facts, which he applies to their interpretation; so far his method is 'deductive.' But the results of the application of this 'general conception' are so carefully verified by appeals to experience at every step, and so often modified, to bring them into agreement with experience, that the so-called 'deductive' enquiry seems not to differ from the 'inductive' process of establishing generalisations by the observation of particular phenomena. In short Aristotle's method in Ethics answers pretty exactly to what Mill (*Logic* Book vi. ch. 9) calls the 'Physical or Concrete Deductive

method,' the method of astronomy, natural philosophy, physiology, and especially of social science, 'that most complex of all studies.' The author of the *Ethics* is 'aware' (to borrow Mill's words) 'that the same superior complexity [of social phenomena] which renders the instrument of deduction [more necessary, renders it also more precarious]; and he meets this difficulty by the systematic use of verification, characterised by Mill as 'the third essential constituent part of the Deductive method,' and described as the process 'of collating the conclusions of the ratiocination either with the concrete phenomena themselves, or when such are obtainable, with their empirical laws.' Aristotle's appeals to 'the concrete phenomena themselves'—to his own observations in Ethics and Politics, occur on every page; while to 'their empirical laws,' as popularly recognised in ἔνδοξα and λεγόμενα, he attaches the greatest weight. The spirit in which Aristotle employs the concrete deductive method in the *Ethics* could not be better characterised than in the following passage (Mill's *Logic* vi. 9): 'The ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science is not the *à priori* reasoning itself, but the accordance between its results and those of observation *à posteriori*. Either of these processes, apart from the other, diminishes in value as the subject increases in complication, and this in so rapid a ratio as soon to become entirely worthless; but the reliance to be placed in the concurrence of the two sorts of evidence, not only does not diminish in anything like the same proportion, but is not necessarily much diminished at all. Nothing more results than a disturbance in the order of precedency of the two processes, sometimes amounting to its actual inversion; inasmuch that instead of deducing our conclusions by reasoning, and verifying them by observation, we in some cases begin by obtaining them conjecturally from specific experience, and afterwards connect them with the principles of human nature by *à priori* reasonings, which reasonings are thus a real verification.'

In the *Ethics* 'the order of precedency' is frequently 'disturbed,' and even 'inverted,' in correspondence with the exigencies of a difficult enquiry. Hence the hesitation which Aristotle's commentators have shown in deciding the question, whether the method of the *Ethics* is 'deductive,' or 'inductive.' The truth however is, as we have seen, that the abstract distinction between Deduction and Induction is not *à propos* in relation to a concrete enquiry like the present.

1098 a.20. With regard to Aristotle's attitude, in other concrete enquiries than those of the moral sciences, to the three operations noted by Mill (*Logic* iii. 11) as essential to the Deductive method, viz. the processes (1) of direct induction, (2) of ratiocination, and (3) of verification, it may be said that while he is fully aware of the importance of the third, and carries out the second with marvellous acuteness, he is not sufficiently careful about the first. His natural science is largely vitiated by the influence of *notiones temere a rebus abstractae*. But in ethical and political science the case is different. Here the ratiocinations, the results of which are carefully verified, proceed from principles which, from the nature of the subject to which they belong, are based on a solid foundation of experience. Human life is always present to our observation, and rouses our liveliest interest; and we frame true generalisations about it before we are well aware that we are generalising at all; at any rate, our unconscious generalisations are so nearly true, that subsequent conscious verification easily corrects them. But in the field of natural science, Aristotle had no such foundation already laid for his *ἀρχαί*. He had to depend, in an age in which observers were few and inexperienced, scientific collaboration unknown, and instruments of observation non-existent, almost entirely upon himself. Little wonder then that his principles in this field did not answer to the 'subtlety of nature,' and gave results often so vague, and wide of the mark, that they *seemed* to be verified by observations which were really quite irrelevant to the subject of enquiry.

a. 22. δόξειε . . . ἐλλείπον] Victorious, followed by most of the editors, quotes *Soph. El.* 34. 183 b. 17 τῶν γὰρ εὕρισκομένων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν παρ' ἐτέρων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεποιημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδέδωκεν ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαβόντων ὕστερον τὰ δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὕρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἴθε, χρησιμωτέραν μὲντοι πολλῶ τῆς ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξήσεως. Μέγιστον γὰρ ὕσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον ὄσφ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσοῦτ' μικρότατον ἢν τῶ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατον ἔστιν ὑφθῆναι. Ταύτης δ' εὐρημένης ῥῆον τὸ προστιθέναι καὶ συναύξειν τὸ λοιπὸν ἔστιν ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς λόγους συμβέβηκε, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας τέχνας.

διαρθρῶσαι] 'to articulate,' 'to work out in detail.'

a. 23. καὶ ὁ χρόνος κ.τ.λ.] Cf. *Plut. Conviv. vii Sap.* 9 τί σοφώτατον; χρόνος (ἔφη Θαλῆς) τὰ μὲν γὰρ εὕρκεν οὗτος ἦδη τὰ δὲ εὕρσει.

a. 26. § 18.] See Grant's useful note on the various meanings of ἀκρίβεια.

Here, according to Grant, ἀκρίβεια combines three meanings: 'It 1098 a. 26. seems to say that *mathematical exactness* is not suited to Ethics—that too much *subtlety* is not to be expected (καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης κ.τ.λ.)—that too much *detail* is to be avoided (ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα κ.τ.λ.).'

The definition of the Chief Good is not like a definition in Geometry, the consequences of which can be demonstrated to the eye plainly in a diagram. It only enables us to trace *tendencies*—τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, which may be counteracted in particular cases. It is a principle, after all, not so much of science as of conduct; it leads us not to scientifically demonstrated conclusions, but to good and useful acts: cf. i. 3. 6 τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ πράξις. Like the carpenter's right angle, it is a principle *χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον* sufficiently correct for the practical purpose in view—a purpose which would be defeated if greater elaboration were attempted: cf. i. 13. 8 θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῶ πολιτικῶ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἰκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα. Cf. Mill's *Logic* vi. 9: 'It is evident . . . that Sociology considered as a system of deductions *à priori* cannot be a science of positive predictions but only of tendencies. We may be able to conclude from the laws of human nature applied to the circumstances of a given state of society that a particular cause will operate in a certain manner, unless counteracted; but we can never be assured to what extent or amount it will so operate, or affirm with certainty that it will not be counteracted; because we can seldom know, even approximately, all the agencies which may coexist with it and still less calculate the collective result of so many combined elements. [E.g. the collective result in a given case of the elements of *εὐδαιμονία*. One man's *εὐδαιμονία* may be seriously affected by external circumstances, which do not so seriously affect that of another.] The remark, however, must here be once more repeated, that knowledge insufficient for prediction may be most valuable for guidance. It is not necessary for the wise conduct of the affairs of society, no more than of any one's private concerns, that we should be able to foresee infallibly the results of what we do. We must seek our objects by means which may perhaps be defeated, and take precautions against dangers which possibly may never be realized. The aim of practical politics is to surround any given society with the greatest possible number of circumstances of which the tendencies are beneficial, and to remove

1098 a. 26. or counteract as far as practicable those of which the tendencies are injurious. A knowledge of the tendencies only, though without the power of accurately predicting their conjoint result, gives us to a certain extent this power.'

a. 28. κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκείον τῆ μεθόδῳ] Eustratius explains the distinction made here—οὐ μόνον φησὶν, κατὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐπιζητεῖν δεῖ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὰ μεθόδους τὰς καταγινόμενας περὶ αὐτά . . . εὐρίσκομεν γὰρ πολλαίαι διαφόρους μεθόδους καταγινόμενας ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπὸν ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν κατὰ τήνδε, τὴν δὲ κατὰ τήνδε τὴν πρόθεσιν . . . παράδειγμα τοῦ λόγου τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης περὶ ζήτησιν ἄμφω τῆς ὀρθῆς γωνίας καταγινόμενοι κ.τ.λ.

a. 29. § 19. καὶ γάρ] The connexion here is explained by Eustratius, as quoted in the last note. The comparison of the γεωμέτρης and τέκτων occurs also in Aristoxenus 33. 15 (p. 48, ed. Marquard)—ὁ μὲν γεωμέτρης οὐδὲν χρῆται τῆ τῆς αἰσθήσεως δυνάμει, οὐ γὰρ ἐθίζει τὴν ὄψιν οὔτε τὸ εὐθεῖ οὔτε τὸ περιφερὲς οὔτ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε φαύλως οὔτε ἐδ κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁ τέκτων καὶ ὁ τορνευτής . . . τῷ δὲ μουσικῷ σχεδὸν ἔστιν ἀρχῆς ἔχουσα τάξιν ἢ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀκρίβεια, οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φαύλως αἰσθανόμενον ἐδ λέγειν περὶ τούτων ὧν μηδὲνα τρόπον αἰσθάνεται.

a. 30. τὴν ὀρθήν] sc. γωνίαν.

a. 31. τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι] 'Its essence, or essential attributes.' Technically τί ἐστι stands for the γένος, and ποῖόν τι for the διαφορά εἰδοποιός which, impressed upon the matter of the γένος, makes the οὐσία or τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι declared by the ὀρισμός. See *Top.* iv. 2. 122 b. 15 οὐδενός . . . ἢ διαφορά γένος ἐστίν· ὅτι δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, δηλοῦν οὐδεμία γὰρ διαφορά σημαίνει τί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποῖόν τι, καθάπερ τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν: *Top.* iv. 6. 128 a. 26 ἢ μὲν διαφορά τὴν ποιότητα τοῦ γένους, αἰε σημαίνει . . . ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν πεζόν, ποῖόν τι λέγει ζῶον: *Met.* Δ. 14. 1020 a. 33 τὸ ποῖόν λέγεται ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ἢ διαφορά τῆς οὐσίας· οἷον ποῖόν τι ἄνθρωπος ζῶον, ὅτι δίπουν, ἵππος δὲ τετράπουν· καὶ κύκλος ποῖόν τι σχῆμα, ὅτι ἀγώνιον, ὡς τῆς διαφορᾶς τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιότητος οὐσης. 'Diese Unterscheidungsmerkmale der Arten (i. e. ἢ διαφορά) . . . sind nicht,' says Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 206, ed. 3) 'accidentelle, sondern Wesensbestimmungen (*Met.* vii. 4. 1029 b. 14, 1030 a. 14, *Top.* vi. 6. 144 a. 24 οὐδεμία γὰρ διαφορά τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπαρχόντων ἐστὶ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ γένος· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὴν διαφορὰν ὑπάρχειν τῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν)', sie gehören zum

Begriff des Subjekts, von dem sie ausgesagt werden, alles daher, 1098 a. 31. was in ihnen enthalten ist, gilt von den Arten und den Einzelwesen, denen sie zukommen (*Kat.* c. 5. 3 a. 21 ff., b. 5). Es kann deshalb von ihnen gesagt werden, dass sie (zusammen mit der Gattung) die Substanz bilden (*Met.* vii. 12. 1038 b. 19), dass sie etwas substantielles aussagen (*Top.* vii. 2); sie selbst jedoch, für sich genommen, sind nicht Substanzen, sondern Qualitäten, drücken nicht ein τί, sondern ein ποῖόν τι aus (*Top.* iv. 2. 122 b. 16, ch. 6, 128 a. 26, vi. 6. 144 a. 18–21, *Phys.* v. 2. 226 a. 27).'

The words before us are τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι, not τί ἐστι καὶ ποῖόν τι. With καὶ, we could translate—'the genus and difference,' or 'the generic and specific attributes,' giving τί ἐστι its strict meaning, according to which it is distinguished from τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. In *de part. anim.* i. 1. 641 a. 16 the phrase καὶ τί καὶ ποῖόν τι actually occurs, where τί and ποῖόν τι are equivalent to γένος and διαφορά respectively, and the whole amounts to οὐσία, or τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. But here ἢ obliges us to give τί ἐστιν by itself the meaning of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οὐσία, or 'essence'; while the alternative (ἢ) ποῖόν τι, which may be rendered by 'essential attributes,' expresses the same 'essence' looked at from a slightly different point of view, as constituted by the τελευταία διαφορά: see *Met.* Z. 12. 1038 a. 19 φανερόν ὅτι ἡ τελευταία διαφορά [μετὰ τοῦ γένους δηλαδή, *Alex. ad loc.*] ἢ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος ἔσται: on which Alexander (p. 488, Bonitz's edition of *Alex.*) has ἡ τελευταία διαφορά ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος, τὰ δὲ πρὸ αὐτῆς ὕλη . . . τὸ μὲν ζῶον πεζὸν ὕλη ἐστὶ . . . τὸ δὲ δίπουν εἶδος: and Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 207, ed. 3) explains that the τελευταία διαφορά is not simply the last specific character as such, but the specific notion determined by it. On the technical distinction between τί ἐστιν and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι see Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 207–9, ed. 3; Schwegler, *Met.* Excursus i; Trendelenburg, *Rhein. Mus.* 1828, vol. ii. 457–483; Trendelenburg, *De Anima* note on i. 1. 2 (cf. his note *de An.* iii. 4. 7 on τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι); Trendelenburg, *Kategorienlehre* 34 ff.; Biese, *Ph. d. Arist.* i. 243, 366, 427, ii. 35; Waitz, *Organ.* 67. b. 12, 94 a. 11. 'Zu dem einfachen τί ἐστι,' says Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 209, ed. 3), 'verhält sich das τί ἦν εἶναι wie das Besondere und Bestimmte zum Allgemeinen und Unbestimmten . . . Das τί ἦν εἶναι ist mithin eine bestimmte Art des τί ἐστι (daher *De Anima*, iii. 6. 430 b. 28 τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, das Sein nach der Seite des Wesens), und es kann deshalb dieses, wie diess bei Arist. sehr häufig ist, in der engeren Bedeutung des τί ἦν εἶναι gebraucht werden, wogegen das letztere niemals

1098 a. 31. in der umfassenderen des τί ἐστι steht, so dass es auch den Stoff oder die blosse Eigenschaft oder das Allgemeine der Gattung, abgesehen von den artbildenden Unterschieden, bezeichnete.' Eustratius' note on the words before us is—ὁ δὲ γεωμέτρης τῆν τε οὐσίαν καὶ ποιότητα τῆς ὀρθῆς ἐπιζητεῖ τί τέ ἐστιν ἐξετάζων, καὶ τίνα ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὴν ὀξείαν καὶ ἀμβλείαν. This would be its τελευταία διαφορά.

a. 32. ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα κ.τ.λ.] cf. Agathon, apud Athen. 185

τὸ μὲν πάρεργον, ἔργον ὡς, ποιούμεθα,
τὸ δ' ἔργον, ὡς πάρεργον, ἐκποιούμεθα.

a. 33. § 20. οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον . . . ὁμοίως] Sections 17–19 have insisted on the importance of a περιγραφή, or ἀρχή, to the subsequent development of a science. Section 20 suggests that, while every science must accept its particular ἀρχή or ἀρχαί as ultimate (*i. e.* without foregoing *demonstration*), some sciences push their ἀρχή or ἀρχαί farther back than others. The theoretical sciences are concerned to have principles as ultimate and irreducible as possible¹, whereas the practical science of Ethics, the end of which is not knowledge but conduct, does well to acquiesce in a principle or principles leading to useful applications, without troubling itself to go back very far upon the theoretical reasons which might be adduced (were it worth while) in support of the principle or principles in which it acquiesces. What the Paraphrast says of ἀρχαί generally is especially true of the ἀρχή of morals—εἰ γὰρ ζητήσομεν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἰτίαν οὐδέποτε ἀρξόμεθα ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀπειρον βαδιοῦμεθα.

1098 b. 1. τὸ ὅτι] as distinguished from the διότι: see *An. Post.* i. 13. 78 a. 22, sqq. Cf. *E. N.* i. 4. 7. 1095 b. 6. Τὸ ὅτι may signify, either a particular fact accepted immediately on the authority of sense, or a general principle accepted, without syllogistic proof, on the authority of induction. In either case there is an ἀρχή or Beginning—a stimulus which initiates, in the one case, a movement in correspondence, or a process of continued observation; in the other

¹ Cf. *Top.* i. 1. 100 a. 27 ἀπόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἦ, ἢ ἐκ τοιούτων ἃ διὰ τινῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε . . . ἔστι δὲ ἀληθὴ μὲν καὶ πρώτα τὰ μὴ δι' ἐτέρων, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτῶν ἔχοντα τὴν πίστιν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, ἀλλ' ἐκάστην τῶν ἀρχῶν αὐτὴν καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι πιστήν. Cf. *De Gen. An.* ii. 6. 742 b. 32 τῆς γὰρ ἀρχῆς ἄλλη γνώσις καὶ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις.

case, a ratiocinative train of thought. A sudden noise which makes me turn round to look, and a general point of view which enables me to explain the particulars of a science, are both ἀρχαί.

οἶον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή] Rasso w b. 2. (*Forsch.* p. 16), following Zeller and Münscher (*Quaest. crit.* p. 18), regards the words οἶον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς as an interpolation, at the same time holding that the whole passage § 18 μεμνησθαι a. 26 . . . § 23 ζητουμένων, b. 8, consisting mainly as it does of repetitions of i. 3. 1 and i. 4. 5–7, is not by Aristotle. Susemihl brackets § 17 δόξειε a. 22 . . . § 23 ζητουμένων b. 8. Ramsauer proposes the omission of δ' before ὅτι, and takes the clause τὸ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή closely with οἶον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς—'velut in iis quae principia sunt causas quaerere absurdum; esse enim illa, omnium primum est.' I think that οἶον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς may be an interpolation, but that we have no substantial grounds for condemning it as such.

§ 21. τῶν ἀρχῶν . . . ἄλλως] 'And these starting-points, or principles, are arrived at, some in one way, some in another; some by induction, others by perception, others again by some kind of training.' Peters.

ἐπαγωγῆ] Cf. *E. N.* vi. 3. 3. 1139 b. 28 ἡ μὲν δὲ ἐπαγωγή ἀρχή ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαί ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. See *An. Post.* ii. 19, where the part played by the repetition of particular experiences in producing principles is graphically described. Cf. *An. Post.* i. 18. 81 a. 38 φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἴ τις αἰσθησις ἐκλείπειν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐκλείπειναι, ἢν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν, εἴπερ μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῆ ἢ ἀποδείξει. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἐπαγωγῆ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι εἰ μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς· . . . ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἰσθησιν ἀδύνατον· τῶν γὰρ καθέκαστον ἢ αἰσθησις. This last passage, dealing as it does with the origin of τὰ καθόλου or general principles, does not contradict the statement before us, αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῆ θεωροῦνται αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει κ.τ.λ. dealing with the origin of ἀρχαί or principles which are not regarded as necessarily *general* principles in all cases. Where an ἀρχή is the result of ἐπαγωγή, it is of course a general principle; but sense-perception (*αἰσθησις*) can also give an ἀρχή which, though merely a particular impression, is a *Beginning* (ἀρχή), or stimulus, capable of inducing a train of φαντάσματα, or of rousing an ἐπιθυμία, or of immediately calling forth a movement in response. The

1098 b. 3. ἀρχή produced by ἐπαγωγή is the cumulative result of a great many sense impressions, and action or thought suggested by such an ἀρχή is more likely to be in correspondence with the environment than that suggested by a single impression which may be of an exceptional character. But such a single impression obviously differs in degree rather than in kind from the deeper impression produced by induction. Sometimes we think and act on the strength of deep impressions produced by long and uniform experience, sometimes on the strength of the impressions which we receive at the moment. It is to be remembered, however, that the channels of these latter impressions—the organs of special sense—are themselves the results of long and uniform experience in the race, and that the impressions received through them are consequently not so particular as they seem to be when contrasted with ‘generalisations from experience,’ the formation of which we can trace in the life of the individual. Indeed Aristotle himself recognises the universal element in αἴσθησις in such passages as *An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 a. 16 καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἢ δ' αἴσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' οὐ Καλλίου ἀνθρώπου; and *An. Post.* i. 31. 87 b. 28 εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ τοιοῦδε, καὶ μὴ τοῦδέ τινος, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνεσθαι γε ἀναγκαῖον τόδε τι, καὶ ποῦ, καὶ νῦν.

The latter part of the passage quoted above (note on § 19 a. 29) from Aristoxenus illustrates how αἴσθησις may be an ἀρχή: τῷ δὲ μουσικῷ σχεδὸν ἐστὶν ἀρχῆς ἔχουσα τάξιν ἢ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀκρίβεια, οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φάῤῥως αἰσθανόμενον εἰ λέγειν περὶ τούτων ὅν μηδένα τρόπον αἰσθάνεται.

The ἀρχαί obtained by ἔθισμός are (1) the moral habits or tendencies to act in certain ways. These habits are produced by the repetition of particular acts, just as scientific generalisations result from repeated perceptions. After many observations we acquire a certain point of view which dominates our scientific procedure in the department to which the observations belong. After performing many similar acts we acquire a bent which disposes us to go on performing the acts in question. Farther, as belief goes with action, a tendency to act in a particular way is attended by a belief that it is good (*i. e.* right or desirable) to act in that particular way. Hence ἔθισμός not only produces the ἀρχή of Habit, or tendency to act in a particular way, but also, as a kind of ἐπαγωγή, produces (2) a point of view from which conduct is re-

garded—the ἀρχή of belief or opinion on moral matters. Cf. *E. N.* 1098 b. 3. i. 4. §§ 5, 6.

καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως] This does not mean that there are *other* b. 4. ways in which ἀρχαί are obtained besides the three mentioned. Transl. ‘some in one, some in another of these three ways.’

Eustratius has a note which brings out well the connexion between the clause τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. and what immediately precedes: ἐπεὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μὴ δι' ἀπόδειξιν εἶπε γινώσκεισθαι, μηδὲ τὸ διότι περὶ αὐτῶν ἀποδίδοσθαι, ὥσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος—καὶ πῶς ταύτας γνωρίζομεν καὶ ἐπιστησόμεθα ἀγνώστους οὕσας καὶ μὴ ὑποβαλλόμενας ἐπιστήμῃ; συμβήσεται γὰρ διὰ τῶν ἀδήλων δῆλα τὰ ἀδηλα γίνεσθαι—παραδίδωσι τοῖς τρόποις δι' ὃν ἡμῖν ἡ γνώσις τῶν ἀρχῶν περιγίνεται ἄλλους παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὄντας. ἐπαγωγῇ μὲν θεωροῦνται ὡς αὐταὶ τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἴσα κ.τ.λ. . . . αἰσθήσει δὲ ὡς τὰς ἐκάστου τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων οἰκείας γνωρίζομεν ποιότητας· οἶον πυρὸς μὲν τὴν θερμότητα, ἀέρος δὲ τὴν ὑγρότητα, ὕδατος τὴν ψυχρότητα, γῆς τὴν ξηρότητα. ἔθισμῳ δὲ, ὡς αἰ ἔρεται· πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως καλὰ εἶναι γνωρίζομεν τὰ σωφρονικὰ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ταῦτα;

§ 22. μετιέναι κ.τ.λ.] ‘We must endeavour to attain each in the natural way’—Grant. *E. g.* we must remember that moral principles naturally result from ἔθισμός. We must not try to reach them by a purely intellectual process, as if they were theoretical principles, or by the short-cut of the intuition or feeling of the moment. Cf. Eustratius—ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ διαφόρους τρόπους ἢ τῶν ἀρχῶν γνώσις ἡμῖν περιγίνεται, διὰ τοῦτο φησὶν ὅτι πειρατέον ἐκάστας κατὰ τὸν τρόπον ἐκείνον μετέρχεσθαι καθ' ὃν πεφύκασιν εἰς γνώσιν ἡμῖν ἔρχεσθαι.

διορισθῶσι] Cf. *An. Post.* ii. 3. 90 b. 24 αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων b. 6. ὀρισμοί· ὅν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται ἀποδείξεις, δέδεικται πρότερον. ἢ ἔσονται αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀποδεικταί, καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀρχαί, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰς ἡπειρον βαδίζεται, ἢ τὰ πρότα ὀρισμοί ἔσονται ἀναπόδεικτοι. Bywater has restored διορισθῶσι from K^b, for the ὀρισθῶσι of all other MSS.

§ 23. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἡμῖσι τοῦ παντός εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή] Cf. *Pol.* E. b. 7. 4. 1303 b. 29 ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἡμῖσι εἶναι παντός, which seems to be the ordinary form of the proverb. Did Aristotle borrow the modification πλεῖον ἢ ἡμῖσι from Plato, *Legg.* 753 E—ἀρχὴ γὰρ λέγεται μὲν ἡμῖσι παντός ἐν ταῖς παροιμίαις ἔργου, καὶ τό γε καλῶς ἄρξασθαι πάντες ἐγκωμιάζομεν ἐκάστοτε· τὸ δ' ἔστι τε, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, πλεόν ἢ τὸ ἡμῖσι καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτὸ καλῶς γενόμενον ἐγκεκομιάκεν ἰκανῶς? If we are to believe Teichmüller, however (*Literarische Fehden*, p. 188), the

- 1098 b. 7. *Ethics* were written before the *Laws*. Cf. *Probl.* x. 13, 892 a. 29 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον ἡμῶν γάρ. Cf. *Hor. Ep.* i. 2. 40 'Dimidium facti, qui coepit, habet,' and Orelli's note *ad loc.* Lucian, *Hermot.* 3, erroneously attributes the proverb to Hesiod; but Hesiod's dictum (ἔργα κ. ἡμ. 30 νήπιοι οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὄσφ πλέον ἡμῶν παντός) has an entirely different meaning.
- b. 8. συμφανῆ] The notion of the Chief Good 'throws the light of science' upon the complicated phenomena of human life.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Let us now see if our Definition agrees with popular opinions about Happiness, for if it does not, it cannot be true in fact, however correct in logic.

Good things are popularly distinguished as (1) external good things, (2) good things of the soul, (3) good things of the body; and good things of the soul are placed highest. Our Definition agrees, making the Chief Good consist in certain vital functions or actions of the soul, and in conduct. Indeed the expressions 'functions,' 'actions,' and 'conduct,' by themselves, are sufficient to show that our end is a good thing of the soul, not an external good thing. Again, the Happy man is popularly said to 'live well,' and 'to do and fare well': now, we practically define Happiness as 'a good life,' or as 'well-doing.' Further, everything that has ever been viewed as an essential requirement of Happiness, and has consequently been identified with it, is included in our Definition—Goodness, Prudence, Wisdom, Pleasure, External Prosperity. We must believe that these, as elements, are really contained in Happiness, unless we are prepared to deny all weight to consensus and authority.

In the first place, then, we have the support of those who say that Happiness is Goodness, for we make it a function manifesting excellence, or goodness—our advance being that we thus make it consist, not in possession, but in use, not in having something, but in doing something: for a man may have a good thing, and yet it may result in no good for him. As at Olympia the crown is for one of the competitors, not for the strongest man in Greece if he hold aloof, so in life, success is won not by being good, but by well-doing.

Again, our Definition gives due place to Pleasure, for the 'life of well-doing' has its own pleasure—an inherent pleasure, not a merely ornamental pleasure, which may be put on, as it were, and taken off. Whatever a man does habitually he likes, i. e. takes pleasure in; and the good man takes pleasure in the good actions which constitute his Happiness—indeed he would not be a good man if he did not take pleasure in them. Moreover, taking pleasure in the things which he ought to take pleasure in, he enjoys real pleasures, i. e. pleasures which

combine together harmoniously in his life; whereas the pleasures of ordinary men are unreal, as judged by this test, i. e. they conflict with one another.

And not only are the actions in which Happiness consists pleasant in the eyes of the good man—they are also truly good and truly fair in his eyes: and he is the best judge.

Happiness, then, is in itself 'fairest, sweetest, best'—all three: it is not righteousness which is fairest, and possession sweetest, and health best, as the Delian Inscription hath it: yet, 'the functions of the highest excellence,' in which Happiness consists, cannot be performed in the absence of external good things. It is impossible, or difficult, to play a brilliant part on the stage of life without equipment. Friends, wealth, influence, are the instruments; high birth, fair children, beauty, the ornaments of the Happy Life. This is why some have even identified Happiness with external prosperity, i. e. with good fortune.

§ 1. σκεπτόν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς] αὐτῆς grammatically refers to ἀρχή in 1098 b. 9. 7. § 23, but the sense requires us to understand εὐδαιμονίας. I read δέ for δὴ, with Susemihl and Bywater.

ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος] These words are to be taken as a periphrasis for 'logically,' 'syllogistically,' or 'formally.' 'But we must examine our principle—the notion of the Chief Good, not only from the formal point of view—from the point of view of "Conclusion and Premises," but also in the light of the popular opinions about it.' This rendering takes λόγος=συλλογισμός by a common usage, and contrasts τὰ ἐξ ὧν, the premisses, with the συμπέρασμα. Cf. *An. Post.* i. 7, i. 10, and especially *An. Prior.* ii. 4. 57 a. 36 (quoted by Ramsauer) φανερόν οὖν ὅταν μὲν ἢ τὸ συμπέρασμα ψευδές, ἀνάγκη ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος ψευδῆ εἶναι ἢ πάντα ἢ ἕνα. This passage seems decisive as to the meaning of the phrase ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, and deprives of plausibility an objection which might be urged against our rendering, viz. that λόγος must here mean ὀρισμός, and not συλλογισμός, because in the subsequent sections it means ὀρισμός. Coraes is therefore wrong with ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος· τὰ μέρη ἐξ ὧν ὁ ὀρισμός σύγκειται τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. The definition of the Chief Good has been reached as a συμπέρασμα by a process of reasoning from premisses (ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος) involving such abstract notions as τέλος, ἀγαθόν, ἐνέργεια. The result of this abstract process—the Definition of the Chief Good in i. 7. 15—must, Aristotle now says, be verified by being collated with concrete experience as embodied in the common opinions and sayings of men. While this seems to be the plain meaning of the passage before us, the awkwardness of its phraseology must be admitted. Συμπέρασμα, the technical term for the conclusion of the συλλογισμός, is im-

1098 b. 9. properly applied to an ἀρχὴ ἧς οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός, especially in a context like the present (unless Rasso and Susemihl are right in bracketing ch. vii. §§ 17 or 18–23), where the non-syllogistic origin of ἀρχαί is carefully insisted upon. Eustratius, who sees the difficulty just noticed, has a good note, in which he gives what I take to be the correct interpretation—ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ὀρισμοῦ μεταβάς εἰς τὸ κοινῶς εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, κάτεισι εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν αὐτὸς ἔθετο τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὀρισάμενος. ἐπεὶ δὲ συλλογισάμενος διὰ πολλῶν συνήξεν αὐτήν, τὸ ὅτι οὐ τὸ διότι ἀποδιδούς [Eustr. has said above in his note on 7. § 20 τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅρου τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐκλεγόμενος οὐδαμῆ αἰτίαν εἴληφε δι' ἣν ὑπάρχει ἐκείνων ἕκαστον τῆ εὐδαιμονία οὐδὲ διατὶ μέρος τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς ἐστίν. . . ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη δεῖξις τοῦ ὅτι οὐ τοῦ διότι ἐστὶ], φησὶ νῦν ὅτι σκεπτέον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰ ἀρμόδιος ὅρος τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς, οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὃ αὐτῇ ἢ ἀρχῇ καὶ ὁ ὅρος ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος τουτέστιν ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων ἐξ ὧν ἡ περὶ αὐτοῦ δεῖξις συντέθειται, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

The doctrine, justly insisted upon by Aristotle in the present passage—that the principle of moral science must be brought to the test of substantial agreement with popular opinion—does not admit of analogical extension to the principles of the physical sciences. Popular opinion cannot afford to be far wrong in matters of conduct, but has little reason for being right as to the remote truths of the physical sciences. Aristotle, however, submits the principles of the physical sciences, equally with the principle of moral science, to *dialectical* tests, *i.e.* examines them in connexion with τὰ ἔνδοξα: see *Top.* i. 2. 101 a. 36 ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν περὶ ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν [χρήσιμος ἢ πραγματεία, *i.e.* *the Topics*, which supply premisses for the *διαλεκτικὸς συλλογισμὸς*, and rules for its employment]· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προτεθείσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ πρῶται αἱ ἀρχαὶ πάντων εἰσὶ, διὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνδόξων ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν διελεῖν τοῦτο δ' ἴδιον ἢ μάλιστα οἰκείον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστίν· ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὐσα, πρὸς τὰς ἀπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει. In his note on the above passage, Alexander (Berlin Schol. 254 b. 36) illustrates the relation of Dialectic to first principles, by showing how ἔνδοξα may be used in support and elucidation of the Definitions of Geometry. See Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. pp. 243–4 ed. 3) 'Sie (*i.e.* die Dialektik) dient insofern namentlich zur Feststellung der wissenschaftlichen Principien, denn da sich diese als ein erstes nicht durch Beweisführung aus etwas gewisserem ableiten lassen, bleibt nur übrig, sie vom

wahrscheinlichen aus zu suchen. Ihren Ausgang nimmt eine solche Untersuchung von den herrschenden Annahmen der Menschen; denn was alle, oder doch die erfahrenen und verständigen glauben, das verdient immer Beachtung, da es die Vermuthung für sich hat, auf einer wirklichen Erfahrung zu beruhen (cf. *E. N.* vi. 11. 6, x. 2. 4, vii. 13. 5; *Rhet.* i. 1. 1355 a. 15). Je unsicherer aber diese Grundlage ist, um so mehr drängt sich auch Aristoteles das Bedürfniss auf, aus welchem schon die Sokratische Dialektik entsprungen war, ihre Mangelhaftigkeit dadurch zu verbessern, dass die verschiedenen in der Meinung der Menschen sich kreuzenden Gesichtspunkte zusammengebracht und gegen einander ausgeglichen werden. Daher die Gewohnheit des Philosophen, seinen dogmatischen Untersuchungen *Aporien* voranzuschicken.'

That Aristotle failed to draw consciously any very marked distinction between the principle, or principles, of moral science, and the principles of the physical sciences, as related to ἔνδοξα, shows how defective his conception of the method of the physical sciences really was. The dialectical sifting of ἔνδοξα, or men's opinions about facts, in order to find the residuum of truth contained in these opinions, can never take the place, in the physical sciences, of direct observation and arrangement of the facts themselves. The dialectical method of physical enquiry is on a par with the attempt to sift historical truth directly out of myths by a rationalising process (on which see Grote's *Greece*, Part i. ch. 16)¹. The importance, however, of a dialectical treatment of the principle, or principles, of *moral* science cannot be too much insisted on. The value of these principles is that they lead 'not to knowledge but to conduct.' Unless conduct is to be revolutionised rather than regulated, these principles must, on the whole, agree with the moral sentiments and opinions which, by their prevalence, prove themselves to be such as the welfare of man requires.

The moralist's function, then, according to Aristotle's view (the justice of which is indisputable), is to introduce form, clearness, consistency, into the body of opinions, on practical matters, commonly held by men. These opinions are, on the whole,

¹ We must not, however, underrate the indirect service rendered by Aristotle to these very physical sciences. His 'dialectical' treatment of their principles put Europe in possession of the subtle calculus of philosophical language, without which later brains could not have thought out the discoveries suggested to them by wider and more careful observations.

1098 b. 9. sound (otherwise they would not prevail on matters of such vital importance to the human race), but are wanting in clearness and consistency viewed as a body. The moralist, viewing them as a body, detects and removes the inconsistencies, and produces a system in which his contemporaries recognise the clear expression of their own obscurely entertained sentiments. So, to take a parallel case, the policy of Pericles was recognised by the Athenian δῆμος as the perfect form of its own political views and aspirations, which, without his genius, would never have found expression as a system. See *E. E.* i. 6. 1216 b. 26 πειρατέον δὲ τούτων πάντων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίαις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς φαινομένοις. κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομιλοῦντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις· εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον γέ τινα πάντας, ὅπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύσαι πῶς περὶ αὐτῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων, οὐ σαφῶς δὲ προϊούσῃ ζῆται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς, μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἀεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι συγκεχυμένως (cf. *de Anima* ii. 2. 413 a. 11): *E. N.* vii. 1. 5 δεῖ δ' ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τίθεντας τὰ φαινόμενα, καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας, οὕτω δεικνύσαι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλείστα καὶ κυριώτατα· εἴαν γὰρ λύηται τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἰκανῶς. — *E. N.* x. 8. 12 σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρῆ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον (cf. *E. N.* x. 1. §§ 3, 4).

b. 11 τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ . . . τὰληθές] The passage *E. N.* x. 8. 12, just quoted, helps us to understand this clause. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα are 'the natural attributes of the thing, the facts of its nature' (Grant), which, it is here tacitly assumed, are adequately represented in the opinions or λεγόμενα appealed to. If the Definition be true (τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ), these commonly recognised facts will agree with it; but if it be false (τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ), they will soon show themselves at variance with it. Grant notices the confusion caused 'by the word τὰληθές in the second part of the sentence answering to τὰ ὑπάρχοντα in the first,' and consequently having to be taken in a different sense from τῷ ἀληθεῖ immediately above. Rassow, however (*Forsch.* p. 73), conjectures, with great plausibility, that τὰληθές is the blundering interpolation of a reader, who did not observe that τὰ ὑπάρχοντα is the subject of διαφωνεῖ, as well as of συναδέει. His words are: 'Vergegenwärtigt man sich den Zweck

des Abschnittes, so wird man nicht Anstand nehmen können, das Wort τὰληθές als falschen Zusatz eines Lesers, der ein Subject zu διαφωνεῖ vermisste, auszumerzen. Denn Aristoteles kann nur dieses sagen wollen: ist eine Begriffsbestimmung richtig, so stimmt sie mit den ὑπάρχοντα überein d. h. hier mit dem, was einem Dinge nach allgemeiner Ansicht zukommt; ist sie falsch, so ergibt sich bald, dass sie damit in Widerstreit steht.

§ 2. νενεμημένων δὴ . . .] 'To apply our principle (δῆ), goods have been divided into three kinds' (Grant)—i. e. to apply the principle of appealing to λεγόμενα.

As Ramsauer observes, this threefold division of goods is indicated by Plato in *Philebus* 48 E and *Euthyd.* 279 B. Cf. also *Legg.* 743 E. It is a very natural division, and doubtless was made long before Plato and Aristotle; but the Peripatetics seem to have given it philosophical importance, by taking it in connexion with their discussions of εὐδαιμονία. Cf. *Plut. de Vita et Poesi Homeri*, ch. 137 οἱ δ' ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου προτείνει μὲν τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθὰ νομίζουσιν οἷον φρόνησιν ἀνδρείαν σωφροσύνην δικαιοσύνην. δεύτερα δ' εἶναι τὰ τοῦ σώματος οἷον ὑγίειαν κ.τ.λ. . . . τρίτα δὲ τὰ ἐκτὸς οἷον εὐδοξίαν κ.τ.λ. . . ἐπαινετὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὸν τὸ ἐν ἀληθῶσι καὶ νόσφι καὶ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ συμφοραῖς ἀβουλήτοις χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀρετῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀντεχούσης τοῖς κακοῖς, οὐ μέντοι ἀρετὸν, οὐδὲ μακάριον· τὸ δ' ἐν ἀγαθοῖς νοῦν ἔχειν τῷ ὄντι εὐδαιμον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν κτήσιν μόνην τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καλόν. Didymus—'Αριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν περιπατητικῶν περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν δόγματα (*Mullach, Fr. Phil.* ii. pp. 89, 90)—after making out a parallelism between the ἀγαθὰ of body, mind, and estate thus—

ὑγίεια	σωφροσύνη	πλοῦτος
ἰσχὺς	ἀνδρεία	ἀρχή
κάλλος	δικαιοσύνη	φιλία
εὐαίσθησία	φρόνησις	εὐτυχία—

goes on to say—τοὺς δὲ νομίζοντας τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθὰ συμπληροῦν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν εὐδαιμονία βίος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ βίος ἐκ πράξεως συμπληρῶται· τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν οὕτε πράξιν εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτὰ, οὐθ' ὅλως ἐνέργειαν.

The passages in which Aristotle refers to this threefold division are *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 25 οὕτω γὰρ αὐταρκέστατος εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τὰ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. ἔστι δ' ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἔξω δ' εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὴ:

1098 b.12. *Pol.* H. I. 1323 a. 22 νομίσαντας οὐν ἰκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἑξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσκειν ἂν, ὡς οὐ, τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίους χρή. Cf. *E. E.* ii. 1. 1218 b. 32 πάντα δὴ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τούτων αἰρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιροῦμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑξωτερικοῖς λόγοις: *M. M.* i. 3. 1184 b. 2 ἔστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ οἷον αἱ ἀρεταὶ τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ σώματι οἷον ὑγίεια, κάλλος, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς, πλοῦτος ἀρχὴ τιμῆ ἢ εἴ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων. τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βέλ-
 τιστα. The following passage, attributed by Mullach (*Fr.* i. p. 554 b.) to the Pythagorean Archytas, is so evidently from a late Peripatetic summary done into the Doric dialect, that it is added here merely as another proof of the importance given by Peripateticism to the threefold division of ἀγαθὰ, not as being a possible source from which Aristotle may have borrowed that division: ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος οὐχ ἄ ψυχὰ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ζῶον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοιούτων ἄνθρωπος· καὶ γὰρ αἱ τὰς ψυχᾶς ὄργανον τὸ σῶμα πέφυκε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ μέρος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ψυχά. διὸ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἃ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἃ δὲ τῶν μερέων. καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν ἀγαθὸν εὐδαιμοσύνη, τῶν δὲ μερέων τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ψυχᾶς μὲν, φρόνησις, ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, σώματος δὲ κάλλος, ὑγίεια, εὐεκτία, εὐαισθησία, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς, πλοῦτος καὶ δόξα καὶ τιμὰ καὶ εὐγένεια ἐπιγέννημα ἦμεν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἀκόλουθα τοῖς φύσει προϋφειστακόσιν ἀγαθοῖς. δορυφορεῖ δὲ τὰ μῆνοια τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέζονα, φιλία μὲν καὶ δόξα καὶ πλοῦτος σῶμα καὶ ψυχάν, ὑγίεια δὲ καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ εὐαισθησία ψυχάν, φρόνησις δὲ καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τὸν νόον τὰς ψυχᾶς, ὁ δὲ νόος τὸν θεόν. οὗτος γὰρ ὁ κράτιστός ἐντι καὶ ὁ ἀγεμονεύων· καὶ τούτω ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν ἀγαθῶν δεῖ παρῆμεν. στρατεύματος μὲν γὰρ ἀγείται στραταγός, πλωτάρων δὲ κυβερνήτας, τῷ δὲ κόσμῳ θεός, τὰς δὲ ψυχᾶς νόος, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸν βίον εὐδαιμοσύνας φρόνησις. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄτερόν ἐντι φρόνησις, αἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμα τὰς περὶ τὸν βίον εὐδαιμοσύνας ἢ ἐπιστάμα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθῶν.

b. 14. λέγομεν] 'are commonly said to be.' Peters.

b. 16. τίθεμεν] 'may be said to be.' Peters.

ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο] 'so our Definition (λόγος) is right.' τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς of the present passage is equivalent to the ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια of the Definition, as given in ch. 7. § 15. In making the highest good an ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, the Definition agrees with the commonly accepted view that the goods of the ψυχῆ are the highest.

§ 3. ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι . . . τέλος] 'But indeed we secure the support of this opinion by the mere statement that certain actions and exercises are the end'—Peters: *i. e.* 'our Definition is also seen to be right, in that it makes certain actions and functions the end.' 'Qui enim dicunt, actionibus humanis felicitatem contineri, in animo sitam felicitatem volunt, cum solus animus in homine agendi sit principium'—Michelet. As ψυχικὰς was the emphatic word in the previous §, ἐνεργεῖαι is emphatic here: see Eustr., διαφέρει δὲ τοῦτο (*i. e.* the point made in § 3) τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ (*i. e.* that made in § 2), ὅτι ἐν ἐκείνῳ μὲν τὸ καλῶς εἶρησθαι ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν συνέστησεν· ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι πράξεις εἶναι καὶ ἐνεργείας τὸ τέλος. τὸ δὲ τινὲς προσέθηκεν ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλῶς πράξεις καὶ ἐνέργεια τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ ποιαι· ἦτοι κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί.

γίνεται] 'is shown to be.' Cf. i. 7. 15 for this use of γίνεται. b. 20.

§ 4. τῷ λόγῳ] 'our Definition.'

τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαιμόνα] 'the popular saying that the εὐδαιμόνων lives and fares well.'

εἶρηται] *i. e.* in our Definition. b. 22.

§ 5.] 'Farther, the various things which are looked for in Happiness seem all to belong to it as we have defined it.'

§ 6. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῇ] The Cynics, who held αὐτάρκη τὴν ἀρετὴν b. 23. εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν (Diog. L. vi. 11 apud Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Ph.* § 226 *Cynici*)—a view afterwards adopted by the Stoics.

τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις] The commentators generally identify this with b. 24. the view of Socrates, comparing *E. N.* vi. 13. 3; cf. *E. E.* i. 5. 1216 b. 3 Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτερος φετ' εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκων τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ ἐπέζητει τί ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς· ἐποίησε γὰρ ταῦτ' εὐλόγως. ἐπιστήμας γὰρ φετ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥστ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἶδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐσμέν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι. Of course this is an absurd travesty of the doctrine of Socrates.

ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις] Anaxagoras probably for one: cf. *E. E.* i. 5. 1216 a. 11 τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τινα διαπορούντα τοιαῦτ' ἅπαντα, καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνας ἕκεκ' ἂν τις ἔλοιτο γενέσθαι

1098 b.24. μάλλον ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι “ τοῦ ” φάσι “ θεωρῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον τάξιν.” Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἕνεκεν τὴν ἀρεσιν ᾗστο τιμίαν εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν. Cf. *E. E.* i. 4. 1215 b. 6 ‘Αναξαγόρας μὲν ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος, “ οὐθεὶς ” εἶπεν “ ὄν σὺ νομίζεις, ἀλλ’ ἄποσις ἂν τίς σοι φανεῖη.” Τοῦτον δ’ ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐκείνος ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλοῦσιον ταύτης τυγχάνειν τῆς προσηγορίας. Αὐτὸς δ’ ἴσως ᾗστο τὸν ζῶντα ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τινας θεωρίας κοινωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν μακάριον εἶναι. Cf. *E. N.* x. 8. 11.

b. 25. τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς] cf. Plato *Philebus* 27 D ἴθι δὴ νικῶντα μὲν ζῆμέν που τὸν μικτὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως: cf. *Phileb.* 60 D, E.

μεθ’ ἡδονῆς] seems to mean ‘with pleasure added,’ as distinguished from οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς, ‘with pleasure essentially involved’; so, apparently, the Paraphrast—τοῖς δὲ τούτων τι μεθ’ ἡδονῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τούτων τικτομένης. Cf. below, § 12 οὐδὲν δὴ προσδέεται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὡς περὶ περιήπτου τινός, ἀλλ’ ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. When Plato praises τὸν μικτὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως, he, like Aristotle, regards the relation of pleasure to virtuous action as an essential one: this is plain from *Philebus* 63 E ἄλλας δὲ ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς ἄς εἶπες, σχεδὸν οικείας ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθ’ ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν καὶ δὴ καὶ ξυμπάσης ἀρετῆς ὅποσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὅπαδοι γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ ξυνακολουθοῦσι πάντη, ταύτας μίγνυ κ.τ.λ. Aspasius explains differently: μεθ’ ἡδονῆς μὲν οἱ λέγοντες μέρος τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ποιοῦσι τὴν ἡδονὴν, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς, οὐ μέρος ἀλλ’ ὄν οὐκ ἄνευ ἢ εὐδαιμονία λέγουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν.

b. 26. ἕτεροι] The commentators identify this with the opinion of Xenocrates, Plato’s disciple: see Clem. Alex. *Strom.* ii. p. 419 a, quoted by Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Ph.* § 301 Ξενοκράτης . . . τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποδίδωσι κτήσιν τῆς οικείας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς αὐτῇ δυνάμεως. εἶτα ὡς μὲν ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται φαίνεται λέγων τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς δ’ ὑφ’ ὧν τὰς ἀρετάς, ὡς δὲ ἐξ ὧν ὡς μερῶν τὰς καλὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας ἔξεις τε καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις, ὡς τούτων οὐκ ἄνευ τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκτός. This does not seem to differ essentially from Aristotle’s own view of the nature and conditions of εὐδαιμονία.

συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν] M^b, O^b, Ald., CCC, and NC give συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν. MS. authority does not count for much where παρά and περί are concerned. Συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν (‘take in as an

adjunct,’ *Liddell and Scott*) expresses a view of the relation of 1098 b.26. ἢ ἐκτός εὐετηρία to εὐδαιμονία such as Aristotle himself holds; συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν (‘include along with’) expresses a view which Aristotle would object to as putting ἢ ἐκτός εὐετηρία—a mere condition, οὐδ’ ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη, or ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, too much on a par with the formal elements, or μέρη strictly so called, of εὐδαιμονία. On τὰ μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας see below note on § 16.

εὐετηρίαν] literally, ‘goodness of season (ἔτος),’ and then, generally, ‘prosperity.’

§ 7.] Cf. vii. 1. 5, and note there.

b. 27.

§ 8.] Aristotle now proceeds to show his own coincidence b. 30. with these preexistent theories. It is to be observed that he says nothing here in reference to those who made happiness to consist in “thought” [φρόνησις] or “a sort of philosophy” [σοφία τις]. This is one of the marks of systematic method in the *Ethics*. He will not anticipate the relation of φρόνησις and σοφία to εὐδαιμονία.’ Grant.

Although it is true that Aristotle makes no explicit reference in this chapter to those who made happiness to consist in φρόνησις or σοφία τις, he seems to me not entirely to overlook their opinion; for in § 13 he passes from the consideration of the pleasure involved in αἱ κατ’ ἀρετὴν πράξεις to the assertion that they are not only pleasant, but also καὶ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ καλά, as judged by the σπουδαῖος, the standard of excellence. This appeal to the κρίσις τοῦ σπουδαίου involved in defining the Chief Good as ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀρετὴν seems to me to give full weight in the Definition to the opinion of those who make Happiness consist in φρόνησις or σοφία τις, and I think that § 13 is intended to bring this out.

συνωδός] Susemihl now wishes to read (*E. E.* Appendix, p. 163) σύνωρος (‘conterminous with’) after K^b. He thinks that συνωδός, given by NC (not by Z=CCC) and Cambr., supplies the intermediate form between the correct σύνωρος and the plausible συνωδός: see his reply to Adolf Busse (*zur Textkritik der Nic. Eth.*: *Hermes*, vol. xviii. p. 137, sqq., 1883) in *N. Jahrb.* 1883.

ταύτης γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ κατ’ αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια] ‘For “exercise of faculties b. 31. in accordance with excellence” belongs to excellence.’ Peters. ‘Zur Tugend gehört die ihr gemässe Wirksamkeit.’ Stahr.

§ 9.] With this § cf. *M. M.* i. 4. 1184 b. 28 τὸ ἀρα εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ

1098 b. 31. ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῷ εὖ ζῆν ἔστιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν. Τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἔστι τέλος καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. Ἐν χρήσει τοίνυν τινὲς ἂν εἴη καὶ ἐνεργεία ἡ εὐδαιμονία. Ὅν γὰρ ἦν ἕξις καὶ χρήσις, ἡ χρήσις καὶ ἡ ἐνεργεία τέλος· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις ἔστιν. Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἐνεργεία καὶ ἡ χρήσις αὐτῆς τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὥστε τέλος ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐνεργεία καὶ ἡ χρήσις αὐτῆς. Ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν. Ἐπειδήπερ οὖν τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ αὕτη τέλος ἐνεργείας, ζῶντες ἂν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς εὐδαιμόνες ἂν εἴημεν καὶ ἔχοιμεν τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν. Ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τελειῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τέλος, οὐδὲ τοῦτο δεῖ λανθάνειν ὅτι καὶ ἐν τελείῳ ἔσται. Οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἐν παιδί (οὐ γὰρ ἔστι παῖς εὐδαιμών) ἀλλ' ἐν ἀνδρὶ· οὗτος γὰρ τέλειος. Οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ γε ἀτελεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν τελείῳ. Τέλειος δ' ἂν εἴη χρόνος, ὅσον ἀνθρώπος βιοῖ. Καὶ γὰρ λέγεται ὀρθῶς παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὅτι δεῖ τὸν εὐδαιμόνα ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ βίου κρῖναι, ὡς δέον τὸ τελειῶν εἶναι καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ τελείῳ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ. Ὅτι δὲ ἐνεργεία ἔστιν, ἴδοι ἂν τις καὶ ἐπιτεῦθεν. Ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕπνοις, οἷον εἴ τις καθεύδοι διὰ βίου, τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ πᾶν βουλόμεθα λέγειν εὐδαιμόνα εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ὃ ἦν κατὰ τὴν ἐνεργείαν· cf. *E. N.* ix. 9. 5, and x. 6. 2.

b. 32. ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει . . . ἐν ἕξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ] Eustr. has ἡ μὲν χρήσις καὶ κτήσις, ἐπὶ τῶν ὀργάνων λέγεται καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ἀνάλογον, ἡ δ' ἕξις καὶ ἐνεργεία ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τινι θεωρουμένων ποιότητων καὶ τελειουσῶν αὐτό. οἷον πλοῦτος μὲν καὶ σκευὴ καὶ τὰ τῆς τέχνης ὑπουργὰ ὄργανα ἐν κτήσει εἶναι τοῖς ἔχουσι λέγονται, καὶ δεῖ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ δέοντα ὡς μὴ μάτην ἢ τούτων εἴη κτήσις· τέχνη δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀρετὴ ἕξις τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν αὐτῇ μὲν ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὐσαι, τελειωτικαὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ εἰσὶ, καὶ δεῖ κατ' αὐτὰς ἐνεργεῖν ὡς μὴ μάτην τὰς ἕξεις ἔχοιμεν· ὡς γὰρ θησαυρῷ μὴ φαινομένῳ μάτην ἢ κτήσις, οὕτω καὶ ἕξει ἀγαθῇ μὴ ἐνεργούσῃ εἴη ἂν τὸ ὑπάρχειν διάκενον.

b. 33. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν . . . ὑπάρχουσαν] 'for the Habit (of Virtue) may be present, and yet bring forth no good result.'

1099 a. 2. ἐξηρηγηκότι] ἐξαργεῖν means 'to lie quite idle,' like a field 'lying fallow.'

a. 3. πράξει] The subject is ἐνεργεία, but Eustrat. has πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργῶν καὶ εὖ πράξει· ἐκ γὰρ ἀγαθῆς ἕξεως ἀγαθαὶ προβαίνουσιν ἐνεργείαι. So the Par. πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁ τὴν ἐνεργείαν ἔχων, καὶ εἰ τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἐνεργείαν ἔχει, εὖ πράξει.

ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμπίασιν κ.τ.λ.] Cf. *E. E.* ii. i. 1219 b. 9 στεφανοῦνται οἱ νικῶντες, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικᾶν, μὴ νικῶντες δέ.

τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κάγαθῶν . . . ἐπήβολοι γίνονται] 'win the great prizes of life.' Cf. i. 10. 14 μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν . . . γενόμενος ἐπήβολος.

§ 10. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι α. 7. τῶν ψυχικῶν] The connexion is explained by the Paraphrast—ἔστι δὲ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς, οὐκ ἔξωθεν ἔχων τὴν ἡδονήν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ἔστιν (cf. *E. N.* x. 3. 6 εἰ δὴ ἔστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἦδοιτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστω ἄρα ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις ἡδονή), οὐδὲν κωλύει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαν μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναι. Cf. *E. N.* x. 4. 10, 11, and x. 5. 6: also *E. E.* ii. i. 1218 b. 32 πάντα δὴ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτός ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἰρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις· φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ: and *M. M.* i. 3. 1184 b. 5 τὰ δ' ἐν ψυχῇ διώριστα ἀγαθὰ εἰς τρία, εἰς φρόνησιν εἰς ἀρετὴν καὶ ἡδονήν.

ἐκάστῳ δ' ἔστιν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτιοῦτος] If a man is a. 8. φιλοτιοῦτος, he will, unless hindered, perform the πράξεις which his disposition prompts. These πράξεις, being *his own*, i.e. proceeding from *his own disposition*, will be pleasant (see *E. N.* viii. 3. 6 ἐκάστῳ γὰρ καθ' ἡδονήν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκείαι πράξεις); their being pleasant and their being performed are two inseparably connected characteristics of such πράξεις.

§ 11. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' α. 11. εἶναι] The φαῖλος is not an organic whole. His desires do not represent the good of a permanent personality, but are merely the cravings of this or that part as separately affected. The whole does not live in every part, but every part is devoted to its own separate gratification. What pleases one part displeases another part. But the rational man—the φρόνιμος or σπουδαῖος—perceives and loves the beautiful Form of Human Nature (τὸ καλόν), and is regulated by his consciousness and love of it in all his desires. Nothing is pleasant to him which harms, or even does not benefit, his nature as a whole—τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἔστιν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα. τὰ φύσει ἡδέα—'things naturally pleasant' are thus things which call forth the functions, and preserve the health, of a man's true φύσις—his rational personality; τὰ μὴ φύσει ἡδέα are things which stimulate desires 'not obedient to reason,' i.e. not organised as parts of a consistent and permanent system. Cf. the description in *E. N.* ix. 4 of the σπουδαῖος and of the φαῖλος respectively—§ 3 ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ (ὁ σπουδαῖος) καὶ τῶν αἰτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ

1099 a.11. βούλεται δὴ εἰναι τὰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τὰ γὰρ διαπονεῖν) καὶ εἰναι ἐνεκα (τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ)· καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται εἶναι καὶ σφίζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο φ' φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. On the other hand (§ 9) στασιάζει (τῶν φαύλων) ἢ ψυχῆ, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων, τὸ δ' ἡδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκείσε ἔλκει ὡς περ διασπῶντα. It may be noted that the term φύσει has the same reference, in the phrase τὰ φύσει ἡδέα, as the term *natural* has in Butler's expression, 'the natural supremacy of Conscience' (*Sermon 2*), viz. to Human Nature as a system.

a. 14. ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδέαι καὶ καθ' αὐτάς] 'accordingly they are pleasant, both to those who perform them, and in themselves,' i. e. the desires of the φιλόκαλοι are in perfect correspondence with 'the Nature of Things,' or 'moral environment'—τὰ φύσει ἡδέα, the things in which a man *ought* to take pleasure, are αὐτοῖς ἡδέα, things in which they do, as a matter of fact, take pleasure. Cf. *E. N.* iii. 4. 5 καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἔξω ἰδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλείστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθές ἐν ἐκάστοις ὄραν, ὡς περ κανῶν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὄν.

a. 15. § 12. οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται κ.τ.λ.] Ramsauer contrasts the relation of εὐδαιμονία το τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ—§ 15 φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη. In short, ἡδονή, being τῶν ψυχικῶν, cannot be a περίπτωσις. On the whole § 12 see Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 620 (third edition): 'Die Lust soll nicht der Zweck und Beweggrund unseres Thuns sein, sondern nur eine nothwendige Folge der naturgemässen Thätigkeit; könnten beide getrennt werden, so würde ein tüchtiger Mensch die Thätigkeit ohne Lust der Lust ohne Thätigkeit unbedingt vorziehen (*E. N.* x. 3. 12 οὐδέτις τ' ἂν εἴποιτο ζῆν παιδίον διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποῖων τι τῶν αἰσχιστῶν, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλὰ τε σπουδὴν ποιησάμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέρῃ ἡδονήν, οἷον ὄραν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· εἰσόμεθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνουτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή); in Wahrheit jedoch besteht die Tugend eben darin, dass man die Lust von der Tugend gar nicht zu trennen weiss, dass man sich in der tugendhaften Thätigkeit unmittelbar befriedigt fühlt, und keines weiteren, äusserlichen Zusatzes von Vergnügen bedarf.' Zeller then quotes *E. N.* i. 8. 12. Cf. also ii. 3. 1.

a. 16. περίπτωσις] 'τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν φυλακῆριον, καὶ συνηθέστερον, φυλακτὸν (Γαλλ.

amulette)'—Coraes. Grant quotes Plut. *Pericles* 38 Θεόφραστος . . . 1099 a.16. ἰστέλλετο ὅτι νοσῶν ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπισκοποῦμένῳ τινὶ τῶν φίλων δέξειε περίπτωσις ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν τῷ τραχίλῳ περιηρημένον: and Plato, *Rep.* iv. 426 B οὐδ' αὖ ἐπῶδαί οὐδὲ περίπτωσις.

οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων] 'This anticipates *Eth.* ii. 3. 1, where a. 17. it is said that pleasure is the test of a *ξίσις* being formed.' Grant.

§ 13. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλά] cf. Eustrat. οὐ μόνον ἡδέαι a. 22. φησὶ καθ' εἰς αἰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὡς οὐσιωδῶς αὐταῖς ἐνυπάρχουσιν κεκμημένα τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθαί καὶ καλά.

καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον] i. e. ἄρισται καὶ κάλλισται.

εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὡς εἴπομεν] See a. 23. note on § 8 b. 30 above. Cf. Eustrat. καὶ τοῦτο (i. e. καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον) δῆλον ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος· σπουδαῖος γὰρ ὢν ὁ κρίνων περὶ αὐτῶν, ὁρθὸν ἔχει τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὸ κριτήριον, καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡδιστον αὐτῷ καὶ ἄριστον καὶ κάλλιστον αἰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεις κρίνονται, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, εἴην ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δὲ μὴ, φαῦλός τε ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ διάστροφος ὁ ὁρθός· ὅπερ ἄπορον. On the σπουδαῖος as the standard cf. *E. N.* iii. 4. 5; ix. 4. 2, 3.

κρίνει δ' ὡς εἴπομεν] viz. καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ εἶναι τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον.

§ 14. καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα] 'and a. 25. these are not separated as they are in the Delian Inscription.' The Eudemian Ethics open with the quotation of these lines¹. Zell, Coraes, Fritzsche (*Eth. Eud.*), Michelet, and Grant collect various renderings of the sentiment, e. g. Plato, *Gorgias* 451 E οἴομαι γὰρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἄδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν φ' καταριθμοῦνται ἄδοντες, ὅτι ὑγαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὡς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως κ.τ.λ.: Theognis (*Poet. Gn.* p. 11, Tauchnitz) κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον· λῶστον δ' ὑγαίνειν | πρῆγμα δὲ τερπνότατον τοῦ τις ἐρώτο τυχεῖν: Simonides (or Epicharmus)

ὑγαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ
 δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φῦαν γενέσθαι,
 τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,
 καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων:

¹ Brit. Mus. 16. C. xxi (B³) and the Aldine Edition give—ἡδιστον δὲ τυχεῖν οὐ τις ἕκαστος ἐρά.

1099 a.25. Soph. *Creusa* (apud Stob.)

καλλιστόν ἐστι τοῦνδικον πεφυκέαι
 λῦστον δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἄνοσον ἠδιστον δ' ὅτφ
 πάρεστι λῆψις ὧν ἐρᾷ καθ' ἡμέραν.

a. 29. ταύτας δέ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.]
 The unity of *εὐδαιμονία*—the *ἀρίστη ἐνέργεια* in which the other *ἐνέργειαι* are not lost, but co-ordinated and used for the good of the whole—is well brought out by Eustr. in his note, here—*ἔστι δὲ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἢ ὁμοῦ πάσαι αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνέργειαι, ἢ εἰ μίαν τις τούτων ἐρεῖ, ἢ ἀρίστη πασῶν . . . αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ φρόνησιν, ἢ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας συντηροῦσα καὶ συνέχουσα.*

a. 31. § 15.] External goods are necessary as conditions of *εὐδαιμονία*, but are no parts of it, just as air and light are necessary to the life of a plant, but are no parts of that life. Even pleasure, although it must not be accounted a *part* of *εὐδαιμονία*, is more intimately connected with it than external goods. Cf. *Pol.* H. 7. 1328 a. 21 *ἐπεὶ δ', ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνηστώτων οὐ ταῦτά ἐστι μόρια τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως, ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν . . . διὰ κτήσεως μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως . . . ἢ δὲ πόλις κοινωμία τίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμοίων, ἔρεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ἀρίστης' ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τις τέλειος κ.τ.λ. : *E. E.* i. 2. 1214 b. 11 *μάλιστα δὲ δεῖ πρώτων . . . διορίσασθαι . . . ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ ζῆν εὖ, καὶ τίνων ἄνευ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν. οὐ γὰρ ταυτόν, ὧν ἄνευ οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑγαίνειν, καὶ τὸ ὑγαίνειν. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων πολλῶν' ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν καλῶς, καὶ ὧν ἄνευ οὐ δυνατόν ζῆν καλῶς : *E. N.* vii. 13. 2 *οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία τῶν τελείων' διὰ προσδέεται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζεται ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλας περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, εἰάν ἢ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. See Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 620, 621 (ed. 3) 'Mit mehr Schein liesse sich seinen Aeusserungen über die äusseren Güter der Vorwurf machen, dass er den Menschen hier zu sehr von blos natürlichen und zufälligen Vorzügen abhängig mache. Aber doch verlangt er auch jene nur darum und nur so weit als sie unentbehrliche Bedingungen eines vollendeten Lebens und Werkzeuge der sittlichen Thätigkeit sind, womit er unstreitig Recht hat. . . . pp. 622, 3 Die Glückseligkeit besteht wesentlich und ur-***

springlich in der vernunftgemässen Thätigkeit, in der Ausübung 1099 a.31. einer vollendeten Tugend; alles übrige kommt nur als eine Bedingung derselben in Betracht und ist nur insofern für ein Gut zu halten, wiefern es mit jener zusammenhängt, als ihre natürliche Folge, wie die Lust, oder als ihr Hilfsmittel, wie die leiblichen und äusseren Güter; muss aber vorkommenden Falls zwischen diesen verschiedenen Gütern gewählt werden, so müssen alle andern den geistigen und sittlichen, weil sie allein unbedingte Güter sind, nachstehen.'

ἀχορήγητον] 'Tanquam ars poetae vel actorum virtus jacet nisi a. 33. externo splendore ac pompa scenaeque adjuvetur, ita ἡ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν fere nulla est nisi vita hominis instructa sit variis bonis.' Ramsauer. Without the *χορηγία* of favourable circumstances a man cannot play a brilliant part on the stage of life.

§ 16. ἐνίων δέ . . .] Things, the absence of which mars *εὐδαιμονία*, 1099 b. 2. are distinguished, as Ramsauer notes, from things which are necessary to it as *ὄργανα*. The *δέ* after *ἐνίων* thus answers to the *μὲν* after *πολλά*. Grant quotes *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 18 *εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν, πολυφιλίαν, χρηστοφιλίαν, πλοῦτον, εὐτεκνίαν, πολυτεκνίαν, εὐγηρίαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετὰς, οἷον ὑγιειαν κάλλος ἰσχυρὸν μέγεθος δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικὴν, δόξαν, τιμὴν, εὐτυχίαν, ἀρετὴν' οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὐταρκέστατος εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τὰ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ' οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα. He adds, 'The expression in the *Rhet.* "parts of happiness" is equivalent to "instruments" of happiness, the more accurate designation in the present passage.' This is scarcely correct;—the present passage, as we have just seen, distinguishes the instruments (*ὄργανα*) of happiness, such as *πλοῦτος*, and its ornaments, such as *κάλλος*; whereas in the *Rhet.* both are called 'parts'—*μέρη*. In *E. E.* i. 2. 1214 b. 26 (*ὧν ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐνίοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσι*), on the other hand, we find *μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας* contrasted with *ὧν ἄνευ οὐχ οἷόν τε*, this latter expression being, in fact, equivalent to the *μέρη* of the *Rhet.* The *Rhet.*, concerned as it is to supply points to speakers addressing popular audiences, naturally differs from the more philosophical *Ethics* (*Nic.* and *Eud.*) in its presentation of *εὐδαιμονία*. It includes conditions, instruments, and ornaments among the *μέρη*. For *μέρη* as 'formal elements of the notion' see *Met. Z.* 10 and 11.*

1099 b. 3. εὐγενείας] See Pseudo-Plut. *de Nobilitate* γ' Ἀριστοτέλην ὁρῶμεν ἐν τῷ ἐκδομένῳ περὶ εὐγενείας βιβλίῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς διακεκομηκότα καὶ ἐν τῶν ἀγαθῶν λόγῳ διηριθμηκότα¹. The fragments from this Dialogue περὶ εὐγενείας, preserved in Stob. *Flor.* 86. 24, 25, and 88. 13 (see Berlin Aristotle, 1490), seem to suggest for εὐγένεια a more intimate relation to εὐδαιμονία than that occupied by the other ἀγαθά mentioned with it; for it is defined as ἀρετὴ γένους—'hereditary virtue' (so also in *Pol.* Γ. 7. 1283 a. 37); and, as such, must contribute to the content of that τελεία ἀρετὴ which manifests itself in the ἐέργεια of εὐδαιμονία. Εὐγένεια is thus on a higher level than the 'instruments' or 'ornaments' of εὐδαιμονία.

οὐδὲ πάντῃ εὐδαιμονικός] 'is not very likely to be happy.' Peters.

b. 5. ἢ φίλοι] omitted by H^a, NC, P², Par. 1417, Par. 1853, Eustratius, Heliodorus. Accordingly Susemihl brackets the words. The reference to φίλοι is certainly not quite in place here, where the writer is speaking of the ornaments rather than of the instruments of εὐδαιμονία.

b. 8. § 17. ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν] These words are regarded as spurious by Giphanius, Ramsauer, and Susemihl. But are they not necessary to account for the δθεν which follows in Ch. 9. § 1? I think that they are: see Grant, *ad loc.*—'The word δθεν expresses the thread of connexion by which this new subject of discussion (*i.e.* πότερον ἐστὶ μαθητὸν κ.τ.λ.) is introduced. Since happiness seems to be a balance of two principles, an internal one, virtue, and an external one, circumstances, the question arises whether it is attainable by the individual through any prescribed means, or whether it is beyond his control. It seems chiefly, however, to be upon the word ἀρετὴν that Aristotle goes off. The question of the day, πότερον μαθητὸν ἢ ἀρετὴ, comes before him in mentioning that some identify happiness with virtue. . . . The question forms an important point at issue in the ethical systems of Aristotle and Plato. The conclusion of Aristotle is directly opposed to that which is tentatively stated at the end of the *Meno* (99 E)—ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτὸν, ἀλλὰ θεία μοῖρα παραγνομήτη ἄνευ νοῦ οἷς ἂν παραγίγηται.' It

¹ The text of the passages quoted from Aristotle in the editions of the *de Nob.* (ch. 14) has no authority. The passages were inserted by J. C. Wolf, the first editor of the work. See Newman's *Politics*, vol. ii. p. 68.

must be remembered, however, that, in the *Meno*, it is the political 1099 b. 8. *genius* of a Pericles or Themistocles which is ascribed to θεία μοῖρα; whereas in *E. N.* i. 9 Aristotle is speaking of the εὐπραξία of average citizens—οἱ μὴ πεπηρωμένοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

The view that Happiness is Good Fortune—a gift bestowed by an external Power, Heaven or Fortune, upon certain favoured persons, is the very antithesis of our view that it is a function which the strenuous man, by his own efforts, learns to perform; and it may be useful here to compare the degrees in which two such opposite views of the origin of Happiness succeed in accounting for the facts of life.

We may begin by admitting that if Heaven has any gift for man, Happiness may well be that gift: it is indeed a 'Divine thing': but this it surely may be in virtue of being the crown of man's endeavour.

Again, if Happiness were a gift of Fortune, it would be something exceptional, not widely distributed as it is. Its being widely distributed corroborates our view that it is attained through exertions of which most men are capable.

*And again, it is surely more in keeping with the 'beauty' of Happiness—that is, with the exquisite Harmony of the Happy Life, to ascribe it to the operation of a steady principle of causation, such as human agency, rather than to an aimless principle like Fortune or Chance. The organisms of the physical world are too beautiful, we think, and too definite, to be the results of Chance; but the life of the good man is far more beautiful and definite. Indeed this beauty and definiteness of the Happy Life are implied in our Definition, which thus throws much light on the question of the origin of Happiness now before us. We define it as a vital function manifesting excellence—implying thus that it is of a definite kind: and here we find ourselves in agreement with the doctrine laid down at the beginning of this Treatise—that the Chief Good is the end of Statesmanship; for the statesman's principal care is to produce a certain definite character in his citizens, *i.e.* to make them good, and capable of well doing. With good reason, then, we do not speak of an ox as 'happy'—for he cannot perform the functions in which Happiness consists; or a child (unless by anticipation)—for he cannot yet perform them. The performance of them needs, as we have said, perfect excellence and a perfect life: and often enough life is imperfect: many are the changes of fortune; the man who flourishes most may happen upon great misfortunes in his old age, like Priam; and no one would call a Priam 'happy.'*

1099 b. 9. § 1.] Cf. *E. E.* i. 1. 1214 a. 14 πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ πῶς κτητόν, πότερον φύσει γίγνεται πάντες εὐδαίμονες οἱ τυχεῖς αὐτοὶ ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, ὡς περὶ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χρόνιον διαφέροντες, ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως, ὡς οὐσης ἐπιστήμης τινὸς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἢ διὰ τινος ἀσκήσεως (πολλὰ γὰρ οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν οὔτε μαθεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἐθισθεῖσθαι ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φαῦλα μὲν τοῖς φαύλως ἐθισθεῖσι, χρηστὰ δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς), ἢ τούτων μὲν κατ' οὐδέναν τῶν τρόπων, δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον ἦτοι καθάπερ οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεόληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπινοία δαιμονίου τινὸς ὡς περὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἢ διὰ τὴν τύχην (πολλοὶ γὰρ ταῦτόν φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν).

b. 11. §§ 2, 3.] Aristotle, while declining to regard Happiness as a special gift bestowed on a favoured few by anthropomorphic gods, is willing to allow the term *θείον* to be applied to it as an ornate epithet—as indeed the term may be applied to any beautiful result of the formative agency of Nature: cf. *E. N.* vii. 13. 6 πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θείον: *de An.* ii. 4. 415 a. 26 φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζῴσι ἔργων, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἶον αὐτό, ζῶον μὲν ζῶον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτὸν ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχωσιν, ἢ δύναται πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται, κακείνου ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν πράττει: *E. E.* H. 14. 1248 a. 26 κωεὶ γὰρ πως πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θείον.

b. 14. ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον] Eustr. says τῶν περὶ προνοίας εἴη ἂν λόγων οἰκειότερον καὶ θεολογικῆς θεωρίας ἐχόμενον ἠθικῆ δὲ ἢ προκειμένην πραγματεία, καὶ ὅσον κατ' αὐτὴν ἰκανὸν τὸ εἰρημένον. The question, however, is not one which Aristotle cares to discuss even where, as in the *Metaphysics*, it might seem more in place than here. The passage, *E. N.* x. 8. 13, in which he comes nearest to seriously entertaining the question of a personal relation between the gods and men, on close examination, is seen to commit him to nothing more than an ornate use of the epithet *θεοφιλέστατος*.

b. 18. § 4. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύκοιρον . . . ἐπιμελείας] There is a certain looseness in the reasoning here; indeed Grant describes the last clause, as it stands, as a *petitio principii*. The argument seems to be this:—If we suppose that Happiness is acquired δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ τινα μάθησιν ἢ ἀσκησιν, *i. e.* by our own personal exertions, we not only are still at liberty to describe it as *ἄριστον*, *θείον*, and *μακάριον*, but we are able to explain the admitted fact that it is 'common to many' (*πολύκοιρον*)—a fact which is irreconcilable with its being

θεοδοτος or the *special* gift of the gods. 'But it would seem also 1099 b. 18. to be common to many—a characteristic which can be explained (*γὰρ*) only if we suppose that it may be acquired through study and diligence, by all who are not incapacitated for virtue.' The importance of τὸ πολύκοιρον, as enabling us to discriminate between the claims of an exceptional agency like *θεός*, *εὐφύια*, or *τύχη* on the one hand, and of man's own personal exertion (*ἐπιμελεία*, &c.) on the other hand, to be the source of Happiness, is well brought out in *E. E.* i. 3. 1215 a. 12 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γινόμενοις ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ζῆν ἐστίν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἴη πολλοῖς (οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ δι' ἐπιμελείας ἢ κτήσεως οὐδὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας): εἰ δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῶν ποιῶν τινα εἶναι καὶ τὰς κατ' αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ θειότερον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλείοσι ἐνδέχεσθαι μετασχεῖν, θειότερον δὲ τῷ κείσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς αὐτοῖς παρασκευάζουσι ποιοῦς τινὰς καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

§ 5.] On this section Ramsauer remarks, 'jam enim missa est b. 20. omnis cogitatio de deorum beneficio. Nec deesset forsitan necessario τὸ πολύκοιρον, si res ad deum referenda esse videretur; quod vero fortunæ attribuitur sprete omni lege ne ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ quidem potest accidere.' The fact that Happiness is 'common to many' certainly excludes the hypothesis of mere chance being its cause; but I cannot agree with Ramsauer in thinking that the same fact does not, in Aristotle's mind, necessarily exclude the hypothesis of its being the gift of personal gods. We must remember that the popular conception of *εὐδαιμονία* which Aristotle has to correct is that embodied in the etymology of the word, and associated with such examples as Polycrates and Croesus, who, because *specially* favoured by Heaven, were also *specially* exposed to its *phōnos*.

Michelet's note on § 4 makes εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύκοιρον disprove the intervention of the gods. 'εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύκοιρον' nempe si exercitatione virtus comparatur. Jam autem concludit: Cum a multis possit acquiri, revera exercitatione comparatur. Sin vero a Diis mitteretur, paucis Deorum amicis contingeret, ut admodum paucis Homeri heroibus, ex. gr. Menelao campi Elysii.' I think that τὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πολύκοιρον is intended to disprove the agency of *any exceptional* cause, whether God or Chance.

In illustration of the conception of *φύσις* contained in § 5 Zell and Michelet quote *Phys.* viii. 6. 259 a. 10 ἐν γὰρ τοῖς φύσει δεῖ τὸ

1099 b.20. πεπερασμένον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, εἰν ἐνδέχεται, ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον: *de Juv. et Sen.* 4. 469 a. 28 τὴν φύσιν ὁρῶμεν ἐν πᾶσιν ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ποιοῦσαν τὸ κάλλιστον.

The implication in the argument εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν κ.τ.λ. is that εὐδαιμονία, being man's perfection or the realisation of his φύσις, will, like other realisations of φύσις, manifest τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ πεπερασμένον—that definite structure and function, which cannot be the result of an indefinite principle, an αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, such as τύχη. On τύχη see *Met.* K. 8. 1064 b. 32 πᾶν δὴ φαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης . . . τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τὸ δὲ οὐθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐθ' αἰεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν . . . ἔστι δὴ τὸ συμβεβηκός ὃ γίγνεται μὲν, οὐκ αἰεὶ δ' οὐδ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ . . . τὸ δὲ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐστίν. τύχη δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τι τούτων γένηται κατὰ συμβεβηκός . . . ἢ τύχη δ' αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά του γιγνομένοις . . . τὰ δ' αἰτία ἀόριστα ἀφ' ὧν ἂν γένοιτο τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης. Cf. also *Phys.* ii. 4, 5, 6—e.g. 5. 197 a. 18 καὶ τὸ φάνα εἶναι τι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἢ τῶν αἰεὶ ὄντων ἢ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· ἢ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις παρὰ ταῦτα· ὥστε ἐπειδὴ ἀόριστα τὰ οὕτως αἰτία, καὶ ἡ τύχη ἀόριστον.

In *Phys.* ii. 8. 199 b. 13 the definite products of φύσις, the principle of organic growth, are contrasted with the haphazard results of chance—ἔδει καὶ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι γίνεσθαι ὅπως ἔτυχεν· ὅπως δὲ ἀναίρει ὁ οὕτω λέγων τὰ φύσει τε καὶ φύσιν· φύσει γὰρ ὅσα ἀπὸ τινος ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχῆς συνεχῶς κινούμενα ἀφικνεῖται εἰς τι τέλος· ἀφ' ἐκάστης δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάστοις οὐδὲ τὸ τυχόν· αἰεὶ μὲντοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ, εἰ μὴ τι ἐμποδίσῃ. *Phys.* ii. 8 is, indeed, the best commentary on the present §. It is argued in the present § that εὐδαιμονία, civilization, the perfect form of man's life, is too beautiful and definite an organism to be the result of chance; so in *Phys.* ii. 8 it is argued that the beautiful structures of plants and animals cannot be due to the working of the haphazard principle of τὸ αὐτόματον, with which 'the survival of the fittest' is mistakenly identified in the chapter—as in the following passage 198 b. 23 τί καλύει οὕτω καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν ἐν τῇ φύσει, ὡς τοὺς ὀδόντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀνατεῖλαι τοὺς μὲν ἐμπροσθίους· ὅξεις, ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς τὸ διαίρειν, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους πλατεῖς καὶ χρησίμους πρὸς τὸ λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν, ἐπεὶ οὐ τούτων ἕνεκα γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν οἷς δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του. ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἕνεκά του ἐγένετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάτα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπόλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ

ἀνθρώπων. ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος, ὃ ἂν τις ἀπορήσειεν, οὗτος, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος 1099 b.20. ταυτοῦτε ἐστὶν· ἀδύνατον δὲ τούτων ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ αἰεὶ οὕτω γίνονται ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τῶν δ' ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. Darwin quotes this passage at the beginning of the 'Historical Sketch' prefixed to his 'Origin of Species,' and adds—'We here see the principle of natural selection shadowed forth, but how little Aristotle fully comprehended the principle is shown by his remarks on the formation of the teeth.' Aristotle's doctrine of φύσις, however, is not inconsistent with Darwinism—indeed, if teleology is to find a place at all in Darwinism, it must, I feel sure, be in that form in which it is conspicuous in Aristotle's doctrine of φύσις. Aristotle's mistake in the passage quoted by Darwin is to see chance, and not natural law, in τὰ συστάτα ἐπιτηδείως.

πέφυκεν.] Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater rightly place a b. 22. comma instead of a full stop after πέφυκεν.

§ 6. τὰ κατὰ τέχνην] τέχνη, like φύσις, is τοῦ μέσου στοχαστική—strives to realise that which is definite: cf. *E.N.* ii. 6. 9. It is directly opposed to τύχη, which is its στερήσις: cf. *Met.* A. 3. 1070 a. 6 ἢ γὰρ τέχνη ἢ φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τύχη ἢ τῶν αὐτομάτων· ἢ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἢ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ . . . αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι στερήσεις τούτων.

κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην] ἀρίστη δ' αἰτία τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐργαζομένων ἀρετῇ b. 23. ὡς κρείττων καὶ τέχνης καὶ φύσεως. Eustr. Cf. *E.N.* ii. 6. 9. 1106 b. 14 ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστίν.

§ 7. συμφανές . . . ζητούμενον] 'Light is thrown on the b. 25. question before us (i.e. how we attain Happiness) by our definition (of Happiness) also.'

ποιὰ τις] 'of a certain definite kind,'—i.e. realised under b. 26. definite conditions internal and external. Cf. Aristoxenus 18. 20 (Marquard p. 24) τὸ ἡρμοσμένον μέλος . . . προσδέεται συνθέσεώς τινος ποιῆς καὶ οὐ τῆς τυχοῦσης. Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* ii. 4. 167 οὐδὲ δὴ ἢ στερήσις ποιότητος οὐδὲ ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ἐρημία ποιότητος. So here, εὐδαιμονία, being an ἐνέργεια ποιὰ τις, cannot be the result of τύχη, for τύχη is the στερήσις or ἐρημία ποιότητος.

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν . . . ὀργανικῶς] i.e. Happiness is essentially ψυχῆς b. 27. ἐνέργεια, but requires the other goods as the conditions of its realisation. (1) It requires τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὰ as its ὕλη, matter,

1099 b. 27. or necessary substratum—(τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον. Cf. *Phys.* ii. 9. 200 a. 7 ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ἐν ὅσοις τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐστίν, οὐκ ἄνεν μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἐχόντων τὴν φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἢ ὡς ὕλην, ἀλλ' ἕνεκά του· οἷον διὰ τί ὁ πρίων τοιοσδί; ὅπως τοῦδι, καὶ ἕνεκα τοῦδι. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ἂν μὴ σιδηροῦς ἢ ἀνάγκη ἄρα σιδηροῦν εἶναι, εἰ πρίων ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως οὖν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τέλος· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον· τὸ δ' οὐ ἕνεκα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ) —health, vigour and longevity, goods of the body, are necessary to the Form of Happiness, as the matter in which it is realised. So, cutting the form of a saw is realised in the matter of iron, not of wood. This relation of Happiness or ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια to bodily excellence is indeed merely an extension of Aristotle's general doctrine of the relation of the ψυχή to the body: see *de An.* ii. 1. 412 a. 20, where ψυχή is defined as εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζῶν ἔχοντος—the ψυχή is the form of the σῶμα, which is the δύναμις or matter. (2) Happiness requires τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ as instruments (τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. Cf. *E. N.* i. 8. 15. 1099 a. 33 πολλά μὲν γὰρ πράττεται καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως).

b. 31. § 8. ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθοῦς] καὶ ἀγαθοῦς is here expegetical—'of a certain definite character, i. e. good.' Cf. Eustratius: ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἔργον ἔχει ἐπιμελέστατον ποιεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ποιούς τινας ἢ γοῦν ἀγαθοῦς καὶ πρακτικοῦς τῶν καλῶν. By the agencies of μάθησις, ἀσκησις, and ἐθισμός, πολιτικὴ effects the Happiness of the citizens—a definite result.

b. 32. §§ 9, 10.] These sections are intended to strengthen the position, that personal exertion is the cause of εὐδαιμονία, by pointing to the absence of ability to make the exertion on the part of children and brutes, ὧν οὐδὲν εὐδαιμον λέγομεν.

1100 a. 4. §§ 10, 11. δεῖ γὰρ . . . πολλαὶ γὰρ . . .] The first γὰρ introduces a clause explaining why children cannot yet be called εὐδαιμόνες: the πράξεις in which εὐδαιμονία consists require τελεία ἀρετή and a τέλειος βίος. The second γὰρ introduces (somewhat irrelevantly) a clause which explains why even those old and virtuous enough to be πρακτικοί may still fail to satisfy the requirement of the τέλειος βίος, regarded as a life free to the end from great misfortune. Thus the transition is made to the subject of the next chapter. See Ramsauer on §§ 10 and 11.

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT.

Are we then 'to call no man happy while he lives,' following Solon's maxim 'wait for the end'? If this means that 'a man may be happy after his death,' we who define Happiness as 'a vital function' can admit no such doctrine; but we need not suppose that Solon meant anything so absurd. He meant that when a man is dead he is beyond all chance of misfortune, and that we may then, if his life has been happy, safely say so. But can we really feel sure that even when he is dead a man is beyond the reach of good and evil fortune? A living man may be touched by good and evil fortune without being conscious of it; so perhaps the unconscious dead may be touched by the good and bad fortune of their children and remoter descendants. It would indeed be absurd to suppose that a dead man is so touched by posthumous fortune as to become now 'happy,' now 'wretched'; but it would be equally absurd to maintain that he cannot be touched by it at all. Perhaps however the further examination of Solon's maxim may throw some light on this question of posthumous fortune—Must we then 'wait for the end' before we venture to felicitate a man on his Happiness? Surely it is absurd to wait till Happiness is a thing of the past, before we venture to admit its existence—because, forsooth, it is a stable thing, whereas the fortune of man's life is unstable to the end. So, let our answer to Solon be—This continual observance of the changes of fortune is a great error. Happiness does not consist in good fortune, although it requires its material assistance: nor does Wretchedness consist in bad fortune: it is in actions, good and bad, that Happiness and Wretchedness consist. And here we may note that our Definition of Happiness is corroborated by Solon himself. It is the stability of Happiness which strikes him most. How the stability which he regards as essential to Happiness can be predicated of a life which is still obnoxious to fortune, is his difficulty. Now the functions in which our Definition makes Happiness consist have more stability than aught else in human life. They are the man's throughout life, even more than his knowledge and skill of hand. In the performance of the highest of them he lives continuously, identifying himself with them. Himself he still is both in prosperity and in adversity—a personality maintaining its identity through all changes. Slight changes do not influence him much; greater changes enhance his Happiness or mar it; but even where they do most to mar it by laying sorrows upon him and impeding him in the performance of his functions, his noble personality shines out: we see him bearing his misfortunes cheerfully, not because he does not feel them, but because he 'has a heart above them all.' Such a man, whatever happened, could never become 'wretched,' for he could never perform the base actions in which Wretchedness consists; on the other hand it would be absurd to extol 'the felicity of his life,' if he ended his days like Priam.

From what has been said it is evident that the happy life is essentially uniform. The happy man is not easily moved from his Happiness by ordinary misfortunes: and if once moved somewhat from it by great misfortunes, is not

restored to it in a short time, but, if at all, only after many years full of glorious achievements.

And now we may present our Definition in this final form—'The happy man is he who, being perfectly good, manifests his goodness in action, who has been sufficiently furnished with external good things, whose life embraces a definite, i. e. a perfect period—and (perhaps we should add), whose death is according to his life.'

1100 a. 10. *Introductory Note.*] In this chapter Aristotle shows how his conception of ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν may, as ἀρχή, be applied to solve (cf. i. 7. 23 δοκεῖ γὰρ πλείον ἢ ἡμῶν παντὸς εἶναι ἢ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων) what is undoubtedly the most pressing question which the moralist has to deal with. The question is—How can there really be such a thing as Happiness for living men, who are always exposed to terrible vicissitudes of fortune? Aristotle's answer is—Happiness does not depend essentially, as is popularly supposed, on the outer moment of Fortune, but is within a man, and is as abiding as his personality, of which it is the function. It is indeed affected by Fortune, but it is not the sport of Fortune. If, then, the Definition is correct with its ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν, Happiness is possible. But further, the very circumstance that pessimism, or disbelief in the possibility of Happiness, prevails, is evidence in favour of the conception embodied in the Definition. Men are agreed that Happiness, if it exists at all, must be something stable and lasting; this is why, considering too exclusively the mutability of Fortune, they despair of Happiness. Their agreement that Happiness (did it actually exist) would be something stable, is a δόξα in favour of the correctness of ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν, for such an ἐνέργεια is preeminently stable.

Having shown that Happiness is possible, because essentially ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν, Aristotle is willing to concede to popular opinion a very important influence exercised by Fortune; and in making this concession even entertains the question, whether the influence of Fortune ceases for the individual at his death, or does not rather (as another popular belief will have it) affect even the dead through their descendants. His discussion of this question (resumed on ch. 11) is remarkable as leading to no definite statement of his own view. The discussion is conducted in the spirit of the dialectic which animates the Platonic 'Dialogues of Search.' Indeed, the disproportionate space occupied by the subject or sub-

jects of chapters 10 and 11 suggests the thought that in these 1100 a. 10. chapters we have part of an early Aristotelian *Dialogue* worked into the later and more dogmatic *Ethics*. Aristotle is reputed to be the author of a *Dialogue* Εὐδημος ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς treating of the immortality of the soul, fragments of which have come down to us (see Berlin Aristotle, p. 1479 sqq.). Cf. the conjecture of Blass (*Rhein. Mus.* vol. xxx. p. 481 sqq. 1875) that the *Dialogue* περὶ φιλοσοφίας was made use of in the composition of certain parts of the *Metaphysics* and *de Coelo*. Be this as it may, the point of interest for us here is that in the *Ethics* Aristotle thinks it worth while to discuss, at considerable length, without arriving at any positive expression of opinion, a question on which we know, from his other writings, that he had formed a positive opinion. The ψυχή he defines in the *de An.* ii. 1. 412 b. 10 as τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιαυτῷ σώματι. Personal consciousness—all that is included in the designation παθητικὸς νοῦς, perishes with the body. The ποιητικὸς νοῦς is eternal, but it is cosmic not personal:—*de An.* iii. 5. 430 a. 17 καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀμυγῆς καὶ ἀπαθῆς τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνεργεῖα . . . χωρισθεὶς δὲ ἐστὶ μόνου ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνου ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίου: οὐ μνημονεύομεν δὲ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθὲς . . . ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτὸς καὶ ἕνευ τοῦτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ—on which see Trendelenburg, *de An.* p. 491, who finds in οὐ μνημονεύομεν a denial of Plato's doctrine of ἀνάμνησις. Even in the chapter before us (*E. N.* i. 10) 'one phrase occurs,' as Grant points out (*Eth. Essay* v. p. 302), 'in which the real feeling of Aristotle, for the moment at least, seems to be let out. He asks (*Eth.* i. 10. 2), "Can Solon have meant that a man is happy when he has died?" and replies, "This would be an absurdity, especially since we consider happiness to be ἐνέργεια" . . . it is clear that we have here a brief indication that death destroys those potentialities that result in happiness. It would seem then that the only immortality which is left possible by his belief is a Buddhist nirvāna' (see generally Grant's *Eth. Essay* v. pp. 295-303, where he discusses Aristotle's opinions as to the nature of a soul). Why, then, does Aristotle discuss the question of personal immortality as he does here? The form in which the question is raised seems to help us to an answer. 'How is the happiness of the dead affected,' he asks, 'by the fortunes and conduct of their descendants?' We immediately think of the importance attached in ancient societies to the performance by descendants of the ceremonial rites due to ancestors, the proper performance of which may almost be said to

1100 a. 10. have been the *raison d'être* of the family as a corporation to be perpetuated. The large place which the cult of ancestors held in the imagination and traditional practice of the ordinary Greek seems to explain the prominence here given by Aristotle to the discussion of a subject in which he had no scientific interest, and his unwillingness to commit himself to a conclusion which he knew would be *λίαν ἀφίλον* . . . *καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον* (i. 11. 1). It is to be noted, however, that he rationalises the issue put—It is the effect on dead ancestors, not of the ceremonial conduct, but of the fortunes of their descendants which he discusses. On ancient beliefs regarding the soul and death, and on the cult of the dead, see Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique* Livre i, chapters 1 and 2.

It is perhaps worth noticing in conclusion that in the Dialogue *Εὐδημος ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς*, an argument for the immortality of the Soul seems to have been drawn from the religious homage paid to the dead. Fr. 33, Berlin Arist. 1480 a. 11 ἢ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοφυῶς πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ σπένδομεν χοῆς τοῖς κατοικομένοις καὶ ὄμνουμεν κατ' αὐτῶν, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῷ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὄντι σπένδει ποτὲ ἢ ὄμνουν κατ' αὐτοῦ.

a. 11. § 1. *κατὰ Σόλωνα*] See Herod. i. 30–33 for the conversation between Solon and Croesus—*οὕτω ὦν, ὃ Κροῖσε*, says Solon (ch. 32. § 6) *πᾶν ἐστὶ ἄνθρωπος συμφορῇ· ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ καὶ πλουτέειν μὲν μέγα φαίναται καὶ βασιλεὺς εἶναι πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἐκεῖνο δὲ τὸ εἶρεό με, οὐκω σε ἐγὼ λέγω (i. e. εὐδαίμονα), πρὶν ἂν τελευτήσαντα καλῶς τὸν αἰῶνα πύθωμαι. . .* Again, § 12 *πρὶν δ' ἂν τελευτήσῃ ἐπισχέειν, μηδὲ καλέειν κω ὄλβιον, ἀλλ' εὐτυχέα*, and § 17 *σκοπέειν δὲ χρῆ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῆ ἀποβήσεται. πολλοῖσι γὰρ δὴ ὑποδέξας ὄλβιον ὁ θεός, προρρίζους ἀνέτρεψε.* The result is given ch. 33 *ταῦτα λέγων τῷ Κροίσῳ (ὁ Σόλων), οὐ κως οὔτε ἐχαρίζετο, οὔτε λόγου μιν ποιησάμενος οὐδενὸς ἀποπέμπεται· κάρτα δόξας ἀμαθία εἶναι, ὅς τὰ παρόντα ἀγαθὰ μετεῖς, τὴν τελευτὴν παντὸς χρήματος ὄραν ἐκέλευε.* Plut. *Vita Solonis* ch. 27 *Ἐλλήσιν, εἶπεν, ὃ βασιλεὺς Δυδᾶν πρὸς τε τᾶλλα μετρίως ἔχειν ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκε καὶ σοφίας τινὸς ἀθαρσοῦς, ὡς ἔουκε, καὶ δημοτικῆς, οὐ βασιλικῆς οὐδὲ λαμπρᾶς, ὑπὸ μετρίτητος ἡμῖν μετρίων, ἢ τύχαις ὁρῶσα πανταδαπᾶς χρώμενον ἀεὶ τὸν βίον οὐκ ἔα τοῖς παρούσιν ἀγαθοῖς μέγα φρονεῖν οὐδὲ θανμάζειν ἀνδρὸς εὐτυχίαν μεταβολῆς χρόνον ἔχουσαν. ἔπεισι γὰρ ἐκάστῳ ποικίλον ἐξ ἀδήλου τὸ μέλλον· φ' δ' εἰς τέλος ὁ δαίμων ἔθετο τὴν εὐπραγίαν, τοῦτον εὐδαίμονα νομίζομεν. ὁ δὲ ζῶντος ἔτι καὶ κινδυνεύοντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ μακαρισμός, ὡσπερ ἀγωνιζομένου κήρυγμα καὶ στέφανος, ἐστὶν ἀβέβαιος καὶ ἄκρος.* The com-

mentators quote for the sentiment of this dictum attributed to 1100 a. 11.

Solon—

Soph. *O. T.* 1528

ὥστε θνητὸν ὄντ' ἐκείνην τὴν τελευταίαν χρεῶν
ἡμέραν ἐπισκοποῦντα μηδέν' ὀλβίζειν, πρὶν ἂν
τέρμα τοῦ βίου περάσῃ μηδὲν ἀλγεῶν παθῶν.

Trach. 1

λόγος μὲν ἐστ' ἀρχαῖος ἀνθρώπων φανείς,
ὡς οὐκ ἂν αἰὼν' ἐκμάθους βροτῶν, πρὶν ἂν
θάνη τις, οὐτ' εἰ χρηστὸς οὐτ' εἰ τῷ κακός.

Eurip. *Androm.* 100

χρῆ δ' οὐποτ' εἰπέειν οὐδὲν ὄλβιον βροτῶν,
πρὶν ἂν θανόντος τὴν τελευταίαν ἰδῆς
ὅπως περάσας ἡμέραν ἦξει κάτω.

Troad. 509

τῶν δ' εὐδαιμόνων
μηδένα τομίζειτ' εὐτυχεῖν πρὶν ἂν θάνῃ.

To these passages may be added *Διονυσίου τυράννου ἐκ Λήδας* (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. iv. 18, ed. Meineke)—

θνητῶν δὲ μηδεὶς μηδὲν ὄλβιον ποτε
κρίνη, πρὶν αὐτὸν εὖ τελευτήσαντ' ἰδῆν·
ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ γὰρ τὸν θανόντ' ἐπαυέσαι.

§ 2. *ἄποπον*] See Grant's *Eth.* Essay v. p. 302, quoted in Intro- a. 13. ductory Note to this chapter.

§ 3. *μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται*] 'Solon's meaning' was evidently a. 15. *ὅτι τρικυκάτα ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς κ.τ.λ.*, as may be seen from the accounts given by Herod. and Plut., not that 'a man is positively happy after death.'

ἀσφαλῶς] Cf. Dionysius quoted at the end of note on § 1. a. 16.

ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα] Ramsauer points out that a. 17. *μὲν* here is not followed by *δέ*, the opposition generally expressed by means of two clauses being implied in the single clause *ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα*—'ut si explicares "haec quamquam vera sunt tamen aliam admittunt controversiam."' *δέ* at the beginning of § 4, *ἀπορίαν δέ*, has no relation to this *μὲν*.

δοκεῖ] not to be taken as necessarily an expression of Aristotle's a. 18. own opinion.

1100 a. 19. εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ] ὡς περὶ κἀν εἴ τις ζῶσι μὲν ἀγαθοῖς τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀγαθὸς ὢν, τῶν δὲ οἰκείου αὐτοῦ εἶδ' ἐχόντων, καὶ αὐτῶν εἰς γνῶσιν οὐκ ἔρχοιτο καὶ δι' ἀποδημίαν ἴσως ἢ διὰ χρόνιον καὶ σφοδρὰν ἀσχολίαν πρὸς ἕτερα, οὕτω καὶ τῷ τεθνεῶτι συμβαίνει πολλάκις γίνεσθαι μηδεμίαν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἃ τοῖς οἰκείοις αὐτοῦ συμβέβηκεν—Eust. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 120) would place a comma after ζῶντι, on the ground that the words μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ cannot go with the conditional clause: the construction is δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστὶ μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ.

A dead man, it may be argued, is like a living man absent on a long journey, to whom, without his knowing it, good and evil may happen, in the matter of his estate, or in the persons of his relatives left at home. A dead man may thus perhaps be said 'to participate unconsciously' in the happiness or misery of his descendants. Aristotle says nothing here to lead us to suppose that he appropriates this view; indeed, he could not appropriate it, for it still assumes personal immortality, although in a highly attenuated form. Aristotle's own doctrine is that 'immortality' belongs to the family or race, as distinguished from the individual: see *de An.* ii. 4. 415 a. 26 φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα, ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἶον αὐτό, ζῶν μὲν ζῶν, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ αἰεὶ καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχωσιν ἢ δύναται . . . ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τοῦ αἰεὶ καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ἢ δύναται μετέχευε ἕκαστον, κοινωνεῖ ταύτῃ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δ' ἦττον' καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' οἶον αὐτό, ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐκ ἔν, εἶδει δ' ἔν. *Oecon.* i. 3. 1343 b. 23 ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἀναπληροῖ ταύτῃ τῇ περιόδῳ τὸ αἰεὶ εἶναι' ἐπεὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν οὐ δύναται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος' οὕτω προφοκονοῦμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑκατέρου ἢ φύσις τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς γυναίκος πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν.

a. 20. τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι] *i. e.* to himself.

a. 21. § 4. ἀπορίαν δέ] This is Bekker's reading, followed by Bywater. I am inclined to follow Susemihl in reading δῆ: nothing new is going to be added: what has been said is going to be repeated in different words.

a. 23. κατὰ λόγον] 'in accordance with his life': Eustr. has κατὰ λόγον ἦτοι κατὰ ἀκολουθίαν καὶ ἀναλογίαν τῆς αὐτοῦ μακαριότητος.

a. 26. τοῖς ἀποστήμασι] 'in their respective degrees of removal.' Grant.

§ 5. μὴδ' ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον] 'not even for a time'—*i. e.* for a short time after the death of the γονεῖς.

On § 5 Grant remarks—'The second part of this sentence, pronounced so strongly as it is, seems to contradict what one would have supposed to be Aristotle's philosophical creed. But he is here speaking from the popular point of view, and states strongly the two sides of the difficulty that presents itself. For the nonce he accepts a common belief on the subject (cf. i. 11. 1, i. 11. 6), but modifies it so as to leave it unimportant.'

§ 6. τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν] viz. πρότερον οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων a. 31. εὐδαιμονιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῆ; § 1. The solution of this ἀπορία will help us to the answer of τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον, viz. πρότερον συνικνεῖται τὰ τῶν ἐγγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν; the discussion of which is resumed in the next chapter.

§ 7. ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι] Zell quotes *Phys.* iv. 14. 223 b. 24 φασὶ γὰρ 1100 b. 3. κύκλον εἶναι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα. Michelet quotes Herod. i. 207 κύκλος τῶν ἀνθρωπῆτων ἐστὶ πρηγμάτων.

§ 8.] Grant notes that the words χαμαιλέοντα καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον b. 6. form an iambic line, probably quoted from some play.

§ 9. ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν;] This is b. 7. Solon's error. He attaches too much weight to fortune. Happiness is essentially the virtuous life, which can maintain itself even in the midst of misfortunes.

With ἐπακολουθεῖν ταῖς τύχαις cf. Menander (*Stob. Ecl. Phys.* ii. 8, Meineke, *Fr.* iv. 215)

δυσπαρakoλoύθητόν τι πράγμα' ἐστὶν τύχη.

§ 10. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν] To be taken b. 11. closely with what immediately precedes—'Happiness does not consist in good fortune. Good fortune is only an external condition, not part of the essence, of Happiness. Happiness consists essentially in the performance of function: and (§ 10) this theory (τῷ λόγῳ) of Happiness is confirmed by the very difficulties themselves which we have reviewed.' Τὸ διαπορεῖν is διέρχεσθαι τὰς ἀπορίας (see *Index Arist.* s. v. διαπορεῖν); consequently here τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν means 'the result of the review of ἀπορίαι which we have concluded.' The result of this review has been to bring out τὸ μόνιμόν τι εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν as the thought underlying the ἀπορίαι—'How can εὐδαι-

1100 b. 11. *μονία*, which is *μόνιμόν τι*, be realised in the life of man, which is obnoxious to fickle fortune (§ 7)? Our Definition, which makes Happiness consist, not in good fortune, but in those functions which are the most stable elements in human nature, is thus confirmed by 'the review of *ἀπορία*.' The Paraph. Heliodorus explains this excellently—*λέγομεν τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν, οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ἡ εὐδαιμονία συνίσταται, ἢ τοῖναυτί· ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται μὲν τούτων πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ἀνθρώπων βίος, καθάπερ εἵπομεν· ἡ δὲ οὐσία τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὐκ ἐν αὐταῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείᾳ συνίσταται, καθὼς εἴρηται. Μόνιμον γὰρ δεῖ εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ δυνατόν αὐτὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ τύχης συνίστασθαι· καὶ τοῦτο μαρτυρεῖ ἡ προκειμένη ζήτησις· ἀπὸ τούτου γὰρ ἔλαβε τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ὑποκείσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν μόνιμον εἶναι.*

b. 14. *μονιμώτεροι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐταὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι*] The contrast here is between deeply organised functions, *whether intellectual or moral*, involving the coordination of all parts of a man's nature—*i.e.* between the display of intelligence and moral goodness, on the one hand, and special knowledge, involving the perhaps exclusive cultivation of one small part of human nature, on the other hand. An intelligent man will show intelligence on all occasions, a just man will always act justly; but an examinee may quite forget a branch of knowledge, after the reason for which he 'got it up' has ceased to exist.

b. 15. *τούτων δ' αὐτῶν*] *i.e.* τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν.

αἱ τιμώταται] The exact force of this expression may be gathered from i. 12, which asks whether *εὐδαιμονία* is *ἐπαυετόν* or *τίμιον*. Things which are means are *ἐπαυετά*, but an end-in-itself, such as *εὐδαιμονία*, is *τίμιον*. Hence here *αἱ τιμώταται* may be rendered—'the highest,' *i.e.* the most final. The *μακίριοι*—those who realise most perfectly that 'humanity is an end-in-itself,' not a means to something beyond itself, spend their lives in—identify themselves with the performance of functions which are 'highest' in this sense. We may take it, then, that *αἱ θεωρητικαὶ ἐνεργεῖαι* were in Aristotle's mind when he wrote *τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμώταται*.

b. 16. *καταζῆν*] Coraes suggests *ζῆν*: cf. the Paraph. *διὰ τὸ ζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοῖς μακαρίους μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα*. The compounded form *καταζῆν* is rare, but it is, I think, appropriate here: perhaps, however, the *κατα-* represents a dittograph of the preceding *-τατα*.

αὐτάς] the reading of Mb, CCC, N C, Vet. Int. adopted by 1100 b. 17. Susemihl and Bywater instead of *αὐτά*.

λήθην] Similarly in *E. N.* vi. 5. 8 *τέχνη* and *φρόνησις* are contrasted—*λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως (e.g. τέχνης) ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν*. *Τέχνη* implies the cultivation of a small part of a man's nature; whereas *φρόνησις* involves the organisation of the whole man, and he cannot 'forget' or lose his *φρόνησις* without becoming another being. Cf. Grant on the present § (i. 10. 10)—'The *ἐνεργεῖα* . . . is our life and being, and it would be absurd to speak of forgetting this. It "is more abiding than the sciences," *i.e.* than the separate parts of knowledge, which do not constitute the mind itself.'

§ 11. *τὸ ζητούμενον*] *τὸ ζητούμενον ἦν εἰ δύναται μένειν ὁ εὐδαίμων* b. 18. *μακάριος ἐν ταῖς τῶν τυχῶν μεταπτώσεσιν*. Eustr. So the Paraph.—*ὑπάρξει τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, τὸ μόνιμον δηλονότι αὐτῷ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν*.

μάλιστα πάντων] 'mostly'—Grant; *πάντων* is neut. b. 19.

πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν] Grant (note on § 10) points out that these words show that the opposition between *αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖαι* and *αἱ ἐπιστήμαι* in § 10 is not the opposition 'between the moral and intellectual *ἐνεργεῖαι*.'

δ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου] Zell, Coraes, b. 21. Michelet, and Grant refer to Plato, *Protagoras* 339 *λέγει γὰρ πού Σιμωνίδης . . . ὅτι*

*ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν
χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόφ
τετράγωνον ἄνευ ψόγου τε-
τυγμένον.*

Cf. *Rhet.* iii. 11. 1411 b. 25 *λέγω δὴ πρὸ δμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει· ὅλον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον, μεταφορᾷ· ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια, ἀλλ' οὐ σημαίνει ἐνεργεῖαν*. Sopater, apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. ii. 222 (ed. Meineke), quoted by Zell, indicates the precise metaphor conveyed by *τετράγωνος*—*τίς οὖν οὕτω κατὰ τὸν Σιμωνίδου λόγον τετράγωνος, ὃς κατὰ πᾶσαν τύχην καὶ πραγμάτων μεταστάσιν ἀσφαλῶς ἐστήξεται*. So Eustr. *τετράγωνος, ἦτοι βεβηκῶς καὶ στάσιμος· ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν τοιούτων σχημάτων, ἃ ὅπως ἂν βιβέντα πεσῆται ὄρθια ἴστανται*. Cf. Suidas *sub voc.* *Δαμάσκιος*—*σεμνὸς δὲ ἦν καὶ εὐσχή-*

1100 b. 21. μὴν τὰ πάντα καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένως, ὡς φάναι κατὰ τὸν Σιμωνίδην.

b. 26. § 12. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.] αὐτὰ and ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν are distinguished. 'In themselves they naturally help to lend a charm to life, and the use of them is noble and good.'

b. 30. διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν] Both Michelet and Grant remark on the Stoical tone of this passage. Grant compares *E. N.* iii. 9. 4, where the self-sacrifice of the brave man is described.

1101 a. 2. § 13. ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων κ.τ.λ.] τὰς τύχας ἢ ὡς ὄργανα χρῆ ἢ ὡς ὕλας ὑποκειμένας λογιέσθαι. Eustr.

a. 6. § 14. ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε κ.τ.λ.] The distinction between εὐδαίμων and μακάριος is not carefully observed by Aristotle. We may perhaps say that the latter term is strictly applied to the man whose happiness is not marred in any way by circumstances: cf. the derivation given in *E. N.* vii. 11. 2 τὸν μακάριον ὀνομάσκειν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν.

a. 14. § 15.] In this § the words ἡ προσθετόν a. 16 . . . πάντως a. 19 are bracketed by Susemihl. Rasso had pointed out (*Forsch.* pp. 118, 119) that they (and also the words εἰ δ' οὕτω a. 19 . . . ἀνθρώπου a. 21 in § 16) are inconsistent with the result gained by Aristotle from the discussion of Solon's dictum, although quite in harmony with the later peripatetic view of the βίος τέλειος. Rasso's words are—'Was hindert uns also, fährt Aristoteles fort (§ 15), den glücklich zu nennen, der der vollkommenen Tugend gemäss thätig und mit äussern Glücksgütern hinlänglich ausgerüstet ist μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον? Schlösse hier die Untersuchung, so wäre nicht bloss die Ansicht des Solon zurückgewiesen, sondern man würde auch über die Frage, was man unter dem βίος τέλειος zu verstehen habe, keineswegs im Zweifel sein können. Denn wenn es denkbar ist, dass jemand die Eudämonie besitzt, verliert und wiedergewinnt, wie kann der Besitz desselben an das volle Menschenleben gebunden sein? (cf. note on i. 7. 16). Aber wider Erwarten erfolgt ein Zusatz, der zwar in der Form einer Frage auftritt, aber doch einer Frage, die eher zu Bejahung als Verneinung hinneigt. Es heisst: ἡ προσθετόν . . . πάντως; εἰ δ' οὕτω . . . δ' ἀνθρώπου. Wer so definiert

kann nichts einzuwenden haben gegen das Solonische Wort; denn 1101 a. 14. mag er auch auf die äussern Glücksfälle ein minderes Gewicht legen als Solon, so stimmt er ihm doch darin bei, dass es zur Glückseligkeit nicht eines gewissen Abschnittes des Lebens, sondern des ganzen Lebens bedürfe, und wer dies meint, wird Solons Vorsicht im Urtheil nur billigen können. (Oben ch. 10 § 7, war es als ein ἄτοπον bezeichnet, εἰ δ' ἔστιν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον. Auch dies wird durch die Worte, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν zurückgenommen). Die letztere Definition, die, wenn man auf die Fassung Gewicht legen darf, noch als fraglich hingestellt wird, scheint in der Schule des Aristoteles die herrschende geworden zu sein. Denn während er selbst noch Gründe gegen die Solonische Ansicht anführt, wird diese in der Eudemischen Ethik kurzweg als richtig bezeichnet und demgemäss der βίος τέλειος als das volle Menschenleben gefasst.'

Susemihl apparently differs from Rasso in regarding the words εἰ δ' οὕτω . . . μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπου § 16 as genuine. But surely, if the words ἡ προσθετόν . . . πάντως, with their references to the future (βιωσόμενον and τελευτήγοντα) are inconsistent with Aristotle's criticism of the Solonian dictum, the words οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει are equally so. Nor is the sentence εἰ δ' οὕτω . . . μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπου even consistent with itself. The writer of it evidently lays emphasis on τῶν ζώντων, and intends to make a statement which shall embody what he conceives to be Aristotle's correction of Solon's τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζειν: but he does not see that the words καὶ ὑπάρξει deprive the correction of meaning, Aristotle's objection to Solon being that Solon will not acquiesce in the present, but must needs wait for the future. Aristotle's view of Life is like his view of Pleasure. Both Life and Pleasure are perfect (τέλειω) ἐν τῷ ἀτόμῳ νῦν. We have not to wait for a future τέλος: if we had, Life would be a γένεσις, not an ἐνέργεια.

§ 16. μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπου] Before ἀνθρώπου Γ, C C C, Eustr., a. 20. Paraph., corr. P¹ (*i. e.* Par. 2023), and perhaps Asp. (see Bywater) read ὡς, which Michelet ascribes to Christian influences—as if the distinction intended were that between the imperfect happiness competent to man's fallen nature and the perfect felicity of God: whereas according to the true Aristotelian teaching, man, although

1101 a. 20. partially subject to the vicissitudes of fortune, has a region—that of thought—exempt from their influence. As exercising thought he enjoys a felicity which does not differ in kind from the divine; while, as a composite being, he enjoys a human happiness. Be this as it may, I cannot see how the so-called Christian distinction may not be got out of the words before us as well without as with *ὡς*. The meaning (with or without *ὡς*) seems however to be simple enough—we may call men *μακάριοι*, but we must remember that they are *men*. The difference between the happiness of man and of God is not in the kind of function which constitutes the happiness in each case, but in the continuity of that function: see *Met. A. 7. 1072 b. 13* ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις· διαγωγὴ δὲ ἐστὶν οἷα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν· οὕτω γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον . . . ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχῆς καὶ αἰδῖος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

Eustratius, although he perhaps writes under the influence, to some extent, of the Christian distinction, does not really misrepresent the Aristotelian teaching in his commentary on the words before us—*μακαρίους δὲ φησὶ ὡς ἀνθρώπους ἦτοι κατὰ τὸ ἀρμόζον ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, οἷς ἢ ἐν βίῳ διαγωγὴ ἐν διαρκείᾳ ῥύσει καὶ μεταβολῇ ὑπάρχει, ἐπεὶ τῆς νοεῖας καὶ θείας φύσεως ἄλλο εἶδος μακαριότητος, ἐν στάσει τὸ εἶναι ἐχούσης καὶ μηδεμίαν ὑπομενούσης μεταβολήν*. I have great doubts, however, of the genuineness of the words εἰ δ' οὕτω . . . ὁ ἀνθρώπους.

CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

To return now to the question whether the dead are touched by the fortunes of living descendants and friends—That they are not touched at all is a cold doctrine opposed to most men's way of thinking, and therefore not one which we should be justified in maintaining dogmatically: but to make a critical examination of the particular cases, in order to estimate the probability of the dead being or not being touched in each, would take too long: a general statement on the subject must suffice; and let it be this—Different things whether happening to ourselves or to our friends affect us differently. Some things affect us deeply, other things lightly. This during our lives. But when we compare the way in which the dead are 'affected' with that in which the living are 'affected,' we must be prepared for a vast difference—much vaster than that in

the theatre between the effect of a messenger's tale of horror and crime and the effect of the crime itself in all its horror enacted on the stage before our eyes. Taking account then of this vast difference in the way in which the dead as compared with the living are 'affected'—if they are 'affected' at all (a doubt which we must not lose sight of either)—we may say that if aught of good or evil reaches the dead from the living world and touches them, it is so trifling, or they are so insensible to its influence, that it does not affect their Happiness if they are happy, or Wretchedness if they are wretched.

§ 1.] On the subject of this ch. see introductory note to ch. 10. 1101 a. 22. He now returns to the ἐπιζητούμενον of i. 10. 6.

λίαν ἀφίλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον] Remembering that a. 23. the treatment of the subject in this and the preceding chapter is *dialectical*, we may recognise in these words two marks of the legitimate dialectical πρότασις or πρόβλημα, as it is described in the *Topics*. (1) No πρότασις may be employed which deeply offends the religious and moral sentiments of men, *Top. i. 11. 105 a. 3* οὐ δὲ δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκοπεῖν· ἀλλ' ἢ ἀπορήσειεν ἢν τις τῶν λόγων δεομένων, καὶ μὴ κολλάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποροῦντες πότερον δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν, καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς ἀγαπᾶν ἢ οὐ κολλάσεως δεόνται, οἱ δὲ πότερον ἢ χιῶν λευκῆ ἢ οὐ, αἰσθήσεως. So, to call in question the consciousness of the Dead is a heartless proceeding (λίαν ἀφίλον) and not suited to Dialectic. (2) Another mark of a legitimate dialectical πρότασις seems to be indicated by the words καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον, viz. that, except where it is supported by very exceptional evidence, it must not conflict with popular opinion. See *Top. i. 10. 104 a. 8* ἐστὶ δὲ πρότασις μὲν διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἐνδοξος ἢ πᾶσι ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσι ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις, μὴ παράδοξος· βεῖη γὰρ ἂν τις τὸ δοκοῦν τοῖς σοφοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ ἐναντίον ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν δόξαις ἢ: and *Top. i. 11. 104 b. 19* θέσις δὲ ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν· οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀριστοθένης . . . τὸ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφηνάμενον φροντίζεω εἰσθές ἐστιν. In a dialectical discussion, then, like the present, we must not call in question the widely entertained belief, that the dead are conscious, the denial of which moreover wounds the tenderest feelings of mankind. But while, for these reasons, unwilling here entirely to deny this popular belief, Aristotle does not scruple to *minimise* it—his dialectical conclusion being § 5 ἔσκε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ δίκνεύται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι οὐκ, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοῦναντίον, ἀφαιρῶν τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι,

1101 a. 23. εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον.

a. 28. §§ 3, 4, 5.] We have here a double protasis εἰ δὲ a. 28 . . . διαφέρει δὲ a. 31, the apodosis beginning—συλλογιστέον δὲ a. 34.

a. 32. § 4. τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προὔραρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι] 'It makes a much greater difference whether a calamity happen to the living or to the dead, than it does whether a terrible crime be presupposed in the plot of a tragedy or enacted on the stage.' Michelet appositely quotes Hor. *A. P.* 181

'Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures
Quam quae sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus.'

There can be very little doubt that this is the meaning of the passage; but most of the commentators, beginning with Eustrat., miss the point, e.g. Coraes, with οἶον ἐπὶ παραδείγματος, Οἰδίπους, τὴν μητέρα γαρῶν, τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκοπτόμενος, τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἐκπίπτων, ὅτ' ἔζη, διαφέρει τοῦ ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ ταῦτά ταῦτα πάσχειν ὑποκρινομένου Οἰδίποδος.

a. 34. § 5. συλλογιστέον] 'we must take into account.'

μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.] 'or rather perhaps (we must take into account, συλλογιστέον understood) the fact that a question is raised about the dead etc.' Grant. Lambinus suggested μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τότε δεῖ διαπορεῖσθαι: but as Grant argues¹ 'The alteration would really alter and spoil the context. Aristotle does not say "Perhaps after all we had better start the question anew, whether the dead are conscious of events." This would contradict § 6. He only says, "While granting the hypothesis that they do feel, we must take into account the element of doubt which still continues to attach to the subject."' Rassow, however—(*Forsch.* p. 74), is of opinion that μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τότε δεῖ ἀπορεῖσθαι is the correct reading. I cannot help thinking that the considerations urged by Grant against the conjecture of Lambinus tell equally against that of Rassow.

1101 b. 1. ἐκ τούτων] ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων—Aspasius: so Stahr, Peters, and Williams: but the Paraph. has—φαίνεται τοίνυν ὅτι, εἰ καὶ ἔρχεται τι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τούτων.

¹ After noting the rendering of the Paraph. as supporting Lambinus—σκεπτέον οὖν περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς: βέλτιον δὲ ἐστὶ σκεφασθαι εἰ κοινωνοῦσιν κ.τ.λ.

εἰ δὲ μή] sc. ἀφανρὸν τι καὶ μικρόν.

§ 6.] Victorius thinks that this § is an ancient scholium which has got into the text—'nihil enim novi tot verbis exponitur: nec solum sententia sed ne verba quidem variantur . . . sunt etiam libri nonnulli (which?) a quibus haec verba absunt. Stahr follows Victorius in regarding the § as an interpolation.

CHAPTER XII.

ARGUMENT.

Let our next question be this—Is Happiness a thing which we praise, or is it not rather a thing which we revere? It must be either praised or revered; for it is actually good, not a mere possibility of good.

A thing is praised because it is a good means to some end: e.g. a virtuous character is praised because it produces virtuous actions. Where there is no reference to an end beyond, praise is misapplied: e.g. it is misapplied, and ridiculously so, to the Gods who exist for themselves not for man. It is plain then that the Chief Good is above praise: 'that a good thing which is above praise must be the Chief Good' was indeed the argument which Eudoxus used to prove that 'Pleasure is the Chief Good'—and a very fine line of advocacy it was, in the opinion of many.

As for encomia—they are for performances such as feats of bodily strength or masterpieces of art: but the works of those who have made encomia their special subject may be consulted for details; our present subject is Happiness, and it is plain that Happiness is revered as an End. As a Beginning also or First Principle it is revered. All that is done by men is done for its sake: it is the Prime Mover or First Cause of all their actions. Such a Principle and Cause of Good we revere as divine.

Introductory Note.] Except that this chapter contains a further attempt to show the agreement of the Definition with popular opinion and forms of speech, its connexion with the immediate context is not evident. The following passage in *E. E.* ii. i. 1219 a. 40—b. 16, which gives an imperfect conspectus of the contents of several chapters of the *E. N.*, seems however to bring out the solidarity of the enquiry before us with the preceding discussions, especially with the question εἰ δεῖ τὸ τέλος ὄραν:—ὅτι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸν ὄρον αὐτῆς λέγομεν καλῶς, μαρτύρια τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. τό τε γὰρ εὐ πράττειν καὶ τὸ εὐ ζῆν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὃν ἕκαστον

1101 b. 10. *χρησίς ἐστι καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ πράξις (καὶ γὰρ ἡ πρακτικὴ χρηστικὴ ἐστὶ . . .) καὶ τὸ μῆτε μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι εὐδαιμόνα μῆτε παῖδα μῆθ' ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν (διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζεω, ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος' οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὐδαιμόνον' οὐ γὰρ ὄλον)' ἔτι δ' οἱ ἔπαινοί τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων' καὶ στεφανοῦνται οἱ νικῶντες, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικᾶν, μὴ νικῶντες δέ' καὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ὁποῖός τις ἐστίν' ἔτι διὰ τί ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται; ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τᾶλλα, ἢ τῷ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι ἢ τῷ μόρια εἶναι αὐτῆς. διὸ ἕτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ ἐγκώμιον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργου' ὁ δ' ἔπαινος τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθόλου' ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους.* It will be observed that the word *τίμιον* is not used here, the writer, true to his view—τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζεω ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος, ending the passage with ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους.

b. 10. § 1.] *εὐδαιμονία* is evidently not a *δύναμις* or mere potentiality of good: it is definitely and actually good. But is it actually good as a means or as an end? This question, which has already been answered over and over again, may be answered once more by reference to the popular distinction between *ἐπαινετά* and *τίμια*, the former being good means, and the latter good ends. The result of this reference is οὐδεὶς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς θεϊωτέρον τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει (§ 4). Cf. *M. M.* i. 2. 1183 b. 20—37—a passage which fully explains what Aristotle understands here by *ἐπαινετά* (οἶον ἀρεταί) *τίμια* (οἶον ψυχῆ, νοῦς, ἢ ἀρχή) and *δυνάμεις* (οἶον ἀρχὴ πλοῦτος ἰσχύς κάλλος). Ramsauer, who has an important note here, points out that the conjunction *ἐπαινετά, τίμια, δυνάμεις* occurs only in the *Eth. Nic.* and the *M. M.* In *Top.* iv. 5 τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ τὸ ποιητικόν is distinguished as δι' ἄλλο αἰρετόν from τὸ τίμιον, which is δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν, no mention being made of τὸ ἐπαινετόν¹: (126 b. 4 [ὄρᾶν δέ] καὶ εἴ τι τῶν δι' αὐτὸ τιμίον ἢ αἰρετῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἔθηκεν' πᾶσα γὰρ δύναμις καὶ πᾶν τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ τὸ ποιητικὸν δι' ἄλλο αἰρετόν), while in another passage, *Top.* iii. 1. 116 b. 37, *τίμια* and *ἐπαινετά* do not seem to be distinguished, *both* being ends or means—ἔτι τὸ κάλλιον καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τιμιώτερον καὶ ἐπαινετώτερον, οἶον φιλία πλοῦτος καὶ δικαιοσύνη ἰσχύος. τὰ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ τῶν

¹ The term *ἐπαινετόν* does not indeed occur in this passage; but its contrary *ψεκτόν* occurs in the immediate context, 126 a. 30 ὄρᾶν δέ καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ψεκτῶν ἢ φευκτῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατὸν ἔθηκεν . . . then follows 126 b. 4 καὶ εἴ τι τῶν δι' αὐτὸ τιμίον ἢ αἰρετῶν εἰς δύναμιν . . . ἔθηκεν.

τιμίον καὶ ἐπαινετῶν, τὰ δ' οὐ καθ' αὐτὰ ἀλλὰ δι' ἕτερον' οὐδεὶς γὰρ 1101 b. 10. τιμῆ τὸν πλοῦτον δι' εαυτὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἕτερον, τὴν δὲ φιλίαν καθ' αὐτό, καὶ εἰ μηδὲν μέλλει ἡμῖν ἕτερον ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἔσσεσθαι. All we can say is that here in the *Ethics* Aristotle finds that it suits his purpose to make a distinction between *ἐπαινετά* and *τίμια* which he does not make in the *Topics*.

§ 2. φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τι b. 12. πῶς ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι.] When the possession of a good *quality* places a thing in a definite *relation to* something else we praise it on account of its relation to that something else (*γίνονται οἱ ἔπαινοι δι' ἀναφορᾶς* § 3). Cf. *Cat.* 7. 6 b. 2 ἐστὶ δὲ . . . τῶν πρὸς τι . . . ἔξις διάθεσις ἐπιστήμῃ αἰσθησις θέσις. πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται . . . ἢ γὰρ ἔξις τινὸς ἔξις λέγεται, καὶ ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ τινὸς ἐπιωτήμῃ κ.τ.λ. Cf. the last words of the present book of the *E. N.*: τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν. A good quality to be *ἐπαινετόν*, however, must be one which places its possessor in a *definite* relation. There are certain good qualities—various *ἐπιστήμαι* or *τέχναι* (the *δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγον* of *Met.* θ. 2. 1046 b. 1) such as *ῥητορικὴ, διαλεκτικὴ, ἰατρικὴ*, which may be used for good or evil indifferently, and therefore are not *ἐπαινετά* or, at least, not so without qualification. But moral *ἔξεις* (*e. g.* *δικαιοσύνη*) differ from such *δυνάμεις* in being the sources of good actions only, in this respect resembling the *ἄλογοι δυνάμεις* or natural properties of *Met.* θ. 2, which always produce the same effects—the peculiar property of fire, *e. g.* always producing heat, that of snow, cold: cf. also *E. N.* v. 1. 4. These moral *ἔξεις* are *ἐπαινεταί* without qualification, as they tend definitely to good; whereas many intellectual *ἔξεις* (and it will be observed that no intellectual *ἔξεις* are instanced by Aristotle in the section before us—i. 12. 2) belong rather to the class of *δυνάμεις* which are distinguished from τὰ ἐπαινετά in § 1. Eustratius seems to see this—τὰ μὲν θεία τίμια λέγομεν ὡς ὑπάρχοντα ἰπὲρ ἔπαινον . . . ἐπαινετά δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὡς τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι μὲν λειπόμενα, ἐπαινοῦν δὲ μόνον τυγχάνοντα. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα ἀνθρώπινα μὲν καὶ ταῦτα, ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα δέ, ὡς καὶ κατορθοῦν δύνασθαι καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δυνάμεις λεγόμενα, ὡς τινος τῶν τεχνῶν ὑπάρχει εἰρεῖν, οἶον ἰατρικὴν ἢ ῥητορικὴν κ.τ.λ. These instances, it will be observed, differ from those given by the author of *M. M.* i. 2, who has τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις οἶον ἀρχὴ πλοῦτος ἰσχύς κάλλος 1183 b. 28.

Besides the moral *ἔξεις*, there is another class of *ποιότητες*,

1101 b. 12. sufficiently definite in the direction of good to be 'praised' without qualification—viz. those described in *Cat.* 8. 9 a. 15 as τὰ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν—οὐ γὰρ τῷ διακείσθαι πως ἕκαστον τούτων λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν . . . τοῦ ποιῆσαι τι βραδίως . . . οἷον πυκτικοὶ ἢ δρομικοὶ (cf. the passage before us, § 2) λέγονται οὐ τῷ διακείσθαι πως ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαι τι βραδίως. To prevent misunderstanding it is proper to add that, although in the view of the passage before us (*Eth.* i. 12. 2) the qualities or ποιότητες regarded as ἐπαινετά *par excellence* are the moral ἕξεις and τὰ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν λεγόμενα, still it is not implied that all intellectual ἕξεις are mere potentialities for good or evil, like ῥητορικὴ, and therefore not properly ἐπαινετά. Those ἐπιστήμῃ which are concerned with necessary truth cannot be turned to evil account, and, *quia ἕξεις*, are accordingly ἐπαινετά: similarly the intellectual ἕξεις of φρόνησις, although concerned with contingencies, is ἐπαινετή, being one of those οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαφενδόμεθα (*E. N.* vi. 6. 2). That Aristotle extended ἐπαινος to intellectual as well as to moral ἕξεις is indeed plain from the last section of this book, where ἀρετή is described as ἐπαινετή ἕξις, and the ἀρεταί are then distinguished as ἠθικαὶ and διανοητικαί. The tendency, however, which we have noticed in the passage before us (i. 12. 2) to regard the moral ἕξεις as preeminently ἐπαινεταί is developed by the writer of the *M. M.* into the doctrine that the intellectual ἕξεις are ποτ' ἐπαινεταί: see *M. M.* i. 5. 1185 b. 3 ἔστιν δ' ἡ ψυχὴ, ὡς φαμέν, εἰς δύο μέρη διηρημένη, εἰς τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον. ἐν μὲν δὴ τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις ἀγχίνοια σοφία εὐμάθεια μνήμη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἄλογῳ αὐταὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ λεγόμεναι, σωφροσύνη δικαιοσύνη ἀνδρεία ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοῦ ἤθους δοκοῦσιν ἐπαινεταὶ εἶναι. κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας ἐπαινετοὶ λεγόμεθα κατὰ δὲ τὰς τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται· οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι σοφός, οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται, οὔτε ὅτι φρόνιμος, οὐδ' ὅπως κατὰ τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. This is not in itself Aristotelian, but Aristotle suggested it.

With the words which head this note—φαίνεται δὴ κ.τ.λ. cf. *Met.* Δ. 14. 1020 b. 23 μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποιὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμφύζων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν: cf. also *E. N.* ii. 5, which turns on goodness (ἀρετή) being regarded as *the ποιότης par excellence*: hence an examination of the admitted forms of ποιότης—ἕξις, δύναμις, πάθος (or παθητικὴ ποιότης), with the conclusion § 6. 1106 a. 11 λέπεται ἕξεις τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι.

b. 16. καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δέ] K^b: accepted by Rassow (*Forsch.* 54). The

δὲ serves to bring out clearly that there are *two distinct* classes 1101 b. 16. of ἐπαινετά—the ἀρεταί, and τὰ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν: hence also the word πεφυκέαι here.

§ 3. γελοῖοι] *sc.* οἱ θεοί.

b. 19.

τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει] *i. e.* τοὺς θεοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφέρεσθαι. Cf. b. 20. *E. N.* x. 8. 7 for Aristotle's view of the life of the Gods, which is θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια, holding itself entirely apart from admixture with the concrete, and consequently from interference in human affairs.

§ 4. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν] *sc.* τὰ θειότατα.

b. 25.

§ 5. Εὐδοξος] Said to have been one of Plato's pupils; chiefly b. 27. celebrated as an astronomer (*Met.* Δ. 8); made ἡδονή the summum bonum (*E. N.* x. 2). For references to the literature about him see Schwegler, *Met.* vol. iv. p. 310. Opposite the section before us there is a scholium on the margin of Par. 1854 (L^b)—not however, so far as I could judge, one of those by the hand which wrote the text—throwing considerable light on this doctrine of Eudoxus: it is (see Cramer, *Anecdota Graeca* vol. i. Schol. Cod. Par. 1854, p. 1101 b. 27)—ἔλεγε γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπέκεινα εἶναι πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπένεμεν αὐτῇ ὁ Εὐδοξος τὰ ἀριστεία. This expression ἐπέκεινα πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν suggests the view that the doctrine of Eudoxus was only a modification of Plato's theory of the ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ, and consequently by no means a 'hedonistic' doctrine, as Aristotle insinuates *E. N.* x. 2. 1 ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτοῦς· διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σῶφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. Here Aristotle speaks as if Eudoxus was better than his doctrine: but it is quite in Aristotle's manner to misrepresent the doctrines of the Platonists. See note on *E. N.* x. 1. 2. In the present § (i. 12. 5) it will be understood that Aristotle does not imply his approval of the conclusion drawn by Eudoxus.

§ 6.] ἐγκώμια are given to good acts or products as such; ἐπαινος b. 33. to the qualities in men necessarily resulting in such acts or products; while a life spent in the systematic performance of all good acts is, taken as a whole, τίμιον and τέλειον. The editors refer to *Rhet.* i. 9. 1367 b. 26 ἔστι δ' ἐπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς . . . τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστὶ . . . διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιά-

1101 b. 33. ζόμεν πράξαντας' τὰ δ' ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστίν' ἐπεὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ μὴ πεπραγότα, εἰ πιστεύομεν εἶναι τοιούτων. See also the passage from *E. E.* ii. 1 quoted in the introductory note to this chapter.

b. 35. § 7. τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις] In a list of Aristotle's works given by Hesychius we find τέχνη ἐγκωμιαστική (see Berlin Arist. 1469): cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 4 on the ἐγκωμιαστικὸν εἶδος.

1102 a. 2. § 8. ἀρχή] ἀρχήν Mb, Ob C C C, Ald., but ἀρχή is right; Zell quotes ii. 9. 1 τοιαύτη ἐστίν (ἡ ἀρετὴ) διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι, and vii. 14. 5 ἔτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι.

The τέλος, or perfect adult form, is the ἀρχή which determines the growth, through all its stages, of a plant or animal (see *Met.* λ. 8. 1073 a. 1 τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστίν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον); similarly, εὐδαιμονία—the τέλος, or perfect form of human nature, is, as καλόν, the ἀρχή, or principle of attraction, which moves states and individuals to the performance of noble actions.

CHAPTER XIII.

ARGUMENT.

Since Happiness is 'a vital function manifesting perfect excellence,' let us now, in order to get a clearer view of Happiness, examine the nature of 'excellence.' In doing so we shall only be following out the line of enquiry contemplated at the beginning of this Treatise, when we described our Science as a kind of Statesmanship; for the 'excellence' or 'goodness' of their citizens is what all true Statesmen (e.g. the great lawgivers of Crete, Sparta, and other states) have been most anxious about.

Of course it is man's excellence that we examine; and the excellence not of his body but of his soul; for we define Happiness as a vital function, i.e. a function of the soul. The Statesman then must know something about the soul as a whole, just as the physician must know the body as a whole: in each case no part can be known or treated aright except as part of the whole. But the Statesman's study of Psychology need not go into wearisome details, for its end is practical not scientific.

It will be enough then if we here borrow the main outlines of Psychology from other works in which the subject is treated—and first, let us borrow the division of the soul into (1) the irrational part and (2) the part which has reason—it does not concern us here whether these parts are really separate as hand and foot are in the body, or only separated in thought as convex and concave in the mathematical circumference. Then the irrational part is subdivided. First we have the vegetative part, the principle of nutrition and growth, which we see perhaps most plainly at work in the embryo; but it continues to

operate in the adult also. This principle is common to all living creatures and not peculiar to man. Thus it operates most in sleep when the difference between men as men, i.e. between good men and bad men, is least apparent: 'during half their lives' according to the saying 'the happy are no better off than the miserable.' And this is easily explained, for sleep is the non-activity of the soul qua principle of conduct—although the principle of conduct may sometimes be so far active in sleep as to make the dreams of the good man better than those of the bad man. But enough of this: let us pass on from the nutritive part whose excellence is not that of man as man, to the other subdivision of the irrational part—to 'the principle which though irrational yet participates somehow in reason.' In the continent man and in the incontinent man we see two principles, one that of reason which we praise, and another which opposes reason. This latter principle in the continent man at least obeys reason or participates in it. Thus the irrational part of the soul contains two principles—the vegetative principle which does not participate in reason at all, and the appetitive which does in the sense of listening to reason and obeying it. Admonition, reproof and exhortation all witness to its participation in reason; and if we wish on the strength of its 'participation' to say that it 'has reason,' there can be no objection to our saying so, and subdividing 'the part of the soul which has reason' into two parts—the part which has reason in the strict sense, i.e. in itself, like the father who directs; and the part which has it in a secondary sense, i.e. by derivation from another or participation, like the child who follows his father's directions.

This subdivision underlies the classification of the 'excellences.' We distinguish them as those of the intellect (i.e. the part which has reason in itself) and those of the moral character (i.e. the appetitive part which follows reason). Wisdom, intelligence and prudence are excellences of the intellect; liberality and temperance of the moral character. When we are describing a man's moral character we do not speak of him as wise or intelligent but as good tempered or temperate; whereas the wise man comes in for the praise appropriate to his habit, which belongs to the other division, that of the intellect. In both divisions an 'excellence' may be described as a 'habit which we praise.'

§ 1. περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἶη] K^b, Camb., and Asp., are 1102 a. 6. the authorities for ἂν εἶη, accepted by Bywater. The words ἂν εἶη, are not found in other authorities.

A new division of the *Ethics* begins here. After indicating, in this chapter, the psychological ground of the distinction between the διανοητικαὶ and the ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί, Aristotle goes on in Book ii, and Book iii chapters 1–5, to discuss the common characteristics of the ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί. This discussion is summed up in iii. 5. 21 κοινῆ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται: then follows a detailed account of the separate ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί up to the end of Book v: while Book vi is devoted to a discussion of the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί.

§ 2. ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός] Michelet compares *Pol.* iii. 5. a. 8.

1102 a. 8. 1280 b. 4 φανερόν ὅτι δεῖ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι τῇ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀνομαζομένη πόλει. Cf. also *E. E.* i. 5. 1216 a. 23 οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας. οὐ γάρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ὁ μὲν γάρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἐστὶ πράξεων προαιρετικῶς, αὐτῶν χάριν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἕνεκεν ἄπτονται τοῦ ζῆν οὕτως.

a. 10. § 3. Κρητῶν] *Pol.* ii. 7.

a. 11. Λακεδαιμονίων] *Pol.* ii. 6. Grant remarks that 'Aristotle seems to have inherited the preference felt by Plato and Socrates for the Spartan constitution; not so much as a historical fact, but rather as a philosophical idea. It presented the scheme of an entire education for the citizens, though Aristotle confesses that this became degraded into a school for gymnastic.' The fault which Aristotle finds with the Spartan legislation is that it is based on a one-sided psychology—that it recognises only the virtues of the θυμοειδὲς μέρος. Cf. *Pol.* ii. 6. 1271 a. 41 καὶ ὡδὶ δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιτιμήσειεν ἂν τις . . . πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἢ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ, τὴν πολεμικὴν· αὕτη δὲ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τοιγαροῦν ἐσφάζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν, μηδὲ ἡσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἀσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριότεραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. Cf. *Pol.* Θ. 3. 1338 b. 9 νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν παιδῶν αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἕξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λωβώμεναι τὰ τε εἶδη καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ δὲ δάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε πρὸς μίαν . . . οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην, βλέποντα ποιητέον τὴν ἐπιμελείαν.

εἴ τινες ἕτεροι] Michelet suggests the Carthaginians, whose constitution is described, and on the whole favourably criticised in *Pol.* ii. 8. Eustr. has ὡς ὁ Σόλων Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἑτέρων ἕτεροι.

a. 13. § 4. κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν] see *E. N.* i. 2. 5. Cf. i. 9. 8. The Par. has ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ζήτησις αὕτη ἀκόλουθος ἂν εἴη τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ λόγου σκοπῷ· ἦν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος περὶ τοῦ τέλους τῆς πολιτικῆς.

a. 14. § 5. ἀνθρωπίνης] I transcribe Eustratius' note on this §, not as throwing much light on Aristotle's doctrine of τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, but as an interesting example of how Aristotelian doctrines fared under the combined influences of Neoplatonism and Christian asceticism: πολλὰ γένη ἀρετῶν εἰσῆγον οἱ παλαιοί, πολιτικὴν καθαρτικὴν

νοερὰν καὶ τὴν παραδειγματικὴν καὶ τὴν θεουργικὴν· τούτων δ' ἐκάστην 1102 a. 14. διήρουν εἰς τέτταρα τὰ πρῶτα φρόνησιν ἀνδρείαν σωφροσύνην δικαιοσύνην, ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἕκαστον ἀποδιδόντες αὐτῶν, οἰκείως δηλονότι τῶν γενῶν ἐκάστου. ἀλλὰ νῦν ἡμῖν τὰ δύο ταῦτα συνέγνωσται γένη μάλιστα, ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ καθαρτικὴ, ἡ μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς συμπραττούσης τῷ σώματι, ἡ δὲ χωριστένης αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐχούσης ἀσυμπαθῶς πρὸς αὐτό, ὡς εἶναι τὴν μὲν μετροπάθειαν μόνον κολάζουσιν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν παθῶν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου συντηροῦσαν τὴν κατὰ ταῦτα ἐνέργειαν, τὴν δὲ ἢ εἰς ἀπάθειαν ἄγουσαν ἐν τῷ ἔτι καθαίρεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ καὶ ἤδη ἀπαγαγοῦσαν ὅτε ἤδη καὶ κεκάθαρται, καὶ ἀπροσπαθῆς πρὸς τὸ σῶμα γεγένηται. ἀνθρώπινον τοῖον ἀρετὴν φησὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν, ὡς οὔσης τῆς καθαρτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπου ὅσον κατὰ τὸ συναμφότερον· ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἡμερον καὶ συναγλαστικὸν καὶ κοινωνικόν· ὅτε δὲ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ οἰκείον σῶμα κοινωνίαν ἀρνήσεται, ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπείαν τότε καθέστηκε σύνθεσιν, πᾶσαν ἰλικιὴν ἀπρηνημένον ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ἀνεπιστρόφῳ τῶν χειρόνων ψυχῇ καὶ κῶ καθαρῷ πρὸς τὰ κρείττω ἀναφερόμενος καὶ πρὸς τὴν θείαν ἀναπλούμενος ἔλλαψιν.

§ 6. καὶ τὴν εἰδαιμονίαν δέ] This clause introduced by καὶ . . . a. 17. δέ (on which see Eucken, *de Arist. dicendi rat. Pars Prima: de particularum usu* p. 32) stands to that immediately preceding it in the same relation in which the words καὶ γὰρ τὰγαθόν κ.τ.λ. in § 5 stand to those immediately preceding them: accordingly, the Paraphrast's rendering is simply—ἐπεὶ τοῖον ἡ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἀρετῇ οὐ τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς (καὶ τὴν εἰδαιμονίαν γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν), κ.τ.λ.

§ 7. ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύοντα καὶ πᾶν <τὸ> σῶμα] a. 19. It seems best (with the Par., Victorius., Zell, Coraes, Grant, Stahr, Williams and Ramsauer) to govern καὶ πᾶν <τὸ> σῶμα by εἰδέναι, not by θεραπεύοντα (with Eustr., Argyrop., Lamb., Michelet and Peters). 'The statesman must know something about the nature of the soul, just as the practical oculist must have a general knowledge of the body': δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πῶς ἔχει τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀφθαλμὸν θεραπεύειν, τοῦ σώματος παντὸς τὴν γνώσιν ἔχει ἀνάγκη Paraph. This interpretation is strongly supported by Plato, *Charm.* 156 B, quoted by Coraes and Grant—ἤδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκουσ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοῖς προσέλθῃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσὶ πού ὅτι οἶχ οἶόν τε αὐτοῖς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶη ἅμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν εἰ μέλλοι καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων εἶ ἔχειν καὶ αὐτὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἶεσθαι ἂν

1102 a. 19. ποτε θεραπεύσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἄνευ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος, πολλὴν ἄνοιαν εἶναι· ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ λόγου διαίταις ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα [cf. Ramsauer's conj. (adopted by Bywater) πᾶν τὸ σῶμα for πᾶν σῶμα in *E. N.* i. 13. 7] τρεπόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος ἐπιχειροῦσι θεραπεύειν¹. This wide view of the relation of the special organ to the whole body, or of local symptoms to the general condition of the body, recalls the teaching of Hippocrates, to physicians of whose school we may suppose Aristotle to refer in the expression τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες § 7. In the Treatise *περὶ ἀρχαῖης ἰατρικῆς* 20, Hippocrates lays down, and in the *Prognostic* (see Littré, *Hipp.* ii. 96) and Treatise *περὶ διαίτης δέξιν* (see Littré, *Hipp.* ii. 198) applies, the great principle—that we must study ὁ ἄνθρωπος, the concrete human organism, in all its rapports with external things, and ascertain the effects, healthy and morbid, which they produce upon it, instead of taking (as unscientific practitioners do) each symptom by itself, and pronouncing it to be a case of ψυχρόν, which must be met by the application of θερμόν, or of ὑγρόν, by the application of ξηρόν—a method which he derides in *περὶ ἀρχ. ἰητ.* 13, as ὁ τρόπος ὁ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. See *περὶ ἀρχ. ἰητ.* 20 (Littré vol. i. p. 622) ἐπεὶ τοί γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὶ ἰητρῷ περὶ φύσιος εἰδέναι, καὶ πάνυ σπουδαῖα ὡς εἴσεται, εἴπερ τι μέλλει τῶν δεόντων ποιῆσειν, ὃ τί ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπος πρὸς τὰ ἐσθιόμενα καὶ πινόμενα, καὶ ὃ τι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ ὃ τι ἀφ' ἑκάστου ξυμβήσεται. Littré (vol. i. pp. 295, 296 *Introd.*) is of opinion that Plato has this passage (or one to similar effect at the beginning of the First Book *περὶ διαίτης*, see Littré vol. i. p. 300) in view in *Phaedrus* 270 C Σω. ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἶε δύνατὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως; Φαι. εἰ μὲν Ἰπποκράτει τε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πείθεσθαι, οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος ἄνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης. Although Aristotle only once mentions Hippocrates by name (and that without any reference to his doctrines—*Pol.* H. 4. 1326 a. 15), traces of the influence of his teaching are, according to Littré (vol. i. p. 72), numerous in the Aristotelian writings. To the passages mentioned by Littré may be added *de Sensu* i. 436 a. 20 (quoted by Grant and Ramsauer to illustrate τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες), a passage which describes the method of physicians who observed a rule identical

¹ Cf. Aristocles peripateticus (Suidas. s. Ἀριστοκλήης), apud Euseb. *Præpar. Evang.* xi. ch. 3 καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ ἰατροὶ μέρη τινα θεραπεύοντες, ἐπιμελοῦνται τῶν ὅλων σωμάτων πρῶτον, οὕτω κ.τ.λ.: see Mullach, *Fragm. Phil.* iii. 206, 299.

with that (ἀναγκαῖον παντὶ ἰητρῷ περὶ φύσιος εἰδέναι) laid down by 1102 a. 19. Hippocrates—σχεδὸν τῶν τε περὶ φύσεως οἱ πλείστοι καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφωτέρας τὴν τέχνην μεινόντες οἱ μὲν τελ. ὑπῴσω εἰς τὰ περὶ ἰατρικῆς, οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἄρχονται περὶ ἰατρικῆς. Medical specialists, (see Herod. ii. 84, for the length to which specialisation was carried in Egypt), must control their treatment of particular organs by a competent knowledge of the structure and functions of the whole organism; similarly, the statesman who has to educate a people must do so with a knowledge of human nature as an organic whole, otherwise he will fall into error like that of the Spartan Legislator who cultivated the warlike virtues of his people at the expense of the peaceful. Cf. *Pol.* H. 13. 1334 a. 6 αἱ γὰρ πλείστα τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι μὲν σῶζονται, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται . . . ἀτίος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάζειν.

The interpretation offered by Eustr., Argyrop., Lamb., Mich. and Peters cannot, I think, be easily maintained against the evidence afforded by the parallels quoted above. Argyropylos referring καὶ πᾶν σῶμα θεραπεύοντα, gives the following rendering—'Quemadmodum et eum qui curaturus est oculos totumque corpus, de ipsis scire oportet'; which is thus explained by Michelet—'ut politicum qui animo medetur animi naturam perspectam habere oportet, ita medicus qui oculum totumve corpus curat, id, quod semper curat, sive oculum sive corpus nosse debet. Virtus enim se habet ad animum ut sanitas ad oculum corpusve.' The other interpretation, according to Michelet, 'leaves us without a simile';—'nec dicere vult Aristoteles, animi virtutem spectanti majus quiddam animo investigandum esse, quemadmodum qui oculis mederetur totum corpus nosse deberet: istud enim de medico quidem et ipsum verum est, de politico autem nihil simile proferre possit.' This objection we may answer by remarking that what Aristotle insists upon is that the statesman must have a knowledge of human nature as a whole, if he is to deal successfully with the education of *any of its particular* tendencies or capacities: *i. e.* that *whenever* he is engaged with one part of human nature he must think of the other parts: *e. g.* when he is dealing with a particular ὄρεξις, say the love of money, he must take it in connexion with other ὄρεξις, such as that for pleasurable indulgence; and further, must consider the relation of the ὀρεκτικὸν μέρος generally to the rational element: and the connexion of both ὄρεξις and λόγος with the θρεπτικὸν μέρος.

1102 a. 24. § 8. τούτων χάριν] τῶν ἀρετῶν ἕνεκα. Eustr.

a. 26. § 9. ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις] I think that it is best to render this expression quite generally—'in other accounts,' or 'elsewhere,' leaving it to be gathered from the context whether the reference, in this or that particular case, is to written or to unwritten opinions, to the opinions of Aristotle himself, or to those of others. That the reference is always to a definite class of *popular treatises* (as distinguished from the *abstruse treatises*—ἀκροατικοὶ λόγοι, see Strabo xiii. 609, Plut. *Alex.* 7, *adv. Colot.* 14, Aul. Gell. xx. 5) written by Aristotle himself was held by many of the older interpreters (e. g. by Victorius and Lambinus), but has been given up by most modern scholars. The literature of the subject is very extensive. The student may consult (in addition to the notes of Michelet, pp. 28–31 and p. 72, Zell, p. 56, and Ramsauer, p. 71), the following authorities—*Ind. Ar.* s. v. ἐξ. λογ.; Grant, *Ethics* (appendix B on ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι), Grote, *Aristotle* i. 63 sqq.—Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*, Susemihl, *Neue Jahrbücher* vol. 129 ('ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι bei Arist. u. Eud.'): his conclusion is that ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι = 'ausserphilosophischen Erörterungen mit verschiedener Färbung in verschiedenen Stellen'. Thurot, *Études sur Aristote*, 1860, p. 223; Brandis, *Die Schicksale der Aristotelischen Bücher, Rhein. Mus.* i. 254; Stahr, *Aristotelia* vol. ii. 3 (über den Unterschied exot. u. esot. Schriften des Arist.), and Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* vol. ii. 2. p. 114 sqq. Zeller's conclusion (p. 118 sqq.) is expressed thus—'Wenn auch im allgemeinen jede Erörterung eine exoterische genannt werden kann, welche nicht zu der eben vorliegenden Untersuchung gehört, oder welche nicht tiefer in ihren Gegenstand eindringt, wenn ferner die "exoterischen Reden" nicht immer und nicht nothwendig eine bestimmte Klasse von *Schriften* bezeichnen, so finden sich doch Stellen, in denen wir allen Grund haben, sie auf solche zu beziehen.' The present reference (*E. N.* i. 13. 9) Zeller thinks (p. 122), is most probably to the Dialogue *Eudemus*.

It is to be observed that the Paraphrast, in his note on the present passage, is careful to say that the reference is *not* to written works—περὶ ψυχῆς τοῦτων οὐ μόνον ἐν συγγράμμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ στόματος πρὸς τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας ἀρκούντως εἶπομεν ἕνα καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς.

a. 27. οἶον] = scilicet, videlicet. See *Ind. Arist.* and Ramsauer's note.

Bernays (*die Dial. d. Arist.* p. 65) makes οἶον here = 'zum Beispiel,' 1102 a. 27. wrongly, I think.

§ 10. τῷ λόγῳ] As we might say—'logically two, but really a. 30. (*πεφυκότα*, i. e. as really existing) indivisible.' Cf. *Met.* M. 2. 1077 b. 13. The distinction marked by λόγῳ and πεφυκότα here is that elsewhere marked by λογικῶς and φυσικῶς (see note on vii. 3. 9). To explain a thing λογικῶς is to explain it by means of a formula more or less abstract and general: to explain it φυσικῶς is to explain it more concretely, taking account of its natural properties. It is evident that while only one exhaustive concrete view of an object can be taken, more than one abstract view may. Thus a σύνολον may be λόγῳ δύο. Ψυχῆ, which is the totality of the functions of the body, exists (πέφυκε) only as a totality. Reason does not exist without sense, or sense without the vegetative functions; but we can look at the ψυχῆ from various points of view—as rational, sensitive, vegetative; just as in mathematics we can look at a real line, which has a certain breadth as well as length, from the point of view of its length only.

ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ] Here the circumference formed by a line 'with a. 31. out breadth' is looked at from two points of view—as concave and convex.

§§ 11–19.] The 'psychology' contained in these §§ is, with slight a. 32. differences of terminology, that already given in i. 7. 12–13, where see notes.

§ 11. κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ] The meaning of κοινῷ here is explained below, § 12—ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινῆ τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται. In *De An.* ii. 4. 415 a. 23 nutrition and reproduction are mentioned as the two functions of this 'part of the soul'—ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δυνάμις ἐστὶ ψυχῆς, καθ' ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν. ἧς ἐστὶν ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφή χρῆσθαι.

§ 12. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα] The commentators 1102 b. 3. quote περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐργηγάρσεως I. 454 b. 32 τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ τὸ θρεπτικὸν μῦρον ἐν τῷ καθυδέειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐργηγορέναι τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ αἰξάνεται τότε μᾶλλον, ὡς οὐδὲν προσδεόμενα πρὸς ταῦτα τῆς αἰσθήσεως. The natural connexion between sleep and nutrition is brought out in full detail in περὶ ὕπνου 3. 'Der Zweck des Schlafes,' says Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. p. 550 (referring to *De Somno* 3), 'ist die

1102 b. 3. Erhaltung des Lebens, die Erholung welche ihrerseits wieder dem höheren Zwecke der wachen Thätigkeit dient. Seine natürliche Ursache liegt in dem Ernährungsprocess.

b. 7. § 13.] In the treatise *περὶ ἐνυπνίων* Aristotle explains dreams as caused by *κινήσεις*, similar to those made by the *αἰσθητά*, occurring in the organs of sensation in the absence of the *αἰσθητά*. He points to the phenomenon of 'after-images,' 2. 459 b, as illustrating the principle of the persistence of sense *κινήσεις*, and accounts for the dreamer's belief in the truth of his dream, while it lasts, by the fact that the *κίνησις* which constitutes the dream is not exposed to the lively criticism of other experiences, but has the *ἀρχή* (or conscious principle) of the dreamer all to itself, δι' ἀρχίαν τῶν κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν. The *ἀρχή* pronounces for the truth of any experience purporting to come from sense, unless a more authoritative experience be present to contradict the judgment—*περὶ ἐνυπνίων* 3. 461 b. 3 ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἀφ' ἐκάστης αἰσθησεώς φησιν ἢ ἀρχή, ἐὰν μὴ ἕτερα κυριώτερα ἀντιφῆ. φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ἐπικρίνον κατέχεται ἢ μὴ κινῆται τὴν οἰκίαν κίνησιν.

b. 9. πλὴν εἰ μὴ] M^b, Asp.—adopted, in place of the πλὴν εἴ πη of other sources, by Bywater, who makes the words ὅθεν φασὶν . . . φαῦλη parenthetical.

b. 10. βελτίω] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* ix. 571 C: also *Probl.* A. 14. 957 a. 23.

b. 13. § 15. ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς] *φύσις* here is equivalent to *δύναμις* or *μόριον*.

b. 14. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον] In the *ἐγκρατῆς* or 'continent man,' and *ἀκρατῆς* or 'incontinent man,' there is a struggle between *ἐπιθυμία* and *λόγος*, with the result that, in the case of the *ἐγκρατῆς*, *λόγος* generally prevails, and, in the case of the *ἀκρατῆς*, *ἐπιθυμία*: *i.e.* both know that it is wrong to follow pleasure, but feel inclined to follow it; the *ἀκρατῆς*, however, yields to his inclination, whereas the *ἐγκρατῆς* does not. Distinguished from the *ἀκρατῆς* and *ἐγκρατῆς*, in whom a struggle takes place between *λόγος* and *ἐπιθυμία*, are the *ἀκόλαστος* or 'incorrigible,' and the *σώφρων* or 'temperate man,' in neither of whom there is a struggle—because, in the *ἀκόλαστος*, *ἐπιθυμία* has gained complete supremacy, and *λόγος*, in the *σώφρων*. The desires of the *σώφρων* cheerfully obey reason: the reason (or

conscience) of the *ἀκόλαστος* is either silenced or transformed into a *ψευδὴς λόγος*—a Flatterer of Desire.

ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν] Cf. iii. 2. 4, 5 καὶ ὁ ἀκρατῆς b. 21. ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατῆς δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ: cf. also note *ad loc.* with reference to *Rep.* 440, where Plato proves that the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* and *λογιστικόν* are distinct 'parts,' by pointing, just as Aristotle does here, to the 'opposition' between them.

§ 16. πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει] *i.e.* πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ b. 25. τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια . . . ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα . . . οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν—§ 10 above.

§ 17. πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς] *s.c.* ὀρεκτικόν. b. 26. Aristotle seems here to offer a sort of apology for describing τὸ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς as μετέχον λόγου. See note on i. 3. 6 for an estimate of the *λόγος* τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς.

σώφρωνος καὶ ἀνδρείου] The *σώφρων* and *ἀνδρείος* are given as b. 27. examples of *confirmed* virtue. *ἐγκράτεια* is not properly *ἕξις*.

πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ] Cf. ix. 4. 3 ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ (ὁ b. 28. σπουδαῖος) καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πάσαν τὴν ψυχὴν. On the other hand, στασιάζει (τῶν μοχθηρῶν) ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενον τινῶν τὸ δ' ἡδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκείσε ἔλκει ὡσπερ διασπῶντα—ix. 4. 9.

§ 18. φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν] *i.e.* as well as the *ψυχὴ* itself, which has already (§ 9) been divided into two parts—τὸ ἄλογον and τὸ λόγον ἔχον.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγῳ] It is true that *λόγος*, as b. 29. *conscientia*—*i.e.* as a regulating principle within the individual of which he himself is conscious, does not interfere with his vegetative (or merely physiological) functions, as it interferes with his appetites and desires. At the same time we must remember that these vegetative functions are there because they are materially necessary, in the economy of the *ψυχῆ*, for the realisation of its end—the consciousness of *λόγος*. In this sense then they 'participate in *λόγος*': they must be defined in reference to it (*ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει* iii. 7. 6): except as 'necessary in the economy of the *ψυχῆ*, for the conscious

1102 b.29. realisation of λόγος,' they are meaningless—as the οἰκία is meaningless except as 'materially necessary for the πόλις.' We may say, then, that, although the φυτικὸν μέρος 'has nothing in common with λόγος'—if λόγος be taken to mean (as it certainly means in this context) the individual's conscious regulation of irrational tendencies, yet it 'has all in common with λόγος,' in so far as it is δεκτικόν, *i.e.* so constituted as to serve as material basis for the individual's consciously realised λόγος. Again, although the conscious λόγος of the individual cannot step in suddenly to modify his own vegetative, or merely physiological functions, as it can to modify his appetites and desires, the conscious λόγος of the 'legislator' does, in the long run, modify the vegetative, or merely physiological functions of the individuals belonging to the race over whose development he presides. In the interest of the particular form of culture which it is his 'end' to realise in his citizens, 'the legislator' will see that the suitable physique is at last produced in them. But, after all, we need not look so high as 'the legislator' to find conscious modification of vegetative functions. The results of 'sexual selection' are evidence for the reaction of 'consciousness,' even among the lower animals, on the vegetative part. However, to limit the reference to the human race—we can say τὸ μὲν φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινοῦεῖ λόγου only if we take λόγος in the restricted sense of the reason of the individual, and forget that νόμος which is λόγος ἀπὸ τῆς φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ (*E. N.* x. 9. 12) takes measures which, in the history of the race, profoundly affect 'the vegetative part.'

b. 30. τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν] *i.e.* τὸ ὀρεκτικόν is the generic term: see *De An.* iii. 3; 414 b. 2 (quoted by Ramsauer) ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις.

b. 31. οὕτω δὴ . . . μαθηματικῶν] The Paraph. has—λέγομεν γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων λόγον ἔχειν τὸ ἐπιστρέφειν πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ οἷς κελίουσιν ἐξακολουθεῖν· λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν λόγον ἔχειν τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ καὶ γῶσιν τινα καὶ ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν ἔχειν. The phrase ἔχειν λόγον has a double meaning: ἔχειν λόγον τῶν μαθηματικῶν is 'to have the theory or demonstration of mathematical propositions' in one's own mind—*i.e.* to understand it for oneself: to take it on authority would not be to 'have it,' in this sense of 'having': ἔχειν λόγον τοῦ πατρὸς is, idiomatically, to 'have regard to one's father'—to pay attention to his advice; but here the reader is asked to lose sight, for a moment, of the idiomatic sense of the phrase, and contrast

'having the λόγος of one's father' with 'having the λόγος of 1102 b. 31. mathematical propositions.' 'Having the λόγος of one's father' is having it as borrowed from him; 'having the λόγος of mathematical propositions' is having it in the strict sense of 'having'—having it in one's own right, for the λόγος of the μαθηματικά is the λόγος of the μαθηματικός himself—ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀνεν ὕλης τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστι τὸ νοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον: *De An.* iii. 4. 430 a. 2.

It is difficult to express in English the double entendre of the Greek; but the meaning is that one is 'rational'—ἔχει λόγον—in two senses—as yielding to the good advice of another, and as grasping scientific truth by one's own effort.

§ 19. εἰ δὲ χρή καὶ τοῦτο φάναι, λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ 1103 a. 1. λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὡς περ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικὸν τι] The ἄλογον has been shown to be διττόν—*viz.* τὸ φυτικὸν and τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. τὸ ὀρεκτικόν has, *quia* κατήκον λόγου, been described as μετέχον λόγου. Aristotle now goes on—'If we are to say that the ὀρεκτικόν also (καὶ τοῦτο), as well as the λόγον ἔχον proper, ἔχει λόγον in virtue of its being μετέχον λόγου; then the λόγον ἔχον also will be διττόν as well as τὸ ἄλογον. We shall have the λόγον ἔχον subdivided into (1) τὸ λόγον ἔχον κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ—that which 'has reason,' in the strict sense of 'having,' *i.e.* 'has it in itself,' and (2) τὸ λόγον ἔχον, where ἔχον=μετέχον—that which 'has reason,' not in its own right, but by derivation or participation. An illustration may make this clearer: Animals are divided into (1) rational—man, and (2) irrational—the lower animals. Of the lower animals some (a) *e.g.* bats, do not allow themselves to be directed by man's reason: others (b) *e.g.* dogs, do: and if we may call (b) 'rational,' then (1) will have its two divisions, as well as (2), (b) being counted under both (1) and (2).

ἐπινοούμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν] See note on i. 12. 2. a. 8.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

Excellence being of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral, the former owes its origin and development, for the most part, to teaching, and therefore needs time and experience, the latter comes from habit (ἔθος—hence its name in Greek ἠθική). This being so, it is plain that the various forms of Moral Excellence, i. e. the various Moral Virtues, are not naturally implanted qualities in us; for habit cannot alter any natural quality: e. g. it is the nature of a stone to fall, and you cannot habituate it to rise by throwing it up into the air ever so often. The Virtues, then, are not naturally implanted qualities; but this does not mean that their presence in us is 'contrary to nature.' It is our nature to be capable of acquiring them; but it is by habit that we do actually acquire them.

Further, where a natural endowment is concerned, the order in time is (1) faculty, or organ, e. g. eyes, and (2) employment of faculty, or organ, e. g. seeing: we did not acquire our eyes by often seeing, but first had eyes, and then saw with them; whereas in the case of the Virtues the order is reversed: we acquire them by acting, even as we acquire the Arts—we become builders by building, just men by doing just acts. To understand how true this is, we have only to look at the procedure of law-givers. Wishing to make their citizens good, they provide laws under which their citizens are habituated to perform good actions. A good constitution differs from a bad one in the success with which it habituates the citizens to perform good actions.

Again, the analogy of the Arts, referred to above, will help us to understand another point, viz.—that it is in the same, not in different circumstances, with the same, not with different opportunities, that one man, by repeatedly acting well, acquires a Virtue, and another man, by repeatedly acting badly, falls away into the opposite Vice. In the same circumstances one man becomes a good builder, or musician, and another man a bad builder or musician, according as the one repeatedly builds, or plays, well, and the other badly: so, it is in the same business that one trader becomes just, and another unjust, in the same service that one soldier acquires the Virtue of courage, and another falls away into the Vice of cowardice. To sum up—: it is from the repeated performance of similar acts that a Habit is formed. Hence the importance of seeing that the acts are of the right kind; for according as they are good or bad, so will the Habit be good or bad. It thus makes all the difference to a man's character, whether the acts, which he has been habituated from youth upwards to perform, are good or bad.

§ 1. τὸ πλεῖον] The Paraphrast has—καὶ ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ ἔχει μὲν 1103 a. 15. καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν (δεκτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐπιστήμης) καὶ ἀπὸ ἔθους αὔξησιν λαμβάνει τινά· τὸ δὲ πλεον ἀπὸ τῆς διδασκαλίας καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν ἔχει. For an account of the relation of ἐμπειρία to the ἀρχαί of ἐπιστήμη see *An. Post.* ii. 19.

ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους] Grant quotes Plato, *Legg.* 792 E πᾶν ἦθος a. 17. διὰ ἔθος. Cf. also *E. E.* ii. 2. 1220 a. 9, and *M. M.* i. 6. 1186 a. 1, and Plutarch *De Virt. Mor.* ch. 4 (quoted by Zell)—διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἀνόμασται τὸ ἦθος· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ποιότης τοῦ ἀλόγου τὸ ἦθος· ἀνόμασται δέ, ὅτι τὴν ποιότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἔθει λαμβάνει τὸ ἀλογον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πλαττόμενον, οὐ βουλομένου τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν (οὔτε γὰρ δυνατὸν οὔτε ἄμεινον) ἀλλὰ ὅρον τινὰ καὶ τάξιν ἐπιτιθέντος αἰτῶ, καὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς, οὐκ ἀπαθείας οὔσας, ἀλλὰ συμμετρίας παθῶν καὶ μεσότητος, ἐμποιοῦντος· ἐμποιεῖ δὲ τῇ φρονήσει τὴν τοῦ παθητικοῦ δύναμιν εἰς ἕξιν ἀστείαν καθιστάς.

ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ, as such, comes ἐξ ἔθους: but ἔθος requires a certain εὐφροσύνη to work upon (see Grant *ad loc.*). The children of a civilized community inherit tendencies to virtue which make habituation easy.

§ 2. οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται] i. e. only a. 19. those ἀρεταί are called ἠθικαί which result from training under νόμος; for there are φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί (see *E. N.* vi. 13). The difference, however, between φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ and ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ is that the former does not, like the latter, involve the whole man. A man may have 'natural,' or constitutional, courage without possessing other good qualities; whereas, if he possess ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ, his nature has become a unity and a system in perfect adjustment to the complex external system represented by νόμος, or the law and fashion of the society in which he lives. When man is said to be φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, it is not meant that he is produced by Nature in ready-made correspondence with a complex social environment. His correspondence is only the final result of prolonged contact with society; but he has a natural tendency to correspond. In other words, the uncivilized man is not civilized already, but has it in him to become civilized—οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειομένους δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους (§ 3).

Φύσις, like many other leading terms, has both a generic and a specific sense in Aristotle—a circumstance which often involves the philosopher himself, as well as his interpreters, in considerable

1103 a. 19. confusion. In its generic sense it = 'laws of nature'; in its specific sense, 'laws of organic nature,' or 'biological laws,'—*i. e.* laws of nature which result in the production and maintenance of definite living structures. It is in connexion with this narrower sense of the term that we must take all Aristotle's most characteristic statements about φύσις (as in *Phys.* ii)—οὐδὲν μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ—τέλος καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα ἢ φύσις—ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ—ἀεὶ τὸ βέλτιον, &c. In the present section, however, φύσις is used in the wider sense, which includes all 'laws of nature,' organic and inorganic. Of course, it is true only of the laws of inorganic matter that they are not changed by habituation (οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται); for in the sphere of biology τὰ φύσει ὄντα change in relation to, adapt themselves to, or 'habituate' themselves to, changes in the environment.

The distinction therefore drawn in *Met.* θ. 2. 1046 b. 1—αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις πάσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταὶ αἱ δ' ἄλογοι μία ἐνός—does not properly discriminate between man's conscious life on the one side, and nature, whether organised or unorganised, on the other; but rather between organised nature (including man's conscious life) on the one side, and inorganic nature on the other. The expression μετὰ λόγου by itself is wide enough to include all organisms. Only organisms exhibit λόγος or *ratio*. Inorganic nature is essentially ἄλογος.

a. 28. § 4. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον] Grant observes (*Ethics* Essay iv. vol. i. p. 240, note 34) that 'this doctrine is opposed to some of the modern discoveries of psychology, as, for instance, Berkeley's "Theory of Vision."' Taking his stand on οὐθὲν τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, Aristotle fails to see that the senses are really 'habits' organised in the race, and that the difference between the senses and the moral virtues—both being viewed as adaptations to environment—is that the former are adaptations of very long standing, deeply organised in the race, whereas the latter are, so to speak, adaptations of yesterday's date, and not yet perfect in the race—*i. e.* not inherited except in the vague form of εὐφυΐα.

'We need only compare,' says Grant (note on § 2 of this chapter), 'the theory of Virtue in this book with the discussions in the *Meno* of Plato, to see how immensely Moral Philosophy had gained in definiteness in the mean time.' Virtue and knowledge are, indeed, no longer confused together. Virtue is no longer said to be pro-

duced by 'teaching,' like knowledge, but to result from 'acting in 1103 a. 28. correspondence with νόμος, or the social environment.' This was certainly a great advance in definiteness of theory. But yet, the 'social environment,' as Aristotle understands it, lacks continuity in time; every man has to begin his adaptation almost at the beginning. The peripatetic doctrine of catastrophes, or φθοραί (see *Pol.* ii. 5. 1269 a. 5, 6, and Newman's notes), whereby all except a few human beings were periodically destroyed, civilization having to begin afresh on each occasion (see Bernays, *Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit* p. 39), finds its parallel in Aristotle's theory of the growth of moral virtue, in which Heredity is not recognised sufficiently¹ by the side of Habituation, or individual adaptation.

§ 5. νομοθέται] Aristotle, in common with his contemporaries, b. 3. had not adequately grasped the truth that 'constitutions are not made but grow.' He shows a tendency to personify social influences, and make them emanate from a definite legislator in the past. The foundation of colonies, under ready-made laws, doubtless gave plausibility to this view, which in itself however is quite in keeping with the peripatetic doctrine of discontinuous civilization alluded to in the last note.

§ 6. ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.] *i. e.* 'The circumstances and acts b. 6. are generically the same, only differing as to well and ill.' Grant. Repeated προαιρέσεις, good or bad (bad προαιρέσεις not being easily distinguishable from mere ὀρέξεις) transform an original δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων into a fixed ἕξις, good or bad, which resembles the ἄλογος δύναμις of *Met.* θ. 2. 1046 b. 1 in being μία ἐνός. See *Met.* θ. 5. 1048 a. 8 ἐκείναι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων [ποιητικαί], ὥστε ἅμα ποιήσει τὰναντία τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὄρεξιν ἢ προαίρεσιν: and *E. N.* v. 1. 4 δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτῆ εἶναι, ἕξις δ' ἢ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ.

§ 7. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται] 'It b. 21. will be observed that why an act tends to reproduce itself Aristotle does not inquire'—is Grant's remark here. But it need not sur-

¹ Not that Aristotle did not make valuable first contributions to a just view of the importance of Heredity in morals and politics—in his doctrine of φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ and εὐφυΐα, and of εὐγένεια defined as ἀρετὴ γένους in a fragment of the Dialogue *De Nobilitate* (preserved by Pseudo-Plut. *de Nob.* 14 [but cf. Newman's *Politics* vol. ii. p. 68] and Stob. *Fl.* vol. iii. p. 166 ed. Meineke: see note on i. 8. 16. b. 3), and in *Pol.* iii. 7. 1283 a. 37.

1103 b. 21. prise us that Aristotle does not stop to put this question, for if it is a legitimate question at all, it is, at any rate, a very wide and vague one. To ask why acts tend to reproduce themselves—why they become easier instead of more difficult—why, in short, habits are formed, is tantamount to asking why there is such a thing as life, or the continuous correspondence of organism with environment. For further considerations relating to this subject see note on ii. 6. 17.

b. 22. § 8. ποιᾶς ἀποδιδόναι] ‘tales reddere’—Michelet. ‘Wherefore we must see that the acts are of a certain kind.’ For the Aristotelian use of ἀποδιδόναι see *Index Arist.* and Cope, *Rhet.* i. 1. 7. 1354 b. 3, note. Cope quotes the δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιᾶς ἀποδιδόναι of the present § and says—‘τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδιδόναι is not simply “to produce” but to produce energies that are due to the system, energies corresponding to the faculties from which they spring.’ Instead of ‘corresponding to the faculties from which they spring’ he ought to have said—‘corresponding to the faculties which it is desired to produce’—i.e. fitted to produce certain faculties or habits.

b. 23. ἀκολουθοῦσιν] For the technical meaning of this term see *E. N.* vii. 12. 1 b. 26, note.

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

The way then in which the acts are performed being so important, we must now enquire what is the right way, for this Treatise is intended to be practically useful. The right way is the way which the Right Reason prescribes—let this be taken as the most general answer which can be given, and let us start from it: we will examine afterwards the nature of the Right Reason and its relation to the Virtues.

But before proceeding, let us remind the reader again that we agreed that a theory of conduct ought to be an outline, not an exact system; theories being always conditioned by subject matter, and the subject matter of our present inquiry—‘all that relates to Conduct’—being one which presents no absolutely fixed conditions, in this respect resembling the subject matter of medical science—‘all that relates to Health.’ With such a subject matter, our Theory, as a

whole, must be a tentative outline; still more tentative must be any narrower generalizations which we may make within its compass; for the particular cases which such generalisations attempt to explain are cases which fall under no art, and are provided for by no set of traditional rules, but must be dealt with, as the special occasions require, by the agents themselves, just as the exigencies of a particular case of illness must be dealt with by the doctor, or those of a particular storm, by the pilot, as he judges best at the time.

But we must not despair. We must do what we can to help our ‘theory of conduct’ in its evil plight. Let us then venture upon the generalization, that, as in eating and drinking, so in conduct, excess and defect are injurious, and the mean salutary—that e.g. it is by fearing dangers too much and too little, that men become cowardly and rash; by avoiding these extremes, that they become courageous. It is in the same circumstances, then, and with the same opportunities, that one man, by repeatedly acting well, acquires a virtue, and another, by repeatedly acting badly, falls away into the opposite vice. To this we must now add, that the virtue or vice, once fully formed, will manifest itself in the continued performance of the acts, good or bad, in which it originated—herein following a law observable in the case of acquired bodily qualities also: men become strong by taking much food and exercise; and strong men show their strength in taking much food and exercise. So, men become temperate by denying themselves pleasures; and temperate men show their temperance in denying themselves pleasures.

§ 1. ὡςπερ αἱ ἄλλαι] The θεωρητικαὶ φιλοσοφίαι are three—1103 b. 27. μαθηματικὴ, φυσικὴ and θεολογική. See *Met. E.* i. 1026 a. 18.

ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 55), followed by b. 29. Bywater and Sus., reads ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι for Bekker’s ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ σκέψασθαι, on the ground that ἀναγκαῖον does not, except very rarely, occur with ἐστὶ in the Aristotelian writings. Rassow is supported by L^b, CCC, B¹, B².

§ 2. κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον] In the present passage it seems best b. 32. to avoid translating κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον “according to right reason,” as is usually done, (1) because of the article which seems to show that λόγος is used in a general sense here, and not to denote a particular faculty of the mind; (2) in reference to the train of associations which must have been in Aristotle’s mind of “standard,” “proportion,” “law,” &c.—Grant *ad loc.* Organic potentialities—αἱ μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις—may result in structures, or habits, variously fitted to correspond with the environment. Where the correspondence is an exact one, the organisation, or λόγος, is said to be ὀρθός. In ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ human nature realises itself as a system or organism (ὀρθὸς λόγος), capable of withstanding the disintegrating influences of pleasure and pain. The process

1103 b. 32. which results in ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ is the εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων (Eustr. *ad vi.* 13. 1). If a *faculty* of ὀρθὸς λόγος is to be distinguished from the proportion, or orderly arrangement, which is its *object*, it can be distinguished only logically; for the two are really one. The ὀρθὸς λόγος is the personality, or orderly nature, of the virtuous man, of which he is necessarily conscious. 'According to the right ratio' renders κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον adequately in most places.

b. 33. ὕπερον] Book vi, or what may have corresponded to it in the original Nicomachean Treatise.

b. 34. τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς] ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος is not coordinate with the ἀρεταί, any more than the whole body is coordinate with the hand or head. The hand is a hand only because it belongs to a body which has a head and all other necessary parts. The ἀρεταί are ἀρεταί only because they coexist in a definite system or λόγος. Courage without all the other virtues is a mere abstraction, like a hand belonging to no body: οὐ χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί *E. N.* vi. 13. 6.

1104 a. 4. § 3. οὐδὲν ἐστηκὸς ἔχει] Not being ἐξ ἀνάγκης, they vary; but they vary within the limits fixed by the conditions of human existence. τὰ δίκαια are not νόμος, but φύσει: *i. e.* they are suitable to human nature, which is regulated by certain *uniform biological laws*, not to be confounded, however, with the *necessities* of mathematics or metaphysics. After all, however, the expression οὐδὲν ἐστηκὸς ἔχει is too strong, and is apt to mislead. Perhaps 'nothing *absolutely* fixed' would express what we ought to understand.

a. 5. § 4. τοιοῦτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου κ.τ.λ.] The most general statement that can be made in morals (the definition of εἰδειμνία) is, even as a general statement, lacking in definiteness. It is only a περιγραφή (i. 7. 17) or rough sketch, of that which is essentially contingent: something very different from the absolutely definite ὄρισμοί of 'things which cannot be otherwise,' which stand as the ἀρχαί of mathematics. But indefinite as the highest generalisation of morals is, it is more definite than the lower generalisations, which relate to special duties. When we descend from the περιγραφή of Life as a whole, to the details of Life—to the duties of Kallias in his particular circumstances, we are indeed 'immersed

in matter'—we no longer look for ἀκρίβεια—not of course for 1104 a. 5. mathematical ἀκρίβεια—for that did not belong to our περιγραφή—but not even for the ἀκρίβεια of the skilled workman. Rules of conduct for Kallias cannot be turned out like shoes.

§ 5. βοηθεῖν] Still, something may be done in the way of a. 11. supplying a rule applicable to all cases—'Do not run into extremes.'

§ 6.] The parenthesis δὲ γὰρ . . . χρῆσθαι, follows ὁρῶμεν in Coraes' text, and the same order appears in two MSS. noticed by that editor, and in Argyropylos, and the Paraphrast. At any rate the parenthesis contains the reason for adducing the illustration ὡς περ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχυρίας κ.τ.λ. Ethical phenomena are ἀφανῆ and must be illustrated by physical phenomena which are φανερά. Zell, however, *ad loc.*, refers to instances in which the clause containing the reason stands before that containing the statement for which the reason is given.

τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα κ.τ.λ.] Grant remarks that this is perhaps a. 15. taken from Plato *Erastae* 134. Cf. *M. M.* i. 5. The doctrine that medical treatment ought to aim at the mean had been laid down by Hippocrates *Περὶ ἀρχαῖς ἰητρικῆς*, ch. 9 (Littre, i. 588). Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν ἀπλῶς, ὡς περ ὑψηγέεται, ὅσα μὲν ἦν ἰσχυρότερα ἐβλαπτεν, ὅσα δ' ἦν ἀσθενέστερα ἀφέλεε τε καὶ ἔτρεφε τὸν κάμνοντα καὶ τὸν ὑγαιίνοντα, εὐπετές ἂν ἦν τὸ πρῆγμα: πολλὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἀσφαλῆος ἂν ἔδει περιλαμβάνοντα ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀσθενέστατον. νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἀμάρτημα, οὐδὲ ἦσσον λυμίνεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἦν ἐλάσσονα καὶ ἐνδεέστερα τῶν ἰκανῶν προσφέρηται: τὸ γὰρ τοῦ λυμοῦ μέρος δύναται ἰσχυρῶς ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ γυνώσκει (lame or weaken) καὶ ἀσθενέα ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀποκτείνειν. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἐτεροῖα μὲν τῶν ἀπὸ πληρώσεως, οὐχ ἦσσον δὲ ἅμα δεινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ κενώσεως: δι' ὃν πολλὸν ποικιλωτέρα τε καὶ διὰ πλέονος ἀκριβῆς ἐστὶ ('ainsi la médecine a bien plus d'une face, et exige une précision de plus d'un genre.' Littre). δεῖ γὰρ μέτρον τινὸς στοχάσασθαι: μέτρον δέ, οὐδὲ σταθμῶν, οὐδὲ ἀριθμῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον, πρὸς τὸ ἀναφέρων εἶη τὸ ἀκριβές, οὐκ ἂν εὐροῖς ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦ σώματος τῶν αἰσθησῶν διὸ ἔργον οὕτω καταμαθεῖν ἀκριβέως, ὥστε σμικρὰ ἀμαρτάνειν ἔνθα ἢ ἔνθα κὰν ἐγὼ τοῦτον τὸν ἰητρὸν ἰσχυρῶς ἐπαυέοιμι τὸν σμικρὰ ἀμαρτάνοντα: τὸ δ' ἀκριβές ὀλιγάκις ἐστὶ καταδεῖν: ἐπεὶ οἱ πολλοὶ γε τῶν ἰητρῶν ταῦτά μοι δοκοῦσι τοῖσι κακοῖσι κυβερνήτησι πάσχειν: καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνοι ὅταν ἐν γαλήνῃ κυβερνῶντες ἀμαρτάνωσιν, οὐ καταφανέες εἰσὶν: ὅταν δὲ αἰτοῦς κατάσχη χερσῶν τε μέγας καὶ

1104 a. 15. *ἄνεμος ἐξώσσης, φανερώς ἤδη πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισι δι' ἀγνωσίην καὶ ἀμαρτίην δῆλοί εἰσιν ἀπολέσαντες τὴν ναῦν.* There is much in the above passage (especially the remarks about τὸ ἀκριβές, and the illustration from κυβερνητική) to suggest that Aristotle retained a reminiscence of its drift when he wrote §§ 3, 4, 5, and 6.

a. 24. § 7. οἱ ἄγροικοι] In ii. 7. 13 the ἄγροικος is adduced to exemplify another ἄλλειψις—viz. that περὶ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν παιδιᾷ.

a. 30. § 8. οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος] Here Aristotle may almost be said to explain the formation of moral habits by the principle of 'the survival of the fittest'—γίνεται γὰρ [sc. ἡ ἰσχύς] ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφήν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δύναται αὐτὰ ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. This is one of those very important passages in the *Ethics* which remind us that the author was a great biologist.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

According as the performance of certain acts is attended by pleasure or by pain, we may infer that the habit of performing them has or has not been acquired. Thus he who faces danger and feels pleasure, or at least no pain, in so doing, is habitually courageous; while he who feels pain in so doing, is cowardly. Indeed we may go so far as to describe the field of moral virtue as 'Pleasures and Pains'—for

(1) *It is Pleasure that tempts us to do wrong, and Pain that makes us hold aloof from noble deeds. True education is being trained from childhood to like and dislike aright, as Plato says.*

(2) *Pleasure or Pain attends every action and every feeling, and it is with actions and feelings that moral virtue has to do.*

(3) *Moral correction is effected by the remedial influence of Pain.*

(4) *Every thing is naturally related to, and concerned with, that which naturally affects it for good or evil. Now, we are affected for evil, i.e. made worse, by Pleasures and Pains unduly pursued and avoided. And this is so true, that some have been induced to go the length of defining Virtue, as insensibility to the influence of Pleasure or Pain. But this is too unqualified a statement; for it ignores the distinction between due and undue influence.*

(5) *Again, there are three objects of choice, the honourable, the useful, and the pleasant, and three of aversion, the dishonourable, the injurious, and the painful: now, the good man tends to act rightly in relation to all these objects, and the bad man tends to err, but chiefly in relation to Pleasure—for Pleasure enters most largely into the composition of human nature: it belongs not only*

to man's merely sentient nature which he shares with the lower animals, but attends the pursuit and attainment even of the distinctively human objects of choice, the honourable, and the useful.

(6) *Again, the liking for Pleasure has grown up with us all from our childhood. It has sunk like a dye into the fibre of our lives, and is not to be easily rubbed out.*

(7) *And not only do we estimate our feelings according to the Pleasure or Pain attending them: even to our actions we all, more or less consistently, apply the same standard. To bring this personal standard into harmony with what is objectively right—to make the individual 'like and dislike aright,' is the all-important object to which the Moralist must exclusively devote himself.*

(8) *Lastly, it is the glory of Art and Virtue to conquer difficulties. What more difficult conquest than that of Pleasure could be set before Moral Virtue and the Art of Virtuous Living?*

We have now established the following points—that Virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains: that, according as the same opportunities are repeatedly used for the performance of good actions, or repeatedly used for the performance of bad actions, a man acquires a virtue, or falls away into the opposite vice: and that the formed virtue or vice manifests itself in the continued performance of the good or bad actions in which it originated.

§ 1. σημείον δὲ δεῖ ποιῆσθαι τῶν ἔξεων τὴν ἐπιγνωμένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις] If certain acts are attended by pleasure, we may generally take it that the habit of performing them has been contracted; as long as they remain painful, we can infer that the habit has not been contracted.

It is to be noted that the term ἐπιγνωμένην occurring here is employed in *E. N.* x. 4. 8 to express the relation of pleasure to action: τελειῶ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἔξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιγνωμένον τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. Transferring the simile to the present passage, we may say that pleasure is the sign of the perfect habit, as the bloom of beauty is the sign of youthful prime.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σῶφρων] Aristotle here lays it down that the good man does good actions easily and with pleasure. But it may be urged—'The greater the difficulty, the greater the merit. There is no merit in doing good actions mechanically.' Surely this is a narrow view to take of a good action. A good action is not a *tour de force*. We must not allow the sense of pride and victory felt when a difficulty has been overcome, to influence our judgment. The important point is that a good action has been done, not that something has occurred to stimulate *amour propre*. A difficult action is not so likely to be repeated as one which is done easily, and it is of im-

1104 b. 5. portance, in estimating the value of a good action, to know whether it is likely to be repeated, or is merely an isolated ἐπίδειξις.

b. 8. περὶ ἡδονᾶς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ] The rest of this chapter contains eight Considerations in support of the statement that moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains.

b. 9. Consideration (1) is—διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα] A distinction seems to be drawn here between the ways in which we are influenced by pleasure and by pain respectively. Under the influence of pleasure we directly seek what is bad, not recognising it as bad (see the analysis of ἀκρασία in *E. N.* vii, 3), whereas pain makes us desist from doing what we clearly see to be right.

Particular pleasures and pains are the influences which tempt men to perform acts involving excess or defect—i. e. to sacrifice their permanent welfare to something unenduring. The μεσότης, or ὀρθὸς λόγος (right ratio), is that definite organisation of the moral nature, which has grown up in response to νόμος, and withstands the disintegrating influence of particular pleasures and pains. But the life κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον has its own pleasure. All acts which subserve the maintenance of the ὀρθὸς λόγος are pleasant to the good man, and habitually performed; while acts which tend to destroy that λόγος, however 'pleasant' they may once have been, have ceased to be pleasant to the good man, and are no longer performed. We are thus brought to the old distinction between 'good and bad pleasures,' i. e. between pleasures attending acts which conduce to the maintenance of the μεσότης, or ὀρθὸς λόγος (right ratio), and those attending acts which, on account of their kind or degree, hinder the establishment and maintenance of the λόγος. Ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ is the final result of that education, or adaptation, which enables a man to distinguish between 'good and bad pleasures,' and choose the good.

b. 11. § 2.] Zell, Michelet, and Grant quote Plato, *Legg.* 653.

b. 13. § 3.] Consideration (2). The virtues have to do with πάθη and πράξεις, which are all attended by pleasure and pain: cf. *E. N.* x. 4. §§ 6-9, referred to by Michelet. αἱ, omitted by Bek., should be read before ἀρετῆ (see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 55); K^b, CCC, and Cambr. have αἱ.

b. 16. § 4.] Consideration (3). Punishment, one of the great agencies

of moral improvement, consists in the infliction of pain applied as 1104 b. 16. a contrary to vice which is pleasant. The Paraphrast has—καθ' ἄτερ ἐκείναις (i. e. ταῖς ἰατρείαις) ἐναντία αἱ νόσοι ἄς θεραπεύουσι, καὶ ἐὰν ἴδωμεν ἰατρὸν ψυχρὰν προσάγοντα θεραπείαν γνώσκομεν εὐθὺς τὴν νόσον ἀπὸ θερμῆς συστήναι, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κολάσεων ὀδυνηρῶν οὐσῶν γνώσκομεν ὅτι θεραπευόμεθα κακίας ἀπὸ ἡδονῆς γίνονται. Zell, Michelet, and Grant refer to Hippocrates, *Aph.* xxii. § 2, for the doctrine αἱ δ' ἰατρείαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων. There is a passage however in his work περὶ ἀρχαῖης ἰητρικῆς (13. Littré i. 598), in which Hippocrates ridicules the application, at least, which the doctrine receives from ordinary practitioners, who follow what he calls ὁ τρόπος ὁ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. This τρόπος or Method juggles with certain notions temere a rebus abstractae, simply directing the practitioner βοηθεῖν τῷ μὲν θερμῷ ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν, and so on with the other ἐναντία. But let us test this Method in a concrete case: A patient has a complicated illness occasioned by eating unwholesome food. Is his condition θερμὸν, or ψυχρὸν, or ξηρὸν, or ὑγρὸν? Hippocrates asks derisively: And where shall we find the remedy likely to cure him under the contrary category? See also note on *E. N.* i. 13. 7.

§ 5.] Consideration (4). Pleasures and pains make us worse; b. 18. hence some have gone the length of defining virtue as insensibility to their influence. But this is going too far; for virtue is not λόγος in the abstract, but an ἐνλος λόγος—the result of an εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων. It is the order of the πάθη, not ἀπάθεια. So Plato (*Philebus* 60 D, E) says that the Best Life must have both ἡδονή and φρόνησις. The peripatetic view is well expressed by Plutarch in the following passage (*De Virtute morali*, 12)—διὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, τὴν ἄγαν ἀφοιρετεῖον ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀμύνας, τὴν ἄγαν μισοπονηρίαν. οὕτω γὰρ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάληγτος, ἀλλὰ σώφρων, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος, οὐκ ὤμος οὐδὲ πικρὸς ἔσται. τῶν δὲ παθῶν παντάσῃ ἀναιρεθέντων, εἰ καὶ δυνατὸν ἐστίν, ἐν πολλοῖς ἀργότερος ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀμβλύτερος, ὥσπερ κυβερνήτης πνεύματος ἐπιλεπόντος. ταῦτα δ' ἄμελει καὶ οἱ νομοθέται συνιδόντες, ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ ζῆλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ σάλπιγγι καὶ αὐλοῖς ἐπεγείρουσι καὶ αὔξουσιν τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ μάχιμον. Cf. ch. 4 of the same treatise quoted above in note to ii. 1. 1, a. 17.

πρώην] Bywater, following K^b, for the πρότερον of all other authorities. I confess that I do not like πρώην. It does not appear in the *Ind. Arist.* In a course of oral lectures its occurrence

1104 b. 18. would not surprise us, as its ordinary meaning (especially in the phrase *χθές και πρόην*) seems to be 'the day before yesterday.'

b. 21. *φάλοι*] The reading of K^b L^b M^b, Camb., NC, is obviously right (see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 55). Bekker reads *φάλοι*.

b. 23. *ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου*] 'by,' or 'in the definition,' or 'formula.'

b. 24. *ἀπαθείας κ.τ.λ.*] See the notes of Zell and Michelet. The Cynics seem to be specially referred to here: Socrates may also be intended, for he is elsewhere (*E. N.* vi. 13) accused of making the *ἀρεταί*, *φρονήσεις*, or *λόγοι*: and Speusippus held *στοχάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀοχλησίας* (see Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.: Speusippus*): Democritus also is stated to have held a similar view (see Ritter and Preller: *Democritus*).

b. 27. § 6. *ὑπόκειται . . . πρακτικῇ*] The Paraph. has—*ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἢ ἕξις ἢ οὕτως ἔχουσα περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λύπας καθὼς προσδιωρισάμεθα—i. e. ὅτε δεῖ, ὡς δεῖ, κ.τ.λ.*, thus taking *ἡ τοιαύτη* closely with *περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λύπας*. Grant has—'we may begin by assuming then . . . that this kind of excellence (*i. e.* moral) is concerned with pleasures and pains.' So Williams and Peters. I think that the Par. is right.

b. 29. § 7.] Consideration (5). There being three generally recognised objects of *αἵρεσις*—*viz.* τὸ καλόν, τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ ἡδύ, the last is involved in the first two. The *καλόν* is τὸ εὖ ζῆν—the Noble Life, the conception of which serves as a regulative principle. The *συμφέρον* is (in the strict sense of the term) that which is recognised as a means to the attainment of some end, whether that end be the realisation of the Noble Life, or some subordinate end. The *ἡδύ* is something desired irrespectively of its goodness or utility. In seeking the *καλόν* and the *συμφέρον* a man is conscious of a system of things; whereas in following the *ἡδύ*, as such, he has to do with merely isolated particulars. The pursuit of the *καλόν* and of the *συμφέρον* is, however, pleasant, because it is a pursuit; to pursue successfully and to feel pleasure being practically identical.

γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ὅτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν] Here Bywater restores *ὅτι* from K^b, in place of the *ἔτι* of all other authorities. I think that *ἔτι* is right, and that *καὶ ἐκ τούτων . . .*

ἔτι = ἐκ τῶνδε. Φανερόν ὅτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν would = *φανερόν ὅτι ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λύπων*: but throughout this chapter *περὶ* is used with the accusative of the terms denoting the circumstances or environment of *ἡθ. ἀρετή*. I think that here *περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν* can mean only 'about the same things,' *i. e.* about *ἀρετή* and *κακία* mentioned in the two immediately preceding lines. I should like, however, to read *περὶ αὐτῶν* for *περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν*. The recurring *-των* or *-ων* terminations in the immediate context—*αὐτῶν τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν*—would easily lend themselves to clerical error.

τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν] 'The subjects of choice'—*i. e.* the three b. 35. subdivisions mentioned under the head of *αἵρεσις*.

§ 8.] Consideration (6). The love of pleasure is innate, ingrained in our nature, and hard to rub out. '*χαλεπὸν ἀποτρέψασθαι . . . ἐγκεχρωσμένον*' the metaphor,' says Grant (following Gifanius and Zell), 'though not its precise application, seems taken from Plato, *Rep.* iv. p. 429 D, where the effects of right education are compared to a dye with which the mind is imbued, so as to resist the deterrent effects of pleasure and pain.'

Consideration (7). Pleasure and pain are the tests which we apply to actions *also* (*sc.* as well as to feelings). Michelet aptly quotes Diog. Laert. x. § 129, speaking of Epicurus—*ταύτην (ἡδονὴν) γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἵρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην κατανώμεν, ὡς κανὸν τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες*.

§ 10.] Consideration (8). It is very difficult to contend against pleasure and pain; the contest therefore is worthy of the great Art of Life.

'*Ἡράκλειτος*] See the notes of Zell, Coraes, Michelet and Grant: a. 8. cf. also Bywater's *Heracliti Eph. Reliquiae*, cv. p. 41. Heraclitus spoke only of the difficulty of contending with *θνμός*, as is recognised in *Pol.* θ. 9, 1315 a. 30, and in *Eth. Eud.* ii. 7. 1223 b. 23. His words, according to Bywater, were *θνητῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπὸν ὅτι γὰρ ἂν χρηζήναι γίνεσθαι ψυχῆς ὠνέεται*.

ἀρετῇ] *ἠθικῇ* read by M^b, rc. L^b, NC, Paris 1853, B⁹ and some a. 11. other inferior MSS.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

But here a difficulty may be raised—A man becomes just by performing just acts: but surely, if he performs just acts, he is already just: if a man writes correctly, he surely can write. To this we may answer, that the inference is not certain in the case of the man who writes correctly, any more than in the case of the man who performs just acts. A man may write something correctly by chance, or at the suggestion of another person. We do not know that he can write, till we know that he has written something as only a person who can write could—i. e. from his own knowledge of the art of writing. So much for the analogy between an art and a virtue, appealed to by the promoters of the difficulty before us. The analogy, even so far as it holds, is evidently not in favour of their suggestion, but against it. It is, however, where the analogy breaks down entirely, that we see the best opening for a decisive refutation—and it breaks down here: a work of art has its artistic merit in itself: it is enough in the realm of art if a work, with certain good qualities in it, has been produced—we say 'What a beautiful work!' But in the realm of conduct we do not say 'Well done!' as soon as we see an action, with certain good qualities in it, performed. Before we pronounce, we look at the agent also, and ask—'How did he perform it?' (1) Did he know that he was performing it? (2) Did he choose deliberately to perform it, and that, because he thought it right, not because he thought it would lead to some ulterior pleasure or profit? and (3) Did he perform it as the result of a fixed and unchangeable habit in him? Unless these conditions in the agent be fulfilled, we do not speak of the moral value of actions: but works of art have their artistic merit independently of any such conditions in the artist, except of course that of his having knowledge. With the acquirement of the virtues knowledge, such as is required in the artist, has little or nothing to do; but the other conditions mentioned are all-important, realised as they are in consequence of the frequent performance of good actions.

Actions, then, are said to be just or temperate, when they are such as the just or temperate man would perform; but it does not necessarily follow that if a man performs these actions he is just or temperate. More is needed: to be just or temperate he must perform them as just or temperate men perform them.

We have good reason for saying, then, that it is by performing just or temperate acts that a man becomes just or temperate. Nay, how could it be otherwise? Who, if he omits to perform such acts, has the least chance of ever becoming good? And yet the majority of men omit to perform them, and take refuge in talk, and think that they have a philosophy of life which will make them good. They are like patients who listen attentively to their physician, but do not follow his prescriptions. Foolish patients! foolish moralists!

§§ 1-3.] This ἀπορία we may resolve by pointing out (which 1105 a. 17. Aristotle does not do explicitly) that τὰ δίκαια before the formation of the Habit are, so far as the agent is concerned, only ὁμοιούτως δίκαια. They are only apparently *his* just acts; really, *qua* just, they are expressions of the wise intention of the law-giver, or ruler, who enjoins and enforces them. The moral agent himself has to begin by acting under the compulsion of the law, until by repetition a habit is formed, and he performs the acts in question *proprio motu*, the habit bringing with it an insight, more or less clear, into the significance of the acts, and a belief that they are good. Then they are really the agent's own just acts—i. e. they are 'just' in the strict, and not in an equivocal sense. Thus the analogy between ἀρετή and τέχνη, appealed to by the promoters of the ἀπορία (which, it may be observed, is an *ignavia ratio* in morals—or excuse for inactivity—see § 6 of this chapter—similar to that in science refuted in the *Meno* 80 E—οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι ζῆρεῖν ἀνθρώπου οὔτε ὁ οἶδεν οὔτε ὁ μὴ οἶδεν οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ὁ γε οἶδε ζητοῖ οἶδε γὰρ, καὶ οὔδεν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως. οὔτε ὁ μὴ οἶδεν οὔδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὅτι ζητήσει) does not help them. A just act may be just in an equivocal sense, as a word correctly written (γραμματικόν τι) may be 'correctly written' merely in an equivocal sense, and is no sure sign that a man *can* write. The analogy only makes it clearer that the difficulty about 'becoming just by doing just acts' is to be met by pointing out that the acts are not really 'just' at first, but 'must and can' be *made just* by the strenuous practice of the agent himself. It is this 'must and can' which οἱ ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες (§ 6)—the promoters of this ἀπορία—ignore.

But, after all, there is no real analogy (for the purpose of the present discussion) between the ἀρεταί and the τέχναι—ἔτι οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἔστιν ἐπὶ τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν (§ 3, a. 26). The goodness of a work of art is something quite different from that of a moral action. The goodness of the work of art is a quality which we see at once in the work *itself*—Hermes is dug up at Olympia, and we find him beautiful as soon as we see him. But the goodness of a moral action is not a quality in the action itself, which we can appreciate apart from the goodness of the agent. The reason of this is that the real object of the moral judgment is not the isolated action, but *the system of conduct to which it belongs*; and this we can get at only through a knowledge of the *way in which* the agent performed the given action. If we find that an

1105 a. 17. action, belonging *prima facie* to a noble system of conduct, has, as a matter of fact, been performed by the agent deliberately in the interest of that system, and performed also easily and with pleasure, as being an action with which he identifies his own good, then we venture to speak of 'the goodness of the action.' We know that it is a good action which we can count on the agent to repeat. It is only actions which will be repeated that are morally significant. An action, however useful and even well-intentioned, which is not likely to be repeated, because the agent finds it difficult and unpleasant, is not an important factor in that correspondence with the environment which is the ultimate object of the moral judgment. Of course it is true that there are actions which from their very nature are exceptional, because intended to meet exceptional circumstances—actions involving heroic self-sacrifice, which take a position analogous to that of great works of art, and demand unhesitating and immediate applause, although performed by a man of whose disposition we otherwise know nothing; but in the vast majority of cases it is unsafe to estimate an action thus from the outside, judging of its moral value from its splendour or immediate utility; before we come to a decision, we ought to know the state of the agent—whether he is aware that he performs the act, whether he chooses it because it is right, and that, of fixed habit, having often performed it before, and therefore being likely to perform it often again.

a. 28. § 3. ἀρκεί οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι.] I prefer αὐτά given by L^b and NC.

a. 31. πρῶτον μὲν εἰδώς κ.τ.λ.] *i.e.* (1) it must not be done δι' ἄγνοιαν, otherwise it would be involuntary, *i.e.* not his act at all, but a mere accident without moral significance (see *E. N.* iii. 1. 3); (2) it must not be the result of unregulated θυμός or ἐπιθυμία, but of βουλευτική ἡρεξίς, *i.e.* προαίρεσις (see *E. N.* iii. 3. 19), and the βούλησις must be directed to the good end, τὸ καλόν, τὸ εὖ ζῆν, for it is possible to employ apparently good actions as means to an unworthy end. This seems to be the sense of προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά—viz. 'choosing means for the sake of the good end which one appears to choose them for': 'choosing them *as being what they are—good*: *i.e.* good means to a good end': *e.g.* a man must choose to perform a charitable act for the sake of the public good which such acts promote, not for the sake of personal popularity,

In the latter case his 'charitable act' would be such only in appearance. Προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά cannot signify 'choosing them, *i.e.* the particular acts, for their own sakes, as ends-in-themselves,' for προαίρεσις is the choice of means (see *E. N.* iii. 2. 9). Good choice treats particular acts as means to the realisation of εὐδαιμονία, the chief end. (3) Not only must an act, to be morally good, be chosen in the way described above, but the choice of it must be habitual and practically inevitable. The προαίρεσις of means, to be good, must be guided by the βούλησις (*E. N.* iii. 2. 9) of an End, or Life, to which the whole nature of the moral agent has been perfectly adapted.

τὸ μὲν εἶδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν κ.τ.λ.] 'This,' Grant remarks, 'is b. 2. a reaction against the Socratico-Platonic doctrine that virtue consists in knowledge.' Aristotle uses εἶδέναι in two senses in the present context, in one of which he affirms, and in the other seems to deny, its necessity in morals. A man must *know that he is doing* an act, if the act is to have any moral significance at all. This is an indispensable condition (πρῶτον μὲν εἰδώς), as we have seen above. But, this condition fulfilled, a man may act well without a *theory of action* (τὸ μὲν εἶδέναι), if his moral habits are good; whereas correct theory without good habits would avail nothing. The statement, however, τὸ μὲν εἶδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει, even as thus explained, is too strong from Aristotle's own point of view. Without a *theory*, conduct could not long maintain itself as a system. Aristotle concedes this in his doctrine of the πρακτικὸς νοῦς, and in his view that the moral agent ought to become νομοθετικός (*E. N.* x. 9. 14). After all, if allowance be made for difference of philosophical language, Plato and Aristotle hold essentially the same view about the place of knowledge in morality. It may be pointed out in passing that the distinction drawn in § 3 between a work of art which has its good in itself, and an action which must be interpreted in the light of the agent's character, is the distinction of *Met.* θ. 8, between ἐνέργειαι which have an ἔργον παρ' αὐτάς, and those which have not—1050 a. 30 ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἑτερόν τι ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν ἢ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἢ τε οἰκοδομήσις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ κ.τ.λ. . . . ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἢ ἐνέργεια οἷον ἢ ὄρασις ἐν τῷ ὄρῳ, καὶ ἢ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωρούντῳ. The excellence of Homer is embodied in his ἔργον, and remains there for all time;

- 1105 b. 2. but a good action is only a glimpse which we get of a good life. On the one hand, it is the Iliad, and not its author that is important; on the other hand, it is the orderly beautiful life, of which the action is a symptom, that is precious.
- b. 3. τὰ δ' ἄλλα . . . ἄπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν . . . περιγίνεται.] The ἄλλα are τὸ προαιρέσθαι δι' αὐτά and the ἔξις, both of which come from acting, not from philosophising.
- b. 5. § 4.] Good actions are only then morally good, *i.e.* really what they appear to be, when they are done by a good man: and a good man is a man who performs good actions easily and in the interest of a noble system of conduct.
- b. 9. §§ 5, 6.] show that the remark πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς [*sc.* ἔχειω] τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει (§ 3) is directed, not so much against Plato, as against Sophists like Isocrates, who professed (or were accused, by those who did not themselves take fees, of professing) to teach conduct by a course of lectures—*cf.* *E. N.* x. 9. 20.

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

We have assumed the concrete existence of Virtue, and tried to show how it is practically acquired: let us now try to find its formal definition; and first let us ask—What is its Genus?

The qualities which manifest themselves in the Soul are three—Feelings, Capacities, Habits; and Virtue will be one of the three.

(1) *Feelings: e.g. desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, emulation, pity—these, and all other feelings, being accompanied by pleasure or pain.*

(2) *Capacities: being capable of experiencing these feelings—e.g. being capable of feeling anger or pity.*

(3) *Habits: the relations, good or bad, in which we stand to our various feelings, e.g. if we are disposed too much or too little to anger, it is a bad habit; if moderately, a good habit.*

The Virtues and Vices then are not feelings, because we are not said to be good or bad for our mere feelings, or praised or blamed for them, whereas we are praised for our Virtues, and blamed for our Vices. Again, we experience a feeling, e.g. anger or fear, without choosing to experience it, but the virtues involve Choice. Moreover we are said to be 'moved' by our feelings, but 'disposed,' not 'moved,' by our Virtues and Vices.

Nor are the Virtues and Vices capacities, for we are not said to be good or bad, and we are not praised or blamed, because we are capable of experiencing certain feelings. Further, we are endowed by nature with these capacities; but it is not nature which makes us good or bad, as was pointed out before.

If then the Virtues are neither feelings nor capacities, it remains that they are habits.

§ 1. τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή] What is its γένος. It seems to be a 1105 b. 19. reversal of the natural order to enquire first (as Aristotle has done in the previous chapters of this Book)—How Virtue is acquired; and then (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα) to ask—What Virtue is. This is surely the order which Socrates finds fault with Meno for wishing to adopt (*Meno* 86 C, D). Perhaps we may answer for Aristotle that it is only the man who has acquired ἀρετή for himself who can understand its τί ἐστὶ. The present enquiry therefore follows a natural course, when starting from ἀρετή, as something concretely known, it first tries to show how it is practically acquired, and then tries to find its formal definition.

τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.] As Michelet and other b. 20. commentators point out, the phenomena in the Soul are here said to be three, because ἀρετή, or goodness, the quality (ποιότης) *par excellence* (*cf.* *E. N.* i. 9. 8 αὕτη δὲ [*i. e.* ἡ πολιτικὴ] πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινος καὶ ἀγαθοῦς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι; and *Met.* Δ. 14. 1020 b. 23 μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποιὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμφύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν), suggests the accepted threefold division (so far as the ψυχὴ is concerned) of ποιότης into ἔξις, δύναμις, and πάθος. See *Cat.* 8. 8 b. 25 sqq., and Grant's note. Zell quotes Plutarch, *De Virt. Mor.* 4 τρία γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα φασὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν, δύναμιν, πάθος, ἔξις· ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ἀρχὴ καὶ ἕλη τοῦ πάθους, οἷον ὀργιλότης, αἰσχυνηλία, θαρραλεότης· τὸ δὲ πάθος κίνησις τις ἤδη τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον ὀργή, αἰδώς, θάσος, ἡ δ' ἔξις ἰσχύς καὶ κατασκευὴ τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄλογον δυνάμεως ἐξ ἔθους ἐγγεγομμένη, κακία μὲν ἂν φαίλωσ, ἀρετὴ δὲ ἂν καλῶσ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παιδαγωγηθῆ τὸ πάθος.

§§ 2–6.] A πάθος is an isolated feeling or affection, and a δύναμις b. 21. is the capacity for experiencing such a feeling. A capacity of this kind, with the resulting feeling, is *natural*, *i.e.* independent of education, and, in itself, is *neither praised as good, nor blamed as bad*. Moreover, a feeling is a *motion* (κατὰ τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα) which arises out of a capacity *independently of choice* (ἀπροαιρέτως).

1105 b. 21. These characteristics of πάθος and δύναμις exclude the possibility of ἀρετή being a πάθος or δύναμις: for ἀρετή is a disposition (κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς διακείσθαι πῶς λεγόμεθα) not a motion; it implies choice; and it is praised as good; besides, it is acquired by education. But these are the characteristics of ἕξις. Accordingly λείπεται ἕξις αὐτὰς εἶναι.

In other words, the 'Qualities' of the ψυχὴ are either affections (πάθη) or capacities (δυνάμεις and ἕξεις). Virtue is not an isolated affection. It is therefore a capacity. But it is not a natural capacity. Therefore, it is an acquired capacity, i. e. a ἕξις: and a ἕξις for which we are praised.

§ 2. πάθη] It is to be observed that the doctrine of this section is considerably simpler than that of the corresponding passage in *Cat.* 8. In this latter passage παθητικαὶ ποιότητες and πάθη are distinguished (9 a. 28). Παθητικαὶ ποιότητες are permanent qualities, such as a pale complexion, or madness, whether congenital or caused by disease; whereas πάθη are transient qualities (if the term qualities be admissible), such as paleness suddenly produced by fear, or excitement by pain—9 b. 19 ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων συμπτώματων (μελανία, ὠχρότης: and the same remarks are afterwards applied to psychical conditions, such as manikḗ ἔκστασις) ἀπὸ τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ παραμονίμων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε, παθητικὰ ποιότητες λέγονται: ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα . . . ὅσα δ' ἀπὸ βραδῶς διαλυομένων καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνεται, πάθη λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὐ. οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ποιοὶ τινες κατὰ ταύτας: οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυρῆναι ἐρυθρία λέγεται: οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβηθῆναι ὠχρία: ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δ' οὐ. Here the writer says that πάθη are not ποιότητες: but above (9 a. 28) he has said—τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικὰ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη. The difference between a παθητικὴ ποιότης and a δύναμις according to *Cat.* 8 is that, while the former is the permanent manifestation or induration, as it were, of a πάθος, the latter is a natural capacity of doing or resisting something: see *Cat.* 9 a. 18 δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ποιῆσαι τι βραδῶς ἢ μηδὲν πάσχειν. The δύναμις of the *Categories* thus differs from that of the *Ethics*, which is καθ' ἣν παθητικοὶ τούτων (i. e. τῶν παθῶν) λεγόμεθα. Indeed the δύναμις of the *Ethics* stands very close to the παθητικὴ ποιότης of the *Categories*. The manner in which the notion of παθητικὴ ποιότης, or permanent manifestation of a πάθος, naturally passes into

that of δύναμις καθ' ἣν παθητικοὶ (τοῦ πάθους) λεγόμεθα is easily seen in 1105 b. 21. the case of psychical παθητικαὶ ποιότητες, where the manifestations generally admit of degrees; thus the παθητικὴ ποιότης of μανικὴ ἔκστασις, or insanity, is not always violently manifested; and the violent outbursts, when they occur, appear as πάθη, or κινήσεις, arising out of the normal ἔκστασις, which thus comes to be regarded as a capacity, rather than as a manifestation. If we compare the parallel passage in the *Eudem. Ethics* (ii. 2) with *Cat.* 8 we can see how close παθητικὴ ποιότης and δύναμις stand to each other, where τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν at least are concerned. In the *Categories* the ὄργιλος is said to have a παθητικὴ ποιότης (*Cat.* 8. 10 a. 2 ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας [sc. τὰς παθητικὰς ποιότητας] λέγονται, ὄργιλοι κ.τ.λ.); in the *Eth. Eud.*, to have a δύναμις (*Eth. Eud.* ii. 2. 1220 b. 12 λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον κ.τ.λ. . . . καὶ κατὰ μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι ποιότης, ἀλλὰ πάσχει: κατὰ δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις, ποιότης: λέγω δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις καθ' ἃς λέγονται κατὰ πάθη οἱ ἐνεργούντες: οἷον ὄργιλος κ.τ.λ.).

In the foregoing remarks I have purposely omitted, as irrelevant, reference to such παθητικαὶ ποιότητες as *swiftness*, so called because they are qualities which produce πάθη in us—*Cat.* 8. 9 b. 5 τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστην τῶν εἰρημένων ποιότητων πάθος εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικὰ ποιότητες λέγονται.

λυπηθῆναι] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 88) seems to make out a good case for his conjecture φοβηθῆναι. After quoting the § from λέγω δὲ πάθη down to ἐλεῆσαι, he says: 'Affecte nenne ich Begierde, Zorn, Furcht u.s.w., überhaupt alles, womit das Gefühl von Lust und Unlust verbunden ist. Wer so definit, kann unmöglich die λύπη selbst als Affect bezeichnen. Dennoch wird unmittelbar darauf λυπηθῆναι als Beispiel eines solchen angeführt. Ich vermute φοβηθῆναι, denn φοβεῖσθαι wird neben ὀργίζεσθαι wiederholt in diesem Abschnitte als Beispiel gebraucht. Z. 31 κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα, οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὀργιζόμενος. p. 1106 a. 2 ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως. Die grosse Ethik, die diesen Abschnitt fast wörtlich wiedergibt, hat in ihrem Text bereits λυπηθῆναι i. 7. 1186 a. 15: dagegen hat Stobaeus *Ecl. Eth.* p. 85 Meineke φοβεῖσθαι: δυνάμεις καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων εἶναι λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς ὀργιζόμεθα φοβούμεθα ζηλούμεν κ.τ.λ.'

ἕξις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὐ ἢ κακῶς] Cf. *E. E.* ii. 2. 1220 b. 18 ἕξις δὲ εἶσιν, ὅσαι αἰτιαὶ εἰσι τοῦ ταῦτα (i. e. τὰ πάθη) ἢ κατὰ λόγον ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἐναντίως. The ἕξις of virtue is the result of the

1105 b. 25. εἰδοποίησις καὶ μὀρφῳσις τῶν παθημάτων (Eustratius) effected by moral training.

b. 29. § 3. οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοιο] Because, as is explained in *Cat.* 8, the πάθη are not properly ποιότητες: we are not ποιότητες in consequence of them. It is thus evident that it is only on account of their close connexion with παθητικαὶ ποιότητες, of which they seem to be at once the causes and the results, that πάθη are considered under the head of ποιότης at all. In themselves they are κινήσεις (see § 4 of this chapter), or ἐνέργεια—*not* ποιότητες (see *E. N.* x. 3. 1). This is recognised in *E. E.* ii. 1. 1218 b. 35 τῶν δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ μὲν ἕξεις ἢ δυνάμεις εἰσὶ, τὰ δ' ἐνέργεια καὶ κινήσεις.

1106 a. 3. § 4. προαιρέσεις] As Grant points out, there has been no proof of this yet. Aristotle, however, has probably in his mind the doctrine of *Met.* θ. 2 and 5, according to which ὄρεξις or προαίρεσις determines (as τὸ κύριον) which of the two contraries open to a δύναμις μετὰ λόγου shall be manifested. He therefore assumes here as a settled point, that the ἀρεταί, having been acquired in circumstances in which the development of the contrary κακία was possible, are μετὰ προαιρέσεως. It is true that the δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγου of *Met.* θ. 2 and 5 are identified with the properly intellectual potentialities, or abilities, *i.e.* with the τέχνηαι and ἐπιστήμαι: but the doctrine of *Eth. Nic.* iii. 5—that, if the performance of good acts is ἐφ' ἡμῶν, then the performance of bad acts is equally ἐφ' ἡμῶν—enables us, or rather obliges us, to extend the notion of ἡ μετὰ λόγου δύναμις ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων οὐσα so as to include moral potentiality also—*i.e.* the power of acting well or ill in given circumstances, which man, in virtue of his λόγος, possesses. Indeed, the notion may be even farther generalised, so as to include all Life (physical as well as moral), *i.e.* all cases in which an organism may, or may not, succeed in doing what is for its advantage in given circumstances: and this generalisation of the notion would be in strict conformity with the meaning of λόγος=orderly arrangement of parts, or organisation. All organisms, in that they can so behave as to survive or perish, possess δυνάμεις τῶν ἐναντίων: whereas in the inorganic world there is no 'adaptation to an environment, or failure in adaptation': there are only ἄλογοι δυνάμεις, operating in one direction.

a. 6. διακείσθαι πῶς] Except, apparently, for the alliteration, this might have been ἔχει πῶς. The ἀρεταί are διαθέσεις which have

become fixed, *i.e.* ἕξεις—see *Cat.* 8. 9 a. 8 διαφέρει ἕξις διαθέσεως 1106 a. 6. τῶν τὴν μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι τὴν δὲ πολυχρονιωτέραν καὶ δυσκίνητοτέραν. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ διαθέσεις οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕξεις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἔχοντες καὶ διάκεινται γέ πῶς κατ' αὐτάς· οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι οὐ πάντως καὶ ἕξω ἔχουσιν. Examples of a διάθεσις are ψυχρότης, νόσος.

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

So much for the genus of Virtue—it is a Habit. But what is its differentia? What sort of Habit is it?

Let us begin with the statement, that a virtue or excellence gives perfection both to the condition and to the function of that of which it is the virtue or excellence. Thus the excellence of the eye makes the eye itself and its sight good. So man's excellence or virtue will be a habit which makes him good, and causes him to perform his peculiar function well. The differentia then which we are looking for is contained in the words—'which makes him good and causes him to perform his peculiar function well.' We have already said, in passing, that Goodness is preserved by the Mean, and that 'performing well' consists in avoiding extremes and choosing the Mean. Accordingly, if we now explain fully what 'choosing the Mean' is, we shall explain the true differentia of Virtue.

*Wherever a measurable whole can be divided into two parts, we can subtract a part which is 'greater than,' or a part which is 'less than,' or a part which is 'equal to,' the part which we leave. Here 'equal to' is the arithmetical mean between any two unequal parts into which the whole may be divided; it is the absolute mean, or 'half of the thing,' which is the same for all men. From this absolute mean, however, we must distinguish the relative mean, or 'mean for me,' which is not the half of the thing and the same for all men, but that amount which is neither too much nor too little for me—that amount which exactly suits me in my particular circumstances: e.g. let two pounds of meat a day be too little, and ten too much for me during my training: it does not follow that the arithmetical mean between two and ten—the half of their sum, *i.e.* six pounds, will suit me. Whatever quantity between the extremes two and ten suits me is the mean for me, and will be prescribed by my trainer. And the rule which the trainer here observes is that which all artists follow. They all look to this, not to the arithmetical mean: *i.e.* they all aim at what is simply enough in the circumstances, avoiding excess and defect. Thus we say of a master-piece of art—'you could not take from it, or add to it, without spoiling it.' And if Art achieves her triumphs by observing this golden rule, much more carefully will Virtue observe it, inasmuch as her*

triumphs are greater: for the Virtuous Character is like one of the organisms which Nature brings forth—it is more fitly contrived and more beautiful than any work of art. When we say that Virtue observes the mean, we refer only to Moral Virtue, for it is acquired in a region—that of feelings and actions—where excess and defect are possible. Thus, take the feeling of anger: if we are too angry, or not angry enough, we err and are blamed; but if we are angry at the proper time, and at the proper things, and with the proper persons, and with the proper effect, and in the proper way, we hit off 'the happy mean,' and do what we are praised for, and what is right. But where 'we are praised,' and 'do what is right,' Virtue is concerned. It is Virtue therefore which makes us 'hit off the mean': indeed we may perhaps even say that 'Virtue is itself a kind of mean.' Again, there are many wrong ways (evil is something indefinite as the Pythagoreans opined, good something definite), but only one right way. Hence it is easy to miss the mark, difficult to hit it—another reason why we assign the mean—for it is difficult—to Virtue, and the extremes to Vice—for they are easy.

Moral Virtue may then be defined, as 'A Habit involving Choice, lying in a Relative Mean fixed by Reason, that is, as the Prudent Man would fix it.'

But it is only as formally defined, that Virtue 'is a mean,' or 'lies in a mean,' between two vices, choosing the middle course between their extremes. This 'middle course,' we must remember, is likewise the Best Course: and as choosing what is Best virtue is 'supreme excellence.'

It is not to every action, however, and every feeling that the formula of the mean applies. Some feelings, e. g. envy, some actions, e. g. theft, are seen, as soon as named, to imply evil. It is never possible to have such feelings, or perform such actions, 'in the right way.' To suppose it possible would indeed be as absurd as to suppose that acting unjustly or acting intemperately could have its excess, defect and mean, or that the exact mean point of justice or temperance could be resolved into excess and defect. In short there is no mean in excess and defect, and no excess and defect in the mean.

1106 a. 15. § 1. ποία τις] Having in the last chapter shown *ὅ τι ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἢ ἀρετῇ*, viz. that it is a *ἕξις*, Aristotle now proceeds to declare its differentia—*ποία τις*.

§§ 2, 3.] Taken, as Grant points out, from Plato, *Rep.* 353 B.

a. 25. § 4. ποία τίς ἐστὶν ἢ φύσις αὐτῆς] Its differentia is that it is *ἐν μεσότητι*.

a. 26. συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ] Continuous and discrete quantity—i. e. magnitude (*μέγεθος*) and number (*πλήθος*), according to Grant, who quotes *Cat.* 6. 4 b. 20 *τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ διωρισμένον τὸ δὲ συνεχές . . . ἐστὶ δὲ διωρισμένον, οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος, συνεχές δὲ οἷον γραμμῇ ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τόπος*. It will be observed, however, that in this passage from the *Categories* the

term used is *διωρισμένον* not *διαιρετόν*. Is *διαιρετόν* in the *Ethics* 1106 a. 26. equivalent to *διωρισμένον* in the *Categories*? Against an affirmative answer we have *De Coelo* i. 1. 268 a. 6 *συνεχές μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ διαιρετόν εἰς αἰεὶ διαιρετά*: and *Met.* Δ. 13. 1020 a. 10 *λέγεται δὲ πλήθος μὲν τὸ διαιρετόν δυνάμει εἰς μὴ συνεχῆ, μέγεθος δὲ τὸ εἰς συνεχῆ*, from which passages it would appear that both *μέγεθος* and *πλήθος*, i. e. both the *συνεχές* and the *μὴ συνεχές* are *διαιρετά*. If *διαιρετόν* then is to be distinguished from *τὸ διωρισμένον*, which undoubtedly stands for *πλήθος*, we must translate *συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ* by 'continuous and at the same time capable of division'—the rendering rejected by Grant, but supported by the Paraphrast, who has—*ἐν παντὶ συνεχεῖ, οἷον γραμμῇ ἐπιφάνεια, σῶματι, ἢ λόγῳ ἢ χρόνῳ, καὶ ὅλως ἐν παντὶ δυναμένῳ διαιρεθῆναι*¹. The writer of the parallel passage in *E. E.* ii. 3 certainly understood the reference to be to the *συνεχές* alone, and not to the *συνεχές* and *διωρισμένον*. His words are, 1220 b. 21 *ἐν ἅπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἐστὶν ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μέσον* καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οἷον ἐν γυμναστικῇ ἐν ἰατρικῇ ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ, ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, καὶ ἐν ὁποιοῦν πράξει καὶ ἐπιστημονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστημονικῇ, καὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ ἀτέχνῳ ἢ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχές ἢ δὲ πράξις κίνησις. The Ald. Sch. follows the lead of Eudemus. He says—*πρόδηλον ὅτι πάση πράξει παρακολουθεῖ χρόνος, οὐκ ἔλασσον δὲ περὶ πράξεως ἢ πάθη ἢ ἀρετῆ καθ' ὃ οὖν ἐν χρόνῳ, ὃ δὲ χρόνος ἐν συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὴ τὴν διαίρεσιν λήψεται*.

§§ 4-8.] It is unfortunate that Aristotle, in introducing the subject of the ethical mean, gave such prominence to the *συνεχές* καὶ *διαιρετόν* i. e., to Quantity simply as Quantity. He thereby invited scholastic explanations like that by which Eudemus attempts to show *how* moral action falls under the head of the *συνεχές*—*E. E.* ii. 3. 1220 b. 26 *ἢ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχές ἢ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις*: and laid his Theory open to the (really false) charge of recognising only a quantitative difference between Virtue and Vice. As a matter of fact, however, he is careful to distinguish between the *μέσον τοῦ πράγματος* and the *μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς*. The *μέσον τοῦ πράγματος*, as such, has no place in morals, being confined to departments in which the 'middle,' or 'half,' of something can be exactly measured, or counted. The *μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, with which

¹ It is fair to add, however, that the Paraphrast passes, a few lines below, from the 'continuous' to the 'discrete'—but uses the term *διωρισμένον*, not *διαιρετόν*. Aspasius is defective here.

1106 a. 26. alone we have to do in morals, is that δ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει, *i.e.*, that which enables a particular person to correspond successfully with his social environment. Here account must be taken of complicated organic conditions, of complicated external circumstances, and of intricate actions and reactions between these organic and external factors: and the division of a *συνεχές* throws little light upon the problem. This Aristotle sees clearly. It seems probable that, having arrived at a satisfactory result in the preceding chapter by looking at *ἀρετή* in connexion with the Category of *ποιόν*, he next turned to that of *ποσόν* for help, and so stumbled upon *τὸ συνεχές*, of which his commentators have unfortunately made so much.

When we have found *τὸ μέσον τὸ τοῦ πράγματος*, we have found a quantity simply. But in *τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς* we have a quantity, as it is related to a quality. From *σχῆμα*, the fourth kind of *ποιότης* (see *Cat.* 8. 10 a. 11), we may obtain an illustration of the way in which quantity is related to quality. Let us suppose that a disc is 'of no use' with a diameter of 10 inches, and that it must be enlarged till it becomes a disc 'of a useful size.' In adding matter (*e.g.* copper) to it, it is true that we must not add 'too much or too little'; but, more than this, 'the due amount' which we add must have *the quality of shape suitable to a disc*; the same 'amount' with another quality of shape would not help us. This *due amount thus circularly qualified* might be called *τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς τὸν κύκλον*. It is clear then that *τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, although it has its quantitative aspect, is essentially that which is qualitatively suitable to the moral character in the circumstances in which it is placed¹.

The analogy between the moral character and the definite well-balanced forms of organic nature, and of art, was always present to Aristotle's mind; indeed we have to look no farther than the 9th section of this chapter to find it mentioned. Living organisms, and works of art, are *σχήματα*, definite after their kinds, which Nature and Man respectively form by qualifying matter. The

¹ Cf. Trendelenburg *Logische Untersuch.* i. 358 sqq.; he remarks that Aristotle's virtuous *μεσότης* is not a mere *quantum*, but keeps in view the qualitative peculiarity of virtue: and that when Plato extols measure in the moral, natural, and artistic worlds, he understands not measure *per se*, but measure in relation to a qualitative *end*. It is in the end which it subserves that measure has its ethical value.

quantity of matter used in any case is determined by the form 1106 a. 26. subserved; the size of a particular organ, or part, is determined by its form, which again is determined by the form (limiting the size) of the whole organism, or work. Thus animals and plants grow to sizes determined by their particular structures, habitats, and conditions of life¹, and each separate organ observes the proportion of the whole to which it belongs. The painter or sculptor considers the symmetry of the whole composition in every detail of his work. The conductor of a choir is forced to exclude a voice which surpasses all the others conspicuously in beauty—*Pol.* iii. 8. 1284 b. 8 *ὅτε γὰρ γραφεὺς εἰσειεν ἂν τὸν υπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ζῶον, οὐδ' εἰ διαφέρει τὸ κάλλος' ὅτε ναυπηγὸς πρῦμαν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι μορίων τῶν τῆς νεὸς' οὐδὲ δὴ χοροδιδάσκαλος τὸν μείζονα καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χόρου φθεγγόμενον εἰσει συγχορεύειν.* In all cases Form dominates matter, quality quantity. Similarly, the moral character is a definite Form which maintains itself as such, the *μέσον*, so-called, which it observes in various circumstances being that course of action which is best fitted in the circumstances to secure its continued maintenance. The less we think of the 'middle,' or 'half' of *τὸ συνεχές καὶ διαιρετόν*, in such a connexion, the better. When an insect escapes capture by resembling the colour of the leaves or bark on which it lives, its development of that particular shade of colour and no other, has as much right to be described as an observance of the *μέσον*, as the temperance which protects the citizen from extremes disastrous to himself and others.

§ 7. τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν] otherwise ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης— a. 35. defined by Nicomachus Gerasenus (ἀριθ. εἰσαγωγή i. 23, p. 124, ed. Hoche): *ἔστιν οὖν ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης, ὅταν τριῶν ἢ πλείονων ὄρων ἐφεξῆς ἀλλήλοις κειμένων ἢ ἐπινοουμένων ἢ αὐτῇ κατὰ ποσότητα διαφορὰ εὑρίσκειται μεταξὺ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχουσα, μὴ μέντοι λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ὄροις πρὸς ἀλλήλους γίνηται, οἷον α, β, γ, δ, ε. ἐν γὰρ τῇ φυσικῇ ταύτῃ ἐκθέσει τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ συνεχῶς καὶ ἀνπερβάτως ἐξεταζομένη εὑρίσκειται πᾶς ὁστισοῦν ὄρος δυεῖν ἀνὰ μέσον τεταγμένος τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς διασώζων μεσότητα. ἴσαι γὰρ αἱ διαφοραὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσι πρὸς τοὺς ἐκατέρωθεν τεταγμένους, οὐ μὴν ἔτι καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς σώζεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.* Cf. also Archytas apud Mullach *Fragm. Phil.* ii. 119.

The ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης answers to *the average* as found by

¹ Cf. Spencer's *Biology*, part ii. ch. 1 on Growth.

1106 a. 35. statistics. Statistics give us the average amount of beer, e.g., consumed per head in a city: but it is only by accident that this amount happens to be that good for a particular person.

b. 7. § 8. μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς] Morality and art have nothing to do with the μέσον τοῦ πράγματος *as such*. When we say that they seek the μέσον, we mean by that term τὸ μέτριον (as used by Plato in the *Politicus*)—the qualitatively suitable quantity, which may of course, in some cases, happen to be τὸ μέσον τὸ τοῦ πράγματος. Thus corrective justice seeks to effect τὸ ἴσον (or μέσον) τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν (see v. 4. 3)—but only because that ἴσον or μέσον is qualitatively suitable: *the end of justice is best served*, if the parties are treated as equals who have been made unequal by the βλάβος, and the arithmetical mean is struck between them.

b. 8. § 9.] τέχνη, ἀρετή, and φύσις are principles which produce definite forms. The forms which τέχνη produces in matter do not, however, penetrate the matter, as do those produced by ἀρετή and φύσις. The sculptor shapes only the outside of the marble. But a living being is organised throughout its matter, as deep down as the microscope can reach¹. Similarly, a virtuous character is no mere external accomplishment, but the personality of the man. For this reason ἀρετή is said to be πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων. It is a beautiful organism in which nothing is μάτην, as distinguished from a product of workmanship, necessarily rough and imperfect.

What Aristotle somewhat unfortunately calls the μέσον in nature, art, and morals, Plato called more happily the μέτριον. In three passages in the *Politicus* he anticipates all that is valuable in Aristotle's doctrine, and even stumbles in one place upon the use of the term μέσον, only however to drop it. In the first passage (*Politicus* 283 E-284 A) he says that good and bad men are chiefly distinguished by their different relations to the φύσις τοῦ μετρίου, and that all the arts produce their good and beautiful results by observing τὸ μέτριον. In the second passage (*Politicus* 284 D) he distinguishes between the sciences which have to do with number and magnitude as such, and those which regard τὸ μέτριον, τὸ πρέπον, τὸν κυρόν, τὸ δέον, thus dividing ἡ μετρητικὴ into

¹ As Leibnitz says—'Machinae naturae h.e. corpora viventia sunt adhuc machinae in minimis partibus usque in infinitum. Atque in eo consistit discrimen inter naturam et artem, hoc est inter artem divinam et nostram.'

two parts. Aristotle's distinction between the μέσον τοῦ πράγματος 1106 b. 8. and the μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς involves the same division. It is in this passage that Plato happens to use the term μέσον. In the third passage (*Politicus* 310) Plato makes a practical suggestion with regard to the realisation of τὸ μέτριον in the character of the community, which shows us how deeply he has penetrated into the meaning of this great principle of Life. The μέτριον, he suggests, may be realised by the intermarriage of opposite natures. Naturally, from ἴσαστον, like seek like; ἀνδρείοι do not mix with σώφρονες. The result is that after many generations the former become savage, and the latter unable to hold their own. It is for wise legislation to weave together opposite tendencies, and produce a race which may be compared to a web, λείον καί, τὸ λεγόμενον, εὐήτριον (with a fine warp). Again, μετριότης or ξυμμετρία is the principle of good, beauty, and survival in an interesting passage in the *Philebus* 64 D, E.

§ 10. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν] ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἰς ἐν μεσότητι, because it is b. 10. a form concretely realised in the ὄλη of the pleasures and pains which attend actions and feelings. It is an ἔνυλος λόγος effected in this ὄλη with difficulty. It is said to be ἐν μεσότητι in relation to the tendencies to disorder which it withstands. But διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ is the Principle of Form or λόγος viewed *per se* as incompatible with the irregularity of excess or defect. Thus φρόνησις is the Principle of Form in relation to the ὄλη of τὰ πρακτά. This Principle *itself* is not said to be ἐν μεσότητι, but the concrete form, or moral order, which it produces in our passions (*i.e.* the ἔνυλος λόγος of ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ) is, because that concrete form may fail (by reason of ὑπερβολή and ἄλλειψις) to be produced. Where, however, failure is impossible—in the region of the αἰῶλοι λόγοι, or *rationes*, of science and speculation, truths in the pursuit of which there is no πλάνη and no temptation from the side of pleasure or pain¹—it would be unmeaning to use the expression ἐν μεσότητι, which connotes success in circumstances in which failure is possible.

Thus the faculties by which we apprehend such truths—the purely intellectual ἔξεις—σοφία and ἐπιστήμη—are not described as ἐν μεσότητι οὐσαι—for two reasons: first because they are phases of

¹ *E. N.* vi. 5. 6 οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ἐπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρὸν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πραιτόν.

1106 b. 16. the Principle of Form, which *in itself* is incompatible with *ὑπερβολή* and *ἔλλειψις*: secondly because they are concerned with *objects* which offer no obstacles to the reception of the form of reason. Hence the broad distinction which must be kept in view for the right understanding of the present section:—That in its *practical* exercise—in dealing with matter, or, as we should say, with ‘an environment,’ *λόγος*, or the Organising Principle (though *in itself* incompatible with *ὑπερβολή* and *ἔλλειψις*), is surrounded by difficulties and dangers, which it surmounts and avoids by ‘doing the best in the circumstances’—by ‘adaptation’—*τῷ τοῦ μέσου στοχάζεσθαι*: whereas in its *scientific* exercise (as Aristotle understood its scientific exercise), the Principle of Reason has not to impress its form upon an alien and rebellious matter, but finds itself face to face with itself in its object, and, being dominated by nothing beyond itself, cannot fall into error: cf. *Met.* A. 10. 1075 a. 3 *οὐχ ἑτέρου οὐν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία.*

Admitting fully the importance in *Metaphysics* and *Ethics* of this doctrine of the infallibility and autonomy of Reason, I think that it causes Aristotle to overlook the fact that there are properly scientific operations which closely resemble moral actions in the dangers and difficulties by which they are surrounded. The scientific operation of *ἐπαγωγή*, for example, consists in the slow and difficult formation of a conception out of the manifold of confused sensations. At every step of this process the intellect is liable to be deceived by present appearances, while memory often plays it false: above all, the feelings affect its point of view—*Intellectus humanus luminis sicci non est*. To form a true conception, or *καθόλου*, out of many *αἰσθητά* is as closely connected with adaptation to the environment, as the formation of a good habit of acting is, and attended by difficulties perhaps as great, though not of the same kind. The *καθόλου* therefore which embraces just the most important points in the *αἰσθητά*, omitting those which are not important, might with truth be described as apprehended or ‘held’ by a *ἕξις* lying *ἐν μεσότητι*. But Aristotle, although he gives a very good account of *ἐπαγωγή*, and the formation of universals, prefers, in contrasting moral virtue and science, to look at the latter as engaged with the abstract truths of mathematics and metaphysics, which the Greek mind pursued with so much success. If the difficulties of concrete

scientific investigation had been more fully appreciated by him, he would not have drawn the line so sharply as he seems to do in this section, between *ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ* and *διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ*. It is to be noticed however that *τέχνη*, which he has correctly described as *τοῦ μέσου στοχαστικὴ*, is the *ἀρετὴ* of the *ποιητικὴ διάνοια*: see *E. N.* vi. ch. 2 and ch. 4. Indeed it is implied in the definition of *ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ* (§ 15) that *φρόνησις* also is *στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου*. The same is, as I have tried to show, true of other intellectual *ἕξεις*, in so far as they also are modes of our adaptation to a difficult environment. There is therefore little value in the limitation apparently implied in the words *λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν*, except in so far as attention is called to the much greater influence of pleasure and pain in the moral than in the scientific sphere of human activity. All thinking, even the most abstract, is ‘a mode of adaptation’—*i. e.* is ‘practical.’ Aristotle admits this in the opening words of the *Metaphysics*—*πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει*. A belief is honest which we are prepared to *act* upon; and a belief which leads to hurtful action is not *true*. The avenues of knowledge, the special senses, do not give the whole truth about the universe, but only so much as enables us to live. Their truth is relative to conduct. The practical curiosity of the eye of sense, which sustains the intelligence of the lower animals, becomes in man the theoretical curiosity of the ‘mind’s eye’—*Met.* A. 2. 982 b. 12 *διὰ τὸ θαυμάζω οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν.*

§ 11. *μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον*] The *via media* which *ἀρετὴ* takes is b. 22. also the *best* way—*i. e.* the only right way in the circumstances. Cf. below, § 17.

§ 12. *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις*] as well as *περὶ τὰ πάθη, e. g.* b. 23. *φραβηθῆναι*, mentioned in § 10.

ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις [ψέγεται.]] Rassow b. 23. (*Forsch.* 33) suggests *ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται καὶ ἀμαρτάνεται*—on the ground that both predicates (*ἀμαρτάνεται* and *ψέγεται*) belong to each of the extremes. Bywater brackets *ψέγεται*.

§ 13. *στοχαστικὴ γε*] Ramsauer has—‘*Particulâ γε adjectâ excusatur quasi audacia loquendi qua nova vox μεσότης ἡ ἀρετὴ modo proposita est; neque enim prorsus certum virtutem ideo quod sit τοῦ μέσου vel στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου, necessario ipsam esse μεσότητα.*’

1106 b. 36. The virtuous habits produced by the external agency of νόμος, and maintained and perfected by the φρόνησις at last awakened in the subject himself, are severally termed μεσότητες. In this Book, and the two following Books, each of these μεσότητες is treated separately in connexion with its own special extremes, and little care is taken to remove the very natural impression that its relation is *only* to these specified extremes—that, for instance, the nature of ἐλευθεριότης is exhausted when we have defined it as the mean between ἀσωτία and ἀνελευθερία. Moral virtue thus seems to be presented as a σμῆνος ἀρετῶν. But closer attention shows that this is not the impression which Aristotle intends to convey—that the separate treatment of the virtues, in relation to special extremes, is intended only to bring out into clear light, one after another, a number of important *aspects of the same moral agent*, as he is placed in different circumstances: that we have to do, not with so many *individuals*—the ἀνδρείος, σώφρων, &c.—but with *points of view* obtained by analysis, the intention of the analysis being to enable us at last to clothe the concrete agent more fully with his attributes. Against the separate or analytical treatment of the various μεσότητες in succession, we must set the statement οὐ χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί (vi. 13. 6). The various virtues, although for greater clearness they may be treated separately, are not separately existent, but each exists only as all the others exist, and form an ὀρθὸς λόγος, or system, which is different (within limits) for each man. Each man has, as it were, his own moral centre of gravity, and all the virtues, related to one another in a particular way, are necessary to his stability; but his moral stability may be assailed in different ways, in different circumstances. On the field of battle the emotions of fear and over-confidence are its special assailants, and its maintenance against them is courage. Other circumstances have other special temptations, and the maintenance of stability receives other names. But the centre of gravity remains the same in all, being that particular λόγος, or organisation, of his whole nature which is best for the particular man. The one vice of cowardice, or of rashness, would amount to the demoralisation of the whole nature. We cannot conceive of the magnificence of the rash man, or of the temperance of the coward.

These considerations show how mistaken the objection is to Aristotle's theory of the virtuous mean, that it makes merely a quantitative difference between Virtue and Vice. This objection

can be felt only by one who thinks of courage, for instance, merely 1106 b. 36. in connexion with its specified extremes—cowardice and rashness. But courage is only a particular manifestation of ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή: and cowardice, or rashness, is only a particular symptom of *total* demoralisation. Cowardice, or rashness, therefore differs from courage as the confusion differs from the order of the whole nature. If this is not a *qualitative* difference, it will be difficult to point to any that is.

The various Virtues described in this Book and in the two following Books may be taken, then, to be illustrations, more or less striking, of the function of φρόνησις, or the consciousness of the 'right ratio,' in preserving that ratio against the various assaults to which it is exposed through the sensibility. As ἀνδρεία is the preservation of the right ratio in the presence of danger to life in battle, so σωφροσύνη is its preservation amid the temptations of bodily pleasure; μεγαλοπρέπεια its preservation in the midst of great wealth and state; ἐλευθεριότης, in the midst of the daily calls upon one's purse; πραότης, amid the irritations of social intercourse; εὐτραπέλεια, amid its gaieties. In these and all other circumstances of temptation there is no occult quality, no separate faculty, which deals with each kind of temptation—the man indivisible deals with each, preserving in the particular circumstances of each temptation a moral balance, which has been preserved so long, under such various assaults, that its preservation in any circumstances whatsoever is no longer doubtful.

But is not this all too vague? How shall a man know that he is really preserving his 'moral balance,' or character? The *E. N.* refer us to the φρόνημος or σπουδαῖος, and the *E. E.* end by referring us to the σκοπὸς τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας, explained (*E. E. H.* 15. 1249 b. 20) as τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν—all that hinders this is evil; all that promotes it, good. This may be taken to mean that we must regulate our lives in accordance with νοῦς—τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον, that we must not allow 'the sensibility' to dominate our conduct. But 'regulate our lives in accordance with Reason' is a formula which conveys no information as to the real requirements of Reason; for, although it is plain that we are to restrain the sensibility, how far we are to do so we are left without means of judging. How is a man to know when a particular πάθος, admitted, disturbs the poise of his whole moral nature, and when not? If he be καλὸς κἀγαθός, Eudemus seems to answer, he will know. Still, it would be

1106 b. 36. desirable that those who have not yet attained to the height of *καλοκάγαθία* should know, at least approximately, the proportions of the moral *κράσις*, which, when fully achieved, is doubtless very hard to disturb. But Eudemus gives us no further information on this point. Aristotle tells us to observe the proportions of the *φρόνιμος* or *σπουδαῖος*: but still we are not told what these proportions are. We are told that his nature is 'intelligible,' not a mere bundle of sensations: that it is *ᾠρισμένη λόγῳ*—but we are not told more. Evidently, then, Aristotle will have us look *for ourselves* at the *σπουδαῖος* in the concrete, and watch how he actually tempers his nature. This is undoubtedly to refer us to a standard of great practical value, albeit to one which, being merely empirical, is apt to be misinterpreted. It must be admitted, however, that even those moral systems, which profess to give an ultimate standard, are obliged to acknowledge that the *σπουδαῖος*, or man who acts up to the requirements of the ultimate standard, is indispensable as a *representative standard*, which the bulk of mankind can easily see, and will, from a natural tendency to imitate social types, probably conform to. So far, then, Aristotle's *σπουδαῖος*—the good man whom we admire and wish to imitate—is an excellent moral agency, not only representing the standard of right actions, but supplying a strong motive to perform them. On the other hand, the Eudemian *σκοπὸς τῆς καλοκάγαθίας—τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν* is a mere formula—'Live according to Reason'—not a concrete example of the rational life successfully achieved, which may serve at least as an empirical rule of conduct likely to be followed.

But how shall we know the *σπουδαῖος*, or *φρόνιμος*, when we see him? Aristotle's answer to this really vital question is nowhere given in so many words, but is not difficult to gather from the general drift of his *Ethics* and *Politics*. We recognise the *φρόνιμος* when we see him, because we have ourselves received an education similar in kind to that which he has received and perfected. This education is that of correspondence with the *νόμος*—the law, custom, fashions, and social conditions generally—of the State into which we have been born, and in which we live. The *φρόνιμος* corresponds with these conditions in an eminent manner. In all his actions he shows himself at home in his own city, and worthy of it. The maintenance, then, of a beautiful everyday life, according to Hellenic traditions—a life in whose varied activities one takes a personal, but not a self-aggrandising part—is Aristotle's

standard of Virtue. It has the advantage of being a standard 1106 b. 36. which it is not very difficult to keep in view. It is easier to see whether a particular action is in harmony with the tone of the society in which one has been brought up, than to see whether it promotes the 'greatest good of the greatest number.' But it will be said—'The tone of the society in which one has been brought up may be bad: this is not an *ultimate* standard which Aristotle gives us.'

Perhaps not: but we must answer on behalf of Aristotle, that he knew nothing better than the limited society of the Hellenic city. The culture of the few, according to the Hellenic pattern, was his standard. He was a stranger to political and economic considerations, which, in modern times, have made 'society' co-extensive with 'the greatest number'; he was a stranger also to that philanthropy which gives up 'culture' with its *πάσαι ἀρεταί*, and leads what he must have considered a *μονόκωλος βίος* in order to help the miserable.

The *ὀρθὸς λόγος*, then, which the virtuous man preserves in all circumstances is 'correspondence with his social environment.' It is a 'correspondence' which 'extends in space and time'—*i.e.* it is an adaptation to the environment *as one whole*. The man whose habits have been determined by the conditions of peace, but not by those of war, or *vice versa*, is a man who does not correspond with his environment as one whole, and his correspondence even with one set of conditions is more apparent than real, because peace and war cannot be sharply separated; in war he must look forward to peace; and when he has obtained the blessings of peace, he must be ready to defend them. Thus the warlike and the peaceful virtues of the good man do not refer simply to war and peace respectively. The rule which his *φρόνησις* or social and moral tact lays down for him is—'So act in any particular case, that you heighten your power of acting well in any other case.' This rule implies a highly developed adaptation. Every stimulus is received as being what it is, because the whole environment is what it is. The moral nature of such a man is like a highly organised animal, which acts in response to a particular stimulus in a manner which promotes the good of the whole organism as exposed in the present and future to a whole system of stimuli.

Φρόνησις, or the 'Practical Reason,' does not appear fully in a

1108 b. 38. man till 'good habits' have been formed—till the manifold of his sensible nature has been reduced to the *ὀρθὸς λόγος*. Reason grows with its object. It is evolved as the moral agent takes increased pleasure in good actions—called 'good' at first only by anticipation, in relation to a future *ὀρθὸς λόγος* in him, or still latent Reason. Reason is thus the Habit of Habits. It may be that this supreme Habit of the moral life reveals its existence, in the experience of some men, suddenly, like the light-bringing idea which flashes all at once in the mind of a man of science, after years of patient study. This is the moral experience which Kant prefers to dwell on, maintaining that the recognition of Duty 'is not to be effected by gradual reform, as long as the Principle of a man's actions remains impure, but requires a revolution in the mind, and he can only become a new man by a kind of new birth, as it were, by a new creation and a change of heart.' And again—'Virtue is described by some as a long practice (in observing the law) by which a man has passed from the propensity to vice, by gradual reform of his conduct and strengthening of his maxims, into an opposite propensity. This does not require a change of heart, but only a change of morals.' We must not suppose, however, that passages like the foregoing are intended to condemn habituation, which no moralist could refuse to regard as the great practical agency in the formation of Virtue. The difference between Kant and Aristotle is not really one of principle, but of detail. Kant confines himself almost entirely to the description of the pure Form of Virtue, and leaves nearly untouched the practical question of its actual superinduction upon sensible beings; while Aristotle applies himself largely to this latter question. But Aristotle's Habituation (which Kant doubtless refers to in the passages quoted above) is misrepresented, when it is implied that it is a process which can go on while all the time the 'Principle of action remains impure.' 'The long practice in observing the Law' is possible, Aristotle would tell us, only because there is, in the subject of it, a principle of rational personality (*τὸ προαιρούμενον*) which, aided doubtless by 'the Law,' can and does set aside mere *ἐπιθυμία*. Virtue is a *ἕξις προαιρετική*. *Προαίρεσις* is an 'autonomous' principle. It is absurdly wrong to class Aristotle among those 'who recognise only 'heteronomy'—'Will ruled by appetites'—in morals. *Προαίρεσις* is *βουλευτική ἄρεξις* (iii. 3. 19)—a Principle which reaches forth to take, or refrains from taking, after deliberation,

as distinguished from *ἐπιθυμία* which rushes blindly at its object. 1108 b. 38. The *σπουδαία προαίρεσις* which, as organising principle, builds up the virtuous character; reaches forth or refrains in the interest of the whole moral organism or Personality, and sets aside the solicitations of the separate parts as such. Aristotle's insistence on the unity of the virtues in *φρόνησις* disposes at once of the suggestion that he founds morality on 'heteronomy.' He would have no difficulty in agreeing with Kant in distinguishing between 'true and merely habitual morality.' Good natural tendencies (*φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί*) may be confirmed into habits, apparently good, but yet forming no parts of a moral organism. A collection of such independent habits would be 'habitual virtue,' as distinguished from a 'virtuous character.' The man who has merely 'habitual virtue' is virtuous because, being a man of naturally good disposition, he happens also to have lived all his life in contact with certain good influences: but his nature has no system. He is perhaps honest enough, but illiberal; temperate enough, but not courageous. This would be a case of 'heteronomy.' But where a habit—*e.g.* *σωφροσύνη*—exists in a man, just as the *ὀρθὸς λόγος* of his whole moral nature requires it to exist—so that all the other virtuous habits coexist with it in perfection—we have the 'autonomy of the Will.' The actions which proceed from such a habit are determined 'formally'—*i.e.* by the consciousness of the whole moral organism, or *ὀρθὸς λόγος*. They are 'formally,' not 'materially,' determined because they proceed from, or are the expression of, the man as an *εἶδος* or Form—a system of related parts grasped by Reason; and are not merely due to the susceptibility of a single part placing itself in material isolation. As man is concretely constituted, all his moral actions must be occasioned by stimuli conveyed through the parts—*i.e.* by particular feelings, pleasant, or painful. But in some cases, in the moral, as in the physical organism, the external stimulus acts merely as a local irritation, provoking, as it were, a reflex movement of merely local significance; while in other cases, it is answered by a deliberate movement, resulting from the reaction of the whole organism, and subserving its highest interest.

There seems, therefore, to be no real antagonism between Aristotle's doctrine of Habituation, and Kant's doctrine of the Autonomy of the Will¹.

¹ According to Kant, man has two characters—an 'intelligible' and a 'phe-

1106 b. 36. The close connexion which Aristotle's philosophical definition of ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ establishes between the μεσότης and φρόνησις recalls the kinship popularly recognised between τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν and τὸ γνῶθι σεαυτὸν—as, for example, in the following passage in Plutarch's *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, 28—δύ' ἐστὶ τῶν Δελφικῶν γραμμῶν τὰ μάλιστα ἀναγκαῖα πρὸς τὸν βίον, τὸ γνῶθι σεαυτὸν, καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἤρτηται καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα. ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀλλήλοις σίμφωνα καὶ συμφυλά, καὶ διὰ θατέρου θάτερον ἔοικε δηλοῦσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν. ἔν τε γὰρ τῷ γινώσκειν ἑαυτὸν περιέχεται τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ γινώσκων ἑαυτὸν. Διὸ καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων φησὶν ὁ Ἴων οὕτως

τὸ γνῶθι σεαυτὸν, τοῦτ' ἔπος μὲν οὐ μέγα,
ἔργον δ', ὅσον Ζεὺς μόνος ἐπίσταται θεῶν.

ὁ δὲ Πίνδαρος,

Σοφοὶ δέ, φησί, καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν ἔπος αἰνεῖσαν περισσῶς.

1107 a. 3. § 16. καὶ ἔτι τῷ] *i. e.* καὶ ἔτι μεσότης ἐστὶ τῷ. . . . Ramsauer says 'Suppletur notio jam satis adumbrata (καὶ ἔτι). Dativo enim infinitivi circumscribitur qua ratione vel quibus in rebus sit virtus id quod modo explicatum est: ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ . . . μεσότης τῷ. Quo in supplemento summum est ut referatur virtus et vitia illi opposita ad τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις.' Of course it is no new point which is thus introduced by καὶ ἔτι. It has already been brought forward in § 10 αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ πάθη and πράξεις and in § 12.

a. 6. § 17. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν κ.τ.λ.] See Grant's excellent note *ad loc.* and his Essay iv. p. 260. 'This passage,' he says (in his note), 'implies that the term μεσότης is an abstract and metaphysical expression for the law of virtue, estimated by the understanding (though doubtless the deepest view attainable); but that viewed in relation to the good, or (as we should say) from a moral point of view—virtue is no mean state lying between vices (as if virtue were a little less vice, and vice a little more virtue), but an extreme, that is, utterly removed from, and opposed to vice.' In other words—

nomenal.' In virtue of the former he is free: in respect of the latter, he is part of nature, and subject to its necessary laws. This distinction seems to me to be, at bottom, that between the individual organism, on the one hand, and its genealogical antecedents and its environment, on the other hand. When the organism 'corresponds with its environment,' the functions which it performs are *its own* functions—they are performed in accordance with its own constitution, and we may call them *free*: and yet they are *necessary*, because its constitution and the external stimuli which act on its constitution are products of the necessary laws of the Universe. Cf. note on *E. N.* iii. 1. 2.

μεσότης δύο κακιῶν is a scientific formula, which describes the virtuous character in relation to the difficulties which surround it in its 'struggle for existence.' It describes Virtue, as the Darwinian theory describes the forms of vegetable and animal life—with special reference to the πολλὰ ἰδέαι θανάτου which they manage, in various ways, just to evade. But Virtue, like these other forms, is something more than the negative 'that which just manages to avoid fatal error.' It must contain some positive reason for its existence. It does not exist simply because it does not happen to perish. The scientific formula, however, takes no account of this positive reason, but confines itself to τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (see *Phys.* ii. 9. 199 b. 34 sqq.)—'If virtue is to be realised, such and such extremes must be avoided': so Darwinism—'If the butterfly is to live, it must have such and such spots.' But why Virtue (or the butterfly) should take the trouble to struggle for existence, is a question to which the formula contains no answer. Indeed no *scientific* answer can be given to such a question. We can only say with Aristotle that Virtue exists *because it is a beautiful and excellent thing* (see iii. 7. 6), just as plants and animals exist because it is 'better' that they should live than not live—see *De Gen. Anim.* ii. 1. 731 b. 24 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν αἰδία καὶ θεῖα τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον αἰτιον αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν τοῦ βελτίονος ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰδιον ἐνδεχομένον ἐστὶ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν καὶ τοῦ χείρονος καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος, βελτίον δὲ ψυχὴ σώματος τὸ δ' ἔμφυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν τοῦ μὴ ζῆν, διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας γένεσις ζῴων ἐστίν.

Regarded scientifically, then, as a form constituted in a certain way out of certain elements, Virtue is a Mean suggesting Extremes. The Extremes represent the prevalence of that matter which Virtue reduces to form; and a scientific account of Virtue must describe the manner in which it accomplishes this achievement. But the achievement itself is not the manner of its accomplishment. So, Phidias, in executing his work, must be alive to all the various treacheries of his material and subject; but when the work is finished, it stands a god.

Plutarch (*De Virt. Mor.* 5) glosses this passage in a manner which shows that he did not allow the doctrine of μεσότης to suggest 'a merely quantitative difference between Virtue and Vice'—ἀρετὴ . . . οὐκ οὐσα φθορὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδὲ ἀναίρεσις, ἀλλὰ τάξις καὶ διακόσμησις, ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιότητι, τῷ ποσῷ δὲ μεσ-

1107 a. 8. της γίνεται, τὸ υπερβάλλον ἐξαιρούσα καὶ τὸ ἐλλείπον. Cf. also with this §, iv. 3. 8 ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δὲ μέσος.

On τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι see *Met. Z.* 4 and 17: Trendelenburg, *Rhein. Mus.* 1828, vol. ii. pp. 457-483: Trendelenburg, *De An.* i. 1. 1, note, and iii. 4. 7, note: Trendelenburg, *Kategorienlehre*, pp. 34 sqq.: Biese, *Phil. des Arist.* vol. i. 243, 366, 427, ii. 35: Waitz, *Organ.* 67 b. 12, 94 a. 11, &c.: Schwegler, *Met. Excursus* i.

The τί ἦν εἶναι, defined in *Met. Z.* 7. 1032 b. 14 λέγω δ' οὐσίαν ἀνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, is the law, or principle, in accordance with which a thing is constituted, and is what it is. It thus answers nearly to Bacon's *Forma*. A doctor's prescription is a formula which states the τί ἦν εἶναι of the dose which is made up in accordance with it: the architect's plan, realised in bricks and wood by the builder, is the τί ἦν εἶναι of the house: the structural type which an animal conforms to is its τί ἦν εἶναι.

a. 8. § 18. οὐ πάντα κ.τ.λ.] *i.e.* there are πράξεις and πάθη which cannot be so modified as to form parts of an orderly character and life, but must be eradicated by education. Thus ἀναισχυντία, being a natural tendency towards vice in relation to bodily pleasures, must be eradicated, as its contrary αἰδώς, which is a natural tendency towards virtue in relation to these pleasures, and the source of σωφροσύνη (see *E. E.* iii. 7. 1234 a. 32), must be fostered in the young. Again, φθόνος contributes to ἀδικία (see *E. E.* iii. 7. 1234 a. 30)—*i.e.* it is a natural tendency to grudge our neighbour his due share. This natural tendency cannot be organised into a virtuous character, or turned to good use, but must be eradicated, if possible, by education. For the relation of φθόνος to ἀδικία cf. Chares (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. ii. 47. ed. Meineke),

ἀδικώτατον πρᾶγμα ἔστι τῶν πάντων φθόνος,

and Hippothoon (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. ii. 48),

φθόνος κάκιστος κἀδικώτατος θεὸς

κακοῖς τε χείρει κἀγαθοῖς ἀλγύνεται.

a. 12. λέγεται] Bekker and Susemihl read ψέγεται on the suspicious authority of M^b alone.

§§ 18-20.] These sections show clearly that Aristotle does not make 'a merely quantitative difference between virtue and vice'¹—

¹ It would not be necessary to notice this view of Aristotle's doctrine, had it not been advanced by Kant. There are other indications pointing to the conclusion that Kant's study of Aristotle was not very careful.

οὐκ ἔστι σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις—*i.e.* ἀκολασία 1107 a. 12. and ἀναισθησία do not differ from σωφροσύνη in a merely quantitative manner, nor θρασύτης and δειλία from ἀνδρεία: θρασύτης *e.g.* is not the ὑπερβολὴ of ἀνδρεία—the two are qualitatively different. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of the μεσότης of an ἄκρον—and the μέσον is in a sense an ἄκρον, an indivisible point which cannot be resolved into mean and extremes. We cannot speak of 'moderation in moderation.' Or otherwise—an ἄκρον is a quality not a quantity: cf. Plutarch's expression quoted in note on § 17 ἀκρότης μὲν ἔστι τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιότητι.

CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

Now let us draw up a Diagram to show in detail that our formula 'Excess—Mean—Defect' applies to particular cases. We shall thus give reality to a theory which, left in its general form, would be too vague.

[For the 'Diagram' of ἔξεις (§§ 2-13) see text.]

In the foregoing Diagram (§§ 2-13) it is in the Habits of the Characters in the middle column, *i.e.* in the ways in which they are disposed towards actions or feelings, that the mean is realized. But (§§ 14, 15) it is sometimes realized also in feelings themselves and their immediate accompaniments. Thus, although Shame is not a virtuous habit, 'the man who has a sense of Shame' is praised. He occupies the mean; while one extreme is occupied by 'the Bashful Man,' who is always covered with Shame, and the other by 'the man who is without any sense of Shame.' Again the feeling of Indignation is the mean between Envy and Malignant Joy. But we shall have an opportunity afterwards of discussing these matters.

[Monro (*Journ. of Philol.* vi. pp. 185 sqq., 1876) brings forward what seem to be strong reasons for regarding this Chapter as an interpolation. Its terminology agrees rather with that of the *E. E.* and *M. M.* than with that of *E. N.* iv. The discrepancies will be pointed out in the notes on Book iv.]

§ 1. κοινότεροι] So Bywater. Bekker and Sus. read κενότεροι. 1107 a. 30. The reading of the majority of MSS. is κοινότεροι. See Susemihl's apparatus criticus *ad loc.* and *E. E.* appendix p. 164. Manuscript authority, however, is nearly useless in the cases of κοινός, κενός, and κωδός, and Bekker, I think, was right in neglecting it here, and

1107 a. 30. going on internal evidence, which seems to be in favour of *κενώτεροι*. See the passages adduced by Zell, Michelet, and Grant, and by Zeller *Ph. d. Gr. (Arist.)*, p. 171. n. 2 (3rd German Edition), especially *de Gen. Anim.* 748, a. 7 οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος καθάλου λίαν καὶ κενός· οἱ γὰρ μὴ ἐκ τῶν οικείων ἀρχῶν λόγοι κενοί. The reading *κενώτεροι*, as the antithesis of *ἀληθινώτεροι*, is supported by a line of Menander preserved in the Florentine MS. (Laurent. 22. 8) of Johannes Damascenus (see Meineke's Stobaeus: *Flor.* iv. p. 242)—

ἀληθές εἶναι δεῖ τὸ σεμνόν, οὐ κενόν.

a. 33. διαγραφῆς] ὑπογραφή in *E. E.* ii. 3. 1220. b. 37.

§ 2.] See Michelet's important note, the gist of which is as follows—we have here *four* extremes round *ἀνδρεία* thus—

Defect of Fear—ἀφοβία.	ἀνδρεία.	Excess of Fear	}	—δειλία.
Excess of Confidence—θρασύτης.	Defect of Confidence			

There is this difference between the two sides, as the Ald. Schol. notes, that excess of fear and defect of confidence are never disjoined, but always make together a single vice, of which they are, as it were, the moments; whereas the 'moments' on the other side—viz. defect of fear and excess of confidence, may exist apart, and give rise to two distinct vices, the defect of fear constituting what Michelet calls *Intrepidity*—a passive vice; the excess of confidence constituting *θρασύτης*, rashness—an active vice. Hence it results that *two vices* are opposed to *ἀνδρεία* on one side—'intrepidity' and rashness; and only one vice on the other side—cowardice. Further, as cowardice is a vice of defect, the writer of this chapter is led to speak of *both* the vices on the other side as vices of excess: hence the expression ὁ τῆ ἀφοβία ὑπερβάλλον, instead of ὁ τῆ φόβῳ ἑλλείπων. The Ald. Schol. explains how Intrepidity is distinguished from θρασύτης—πρόσεστι δὲ καὶ τῆ θρασύτητι πρὸς τῆ ἀφόβῳ καὶ τὸ ἀλόγως ἰτητικὸν πρὸς τὰ δεινά· καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον ἐν τῷ θάρρει ἀφοβος, οὐκ ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀφοβος θραύς. See also Grant's note *ad loc.* Grant acutely recognises this complicated treatment of *ἀνδρεία* as 'a sign that Aristotle is here only working his way to the theory of the mean.' He probably thought out his theory first in connexion with *ἀνδρεία*. It is to be noted, however, that in § 4 of this chapter a similarly complicated account of *ἐλευθερίτης* is given, and appears also in iv. 1, just as the refinement with regard to *ἀνδρεία* appears also in iii. 7. 7.

§§ 2-16.] The virtues, with their extremes, enumerated in this 1107 a. 33. chapter, are all described in detail in Books iii and iv—where see notes.

§ 4. δ' ἐν αὐταῖς] Bywater, for Bekker's δ' ἐαυταῖς Lb. κατ' αὐτάς b. 11. is the reading of CCC, αὐτάς pr. Camb., δ' ἐαυτάς NC. Perhaps δ' ἐαυτοῖς: see note on viii. 4. 2. 1157 a. 19.

§ 8. <τῷ> περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν] Bywater adopts the τῷ from b. 25. Ramsauer. I should like to read τὴν ἐλευθερίτητα, περὶ μικρὰ οὖσαν.

§ 9. κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον] Either τύπων καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ (§ 5), 1108 a. 3. or (as the Paraphrast takes it) ζητοῦντες ἐν ἑκάστῳ τὴν μεσότητα καὶ τὰ ἄκρα: see the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant. 'According to the method which has hitherto guided us'—Grant.

§ 11. πειρατέον . . . αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκα κ.τ.λ.] a. 17. 'Aristotle's method,' says Grant, 'consists partly in accepting experience as shown in common language, &c., partly in rectifying it, or re-stating it from his own point of view; partly in finding new expressions for it, so as to discover men's thoughts to themselves. He usually rather fixes the meaning of words, than creates new ones. For instance, he here assigns a peculiar and limited meaning to ἀλήθεια and φιλία. His influence upon the forms of language of civilised Europe can hardly be overrated. It is far greater than has ever been exercised by any one man beside.'

§ 12. προσποιήσις] See note on iv. 7. 15. b. 26.

a. 21.

§ 14. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες] a. 30. αἰδώς and νέμεσις, being πάθη, are not μεσότητες in the strict sense; but are here called μεσότητες, as it were by anticipation, because they represent tendencies which can be easily cultivated into ἀρεταί. They are the natural sources, or the physical basis, of σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη respectively according to Eudemus (*Eth. Eud.* iii. 7), who describes them, together with φιλία, σεμνότης, ἀλήθεια, and εὐτραπελία, as παθητικαὶ μεσότητες—praiseworthy, but not ἀρεταί (nor are their contraries κακίαι), for they are without προαίρεσις. These praiseworthy πάθη, being φυσικά (i. e. natural in the sense of being independent of education), contribute to the φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί. Now, each perfectly developed virtue has its *natural* counterpart, out of which it has been evolved by φρόνησις—*Eth. Eud.* iii. 7. 1234 a. 29 εἰκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως. Thus, αἰδώς

1108 a. 30. contributes to *σωφροσύνη*, and *νέμεσις* to *δικαιοσύνη*, and each may be called a *μεσότης* by anticipation. In Plutarch, *De vita et poesi Homeri* 132, the peripatetic doctrine of the relation of these *πάθη* to Virtue is touched upon as follows—*τῶν περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην ἀστεία πάθη ἡγουμένων τὴν νέμεσιν καὶ τὸν ἔλεον (τὸ γὰρ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς δάκνεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς πλησίον, εἰ παρ' ἀξίαν εὐτυχοῦσι, νέμεσις καλεῖται· τὸ δὲ λυπεῖσθαι εἰ παρ' ἀξίαν δυστυχοῦσιν, ἔλεος λέγεται)*. Perhaps we may say that *αἰδώς* is a *παθητικὴ μεσότης*, or a *φυσικὴ ἀρετή*, when (*in the young*) it takes the fixed form of a *παθητικὴ ποιότης*, as distinguished from a mere *πάθος* (see *Cat.* 8. 9 b. 33 sqq.).

Νέμεσις is not again discussed. The Fourth Book ends with *αἰδώς* (the last section seems to be a later addition), and is probably defective¹.

Νέμεσις (*νέμω*) properly means the distribution of what is due. Personified, it becomes the Goddess of Justice (see the *περὶ κόσμον* 401 b. 12 *Νέμεσιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκάστῳ διανεμήσεως*), especially of just retribution, who humbles the overweening. Without personification, it is the feeling of righteous indignation. We can thus easily understand why Eudemus regards *νέμεσις*, the feeling of indignation naturally aroused by the sight of undeserved success, as 'contributing to' justice, which is essentially *διανεμητικὴ κατ' ἀξίαν*. Although *νέμεσις* is not discussed in the Fourth Book of the *Nic. Ethics* as we have it, it is fully treated in *Rhet.* ii. 9, and its relation to *δικαιοσύνη* made very plain.

a. 33. ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ] Rasso (Forsch. 74), following Coraes, and followed by Susemihl, inserts ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον before ὡς. For Bekker's ὁ μηδέ in the following line he reads μηδέν with Kb (Forsch. 55): and compares 1104 a. 20, where μηδέν occurs in a clause of similar structure. Bywater reads μηδέν for ὁ μηδέ.

a. 35. § 15. νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχειρεκακίας] According to Grant *φθόνος* and *ἐπιχειρεκακία* are 'only different forms of the same state of mind,' and cannot be opposed as two extremes. The true contrary of *φθόνος* is *ἀναισθησία τις*. This is recognised, he thinks, by Eudemus, who has '*φθόνος—ἀνώνυμον—νέμεσις*' in his *ὑπογραφή* (*E. E.* ii. 3. 1221 a. 3), and by Aristotle himself in *Rhet.* ii. 9. 1386 b. 34 ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχειρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφ'

¹ The end of iv may have disappeared along with the Nicomachean v, vi, and vii.

ὅ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γεγονένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ 1108 a. 35. στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθονῇ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν.

The passage quoted from the *Rhetoric* is certainly in favour of Grant's view that *φθόνος* and *ἐπιχειρεκακία* cannot properly be opposed as contraries; but if we turn from the *ὑπογραφή* of Eudemus to the detailed description, we find that it is only the *ἕξις* which he leaves nameless: the *ἕχων* is plainly the man called *ἐπιχειρέκακος*, he tells us: and then he proceeds to contrast the *ἐπιχειρέκακος* with the *φθονερός*, just as the writer of *E. N.* ii. 7. 15 does. Grant is wrong, then, in supposing that the 'mistake (in ii. 7. 15) is set right by Eudemus.' The following are the words of Eudemus (*E. E.* iii. 7. 1233 b. 18) οἷον ὁ φθονερός καὶ ἐπιχειρέκακος· καθ' ἃς γὰρ ἕξις λέγονται, ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ' ἀξίαν εὖ πράττουσιν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχειρέκακου πάθος [ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ] ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλ' ὁ ἕχων δῆλος, ἐπὶ τὸ (?) χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις· μέσος δὲ τούτων ὁ νεμεσητικός καὶ ὁ ἐκάδων οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις.

The writer of the *M. M.* follows *E. N.* iii. 7. 15 and Eudemus in thus making *φθόνος* and *ἐπιχειρεκακία* contraries, although he differs from Eudemus in making the pain and joy of the *φθονερός*, and *ἐπιχειρέκακος* respectively, independent of the good or ill fortune being deserved or not, and in making *νέμεσις* exclusively *λύπη τις*. His words are (*M. M.* i. 27. 1192 b. 18) νέμεσις δὲ ἐστὶν μεσότης φθονερίας καὶ ἐπιχειρεκακίας· . . . ἐστὶ δ' ἡ νέμεσις περὶ ἀγαθὰ ἃ τυγχάνει ὑπάρχοντα ἀναξίῳ ὄντι, λύπη τις. νεμεσητικός οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λυπητικός. καὶ ὁ αὐτός γε πάλιν οὖτος λυπήσεται, ἂν τινα ἴδῃ κακῶς πράττοντα ἀναξίον ὄντα . . . ὁ δὲ γε φθονερός ἐναντίος τούτῳ. ἀπλῶς γάρ, ἂν τε ἀξίος τις ᾖ ἢ ἂν τε μὴ τοῦ εὖ πράττειν, καὶ τῷ ἀξίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀναξίῳ. ὁ δὲ γε νεμεσητικός οὖν, ἀλλὰ μέσος τις ἐστὶ τούτων. The writer of the *M. M.* is certainly right in not ascribing to characters like the *φθονερός* and *ἐπιχειρέκακος* the power of discriminating between deserved and undeserved fortune. He is also certainly right in making *νέμεσις* exclusively *λύπη*.

ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρέκακος] Rasso (Forsch. 74) b. 4. adopts, with much approbation, the suggestion of Sauppe (*Dionysius und Aristoteles* p. 22)—to insert after *λυπεῖται* (1108 b. 5) the words καὶ ὁ μὲν νεμεσητικός ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακῶς πράττουσι λυπεῖται. Of

1108 b. 4. course it is possible that a clause ending with *λυπέται* may have fallen out; but I cannot help thinking that it is awkward to characterise the *νεμσητικός* in two closely adjacent clauses, instead of once for all; and I do not see why we should not be allowed to give its natural weight to the word *επιχαιρέκακος*, and mentally supply *ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσι* after *χαίρειν*. A Greek, I feel sure, could not think of the *επιχαιρέκακος* 'rejoicing at the success' of any one, good or bad: hence Grant's objection falls to the ground—'Again, the *επιχαιρέκακος* cannot be said *τοσοῦτον ἀλλείπειν ὥστε κ.τ.λ.*, for he does not rejoice at the success of the good,' &c. I therefore think that Sauppe's clause is unnecessary. Of course the confusion, pointed out by Grant, of contrasting *φθόνος* and *επιχαιρεκακία* as two extremes is not denied, but is perhaps not so great as Grant supposes. The *φθονερός* is pained by the good fortune of other people: the *επιχαιρέκακος* rejoices at the ill fortune of other people: the *νεμσητικός* is pained by undeserved good or ill fortune. The *φθονερός* and *επιχαιρέκακος* may indeed be *ὁ αὐτός* (*Rhet.*), but there is a logical distinction.

b. 7. § 16. οὐχ ἀπλῶς] *i. e.* πλεοναχῶς v. 1. 7.

b. 8. ἑκατέρας] *i. e.* universal and particular justice v. 1. 8.

b. 9. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν] Grant (followed by Ramsauer) brackets this clause, 'because of the term *λογικαί*, which never occurs elsewhere in Aristotle or Eudemus, as applied to the *διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί*—secondly, because of the sense, since Aristotle could not possibly say that he meant to show how the intellectual excellences were *μεσότητες*—thirdly, because of the extreme likelihood of an interpolation here.'

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

The two vices, that of Excess and that of Defect, and the virtuous Mean, are all three opposed in a certain way to one another—i. e. the two extremes are opposed as contraries, both to the mean, and to each other. Now the mean, standing in contrary opposition to each of the extremes, may be quantitatively expressed as an 'equal' which is 'greater' than 'the less' of the defective extreme, and

'less' than 'the greater' of the excessive extreme. But here the man who actually lives in an extreme becomes the victim of a moral illusion. In 'greater than' or 'less than,' as applied to the mean in its relation to the extreme in which he lives, he sees 'too great,' or 'too little.' The coward calls the courageous man rash, and the rash man calls him a coward—each as it were pushes the man in the virtuous mean away from the middle place towards the other extreme. The contrariety is greater between the two extremes than between each and the mean, for each is more distant from the other than from the mean. But the mean is not always equally distant from each of the extremes, for one extreme sometimes resembles the mean after a fashion; e.g. Rashness bears a certain resemblance to Courage. Hence it is the defect, Cowardice, and not the excess, Rashness, which is regarded as the proper opposite of the mean, Courage, or as more distant from it: but in other cases it is the excess, e.g. Intemperance, which is so regarded, and not the defect, e.g. Insensibility.

When one of the extremes is thus the opposite par excellence of the mean, we have to explain the circumstance in either of two ways: (1) We may have to refer to the nature of the particular extremes themselves: thus ordinary observation makes it plain that Rashness, as a formed Habit, stands closer to Courage, and resembles it more nearly, than Cowardice does. This is the reason why we make Cowardice the opposite par excellence of Courage. It is a reason connected with a difference in the formed habits themselves. Or (2) we may have to refer to a difference, not in the formed habits themselves, but in our own tendencies, making it easier for us to acquire the one habit than the other. Thus our natural tendency to seek pleasure makes it easier for us to acquire the extreme habit of Intemperance than its opposite, the extreme habit of Total Abstinence. This is why Intemperance is the opposite par excellence of Temperance.

§ 1. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντία εἰσὶν, ἢ 1108 b. 13. δὲ μέσῃ ταῖς ἄκρασι] Cf. *Cat.* II. 13 b. 36 sqq. ἐναντίον δὲ ἐστὶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγαθῶ μὲν κακόν' τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον τῇ καθ' ἑκάστον ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον ὑγιείᾳ νόσος καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κακῶ δὲ ὅτε μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον, ὅτε δὲ κακόν' τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ κακῶ ὄντι ἢ ὑπερβολῇ ἐναντίον κακόν' ἔν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντία ἑκατέρῳ, ὅσσα ἀγαθόν. ἐπ' ὀλίγων δ' ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστον αἰεὶ τῷ κακῶ τὸ κακόν' ἐναντίον ἐστίν. In *Cat.* 6. 6 a. 17 τὰ πλείστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει is quoted as a definition of ἐναντία: but that the writer regards it as too narrow is plain from a subsequent passage (*Cat.* II. 14 a. 19) ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι. λευκόν μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει (χρῶμα γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ γένος), δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν (τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆ, τοῦ δὲ κακία τὸ γένος): ἀγαθόν δὲ καὶ κακόν' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη τῶν ὄντα. Cf. also *Met.* Δ. 10. 1018 a. 25 sqq.

§ 2.] ὁ μέσος, *i. e.* ὁ φρόνιμος or σπουδαῖος, alone is in a position to b. 15.

1108 b. 15. judge correctly. See iii. 4. 5 διαφέρει πλείστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ ἀληθῆς ἐν ἐκάστοις ὄραν, ὡσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὄν. The ἄκροι do not possess, as it were, the αἰσθητικὴ μεσότης. Ramsauer appositely compares *de An.* ii. 11. 11. 424 a. 4 ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἶον μεσότητός τιος οὐσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητὰ· τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων—i. e. Sense is affected because it is a mean between contraries—because e. g. it is not so cold as τὸ ψυχρόν and colder than τὸ θερμόν. If it were as cold as τὸ ψυχρόν, it could not be affected by it: and, not affected by τὸ ψυχρόν, it could not be affected by the contrary θερμόν. Similarly, if it were as hot as τὸ θερμόν, it could not be affected by τὸ θερμόν—or by the contrary ψυχρόν. The difficult words γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων (which may be compared with ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρείος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασύς φαίνεται κ.τ.λ. here) are thus explained by Philoponus (quoted by Trendelenburg)—πῶς τὸ μέσον γίνεται τῶν ὑπερβολῶν κριτικὸν ἔδειξε. τὸ γὰρ ἐν μεσότητι τινῶν ἢ πρὸς ἑκάτερον τῶν ἄκρων θάτερον πως ἐστίν. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τὴν οικειάν αὐτοῦ θερμότητα ψυχρόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὴν ψυχρότητα ὑπερβάλλον θερμόν.

b. 27. § 4.] πλείστη ἐναντιότης] Bywater restores πλείστη in place of Bekker's πλείων. The MSS. are practically unanimous in favour of πλείστη. Was the original reading πλείων ἢ?

b. 31. § 5. ὁμοιότης] Both the θρασύς and the ἀνδρείος face the foe; but the δειλὸς runs away: both the ἄσωτος and the ἐλευθέριος spend money; but the ἀνελεύθερος does not. Further, θρασύτης and ἀσωτία represent the prevalence of tendencies which, if properly directed, would have become ἀνδρεία and ἐλευθεριότης respectively; whereas δειλία and ἀνελευθερία represent tendencies which could not be made to lend themselves to the formation of these virtues. Cf. iv. i. 31, where it is said of the ἄσωτος that he is εὐίατος, and ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν.

b. 35. §§ 6-8.] For the two grounds on either of which one of the extremes rather than the other may be opposed to the mean as its contrary *par excellence*, see *Argument* of this chapter.

1109 a. 16. § 8. κοσμιότητα] ἀναισθησίαν—the *vice* opposed to ἀκολασία is what we should have expected (the Paraph. has ἀναισθησίαν), but Aristotle perhaps wished to avoid the unusual word. At any rate κοσμιότης here does not stand for ἀναισθησία, but rather for σωφρο-

σύνη. The conjunction κόσμος καὶ σώφρων is too close in Greek 1109 a. 16. usage to make it possible to take κοσμιότης as 'prudery.'

ἢ ἐπίδοσις] not 'our inclination' but 'our advance.' See the a. 17. notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant. Grant's rendering is—we call those things more contrary to the mean, in which we run to greater lengths.'

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

That Moral Virtue then is a mean state of a certain kind between two vices, that of excess and that of defect; and that it is a mean state because it can hit off the mean in feeling and action—all this we have explained sufficiently. Now let us draw a practical conclusion from the Theory which we have set forth. Our practical conclusion is shortly this—It is a difficult thing to be good. Hitting off the mean in conduct is like finding the centre of the circle—to do it, a man must know how. It is easy to open one's purse and give away money; but to give to the right man, the right amount, at the right time, for the right object, in the right manner—that is indeed difficult, and few can do it. All praise and honour therefore to those who can. Since then it is so difficult to hit off the mean exactly at first, we must begin by avoiding the extreme which is the more contrary to the mean, i. e. the more dangerous extreme, 'steering far from foam and breakers' like Odysseus, adopting the proverbial 'second best course,' and choosing the lesser evil. In order to do this, we must ascertain what things tempt us as individuals most—individuals are differently constituted—and, measuring the strength of the temptation by the pleasure which the thing gives us, draw ourselves away from that course to which we are constitutionally most inclined; for, by thus drawing ourselves far away from our evil bent, like people who straighten timber, we shall reach the mean. But on all occasions it is Pleasure which we must guard against most carefully. We ought to feel towards Pleasure as the elders felt towards Helen, and echo their saying; for if we 'send the enchantress away,' we shall be the less tempted to sin. These are the general rules for hitting the mean; but it is a difficult matter at best to hit it, especially where a multitude of details are concerned: thus, it is a difficult matter to lay down any rule about anger, which shall determine the way in which, the persons with whom, the class of things at which, and length of time during which, one ought to be angry: indeed, so far is there from being a rule, that we sometimes praise the man who is deficient in the feeling of anger, and call him good-tempered, and sometimes the man who waxes wroth, and say that he has a manly spirit. In short, the man who deflects only a little from the right course, whether towards the side of excess, or towards that of defect, is

not blamed; only the man who defects far, for he attracts notice: but how far he must defect, to attract notice, and incur blame, it is not easy to determine theoretically: indeed the question is not really a general one at all, but relates to this, that, and the other particular case, and such particular cases elude theory; only sense can pass judgment upon them as they arise.

Thus much then is plain, that the middle state is praiseworthy, but that it is sometimes by leaning to the side of excess, and sometimes by leaning to that of defect, that we shall more easily reach the mean, or that which is right.

1109 a. 29. § 2. διόπερ τὸ εἶ] This is the reading of K^b, Ald., B¹, B², B³, and CCC (all except K^b insert ἐστὶ after διόπερ), and must be accepted as right, because *M. M.* i. 9. 1187 a. 4 has τὸ δὲ μέσον χαλεπὸν, καθ' ὃ ἐπαινούμεθα διὰ καὶ σπάνιον τὸ σπουδαῖον. All other authorities (including NC, Cambr., and Par. 1853) have ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶ. Michelet, reading ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶ, takes the words as parenthetical, and connects καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν, as predicates, with τὸ δ' ᾧ . . . καὶ ὡς.

a. 31. § 3. ἡ Καλυψώ] The editors point out that Aristotle is wrong here. It was Circe not Calypso who gave the advice to Odysseus (*Od.* xii. 109): but the line quoted is uttered by Odysseus himself afterwards (*Od.* xii. 219), when he gives directions to his pilot. CCC has ἡ Κίρκη Καλυψώ: B¹ and B² have ἡ Κίρκη.

a. 33. τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον κ.τ.λ.]—for the reason given in § 8 of last chapter.

a. 34. § 4. κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν] The meaning of this proverb seems to be placed beyond doubt by a fragment of Menander preserved by Stobaeus (*Flor.* vol. ii. p. 349, ed. Meineke) Μενάνδρου ἐκ Θρασυλέοντος,

ὁ δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστὶ δῆπου λεγόμενος,
ἂν ἀποτύχη τις οἴριου κώπαισι πλείν.

Thus the Scholiast on Plato, *Phaedo* 99 D, is wrong with παροιμία δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσφαλῶς τι πραττόντων, παρ' ὅσον οἱ διαμαρτύντες κατὰ τὸν πρότερον πλοῦν ἀσφαλῶς παρασκευάζονται τὸν δεύτερον. The proverb occurs in *Pol.* Γ. 8. 1284 b. 19, in the *Phaedo* 99 D, and elsewhere.

§§ 4, 5, 6.] The doctrine of the μεσότης here suggests to Aristotle a valuable practical rule. 'Find out the things you have a weakness for, and avoid them as much as you can.'

b. 8. § 6. ἀδέκαστοι] 'unbribed.' δεκάζειν means 'to bribe' (ety-

mology apparently unknown). Λίκου δεκάς was the name for 1109 b. 8. bribed jurymen at Athens. See *Liddell and Scott* s.v. δεκάζειν. Cf. Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία ch. 27 ἤρξατο δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ δεκάζειν, πρότερον καταδείξαντος Ἀντύου . . . κρινόμενος γὰρ . . . δεκάσας τὸ δικάστηριον ἀπέφυγεν.

Ἑλένη] *Il.* iii. 156 sqq.

b. 9.

§ 7. οὐ γὰρ βᾶδιον διορίσαι κ.τ.λ.] *Rassow* (*Forsch.* 16) points out that the passage beginning here, and extending to the end of the Book, occurs again almost *verbatim* in iv. 5. 13, 14. He regards the Second Book as the original locus of the passage.

§ 8. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ βᾶδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι] The twin clause in iv. 5. 13 shows that παρεκβαίνων must be understood here after πόσον.

ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις] αἴσθησις is a κριτικὴ δύναμις (*An. Post.* ii. b. 23. 19. 99 b. 35), because a μεσότης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως (*de An.* ii. 11. 11. 424 a. 4). Here it stands for the faculty by which the good man, as μέσος, discriminates, with the accuracy required by the particular occasion, between the good and the evils contrary to it in the extremes. Cf. τὸ ὄμμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας of vi. 11. 6. See note on ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις iv. 5. 13, for the force of ἐν in the phrase.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

It is only for what is voluntary that men are praised or blamed; for that which is involuntary they are pardoned and sometimes even pitied. The distinction between the Voluntary and the Involuntary is therefore a vital one for the theory of conduct; it is one also about which the practical legislator, who has to assign rewards and punishments, would do well to be clear.

Acts which are either (1) forced upon us, or (2) caused by ignorance, are involuntary.

Where the moving principle is external, i.e. of such a kind that the man contributes nothing to the result by his action or feeling, the result is forced upon him; e.g. the motion of a man who is carried off by brigands is forced upon him.

But is an act 'forced upon him' which a man performs when a painful alternative is offered to him, such as the alternative of his own dishonour, or the death of those dear to him, and he brings himself to accept one of the two evils? Is it voluntarily or involuntarily that he accepts his own dishonour? Is it voluntarily or involuntarily that he consents to the death of those dear to him? The parallel case of the man who throws his goods overboard in a storm will help us to an answer. In ordinary circumstances a man does not throw his goods overboard voluntarily; but, to save his own life, and the lives of the crew, a man of sense will always do so. Let us then call acts of this kind mixed acts, i.e. they are both voluntary and involuntary; but more voluntary than involuntary; for an act is what it is to the agent, at the time when, and in the circumstances in which, he performs it; and these mixed acts, at the time when they are performed, are chosen as being the best in the circumstances, by an agent who has in himself the power of setting his limbs in motion to perform them, and who uses that power, although he could have refrained from doing so. But although a mixed act is thus voluntary as actually performed in given circumstances, it is not in itself the kind of act which a man would choose to perform apart from the given circumstances; and in this sense may perhaps be described as 'except in given circumstances involuntary,' or 'in itself involuntary'—this, however, by a stretch of language, for voluntary and involuntary properly describe acts as

they are to the agent when performed. That mixed acts are voluntary as actually performed is shown by the fact that we even sometimes praise a man for such acts; e.g. when a man submits to disgrace or pain in a noble cause we praise him, whereas if he submit without good reason we blame him. Sometimes however the disgrace which he submits to, and the acts which he brings himself to perform, may be of such a kind that we cannot indeed praise him, but pardon him in consideration of pressure too great for human nature to withstand: although, again, there are things which nothing—not even the prospect of the most terrible death—should compel a man to do: thus the Alcmaeon of Euripides 'compelled to kill his mother' is a ridiculous figure. It is hard sometimes to decide which is the alternative one ought to prefer; but harder far to abide by one's decision once made; for generally the choice is between pain to be endured, and bringing oneself to do or submit to something disgraceful. This is why blame or praise is given according as one does, or does not, bring oneself to accept the disgraceful course.

How then shall we describe an act which is forced upon a man? In the strict sense of the expression, that is forced upon a man which results from a cause lying outside himself, and is entirely independent of his own cooperation: whereas that which in given circumstances is chosen as the lesser evil, and carried out by an agent who has the principle of its initiation in himself, is not forced upon him (however 'involuntary in itself,' i.e. generally undesirable it may be), but is his voluntary act.

So much for painful alternatives: we cannot properly speak of a man being forced to act where they are concerned.

As for the contention that pleasant things, and things which are honourable and good, force us to act, exerting external pressure upon us—it is obviously absurd, for it implies that all our actions are forced upon us—all that we do being for the sake either of pleasant things, or of things which are honourable and good. Moreover, when we are forced to do something, we do it with pain, whereas, when we pursue something pleasant or good, we feel pleasure. It is ridiculous then to blame pleasant things, and not our own susceptibility to their influence—to take credit indeed to ourselves for our good actions, but to throw the blame for our discreditable actions upon pleasant things.

That then is 'forced upon a man' which results, without his cooperation, from a cause external to him.

An act which is 'caused by ignorance' is always 'non-voluntary'; but it cannot be called 'involuntary' unless the man is sorry for it when he finds out the harm which it has done. If he is not sorry, it is best to describe his act simply as 'non-voluntary.'

But there is a difference between acts 'caused by ignorance,' and acts 'performed in ignorance.' The man who is drunk or in a rage acts indeed 'in ignorance'—he does not know what he is doing; but we do not say that ignorance is the cause of his misdemeanours or crimes: we ascribe them to intoxication or anger as the case may be. Indeed whenever a man commits an offence, he may be said to act 'in ignorance' of what he ought or ought not to do; and the effect of repeating such offences is that he becomes an unjust or bad man—he acquires a character. Now we blame character, thus showing that we consider the man a voluntary agent in its formation, i.e. a voluntary agent in

the performance of acts done 'in ignorance' of what he ought or ought not to do: or to put it otherwise—blindness of choice, or not knowing what one ought to do, does not make one's acts involuntary; on the contrary, it makes them bad, and, becoming chronic, amounts to a character for which one is blamed. It is only when a man's 'ignorance,' instead of being due to his own passions and character, is a mere accident of the circumstances of a particular case, that the acts arising from it are involuntary. Thus a man, without any fault of his own, may not know what he does, e.g. that he is revealing a secret, or whom his act affects, e.g. he may mistake a friend for an enemy in the dark, or he may not know how his act will take effect, e.g. sparring he may hurt. Here it is not the man's disposition, temporary or chronic, but the mere accident of his not knowing a particular circumstance, which is the true cause of his act. His act then is involuntary—that is to say, if he is sorry for it afterwards.

Acts forced upon a man and acts caused by ignorance being involuntary, voluntary acts will be those which have their origin in the man himself, he being fully aware of all the material circumstances surrounding their performance. This being so, it follows that acts caused by passion or desire are not to be described as involuntary. If such acts are involuntary, the lower animals, and even children, are incapable of voluntary action. And further—what about good actions caused by passion and desire? Are they involuntary? Or is it only bad actions thus caused that are involuntary, the good ones being voluntary? It would be ridiculous surely to draw such a distinction between the effects of a single agency. And then the absurdity of having to say that we are involuntary agents when we are moved to action by feelings which ought to move us! for we ought to feel angry sometimes; we ought to feel a desire for health and knowledge. Moreover, what we do or suffer involuntarily is painful, whereas that which accords with our desire is pleasant. Again, what is gained by saying that a fault proceeding from desire, as distinguished from one proceeding from deliberate calculation, is involuntary? The important point is that they are both wrong and to be avoided. Indeed the irrational feelings are as much part of the man's nature as his calculating faculty; it is absurd therefore to talk of acts prompted by these feelings being involuntary.

1109 b. 30. § 1.] The discussion of the *εκούσιον* and *ἀκούσιον* connects itself with the subject of *ἀρετή*, because *ἀρετή* is—(1) *ἕξις ἐπαινετή* (i. 13. 19, cf. ii. 9. 9), and—(2) *ἕξις προαιρετική* (ii. 6. 15). We praise what is voluntary; and choice (*προαίρεσις*, iii. 2) is the special form under which the voluntary principle appears in man, as a rational being, and therefore as capable of acquiring *ἀρετή*. 'Αρετή is a 'praiseworthy habit' produced by the repetition of acts of which a man himself is the cause, i.e. of voluntary acts. How a man is an *ἀρχή τῶν πράξεων* Aristotle does not say in the *Ethics*. He contents himself with pointing to the fact that he is. The author of the *Eud. Eth.* (ii. 6) and the author of the *M. M.* (i. 10. 11) discuss the subject of man's voluntary agency with an evident wish to fathom its metaphysical import, but, after all, leave us where Aristotle leaves us—

with the unexplained fact that man is a cause. They point out 1109 b. 30. that all *οὐσίαι* or *φύσεις* are *ἀρχαί*, i.e. generative of other *οὐσίαι* or *φύσεις* like themselves: e.g. *ἄνθρωπος γεννᾷ ἄνθρωπους καὶ ζῶον ζῶα καὶ φυτὸν φυτά*. But man is distinguished from other generative principles, animate or inanimate, by being the author of another class of effects, viz. *πράξεις*:—see *E. E.* ii. 6. 1222 b. 15 sqq. The *ἀρχή*, properly so called (*κυρία*), is that *ὅθεν πρώτων ἡ κίνησις*. Such is God. Mathematical *ἀρχαί* are not properly *ἀρχαί* (*ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς ἀρχαῖς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κύριον*), because they are not causes of motion; *ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ κινήσεως τινός· ἡ γὰρ πράξις κίνησις*. Where the effects are contingent (*ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ*—such as may either happen or not), the *ἀρχαί* must be contingent also. Human actions are contingent; therefore man is a contingent cause—*E. E.* ii. 6. 1222 b. 41 *εἴπερ ἔστιν ἓνα τῶν ὄντων ἐνδεχόμενα ἐναντίως ἔχειν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι τοιαύτας . . . ὅσων πράξεων ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ κύριος, φανερόν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ*.

The view thus set forth by the author of the *E. E.* and the author of the *M. M.* is based on the doctrine of *Met. Θ.* 2 and 5—that *αἰ μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις*, being *τῶν ἐναντίων*, must be dominated by something external to themselves, which shall determine in which of the two contrary ways they shall actualise themselves; *ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον· λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὄρεξιν ἢ προαίρεσιν* (*Met. Θ.* 5. 1048 a. 10). That which is *κύριον par excellence* in man, making him a moral agent—*αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων*, is *βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις*, or *προαίρεσις*. It is by choosing certain acts, and performing them, that we acquire a certain *Habit*. *Προαίρεσις* converts the *δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων* into a definite *ἕξις*, which results in acts of one kind only: cf. *E. N.* v. 1. 4. 'Αρετή is a *ἕξις προαιρετική* (ii. 6. 15), i.e. a habit which was produced by, and is productive of, certain deliberately chosen acts.

ἴσως] See Zell *ad loc.* and on i. 1. 1. *Δοκέει, φαίνεται, ἴσως, σχεδόν*, b. 33. are often employed, 'quanquam in re certa . . . partim ex communi Atticorum consuetudine, partim ex Aristotelis philosophandi ratione, praesertim in his libris de vita et moribus hominum quae res accuratam subtilitatem non admittunt.'

§ 2. *χρήσιμον δὲ κ.τ.λ.*] 'It must not be supposed,' says Grant b. 34. (*Plan of Book iii*), 'that the present disquisition on the Voluntary is a disquisition on Free Will. The latter question Aristotle would certainly have assigned to *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, or *Metaphysics*, and

1109 b. 34. would have thought out of place in a system of Ethics. . . . The ensuing chapters assume that a man is an *ἀρχή* of his own actions, and, with this assumption, treat of the Voluntary under its various aspects in relation to virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment. From this practical point of view these chapters furnish to some extent a psychology though not a metaphysic of the Will.' Again (note on iii. 1. 1-2): 'It is plain that the discussions on the Will are never metaphysical. An appeal to language and common opinions sums up nearly the whole. The scope of the argument is limited to a political, as distinguished from a theological, point of view—*ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι.*' And: 'In asking what is the Voluntary, Aristotle does not pursue a speculative method of enquiry. Such a method might have commenced with the deeplying ideas of personality and consciousness, of the individuality of the subject, &c. But he is content with defining the Voluntary by a contrast to the common notions (*δοκεῖ* § 3) of what constitutes an Involuntary act. It might be said that this is giving a merely negative conception of freedom. But in fact the conception given is positive, only the analysis of it is not pushed very far. The voluntariness of an act Aristotle represents to be constituted in this—that the actor is in every case the *ἀρχή* or cause of his actions, except in cases of compulsion, where there is really a superior *ἀρχή* . . . or of ignorance, where he does not know what his action is, and can only be held to be the cause of what he meant to do. In what sense, and how, the individual is an *ἀρχή* is the point where Aristotle stops short in the enquiry.'

On this I would remark—that if Aristotle 'stops short in the enquiry,' perhaps his theory of 'in what sense, and how' is thereby conveyed. I think it is. This enquiry is about *Responsibility*; and 'Responsibility,' he gives us to understand by 'stopping short' where he does, is meaningless except as resting with the *immediate* cause of an act—*i. e.* with the concrete individual, whose function the act is. The individual is 'responsible' for acts which can be assigned to his *character* as immediate cause. 'Free,' applied to an act, means, 'caused immediately by a character'—the character, of course, performing its functions, like every other organism, in a definite environment, not *in vacuo*. In short, it is only *the individual, as affected by particular circumstances*, who can put forth acts, and be 'responsible' for them, *i. e.* come in for their conse-

quences. This is Aristotle's *theory* of 'freedom'; and I believe 1109 b. 34. that, by thus taking its stand upon 'the concrete individual putting forth acts in his environment,' it suggests the best possible solution of the famous difficulty—How to reconcile 'freedom' and 'necessity,' which modern speculation has—to some extent, needlessly—raised for itself. The solution which Aristotle's theory suggests may be put thus—The ancestral, or other, antecedents of the concrete individual cannot be saddled with 'responsibility': *αἰτία ἐλομένου θεὸς ἀναίτιος*. The individual is 'responsible' for acts which can be assigned to his *character*, as immediate cause. His character is itself, as we now believe, the necessary product of the universe, and the circumstances which stimulate his character to put forth acts are likewise necessary products of the universe: but this does not relieve him of 'responsibility' and make his acts not 'free,' for 'free,' applied to an act, means 'caused immediately by a character performing its functions in its environment.' Only 'the individual character in its environment' can put forth acts, and be 'responsible' for them—*i. e.* come in for their consequences. The universe, which brings forth individuals, is not itself an individual to be held responsible: 'Natur lebt in lauter Kindern; und die Mutter—wo ist sie?' The question of the efficiency, freedom, or responsibility of the individual must not be mixed up with the question of the *origin* of the individual.

It will thus be seen that man as *ἀρχή τῶν πράξεων* is merely a particular aspect of man as living being; for, to be a living being is to be 'responsible' (whether in a physical or in a political environment) for 'free' acts, *i. e.* for 'acts put forth by an organism.' But the organism must not be abstracted from the universe, and made a 'free agent' in the sense of initiating acts with the production of which the laws of the universe have nothing, or not everything, to do. That would be to set up more universes than one. It is as subject of a *libera necessitas*—to employ Spinoza's powerful phrase—that we must conceive the 'free agent.'

When we say, then, that Man is an *ἀρχή τῶν πράξεων* we are face to face with the (for morals) ultimate fact that he is a living being. All living beings, plants as well as animals, the irrational animals as well as man, perform certain functions by which they maintain their own existence. To perform these functions is to be a living being. Man's moral *πράξεις*, by which he corresponds with his distinctively human, *i. e.* his 'political,' environment, proceed from habits of his

1109 b. 34. nature, just as his bodily functions proceed from organs of his nature. Moral *πράξεις* and bodily functions are necessary for the maintenance of his nature as a whole; and are, on exactly the same grounds, said to be *his πράξεις* and *his* bodily functions respectively. Biologically considered, bodily functions differ from moral *πράξεις* in depending upon structural adaptations of older standing. The performance of moral *πράξεις* being thus more precarious than the performance of bodily functions, and, moreover, affecting others, *praise* is accorded when the *πράξεις* are rightly performed. The praise is accorded *not because they are more truly the agent's own acts* than are the unerring perceptions of his eye or ear, or the regular movements of his heart, for which he is not 'praised' at all; but *because they are apt not to be performed rightly*. A man's virtue is praised and rewarded, but not his health, because, as a matter of fact, his virtue grows up in correspondence with an environment which makes itself felt by means of praise and blame, reward and punishment. Those vital functions which we distinguish as voluntary acts are those which proceed from sources within a man, which are capable of being modified, during the lifetime of the individual, in relation to his environment, especially to that very complex part of it of which praise and blame, reward and punishment, are the chief exponents. Such 'sources within a man' are the *πάθη*, belonging as they do to that part of human nature which is characterised as *μετέχον λόγου, κατήκοον λόγου καὶ πειθαρχικόν—i.e. still* capable of being *organised* in relation to *νόμος*, or the rational environment. From the *πάθη* proceed (1) actions neither more nor less the man's *own* actions than are the movements of his heart or lungs, but distinguished from these latter movements by the circumstance that they affect other people's interests directly or indirectly, and accordingly elicit praise or blame, or otherwise call forth social influences, in relation to which they suffer modification—are encouraged or repressed. From the *πάθη* proceed also (2) actions which do not affect other people's interests, and therefore do not elicit praise or blame, but are called voluntary because they do not proceed from their sources in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of their *not* proceeding from them under certain conditions. Whenever, in short, an act proceeds not inevitably from an inherited organ, but with some degree of hesitation from a state of feeling which, in the history of the individual, can be (or could have been) affected

(even to the extent of being sometimes rendered entirely inoperative) 1109 b. 34. by other feelings, whether self-regarding or altruistic, we call the act voluntary. As, however, man's true personality consists in his consciousness of social relations, and his readiness to be modified in correspondence with social requirements, acts which meet these requirements and acts which disregard them are 'voluntary' in the truest sense. Acts which affect the agent alone, although proceeding *contingently* from their sources, and therefore voluntary, are so in the lower sense in which we speak of the actions of children and brutes as voluntary. From the way in which Aristotle connects 'the voluntary' with 'praise and blame' here, and in other passages, we can see that he practically identifies *man's* 'efficiency' with his correspondence, or failure, by reason of the prevalence of selfish feelings, to correspond with the social environment. As it is only the *πολίτης* who is truly *αὐτάρκης* (see *E. N.* i. 7. 6), so it is only the *πολίτης* who is truly an *ἀρχὴ πράξεων*. The term 'voluntary' however in its general sense is applicable to any act which results from a feeling or desire contingently, *i.e.* so results that it *may* be prevented by the operation of another feeling or desire. In carrying back the explanation of voluntary action to the possession by man of a *δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων—i.e.* of tendencies still capable of modification, and in connecting it so closely with the sanctions of a social system, the high complexity of which he fully recognised, Aristotle gives prominence to the same considerations as have led a modern evolutionist, like Spencer, to speak of 'Will as coming into existence through the increasing complexity, and imperfect coherence of automatic actions'—(*Psych.* i. 498-499; cf. whole chapter on *The Will*, Special Synth. ch. ix).

§ 3. τὰ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν] 'Cum spontaneum id sit, cujus b. 35. principium in eo sit qui agat, non ignorante singulas circumstantias, invite factum exstat simulatque una ex ambabus conditionibus, quas requirit spontaneum, abest.' Michelet *ad loc.* A voluntary act in one of which the *ἀρχή* is in the agent himself, he being at the same time aware of the several circumstances of his act. These are the two conditions of a voluntary act. An act is involuntary when either of these two conditions is absent: *i.e.* if the agent, while knowing all the circumstances of his act, is forced to act by an external constraining power, *οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποί ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες* (§ 3); or if, while he is under no external constraint, he is ignorant

1109 b. 35. of the circumstances—*e. g.* one who administers poison, thinking it to be medicine, because it has been put, through no fault of his own, into a bottle labelled ‘medicine,’ is not held to be the ‘cause’ of the consequent poisoning, or to have poisoned ‘voluntarily.’ His act is one δι’ ἀγνοίαν γυγνόμενον.

The remarks of Eudemus (*E. E.* ii. 8) on the βίαιον are very instructive. Τὸ βίαιον and ἀνάγκη, he says, are terms employed to mark a force which interferes with the law governing the behaviour of an object inanimate or animate; a stone is moved upwards βία, fire downwards βία. When these inanimate objects move in their own natural direction—κατὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν καθ’ αὐτὰ ὁρμήν (1224 a. 18), they are not said to move βία, nor yet are they ἐκούσια. There is no name to characterise their movement. Similarly, in the case of animals, we see many motions or acts which are βία—*viz.* those done ἔταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμήν ἔξωθεν τι κινή (1224 a. 22). In the case of inanimate objects it is easy to see the external ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως which interferes with the law of their nature. It is also easy in the case of irrational animals. They live τῇ ὀρέξει. Everything which thwarts their ὀρεξίς is βίαιον. But in the case of man a difficulty arises. He has ἔσω equally internal principles—λόγος and ὀρεξίς, which thwart each other. Does λόγος exert βία in the case of the ἐγκρατής, or ὀρεξίς in the case of the ἀκρατής? No. Both λόγος and ὀρεξίς are internal, and βία is exerted only by external agencies. An act done from prudence, and on rational grounds, is neither more nor less ‘voluntary’ than one done from the mere appetite of the moment,—ἢ δ’ ὅλη ἐκούσια ψυχῇ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βία δ’ οὐδέτερος (1224 b. 26). We must not abstract a man’s motives (whether high or low, whether due to tendencies acquired during his own lifetime, or to those inherited from his ancestors) from *himself*, and say that they are external to him and force him (βία). If later controversialists had seen this as clearly as Aristotle and the peripatetics did, we should have been spared many profitless discussions about the ‘Freedom of the Will’ and ‘Moral Responsibility.’

1110 a. 4. § 4. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος] A tyrant with power over the lives of a man’s family commands him to do something base. He may do it from fear of greater evils—διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν, *i. e.* the death of his family; or he may refuse to do it because honour forbids (διὰ καλόν τι).

In either case he does something most painful to himself; and the 1110 a. 4. question is: Does he act voluntarily or involuntarily?

§§ 5, 6.] The answer is given in these sections. Such actions *a. 8.* are μικταί. Except under very exceptional circumstances no one performs them voluntarily—ἐκούσια δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ’ ὕως ἀκούσια οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο καθ’ αὐτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. But there are exceptional circumstances in which men perform them. In these exceptional circumstances, at the time at which they are performed, they are voluntary—they proceed from an internal ἀρχή, from a desire to perform them in the agent; but in any other circumstances, as a matter of fact, no one would perform them. In discussing therefore the voluntariness of a given action we must look at it strictly in connexion with the circumstances in which it takes place, for ‘the end or motive of an act is that which is in view at the time’ (Peters)—τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἔστω—*e. g.* the τέλος or object which a man has in view when he throws his goods overboard is not the infliction of loss on himself, but the lightening of the ship. The question is whether such an act is *voluntary* or *involuntary*; not whether it is *wise* or *unwise* in the particular circumstances, or *likely to be matter of regret* when the danger has passed. I see no reason for holding with Grant that ‘the phrase τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως is general, not referring only to the cases under dispute, but to action universally’—or that ‘τέλος is used here in a peculiar sense to denote the moral character of an action.’ It seems better to take τέλος in the passage before us in the sense in which it is afterwards employed in chap. 5. § 17 of this Book, as ‘the object specially contemplated by a particular action’—*e. g.* the lightening of the ship. In discussing the question of the voluntariness of a disagreeable action, let us not lose sight of ‘the object specially contemplated by the given action,’ and wander into the irrelevancy of considering the feelings with which such actions are regarded in the abstract.

It may be remarked in passing with regard to the instance of a μικτὴ πράξις given in § 5—that cases arising out of αἱ ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολαί were probably well known in the law courts: cf., for the *Lex Rhodia de jactura*, *Digest.* xiv. 2. 1—‘lege Rhodia cavetur ut si levandae navis gratia jactus mercium factus est, omnium contributione sarciatur quod pro omnibus datum est’;—*i. e.* the principle of the ‘general average’ is to be applied.

1110 a. 17. § 6. ὦν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μὴ] This statement, taken as an aphorism by itself, would be too general. The functions of the heart proceed from an ἀρχή which is strictly ἐν αὐτῷ, *i. e.* is involved in the φύσις of the individual (cf. ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχή ἐν αὐτῷ *Met.* Δ. 3. 1070 a. 7) and yet cannot be described as ἐπ' αὐτῷ.

a. 19. § 7. ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαιροῦνται] 'which shows that the acts are regarded as voluntary'—Peters, note *ad loc.*

a. 28. § 8. Ἀλκμαίωνα] The anonymous scholiast on this Book (Ald. ed.) has the following note here—καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα τὸν Ἀμφιαράου παῖδα, τοῦτον ᾧ ὁ πατήρ ἀνελεῖν τὴν μητέρα (Eriphyle) ἐπέσκηψεν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔσται τὸν πατέρα λυπῶν· ὅς οὐ δι' ἀξίας αἰτίας ποῖων τοῦτο ἰστορεῖται. ἄλλως· παρατίθεται τὸν παρ' Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα ὡς δι' εἰτελῆ τινα ὑπομείναντα μητροκτονῆσαι· λέγει γὰρ παρ' αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀλκμαίων

μάλιστα μὲν μ' ἐπῆρεν ἐπισκήψας πατήρ
ὅθ' ἄρμα(τ') εἰσέβαιεν εἰς Θήβας ἰών·

διὰ γὰρ τούτων ἐντολὰς τοῦ πατρὸς διηγείται, ὡς ἐντεταλμένου αὐτοῦ ἀποκτεῖναι τὴν μητέρα, καὶ καταρασαμένου αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ ἀποκτενεῖ, ἀκαρπίαν τε γῆς καὶ ἀτεκνίαν, καὶ διαβολὰς τινὰς λέγει τῆς μητρὸς, ὧν οὐδὲν ἦν ἄξιον τηλικούτου κακῶν ἀναγκάσαι ποιῆσαι τινα.

a. 32. § 9. ἀναγκάζονται] We have here the influence of an internal ἀρχή—of motives, not of external force, and the term ἀναγκάζονται is perhaps improperly used. But it may be that Aristotle draws a distinction between ἀνάγκη and βία (cf. § 8 ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι—where βιασθῆναι would have been absurd); motives of painful cogency being ἀναγκαῖα, though, as internal principles, not βία. The writer of the *M. M.* discusses τὸ βίαιον and τὸ ἀναγκαῖον in separate chapters (i. 14 and 15); and, although he says τὸ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐν παντί, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός, his example shows that he is thinking of the effect produced on the mind of the agent by an external occurrence, not of physical compulsion—*M. M.* i. 15. 1188 b. 21 οἷον ἠναγκάσθην συντομώτερον βαδίσαι εἰς ἀγρόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀπολωλὸτ' ἂν εἶρον τὰ ἐν ἀγρῷ. In short, very painfully cogent motives may be called ἀναγκαῖα, as distinguished from pleasures, which cannot be called ἀναγκαῖα however pressing—*M. M.* i. 15. 1188 b. 15 τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον οὐ πάντως οὐδ' ἐν παντί λεκτέον ἐστίν, οἷον ὅσα ἡδονῆς ἔνεκεν πράττομεν. εἰ γὰρ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἠναγκάσθην τὴν τοῦ φίλου γυναῖκα διαφθεῖραι ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη.

§ 10. τὰ δὲ ποῖα φατέον βίαια;] This question, following immediately upon the words περὶ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μὴ, and the terms in which it is answered, support the view that Aristotle, like the writer of the *M. M.*, distinguished technically between ἀναγκαῖα and βίαια. In the case of the ἀναγκαῖον it is true that ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός ἐστίν, but not true that ὁ πρᾶττων μηδὲν συμβάλλεται. The external occurrence operates through the medium of the painful feeling which it produces. On the other hand, τὸ βίαιον is distinguished from τὸ ἀναγκαῖον by the differentia ὅπύ' ἂν ὁ πρᾶττων μηδὲν συμβάλλεται. The external agency determines a man's act without the effective intervention of his feelings.

αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια] 'For acts fall within the sphere of particulars; and here the particular thing that is done is voluntary'—Peters: *i. e.* in discussing the voluntariness of an act done under painful circumstances, we must take the act by itself as 'a particular'—in connexion merely with the temporary state of mind out of which it immediately springs; we must not raise the general question of its wisdom or goodness.

ἀποδοῦναι] syn. ἀρίξειν: see *Ind. Arist. s. v. ἀποδιδόναι*—'it is not easy to say.'

§ 11. εἰ δὲ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ κ.τ.λ.] The Aldine Scholiast seems to have read λυπηρά for καλά. He says—τούτων γὰρ χάριν τουτέστι τῶν ἡδέων καὶ λυπηρῶν, τὰ μὲν φεύγοντες τὰ δὲ διώκοντες· τὸ δὲ πάντες, δηλοῦστί χωρὶς τῶν ἀγαθῶν λέγει καὶ σπουδαίων. But καλά (*bona, honesta, formosa*) are regularly coupled with ἡδέα, as *e. g.* in *E. N.* ii. 3. 7, τὸ συμφέρον (not mentioned here) being the means to either. See Grant's note here. Having shown that acts done from feelings produced by painful circumstances are voluntary, and are praised and blamed in various degrees, Aristotle goes on in the present section to show that acts proceeding from states of mind produced by pleasant objects, or by the contemplation of what is good and honourable, are also voluntary. The parenthetical words ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα are to be understood as describing the position of those (εἰ δὲ τις . . . φαίη) whose view he is arguing against. Cf. *M. M.* i. 15. 1188 b. 17 εἰ γὰρ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἠναγκάσθην τὴν τοῦ φίλου γυναῖκα διαφθεῖραι ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη. Pleasant things, and things that are good and honourable, cannot be said to force us, or to be the causes of involuntary actions; for (1) if they

1110 b. 9. were so, then *all* actions would be compulsory and involuntary; since it is for the sake of pleasant things, or of things that are good and honourable, that we do all that we do: (2) those who act under compulsion, and involuntarily, act with pain; those who act for the sake of the pleasant, or the good and honourable, act with pleasure: (3) this doctrine that pleasant things force us 'leaves out of account,' as Grant expresses it, 'the internal susceptibility of the agent (*αἰτῶν εἰθέραιον ὄντα*),' and, in fact, is merely an excuse for bad actions, which are generally done for the sake of pleasant things. We take credit to ourselves for good actions, and blame pleasant things for our bad actions.

The sum of Aristotle's teaching here is that we must not abstract a man's motives, whether good or bad, from himself, and say that they are external to him, and force him. The later doctrines of Necessitarianism and Free Will, both apparently now defunct, equally erred in making the abstraction deprecated by Aristotle.

b. 10. πάντα ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ βίαια] Bekker reads οὕτω for αὐτῷ: but the authority for αὐτῷ—K^b, L^b, M^b, NC, Cambr.—(accepted by Bywater) is stronger.

b. 18. § 13. οὐχ ἐκούσιον] 'Non-voluntary.'

b. 22. τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δὲ] τοῦ is apparently masc.—cf. iv. 6. 9 τοῦ δὲ συνηδύοντος ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δὲ. There is an apparent inconsistency between the doctrine of this §, according to which the *μη μεταμελόμενος* is not to be called *ἄκων*, and the doctrine of § 6 above,—καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ὅτε πράττει λεκτέον.

b. 24. § 14. ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα] 'Through ignorance' . . . 'in ignorance.' After ἀγνοοῦντα Bekker has ποιεῖν, given by Γ and NC. The distinction is that between acting from unavoidable (τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν), and acting in avoidable ignorance (τὸ ἀγνοοῦντα πράττειν). The unavoidable ignorance which can be pleaded in excuse of an action, by an agent who regrets what he has done (*μεταμελόμενος* § 13), and which constitutes (equally with βία) the action in question ἀκούσιον, is that of *mere* particulars (*ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πράξις*); e.g. (to take the example of ἀτύχημα given by the Paraphrast in his note on v. 8. 7)—a sportsman, shooting at a distance from the haunts of

men, kills a man who lies concealed in a thicket. He kills the man 1110 b. 24. *merely* from ignorance of the particular fact that someone is there concealed. He possesses no general principle from which he could possibly have inferred this fact. The fact stands entirely by itself, being of so exceptional a kind that he could not have foreseen it. His ignorance therefore is described (§ 15) as *ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα*, and counts as an external cause co-ordinate with βία, the preposition διὰ in the phrase δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν expressing, as Michelet remarks, an agency distinct from himself, i.e. ignorance not due to his own carelessness or other bad habits. But if, (to take the Paraphrast's example of a ἀτύχημα v. 8. 7), the sportsman shoots too near a frequented highway and unwittingly kills a passer-by, we do not acquiesce in his ignorance of the fact that someone was passing by; we go back to the cause of this ignorance—his own carelessness. We hold him responsible for his ignorance of a fact which he might have, and ought to have, inferred as probable from the general principle in his possession—that highways are frequented by travellers. His ignorance is not due to the exceptional nature of the fact, as in the first case, but to his own disposition. It is not really ignorance of a particular fact which we have here to deal with, but rather a state of ignorance—a general tendency not to notice a certain class of facts. Hence this state of ignorance, whether it consists in the non-application, or in the non-possession, in the temporary obscuration, or in the entire absence, of principles of good conduct, is described as *ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει, or ἢ καθόλου ἄγνοια* (§ 15). It is not an accident external to the man. It is part of himself and whatever it causes he causes. Being a *quality in the agent*, it is, as Michelet remarks, well expressed by the participle ἀγνοοῦντα agreeing with the subject of πράττειν. But not only is it *his* ignorance, just as his health is *his* health. This would not make him socially responsible for its results. He is responsible because it supervenes although it *need not necessarily* supervene, or is not removed, when it *might* be removed. Thus a man is responsible for mistakes committed in temporary states of ignorance induced by drunkenness or passion, because to pass into these states is contingent not necessary: cf. *E. N.* iii. 5. 8 καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια: ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μη μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. For the same reason, he is responsible for acts proceeding from an established vicious cha-

1110 b. 24. racter—from total blindness to the true end of human endeavour—what Plato calls ‘the lie in the soul.’ Similarly, ignorance of a law which has been published and is easy to understand is ignorance for which a man is responsible. Hence the principle of Jurisprudence *Ignorantia juris nocet; ignorantia facti non nocet*. Cf. *É. N.* iii. 5. 8 καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοούντας τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἀ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι’ ἀμέλειαν ἀγροεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ὄν τὸ μὴ ἀγροεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι.

There is of course some confusion in calling *the acts themselves* which are done δι’ ἄγνοιαν non-voluntary or involuntary. Strictly, the acts themselves are voluntary, but their *results* are such as the agent could not possibly have foreseen, and he is not held responsible for results which he did not contemplate and now regrets. It would be more correct to say that a man is not held responsible for such results, than that the acts are involuntary. The sportsman shoots voluntarily into the thicket, being ignorant of the fact that, contrary to all probability, a man lies concealed there. He kills the man; but is not held responsible for this unforeseen result of his voluntary act.

b. 27. διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων] διὰ μέθην καὶ ὀργήν.

b. 28. ἀγροεῖ . . . § 15 περὶ αὐτῆς ἢ πράξεως] If we follow Michelet in sharply distinguishing ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια and ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια, we may explain this passage thus—τὸ συμφέρον¹ is that which is useful as a means: ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια is ignorance in the choice of means to the attainment of an end, and hence is equivalent to ignorance of the *συμφέρον*—cf. iii. 2. 9 ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος. Now this ignorance in the choice of means is not an external accident, but a condition of the agent, which he has brought upon himself by yielding to his πάθη. Hence it is not the cause of involuntary but of voluntary actions—indeed it is the cause of those reprehensible actions the repetition of which eventually establishes an evil character—μοχθηρία: οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκούσιου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας.

Μοχθηρία is thus the same as ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια—ignorance of the true end itself—for it is the moral character which gives the end: iii. 5. 20 τῶ ποιῶντις εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα. Thus, as Giphanius observes, ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια is characteristic of the

¹ Bywater reads τὰ συμφέροντα given by K^b, Asp., and NC.

ἀκρατής, who knows the end, but is tempted by his passions to stray 1110 b. 28. from the path of duty leading to it: while ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια is characteristic of the ἀκόλαστος, who has become permanently blind to the end. A man is responsible for both kinds of ἄγνοια—for the ἄγνοια of temporary passion, and for that of an established vicious character.

But, although Aristotle undoubtedly distinguishes in this Book προαίρεσις, as concerned with the means, from βούλησις the wish for the end, and although it is reasonable to suppose that, in here using the term προαίρεσις, he has in view the technical meaning which he is about to give it; it does not therefore follow that in using the expression ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια he has in view something as distinct from ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια as προαίρεσις itself is distinct from βούλησις: for in iii. 3. 16 he tells us that the objects of βούλησις, and therefore of προαίρεσις, are not *mere* particulars, thus implying that they are particulars in which *the general law or rule* of conduct is seen. Hence ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια, which is equivalent to ἀγροεῖν τὰ συμφέροντα, or ἀγροεῖν ἀ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὄν ἀφεκτέον, is essentially ‘an ignorance of the end,’ or ‘a general ignorance,’ ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια, and, as such, is distinguished from the excusable ἡ καθ’ ἕκαστα ἄγνοια—the thought of this latter expression, as about to be used, having determined Aristotle to translate ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια into the equivalent ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια for the sake of the antithesis. ‘Ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια is thus distinguished from ἡ καθ’ ἕκαστα ἄγνοια as being a *state*, inchoate, or established, *of the agent*, producing acts which are so far from being involuntary that they are morally evil, and confirm the evil tendency—μοχθηρία, from which they spring: *i. e.* ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια may stand either for the state of the ἀκρατής who is said to act from ἐπιθυμία and not with προαίρεσις (iii. 2. 4)—his ἄγνοια being, in fact, the prevalence of ἐπιθυμία *where προαίρεσις ought to prevail*; or for that of the ἀκόλαστος, or ὄλος κακός, who is said to act προαιρούμενος (vii. 7. 2), *i. e.* calmly and without passion choosing means to the bad end which his character sets up—the ἄγνοια being, in this case, that confirmed moral blindness to the good end which makes it possible for him ‘to choose means’ to the bad end.

‘Ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια, accordingly, meaning ignorance which is a state or tendency inchoate or established of the agent, may, in relation to the numerous ἀμαρτίαι which flow, or are likely to flow, from it, be described as a *general ignorance*. Hence follow the

1110 b. 28. words οὐδ' ἢ καθόλου . . . ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα—'that is, it is not general ignorance, but particular ignorance, which makes an act involuntary.' Here all turns on the point whether οὐδ' necessarily *distinguishes* ἢ καθόλου ἄγνοια from the ἄγνοια previously mentioned, or admits of being rendered as above—'that is, it is *not* general ignorance,' &c. The Paraphrast, Grant, Ramsauer, and Peters do not distinguish ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια and ἢ καθόλου ἄγνοια: and, with some hesitation, I agree with them, against Michelet, for the reasons I have given, and because I believe that οὐδ' can be legitimately rendered as above. The Paraphrast's comment is—ἢ γὰρ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια, ἥτις ἐστὶν αἰτία τῶν κακιῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας· οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθόλου περὶ τῆς μέθης ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι πονηρὸν αἴτιον γίνεται τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀγνοῆσαι μερικῶς τῆνδε τὴν μέθην, οἶον, φέρε εἰπεῖν, οὐκ εἰδὸτα μέχρι πόσου πίνοντας ἐνι μεθύειν.

One further point however—Does the writer of *E. E.* ii. 9 throw any light on the present passage? Has he it in view at all? and if so, is the distinction which he draws the same as that which Michelet finds here in § 15? His words are—1225 b. 11 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι διττόν, ἐν μὲν τὸ ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ὃ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὡς δικαίως ἂν ἀγνοῶν λέγοιτο, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ δικαίως, οἶον εἰ δι' ἀμελειαν μὴ ἐχρήτο. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις ψέγοιτο ἂν, εἰ δὲ ῥάδιον ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, μὴ ἔχει δι' ἀμελειαν ἢ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην. Is ὃ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δὲ the man whose ignorance is ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει—Michelet's 'ignorance in the choice of means,' and ὃ μὴ ἔχων the man whose ignorance is ἢ καθόλου—'universal,' i.e. 'of the end'? cf. the οὐδ' ἢ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην) of the *E. N.* with the ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις ψέγοιτο ἂν of the *E. E.*

1111 a. 1. § 15. ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ αἱ] 'Ignorance of the particular occasion and circumstances of the act'—Peters. Better—'the persons and things affected by the act': see below, notes on § 18.

a. 4. § 16. περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι] 'On what object or person.'

a. 9. § 17. λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς] *Liddell-and-Scott* has 'ἐξέπεσέ με—*it escaped me unawares*, Arist. *Eth. N.* 3. 1. 17,' but quotes no other instance of the usage. Ramsauer defends the usage—'Εκπίπτει με alienum a Graecae linguae indole non dixerit qui meminerit legi ἐκβαίνειν, ἐξελεῖν χόραν.' The Paraphrast, how-

ever (perhaps reading λέγοντας), seems to make the subject of 1111 a. 9. ἐκπεσεῖν the persons—λέγοντας γὰρ περὶ ἄλλων συγχυθῆναι φασί, καὶ τι καὶ περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων παραφθέγγεσθαι, μὴ συνωρῶντας δὲ λέγουσιν, ἢ καὶ ἀγνοῦντας ὅτι ἀπόρητα ἦν—*i. e.* ἐκπεσεῖν (= συγχυθῆναι) means 'to be confused,' 'put out,' as we might say. The Ald. Schol., again, has—οἶον λέγοντός μου ἐξέπεσέν μοι τοιοῦτον ῥῆμα—as though he read λέγοντας, and understood the clause to mean, 'they say that, in the course of their talk, the word escaped them.' Aspasius has—τὸ δὲ τί ἐστὶν τὸ πραττόμενον, ὅπερ ἐκπετωκέαι (λέγουσιν, Heylbut) αἰτούς, ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά.

Αἰσχύλος] Tried and acquitted by the Court of Arcopagus: see a. 10. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* ii. 387, Ael. *V. H.* v. 19, and the Ald. Schol.

ἢ Μερόπη] The Ald. Schol. has—καὶ ἔστι παρ' Εὐριπίδῃ ἐν τῷ a. 12. Κρεσφόντῃ ἐπιβουλεύουσα Κρεσφόντῃ τῷ υἱῷ ὡς πολέμῳ δι' ἄγνοιαν. Cf. *Poet.* 14. 1454 a. 5 ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἢ Μερόπῃ μέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν· ἀποκτείνει δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισεν. Cf. *Plut.* περὶ σαρκοφαγίας 2. 5 (quoted by Coraes) σκόπει δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ Μερόπῃ ἐπὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτὸν ὡς φονέα τοῦ υἱοῦ πελεκυν ἀραμένην καὶ λέγουσαν

ὄσιωτέραν δὴ τήνδ' ἐγὼ δίδωμι σοι
πληγὴν—

ὅσον ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ κίνημα ποιεῖ.

ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ] λελογχωμένον δόρυ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔχον ἐπ' ἄκρου σιδήριον ὀξύ, τὴν καλουμένην λόγχην, χρήσιμον εἰς τὰς μάχας· ὅπερ οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι γυμνασίας ἕνεκα καὶ οὐ μάχης ἤβλυον, σφαιρούντες ἢ σκυτοῦντες, οἳ εἰσι τὰ παρὰ τοῖς Γάλλοις καλούμενα *fleurets*. Coraes.

ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πίσας] This is the certain emendation of Bernays a. 13. (accepted by Susem. and Bywater) for the πάσας of the codd. Πιπίσκων is 'to give to drink.' The illustrations in the parallel passages—*E. E.* ii. 9, and *M. M.* i. 16—bear out the emendation.

θίξαι] restored by Susem. and Bywater in place of the δαίξαι of a. 14. most MSS.

ἀκροχειρίζομενοι] explained by the Ald. Schol.—ἔστι τὸ πικτεύειν a. 15. ἢ παγκρατιάζειν πρὸς ἕτερον ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς ἢ ὄλως ἀκραις ταῖς χερσὶ μετ' ἀλλήλων. 'It is what we call "sparring"',—Grant.

The various forms that ἢ ἄγνοια ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα may take are thus illustrated in the present section in the order in which they are

1111 a. 15. enumerated in section 16. Ignorance (1) of the thing done (τί)—Aeschylus and the Mysteries, the catapult accident: (2) of the object of the act (περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι)—Merope's mistake: (3) of the instrument (τίνι)—the pointed spear, the stone mistaken for pumice-stone: (4) of the result of the act (τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα)—killing by a potion intended to cure: (5) of the manner (πῶς)—when in sparring a man hits harder than he supposes or wishes.

a. 16. § 18. ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις] bracketed by Ramsauer, l. 16. In line 18 the same expression occurs in a specific sense,=the persons affected by the act.

a. 18. κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα] 'The most important circumstances are the objects of the action and its result'—as the Paraphrast explains, τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ τὸ ἔργον. The οὐ ἔνεκα here is not, as usual, the *intention* of the doer, for he cannot be ignorant of what he intends to do; but the *outcome* or *result* of what he actually does, which is the opposite of his intention. See Grant *ad loc.*

a. 24. §§ 20, 21.] In the words ὥσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν it is implied that the position ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν is inconsistent with the definition of τὸ ἐκούσιον just laid down. This position must be examined, for if it is correct, the definition will require modification, θυμός and ἐπιθυμία being ἀρχαὶ ἐν αἰτῷ.

a. 27. § 23.] Here, as elsewhere in this Book, Aristotle maintains the necessity of keeping the question of the *voluntariness* of actions distinct from that of their *goodness or badness*. Popular thought tended to merge these two questions. All actions, Aristotle argues, proceeding from modifiable feelings and states of the agent, are voluntary; it matters not, so far as the voluntariness of the actions is concerned, whether the feelings and states are morally good or bad, *i. e.* are the causes of morally good, or of morally bad actions. Further, in this section, Aristotle makes it clear that he regards θυμός and ἐπιθυμία as the sources of τὰ καλὰ. In his system, the passions are not abolished, but regulated. Ἀρετή is the result of the εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων (Eustrat.). The passions supply the motive power in action; διάνοια δ' αὐτῇ οὐθέν κινεῖ (vi. 2. 5).

ἐνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος] 'As one man is the author of both'—Peters. 1111 a. 29. Better—ἐν γὰρ τὸ αἰτιον, θυμός ἢ ἐπιθυμία—Par.

§ 24. ὡν δεῖ δρέγεσθαι] θυμός and ἐπιθυμία are two species of the a. 30. genus ὄρεξις, the third species being βούλησις (see *E. E.* ii. 7. 1223 a. 26), not as yet mentioned. Θυμός and ἐπιθυμία elicited by proper objects (ὡν δεῖ δρέγεσθαι) are surely not causes of involuntary actions. To hold that they are would be to maintain the position, which nobody apparently wishes to maintain, that τὰ καλὰ are involuntary.

§ 26.] The Paraph. has—εἰ ἀκούσια ἦν τὰ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀμαρτηθέντα, a. 33. διέφερον ἂν τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀμαρτανομένων, κατὰ τὴν ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον διαφορὰν διαφέρει δὲ οὐδέν' καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις φευκτά, ὃ τοῦ ἐκούσιου ἐστὶ, καὶ ψόγων ἄξια οὐδὲν ἦττον' ὅπερ οὐκ ἂν ἦν, εἰ διέφερον ὡς ἐκούσιον ἀκούσιον. The force of the section may be brought out thus—'Further, do the faults of anger differ from those of calculation in being involuntary? Surely not. Faults of both kinds should be avoided, and the irrational passions seem to be no less part of human nature than the reason.'

§ 27.] ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (αἱ) ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ b. 1. ἐπιθυμίας] K^b and Γ give ὥστε καὶ αἱ, and the αἱ before ἀπὸ is a conjecture adopted by Byw. from Susemihl. Τοῦ ἀνθρώπου thus becomes the predicate in correspondence with ἀνθρωπικά in the line above. The other authorities (followed by Bekker) instead of ὥστε καὶ αἱ give αἱ δέ. This latter was evidently the reading which the Paraph. had: his words are—ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἄλογα πάθη καὶ ἀνθρώπινά εἰσιν ὥσπερ ὁ λογισμὸς' ἀπὸ τούτων δὲ τῶν παθῶν, θυμοῦ δηλονότι καὶ ἐπιθυμίας, πᾶσαι αἱ ἀνθρώπιναι γίνονται πράξεις.

The writer of the *E. E.* discusses the relation of τὸ ἐκούσιον and τὸ ἀκούσιον to ἐπιθυμία and θυμός in ii. 7. His first position is 1223 a. 33 τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρὸν (ἢ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος) ὥστε βίαιον καὶ ἀκούσιον' τὸ ἄρα κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον. His second position takes the form of an ἀπορία, through which he eventually passes to the solution of the problem of the nature of τὸ ἐκούσιον. 1223 b. 3 ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτων δόξειεν ἂν τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε τοῦναντίον. ἅπαν γὰρ ὁ ἐκὼν τις πράττει, βουλόμενος πράττει, καὶ ὁ βούλεται, ἐκὼν. βούλεται δ' οὐθεὶς ὁ οὔεται εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκρατεύμενος οὐχ ἂ βούλεται ποιεῖ' τὸ γὰρ παρ' ὁ οὔεται βέλτιστον εἶναι πράττειν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεῦσθαι ἐστίν. ὥστε ἅμα συμβήσεται τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν' τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον.

1111 b. 1. Wish (*βούλησις*) is voluntary; but the *ἀκρατής*, who acts *κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν*, acts contrary to his wish; therefore to act *κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν* is to act involuntarily. But, as the writer points out in the next chapter (*E. E.* ii. 8), this *ἀπορία* owes its existence to an unwarranted abstraction. We are not entitled to look at *ἐπιθυμία* by itself as constituting the man, and to say that in the *ἐγκρατής* it is forced by *λογισμός*, or at *λογισμός* by itself, and say that in the *ἀκρατής* it is forced by *ἐπιθυμία*—1224 b. 26 ἢ δ' ὅλη ἐκούσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βία δ' οὐδέτερος. Ἐπιθυμία, in short, is as much the man as *λογισμός*, and action consequent upon either is voluntary. The same remarks apply to *θυμός*.

In the *Rhetoric* i. 10. 1368 b. 32 seven causes of action are enumerated—*τύχη*, *φύσις*, and *βία* of involuntary, and *ἔθος*, *λογισμός*, *θυμός*, and *ἐπιθυμία* of voluntary actions:—*πάντες δὴ πάντα πράττουσι τὰ μὲν οὐ δι' αὐτοῦς τὰ δὲ δι' αὐτοῦς. τῶν μὲν οὖν μὴ δι' αὐτοῦς τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττουσι τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τῶν δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν βία τὰ δὲ φύσει, ὥστε πάντα ὅσα μὴ δι' αὐτοῦς πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ δὲ βία. ὅσα δὲ δι' αὐτοῦς, καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δι' ἔθος τὰ δὲ δι' ὄρεξις τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξις τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλογον ἔστω δ' ἢ μὲν βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἄλλ' ἢ ὅταν οἰσθῆ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἄλογοι δ' ὄρέξεις ὄρηγῃ καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι' αἰτίας ἐπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, δι' ἔθος, διὰ λογισμὸν, διὰ θυμὸν, δι' ἐπιθυμίαν.*

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

Let us now discuss Choice: for its connexion with moral virtue is intimate, and it is a better criterion of character than overt action is.

Choice falls as a species under 'the voluntary,' i. e. 'the voluntary' is of wider extent, for (1) while children and brutes are as capable of voluntary action as adult men are, they are incapable of choice: and (2) the sudden acts of adult men are voluntary acts, but not acts of choice.

Some have identified choice with desire or passion: but (1) the lower animals have desire and passion, without having the power of choice: and (2) the acts of the incontinent man result from desire, not from choice, those of the continent man from choice, not from desire: (3) there is a contrariety between desire and choice; for desire is related to things simply qua pleasant and painful, but choice is not related to its objects qua pleasant and painful, but qua good and bad.

The difference between choice and passion is even more marked than that between it and desire—acts which we perform in a passion we are very far from waiting to choose.

Others again have identified choice with wish. The two are closely connected, but there is a difference: for we never choose an impossibility, although we may wish it, e. g. we may wish never to die. Again, we often wish for results which we have no power to bring about, e. g. that a certain competitor may get the prize; whereas we only choose what we can ourselves bring about. Further, wish is properly of the end, e. g. we wish health; choice of the means, e. g. we choose to do this, that, and the other thing conducive to health, in all cases the objects of choice being things which lie within our power.

Nor is choice opinion, for we may have opinions about all things in heaven and earth, not merely about things which lie within our power; and opinions are distinguished as true or false, whereas choice is good or bad. But if we may not for these reasons identify choice with opinion generally, perhaps we may identify it with opinion about right and wrong in conduct. No: for choosing rightly or wrongly makes us good or bad men; but having opinions about right and wrong does not. And it is correct to say 'we choose to do something,' but not to say 'we have an opinion to do something.' It is 'about something' that we have an opinion. Again choice is praised for having a good object; opinion, for being true; and what we choose is that which we consider good; but we form an opinion about a thing independently of any such consideration. Nor do we always find good choice and true opinion going together. There are some people with excellent opinions who have bad characters, and choose as they ought not. It is another question, which does not concern us, whether an opinion precedes, or attends, an act of choice: at any rate we have shown that the two are not to be identified.

What then remains after all these exclusions? In choosing, as we have seen, we always act voluntarily; but in acting voluntarily we do not always wait to choose—we sometimes act on the spur of the moment, from mere desire. It remains therefore that, in acting from choice, we act voluntarily, not on the spur of the moment, but deliberately; consequently the object of choice is a voluntary act, about which a man has deliberated. After going through a process of reasoning he prefers that which he 'chooses.'

§§ 1-14. *περὶ προαιρέσεως*] This chapter treats of *προαίρεσις* or 1111 b. 5. deliberate choice (late Latin *electio*: see Victorius *ad loc.*). *Προαίρεσις* is a *species* of *τὸ ἐκούσιον*—§ 2 ἢ *προαίρεσις* δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἐκούσιον—i. e. *τὸ ἐκούσιον* is of wider extent, for (1) children and brutes have *τὸ ἐκούσιον*, but not *προαίρεσις*: (2) sudden acts are *ἐκούσια* but not *κατὰ προαίρεσιν*. Again *προαίρεσις* is not *ἐπιθυμία* or *θυμός*, for (1) irrational animals have *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμός*, but not *προαίρεσις*: (2) *ἐπιθυμία* and *προαίρεσις* must be distinct principles, for the supremacy of the one or the other constitutes the different character of the *ἀκρατής* or of the *ἐγκρατής* respectively: (3) the opposition between *προαίρεσις*

1111 b. 5. and ἐπιθυμία is something very different from that between one ἐπιθυμία and another: (4) the relation of ἐπιθυμία to pleasure and pain is very different from that of προαίρεσις to pleasure and pain: (5) the difference between θυμός and προαίρεσις is even more striking than that between ἐπιθυμία and προαίρεσις. Acts done from θυμός are the very opposite of acts from deliberate choice. Again προαίρεσις is not the same as βούλησις, *wish*, for (1) προαίρεσις is of things in our power, βούλησις often for impossibilities: (2) βούλησις has properly to do with the end, προαίρεσις with the means. Again προαίρεσις is not the same as δόξα, for (1) δόξα is about all things—impossibilities as well as things in our power: (2) δόξαι are distinguished as true or false, not as *good* or *evil*. Nor is προαίρεσις the same as δόξα τις, *i. e.* an opinion on matters of conduct (cf. *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 a. 4 οὐδὲ δὴ ἢ τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων πρακτῶν δόξα, ἢ τυγχάνομεν οἰόμενοι δεῖν τι πράττειν ἢ οὐ πράττειν)—for such opinions, however sound, do not affect the character as a series of προαιρέσεις does: (3) we 'choose to take or avoid'; but we do not 'opine to take or avoid': (4) προαίρεσις is praised for its goodness, δόξα for its truth: (5) we choose what we have reason to consider good, but form opinions about things quite irrespectively of this consideration—ἀ οὐ πᾶν ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα (but see note *ad loc.* § 13): (6) it is not always the same men who choose best and who have the best views or opinions on matters of conduct, for some choose through wickedness what they speculatively disapprove.

The point that δόξα precedes, or attends, προαίρεσις is not controverted in the foregoing arguments, which are directed merely against the view that προαίρεσις, and δόξα, or δόξα τις, are identical.

In iii. 3. 19 Aristotle defines προαίρεσις as βουλευτική ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. It is the choice of things in our power, after deliberation; as he says in § 17 of the present Chapter—it is μετὰ λόγον καὶ διανοίας, *i. e.* it implies the exercise of the reasoning faculty. It is not an irrational impulse, like ἐπιθυμία or θυμός, and, at the same time, it is not purely intellectual, like δόξα, but belongs to the appetitive side of our nature (ὄρεξις). For the Eudemean account of προαίρεσις see note on vi. 12. 8.

b. 5. § 1. οἰκειότατον κ.τ.λ.] Cf. *E. E.* ii. 11. 1228 a. 2 ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν ποῖός τις· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα πράττει, ἀλλ' οὐ τί πράττει . . . ἔτι πάντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλέποντες μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔργα· καίτοι αἰρετώτερον ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς . . .

ἔτι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι ἰδεῖν τὴν προαίρεσιν ὅποια τις, διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν 1111 b. 5. ἔργων ἀναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν ποῖός τις. αἰρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἐπαιρετώτερον δ' ἢ προαίρεσις. Cf. *E. N.* x. 8. 5. The doctrine of the present section is already involved in Aristotle's definition of ἀρετῆ as ἕξις προαιρετική κ.τ.λ.

§ 2. τὰ ἐξαιφνης] Ramsauer compares what is said in iii. 8. 15— b. 9. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειώτερον δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνυδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοισ' ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἤττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς. τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαιφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν.

According to both passages, apparently, τὰ ἐξαιφνης are not κατὰ προαίρεσιν: but according to the later passage the ἕξις of ἀνδρεία is specially shown in them. How is this to be reconciled with the definition of ἀρετῆ as ἕξις προαιρετική? By pointing out that the virtuous ἕξις is the organic result, as it were, of many acts of rational choice, which, at first hesitating and difficult, have at last become 'secondarily automatic.' In the first passage Aristotle contrasts sudden acts in general with those chosen after deliberation; in the second passage he has specially in view the sudden emergencies which call for prompt action on the part of the courageous man; and he says, in effect, that the truly courageous man, *having organised his deliberation*, will be ready for these emergencies; that, in relation to them, he will show how well organised his προαιρετική ἕξις of courage is; whereas τὰ προφανῆ may be faced, after deliberation, by one whose deliberation is not yet organised—has not yet become 'secondarily automatic.'

§ 4.] Peters' translation here is—'The continent man, on the b. 13. other hand, deliberately chooses what he does, *but does not desire it!*' Better—'the continent man acts from deliberate choice, not from mere desire,' for we must remember that προαίρεσις is βουλευτική ὄρεξις (*E. N.* iii. 3. 19), and involves appetite and desire.

§ 5. καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία b. 15. οὐ] This does not mean that one desire is never *opposed* to another (cf. *Ald. Schol. ad loc.* δοκεῖ καὶ ἐπιθυμία ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, οἷον εἴ τις δόξης ἐπιθυμῆι καὶ χρηματισμοῦ, ἐν τῷ μὲν δεῖται δαπάνης, ὁ χρηματισμὸς δὲ φειδοῖ περιγίνεται χρημάτων), but that the opposition is not of the nature of *contrary* opposition; whereas deliberate choice and desire are opposed as contraries (ἐναντία), if opposed at all. Two desires

1111 b. 15. relating to *two different* objects may indeed clash and wrangle; but deliberate choice and desire, relating to *the same* object, are opposed in a much more definite manner. Desire seeks to possess it, because it is pleasant; deliberate choice, keeping in view the permanent welfare of the whole man, declines it. The opposition between desire and deliberate choice is, in fact, that between desire and reason—between the tendency to disorder and the principle of order—a definite and standing opposition, very different from the accidental, and often temporary, opposition which obtains between two desires. An illustration may help to make this great difference clear. Two disorderly and self-seeking factions in a state may oppose each other bitterly, or may join hands against the orderly government which strives to repress them both. Their opposition to each other is accidental, not necessary. But the opposition of orderly government to faction is a necessary one, as long as the state, in the proper acceptance of the term, lasts. In the *Republic*, Plato has sketched the décadence of a state, in which order, or *lógos*, has ceased to assert itself, and various *ἐπιθυμίας* assume in turn the functions of government. A strong passion, such as that for honour, or wealth, may, for a time, preserve order in its own interest, and maintain the semblance of a state, but is soon overpowered by a coalition of other passions, which, having obtained mastery over it, begin to wrangle among themselves, till a passion stronger than the rest—personified as the demagogue-tyrant—vaults into supremacy. (*Rep.* 545 sqq.) No one *ἐπιθυμία* is necessarily and always opposed to another. Each has its own object, which may, or may not, at a given time, be compatible with that of another. But so far as all *ἐπιθυμίας*, as such, seek objects which stand out of relation to an orderly system, they are essentially opposed to reason, the principle of order, and therefore to its exponent, deliberate choice. Reason is the permanent personality of the man, which distinguishes itself from every passing desire. It coexists with the desire, and distinguishes itself from it. But one desire does not really *coexist* with another: *i. e.* two desires do not quarrel about the possession of the *same* thing. Each merely seeks its own object, and is unconscious of, and careless of, the object of the other. The technical meaning of the word *ἐναντιοῦται* thus gives the key to the interpretation of the passage before us, as the Ald. Schol. seems to have seen. His words are—*ἀδύνατον τὸν αὐτὸν ἅμα ἐπιθυμεῖν τοῦ τε τραφῆναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ*

τραφῆναι οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἐναντία τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὅτι περὶ τὸ αὐτό. 1111 b. 15. Cf. *Mel.* Δ. 10. 1018 a. 25 ἐναντία λέγεται τὰ τε μὴ δυνατὰ ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ παρεῖναι τῶν διαφερόντων κατὰ γένος, καὶ τὰ πλείστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ τὰ πλείστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν ταύτῳ δεκτικῷ, καὶ τὰ πλείστον διαφέροντα τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ὧν ἡ διαφορὰ μεγίστη ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατ' εἶδος. Contrariety (*ἐναντιότης*) is between things in relation to the same quality, or circumstance, not in relation to different qualities, or circumstances; *e. g.* *ἐπιθυμία* urges a man to drink, and *προαίρεσις* restrains him from drinking: *ἐπιθυμία* and *προαίρεσις* are here opposed (as contraries, *ἐναντία*) on the common ground of drinking. But there is no such common ground on which two *ἐπιθυμίας* can be opposed. One *ἐπιθυμία* does not urge the man to drink, and another restrain him. He does not 'desire' at the same moment to drink and not to drink. The 'opposition' between *ἐπιθυμίας* is of a less definite kind than this: *e. g.* the desire of drink may be 'opposed' to that of money; but this is not 'contrary' opposition (*οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται*), because *ἐναντία* are properly the most distant extremes within the same class, and the desire of drink and the desire of money fall under different classes. But to desire to drink, and to choose not to drink are 'contraries,' both falling under the class of attitudes towards drinking.

The special explanation of the term *ἐναντίου* given in *E. N.* ii. 8. 8 also throws light on the passage before us. The extreme which represents a naturally strong desire is there said to be 'more contrary' to the mean, or good choice, than the extreme which represents a naturally weaker desire; *i. e.* it is more difficult, and more painful, to avoid the extreme which represents a naturally strong desire; for, as desire is of pleasure, the opposition to desire must involve pain. Hence *προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται*. But if one *ἐπιθυμία* conquers another, it is because we like it better—no pain is involved—*ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὔ*.

The contrariety of *λογισμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* is discussed in *Rep.* 440, q. v.

καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία . . . οὔθ' ἠδέος] The Paraph. has—*ἔτι ἡ μὲν* b. 16. *ἐπιθυμία λυπηρά ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικείμενον ἔχει (πρὸς αὐτὸ γὰρ αἰεὶ φέρεται), ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις οὔτε λυπηρά ἐστὶν οὔτε τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικείμενον ἔχει. He seems to have had before him the reading ἐπιλυπος (Cod. Victor.), ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηρά (N^b) οὔθ' ἠδέος. Adopting the reading of Bekker's and Bywater's texts, we may explain the state-*

1111. b. 16. ment thus—*ἐπιθυμία* is concerned directly and exclusively with pleasure, which it seeks, and pain, which it avoids—the two being very intimately connected, since the pain which it avoids is that of the emptiness which it seeks to fill with pleasure (cf. *E. N.* vii. 12. 2). The Paraphrast's reading *ἐπιθυπος* was evidently intended to bring out this meaning, which, however, is sufficiently plain in the better supported reading *ἐπιλύπου*.

But *λυπηρά* for *λυπηροῦ* involves a blunder in Aristotelian doctrine. *Προαίρεσις*, when, in the *ἐγκρατής*, it declines an importunate pleasure, or, in the *ἀνδρείος*, chooses wounds and death in a noble cause, of course involves pain: see *E. N.* iii. 9, §§ 2-5 διὰ καὶ ἐπιθυπον ἢ ἀνδρεία κ.τ.λ. So, we cannot read *ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὐτε λυπηρά οὐθ' ἠδέος*. But it is true to say that 'deliberate choice is not concerned with the painful or the pleasant.' Its object is the *καλόν*, *συμφέρον*, or *ἀγαθόν* generally. It does not seek merely to get present pleasure, and avoid present pain, as *ἐπιθυμία* does, but it looks at *πράξεις* and *πάθη* in their relations to an end. It has to do with the selection of means, irrespectively of the immediate pleasure obtained, or pain avoided, in the course of the selection. The end, of course, whether high or low, is regarded by the agent as good and pleasant. The text followed by the Paraphrast, though obviously corrupt in the form in which he had it, may, however, represent the source from which the writer of the parallel passage in the *Eudemian Ethics* (ii. 10. 1225 b. 30), derived his—*ἔτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν καὶ θυμὸς αἰεὶ μετὰ λύπης προαιρούμεθα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης*—a statement which is true.

b. 18. § 6.] Cf. the comparison of *θυμὸς* and *ἐπιθυμία* in vii. 6. 1-5.

b. 19. § 7. *βούλησις*] not will, but *wish*.

b. 23. *ἀθανασίας*] merely 'exemption from death.' The question of the 'immortality of the soul' is not raised here: see Zell and Grant.

b. 26. § 9. *τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον*] 'Again we are more properly said "to wish the end," "to choose the means."'—Peters. This brings out correctly the force of *μᾶλλον*. The words in iii. ch. 3, § 20—ch. 4, § 1 seem to imply that the proper use of both terms is perfectly definite—that as *προαίρεσις* is only of means so *βούλησις* is only of the end,—*ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπω εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποῖα ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται. Eude-*

mus is equally explicit with regard to *προαίρεσις*—*E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 1111 b. 26. a. 7 *οὐθεὶς γὰρ τέλος οὐδὲν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος*. But with regard to *βούλησις* he says *βούλεται δὲ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος* (1226 a. 13), and *βούλεσθαι μὲν καὶ δόξα μάλιστα τοῦ τέλους, προαίρεσις δ' οὐκ ἔστιν* (1226 a. 16)—which may be thought to suggest the propriety of limiting the reference of *μᾶλλον* in the passage before us (*E. N.* iii. 2. 9) to *βούλησις*, notwithstanding the absolute statement in *E. N.* iii. 4. 1 *ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται*. The Paraphrast however has—*ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν αἰεὶ, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερόντων*.

βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν] sc. *ὅτι βουλόμεθα εὐδαιμονεῖν*. Ramsauer. b. 28.

§ 10. *περὶ τὰ αἴδια*] We are to understand that *δόξα* may *pro-* b. 32. *nounce upon αἴδια*, as upon anything in heaven or earth (cf. vii. 3. 4 *δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος*); but only *ἐπιστήμη* has them as its *true objects*: see vi. 3. 2.

§ 11. *ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τινί]* An opinion on moral matters—as is made 1112 a. 1. clear by the parallel passage *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 a. 4 *οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῶ ὄντων πρακτικῶν δόξα ἢ τυγχάνομεν οἰόμενοι δεῖν τι πράττειν ἢ οὐ πράττειν*. The Ald. Schol. has—*οὐδὲ τινί οἶον τῇ περὶ τούτων περὶ ἃ ἡ προαίρεσις κατὰ γὰρ τὴν προαίρεσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν ποιῶ ἔσμέν' ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοὶ κατὰ δὲ τὴν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων δόξαν οὐκέτι ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γὰρ ὁ δοξάζων ὅτι ἡ ἀνδρία ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἤδη καὶ ἀνδρείος ἢ ἀγαθός· ὁ προαιρούμενος δὲ τοῦ γὰρ ἀκρατοῦς δόξα μὲν ὀρθή, προαίρεσις δ' οὐ*. We can gather from this section what Aristotle would have thought of the tendency to estimate a man's character by his speculative belief.

§ 12. *φυγεῖν [ἢ] τι*] Bywater brackets *ἢ*. It is omitted by K^b. a. 3. *οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν* 'We never opine.' *πάνυ* intensifies the negative, as in the next section—*ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν* (sc. *ἀγαθὰ ὄντα*).

§ 13. *ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς]* *ἢ* is here equivalent to *ἦτοι*, and introduces a. 6. words explanatory of *οὐ δεῖ*. A comma between *μᾶλλον* and *ἢ*, as in Coraes' text, would prevent a natural misunderstanding of the construction.

ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν] sc. *ἀγαθὰ ὄντα*. It is necessary to supply these a. 8. words in order to give the argument force. Ramsauer, who fails to supply them, is aware that the argument, as he conceives it, is a weak one; for he says—'parum in sexto hoc argumento ponderis: *ἐνοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διατάσσουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι* (vii. 3. 3). *Poterit igitur nihilominus ἡ προαίρεσις esse δόξα τις*.' Aristotle

1112 a. 8. means to say here that we choose what we have reason to consider good, but form opinions about things quite irrespectively of this consideration. Here an important difference is noted between choice and opinion: the former relates to the good, the latter does not. The Paraphrast's note I accordingly regard as wrong—*ἐτι προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἂ σφόδρα γινώσκομεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἂ οὐ πάνυ γινώσκομεν ἀληθῆ εἶναι.*

a. 10. § 14. *ἔτιοι*] *οἱ ἀκρατεῖς*, see vii. 3 on the relation of *ἀκρασία* to *δόξα*.

a. 11. § 15. *εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως κ.τ.λ.*] That opinion precedes (and accompanies) choice is undoubtedly Aristotle's opinion, see iii. 3. 17 *τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκρίθην προαιρετὸν ἔστι.* Cf. *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 b. 9 *ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς ἔστιν ἡ προαίρεσις*: cf. also *E. N.* vii. 3. 9 where the premisses of the Practical Syllogism are described as *δόξαι*: and *de An.* iii. 10. 433 b. 27 *ἢ ὄρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῆλον, ταύτη αὐτοῦ κηρικόν* ὄρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας' φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητικὴ.

For the use of the term παρακολουθεῖ Ramsauer quotes *E. E.* ii. 10. 1225 b. 21 *μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρά τινων, καὶ ζητοῦντι δόξειε δ' ἂν δυοῖν εἶναι χάτερον ἢ προαίρεσις, ἦτοι δόξα ἢ ὄρεξις* ἀμφότερα γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολουθοῦντα. Προαίρεσις is not identical with either ὄρεξις or δόξα, but 'involves' both.

a. 16. § 17. *μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας*] Both terms mark an intellectual process, as distinguished from an intellectual act—they mark an association of ideas, a train of thought, a review of the circumstances of the case in their relation to the possibility and advisableness of taking action. 'Choice implies reasoning, and a process of thought.' That 'association of ideas,' 'train of thought,' 'intellectual process' is one of the prominent meanings of *λόγος* is shown by the fact that it is frequently used for *συλλογισμὸς*: while, in its dominant sense, *διάνοια* is the faculty of *joining* and *separating* *νοήματα*—see passages quoted in notes on vi. 2. 2, 3; cf. also vi. 9. 3 where *διάνοια* is said not to be an assertion, or finished intellectual result—*διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται (ὀρθότητα εἶναι τὴν εὐβουλίαν) αὕτη γὰρ (i.e. διάνοια) οὐπω φάσις.*

a. 17. *πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν*] 'προαίρεσις, lit. "choosing before." Our "preference" exactly corresponds here, but unfortunately cannot always be employed.' Peters.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

What then is Deliberation? And what are the things about which we deliberate?—for plainly we do not deliberate about everything. In the first place, not about things which a fool or madman might think fit to 'deliberate about'—nor about the eternal and immutable verities of the Universe and of Mathematics—nor yet about those changes, whether produced by necessity, or nature, or however produced, which take place uniformly, like the changes of the seasons—nor about those events which occur without uniformity, like rains and droughts—nor about chance events, such as the discovery of a buried treasure—nor yet about all which concerns the conduct of human life, for example no Lacedæmonian thinks of deliberating how the blessings of good government may be conferred upon the Scythians.

It remains then that we deliberate about things which lie within our own power. We have nothing to do with things which are accomplished by other causes than Man's efficiency, i. e. nothing to do with things produced by Nature, Necessity, and Chance, the other causes commonly enumerated.

Every man deliberates about those things which he has it in his power to accomplish—but not where he has the guidance of an exact Science or Art. He does not deliberate, for example, how to shape letters, and spell words—for there can be no doubt about that—but where the things, which it is in his power to accomplish, or affect, are not uniformly the same, but vary according to circumstances, as, for example, the things which a doctor or merchant has to deal with vary according to circumstances. Thus, there is more room for deliberation in navigation than in gymnastic, navigation being a less exact system than gymnastic. For the same reason there is wider scope for deliberation in matters of opinion than in matters of scientific knowledge. We deliberate, in short, where results can be predicted with more or less probability, but not with certainty; and where great issues are involved, because we fear that by ourselves we shall not be able to come to a right decision.

It is not about the end that we deliberate, but about the means. We set an end before ourselves, and then enquire how, and by what means, we can reach it: if there are more ways than one of reaching it, we enquire which is the best and easiest way; if there is only one way, we review its steps in the backward direction, till we come to the first step, which is the last to be thought of, but the first to be actually taken.

Here the man who deliberates may be compared with the man who solves a

geometrical problem by analysing an assumption into simpler and simpler elements, till he comes to something sufficiently evident to serve as the starting-point of the synthetic process by which he is conducted to the solution. If, in the course of his deliberative analysis of the successive steps, a man comes upon a step which he sees cannot be taken—e. g. a step impossible without money which cannot be procured—he gives up the idea of trying to reach the end; but if all the steps seem possible, he takes the matter in hand. By 'possible' we mean able to be effected by himself, for that which is effected for him through the instrumentality of his friends may be said to be effected by himself, inasmuch as he is the cause of the actions of his friends. His friends are his instruments, and an important part of deliberation is always about instruments—what instruments are at my disposal, and how shall I use them?

Man is a Principle or Cause of Actions. Deliberation is about Actions, i. e. about means (for actions are means), not about the end. But, although thus concerned with particulars, deliberation is not concerned with them as sense is, which takes each by itself, and merely says—'this is while,' 'that is sweet.' Deliberation reviews certain particulars as members of a definite system—as conspiring to the end, and is thus a process with clear limits, although concerned with particulars.

What deliberation considers, and choice selects, is the same step viewed at different times. Before anything is settled the step is simply 'under deliberation'; but when, as the result of deliberation, it is once for all preferred to other steps, it is 'chosen.' A man comes to the end of his review of practical steps when he reaches the point at which his own efficiency begins, i. e. when he brings the matter to where he, with his leading principle, or power of choice, can do something. Thus in the Homeric constitution the deliberation of the chiefs ended with the practical decision announced by them to the people.

Choice then may be defined as the deliberate reaching-forth towards things which lie within our power.

1112 a. 18. § 1.] βούλευσις, or βουλή, Deliberation, is not about (1) things a madman or fool would deliberate about, nor (2) about eternal and immutable laws, such as those of the Universe and of Mathematics, nor (3) about uniform changes whether due to Necessity or Nature or any other principle of causation, e. g. the rising of the sun, nor (4) about variable events, e. g. drought and rain, nor (5) about chance events, e. g. the finding of a treasure, nor (6) about all human affairs, e. g. not about the government of Scythia (which a Greek could not influence). After all these exclusions, there remain as the objects of deliberation, τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτά, and these are not ends but means. Assuming an end as good, we look about for means, till we arrive at one which it is immediately in our power to produce or supply—τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον of § II. Having used this means, we are then in a position to use a further means, and so on.

2. ὑπὲρ οὗ] for περὶ οὗ—an infrequent use of ὑπὲρ in Aristotle, 1112 a. 20 but more frequent in the *Ethics*, *Topics*, and *Rhetoric* than elsewhere, according to Eucken (*Sprachgebrauch des Arist.* p. 47). In the *Nic. Eth.* it occurs five times—i. 5. 7, i. 6. 13, here iii. 3. 2, viii. 1. 7, and x. 1. 2 (see notes on these passages). Nor is this use of ὑπὲρ frequent in the majority of those books in the Aristotelian Corpus which are plainly not by Aristotle himself. In the *M. M.* however it is very frequent, occurring between 80 and 90 times, and is even more frequent in the *Rhet. ad Alex.*

§ 3. περὶ δὴ τῶν αἰδίων . . . οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου] Cf. *de Coelo* a. 21. ii. 14. 296 a. 33 ἡ δὲ γε τοῦ κόσμου τάξις αἰδίου ἐστίν. This order of the Universe which is said to be αἰδίου depends upon, or is the expression of, an eternal immaterial principle, described in various parts of the *de Coelo* and *Metaphysics* as—οὐσία αἰδίου ἀκίνητος—ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως—τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν οὐ κινούμενον—θεός: e. g. *Met.* Δ. 6. 1071 b. 4 ἀνάγκη εἶναι τινα αἰδίου οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον—and Δ. 7. 1072 a. 21 ἔστι τι αἰεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν ἄπαστον, αὕτη δ' ἡ κύκλω' καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ' ἔργῳ δῆλον. ὥστ' αἰδίου ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος οὐρανός. ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὁ κινεῖ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινῶν καὶ μέσον, ἔστι τοίνυν τι ὁ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, αἰδίου καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὐσα. κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν [κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα]. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά. ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλευτὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ἂν καλόν. . . . ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τι κινῶν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐνέργεια ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. φερόν γὰρ ἡ πρότη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλω' ταύτην δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταῶς, τὸ μὲν βία ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρηται ὁ οὐρανός καὶ ἡ φύσις. διαγωγή δ' ἐστὶν οἷα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτως γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐκείνο (ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου' καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγγήγορσις αἰσθησις νήσις ἡδιστον, ἐλπιδες δὲ καὶ μῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα. ἡ δὲ νήσις ἡ καθ' ἑαυτὴν τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. ἑαυτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ' νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταῦτον νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς. ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων. ὥστ' ἐκείνο μᾶλλον τούτου ὁ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἡδιστον καὶ ἄριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ, θαυμαστόν' εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον, ἔχει δὲ ὧδε, καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γ' ὑπάρχει' ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωὴ, ἐκείνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια' ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αἰτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδίου. φημὲν

1112 a. 21. δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶν ἀίδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχῆς καὶ αἰδῖος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

As Alexander in his commentary on this chapter (*Met.* Δ. 7) puts it (p. 667, ed. Bonitz) ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου σφαῖρα, and the σφαῖραι of the other planets, are moved by ἡ ἀπλανῆς σφαῖρα, or πρῶτος οὐρανός, which is τὸ κινούμενον-καὶ-κινῶν, and intermediate (μέσον) between τὸ πλανώμενον (*i. e.* ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου σφαῖρα and the other planetary σφαῖραι), which it moves, and τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν οὐ κινούμενον, by which it is itself moved. Not only is the Prime Mover described as αἰδῖος, but the πρῶτος οὐρανός is similarly described (*Met.* Δ. 7), as are also the sun, and other bodies of the planetary spheres—*Met.* Θ. 8. 1050b. 20 sqq. and *Met.* Δ. 8. 1073 a. 26–39. From the last passage referred to we learn that the eternal motions proper to the sun and other planets are caused by an equal number of ἀκίνητοι καὶ αἰδῖοι οὐσίαι, which we must regard, not as independent principles, but as *special manifestations* of the πρῶτον κινῶν, which primarily manifests itself in the circular motion of the πρῶτος οὐρανός. (See *Alex. Met.* p. 682; each planetary sphere, he says, has its ψυχὴ in subordination to the πρῶτος νοῦς, as the spheres themselves are subordinate to the ἀπλανῆς σφαῖρα.) The circumstance that the path of each planet is the resultant of its own proper motion and the motion of the containing sphere next above it explains the phenomena of natural growth and decay. The sun and other planets, by variously approaching and receding from different parts of the earth at different seasons, cause the alternations of γένεσις and φθορά which take place in our sublunary region (cf. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* p. 469, sqq., 3rd ed.)—See *de Generat. et Corrupt.* ii. 10. 336 a. 26 sqq.—Φανερόν ὅτι μᾶς μὲν οὐσης τῆς φορᾶς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι ἄμφω διὰ τὸ ἐναντία εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁσαύτως ἔχον ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πέφυκε ποιεῖν. ὥστε ἥτοι γένεσις ἀεὶ ἔσται ἢ φθορά. δεῖ δὲ πλείους εἶναι τὰς κινήσεις καὶ ἐναντίας, ἢ τῇ φορᾷ ἢ τῇ ἀνωμαλίᾳ· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τάναντία αἴτια. διὸ καὶ οὐχ ἡ πρώτη φορὰ αἴτια ἐστὶ γένεσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ τὸν λοξὸν κύκλον· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συνεχές ἐστι καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι δύο κινήσεις· ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἴ γε ἀεὶ ἔσται συνεχῆς γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ἀεὶ μὲν τι κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιλείπωσιν αὐταὶ αἰ μεταβολαί, δύο δ', ὅπως μὴ βῆτερον συμβαῖναι μόνον. τῆς μὲν οὖν συνεχείας ἢ τοῦ ὅλου φορὰ αἴτια, τοῦ δὲ προσιέναι καὶ ἀπιέναι ἡ ἔγκλισις· συμβαίνει γὰρ ὅτε μὲν πόρρω γίνεσθαι ὅτε δ' ἐγγύς. ἀνίσου δὲ τοῦ διαστήματος ὅτος ἀνώμαλος ἔσται ἡ κίνησις· ὥστ' εἰ τῷ προσιέναι καὶ ἐγγύς εἶναι γενῆ, τῷ ἀπιέναι ταῦτόν τοῦτο καὶ πόρρω γίνεσθαι φθέρει, καὶ εἰ τῷ παλ-

λάκις προσιέναι γενῆ, καὶ τῷ πολλάκις ἀπελθεῖν φθέρει· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τάναντία αἴτια. See Schwegler, *Met.* vol. iv. pp. 255, 256. Cf. also *de Coelo* ii. 6. 288 a. 26 sqq.—ἡ γὰρ ἀνωμαλία γίγνεται διὰ τὴν ἀνεσιν καὶ ἐπίτασιν. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπὸ τινος κινεῖται, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν γίνεσθαι τῆς κινήσεως ἢ διὰ τὸ κινῶν ἢ διὰ τὸ κινούμενον ἢ δὲ ἄμφω· εἴτε γὰρ τὸ κινῶν μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει κινῶι, εἴτε τὸ κινούμενον ἀλλοιοῖτο καὶ μὴ διαμένει τὸ αὐτό, εἴτε ἄμφω μεταβάλλοι, οὐθὲν κωλύει ἀνωμάλως κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον. οὐθὲν δὲ τούτων δυνατὸν περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κινούμενον δέδεικται ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ ἀφθαρτον καὶ ἄλωσ ἀμετάβλητον, τὸ δὲ κινῶν πολὺ μᾶλλον εὐλογον εἶναι τοιοῦτον· τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον τοῦ πρῶτου καὶ τὸ ἀπλοῦν τοῦ ἀπλοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀφθαρτον καὶ ἀγένητον τοῦ ἀφθάρτου καὶ ἀγένητον κηητικόν· ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ κινούμενον οὐ μεταβάλλει σῶμα ὄν, οὐδ' ἂν τὸ κινῶν μεταβάλλοι ἀσώματον ὄν. ὥστε καὶ τὴν φορὰν ἀδύνατον ἀνώμαλον εἶναι.

Now to return to the passage before us, *E. N.* iii. 3. 3—we do not deliberate about the eternal constitution of the κόσμος, because we cannot alter it—it is the expression an οὐσία αἰδῖος ἀκίνητος, 'an Eternal not ourselves.' Nor about the eternal relations of mathematics, *e. g.* the incommensurability of the diagonal and side of a square. From the words with which § 4 begins—ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, it is plain that Aristotle thinks of the αἰδῖα here, in § 3, as ἀκίνητα (Ramsauer suggests that he has forgotten to add the words καὶ ἀκινήτων I. 21). Now, it is strictly true that the objects of *pure mathematics* are ἀκίνητα (see *Met.* E. 1. 1026 a. 13 ἢ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ ἀχώριστα μὲν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἔνια [*i. e.* pure mathematics, as distinguished from optics and astronomy: *Alex. ad loc.*] περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δ' ἴσως, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ἕλλῃ· ἢ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα): but, as we have seen, in the κόσμος, an οὐσία αἰδῖος ἀκίνητος manifests itself in αἰδῖοι κινήσεις. We must suppose then that, in using the words περὶ τῶν αἰδῖων ὄντων περὶ τοῦ κόσμου, he is thinking only of the πρῶτον κινῶν or οὐσία ἀκίνητος, which is the cause of eternal motion, but is not itself motion; this cause alone is the true object of θεολογική or ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, the motions in their various spheres produced by it falling under the provinces of ἀστρολογία and φυσική. This is obviously the conception of the province of θεολογική which he entertains in *Met.* E. 1 partly quoted above; for the passage continues—1026 a. 15 ἢ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα μὲν τὰ αἴτια αἰδῖα εἶναι, μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα· ταῦτα γὰρ αἴτια τοῖς φανεροῖς τῶν θείων—*i. e.* πρώτη φιλοσοφία is concerned with τὰ αἴτια,

1112 a. 21. the *causes* of the visible motions of the heavenly spheres. The *motions themselves* fall under *αστρολογία* and that part of *φυσική* which may be entitled *περὶ κινήσεως par excellence*: see *Phys.* ii. 7. 198 a. 27 [ἔστι τοῦ φυσικοῦ εἶδέναι] ἄλλως ὅσα κινούμενα κινεῖ ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὐκ εἶναι φυσικῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχοντα κίνησιν οὐδ' ἀρχὴν κινήσεως κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀκίνητα ὄντα.

a. 23. § 4. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει . . . ἀνατολῶν] These, as distinguished from the *αἰδία καὶ ἀκίνητα* (objects of *θεολογική* and *μαθηματική*), are the objects *partly* of *αστρολογία*—a branch of applied mathematics dealing with the *αἰθιοὶ κινήσεις* of the various heavenly spheres, which present such phenomena as those of *τροπαὶ* καὶ *ἀνατολαί*, here described as *ἐξ ἀνάγκης* (i. e. *ἐξ ἀνάγκης . . . ἢν λέγομεν τῷ μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι ἄλλως* *Met.* E. 2. 1026 b. 29: cf. Δ. 5. 1015 a. 34); *partly* of *φυσική*—a science which deals with uniformities of sublunary motion manifesting themselves in the phenomena of (a) inorganic and (b) organic nature—for this is what the distinction made in *de gen. anim.* i. 4. 717 a. 15—*πάν ἡ φύσις ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖ ἢ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον* practically amounts to. The motions of inorganic nature (manifesting themselves in such phenomena as those of gravitation, heat, light, electricity, chemical combination) are said to proceed *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*, because, although they differ from the *eternal* motions of the heavenly spheres in being capable of suspension (as when a stone is not allowed to move downwards), still, when they do take place, they *always* take place in one way (see *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b. 4 *αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου [δυνάμεις] πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί· αἱ δ' ἄλογοι μία ἐνός· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἢ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγείας*).

The other class of natural motions comprises those that proceed *ἐνεκά του*. These are organic processes, or biological laws, resulting in the production and maintenance of the various definite forms of vegetable and animal life, in which all separate parts and functions conspire in the interest of the whole. It is these organic processes, and the resulting organisms, rather than the phenomena of inorganic nature, which Aristotle has in view in describing *φύσις* as he does in the following passages which are typical of many others—*Phys.* ii. 8. 199 b. 15 *φύσει γάρ, ὅσα ἀπὸ τῶος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχῆς συνεχῶς κινούμενα ἀφικνεῖται εἰς τι τέλος· ἀφ' ἐκάστης δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκαστοῖς οὐδὲ τὸ τυχόν, ἀεὶ μέντοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἂν μὴ τι ἐμποδίῃ . . . ἄσποιν δὲ τὸ μὴ οἰεσθαι ἐνεκά του γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινεῖν βουλευ-*

*σάμενον. καίτοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐνὴν ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἢ 1112 a. 23. ναυπηγική, ὁμοίως ἂν φύσει ἐποίει· ὥστ' εἰ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ἔνεστι τὸ ἐνεκά του, καὶ ἐν φύσει. μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ἔταν τις ἰατρική αὐτὸς ἐαυτὸν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν ἢ φύσει. ἐτι μὲν οὖν αἰτία ἢ φύσις, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἐνεκά του, φανερόν. *Phys.* ii. 1. 193 a. 28 *ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἢ φύσις λέγεται, ἢ πρώτη ἐκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἢ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον . . . καὶ μάλλον αὕτη φύσις τῆς ὕλης . . . ἢ μορφή φύσις. *Phys.* ii. 2. 194 a. 28 ἢ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα—and the frequently recurring οὐδὲν μίτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ. This is Aristotle's *dominant* conception of *φύσις*. It is evidently taken from the phenomena of organic nature, being in fact that noted in *Met.* Δ. 4. 1014 b. 16 *φύσις λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἢ τῶν φυσικῶν γένεσις, οἷον εἰ τις ἐπεκτείνει λέγει τὸ v. At the same time, as has been pointed out above, he distinguishes τὰ φυσικά as inorganic (τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης) and organic (τὰ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐνεκά του)—viz. in *de Gen. An.* 717 a. 15 quoted above, and in *An. Post.* ii. 11. 94 b. 36 ἢ μὲν ἐνεκά του ποιεῖ φύσις, ἢ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ἢ δ' ἀνάγκη διττή· ἢ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὴν ὁρμήν, ἢ δὲ βία ἢ παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, ὥσπερ λίθος ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω φέρεται, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀνάγκην. It will be remembered that this same downward motion of the stone, which is here described as *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*, is said to be *φύσει* in *E. N.* ii. 1. 2. Cf. Grote's *Aristotle*, i. 355: 'Nature produces effects of finality, or with a view to some given end, and also effects of necessity, the necessity being either inherent in the substance itself, or imposed by extraneous force. Thus a stone *falls* to the ground by necessity of the first kind, but *ascends* by necessity of the second kind.'***

The whole field of *φυσική* is mapped out in the following passage, *Phys.* ii. 1. 192 b. 8 *τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας, φύσει δὲ φαινομεν εἶναι τὰ τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αἰτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλά τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆν καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα [ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φαιμέν]. πάντα δὲ τὰ βηθέντα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα· τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχει κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατ' αὔξησιν καὶ φθίωσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν.*

'*Ἡ φύσις ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιούσα—law of inorganic nature, and ἢ φύσις ἢ ἐνεκά του ποιούσα—biological law, may then be distinguished as the two coordinate species of the genus φύσις. But biological laws realise their ends—certain vegetable and animal organisms, by conforming to certain definite conditions imposed, as we say, by the*

1112 a. 23. environment. *If* organisms are to come into being and exist at all, it is *necessary* for them to conform to certain conditions. Hence we must distinguish from ἡ φύσις ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιούσα (which is co-ordinate with ἡ ἐνεκά του), τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον, or τὸ ὡς ὕλη λεγόμενον ἀναγκαῖον, which is the condition to which ἡ φύσις ἢ ἐνεκά του ποιούσα must conform, if it is to realise its end: see *Met.* Δ. 5, where τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἀπλοῦν, *i. e.* in the strict sense, as τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, is distinguished from τὸ οὐ ἄνευ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ζῆν ὡς συναιτίου . . . καὶ οὐ ἄνευ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι. Cf. *Phys.* ii. 9. 199 b. 34 τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἢ καὶ ἀπλῶς; νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἴονται τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸν τοῖχον ἐξ ἀνάγκης γεγενῆσθαι νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς, διὰ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ τὰ θεμέλια, ἢ δὲ γῆ ἔνω διὰ κουφότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα κουφώτατα γάρ. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τούτων γέγονεν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα πλὴν ὡς δι' ὕλην, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τοῦ κρῖπτειν καὶ σώζειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ἐν ὅσοις τὸ ἐνεκά του ἐστίν, οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἐχόντων τὴν φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἢ ὡς ὕλην, ἀλλ' ἔνεκά του, οἷον διὰ τί ὁ πρίων τοιοῦτος; ὅπως τοῦτι καὶ ἔνεκα τουδί. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι, ἂν μὴ σιδηροῦς ἢ ἀνάγκη ἄρα σιδηροῦν εἶναι, εἰ πρίων ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τέλος· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δ' οὐ ἔνεκα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ . . . φανερόν δὲ ὅτι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸ ὡς ὕλη λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ κινήσεις αἱ ταύτης. καὶ ἄμφω μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡ τίνος ἔνεκα· αἴτιον γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὕτη τοῦ τέλους· καὶ τὸ τέλος τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην, ἐπεὶ ἡ οἰκία τοιούδε, τάδε δεῖ γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τοδί, τάδε δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ὑπάρχειν. οὕτως καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ταδί· εἰ δὲ ταδί, ταδί. Thus τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, or τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ὡς ὕλη λεγόμενον, is that suitable environment (constituted for the most part by the operation of the necessary laws of inorganic nature—ἡ φύσις ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιούσα as explained above), which is the necessary condition of the successful operation of the laws of organic nature. Looking at an organism *per se*, we see that its vital functions are conditioned by mechanical and chemical laws; looking at it in relation to its external environment, we see that its life is maintained in correspondence with laws regulating the inorganic phenomena of gravitation, heat, light, electricity, &c.

Ἡ φύσις ἢ ἐνεκά του ποιούσα, then, is 'biological law'; ἡ φύσις ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιούσα is 'law of inorganic nature'; while τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ

ὑποθέσεως expresses the relation in which 'biological law' stands 1112 a. 23. to an environment constituted for the most part by phenomena of 'inorganic nature.' Organisms, and works of human intelligence, are produced only under definite conditions or limitations imposed by this environment.

Thus the ἐξ ἀνάγκης—'according to the laws of inorganic nature,' and the φύσει of the present section (*E. N.* iii. 3. 4) cannot be regarded as mutually exclusive expressions. A stone is said to fall both ἐξ ἀνάγκης, and φύσει. On the other hand, if we give φύσει its *dominant* sense of 'according to biological laws,' we can distinguish it from ἐξ ἀνάγκης—'according to the laws of inorganic nature.' We must remember, however, that 'biological laws' operate only as the ἀνάγκη of the environment permits.

§ 5. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως] From the examples given here a. 26. —οἷον ἀρχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων—we may perhaps identify these with τὰ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος of *Phys.* ii. 8. 198 b. 35 πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ αἰεὶ οὕτω γίνεται ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τῶν δ' ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ' ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ἕναι πολλακίς τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀλλ' εἶναι ὑπὸ κύνα· οὐδὲ καύματα ὑπὸ κύνα, ἀλλ' ἂν χειμῶνος.

οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης] τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης are distinguished as a. 27. occurrences directly affecting man, not to be foreseen by him, because exceptional, from τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου—occurrences, or phenomena, not conceived as affecting man, which contradict the ordinary laws of nature: see *Met.* Δ. 3. 1070 a. 6 ἢ γὰρ τέχνη ἢ φύσει γίνεται ἢ τύχῃ ἢ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἢ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γενῆ, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι στερήσεις τούτων: *i. e.* τύχη is the στέρησις of τέχνη (or, more generally, of νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου § 7). Its sphere is τὸ ἄδηλον in human affairs: τὸ αὐτόματον, in its specific sense, is the στέρησις of φύσις—it is the spontaneous, or that which contradicts uniform law in the domain of nature—especially of organic nature: see *Met.* κ. 8. 1065 a. 26 τὸ δὲ ἔνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐστίν. τύχη δ' ἐστίν ὅταν τι ταύτων γένηται κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ὄν ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὕτω καὶ αἴτιον. ἢ τύχη δ' αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἐνεκά του γιγνομένοις. διὰ περὶ ταῦτα τύχη καὶ διάνοια· προαίρεσις γὰρ οὐ χωρὶς διανοίας. τὰ δ' αἰτία ἀόριστα ἀφ' ὧν ἂν γένοιτο τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης· διὸ ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ καὶ αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐδεός. In *Phys.* ii. 6. 197 a. 36, however, τὸ αὐτόματον is presented as the

1112 a. 27. genus of τύχη—διαφέρει δ' ὅτι τὸ αὐτόματον ἐπὶ πλείον ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης πᾶν ἀπὸ αὐτομάτου, τοῦτο δ' οὐ πᾶν ἀπὸ τύχης. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τύχη καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης ἐστὶν ὅσοις καὶ τὸ εὐτυχήσαι ἂν ὑπάρξειεν καὶ ὅλως πράξις. διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην σημεῖον δ' ὅτι δοκεῖ ἦτοι ταῦτων εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἢ εὐτυχίᾳ ἢ ἔργον, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία πράξις τις· εὐπραξία γάρ. ὥσθ' ὁπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πράξαι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ποιῆσαι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐτὲ ἀψυχον οὐδὲν οὐτε θηρίον οὐτε παιδίον οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαίρεσιν· οὐδ' εὐτυχία οὐδ' ἀτυχία ὑπάρχει τούτοις, εἰ μὴ καθ' ὁμοίτητα.

Human intelligence, and natural organisms, attain to their various ends on condition of utilising and adapting themselves to the necessary laws of 'matter' or 'the environment.' As a rule (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ) they succeed in doing so—ἄλλοι γὰρ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως appears as τὸ συναίτιον. But not always. Sometimes the formative principle is unequal to the task of comprehending the complexity of the material environment, and results follow which, as it were, take the designer or the organism by surprise. These are τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης in the region of human deliberation, τέρατα in the animal and vegetable worlds. Τύχη and τὸ αὐτόματον thus represent the mistakes and failures of intelligence and of the organising principle in nature, in their relations to the material environment. This seems to be the fair inference from Aristotle's statement that they are στερήσεις of διάνοια and φύσις, as well as from his adoption of the description of τύχη as ἀδηλος αἰτία ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ. Material conditions, once ascertained, are found to remain always the same (αἱ δ' ἄλογοι δυνάμεις μία ἐνός), but organising principles may fail to ascertain them, or use them, and so may miscarry: cf. *Phys.* ii. 6. 197 b. 29 οὕτω δὴ τὸ αὐτόματον κατὰ τὸ ἔνομα ὅταν αὐτὸ μάρτην γένηται. Τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, and τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου represent then the mistakes and failures of organising principles. These mistakes and failures are their own mistakes and failures (as a man's bad acts are his own acts), not freaks of a positive 'principle of mistake or irregularity' in the ἄλλῃ, or external world, which is otherwise regulated by necessary laws—*Phys.* ii. 8. 199 b. 1 εἰ δὴ ἔστω ἕνα κατὰ τέχνην ἐν οἷς τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐνεκά του, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀμαρτανομένοις ἐνεκα μὲν τινος ἐπιχειρεῖται ἀλλ' ἀποσυχᾶνεται, ὁμοίως ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, καὶ τὰ τέρατα ἀμαρτήματα ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐνεκά του. I cannot think that Grote (*Arist.* i. 165) is right when he speaks of 'the independent agency' of Chance and Spontaneity. These are not positive agents, but στερήσεις.

§ 6. Σκύθαι] In *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 a. 29, and *M. M.* i. 17. 1189 a. 20, 1112 a. 28. Ἰνδοί (brought within the Greek horizon by Alexander's conquest) are substituted for Σκύθαι.

§ 7. ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου] See *Rhet.* i. 4. 1359 a. a. 32. 30 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ληπτέον περὶ ποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ὁ συμβουλευέων συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἅπαντα ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐνδέχεται καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ. ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἢ ἀδύνατον ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, περὶ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή. οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἀπάντων ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἕνα καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου τὸ συμβουλεύειν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὅσων ἔστιν τὸ βουλευέσθαι. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐστίν· μέχρι γὰρ τούτου σκοποῦμεν, ἔως ἂν εὐρωμεν εἰ ἡμῶν δυνατὰ ἢ ἀδύνατα πράξαι. Below, in the same Chapter (*Rhet.* i. 4), Aristotle enumerates five objects of deliberation—(1) revenue, (2) peace and war, (3) defence, (4) imports and exports, (5) legislation. These are all δι' ἀνθρώπου.

τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλευόνται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν] a. 33. Added lest the reader should misinterpret the words πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. The object of deliberation generally is πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου: but the individual can deliberate only about that part of τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου which is δι' αὐτοῦ.

§ 8. ἀκριβεῖς] As Grant remarks, not 'exact' in the sense in b. 1. which we speak of the 'exact Sciences,' but rather 'fixed'—as may be gathered from the example, the art of writing.

καὶ αὐτάρκεις] explains ἀκριβεῖς. The ἀκρίβεια of a science which has its own principles within itself (which is αὐτάρκης) is greater than that of one which has to borrow them from another science: see *An. Post.* i. 27. 87 a. 31.

§ 9. μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας] τέχνη, as b. 6. Grant notes, is here distinguished from ἐπιστήμη, although in § 8 ἐπιστήμη has just been used as equivalent to τέχνη.

§ 10. ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] See note on i. 3. 4. b. 21. b. 8.

καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον] Ramsauer suggests καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἀδιόριστον: b. 9. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 75), following the ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς ἤδη ἀόριστόν ἐστι τὸ ὡς δεῖ of *M. M.* i. 17. 1189 b. 24, suggests καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ ὡς δεῖ ἀδιόριστον. It is pretty plain that the writer of the *M. M.* had before him both the *E. N.* and the *E. E.* (ii. 10. 1226 a. 33 sqq.) when he wrote 1189 b. 18-26; he reproduces the διχῇ γινόμενης τῆς

1112 b. 9. ἀμαρτίας which is peculiar to the *E. E.*, and the ἀδιόριστον which is peculiar to the *E. N.* But he uses the word ἀόριστον, which is less appropriate in the context than ἀδιόριστον, for ἀόριστον is that which has *no* limits (and therefore would elude intelligence, and could not be the subject of any forecast whatsoever) whereas ἀδιόριστον is that which has *no very definite* limits: see Waitz on *Anal. Pr.* i. 4. 26 b. 14. It may be conjectured that the writer of the *M. M.* found in his copy of the *E. N.* καὶ ἐν οἷς ἂ δεῖ (sc. πράττειν) ἀόριστον, a reading which might easily spring from an original καὶ ἐν οἷς ἂ δεῖ (sc. πράττειν) ἀδιόριστον¹.

b. 11. § 11. βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν] It sometimes happens, however, that deliberation about the means to a contemplated end results in our seeing that the end is not worth the means, and that *another* end is preferable. We sometimes cannot be sure that an end is desirable, *i. e.* is really an end for us, till we have ascertained what means it necessitates. But the ends instanced by Aristotle in this section are those more obvious ends which may be accepted as ends *before* deliberation.

b. 18. κἀκεῖνο] 'refers to ἐνός and διὰ τούτου'—Grant.

b. 19. τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον] *i. e.* the step which must be first taken (πρῶτον ἐν τῇ γενέσει), which, however, is the last to be thought of in the review of the steps (ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει). A wishes to obtain an appointment: he can obtain it through the influence of B: he must get an introduction to B: C can give him an introduction: he must write to C: what is C's address? He must look it out in the directory: there is a directory in the club: he must go there: he must call a cab. Here 'calling a cab' is the πρῶτον αἴτιον.

b. 20. ἀναλύειν . . . ὡς περὶ διάγραμμα] Cf. *Top.* i. 16. 175 a. 27 συμβαίνει δέ ποτε, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀναλύσαντες ἐπίστε συνθεῖναι πάλιν ἀδυνατοῦμεν.

We must suppose that the reference is to what is known as the Analytical Method of proof in Geometry—a Method which Plato is said by Proclus (ed. Friedl. p. 211) and Diogenes Laertius (iii. 24) to have invented, although there are traces of its employment before his time (see Gow, *History of Gk. Mathematics* p. 176).

¹ As regards the admissibility of ἂ δεῖ=τί δεῖ, I am indebted to Prof. Cook Wilson for references to *Ind. Arist.* 532 b. 14, and Kühner's *Gk. Gr.* § 562. 4, 2nd ed.

It consists in assuming as true the proposition to be proved, and deducing from it, as principle, the necessary consequences to which it leads (see D. Stewart, *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, Part ii. chap. 4, § 3. 1. Preliminary observations on the Analysis and Synthesis of the Greek Geometricians)—'If in this deduction,' says D. Stewart, 'I arrive at a consequence which I already know to be true, I conclude with confidence that the principle from which it was deduced is likewise true. But if on the other hand I arrive at a consequence which I know to be false, I conclude that the principle or assumption on which my reasoning has proceeded is false also. Such a demonstration of the truth or falsity of a Proposition is called an Analytical Demonstration. According to these definitions of Analysis and Synthesis those demonstrations in Euclid¹ which prove a proposition to be true by showing that the contrary supposition leads to some absurd inference, are properly speaking Analytical Processes of Reasoning. In every case the conclusiveness of an Analytical Proof rests on this general maxim—that *truth* is always consistent with itself; that a supposition which leads by a concatenation of mathematical deductions to a consequence which is true must itself be true; and that which necessarily involves a consequence which is absurd or impossible must itself be false. It is evident that when we are demonstrating a Proposition with a view to convince another of its truth the synthetic form of reasoning is the more natural and pleasing of the two, as it leads the understanding directly from known truths to such as are unknown. When a Proposition, however, is doubtful and we wish to satisfy our own minds with respect to it, or when we wish to discover a new method of demonstrating a theorem previously ascertained to be true, it would be found far more convenient to conduct the investigation analytically.'

Themistius in his commentary on *An. Post.* i. 12 (vol. i. pp. 41–43, ed. Spengel) has remarks on ἀνάλυσις which are worth careful attention in the present connexion. They bring to light an important difference between βούλευσις and γεωμετρικὴ ἀνάλυσις, here roughly compared by Aristotle. He begins by defining ἀνάλυσις—p. 42 (fol. 6 b) ἀναλύειν δὲ λέγω νῦν τὸ τεθέντος τινὸς ἀληθοῦς συμπεράσματος τὰς προτάσεις ἐξευρίσκειν δι' ἑνὸς συνήχθη. But

¹ 'The *reductio ad absurdum* is a kind of theoretic analysis. This is the only analysis that Euclid admits.' Gow, *Hist. of Gk. Mathematics* p. 177, note 2.

1112 b. 20. true *προτάσεις* may be inferred, as consequences, from a false assumption. Is not this a circumstance which must seriously affect the value of the Geometer's *ἀνάλυσις*? Themistius meets this difficulty by simply pointing out (after Aristotle: see *An. Post.* i. 12, 78 a. 10) that, as a matter of fact, the Geometer *does not infer his true consequences from false assumptions*; and that he can be sure that he does not, because the objects of intuition with which he deals in his *ἀνάλυσις* are so simple and so limited in number—p. 41 (fol. 6 b) *ἐν δὲ τοῖς μαθήμασιν . . . οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ παραλογισμὸς . . . ὠρίσται γὰρ ἕκαστον, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἐκάστου σχεδὸν δεῖξις ἐστὶ τὸν γὰρ κύκλον ἀκούσας εὐθὺς ὄρα γεγραμμένον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ φέρεται ἐπ' ἄλλο τι σημαίνόμενον.* In non-mathematical reasoning, on the other hand, *i. e.* in *διάλογοι*, the *προτάσεις* are indefinite in number and lend themselves to various ambiguities—p. 42 *εἰ δ' οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν ἐκ ψεύδους ἀληθὲς δεῖξαι, ῥάδιον ἂν ἦν τὸ ἀναλύειν . . . χαλεπὸν τὸ ἀναλύειν ἐν ἀπείροις γὰρ ἢ ζήτησι τῶν προτάσεων. ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτη διαφέρει τὰ μαθήματα τῶν διαλόγων, ὅτι ῥῶον ἐν ἐκείνοις ἢ ἀνάλυσις, αἴτιον δέ οὐδὲν γὰρ ψεύδος λαμβάνουσιν εἰς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.* The non-mathematical reasoner can never be sure that his *προτάσεις* are not false. But the mathematician *sees* that his are true; and, as true premisses can give only a true conclusion, he thus demonstrates the supposition with which he began his analysis by the reverse process of synthesis. According to this view, the plainness to the eye of the *προτάσεις* obtained by the *ἀνάλυσις* of *διαγράμματα* has evidently much to do with the conviction that the conclusions synthetically built upon them 'cannot be otherwise.' An assumption is resolved into its elements. These elements are necessarily few, and their nature, and their connexion with the whole, plain to the eye. They are evidently true premisses, hence the conclusion (*i. e.* the original assumption) must be true. But in concrete enquiries, as in that about the cause of *τὸ φυλλορροεῖν* (see *An. Post.* ii. 16), there is no such visible evidence; we can never be sure that we have analysed rightly; hence the conviction of their *necessity* is wanting to our synthetic reasonings on such matters. The writer of the *M. M.* has also a passage in which he dwells on the difference between *γεωμετρικὴ ζήτησις* and *βούλευσις*—*M. M.* i. 17. 1189 b. 6–19.

The *ἀνάλυσις* of the present section is not to be confounded with the *διαίρεσις* of *Met.* Θ. 9. 1051 a. 21, where Aristotle says that theorems and problems are solved by 'division,' *i. e.* by

drawing lines. Thus the Theorem '*τρίγωνον* = two right angles' 1112 b. 20. is proved by so 'dividing' *τρίγωνον*—by so drawing the lines which may be drawn in relation to *τρίγωνον* (or, otherwise, the lines which are 'potentially in *τρίγωνον*') that at last angles = *τρίγωνον* are obtained which are *plainly seen* to be also = two right angles. The three angles of *τρίγωνον* are at last made into angles which can easily be pieced together so as to make two right angles—1051 a. 21 *εὐρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα* (here = demonstrations: see Bonitz *ad loc.*) *ἐνεργεῖα διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὐρίσκουσιν. εἰ δ' ἦν διηρημένα, φανερά ἂν ἦν νῦν δ' ἐνπαρχει δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὄρθαι τὸ τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἱ περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι ἴσαι δύο ὄρθαις. εἰ οὖν ἀήκτο ἢ παρὰ τὴν πλευρὰν, ἰδόντι ἂν ἦν εὐθὺς δῆλον. διὰ τί ἢ ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὄρθῃ καθόλου; διότι εἰ ἴσαι τρεῖς, ἢ τε βάσις δύο καὶ ἢ ἐκ μέσου ἐπισταθείσα ὄρθῃ, ἰδόντι δῆλον τῷ ἐκείνῳ εἶδῶτι. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀναγόμενα εὐρίσκεται.* The two proofs given here are of course 'synthetic,' and in *An. Post.* ii. 111 Aristotle selects the latter of them for reduction to syllogistic form. The angle in the semicircle is 'divided' and so proved to be = one right angle; it is not *assumed* to be = one right angle, which would be the case if the proof were 'analytical.' For a criticism of Euclid's Synthetic Method see Schopenhauer *die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* i. 82–87. Schopenhauer's contention is that Euclid's Synthetic Method involves the substitution of *logical* for *intuitive* evidence. It is *intuitive* evidence, I take it, which Euclid *always* offers (the evidence of superposition in the last resort): but often not in the most direct way. The issue is not, as Schopenhauer will have it, between intuitive evidence on the one side, and the Synthetic Method on the other; but between the Analytic Method and the Synthetic Method. Schopenhauer may or may not be right in holding (against Euclid) that the Analytic Method is better than the Synthetic for the purpose of teaching Geometry. This is a practical question in *Pædagogik* upon which I am not competent to give an opinion; but I think that he is certainly wrong in supposing that Euclid's evidence is 'logical, *not intuitive*.' Euclid marshals intuitive evidence according to the Synthetic Method. The passage quoted from *Met.* Θ. 9 shows that the Synthetic Method of *διαίρεσις* is fully consistent with the appeal to intuition at every step. As an instance of the confusion into which Schopenhauer falls, the fact may be mentioned that, while blaming Euclid for his neglect of the Analytic Method and of the appeal to intuition,

1112 b. 20. (the two seem to be identified by Schopenhauer), he singles out the apagogic proofs for special condemnation, as relying on *Logical* as distinguished from Intuitional evidence. But competent authorities tell us that these apagogic proofs are the only examples of the Analytic Method in Euclid!

b. 23. § 12. καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον . . . γενέσει] The Paraphrast has—*τρόπον τινὰ ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος καὶ ὁ μαθηματικὸς ἀναλύει· καὶ ὁ ἔσχατον εὐρίσκεται ἀναλύοντι, τοῦτο ἔργον πρῶτον γίνεται τῷ βουλευομένῳ καθάπερ ὁ μαθηματικὸς, πρὸς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀφίξεται ἀναλύων, τοῦτο ὑποτιθεῖς, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου διὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὁδεύων, ἀποδείκνυσι τὸ προκείμενον. Καὶ ἄμφω δέ, εἰ ἀναλύοντες ἀδυνατοὶ ἐντύχοιεν, ἀφίστανται τοῦ ζητήματος.*

b. 24. § 13. κὰν μὲν ἀδυνάτω ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται] The parallel in *μαθηματικὴ ζήτησις* to such a case in *βουλεύσις* would be the *ἀδύνατον* to which the *ἀνάλυσις* conducts in apagogic demonstration: cf. καὶ ἄμφω δέ in the passage quoted from the Paraphrast in last note.

b. 30. § 14. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς . . . διὰ τίνος] This clause comes in awkwardly. What are the *λοιπά*? How does the *δι' οὗ*—whether masc. (Michelet) or neut. (Grant)—differ from the *ἔργα* just mentioned, and the *πῶς* from *ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν*? The *πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων* of § 11 seems to make it necessary to take *ἡ διὰ τίνος* here as epexegetic of *πῶς*, and therefore to regard *τίνος* as neut. If *τίνος* is neuter, it will be reasonable to suppose that *οὗ* is masculine.

b. 31. § 15. καθάπερ εἴρηται] Ramsauer notes that the exact phrase *ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων* has not been used before, although *νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου* has been given (§ 7) as one of the *αἰτία*. *Καθάπερ εἴρηται*, he thinks, would be strictly in place only if some such words had been used as we find in *E. E.* ii. 6. 1222 b. 18 *πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ὃ γ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἔστιν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ζῶων*. Perhaps, however, *ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν*, § 13, may be considered sufficient to justify *καθάπερ εἴρηται*.

Ramsauer has another difficulty. He thinks that the words *ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων* are unnecessary to the argument which follows. The 'conclusion' *βουλευτὸν τὸ πρὸς τὸ τέλος* is derived from the premisses *ἡ δὲ βουλή περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρακτῶν*, and *αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα*: but these premisses, he thinks, do not need *ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων* to rest upon. Strictly not: but surely these latter words have this bearing on what follows, that they

serve to introduce (or reintroduce) the *τῶν αὐτῶν πρακτῶν* and the 1112 b. 31. *πράξεις*, which are, in Ramsauer's view, necessary to the 'conclusion.' If, however, we follow Bywater in adopting the *οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη βουλευτὸν* of K^b in place of the old *οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη β*, Ramsauer's difficulty will not arise.

αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα] *Πράξεις* here are *τὰ αὐτῶν πρακτά, τὰ καθ'* b. 33. *ἕκαστα* (iii. 1. 10 *αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα*), or *λοιπά*, which are done for some end (iii. 5. 18 *τὸ τέλος . . . φαίνεται καὶ κείται, τὰ δὲ λοιπά πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες πράττουσι*). Ramsauer finds the statement *αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα* too general, and inconsistent with the doctrine of i. 1, that some *ἐνέργειαι* or *πράξεις* are their own *τέλη*. But it must be remembered that properly it is only *ἐμπραξία*, or a systematic life of *καλαὶ πράξεις*, which is its own *τέλος*. Each individual *πράξις* in the system is correctly described as *ἄλλων ἕνεκα*, cf. iii. 7. 6 *καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρείος πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν*.

§ 16. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη] This, the reading of K^b alone, seems to be right: *οὐ βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη* has already been laid down in § 11: whereas the old reading *οὐκ ἂν οὖν* would make it a 'conclusion' now independently reached. It must be remembered, however, that in these writings a conclusion is sometimes proved, in the most formal manner, more than once in adjacent passages. Grant quotes *Rhet.* i. 6. 1362 a. 17, for the doctrine—*βουλευτὸν τὸ πρὸς τὸ τέλος*.

οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα] These words are added to prevent b. 34. a possible misunderstanding. *Τὰ αὐτῶν πρακτά*, with which *βουλή* is concerned, are indeed *καθ' ἕκαστα*: but *βουλή* is concerned with *τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα* in a different way from *αἰσθησις*. *Αἰσθησις* is concerned with *καθ' ἕκαστα* *as such*, *i. e.* separately—with 'this is red,' 'this is sweet,' 'this is heavy'; but *καθ' ἕκαστα* *as such* are not the objects of *βουλή*: only *καθ' ἕκαστα* in so far as they may turn out to be means to some end: *e. g.* *αἰσθησις* says this piece of cloth is scarlet: *βουλή* decides that it is a bad colour for a uniform.

It follows (*δὴ*) from *τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη* being the objects of *βουλή*, that *τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα* *per se*, as well as *τὸ τέλος* (this is the force of *οὐδέ*) are beyond its scope.

εἰ δὲ αἰεὶ βουλεύεται (sc. *τις*), εἰς ἄπειρον ἤξει] Grant says that 1113 a. 2. *ἤξει* is impersonal: but the analogy of *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 b. 2 *εἰς ἄπειρον ἤξουσι* suggests that *τις* should be supplied.

I do not think that this clause ought to be taken very closely

1113 a. 2. with the immediately preceding words: it rather refers to τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη, and says that in tracing back the series of means (τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων) we must stop somewhere, and begin to act. Οἶον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ are, as Ramsauer observes, questions of fact. With such questions deliberation has indeed nothing to do; but it is not suggested, I think, by the words εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει that deliberation would never reach its goal *if* it tried to deal with them. It simply cannot deal with them; but, within its own sphere of τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος it may prolong the review unduly. It must be noted, however, that the writer of the parallel passage in the *E. E.* (ii. 10. 1226 b. 1) understands by the regression εἰς ἄπειρον an examination of the data of αἰσθησις themselves. So also the Paraphrast—οὔτε τοῖνον τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ βουλευτόν, οὔτε τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅσα καθ' ἕκαστα οἶον, εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο, εἰ πέπεπται, εἰ πεποῖηται ὡς δεῖ ταῦτα γὰρ αἰσθήσει γινώσκωμεν, οὐ βουλῇ καὶ κρίσει· εἰ δὲ περὶ τούτων αἰεὶ βουλεύεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει.

a. 3. § 17. πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετόν] 'Except that the thing chosen is, as such, set apart,' *i. e.* it is the same step, which is first 'under deliberation,' and then 'chosen,' set apart, or fixed upon. We cannot review steps εἰς ἄπειρον: we must eventually choose one of them.

a. 5. ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν] Cf. *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 b. 12 βουλευόμεθα πάντες τοῦτο ἕως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάγωμεν τῆς γενέσεως τὴν ἀρχήν.

a. 6. τὸ ἡγούμενον—τὸ προαιρούμενον] Schol. ὁ πρακτικὸς νοῦς. Cf. vi. 2. 5.

a. 8. § 18. οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἃ προείλοντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ] The Paraphrast's note is—Ὁμηρος . . . εἰσάγει τοὺς βασιλεῖς μετὰ τὴν βουλὴν τὸ προκριθὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντας τῷ δήμῳ, ὡσπερ τῇ προαιρέσει, ὥστε πραχθῆναι. Here δρέξει might be substituted for προαιρέσει to the advantage of the Paraphrast's interpretation, according to which then the βασιλεῖς would represent βούλευσις, the δῆμος would represent δρεξίς, and the result would be the adoption of a line of public action—a προαίρεσις. But if we turn to Aristotle's text we see that this can hardly be the true interpretation. If the δῆμος supplies the active element of δρεξίς, while the βασιλεῖς supply the βούλευσις, how are we to explain ἃ προείλοντο οἱ βασιλεῖς? It does not seem likely that we can have a careless proleptic use of this

word, in a passage which contains the definition of προαίρεσις. 1113 a. 8. We must believe, I think, that οἱ βασιλεῖς, representing, as they do, τὸ ἡγούμενον, also represent τὸ προαιρούμενον, and are therefore the sources of βουλευτικὴ δρεξίς. What place then has the δῆμος in the comparison? Merely, I think, that of ὀργανικὰ μέρη, which can be set in motion by the προαίρεσις.

§ 19. βουλευτοῦ δρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν] Here τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν is a a. 10. partitive genitive—'the object of choice is that among things in our power which we seek to take after deliberation': whereas in the next line it is a genitive depending on δρεξίς. It is a very careless style of writing which permits δρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν to stand so close to δρεξίς τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

ἐκ τοῦ . . . βούλευσιν] M^b has βούλησιν: but βούλευσιν is certainly a. 11. right: cf. vi. 2. 2. The λόγος of vi. 2. 2 is the βούλευσις of the present passage.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

Choice then is of means, wish of the end. But is the end wished the really good, as some suppose, or, as others suppose, only that which the wisher thinks good? Each view has its difficulties. If we say that the really good is the object of wish, we must draw the conclusion that the man who makes a wrong selection, and 'wishes something bad,' does not 'wish' at all; while if we say that whatever a man thinks good is the object of wish, we must be prepared to maintain that there is no such thing as a natural or absolute object of wish, but that all is relative to the feeling of the individual.

Perhaps we may avoid this dilemma by saying that the really good is the object of wish in the strict and true sense of the expression 'object of wish,' but that what each of us thinks good is the object of wish for each of us, i. e. object of wish in a relative sense; so that, if a man is really good, that which is really good will be 'his object of wish,' and, if he is bad, that which is bad—just as the healthy man finds an ordinary 'healthy diet' good for his health, while an invalid finds the diet of the sick room good for his.

In all matters the good man judges rightly, and what things really are he thinks them to be. Every man looks at things in his own way, according to his disposition; but the good man is the normal man, with whose measure the divergencies of other men must be compared. His distinguishing characteristic is that he sees things as they truly are: other men are deceived by pleasure. They think that it is good, although it is not. They seek after it as good, and shun pain as evil.

1113 a. 15. § 1. ἡ δὲ βούλησις . . . τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν] Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 467 D εἰάν τις τι πράττει ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὁ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὐ ἕνεκα πράττει.

δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τάγαθόν εἶναι] τάγαθόν is the reading of Γ, Asp., CCC, NC, Cambr., Ald., and is accepted by Bywater and Susem. The other authorities have ἀγαθόν. Grant has a good note here in which he quotes Plato, *Gorgias* 466 sqq., where the doctrine τάγαθόν ἢ βούλησις is maintained: see also passages collected by Bonitz (note, p. 497, on *Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 a) in which Aristotle describes the general tendency of Nature as towards the good—*de Gen. et Corr.* ii. 10. 336 b. 27 ἐν ἅπασιν αἰεὶ τοῦ βελτιονος ὀρέγεσθαι φημεν τὴν φύσιν—*de Part. Anim.* iv. 10. 687 a. 15 εἰ οὖν οὕτω βέλτιον, ἢ δὲ φύσις ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖ τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ διὰ τὰς χεῖρας ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος φρονιμώτατος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζῴων ἔχει χεῖρας. Cf. also *de Inces. Anim.* 2. 704 b. 15, and passages quoted in note on *E. N.* i. 9. 5.

In all creatures there is a θεῖόν τι which directs their efforts towards that which is naturally good. This instinctive tendency to conform to the objective law of the environment is often thwarted by influences of subjective origin; but the continuance of life proves it to be the strongest principle—τὸ κράτιστον. 'It rules the world,' because, after all, it 'has might as it has right.'

a. 16. τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ] Grant refers to *Met.* κ. 6. 1062 b. 13 καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος (Protagoras) ἔφη πάντων χρημάτων εἶναι μέτρον ἄνθρωπον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον λέγων ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτ' εἶναι παγίως . . . μέτρον δ' εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον ἐκάστῳ. Cf. *Met.* Γ. 5. 1009 a. 6, where Aristotle says that the doctrine of Protagoras amounts to a denial of the Principle of Contradiction—ἔτι δ' ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρου λόγος, καὶ ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως αὐτοὺς ἀμφω ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι. εἴτε γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἀνάγκη πάντα ἅμα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ εἶναι. πολλοὶ γὰρ τάναντία ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοὺς μὴ ταῦτὰ δοξάζοντας ἑαυτοῖς διεψεύσθαι νομίζουσιν' ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι. καὶ εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι πάντ' ἀληθῆ' τὰ ἀντικείμενα γὰρ δοξάζουσιν ἀλλήλοις οἱ διεψευσμένοι καὶ ἀληθεύοντες' εἰ οὖν ἔχει τὰ ὄντα οὕτως, ἀληθεύουσιν πάντες. The denial of this Principle (πασῶν βεβαιωτάτη ἀρχὴ *Met.* Γ. 3. 1005 b. 18) amounts to the denial of Life. Life is not a succession of unrelated φαντάσματα, but a principle acting in conformity with definite objective laws—the physical life acting in conformity with definite physical laws, the moral life with

the law of Duty. Right and wrong are 'in things,' not in our 1113 a. 16. feelings. See Cudworth's *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, book ii. chap. i for an excellent discussion of the individualistic morality of Protagoras.

§ 2. συμβαίνει . . . μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὁ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς a. 17. αἰρούμενος] This verbal difficulty (for Aristotle is really at one with Plato against Protagoras and all who set up the subjective standard of feeling) the writer of the *M. M.* (ii. 11. 1208 b. 39) evades by means of a verbal distinction—βουλητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, βουλητέον δὲ τὸ ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθόν.

§ 3. μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν] i. e. they deny the existence of an a. 20. objective moral standard.

τὸ δοκοῦν . . . φαίνεται] Zell quotes passages which show that a. 21. these terms are properly distinguished: but here there does not seem to be any distinction suggested—*E. E. H.* 2. 1235 b. 25 τὸ γὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλητόν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὀρεκτόν' φαινόμενον γὰρ τι ἀγαθόν' τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται κἂν μὴ δοκῇ' οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖσδε τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα—cf. *de An.* iii. 3. 428 a. 18 sqq.

§ 4. ὁ σπουδαῖος κ.τ.λ.] There is an objective good, a φύσει a. 20. βουλητόν, or ἀγαθόν, which ἀρετή, man's true φύσις, or perfection discloses: cf. vi. 12. 6 ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν. What is said here of the σπουδαῖος, or perfect man, must be said of every perfect organism. Its actions are adapted to its environment. If we were to ask 'what is best for a butterfly?' the answer would be—'to do as the nature and instincts of a butterfly dictate.' The example introduced by ὡς περ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωματίων a. 26 shows how far it was from Aristotle's thought to draw a sharp line between ἀρετή and other phases of life. His biological studies made it impossible for him to do so.

§ 5. μέτρον] For the μέτρον ἄνθρωπος of Protagoras Aristotle a. 33. substitutes μέτρον ὁ σπουδαῖος: cf. *E. N.* ix. 4. 2, and x. 5. 10.

τὴν ἡδονήν] i. e. the pleasure of ἀπόλαυσις is their chief good. a. 34. They do not know that the performance of duty—τὰ καλὰ πράττειν—is the chief good, and is attended by 'its own' pleasure: cf. *E. N.* i. 8. §§ 11 and 12.

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

The particular acts deliberately chosen as means to a wished for end being voluntarily performed, and virtue manifesting itself in the performance of such acts, it follows that being virtuous is 'in our power'—and being vicious also: for, if to do this or that is right, and is in our power, then not to do it, being wrong, will also be in our power; and if not to do it is right, and in our power, then to do it, being wrong, will also be in our power. Indeed, if we deny that being good or bad is in our power, we must deny that man is the parent of his actions. But this we cannot deny, for actions cannot be referred to any other origin than to the man who performs them. Originating in him they are in his power, or voluntary. If they originated elsewhere, what would be the use of trying to influence him by rewards and punishments? If they were not voluntary, we should no more try to persuade him to do them, than we try to persuade a man to feel warm, or experience any other sensation over which he has no power. On the other hand, where the efficiency of the man is obviously excluded, that is, in the case of acts forced upon him, and of acts caused by ignorance, we do not think of punishing him—unless, indeed, the ignorance be caused by himself. Thus the drunken man is ignorant of what he does; but he is himself the cause of the ignorance; and in some cities is doubly punished—both for the ignorance, and for what he does in it: so also men are punished for what they do in ignorance of a plain law, because the ignorance is due to their own carelessness. If it be urged in extenuation—that 'it is their nature to be careless'—we answer that it is a second nature, which they have acquired by repeating acts which it was in their power not to perform: that they knew quite well what the repetition of these acts was leading to; and that consequently their final state—their carelessness or injustice generally—has been voluntarily chosen by them: not voluntarily chosen, however, in the sense that they can, if they wish, lay it aside and become just, any more than a man can, if he wish, lay aside the bad health which has resulted from a voluntarily chosen course of dissipation. It originally rested with themselves not to become unjust; but they have made themselves so with their eyes open. In this sense they are 'voluntarily unjust' although it is now beyond the power of 'wishing' to change their injustice into justice. And, lest it should be thought strange that a moral state which we cannot alter if we wish, should yet be described as 'voluntary,' and be blamed, it may be pointed out that there is nothing exceptional in this: what we say of a moral state is true of many bodily states also: no one would blame a man for natural unsightliness; but for unsightliness produced by dissipation or carelessness a man is blamed: blamed, because his unsightliness was 'voluntarily' produced, although now beyond the power of 'wishing' to change. In short, where blame lies, the vice is 'in our power.' We cannot shelter ourselves from this blame behind the pretext that the vice is now fixed and no longer 'in our power'; it originally was 'in our power' not to contract it.

But some one may say—'Perhaps it is not true that it originally was in our power not to contract it. Perhaps the vicious disposition which you hold a man responsible for because he himself, as you say, has fixed it with his eyes open, was fixed for him from the beginning. A man always seeks what he thinks good. But is he master of his thoughts? Does not his view of the Chief End of Life depend upon his disposition? You say that he himself contributes to the making of his disposition, in which case, of course, he would be in a sense the cause of the view which he takes of the Chief End, and be responsible for the conduct determined by that view—but what if he himself has nothing to do with the making of his disposition—if it is fixed by nature from the beginning? Then surely no blame attaches to the man who does evil. He does evil because nature has not endowed him with an eye for the true end of life.'

To this we answer—You prove more than you wish. You prove virtue to be as involuntary as vice. If vice is natural blindness, virtue is natural endowment. The virtuous man, equally with the vicious man, is dominated in his actions by a conception of the end which has been fixed for him from the beginning. But if, in order to make the good man a voluntary agent, you admit either that he has something to do with the formation of his conception of the good end, or that, though dominated by an end fixed for him by nature, he nevertheless selects means voluntarily—surely you are bound to make the same admissions in the case of the bad man? If the good man is a voluntary agent so is the bad man. Both are efficient in the performance of acts, if not in the formation of the conception of the end. Nay rather, we cannot regard acts and end as separate. By acts good or bad we contribute to the making of character good or bad; and according as is the character so is the end.

If then the virtues are 'voluntary,' the vices are also 'voluntary.' It is not to be supposed, however, that these habits are voluntary as actions are voluntary. A voluntary action is one over which an agent, with full knowledge of all the circumstances, has control from beginning to end. But a voluntary habit is one over the beginning only of which the agent had control—which has imperceptibly, like bodily weakness, taken hold of him and become at last independent of his control. It is called voluntary because the acts which produced it were in his power to perform or not.

§ 1. περὶ ταῦτα] Apparently τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος: see iii. 3. 15, at 1113 b. 4. πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα.

§ 2. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κ.τ.λ.] The Paraphrast exhibits the b. 6. connexion between this clause (introduced by δὴ) and the previous clause thus—ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις δι' ὧν ἐθίζομεν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν ἀρετὴν προουρεταὶ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσὶν. The writer of the *M. M.* (i. 9. 1187 a. 7) makes 'Socrates' deny the doctrine of this section—Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν γενέσθαι τὸ σπουδαῖος εἶναι ἢ φαῦλος. εἰ γὰρ τις, φησὶν, ἐρωτήσῃεν ὄντιναοῦν πότερον ἂν βούλοιο δίκαιος εἶναι ἢ ἀδικος, οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴλοιο τὴν ἀδικίαν. ὁμοίως δ' ἐπ' ἀνδρείας καὶ δειλίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως. δῆλον δ' ὅς ἐφ' αὐτοῖς

1113 b. 6. *τινες εἰσὶν, οὐκ ἂν ἐκόντες εἴησαν φαῦλοι· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ σπουδαῖοι.—* ὁ δὲ τούτου λόγος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής. διὰ τί γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐκ ἔβη τὰ φαῦλα πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα κελεύει; καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς φαύλοις ζημίαν τάττει, ἐν πράττει, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς, ἂν μὴ πράττει; καίτοι ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη ταῦτα νομοθετῶν, ἂ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι πράττειν. ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ σπουδαῖοι εἶναι καὶ τὸ φαῦλοις. The writer of the *M. M.*, of course, misunderstands the true position of 'Socrates.' When 'Socrates' says that vice is involuntary (*e.g.* *Protag.* 345 D, E, also *Gorg.* 509 E), he means only that it is *παρὰ φύσιν*: as for the doctrine *Meno* 100 B *θεία μοῖρα ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιννομένη ἀρετῇ οἷς παραγίγνεται*, where the reference is to the political *genius* of a Themistocles or Pericles—it is evidently not touched by such arguments as those here brought forward by the writer of the *M. M.* 'Socrates' was not the man to underrate the influence of the νομοθέτης.

b. 7. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ.] Grant refers to *Met.* Θ. 2 where αἱ μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις are said to be τῶν ἐναντίων. Cf. *Met.* Θ. 5 where ἄρεξις or προαίρεσις is said to be τὸ κύριον, and to determine which of the two possible ἐναντία shall be selected.

b. 13. § 3. τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι] 'And this (*i.e.* τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά) is, according to our view, being good and bad.' ἦν refers back (as *e.g.* in iii. 8. 14), not perhaps, as Grant thinks, 'to the preceding section,' but more generally to the doctrine already established that the deliberate choice of τὰ καλὰ or τὰ αἰσχρά indicates a good or bad character: cf. iii. 4. 2. At any rate Trendelenburg, in his paper on τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (*Rheinisches Museum*, 1828, vol. ii. pp. 457 sqq.), referred to by Grant, is right in telling us that ἀγαθοῖς here is simply by attraction to ἡμῖν, and that the formula τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι = 'the essential idea of goodness,' or 'of a good man,' is not in the writer's mind. He seems to be thinking of the way in which a man's deliberate actions indicate his character to the ordinary observer; not of the scientific formula (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of Virtue or Vice. For the use of the dat. with εἶναι to express the essential notion see *De Anima* ii. 1. 412 b. 12 ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἢ οὐσία αὐτοῦ—*An. Post.* ii. 4. 91 b. 4 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῶν εἶναι κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι.—*Phys.* iii. 5. 204 a. 23 τὸ γὰρ ἀπεῖρφ εἶναι καὶ ἀπειρον τὸ αὐτό, εἴπερ οὐσία τὸ ἀπειρον καὶ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου—*Met.* Z. 6. 1031 b. 11 ἀνάγκη ἄρα εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλὸν εἶναι, ὅσα μὴ κατ' ἄλλο λέγεται, ἀλλὰ

καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ πρῶτα—*i.e.* the words ἀπειρον, ἀγαθόν, καλόν mark 1113 b. 13. notions, not concrete things. That τὸ ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι in the present passage (*E. N.* iii. 5. 3) cannot mean 'the essential notion' of the virtuous man becomes very plain if we turn to ii. 6. 17, where the essential notion of ἀρετῇ is distinguished from its excellence—κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετῇ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.—Τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ answers to the τὰ καλὰ πράττειν of the present passage.

§ 4. οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος] μακάριος seems to be b. 14. the reading of all MSS., and is accordingly restored by Bywater. Bekker and Susemihl adopt μάκαρ, the suggestion of Victorius. Bergk (*Poet. Lyr.* p. 1076, referred to by Ramsauer) thinks that this line may be by Solon. The Schol. (quoted by Zell and Michelet) says—παροιμία τοῦτο ἢ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ Συρακόσιος κέχρηται ἐν οἷς φησὶν· ἀλλὰ μὲν ἐγὼ 'ναγκαῖοι ταῦτα πάντα ποιέω, οἴομαι δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς, οὐδ' ἄταν ἔχων. ἐν Ἑρακλεῖ δὲ ταῦτα τῷ παραφόρῳ. The line is quoted in the spurious dialogue *περὶ δικαίου* (Plato *Dial.* p. 374 a.) referred to by Zell, Coraes, and Grant. There can be no doubt that the writer of the line used πονηρὸς in the sense of 'wretched,' to contrast with μάκαρ meaning 'happy.' But Aristotle here, and the writer of the dialogue *περὶ δικαίου*, quote the line in order to give the word its other sense of 'wicked,' although that other sense is obviously not intended by the poet. The liberty which they thus take with the poet's meaning is not so great however as it seems. A Greek would not distinguish the two senses of πονηρὸς so sharply as we do when we are compelled to translate the word by 'wicked' in one context, and by 'wretched' in another.

§ 5. τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένους] Above, iii. 3. 15—ἔοικε δὲ . . . ἄν- b. 17. θρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων. As for the parallel ὡσπερ καὶ τέκνον, it has not, Ramsauer notes, been mentioned before in the *E. N.*; but in *E. E.* ii. 6. 1222 b. 15 we have—εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ οὐσῖαι κατὰ φύσιν τινὲς ἀρχαί, διὸ καὶ ἐκάστη πολλὰ δύναται τοιαῦτα γενῶν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπους . . . πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ὁ γ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἔστιν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ζῴων.

§ 6. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα] *i.e.* τὰ εἰρημένα.

b. 19.

παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν] Bekker reads ἐφ' in b. 20. place of the first ἐν. The text as given above is that restored by

1113 b. 20. Rasso (Forsch. p. 56) who quotes in support of ἐν in both places the account of τὸ ἀκούσιον as οὐδ' ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐξώθεν 1110 a. 1, and 1110 b. 2 where τὸ ἀκούσιον is said to occur ὁπότε ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ᾖ, in contrast to τὸ ἐκούσιον which is that οὐδ' ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, 1110 b. 4. He also quotes 1110 a. 16 ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν' ὃν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μή; also 1111 a. 23, 1112 b. 28, 1113 b. 32, 1135 b. 19, 1140 a. 13. 'Ἐπ' or ἐφ' and ἐν are often confused by scribes, and MS. authority does not help us much in coming to a decision; but here there seem to be good internal grounds for preferring ἐν in both places. As for the inference that where the ἀρχαί are ἐν ἡμῖν the acts are ἐφ' ἡμῖν, it is not, as thus stated, conclusive. The movements of the heart and lungs proceed from ἀρχαί ἐν ἡμῖν, but are not therefore ἐφ' ἡμῖν. There are plainly two kinds of ἀρχαί ἐν ἡμῖν. What is the special nature of those ἀρχαί ἐν ἡμῖν which produce movements that are ἐφ' ἡμῖν?

b. 24. § 7. ἡ δι' ἀγροίαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι.] This is a full statement of what is implied in the δι' ἀγροίαν of iii. 1. 14. Grant has some excellent remarks on the value of the argument of this section. 'This fact [of rewards and punishments] is not sufficient to disprove a metaphysical system which would represent legislature, judge, criminal, and the whole world, as forced to do what they do by an irresistible succession of cause and effect. But ethically and politically it is sufficient to justify a practical assumption of freedom. And in any system it must at all events be taken account of.'

b. 31. § 8. διπλά τὰ ἐπιτίμια.] The reference is, as the editors point out, to the law of Pittacus, see Pol. ii. 12. 1274 b. 19, and Rhet. ii. 25. 1402 b. 9.

1114 a. 4. § 10. τοιοῦτους.] K^b N^b and NC have τοιοῦτον. Ramsauer conjectures τοιοῦτοι, and in the next line ἄδικοι and ἀκόλαστοι.

a. 11. § 13.] Rasso (Forsch. p. 28) would transpose the sentences ἔτι δ' . . . ἀκόλαστον, and εἰ δὲ μὴ . . . ἂν εἴη. That which he puts first brings the foregoing remarks to an end; while that which he puts second introduces a new point—the Platonic τὸ τὸν ἀδικούντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι (see Gorg. 509 E ὁμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἄδικεῖν ἀλλ' ἅκοντας τοὺς ἀδικούντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν, cf. Protag. 345 D, E). I think that the run of the passage is much improved by the transposition.

§ 14. οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε κ.τ.λ.] 'No man wishes to be unjust' would 1114 a. 13. be true if wish (βούλησις) were only of τὸ ἀγαθόν, as distinguished from τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. But the ἀδικῶν voluntarily with his eyes open performs the acts ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, and he is responsible for the habit of ἀδικία which is formed. He must be treated practically as if he wished to form it. It is irrelevant, then, to urge 'no man wishes to be unjust' as an excuse of injustice. 'Not wishing,' in the sense of 'not making injustice his ideal,' has evidently nothing to do with the matter. He did not 'wish' in this sense to be unjust, and yet he became unjust by his own voluntary acts; and, being unjust, he may wish to be just, but that will not make him just.

καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν] καίτοι is Rasso's certain conjecture (as it a. 15. seems to me) for καί, see Forsch. p. 28.

προεμένω] sc. τὴν ὑγίειαν. Par.

a. 17.

βαλεῖν] K^b, L^b, M^b, O^b, Γ, Ald., Cambr., have βαλεῖν: but a. 18. λαβεῖν is the reading of CCC, NC, B¹, B². Syllables written backwards are not very uncommon in MSS. Bywater brackets καὶ ῥίψαι, reading βαλεῖν. If βαλεῖν accidentally became λαβεῖν, the words καὶ ῥίψαι would be naturally added; or perhaps ῥίψαι was originally a marginal gloss on βαλεῖν, and crept into the text, and suggested the change (not however universally made) of βαλεῖν into λαβεῖν. Susemihl reads λαβεῖν καὶ ῥίψαι.

§ 15.] We are held responsible for states of body sometimes; a. 21. à fortiori for states of mind, even though it may be beyond the power of 'wishing' to change them.

§ 17.] This involved section, into which the movement of a a. 31. whole Dialogue seems to be compressed, consists of two sentences, in the first of which—εἰ δέ τις 1114 a. 31 . . . εἰφύια 1114 b. 12—the protasis states the position of Aristotle's opponent, and the apodosis, beginning οἰθεῖς 1114 b. 3, develops the consequences of that position in such a way as to lead up to the second sentence—1114 b. 12 εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ, τί μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον;—in which Aristotle refutes his opponent by showing him that he 'proves too much.' The clause 1114 b. 1 εἰ μὲν οὖν . . . b. 3 αὐτὸς αἴτιος is best regarded as a parenthesis stating Aristotle's own view, thrown in at the beginning of the 'Dialogue,' by the side

1114 a. 31. of the opponent's view, to make the issue between the two disputants clearer.

a. 32. τῆς δὲ φαντασίας] φαντασία is described in *de An.* iii. 3. 428 b. 10 as a κίνησις started by αἰσθησις, and resembling it; φαντάσματα are images derived from sense—*ideas*, *Vorstellungen*, 'reliques of motions made in the sense'—to quote an expression of Hobbes (*Lev.* iii), whose account of *Imagination* (*Lev.* ii and iii) resembles Aristotle's account of φαντασία very closely. See *de An.* iii. 3, where, after having shown that φαντασία is not αἰσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς, or δόξα, Aristotle says (428 b. 9) οὐτ' ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦτων ἐστὶν οὐτ' ἐκ τοῦτων ἢ φαντασία. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶ κινήσεντος τοῦδὲ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ τοῦτου, ἢ δὲ φαντασία κίνησις τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίνεσθαι ἀλλ' αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἰσθησις ἐστίν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἢ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. Cf. also 429 a. 1 ἢ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἰσθησις ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους εἰληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν. καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίως εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσοις ἢ ὑπνω, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι. Φαντασία is thus a motion caused by sensation, distinct from sensation, but resembling it. As such, it mediates between sensation and thought—*de Mem.* i. 449 b. 31 νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος—and gives appetite objects, see *de An.* iii. 10. 433 b. 27 ἢ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον ταύτη ἑαυτοῦ κινήτικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πάντα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητικὴ· ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει. Αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία converts the sensation of an object into an idea of it which attracts or repels: λογιστικὴ (called βουλευτικὴ in *de An.* iii. 11. 434 a. 7) φαντασία enables the calculative faculty to marshal reasons which will appeal to ὄρεξις. Hobbes' 'Trayn of Imaginations' (*Lev.* iii)—the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows—is an excellent example of what λογιστικὴ φαντασία does. The close connexion which thus subsists between φαντασία and ὄρεξις enables us to appreciate the force of the former term in the present section. It is used here simply for 'the idea that this or that is good.' Hence it is almost equivalent to 'a desire or wish for this or that.'

εἰ μὲν οὖν . . . αὐτὸς αἴτιος] Aristotle's own view here parenthetically stated in conditional form involves a difficulty. A man is τῆς ἑξέως πῶς αἴτιος because he has voluntarily performed the acts which have resulted in the ἑξις: but each of these acts implies φαντασία—ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας: what if φαντασία ἧς οὐ κύριοι ἐσμεν dominates the whole process by which a ἑξις is formed? Aristotle cannot be said to face this difficulty. It is enough for his present purpose to refute his opponent by making him prove more than he wishes, *viz.* that we cannot take credit to ourselves for our *virtues*. Broader ground, however, might have been taken. It might have been argued that the φύσις, or natural bent which determines the τέλος, is after all *the man's own φύσις*—his *own character*—in short *himself*—the concrete man, made up of elements inherited from ancestors, and of elements taken on in the lifetime of the individual; and that consequently to say that the end is fixed φύσει is to say that the man himself fixes it, not that it is fixed for him, in spite of himself, by an external power. The biological antecedents of the individual are not external to him. They are summed up *in* him. Aristotle's opponent in the present passage, like many disputants in our own day, commits the mistake of externalising biological antecedents. He does not see that an inherited character is still *the man's own* character.

εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθείς] εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς is the reading of M^b, L^b, N^b, Γ, b. 3. Ald., B¹, B², NC, CCC, adopted by Rasso (Forsch. 121) and Susemihl. K^b, O^b, Camb., read εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθείς, adopted by Bekker, Ramsauer, and Bywater. If εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς be adopted, the whole section is one sentence, in which the protasis makes three starts: (1) εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι, (2) εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς, and (3) εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ—the apodosis beginning at τί μᾶλλον b. 12.

ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει] Ramsauer notes that b. 4. this view resembles Aristotle's ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἀδικοὶ καὶ ὄλως κακοὶ γίνονται *E. N.* iii. 1. 14. Aristotle differs from his present opponent in regarding the μοχθηρὸς as αἴτιος τῆς ἀγνοίας, in recognising in the φύσις which causes the ἀγνοία the man's own character.

ἢ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἕφεσις] = τὸ δὲ τέλος οὐ ἐφίεται.

b. 5.

εὐφύης] That εὐφύία is highly prized by Aristotle is shown by b. 8.

1114 b. 8. the place which φυσική ἀρετή (*E. N.* vi. 13. 1) and εὐγένεια (see note on i. 8. 16) occupy in his system.

b. 9. τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . τοιοῦτον ἔξει.] There is a Platonic ring about these words, and the doctrine reminds one of that maintained at the end of the *Meno*—that ἀρετή is a divine gift, which its possessor cannot communicate to others. We can imagine a Platonising opponent encouraged by Aristotle to enlarge on ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ εὐφροσύνη, and so lay himself open to the awkward question—τί μάλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον ;

Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 121) finds the construction of the sentence τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . ἂν εἴη εὐφροσύνη irregular: the words τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . ἔξει have no suitable predicate, the predicate τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ εὐφροσύνη being a superlative which answers rather to the clause καὶ τὸ εὖ . . . πεφυκέσθαι. He accordingly translates, as if εὐφροσύνη ἂν εἴη were read after ἔξει, thus—‘das Grösste und Schönste, was man von einem andern nicht empfangen und lernen kann, sondern was man so besitzen wird, wie es von Natur geworden ist, (ist die εὐφροσύνη), und ist es gut und schön von Natur geworden, so ist es die vollkommene und wahre εὐφροσύνη.’ I cannot help thinking that this is a little too subtle. The superlatives μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον in the first clause of the sentence surely deserve the superlative predicate as much as τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέσθαι. But is Rassow right in making τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . ἔξει a subject with εὐφροσύνη (whether τελεία or not) as predicate? Is it not better to make τὸ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον the object of ἔξει and to regard the clause τὸ γὰρ . . . ἔξει as explanatory of εὐφροσύνης l. 8, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον developing εὖ- and καὶ δὲ . . . ἔφην developing -φροσύνης? We should then translate—‘for he will have that which is greatest and fairest, and that which one cannot receive or learn from another, but has entirely from nature.’ Then follows the clause καὶ τὸ εὖ . . . εὐφροσύνη not as ‘Ein steigernder Zusatz zum Subject (Rassow, *Forsch.* 121),’ but added to distinguish this moral εὐφροσύνη, as τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ, from the lower kind of εὐφροσύνη which a man of ‘good natural ability’ possesses. The τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ εὐφροσύνη of this passage may be compared, as Ramsauer notes, with the θεία εὐτυχία (*E. E.* H. 14. 1248 b. 3), or εὐφροσύνη ὀρέξεως καὶ ἐπιθυμίας (*E. E.* H. 14. 1247 b. 39) of the *E. E.* and *M. M.* The writers of these treatises found the doctrine of φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ in Aristotle; but they certainly developed it in a way which suggests Platonic influence.

The Platonic tone and phraseology of the following passage 1114 b. 9. (*M. M.* ii. 8. 1207 a. 35) is remarkable:—ἔστιν οὖν ἡ εὐτυχία ἀλογος φύσις· ὁ γὰρ εὐτυχὴς ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνευ λόγου ἔχων ὁρμὴν πρὸς τὰγαθὰ, καὶ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνων, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ φύσεως· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ ἔνεστιν τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτον φ' ὁρμῶμεν ἀλόγως πρὸς ἃ ἂν εὖ ἔχωμεν. καὶ εἴ τις ἐρωτήσει τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, διὰ τί τοῦτο ἀρέσκει σοι οὕτω πράττειν; οὐκ οἶδα, φησὶν, ἀλλ' ἀρέσκει μοι, ὅμοιον πάσχων τοῖς ἐνθουσιάζουσιν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ἄνευ λόγου ὁρμὴν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τι. Cf. Plato, *Meno*, 99 D καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαίμεν ἂν θεῖους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνοους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν καταρθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσι.

§ 18. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ] τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

b. 15.

§ 19.] At the end of § 17 the opponent had to admit that if the τέλος being φυσικόν makes vice involuntary, it also makes virtue involuntary. But he wishes to believe that virtue is voluntary (ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιον ἐστὶν 1114 b. 19); accordingly he must admit either that the end is not fixed φύσει (εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἐκάστω φαίνεται ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐστὶν—it is partly due to himself) or that the end is indeed φυσικόν, but the means are voluntarily chosen by the good man (εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἐκούσιως τὸν σπουδαῖον . . .). But either admission, made in the interest of the voluntariness of virtue, entails the voluntariness of vice.

§ 20. ὡςπερ λέγεται] i.e. it is maintained by our opponent that virtue is voluntary.

§§ 21, 22.] The order accepted by Bekker from the MSS. viz. b. 26. (1) κοινῇ . . . προστάξει, (2) οὐχ ὁμοίως . . . ἐκούσιοι ought to be reversed: see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 28. Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* pp. 205-6) inclines to the view that the section οὐχ ὁμοίως . . . ἐκούσιοι is a marginale, and not, as Scaliger supposed, a part of the original text detached from its immediate antecedent § 20 by the intrusion of the words κοινῇ . . . προστάξει. He thinks that the words οὐχ ὁμοίως . . . ἐκούσιοι are out of place after § 20, which merely proves that ἀρετὴ and κακία are equally voluntary. But are they out of place as referring back to the remark made at the end of § 14?

§ 21. πρακτικὰ (καὶ) καθ' αὐτὰς] i.e. not τούτων πρακτικὰ κατὰ b. 28. συμβεβηκός: e.g. the ἔξις of temperance produces temperate acts, because it is its own nature to do so, not because they happen to

1114 b. 28. conduce to health or respectability. Susemihl and Bywater insert *καί* before *καθ'*, with Γ, Asp., Ob, CCC, NC, Cambr. Of course MSS. do not help us to a decision. I do not like the *καί*.

1115 a. 3. § 22. *χρήσασθαι*] 'to act': cf. the use of *χρήσις* = *ἐνέργεια* E. E. ii. 1. 1219 a. 14.

a. 5. § 23. *πόσαι*] See Grant's excellent notes here and on ii. 7. 1. Aristotle can hardly have regarded his list of virtues as theoretically exhaustive. He only means that it is not limited to the four 'cardinal virtues' *σοφία, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη*, but involves a more minute analysis of the conditions of human life than that enumeration presupposes. We may suspect that, having written *τινες εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς*, he naturally went on to write *καὶ πόσαι*.

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

Here ends our general description of moral virtue. Let us now proceed to describe in detail the various forms of moral virtue—the virtues in the plural: their number our list, when finished, will show.

Courage. It is a mediocrity in relation to the feelings of fear and confidence. Now, we fear evils—to use the most general expression. Hence fear is defined as the expectation of evil. But although we fear all evils—disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death, it is not with all of them that courage has to do; for there are some evils which a man ought to fear. Thus if a man does not fear disgrace he is shameless, not courageous, although the latter epithet is sometimes wrongly applied to him, because he resembles the courageous man in 'not fearing.' On the other hand, poverty and disease perhaps ought not to be feared: they do not come by one's own fault; but yet, being without fear of them does not constitute a man courageous, except in a metaphorical sense. A man may be a coward in war, and yet look the loss of his fortune boldly in the face. Or again, he may fear the outrage of wife and children or the jealousy of Heaven, and yet be no coward; may look forward to a flogging with a stout heart, and yet not be courageous. What then is the object of fear with which courage is concerned? Surely that which is the object of the greatest fear—for the courageous man is the man to face it—death, which puts an end to life. But not death, as such, however coming—thus, not death by shipwreck or disease—but death coming gloriously in battle. He is courageous, in the strict sense, who is without dread of a glorious death, and of the risks which bring it to close

quarters with him in sudden onslaught—and such above all are the risks of war: not that the courageous man is not also without dread of death by shipwreck or disease; but the prospect of such a death does not call forth his peculiar excellence, for he revolts against it, as miserable and inglorious, often, in his inexperience, regarding it as inevitable, when it is not; nor can he take up arms and defend himself against it. It is only where a man can take up arms and defend himself, or where death is glorious, that he can 'show courage.'

§ 1. *περὶ ἀνδρείας*] See Grant's excellent notes on §§ 1-8 of this 1115 a. 6. chapter, in which he refers to the *Protagoras* (349-51, 359-61), and to the *Laches* to show that 'Aristotle's admirable account of courage is to some extent indebted to the observations of Plato, while in some points it is a protest against the Platonic theory.' Aristotle's relation to the Platonic theory may be briefly stated thus—Aristotle is at one with Plato in recognising the moral elevation of the virtue, but he limits its sphere to war, whereas Plato extends it so as to include all dangers—even those of temptation.

§§ 1, 2. *περὶ φόβους . . . προσδοκίαν κακοῦ*] Grant quotes *Protag.* 358 D *προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε*, and *Laches*, 198 B *ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δευῖά μιν εἶναι ἃ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἃ μὴ δέος παρέχει δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γηγονότα, οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα δέος γάρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ*. But, it is argued by Socrates,—*ἀνδρεία* cannot be an *ἐπιστήμη*, for science has nothing to do with time. Agriculture, or strategy, *μία οὖσα ἐφορᾷ καὶ γιγνώμενα καὶ γηγονότα καὶ γενησόμενα* (198 E) . . . *καὶ ὁ νόμος οὕτω τάττει μὴ τὸν μάντιν τοῦ στρατηγού ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τὸν στρατηγὸν τοῦ μάντεως*. If courage is a science, it cannot be confined to the future (*δεωῶν καὶ θαρραλέων*) but must be concerned with good and evil universally—*ἢ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων* (199 C). Then, asks Socrates, can he be wanting in the highest virtue, who knows all that is good and all that is evil; and can he fail in temperance or justice or holiness, who alone can guard against evil and compass good, whether in the service of the gods or in the society of men? *οὐκ ἄρα*, concludes Socrates (199 E), *μόριον ἀρετῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ νῦν λέγομενον ἀλλὰ σύμπασα ἀρετή*. What we call 'moral courage' is, in fact, made the foundation of all virtue. Such is the suggestion put forward in the *Laches*. It is particularly to be noted that it is only a suggestion. In § 3 Aristotle protests against this wide and vague use of the term

1115 a. 6. ἀνδρείος suggested in the *Laches*. The term is properly used, he thinks, only in connexion with the dangers of war (§ 10), and καθ' ὁμοιότητα (§ 4) in connexion with all other evils.

a. 7. ἤδη φανερόν γεγένηται] This is the reading K^b, O^b, Cambr., accepted by Susemihl and Bywater, instead of the καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται of other MSS. (some of which, e. g. CCC, B¹, B², however ἀδδ φανερόν γὰρ γεγένηται) accepted by Bekker. I prefer Bekker's reading: cf. below iii. 10. 1 ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονᾶς ἢ σωφροσύνη εἴρηται ἡμῖν. Whatever may be thought of the genuineness of the διαγραφὴ in ii. 7, there can be no doubt that there was a διαγραφὴ of some kind there to which Aristotle is entitled to refer back here.

a. 10. § 3. φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν] Eudemus (*E. E.* iii. i. 1229 a. 33) limits the application of the term φόβος. He distinguishes φόβος, properly so called (fear of death), from dread of disgrace, &c. ὅλως μὲν οὖν φοβερά λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβου. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς τοῖς γὰρ ἄλλων τιὰ προσδεχομένοις λύπην ἕτερα μὲν ἂν τις ἕως λύπη γένοιο καὶ πάθος ἕτερον, φόβος δ' οὐκ ἔσται, οἷον εἴ τις προορῶτο ὅτι λυπήσεται λύπην ἢ οἱ φθονοῦντες λυποῦνται, ἢ τοιαύτην οἷαν οἱ ζηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυρόμενοι. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μόναις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις ἔσεσθαι λύπαις φόβος γίνεται, ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν. Thus φόβος is not the proper name for the anticipation of the pain of envy or shame; it is applied only to the anticipation of such pains as are destructive of life—ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν. This refinement in the use of the term φόβος was doubtless suggested primarily to Eudemus by Aristotle's limitation of the sphere of ἀνδρεία to war; but a passage in *Rhet.* ii. 5. 1382 a. 21 may also have had its influence—ἔστω δὲ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακά φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δύνανται, καὶ ταῦτ' ἔαν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν. τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα οὐ φοβοῦνται· ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. εἰ δὲ ὁ φόβος τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερά εἶναι ὅσα φαίνεται δύναμιν ἔχειν μεγάλην τοῦ φθεῖρειν ἢ βλάπτειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην συντενοῦσας.

a. 12. ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν] Eudemus would have avoided the word φοβεῖσθαι here; nor is it quite consistent with the usage of *Rhet.* ii. 5: εὐλαβεῖται τὸ αἰσχρόν expresses better than φοβεῖται the relation of the ἐπιεικὴς to moral evil.

λέγεται] The subject is ὁ ἀναίσχυτος.

§ 4. οὐδ' ὅλως ὄσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν] In limiting the a. 17. sphere of ἀνδρεία to war, without narrowing the application of the term φοβεῖσθαι (as it is narrowed by Eudemus), Aristotle shows that he fully recognises the virtue which we call 'moral courage'—the σύμπασα ἀρετὴ of *Laches* 199 E, which Plato (adopting the Socratic doctrine of ἐγκράτεια) very rightly regards as the foundation of πολεμικὴ ἀρετὴ and all the other virtues.

§ 5. φθόνον] Does he mean the envy of a rival (or of Heaven), a. 23. or the pain of being oneself envious? The writer of the *E. E.* iii. i. 1229 a. 37 adopts the latter alternative—φόβος δ' οὐκ ἔσται, οἷον εἴ τις προορῶτο ὅτι λυπήσεται λύπην ἢ οἱ φθονοῦντες λυποῦνται.

§ 6. φοβερώτατον . . . κακόν εἶναι] Here δοκεῖ does not necessarily a. 26. express Aristotle's own view, any more than it does in i. 10. 3 δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακόν καὶ ἀγαθόν. *E. N.* i. 10. §§ 3-5, and *E. N.* i. 11, should be read in connexion with the present remark.

§ 7. ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις] Grant quotes *Laches*, 191 D, E, for a. 29. the extended use of the term ἀνδρεία, to which objection is made here and in the following sections—βουλόμενος γὰρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὀπλιτικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἱππικῷ καὶ ἐν ξύμπαντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἶδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνοις ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρείοι εἰσι, καὶ ἔτι αὐτὸ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς δευοὶ μάχεσθαι, καὶ μένοντες ἢ ἀναστρέφοντες—εἰσὶ γὰρ πού τινας, ὃ Δάχης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιαύτοις ἀνδρείω.

§ 8. καλλίστῳ] Cf. *Thuc.* ii. 42. 5 καὶ δι' ἐλαχίστου καιροῦ τύχης a. 31. ἅμα ἀκμῇ τῆς δόξης μάλλον ἢ τοῦ δέους ἀπηλλάγησαν.

§ 10. ὑπόγυια] αἰφνιδίως ἐπερχόμενα Paraph.—the sense given to a. 34. the word here by *Liddell and Scott*; cf. iii. 8. 15 διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειότερον δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἦρτον ἐκ παρασκευῆς τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαιφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. The word ὑπόγυιος means literally 'nigh at hand,' and Hippocrates 1225 C. E. F. is quoted by *Liddell and Scott* for an absolute use of ὑπόγυιον = 'near the end, at the approach of

1115 a. 34. death.' *ὑπόγνια* here may have been selected by Aristotle with a reminiscence of this absolute use; cf. *E. E.* iii. i. 1229 b. 10 καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλησίον ἢ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς ποιητικόν· φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται.

b. 2. § 11. οἱ μὲν] οἱ ἀνδρείοι.

b. 4. § 12. ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν] Men 'show courage' where they can take up arms and defend themselves, or (ἦ) where death is glorious. The former condition may be realised without the latter; in which case the ἀνδρεία would be of one of the spurious kinds described in chapter 8: the latter condition, however, cannot be realised without the former. Death, in a good cause, which a man endured fearlessly, but could not actively resist, would not be καλὸς θάνατος.

CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

Men differ in the things which they fear; but there are things so fearful that no man in his senses will regard them without terror, or think of facing them. These may be dismissed, for we have to do only with things which, although they are fearful, it is possible for men to face. These latter are, in themselves, and for different men, fearful in different degrees. Similarly, things inspire confidence in different degrees. It is with objects of fear, then, which are not too fearful for man to face, and with the grounds of confidence which may be set off against them, that the courageous man is concerned. His fear and his confidence he will govern aright, facing the danger of battle, as he ought, and as reason dictates, for the sake of glorious achievement; for glorious achievement is the end of virtue. A courageous act, like every other virtuous act, realises its own end when it shows forth the end for the sake of which its parent habit exists. The habit of courage is a glory to human nature: it exists for the sake of being a glory to human nature—to be this that it is its end. To show forth then the peculiar glory of courage is the end for the sake of which the courageous man faces danger and does deeds of courage.

On the side of excess we have:—

(1) *The man whose fearlessness is excessive. He has no name, but may be described as a sort of madman, or insensate person, for whom (as they say for the Celts) earthquakes or waves have no terrors.*

(2) *The man whose confidence is excessive—the rash man, who is also a swaggerer and a pretender to courage, but fails in the hour of real danger.*

(3) *The man whose fear is excessive—the coward. He appears also on the side of defect, for his confidence is defective; excessive fear, however, is what is most noticeable in him, and hopelessness; whereas the courageous man is full of good hope. Rash men again are eager for the fray before the danger is at hand, but in the hour of danger they hang back; whereas courageous men are keen when the time for action comes, but keep quiet before it.*

Courage then is a mediocrity in relation to the feelings of confidence and fear, as these are roused in war; and the courageous man deliberately takes his stand where he does because it is glorious to do so, or would be disgraceful not to do so.

But to commit suicide in order to avoid poverty, or the pangs of love, or any other pain or sorrow, is not courageous, but cowardly: for to shrink from hardships is effeminacy; and the suicide braves death, not because death is glorious, but because life is evil.

§ 1. τὸ δὲ φοβερόν . . . ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων] There are two classes 1115 b. 7. of φοβερά, (1) φοβερά which men can face; each one of these is differently φοβερόν to different men: (2) φοβερά so appalling that no man in his senses will face them—lightnings, earthquakes, inundations (Paraph.).

§ 2. ὡς ἄνθρωπος] *i. e.* so far as τὰ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον are concerned. b. 11. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα] *i. e.* as well as τὰ ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων.

ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ] προστάττει is to be understood b. 12. after λόγος, and ὁ ἀνδρείος is the subject of ὑπομενεῖ. He will indeed fear them, but yet, in obedience to the dictates of reason, will face them. Ramsauer refers to a passage in *Top.* iv. 5. 125 b. 20, in which Aristotle makes the ἀνδρείος ἀπαθής, instead of, as here, ἐγκρατὴς φόβου. (See § 5, below κατ' ἀξίαν . . . πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείος). The passage in the *Topics* is as follows—*διαμαρτάνουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὴν ἕξιν εἰς τὴν ἀκολουθοῦσαν δύναμιν τάττοντες, οἷον τὴν πράξηα ἐγκράτειαν ὀργῆς καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φόβου καὶ κερδῶν ἀνδρείος μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρᾶος ὁ ἀπαθής λέγεται, ἐγκρατὴς δ' ὁ πάσχων καὶ μὴ ἀγόμενος. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἀκολουθεῖ δύναμις ἐκατέρω τοιαύτη, ὥστ' εἰ πάθοι, μὴ ἄγεσθαι ἀλλὰ κρατεῖν· οὐ μὴν τοῦτο γ' ἐστὶ τῷ μὲν ἀνδρείῳ τῷ δὲ πρᾶφ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὄλωσ μὴ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.* We may explain this difference between the *Topics* and *Ethics* by pointing out that in the *Topics* Aristotle is speaking of the abstract notion of ἀνδρεία—τοῦτο γέ ἐστι τῷ μὲν ἀνδρείῳ εἶναι, as discussed by dialectical

1115 b. 12. disputants; whereas in the *Ethics* he is describing the ἀνδρείος in the concrete.

τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς] Ramsauer observes that it is here for the first time that the chief end is described as τὸ καλόν: henceforward it is often so described, as in *E. N.* 1116 a. 11, 12, 1117 a. 8, 1178 b. 13, 1120 a. 23, 24, 1122 b. 6: in *E. E.* 1229 a. 8, 1230 a. 27: and in *M. M.* 1190 a. 28 and 33.

b. 15. § 4. <δ> οὐ δεῖ] Susem. and Bywater restore δ from Γ.

b. 17. § 5. ὁ μὲν . . . ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος . . . ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν] 'The man who governs his fear and also his confidence aright, and faces the dangers that he ought to face.'

οὐ ἕνεκα] sc. δεῖ, i. e. καλοῦ ἕνεκα—in a glorious cause.

b. 19. κατ' ἀξίαν] There ought to be the same ratio between the magnitudes of two φόβοι as there is between the magnitudes of their respective φοβερά.

ὁ λόγος] The faculty which perceives, or the consciousness of, that right ratio (ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος . . . τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν) which education has established among the ἄλογα πάθη of human nature.

b. 20. πάσχει] Cf. note on § 2, b. 12, above.

§ 6. τέλος δὲ . . . τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν] See paraphrase at the beginning of this chapter. Rassow's ἔξιν· καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δέ· ἢ δ' ἀνδρεία καλόν· for the received ἔξιν· καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἢ ἀνδρεία καλόν· is probably right (*Forsch.* p. 90). We see from this passage what a 'positive' conception of Nature underlies Aristotle's 'Teleology.' Human Nature is a beautiful organism, and to be beautiful is its *raison d'être*. So a plant or animal is its own *raison d'être*; it performs the functions of its nature for the sake of maintaining that nature in perfection—a doctrine which was afterwards eagerly taken up by Plotinus: see *Enn.* v. 8. (vol. 2. p. 12, ed. Kirchhoff) Διὸ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ποθεινὸν ἔστιν, ὅτι ταῦτόν τῷ καλῷ, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐράσιμον, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι. πότερον δὲ πότερον αἴτιον τί χρὴ ζητεῖν, οὕσης τῆς φύσεως μῆς;

b. 22. ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει] These words are placed by Imelmann (*Obs. Crit. in Arist. Eth. Nic.* p. 6) after τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν with the approval of Rassow. I think they are better in

their old place, immediately after τοιοῦτον (i. e. καλόν) δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος, 1115 b. 22. which they explain. The meaning is—'If ἀνδρεία is καλόν, we may infer that its end is τὸ καλόν, for a thing is (i. e. is essentially as defined—ὀρίζεται) what it is in relation to its τέλος.'

§§ 7-12.] Cf. ii. 7. 2, where the same complicated system of b. 24. extremes is exhibited, viz. :—

- | | |
|---|----------------------------|
| 1. excess of fear | } constituting the δειλός. |
| 2. defect of confidence | |
| 3. excess of confidence | } constituting the θρασύς. |
| 4. defect of fear (or excess of fearlessness) | |
- constituting an ἀνώνυμος.

The writer of *E. E.* iii. 1. 1228 a. 33 sqq., instead of distinguishing the ὑπερβάλλων τῇ ἀφοβία as ἀνώνυμος from the θρασύς, simply says ὁ θρασύς . . . οἷος φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἦττον ἢ δεῖ θαρρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.

§ 7. Κελτούς] Cf. *E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 b. 28. Zell and Coraes b. 28. quote Strabo vii. p. 293, who relates, on the authority of Ephoros—ὄπλα αἰρεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πλημμυρίδας τοὺς Κίμβρους, καὶ ὅτι ἀφοβίαν οἱ Κελτοὶ ἀσκούντες κατακλύζεσθαι τὰς οἰκίας ὑπομένουσιν. Zell thinks it not unlikely that Aristotle here borrows directly from Ephoros. Ramsauer refers to an extract in Stobaeus, *Flor.* ζ. 40 (vol. i. p. 167 ed. Meineke) from the συναγωγή ἐθῶν of Nicolaus, Κελτοὶ οἱ τῷ ὠκεανῷ γειττιῶντες αἰσχροὶν ἠγοῦνται τοίχον καταπίπτοντα ἢ οἰκίαν φεύγειν, πλημμυρίδος δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἕξω θαλάττης ἐπερχομένης μεθ' ὄπλων ἀπαντῶντες ὑπομένουσιν ἕως κατακλύζονται, ἵνα μὴ δοκῶσι φεύγοντες τὸν θάνατον φοβεῖσθαι. As Ramsauer notes, both Plato and Aristotle represent the character of the Northern peoples as marked by the preponderance of θυμός *Rep.* 435 E, *Pol.* 1327 b. 23. Eudemus says (*E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 b. 29) καὶ ὄλος ἢ βαρβαρική ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστίν.

§ 10. ἐν ταῖς λύπαις] i. e. ἐν φόβοις. Excessive fear (generally 1116 a. 1. producing physical symptoms, see iv. 9. 2) is more manifest than defective confidence.

§ 13. ἐν οἷς εἴρηται] i. e. ἐν πολέμῳ.

a. 11.

τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle, *Grant* a. 12. remarks, 'does not sympathise with or discuss the sentimental deaths of the Cynic philosophers. Suicide was afterwards dignified by the

1116 a. 15. Stoics with the name of ἐξαρσγή—"ushering oneself out of the world." See Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics* p. 316 sqq. (English translation) for suicide among the Stoics.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Such is Courage strictly so called; but few other kinds less strictly so called may be distinguished: and first, as resembling true courage most closely—

(1) The courage of the ordinary citizen. He faces danger because his city punishes and disgraces him if he does not, and honours him if he does. Hence 'courageous men' are most common in those cities in which cowardice is held in dishonour and courage in honour. This is the sort of courage which Homer portrays in Hector with his—"What will Polydamas think of me!" and in Diomedes with his—"What will Hector say!" It is like the true courage in so far as its motive is virtuous, i. e. shame and a wish to avoid disgrace and a desire for honour and glory. Under this head we may also bring the courage of those who are compelled by their commanding officers to face danger—a much inferior form, being actuated not by shame, but by bodily fear, by desire to avoid not disgrace but physical pain. This kind of courage to which a man is compelled is very far removed from that of the truly courageous man, who faces death under the inspiration of a glorious cause.

(2) The courage of experience: that of trained professional soldiers who know the risks of war (often more imaginary than real), and how to meet them with the greatest safety to themselves and loss to their adversaries. They go into battle knowing that they are likely to come out of it unhurt. If they are confronted by superior numbers, and see that there is real danger, they are the first to flee; whereas non-professional citizen troops prefer death to the disgrace of flight. Socrates, when he said that 'courage is knowledge,' seemed to identify true courage with this courage of experience; but the two are widely different.

(3) The courage of passion and spirit. This is the courage of wild beasts when they rush upon those who have wounded them, and of Homer's heroes when their 'blood boils,' and they 'breathe forth wrath through their nostrils.' The truly courageous man is indeed helped on by his passion and spirit, but the consciousness of the glorious significance of his achievement is his real motive, and guides him throughout, whereas passion and spirit are blind guides, and cannot supply a moral motive: their influence is that of mere feeling—of painful feeling, when one is angry, of pleasurable feeling, when one wreaks one's vengeance. If pleasure and pain were moral motives, then the ass, emboldened by the pain of hunger to graze on, in spite of blows, and the lover, risking all to enjoy his mistress, would be examples of true courage. True courage is not a thing of feeling, but of reason; nevertheless the courage of

passion and spirit lies near to true courage, in that it is more deeply constitutional than the other forms, and expresses the nature of the man more fully, and accordingly may become true courage, if guided by reason and supplied with an ideal.

(4) The courage of hope. Those who have often conquered are confident in danger, their confidence being due to the idea that they are superior to their adversaries, and will receive no harm from them. Men who are drunk also become emboldened by hope; but if things do not turn out as they expect, then they flee. The unexpected is the best test of a man's courage. Expected dangers a man who is not very courageous may prepare for, and face, because he has come to the conclusion that there is less risk in facing them than in avoiding them; but if a man is found facing an unexpected danger, we may infer that the habit is strong in him.

(5) The courage of ignorance. It is not unlike that of hope, but inferior to it, inasmuch as the man who hopes is actuated by an idea of success in circumstances of which he is aware, whereas the man whose courage is that of ignorance is not actuated by an idea of success in circumstances of which he is aware, but by ignorance of the circumstances, like the Argives who went boldly out to battle, not because they hoped to beat Spartans, but because they thought that Spartans were Sicyonians.

§ 1. κατὰ πέντε τρόπους] The ground on which these five forms 1116 a. 16. of courage are distinguished, as spurious, from true courage is concisely stated in *E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 a. 12 ἔστι δ' εἶδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ' ὁμοίτητα τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτά. The spring of action is different. In the case of true courage it is the obligation which the perception of τὸ καλὸν lays upon the agent: the source of each truly courageous act is the whole man, i. e. the agent as a rational whole; whereas the seeming courageous acts done κατὰ τοὺς πέντε τρόπους spring not from the whole man, but from isolated feelings. It is the same difference as Kant marks by the distinction between a formal principle and material grounds of action.

These spurious forms are given in three different orders by Aristotle, Eudemus, and the writer of the *M. M.* Eudemus (*E. E.* 1229 a. 12 sqq.) has ἡ πολιτική—ἡ στρατιωτική (δι' ἐμπειρίαν)—ἡ δι' ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἄγνοιαν—ἡ κατ' ἐλπίδα—ἡ διὰ πάθος ἀλόγιστον οἶον δι' ἔρωτα καὶ θυμὸν. The writer of the *M. M.* (i. 20. 1190 b. 21 sqq.) has ἡ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν—ἡ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν—ἡ διὰ τὰ πάθος, οἶον οἱ ἐρώντες ἢ οἱ ἐνθουσιάζουσιν—ἡ δι' αἰσχύνην τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας—ἡ δι' ἐλπίδα.

πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτικὴ μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν] 'ideoque (γάρ) a. 17. obtineat primum locum.' Rams. 'This phrase (πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία,' says Grant, 'is to be found in Plato's *Republic* p. 430 C, where it

1116 a. 17. probably originates, but it is there used in a different sense from the present. Plato meant by the term "civil courage" to distinguish the true courage of a civilized man from all merely brutal instincts. Δοκείς γάρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγρονῆναι, τὴν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, οὔτε πάντῃ νόμιμον ἡγείσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. Ἀποδέχομαι τοίνυν τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτικὴν γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέξει. Aristotle meant by "civil courage" that daring which is prompted, not by an independent desire for the beautiful, but by a regard to reputation, and to the fame or disgrace and even punishment awarded by society to brave or cowardly actions respectively. It is scarcely necessary to add that the difference here between Plato and Aristotle is only about the use of a phrase. Aristotle is at one with Plato in regarding true ἀνδρεία as a habit acquired by the πολίτης under the influence of νόμος. We can only say that he thinks fit to use the adjective πολιτικὴ in an inferior sense here, just as he does in *E. N.* i. 5. 4, where he makes the πολιτικὸς βίος one of the inferior lives, although man is φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον. The contrast between πολῖται (ordinary citizens), and hired στρατιῶται (§ 6 below), going out to battle, was doubtless in his mind when he wrote § 1, and probably induced him to give πολιτικὴ the sense which it bears here: cf. *E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 a. 13, where πολιτικὴ and στρατιωτικὴ occur close together—Μία μὲν πολιτικὴ, αὕτη δ' ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ αἰδῶ οὖσα. δευτέρα ἢ στρατιωτικὴ αὕτη δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἶδεναι. That the influence of νόμος, so carefully allowed for in Plato's definition of ἀνδρεία (*Rhet.* 430) as δύναμις καὶ σωτηρία διὰ παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν πέρι καὶ μή, is fully taken account of in Aristotle's theory of ἡ ἀνδρεία ἢ διὰ τὸ καλόν is proved, if it is necessary to quote special passages in support of what is involved in Aristotle's whole conception of the relation between the individual and the state—by *Rhet.* i. 9. 1366 b. 11 ἀνδρία δὲ δι' ἦν πρακτικοὶ εἰσι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει καὶ ἱπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ.

a. 23. § 2. Πουλυδάμας] *Iliad* xxii. 100.

a. 25. Ἔκτωρ] *Iliad* viii. 148.

a. 28. § 3.] Ramsauer, rightly I think, makes δι' αἰδῶ γάρ parenthetical. This kind of courage resembles true courage more closely than the other forms do, because it is actuated by αἰδῶς, which, though not

ἀρετή, is akin to it, and contributes to it (see ii. 7. 14 ἡ γὰρ αἰδῶς 1116 a. 28. ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαυεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδῶν: cf. iv. 9), and by a desire for τιμὴ, which though not τὸ καλόν, or the chief end (see i. 5. §§ 4, 5), is yet its 'guinea stamp,' and an object the moderate pursuit of which constitutes an ἀρετή (see iv. 4) which contributes to the attainment of the chief end.

§ 4. ἀναγκαζομένους] There are thus two kinds of πολιτικὴ a. 30. ἀνδρεία: (1) ἡ δι' αἰδῶ, (2) ἡ δι' ἀνάγκην καὶ φόβον. Grant refers to *Phaedo* 68 D, 'where Plato speaks of most men being courageous from a sort of cowardice'—τῷ δεδιέναι καὶ δέει ἀνδρείοι εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι· καίτοι ἄσπῶν γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλίᾳ ἀνδρείον εἶναι.

ὁ Ἔκτωρ] *Iliad* ii. 391. It is Agamemnon not Hector who a. 33. speaks. The lines are quoted again in *Pol.* iii. 9. 1285 a. 10 and attributed correctly to Agamemnon. See Zell's note.

§ 5. προστάττοντες] The reading apparently of all MSS., except a. 36. a 'Codex Pontificus,' which has the reading προτάττοντες accepted by Lamb., Vict., Coraes, and Susemihl. Προτάττοντες would mean 'posting in front'; προστάττοντες, simply 'posting,' generally with dat. or adverb of place.

τύπτοντες] The commentators refer to Herod. vii. 223, where the Persian commanders at Thermopylae are said to have used whips. See Rawlinson's note (7) on the chapter, and note (8) on Herod. vii. 22 for the practice among the Persians and other Oriental nations.

§ 6. ἡ ἐμπειρία] See *Laches* 195, and *Protag.* 360, where b. 3. ἀνδρεία is defined as ἐπιστήμη or σοφία τῶν δεινῶν τε καὶ μῆ, and *Protag.* 350, where those who know the art of warfare are said to be bolder than those who do not (if the latter are bold they are not ἀνδρείοι but μαυόμενοι)—in short οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροι εἰσι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὴν μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν. But as we have seen (note on iii. 6, §§ 1, 2), objections are raised in the *Laches* 199, to the definition ἐπιστήμη τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μῆ, and 'the knowledge of good and evil,' with which ἀνδρεία is identified at the end of the dialogue, is something differing *toto coelo* from the ἐμπειρία of the professional (*i. e.* mercenary) soldier with which Aristotle very unfairly wishes to confound the Socratic ἐπιστήμη τῶν δεινῶν. Aristotle's unfair statement of the Socratic position, 'is

1116 b. 3. corrected, Grant tells us, 'by Eudemus in his Ethics'—(*E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 a. 15) ἡ στρατιωτικὴ . . . δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη τὰ δεινά, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν. I fear that this 'correction' does not really amount to a fair treatment of the Socratic doctrine. Eudemus still wishes his readers to think that Socrates identified courage with στρατιωτικὴ ἐμπειρία, and therefore ought to have made it knowledge, not of τὰ δεινά, but of τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν, for he says, *E. E.* iii. 1. 1230 a. 4 παραπλησίως δὲ τοῖσι καὶ ὅσοι δι' ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅνπερ τρόπον σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπομένουσιν. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦναντίον ἔχει ἢ ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμην οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. οὐτε γὰρ διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ φοβερά θαρροῦσιν οἱ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰστούς ἀναβαίνειν ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἴσασιν τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν· οὐτε δὲ ὁ θαρραλέωτερον ἀγωνίζονται, τοῦτο ἀνδρεία. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος κατὰ Θεόγγιν ἀνδρεία εἴεν·

"πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενήθι δεδμημένος."

φανερῶς (<δ>) εἶναι δειλοὶ ὄντες ὁμοῦ ὑπομένουσι δι' ἐμπειρίαν τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οὐκ οἴονται κίνδυνον εἶναι· ἴσασιν γὰρ τὰς βοηθείας. σημεῖον δέ· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἔχειν οἴωνται βοήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἤδη πλησίον ἢ τὸ δεινόν, οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. The knowledge of the professional soldier is indeed the knowledge of the means of avoiding danger; but the knowledge required by Socrates is the knowledge of danger itself—the power of estimating it rationally and facing it at the call of duty. The courageous man is the man who knows when to risk all. The professional soldier, simply *quid* professional soldier, never makes up his mind to risk all. If his experience does not tell him that he is likely to escape, his courage fails. To make the Platonic Socrates seem to identify courage with professional ἐμπειρία is ridiculously unfair. And it is only a very superficial appreciation of the meaning of such a statement as that in *Xen. Mem.* iv. 6. 11 οἱ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνους καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοὶ—which could lead anyone to suppose that the real Socrates identified them. For an estimate of the meaning of the Socratic 'virtue is a science' see Grant, *Eth.* vol. i. pp. 165 sqq. Essay II.

b. 7. κενά] The editors have notes here to show that τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου—'the empty alarms of war,' *inania belli* (*Tac. Hist.* ii. 69), and τὰ καινά τοῦ πολέμου, 'the surprises of war,' are both expressions

in use. See also Gölle's note on Thucydides, iii. 30, where τὸ 1116 b. 7. καινὸν τοῦ πολέμου is proved to be the correct reading. The MSS. here (*E. N.* iii. 8. 6) vary hopelessly between κενά and καινά, and need not be considered. I think that κενά is to be preferred; it seems to be a more natural object for *συνεωράσασιν* than καινά.

§ 7. εἶτα] Their ἐμπειρία gives them confidence (1) as making b. 9. them aware of τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, and (2) εἶτα, as making them skilful in the use of weapons, &c. See Grant's note on § 6.

§ 9. τὰ δὲ πολιτικά] the citizen troops.

b. 18.

τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ] The Ald. Schol. has the following—Ἑρμαῖον ἐν b. 18. Κορωνεῖα τῆς Βοιωτίας τόπος οὕτω καλούμενος ἐστὶ πεδινὸς ἐν αὐτῇ, τῶν ἄλλων ἀνωμάτων ὄντων· ἐν δὲ παρατεταγμένοι ποτὲ Κορωνεῖς σὺν τοῖς βοηθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς στρατιώταις ἐκ τοῦ Μεταχίου, μετὰ τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατέλαβον· καὶ τὴν Ἀκρόπολιν εἶχεν ἑαυτῷ Ὀνόμαρχος ὁ Φωκεὺς προδοθεῖσαν αὐτῷ· αὐτοὶ μὲν μέιναντες ἀπέθανον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Ὀνόμαρχον ἀποκλείσαντες τὰς πύλας, ἵνα αὐτοῖς μηδὲ βουλομένοις ἐξείη φυγεῖν καὶ καταλιπεῖν τὴν πατρίδα. οἱ δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν βοηθήσαντες αὐτοῖς στρατιῶται ἐκ τοῦ Μεταχίου ἔφυγον εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς μάχης, αἰσθόμενοι ἕνα τεθνάαι τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν Χίρωνα. Ἰστοροῦσι περὶ τῆς μάχης ταύτης Κεφισσοῦδαρος (Κηφισσοῦδος?) ἐν τῇ δωδεκάτῃ τῶν περὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ πολέμου, καὶ Ἀναξιμένης ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ τῶν περὶ Φίλιππων καὶ Ἐφορος ἐν τῇ τριακοστῇ.¹ Cf. Zell's note on this scholium.

See Grote, *Hist. of Greece* pt. II, chap. 87, for the career of Onomarchus the Phocian. The date of the capture of Coroneia by him was B. C. 353 or 352.

§ 10. καὶ τὸν θυμόν] θυμός in Plato is the *Wille zum Leben*—b. 23. that principle that manifests itself, not only in anger, but in tenacity of purpose, rivalry, pluck, push, and other forms of 'spirit.' Without its aid, λόγος would succumb. The λόγος of the state—its constitution, and institutions, must be maintained by 'public spirit' and 'patriotism,' against the selfishness of citizens, and the attacks of foreigners; the λόγος of the individual must be 'preserved and succoured' against the attacks of pleasure and pain, by 'strength of will'—succoured by θυμός against the insidious attacks of ἐπιθυμία (see *Rep.* 441 A ἐν ψυχῇ . . . ἐστὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐπι-

¹ I find this scholium (with a few verbal differences, and the words ἰστοροῦσι . . . τριακοστῇ omitted) on the margin of CCC. *ad loc.*

1116 b. 23. *κουρον* ἔν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει, and 440 A *πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα*, ὅταν βιάζωνται τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπιθυμίας, λοιδοροῦντά τε αὐτὸν καὶ θυμώμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὡσπερ δυοῖν στασιαζόντων ξύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου), and preserved by it against the disturbing influence of fear (see *Rep.* 430 B *δύναμις καὶ σωτηρία δόξης ὀρθῆς κ.τ.λ.*). In Aristotle *θυμός* has the same fundamental meaning—spirit of independence, enterprise, patriotism, loyalty in national and individual character. Here indeed, as in the parallel passage *E. E.* iii. 1 (1229 a. 24 *δι' ὄργην καὶ θυμὸν ὡσαύτως*, and 1229 b. 29 *καὶ ὅλως ἢ βαρβαρικῇ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστίν*, ἔντοι δὲ καὶ δι' ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ἐπομένουσιν καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινα' μετ' ἐλπίδος γὰρ ἐστὶ τιμωρίας), and in *E. N.* vii. 6, §§ 1–5, it is regarded chiefly in the light of its special manifestation—anger: but in *Pol.* H. 6. 1327 b. 23 sqq. its fundamental meaning—spirit of enterprise, independence, patriotism, loyalty in national and individual character, is brought out very strongly—*τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ πλήρη, διανοίας δὲ ἐνδείστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ μάλλον, ἀπολίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίων ἄρχειν οὐ δυνάμενα* τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἄθυμα δέ, διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὡσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν μετέχει. καὶ γὰρ ἐνθυμον καὶ διανοητικὸν ἐστίν διόπερ ἐλεύθερον τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μῆς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δ' ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη [καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα' τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον, τὰ δὲ εὖ [τε] κέκραται πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ διανοητικούς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδῆς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐαγώγους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν. ὅπερ γὰρ φασὶ τινες δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικὸς μὲν εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας ἀγρίους, ὁ θυμὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν. αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις ἣ φιλοῦμεν. σημείον δὲ πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μάλλον ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας, ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος προσσηκόντως τοῖς φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμόν'

“σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχειαι.”

καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἄρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀήττητον ὁ θυμὸς.

b. 26. *ἰτητικώτατον*] Ramsauer quotes Plato, *Protag.* 349 E καὶ ἴτας γε (ὁ ἀνδρείος), ἔφη, ἐφ' ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἰένα.

Ἵμῆρος] Zell and the other editors note that the first quotation 1116 b. 27. is from *Il.* xiv. 151, or xvi. 529; the second from *Il.* v. 470; and the third from *Od.* xxiv. 318. The fourth does not occur in Homer at all. Theocritus 20. 15 (later than Aristotle) has ἐμοὶ δ' ἄφαρ ἔξισεν αἷμα, and in *Probl.* ii. 26. 869 a. 5 we find ὁ θυμὸς ζέσσι τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐστὶν τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν. Coraes compares Soph. *O. C.* 434 ὀπηρὶκ' ἔξει θυμός, κ.τ.λ.

§ 11. ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς] cf. below § 12 *φυσικωτάτη δ' b. 31.* εὐκειν ἢ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα (i. e. τὸ διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττειν) ἀνδρεία εἶναι. There is a natural alliance between *θυμός* and *λόγος*: see Plato, *Rep.* 441. *θυμός* is an active principle which sides with *λόγος*, the principle of order, against the mere *passions* of the sensibility—the pleasures and pains. Cf. *E. N.* vii. 6, §§ 1–5, where it is argued that ἀκρασία θυμοῦ is not so bad as ἀκρασία ἐπιθυμιῶν, because *θυμός* is, at least, loyal to *λόγος*, whereas *ἐπιθυμία* is ἐπίβουλος. There is thus a special reason for confining the remark *συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς το θυμός*: but Eudemus, looking at the matter from a slightly different point of view, is also right in recognising the material value to true courage of all the feelings—shame, anger, hope, &c. which inspire the various forms of spurious courage—*E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 a. 30 πρὸς τὰς παρακελεύσεις τὰς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις χρήσιμα ταῦτα πάντα: see Ramsauer's note. Fritzsche (*E. E.* p. 65, note 28) quotes Cic. *Tusc.* iv. 19. 43 'quid? quod iidem Peripatetici perturbationes istas, quas nos exstirpandas putamus non modo naturales esse dicunt, sed etiam utiliter a natura datas. Primum multis verbis iracundiam laudant: cotem fortitudinis esse dicunt.'

ἦ ἐν ἔλει] Struck out by Vict. and Scaliger: see Spengel, *Arist.* b. 33. *Stud.* p. 206: may be a dittograph of ἐν ἔλη ἦ.

ἄνοι.] Zell and Coraes adopt the suggestion of Camerarius that b. 36. the reference here is to *Iliad* xi. 557

ὡς δ' ὅτ' ὄνος παρ' ἄρουραν ἰὼν ἐβήσατο πᾶϊδας
ναθῆς, ᾗ δὴ πολλὰ περὶ ῥόπαλ' ἀμφὶς εἴγη,
κείρει τ' εἰσελθὼν βαθὺ λήϊον οἱ δὲ τε παῖδες
τύπτουσιν ῥοπαλοῖσι βίη δὲ τε νηπίη αὐτῶν
σπουδῇ τ' ἐξήλασαν, ἐπεὶ τ' ἐκὼρῆσατο φορβῆς.

§ 12. *φυσικωτάτη*] Cf. *E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 a. 27 *μάλιστα φυσικῇ ἢ 1117 a. 4.*

1117 a. 4. τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀήτητον γὰρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἄριστα μάχονται: *E. N.* vii. 6. 2 ὁ δὲ θυμός φυσικώτερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κ.τ.λ. Θυμός in short represents the natural man—those inherited qualities of constitution which supply the rough material to be shaped by education into the form of virtue. Cf. *Rep.* 410 D καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τό γε ἄγριον τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἂν τῆς φύσεως παρέχοιτο, καὶ ὀρθῶς μὲν τραφέν ἀνδρείου ἂν εἴη.

προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν] θυμός is one of the forms of ὄρεξις. This ὄρεξις must become βουλευτική.

a. 5. καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα] *i. e.* τὸ καλόν, cf. *E. E.* iii. i. 1230 a. 27 ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γε ἀρετὴ προαιρετικὴ (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἔνεκά τινος πάντα αἰρείσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τὸ καλόν), δηλόν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετὴ τις οὕσα ἔνεκά τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν) οὔτε δι' ἡδονήν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. Θυμός then is a principle which naturally lends itself, if cultivated rightly, to the performance of *duty*. It is an active principle which makes a man scorn the passive life of submission to pleasures and pains.

a. 6. ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλογοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδοναί] But, if uncultivated, θυμός manifests itself chiefly as anger—a pain hungering for the pleasure of personal revenge. It thus ceases to be the ally of λόγος, and becomes an ἐπιθυμία opposed to it. Cf. *E. E.* iii. i. 1229 b. 31 καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμός ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά μετ' ἐλπίδος γὰρ ἐστὶ τιμωρίας. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὔτ' εἰ διὰ ταύτην οὔτ' εἰ δι' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν ὑπομένει τις τὸν θάνατον ἢ φυγὴν μειζόνων λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δικαίως (ἂν) ἀνδρείως λέγοιτο τούτων. Cf. *Rhet.* ii. 2. 1378 b. 1 (referred to by Fritzsche in his note on the above passage) καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἔπασθαι τινα ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι ἡδὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἴεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, ὁ δὲ ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται θανάτων αὐτῷ. διὸ καλῶς εἴρηται περὶ θυμοῦ

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο
ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται.

a. 7. διὰ ταῦτα] *i. e.* λύπην (ἀλογοῦσι) and ἡδονήν (ἡδοναί). Pain and pleasure are subjective springs of action (πάθη). Moral action must be actuated by reverence for the objective law of duty (τὸ καλόν) apprehended by reason.

a. 8. οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλόν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος] *sc.* κλεῦναι, cf. *E. E.* iii. i.

1229 a. 1 ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολούθησις τῷ λόγῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλόν 1117 a. 8. αἰρείσθαι κελεύει.

Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 29, 30) omits (with K^b, O^b, and CCC) the sentence οὐ δὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία . . . κίνδυνον at the beginning of § 12 (it is probably a dittograph of the similar clause in § 11. 1116 b. 33, 35); places the sentence φυσικωτάτη . . . ἀνδρεία εἶναι after τι at the end of § 12, 1117 a. 9; and reads δέ (with M^b, O^b) instead of δὴ after καὶ οἱ ἀνθρωποι 1117 a. 6. He adds that the words καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ . . . ἐρώσω § 11 ought perhaps to be struck out. They are out of place in a context relating to τὰ θηρία, and anticipate the transition made by the words καὶ οἱ ἀνθρωποι δέ.

§ 13. μηθὲν ἂν παθεῖν] Perhaps we should read μηθὲν ἂν ἀντιπαθεῖν. a. 14. The MSS. have μηθὲν ἀντιπαθεῖν.

§ 14. μεθυσκόμενοι] Zell quotes *Prob. A.* i. 955 a. 1 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίνειν εἰς μέθην πάντες ἔχουσιν προθυμῶς, ὅτι πάντας ὁ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς εὐελπίδας ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ἡ νεότης τοὺς παῖδας: τὸ μὲν γὰρ γῆρας δύσελπί ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ νεότης ἐλπίδος πλήρης.

§ 15. διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] The courage of the sanguine man is the a. 17. result of temporary feeling; he is elated by a perhaps groundless hope of victory. But the truly courageous man is actuated by steady principle. His nature is such that the law of duty is always before his eyes. Hence (διὸ) you may take him on a sudden without discomposing him. His courage will be ready on the shortest notice, because it is *himself*, not a passing mood.

ἀπὸ ζέως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς] This is a. 19. Bywater's reading for the ἀπὸ ζέως γὰρ μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. of L^b M^b accepted by Bekker. K^b, O^b, CCC, and Cambr. have μᾶλλον ἢ ὅτι ἦττον. I am not sure that the imp. ἦν is in place here. I would suggest ἀπὸ ζέως γὰρ μᾶλλον εἶναι, ὅτι ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς.

§ 16. εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων] Because their hope blinds a. 23. the sanguine to the real nature of the danger which they encounter.

ἀξίωμα] Those who do not know (οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες) are, however, a. 24. inferior to the sanguine in not having that opinion of their own superiority which the latter have. Ἀξίωμα is here the superior value which the sanguine attach to themselves, as persons likely to prevail: cf. *E. N.* iv. 3. 12, where τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα is the

1117 a. 24. superior value which the *μεγαλόψυχος* assigns to himself—*μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἀξίος ἄν*—iv. 3. 3.

a. 26. ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον] The editors refer to Xen. *Hell.* iv. 4. 10 for this incident, which occurred in the battle (B. C. 392) at the Long Walls of Corinth, between the Argeians, Corinthians, and Athenian mercenaries who held Corinth, and the Corinthian exiles aided by Lacedaemonians and Sikyonians. 'The Argeians,' says Grote (*Hist. of Greece* pt. II, chap. 75), 'bold from superior numbers attacked and broke the Sikyonians, tearing up the palisade, and pursuing them down to the sea with much slaughter: upon which Pasimachus the Lacedaemonian commander of cavalry, coming to their aid, caused his small body of horsemen to dismount and tie their horses to trees, and then armed them with shields taken from the Sikyonians inscribed on the outside with the letter *sigma* (Σ). With these he approached on foot to attack the Argeians, who, mistaking them for Sikyonians, rushed to the charge with alacrity.'

Eudemus (*E. E.* iii. 1. 1230 a. 16 sqq.) thus sums up his discussion of the spurious forms of courage—*πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρείων οἱ διὰ τὴν αἰδῶ ὑπομένοντες μάλιστα φαεῖν (& ἄν) ἀνδρείοι, καθάπερ καὶ Ὀμηρος τὸν Ἑκτορά φησιν ὑπομῆναι τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα*

“Ἑκτορα δ' αἰδῶς εἶλε”

{καὶ}

“Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει.”

καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία αὕτη. ἡ δ' ἀληθὴς οὔτε αὕτη οὔτ' ἐκείνων οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ ὁμοία μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τῶν θηρίων, ἃ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμοσε τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται. οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι ἀδοξήσει, δεῖ μένιν φοβουμένους, οὔτε δι' ὀργήν, οὔτε διὰ τὸ μὴ νομίζειν ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχειν φυλακτικὰς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἴσεται οὕτω γε φοβερόν εἶναι οὐθέν. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ προαιρετικὴ (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἐνεκά τινος πάντα αἰρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τὸ καλόν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετὴ τις οὕσα ἐνεκά τινος ποιήσει καὶ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν) οὔτε δι' ἡδονήν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεὶ, ἂν γε μὴ καλὸν ἢ ἀλλὰ μακρόν, οὐχ ὑπομένει· αἰσχρὸν γάρ.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

We have said that Courage is concerned with feelings of confidence, and with feelings of fear: but it is with the latter more than with the former that it is concerned, for fear is painful, and it is harder and more praiseworthy to bear pain than to abstain from pleasure. But though the exercise of courage is surrounded by circumstances of pain, yet the end is sweet, as the garland is sweet for the athlete, though the contest be painful. The courageous man endures death and wounds for the sake of glorious achievement in war. It would be absurd however to say that he rejoices in death and wounds: he endures them as pains, and the more complete his excellence, and the happier his life, the greater pains are they to him: life is so well worth living, and he has to look forward to the loss of so much. But he is all the more courageous that he gives up so much for glory in war: his courage realises in the most perfect way the type of those strenuous virtues which taste pleasure only in laying hold of the end. But, although he is thus the bravest of men, perhaps a less brave man, with nothing to lose, might make a more useful soldier, being ready to risk his life for a small remuneration.

§ 1. μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά] So, as Ramsauer notes, *σωφροσύνη* 1117 a. 30. is ἦπτον περὶ τὰς λύπας (iii. 10. 1), and *ἐλευθεριότης* is μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ δόσει (iv. 1. 1).

§ 2.] *δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*] Cf. ii. 3. 10 *περὶ* a. 34. *δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ.*

§ 3. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, a. 35. ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι] The *ἡδονή* which the courageous man experiences in realising his end is not a pleasurable feeling, but an ideal satisfaction. Pleasurable feeling cannot coexist with painful feeling; but ideal satisfaction may. As Professor Jowett says in his *Introduction to the Gorgias*—Plato does not 'mean to say that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience; or that the sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than of the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as in the Protagoras, of virtue as a calculation of pleasure, an opinion which he afterwards repudiates in the Phaedo. What then is his meaning? And what is the value of his method? His

1117 a. 35. meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by parallel notions, which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have always existed among mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself implies that he will be understood or appreciated by very few. He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that their physical suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them as happy, and we would a thousand times rather have their death than a shameful life. Nor is this only because we believe that they will obtain an immortality of fame, or that they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their enemies and persecutors will be proportionably tormented. Men are found in a few instances to do what is right, without reference to public opinion or to consequences. And we regard them as happy on this ground only, much as Socrates' friends are described as regarding him in the opening of the *Phaedo*; or as was said of another, "they looked upon his face as upon the face of an angel." We are not concerned to justify this idealism by the standard of utility, or by the rules of logic, but merely to point out the existence of such a sentiment in the better part of human nature.

- b. 4. εἴπερ σάρκινοι] Grant translates (rightly I think) 'the blows . . . are painful and grievous to flesh and blood,' following Lambinus, who has *cum ex carne constant*. Michelet rejects this rendering for *praesertim si nulla praedicti sint carne*, referring to *de Anima* ii. 11. 423 b. 22 where flesh is said to be the medium of touch—*δῆλον ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀπτοῦ αἰσθητικόν. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν συμβαίνοι ὕπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτιθεμένων γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιτιθεμένων αἰσθάνεται* ὥστε τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπτικοῦ ἢ σάρξ.
- b. 5. διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ . . . φαίνεται ἔχειν] The ideal satisfaction—'the Idea of Happiness,' is apt to be lost in the crowd of painful feelings.
- b. 7. §§ 4, 5.] In these sections self-sacrifice is praised in a manner which we shall do well to keep in mind when we examine Aristotle's account of *μεγαλόψυχία*. *Quid* *μεγαλόψυχος* the *εὐδαίμων* seems to be devoted to his own *εὐδαιμονία*: but *quid* *ἀνδρείος* he is ready joyfully to surrender it. See Grant's interesting note, in

which Aristotle's *ἀνδρείος*, *ὃ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον* is compared with 1117 b. 7. Wordsworth's 'Happy Warrior'—'more brave for this, that he hath much to love.'

§ 5. οὐ δὴ . . . ἐφάπτεται] *sc. τις*. 'The deep moral pleasure,' b. 15. says Grant (*Ethics*, Essay IV, vol. i. p. 226), 'which attaches to noble acts, Aristotle describes as triumphing even over the physical pain and outward horror which may attend the exercise of courage. And he acknowledges that in many cases this may be the *only* pleasure attending upon virtuous actions.'

Of course τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν stand in a somewhat exceptional position, as compared with τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. They are painful in a sense in which other virtuous actions are not. Other virtuous actions indeed imply a restraint put upon inclination; but when once the moral character has been formed, they are no longer painful: and some of them are even in themselves (*i. e.* as distinguished from their ends) pleasant, *e. g.* τὰ κατὰ τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν are themselves pleasant to the connoisseur (*ἐπιστήμων*) who performs them. Τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν however are not thus *in themselves* pleasant. They are so painful that it is only the man who has the strongest interest in the chief end, who will bring himself to perform them. Aristotle thus gives due prominence in his account of *ἀνδρεία* to the struggle which some have represented as essential to morality. But we must not allow ourselves to be misled by his remarks here. He is not one of those who make a struggle *essential* to morality. On the contrary, morality with him is perfect adaptation to environment: accordingly, we find him in his accounts of the other virtues dwelling on the ease and pleasure with which the good man acts. But the other virtues are concerned with life, and may well result in pleasant actions; whereas *ἀνδρεία* shows itself in the presence of death. It necessarily involves acts which are painful, as breaking with life. Its grandeur is enhanced, in proportion as the life or adaptation which it calls a man away from, is the more perfect. It is perhaps a defect in Aristotle's system that it does not recognise any other virtues, except *ἀνδρεία*, which call a man away from the brilliant everyday life of which the *μεγαλόψυχος* is the ideal ornament: *e. g.* Aristotle's good man is never required to give up his brilliant career, in order to help the outcasts of society. As it is, it is only here in this passage, in reference to the *ἀνδρεία* of the man *ὃ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον*,

1117 b.15. that we find Aristotle deeply touched by the sublimity and pathos of that struggle between inclination and duty, which impressed Kant so powerfully, and is celebrated by him in so many passages full of lyrical fervour.

b.17. § 6. στρατιώτας] *i.e.* mercenaries: μή goes with the subject τοῦς τοιοῦτους, and κριτίστους στρατιώτας is predicate.

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT.

Next in order comes Temperance, the excellence of the other subdivision of the irrational part of the soul. It is, as we have said, a mediocrity in relation to pleasures, and (though to a less extent) to pains; and profligacy is related to the same pleasures and pains.

To what special pleasures then is Temperance related? Pleasures may be distinguished as bodily and mental. Mental pleasures are those which affect the mind without affecting the body, such as the pleasure of being esteemed, of acquiring knowledge, of listening to wonderful tales, of hearing oneself talk, and of gossip. It is not in relation to any of these pleasures that we speak of men being temperate or profligate. The man, *e.g.* who likes to hear himself talk is a bore, but not a profligate. Accordingly, it is ~~not~~ bodily pleasures that Temperance will be concerned; but not with all of them—not with the pleasures of the eye, as such: *e.g.* a man is not temperate or profligate by reason of the pleasure he takes in painting, although there is undoubtedly a right way of liking pictures, as there are wrong ways—nor with the pleasures of the ear: we do not speak of those who are too much addicted to music and the theatre as profligate, or of those who like them in moderation as temperate—nor with the pleasures of smell, except by association: thus there is no profligacy or intemperance in being very fond of the scent of flowers, but there is in being very fond of the odours of the perfume bottle and the dinner table. Profligate, gluttonous persons like these odours because they remind them of the things they lust after. Even people who are not gluttonous like the smell of food when they are hungry; but gluttonous persons like it without being hungry. This associated pleasure is the only pleasure which the lower animals derive from the senses of sight, hearing, and smell. The dog likes the smell, because it suggests the taste, of the hare which he tracks; the lion rejoices when he hears the lowing of the ox and knows that it is near and may soon be eaten; the roe deer, or wild goat, pleases his eye with the prospect of food. Temperance and profligacy then are concerned with those pleasures which the lower animals share with man—servile and brutish pleasures, it would thus appear. These are the pleasures of touch and taste—although taste, properly so called, *i.e.* the

discrimination of flavours, as exemplified by the wine-taster, or the chef, is not what the gluttonous person takes much, or any, pleasure in. His pleasure is in the purely tactual enjoyment which is common to swallowing meat and drink. Thus a certain gourmand wished that his throat were as long as a crane's, showing thereby that his pleasure was tactual. Profligacy then being related to touch, which is the most general or elementary of all the senses, and belongs to man, not as man, but as animal, is justly held to be a disgraceful and brutish vice. Certain finer tactual pleasures must however be distinguished from those to which profligacy, or intemperance, is related. Profligacy, or intemperance, has to do only with the tactual pleasures of certain definite organs: not *e.g.* with the pleasure of a skin glowing under the hand of the rubber in the gymnasium.

§ 1. περὶ σωφροσύνης] See *E. E.* iii. 2 and *M. M.* i. 21. 'Σω-1117 b. 23. φροσύνη,' says Grant, 'which in spite of the false etymology given in Plato's *Cratylus* 411 E [σωτηρία φρονήσεως] and *Eth.* vi. 5. 5 [ὡς σφίζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν] meant originally "sound mindedness" (in German, Besonnenheit), soon came to mean temperance with regard to pleasures. In this sense it is often popularly defined by Plato, cf. *Rep.* 430 E κόσμος πού τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τιῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια. *Sympos.* p. 196 C εἶναι γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, &c.' See also *Charm.*

The same tendency which appeared in Aristotle's treatment of ἀνδρεία appears in his treatment of σωφροσύνη—the tendency to narrow the reference of a term which Plato, in accordance with popular usage, employed with a wider meaning. Σωφροσύνη in the *Republic* is good sense and good feeling, resulting in moderation in all things; and is especially viewed as a *communis sensus*, or ὁμόνοια uniting the various classes of the state in peace and contentment under an established system of government (*Rep.* 432). But Aristotle limits the meaning of the term to moderation in respect of certain bodily pleasures. Σωφροσύνη, from being, in the *Republic*, a virtue with as distinct a social reference as δικαιοσύνη itself, thus becomes, in the *Ethics*, the most strictly personal of all the virtues.

δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί] Ramsauer suspects these words. As they stand, they seem to indicate a plan upon which Aristotle arranges the ἀρεταί in order. He begins with the two ἀρεταί specially associated with the two subdivisions of the ἄλογος φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς, μετέχουσα μέντοι πη λόγου—viz.:—θυμός and ἐπιθυμία. It is true that the other ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί, as well as ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη, consist in the regulation of ἄλογα πάθη having their

117 b. 23. origin in *θυμός* or *ἐπιθυμία*: but *ἀνδρεία* and *σωφροσύνη* are specially associated with these parts, being the regulation of their most characteristic manifestations—those manifestations, namely, which are common to man and brutes, and may, as owing nothing to social influences, be deemed *ἄλογα* in a more thorough sense than such passions as a desire for other people's money, or a desire for honour, which are called into existence by social influences. On the other hand, if the divisions of the *ὀρεκτικὸν μέρος* were in Aristotle's mind, 'Why,' as Grant asks, 'does he not begin with *σωφροσύνη*, since *θυμός* is higher than *ἐπιθυμία* (Eth. vii. 6)?' I am inclined, after all, to think with Grant that Aristotle probably began his list of the virtues with courage and temperance, because they were two of the Greek cardinal virtues; and to follow Susemihl in attaching great weight to Ramsauer's suggestion that the words *δοκοῦσι γὰρ . . . αἱ ἀρεταί* are interpolated.

b. 25. *εἴρηται*] ii. 7. 3.

b. 26. *ἦττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας*] The article before *λύπας* (*cf.* ii. 7. 3 *περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὐ πάσας, ἦττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας*) limits the reference to the pains caused by the absence of the pleasures: *cf.* below iii. 11. 5.

b. 28. *διηρησθῶσαν*] *cf.* x. 5, where *ἡδοναί* are distinguished according to the *ἐνέργειαι* which they attend.

b. 29. *ἐκάτερος*] *i. e.* ὁ φιλότιμος and ὁ φιλομαθής.

b. 30. *τούτων χαίρει*] Scaliger's conjecture *τούτω* is probably correct.

1118 a. 1. § 3.] See Theoph. *Char.* xxii. (iii) *περὶ ἀδολεσχίας*, and xxiii. (vii) *περὶ λαλίας*, and xxiv. (viii) *περὶ λογοποιίας*.

a. 9. § 5. *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*] *i. e.* 'by association.'

a. 13. §§ 6, 7, 8.] *Cf. de Sensu* 5, where two kinds of *ὄσμαι* are distinguished, (1) those which are correlated with the various *χυμοί*, and have therefore *τὸ ἡδὺν καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, or by association. (These are the *ὄσμαι* with which the *ἀκόλαστος* is said in *E. N.* iii. 10. 6 to be concerned *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*.) They are associated with *τροφή* and *τὸ θρεπτικὸν μέρος*, and so become indirectly objects of *ἐπιθυμία*. When the desire for food has been satisfied, these *ὄσμαι* no longer give pleasure. (2) Those *ὄσμαι* which are pleasant *καθ' αὐτάς*, *e. g.* the scent of flowers. They do not invite us to eat, nor do they stimulate any desire. The pleasure

derived from such *ὄσμαι* is peculiar to man, whereas that of *ὄσμαι* 1118 a. 13. associated with tastes is common to him with the brutes; see *de Sensu* 5. 443 b. 16 *εἶδη δὲ τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ δύο ἐστίν' οὐ γὰρ ὡς περ τινὲς φασιν, οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδη τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν. διοριστίον δὲ πῶς ἔστι καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ κατὰ τοὺς χυμοὺς τεταγμένον αἰτῶν, ὡς περ εἴπομεν, καὶ τὸ ἡδὺν καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ πάθη εἶναι, ἐπιθυμοῦντων μὲν ἡδέϊαι αἱ ὄσμαι τούτων εἰσὶ, πεπληρωμένοι δὲ καὶ μηδὲν δεομένοις οὐχ ἡδέϊαι, οὐδὲ τούτοις, ὥστε αὐταὶ μὲν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδὺν καὶ λυπηρὸν, διὸ καὶ πάντων εἰσὶ κοινὰ τῶν ζώων· αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς ἡδέϊαι τῶν ὄσμων εἰσὶν, οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον πρὸς τὴν τροφήν παρακαλοῦσιν, οὐδὲ συμβάλλεται πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον μᾶλλον. Cf. *E. E.* iii. 2, where the above distinction between *αἱ ὄσμαι αἱ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέϊαι* and *αἱ καθ' αὐτάς* is brought out distinctly (it is only hinted at in the *E. N.*—*τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὄσμαίς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους* § 5), 1231 a. 6 *ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὄσμων ταύτας χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς. λέγω δὲ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς, αἷς ἢ ἐλπίζοντες χαίρομεν ἢ μεμνημένοι, οἷον ὕψων καὶ ποτῶν (δι' ἑτέραν γὰρ ἡδονὴν ταύτας χαίρομεν, τὴν τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν), καθ' αὐτάς δὲ οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶν. διὸ ἐμμελῶς ἔφη Στρατόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν τὰς δὲ ἡδύ.**

We may say that *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία* are concerned with those *ἡδοναί* which Plato distinguishes as *πληρώσεις τῆς ἐνδείας*, or *ἀπαλλαγὰι λύπης*, from the *καθαρὰι ἡδοναί*: see note on x. 3. 7, for quotations from *Rep.* 584 B, and *Philebus* 51 B, where Plato distinguishes these two kinds of *ἡδοναί*. The *οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι* of *E. N.* iii. 10. 3 may be an echo of the *τὰς περὶ τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα* of *Philebus* 51 B. The *τῶν ὄσμων τὰς πλείους* of *Philebus* 51 B shows that the distinction marked by Aristotle's *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* and *καθ' αὐτάς* was present to Plato's mind. The following passage in *M. M.* ii. 7. 1205 b. 20-28 may be compared as giving very clearly this distinction between *ἡδοναί*, which is the psychological ground upon which Aristotle proceeds in determining the proper sphere of *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία*—*ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονὴ καὶ καθισταμένης τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, οἷον καθισταμένης μὲν αἱ ἐξ ἐνδείας ἀναπληρώσεις, καθεστηκυίας δὲ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὕψεως καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οἶσαι, βελτίους ἂν εἴησαν αἱ καθεστηκυίας τῆς φύσεως ἐνέργειαι· αἱ γὰρ ἡδοναί καθ' ἀμφοτέρους λεγόμεναι τοὺς τρόπους ἐνέργειαι εἰσὶν ὥστε δηλον ὅτι αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὕψεως ἡδοναί καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τοῦ διανοεῖσθαι βέλτισται ἂν εἴησαν, ἐπεὶ αἱ γε σωματικὰ ἐξ ἀναπληρώσεως.*

1118 a. 16. § 7. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' . . . συμβεβηκός] Zell refers to *Problemata* KH. 7, 950 a. 9 οὐσῶν δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πέντε, τὰ τε ἄλλα ζῶα ἀπὸ δύο μόνων τῶν προειρημένων ἦθεται, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἄλλας ἢ ὅλως οὐχ ἦθεται ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός τοῦτο πάσχει. ὄρων μὲν γὰρ ὁ ὄρων, ἢ καὶ ὄσφραϊνόμενος, χαίρει ὅτι ἀπολαύει· καὶ ὅταν πληρωθῇ, οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡδέα αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡμῖν ἢ τοῦ ταρίχου ὀσμῆς, ὅταν ἄδην ἔχωμεν τοῦ φαγεῖν. ὅταν δὲ ἐνδεεῖς ὡμεν, ἡδέα. ἢ δὲ τοῦ ῥόδου ἀεὶ ἡδέα. Cf. *E. E.* iii. 2. 1230 b. 36 ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα, περὶ ἅπερ καὶ τέλλα θηρία μόνον τυγχάνει αἰσθητικῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ χαίροντα καὶ λυπούμενα, περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἀπτά. περὶ δὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ἡδέα σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἅπαντα φαίνεται ἀναισθητῶς διακείμενα, οἷον περὶ εὐαρμωστῶν ἢ κάλλος. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, φαίνεται πάσχοντα αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἢ τῇ ἀκροάσει τῶν εὐαρμωστῶν, εἰ μὴ τί πον συμβέβηκε τερατώδεις· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ εὐώδη ἢ δυσώδη· καίτοι τὰς γε αἰσθήσεις δευτέρας ἔχουσι πάσας. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς.

I agree with Grant in thinking that this view according to which 'brutes have no pleasure of hearing or smell or sight except accidental ones, namely when sounds or scents indicate to them their prey or their food' is questionable. Some animals seem to derive pleasure from music¹. A dog will sit for an hour at a time at a window looking with evident pleasure and interest at people and vehicles passing in the street. As for his pleasures of smell, which engross so much of his attention, they are obviously so different from any with which our less developed sense makes us acquainted, that it would be rash to say that they are all κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Indeed the presumption is in favour of many of them being καθ' αὐτάς. That a dog experiences ψυχικὰ ἡδοναί, such as those of friendship, performance of duty, and vanity, is pretty obvious.

a. 18. αἱ κύνες] Giphanius notes that *κύων* and *canis* are feminine when hunting is concerned. Aristotle tells us that the female Laconian hounds were better than the males; see *Hist. Anim.* ix. i. 608 a. 27 αἱ Λάκαιναι κύνες αἱ θήλειαι εὐφρύτεραι τῶν ἀρρένων εἰσίν.

a. 22. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδῶν ἢ [εὐρών] ἔλαφον] οὐδ' ἰδῶν = οὐδὲ τῇ ὄψει (cf. οὐδὲ ταῖς ὁσμαῖς, and οὐδὲ τῇ φωνῇ above); and ἢ εὐρών is added

¹ Coraes calls attention to *Pol. Θ.* 6, where Aristotle himself admits that brutes have some appreciation of music: 1341 a. 13.

because he (or an interpolator, according to Sus. and Byw.) is 1118 a. 22. thinking of *Iliad* iii. 23

ὥστε λέων ἐχάρη μεγάλην ἐπὶ σῶματι κύρσας,
εὐρών ἢ ἔλαφον κεραῶν ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα.

§ 8. ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται] Zell quotes a. 25. *Prod.* KH. 2. 949 b. 6 διὰ τί κατὰ δύο μόνας αἰσθήσεις ἀκρατεῖς λέγομεν, οἷον ἀφήν καὶ γεῦσιν; ἢ διὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων γινομένας ἡδονὰς ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις; ἅτε οὖν κοινὰ οὐσα ἀτιμώτατα εἰσι, διὸ καὶ μάλιστα ἢ μόναι ἐπονεῖστοι εἰσιν. ὥστε τὸν ὑπὸ τούτων ἠπτόμενον ψέγομεν καὶ ἀκρατῆ καὶ ἀκολαυτον εἶναι φάμεν, διὰ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν χειρίστων ἡδονῶν ἠπτάσθαι.

ἀφή] Touch is the fundamental sense in all animals; see *de a.* 26. *Anim.* ii. 2. 413 b. 4 αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρώτων ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἀφή. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ἀφῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἢ ἀφή τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μῶριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα μετέχει· τὰ δὲ ζῶα πάντα φαίνεται τὴν ἀπτικήν αἰσθησιν ἔχοντα. Touch is necessary to the preservation of the animal. Sounds and colours and smells do not feed the animal. That which feeds it must touch it immediately. The touch of food is taste. Taste accordingly is correlated with τὸ θρεπτικὸν μέρος, see *de Anima* iii. 12. 434 b. 11 ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῶον σῶμα ἐμψυχόν ἐστι, σῶμα δὲ ἅπαν ἀπτόν, ἀπτόν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἀφή, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα ἀπτικὸν εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῶον. αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις δι' ἐτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἷον ὄσφρησις ὄψις ἀκοή· ἀπτόμενον δέ, εἰ μὴ ἔξει αἰσθησιν, οὐ δυνήσεται τὰ μὲν φεύγειν τὰ δὲ λαβεῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀδύνατον ἔσται σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῶον. διὸ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἀφή τις τροφῆς γὰρ ἐστὶν, ἢ δὲ τροφή τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἀπτόν. ψόφος δὲ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ὄσμη οὐ τρέφει, οὐδὲ ποιεῖ οὐτ' αἰσθησιν οὔτε φθίσιν. ὥστε καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν ἀνάγκη ἀφήν εἶναι τινα, διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀπτοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ αἰσθησιν εἶναι· αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖα τῷ ζῴῳ, καὶ φανερόν ἐστι οὐχ οἷον τε ἄνευ ἀφῆς εἶναι ζῶον. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι τοῦ τε εὐ ἔνεκα καὶ γένει ζῶων ἤδη οὐ τῷ τυχόντι, ἀλλὰ τισίν, οἷον τῷ πορευτικῷ ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν· εἰ γὰρ μέλλει σώζεσθαι, οὐ μόνον δεῖ ἀπτόμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄποθεν. Cf. *de Sensu* i. 436 b. 10 τοῖς δὲ ζῴοις, ἢ μὲν ζῶον ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν αἰσθησιν· τούτῳ γὰρ τὸ ζῶον εἶναι καὶ μὴ ζῶον διορίζομεν. Ἰδία δ' ἦδη καθ' ἕκαστον ἢ μὲν ἀφή καὶ γεῦσις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἢ μὲν ἀφή διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ δὲ γεῦσις διὰ τὴν τροφήν· τὸ γὰρ ἡδὺ διακρίνει καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν αὐτῇ περὶ τὴν τροφήν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν φεύγειν τὸ δὲ διώκειν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ χυμὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ μορίου πάθος. Αἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν αἰσθήσεις τοῖς πορευτικοῖς αὐτῶν, οἷον ὄσφρησις καὶ ἀκοή καὶ

1118 a. 26. ὄψις, πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς ἔχουσι σωτηρίας ἔνεκεν ὑπάρχουσι, ὅπως διάκωσσί τε προαισθανόμενα τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ φείγουσι, τοῖς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως τυγχάνουσι τοῦ εἶ ἔνεκα· πολλὰς γὰρ εἰσαγγέλλουσι διαφοράς, ἐξ ὧν ἢ τε τῶν νοσητῶν ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις καὶ ἢ τῶν πρακτῶν.

§ 9 τῆ γέυσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι] With the pleasures derived from the various flavours which γεῦσις perceives as distinct (and it is with these that γεῦσις in the strict sense is concerned—τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν) the ἀκόλαστος has not directly to do. Γεῦσις, the perception of flavours, stands to the mere sensation of throat-touch, with which the ἀκόλαστος has directly to do, in much the same relation in which the smell of food stands to its taste; and, although certain χυμοί may, like certain ὀσμαι, be desired κατὰ συμβεβηκός by the ἀκόλαστος, yet roughly the remark of Eudemus is true that ἀκολασία is not concerned with the pleasures of the tip of the tongue, but with those of the throat: *E. E.* iii. 2. 1231 a. 12 ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γευστῶν οὐ περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν ἐπτόηται τὰ θηρία, οὐδ' ὅσων τῷ ἄκρῳ τῆς γλώττης ἡ αἴσθησις, ἀλλ' ὅσων τῷ φάρυγγι, καὶ ἔοικεν ἀφή μᾶλλον ἢ γεύσει τὸ πάθος. διὸ οἱ ὀψοφάγοι οὐκ εὐχονται τὴν γλώτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα γεράνου, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξιδος. ὥστε περὶ τὰ ἀπτόμενα, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, θετέον τὴν ἀκολασίαν.

With τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν may be compared *de An.* ii. 10. 422 b. 10 τὰ δ' εἶδη τῶν χυμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χρωμάτων, ἀπλᾶ μὲν τὰ πάντα, τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρὸν, ἐχόμενα δὲ τοῦ μὲν τὸ λεπρόν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἀλμυρὸν· μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων τό τε δριμύν καὶ τὸ αἰσθηρὸν καὶ στρυφνὸν καὶ ὀξύ· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὐταὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι διαφοραὶ χυμῶν. ὥστε τὸ γευστικὸν ἐστὶ τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, γευστῶν δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐντελεχεῖα αὐτοῦ.

a. 32. § 10. ὀψοφάγος] His name, Philoxenus, is given in the passage *E. E.* iii. 2. 1231 a. 16 quoted above, and in the present passage is supplied by N^b, O^b, Ald., K^b, CCC, NC, Cambr., and other MSS.: also in *Prob.* KH. 7. 950 a. 2 we read τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν τροφήν ἀπ' ἐνίων μὲν ἐν τῇ γλώττῃ τὸ ἡδύ, ἀπ' ἐνίων δὲ ἐν τῷ λάρυγγι, διὸ καὶ Φιλόξενος γεράνου φάρυγγα εὐχετο ἔχειν. There are several references to him (or them, for there were more than one of the name) in later writers—Plutarch, Aelian, Athenæus: thus, Plut. *de Amore* I has χυμῶν ἡδονὴν δεδουλώσθαι Φιλόξενον τὸν ὀψοφάγον: Plut. *de occultis vivendo* I τοὺς μὲν γὰρ περὶ Φιλόξενον τὸν Ἐρύξιδος . . . ἐπτοη-

μένους περὶ τὰ ὄψα: Athenæus *Deiym.* viii. 26 κὰν ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει φησὶ 1118 a. 32. [Μάχων]

Φιλόξενος ποθ', ὡς λέγουσ', ὁ Κυθήριος
 ηἴξατο τριῶν ἔχειν λάρυγγα πήχεων,
 ὅπως, καταπίνω, φησὶν, ὅτι πλείστον χρόνον,
 καὶ πάνθ' ἅμα μοι τὰ βρώμαθ' ἡδονὴν ποιῆ.

Cf. also Aelian *Var. Hist.* x. 9 Φιλόξενος λίχνος ἦν, καὶ γαστρὸς ἦππων. Aristophanes mentions an Eryxis son of Philoxenus in *Batrach.* 934. Corr. K^b and Γ have Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξιος, pr. K^b and CCC Φ. ὁ Εἴξιος.

Φάρυγξ is properly the wind-pipe, but is here used loosely for the οἰσοφάγος or gullet. Ramsauer refers to *de Part. An.* iv. 11. 690 b. 29 to show 'quo sensu Aristoteli probabile fuerit votum Philoxeni': ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλώττα τῶν χυμῶν ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, τῶν ἐδεστῶν ἐν τῇ καθόδῳ ἢ ἡδονῇ . . . καὶ σχεδὸν τῶν πλείστων ὄψων καὶ ἐδεστῶν ἐν τῇ καταπόσει τῇ τάσει (v. l. θίξει) τοῦ οἰσοφάγου γίνεται ἢ χάρις.

κοινοτάτῃ] z. e. it belongs to all animals: see *de Anima* ii. 2. b. 1. 413 b. 4 αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἀφή. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ἀφῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἡ ἀφή τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ καὶ τὰ φύσιμα μετέχει τὰ δὲ ζῆα πάντα φαίνεται τὴν ἀπτικὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα. The Paraphrast's explanation is wrong—κοινοτάτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀφή ἐν πάσαις αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀφή τινὶ πᾶσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνονται, for Aristotle in the *de Sensu* 4. 442 a. 29 finds fault with Democritus for reducing all the senses to touch: Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων, ὅσοι λέγουσι περὶ αἰσθήσεως, ἀποπώτατον τι ποιούσι· πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπτὰ ποιούσιν. καίτοι εἰ οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἐκάστη ἀφή τις ἐστίν· τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἀδύνατον, οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιδεῖν. Cf. Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. ii. pp. 152 sqq. for a defence of the view of Democritus assailed by Aristotle.

§ 11. ἐλευθεριώταται] Opposed to ἀνδραποδώδεις in § 8.

b. 4.

γυμνασίους] In the Gymnasia there were baths, apparently similar to our Turkish baths, which were used by the gymnasts after exercise. For the advantages derived from τρίψεις and the consequent θερμασία see *Prob.* AZ. 2. 965 b-966 a, b.

CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

Desires are (1) common to all men and natural, and (2) peculiar to individuals and acquired. Thus the desire for food and drink and the sexual desire are (1) natural, while individuals show (2) preferences for this or that kind of food, etc. But even in these individual preferences there is an element of natural desire, in that there are some things which all men agree in preferring to certain other things. So far as a desire is simply natural, i. e. so far as individual preference has not refined upon it, it does not hold out much temptation to error, and when error takes place, it is always in the way of excess. Thus those people are few who, simply because they are hungry or thirsty, will overfill their bellies with whatever comes to hand. It is only the lowest sort of people who tend to become guzzling-bellies as they are called.

But when individual preference comes in as to the particular kind of food, etc. with which the natural desire is to be satisfied, there are many who err, and many are the ways of error. For when we say that a man 'has a great liking for something,' we mean either that he likes something which he ought not to like at all, or likes it more than the average man does, or in the wrong way. Now in all these respects the profligate, or intemperate man, goes to excess. He delights in things which he ought not to delight in at all—abominations; and where it is permitted to take delight, he does so more than he ought, and more than the average man does.

So much for the relation of temperance and intemperance to pleasures: as for the pains to which they are related, they are those caused by the absence of the excessive pleasures. Such pains the temperate man does not feel, while the profligate, or intemperate, man is tortured by them. These absurd pains (pains produced by pleasures!) are to be distinguished from the more real pains which the courageous man endures and the coward shrinks from.

Those who are deficient in their love of pleasure are very rare—so rare that they are not even distinguished by a name; indeed such insensibility as theirs is scarcely human.

As for the temperate man, he observes the mean in these things. He takes no pleasure in what the intemperate man takes most pleasure, but rather hates it; and the pleasures which he does allow himself are never excessive or ill-timed—whether they be those proper to a healthy constitution, or other pleasures in so far as they do not interfere with health and vigour, and are not inconsistent with the ideal of a noble life, or beyond his means.

1118 b. 8. §§ 1, 2, 3, 4.] The *κοινὰ*, or *φυσικὰ ἐπιθυμίας* are those which all men experience. But few men habitually gratify them in an improper way, simply *quâ* *κοινὰ* or *φυσικὰ*, i. e. promiscuously

without caring for the manner in which they are gratified, so long ^{1118 b. 8.} as they are gratified somehow. The few who do so are the *λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις*, who e. g. overfill their bellies with any sort of food. The *ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι ἐπιθυμίας* are partly (1) the particular directions which the *κοινὰ ἐπιθυμίας* legitimately take in different men, e. g. preference for this kind of food or drink rather than that, where the things specially desired are good, if taken in moderation; partly (2) perversions of the *κοινὰ ἐπιθυμίας*, by which they are directed to objects which are *μισητά*. It is where the *κοινὰ ἐπιθυμίας* take particular directions, that we find *ἀκολασία* for the most part. This particular (and in itself legitimate) way of gratifying a natural human desire attracts one man, that particular way another man, and they go to excess in these particular ways. Here we have to do with what is distinguished in *E. N.* vii. 5. 8 as *ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἀκολασία* from *ἡ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν*, *ἡ θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης*, under which latter head it may be noted the desire of *τὰ μισητά* mentioned in § 4 properly falls.

§ 1.] Scaliger, with the approval of Susemihl and Rassow, (*Forsch.* p. 58) inserts *καὶ φυσικὰ* after *κοινὰ*, b. 8.

τροφῆς . . . καὶ εὐνής] These are the two objects of *τὸ θρεπτικόν* b. 9. distinguished in *de Anima* ii. 4. 415 a. 23—nutrition and reproduction—*ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δύναμις ἐστὶ ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν' ἧς ἐστὶν ἔργα γενεῆσαι καὶ τροφῆ χρῆσασθαι.*

ξηρὰς ἢ ὑγρὰς τροφῆς] We have here the ordinary distinction b. 10. between solid and liquid nourishment. For Aristotle's *scientific* account of the physiology of nutrition and taste see *de Sensu* 4. 441 b. 15 sqq. where he tells us that *τὸ ξηρὸν* and *τὸ ὑγρὸν* must both be present in every experience of taste and process of nutrition—*ὡσπερ οὖν οἱ ἐναποπλύνοντες ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς τοιοῦτον ἔχειν ποιοῦσι τὸ ὕδωρ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φύσις τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ γεώδες, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ γεώδους διηθοῦσα καὶ καιοῦσα τῷ θερμῷ ποῖον τι τὸ ὑγρὸν παρασκευάζει. Καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο χυμὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰρημένου ξηροῦ πάθος ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τῆς γέστεως τῆς κατὰ δύναμιν ἀλλοιωτικῆς εἰς ἐνέργειαν' ἄγει γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν εἰς τοῦτο δύναμις προϋπάρχον' οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. "Ὅτι δ' οὐ παντὸς ξηροῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ τροφίμου οἱ χυμοὶ ἢ πάθος εἰδὴν ἢ στέρησις, δεῖ λαβεῖν ἐντεῦθεν, ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ξηρὸν ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγροῦ οὔτε τὸ ὑγρὸν ἄνευ τοῦ ξηροῦ' τροφῆ γὰρ οὐδὲν αἰτῶν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεμιγμένον.*

1118 b. 11. "Ομηρος] The editors quote *Iliad* xxiv. 129.

ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων] As Achilles, whom Thetis is addressing in the lines referred to above.

b. 12. τοιαῦδε] τροφῆς καὶ εὐνῆς. Ramsauer conjectures παντός for πᾶς in this clause, construing τὸ δὲ τοιαῦδε ἢ τοιαῦδε ἐπιθυμῆν οὐκέτι παντός ἐστιν οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν (masc.). But it is better to accept the anacoluthon, and to suppose that Aristotle wrote τὸ δὲ with the infinitive in his mind, and then carelessly wrote πᾶς instead of παντός because he had written πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμῆν above. Reading πᾶς we must of course make τῶν αὐτῶν neuter, and explain—οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμῆν ὁ αὐτός. Bywater's suggestion, τῆς δὲ τοιαῦδε, is very tempting however.

b. 13. § 2. ἡμέτερον] 'Et fere ἐφ' ἡμῶν,' Ramsauer. 'Ἐπιθετος, ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἐπινοηθείσα, Par. 'Merely capricious,' Grant.

b. 14. ἕτερα γὰρ . . . τυχόντων] Here two reasons are given for the assertion that there is something 'natural' even in the most factitious tastes: (1) they are 'natural,' in the sense of being the expressions of the nature of the particular individuals, it being 'natural' that the tastes of individuals should vary within certain limits; and (2) they are 'natural,' because they are confined within these limits—because, though varying, they agree in not giving the preference in any case to certain things distinguished as τὰ τυχόντα.

πᾶσιν] τισίν Ob, a mere blunder.

b. 20. § 3. αὐτῆν] sc. τὴν γαστέρα.

b. 22. § 4. τῶν γὰρ φιλοτιοιούτων . . . πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν] Rasso (*Forsch.* 58, 59) reads τό for τῶ before χαίρειν (with Mb and Ob) and before μάλλον (Nb and Ob) in line 23, and treats the words τῶν γὰρ (l. 22) . . . δεῖ (l. 24) as an independent sentence, which he closes with a full stop. If τῶν γὰρ φιλοτιοιούτων λεγομένων is to be treated as a genitive absolute, τῶ being retained before χαίρειν and μάλλον, and a comma placed after δεῖ, l. 24, then we must follow Eucken (*De Arist. dic. rat.* p. 31) in reading δὴ (Mb) after κατὰ πάντα.

Grant thinks that ὡς in the phrase ἢ τῶ μάλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ is an interpolation, because he supposes that, if it is retained, we must place a comma after μάλλον, and treat ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ as a separate clause, rendering 'or because they like them as people

in general do;' whereas (he argues) μάλλον ἢ ought to be taken together so as to give the rendering 'or because they like them more than people in general' (πλέον ἢ κατὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς, Par.). This is undoubtedly the right rendering (it is remarkable however that Grant does not notice its inconsistency with the natural meaning of the reading καὶ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν which he accepts in l. 27); but it is not necessary to omit the ὡς in order to obtain it. Μάλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ is as good Greek as μάλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, and has the same meaning. Thus in vii. 8. 2 (referred to by Ramsauer) we have ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστιν τοῖς ταχῶ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπὸ ὀλέγου οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, although in iv. 4. 4 (quoted by Grant) we have ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μάλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. The above being the meaning of ἢ μάλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, it is absolutely necessary to accept in l. 27 the reading of Kb, CCC, and Camb. καὶ ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, rendering 'and more than people in general.'

§ 5.] The pains with which the σώφρων and ἀκόλαστος are b. 27. concerned are not independent pains like those which the ἀνδρείος faces, but pains caused by pleasures (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῶ ἢ ἡδονῆ) i. e. caused by the absence of pleasures.

§ 6. ἀτόπω] This is what Grant calls 'the disgraceful paradox' 1119 a. 4. of ἀκολασία. The Paraphrast has ὥστε καὶ ἀτοπὸν τι δοκεῖ τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου.

§ 7. οὐ πάνν γίνονται] The ascetic spirit (unless we regard a. 6. Cynicism as a manifestation of it) was conspicuously absent from the Greek national character.

οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία' καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κ.τ.λ.] Such insensibility would be inconsistent with being a man; for man is after all an animal: cf. *E. N.* iii. 1. 27 δοκεῖ δ' οὐχ ἧττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη.

οὐ τέτευχε δ' κ.τ.λ.] In *E. N.* ii. 7. 3 we have ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ a. 10. τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνν γίνονται: διόπερ οἱδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναισθητοί. Eudemus (*E. E.* iii. 2. 1230 b. 13) has τοὺς δὲ ἀκνήτως ἔχοντας δι' ἀναισθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡδονὰς οἱ μὲν καλοῦσιν ἀναισθητοὺς, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι τοιοῦτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἔστι δ' οὐ πάνν γνώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδ' ἐπιπόλαιον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ θάτερον ἀμαρτάνειν μάλλον καὶ πᾶσιν εἶναι σύμφυτον τὴν τῶν ποιῶντων ἡδέων ἧτταν καὶ αἰσθησιν. μάλιστα δ' εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἷους οἱ κωμφοδοιδάσκαλοι παρὰ-

1119 a. 10. γουσιw ἀγροίκους, οἱ οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα πλησιάζουσι τοῖς ἡδέσιw. Cf. *E. N.* ii. 2. 7 ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαίων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων, ὡς περ οἱ ἀγροικοὶ, ἀναίσθητός τις: and *E. N.* ii. 7. 13 περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτραπέλος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπέλια, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία: cf. also *E. N.* vii. 9. 3 εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἀγροικοὶ, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι' ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες ἔαν μὴ μεταπέθωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται ἔαν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ ὡς περ ψηφίσματα ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ εὐκασιw ἢ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ. From these passages we may gather that, if any name belongs to the ἐλλείπων περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, it is ἀναίσθητος, and that the ἀγροικός or rustic (as distinguished from the ἀστείος or town-man) is merely adduced in *E. E.* iii. 2 and *E. N.* ii. 2. 7 as an example of ἀναίσθησία, as he is introduced elsewhere as an example of other peculiarities—in *E. N.* ii. 7. 13, of dullness, and in vii. 9. 3, of opinionativeness. Theophrastus, *Char.* x. (iv), gives an amusing sketch of the ἀγροικός. Ἀγροικία is ἀμαθία ἀσχήμων. The ἀγροικός is the man who maintains that myrrh smells no sweeter than thyme: his shoes are too large for him: he talks loudly: he mistrusts his own friends, and makes confidants of his servants. He will stand on the road and look at a cow or a goat, but will look at nothing worth looking at. He runs himself to answer a knock at his door. The ἀναίσθησία of Theophrastus does not seem to have much in common with Aristotle's ἀναίσθησία—insensibility to the pleasures περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος. Ἀναίσθησία is defined in *Char.* xxv. (xiv) as βραδύτης ψυχῆς ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιw. The ἀναίσθητος is the only man who goes to sleep in the whole theatre. He loses things and cannot find them. He fatigues his children by obliging them to wrestle.

With regard to the ἀγροικοὶ of the κωμωδοδιδάσκαλοι referred to by Eudemus—plays entitled ΑΓΡΟΙΚΟΣ, ΑΓΡΟΙΟΙ, ΑΓΡΟΙΜΤΗΣ, are known to have been written by Antiphanes, Menander, Pherecrates, and Sophron: see Fabric. *Bib.* ii. pp. 414, 460, 474, 494 referred to by Zell. It is not unreasonable to suppose that Theophrastus sometimes borrowed from the comedians in writing his *Characters*.

a. 13. § 8. οὐδ' ἄλλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιοῦτω οὐδενί] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 91) reads οὐδ' . . . οὐδέ for the οὐθ' . . . οὐτε of the codd. here. The clause occupies the same position in the first (οὐτε γὰρ ἦδεται . . .) of the two main divisions of the sentence, as the clause οὐδ'

ἐπιθυμεῖ κ.τ.λ. does in the second (οὐτ' ἀπόντων . . .); and if οὐδέ is 1119 a. 13. right in the second division it must be in the first also. Susem. and Bywater follow Rassow.

οὐδ' ἄλλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 91) favours a. 15. οὐθενός, making it depend upon ἐπιθυμεῖ. Although all MSS. apparently exhibit οὐθενός, three—K^b, O^b, and CCC—read immediately after it, not ὄσα but ἄ, and so are as good evidence for an original οὐθέν' ὄσα, as for an original οὐθενός' ἄ. It seems certain that the letters *os* are original, and that Susemihl's οὐθέν' ἄ is wrong. I think, however, that οὐδέν is right. I take the phrase οὐδ' ἄλλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν as a blank adverbial formula, or *et cetera*, added to οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ and οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, and, with them, epexegetic of μετρίως by which οὐτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ is qualified. This blank formula is to be filled in ὄσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα (*E. N.* ii. 3. 5)—*e. g.* οὐδ' ὡς μὴ δεῖ would be included in it.

The reading οὐθενός' ὄσα would easily arise by dittographia of *os*, and would be retained by scribes, for Rassow's reason—that οὐθενός depends on ἐπιθυμεῖ

οὕτως ἔχων] *i. e.* ὁ δρεγόμενος τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν τοιούτοις ἐμποδίων ὕτων, a. 19. ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.

CHAPTER XII.

ARGUMENT.

Profligacy, or intemperance, is more voluntary than cowardice, for it pursues pleasure, which men naturally seek after, whereas cowardice consists in not facing pain, which men naturally avoid. Moreover, pain disturbs and destroys the nature of its subject, but pleasure has no such effect. Being more voluntary, profligacy is therefore more disgraceful. It is easier to habituate oneself to resist bodily pleasures, than to habituate oneself to endure the pains of fear; for one has many more opportunities in life of habituating oneself to resist bodily pleasures, and the process of habituation is without danger. But the habit of cowardice is more voluntary than the particular acts of cowardice; for the habit is not in itself painful, whereas the acts are caused by a pain which disturbs the man's nature and makes him throw away his arms and otherwise disgrace himself. Hence the opinion that these acts are even forced upon him. On the other hand, acts of profligacy are more voluntary than the habit is; for they are actuated by desire and appetite, whereas no one desires the habit.

The term ἀκόλαστος—which means literally, ‘unchastised’—is also applied to children when they are naughty; for there is a certain similarity between the ‘profligate’ and the naughty child. It does not matter here which is the original application of the term; at any rate, its transference is warranted by the real analogy between desire and a child—both try to do what is unseemly, and both grow apace, and need chastisement. If desire be not chastened and brought under subjection to reason, it will go great lengths, being an insatiable principle, which is strengthened by indulgence, till it at last casts reason out. As the child must live in obedience to his master, so must the principle of desire be subjected to reason. Hence in the temperate man desire will be in harmony with reason; both will aim at that which is noble and good; desire will seek the right objects, in the right way, and at the right time, in conformity with the dictates of reason.

1119 a. 21. §§ 1, 2.] In these sections Aristotle is speaking about τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις. Acts of intemperance are more voluntary than acts of cowardice, because the former are prompted by the desire of pleasure, and express the natural bent of the agent, while the latter are done under the constraint of pain, and seem to represent, not the agent, but his necessity.

a. 24. § 2. φύσιν] The normal state, as Grant points out.

μᾶλλον δὴ ἐκούσιον] sc. ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας. The MSS. seem all to have δ', but δὴ is certainly right: see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 92.

a. 26. πρὸς αὐτά] πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα, Coraes.

a. 27. §§ 3, 4.] In these sections he passes on to speak about the ἔξεις themselves.

The habit of cowardice is more voluntary (οὐχ ὁμοίως=μᾶλλον) than acts of cowardice; the habit of profligacy less voluntary than acts of profligacy. The reasons given for these differences are that the habit of cowardice is not painful, as compared with acts of cowardice, which seem to be forced upon a man at the time by the pains of fear; while the habit of profligacy is not desired or sought after, although profligate acts are. There is a good deal of confusion here. The habit δειλία is acquired by the repetition of particular acts caused by λύπη. It is misleading therefore to describe it as αὐτῇ ἄλυπος, in order to prove it to be ‘more voluntary’ than the particular acts. When Aristotle calls a habit ‘voluntary’ he means, as we have seen (iii. 5. 14), that we are responsible for it. If then the acts which produce the habit of δειλία are in a sense involuntary (as caused by λύπη ἢ ἐξίτησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ

ἔχοντος φύσιν), the habit will be equally involuntary, i. e. the δειλός 1119 a. 27. will be relieved of responsibility for it, in proportion as the acts which produced it were ‘involuntary.’ So much for the relation between the acts which made the habit and the habit ‘itself.’ If, on the other hand, the τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα here are not the acts which made the habit of δειλία, but the acts which flow from the habit when made—what is meant by distinguishing the habit itself, as ἄλυπος, from its acts, as forced upon us by λύπη? Are they not forced upon us by a λύπη of which the ‘habit itself’ has made us at least more susceptible? Again, how does the fact that οὐθεὶς ἐπιθυμῇ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι make the habit of ἀκολασία less ‘voluntary,’ in the sense of making it a habit for which we are less responsible? The habit is just as ‘voluntary’ as the acts which produced it; i. e. if they are entirely voluntary, we are fully responsible for it. Nor can the acts which flow from the formed habit of ἀκολασία be distinguished, as ‘desired and fully voluntary,’ from the habit, as ‘not desired and less fully voluntary.’ Surely if these acts are desired, it is because the habit makes us desire them. By ἀκολασία we mean only that such acts are desired. We seem then to have nothing but scholastic trifling in the sections before us, if we render them quite literally thus:—acts of cowardice are forced upon us by the pains of fear; but we do not fear cowardice itself, and it is not painful to be a coward. Therefore cowardice itself is more voluntary than acts of cowardice. On the other hand, acts of profligacy are pleasant and are objects of desire; but we do not desire to be profligate. Therefore profligacy itself is less voluntary than acts of profligacy.’ An important psychological truth, however, may be got out of these sections, if we interpret them a little more freely, and suppose Aristotle to mean by the ἔξεις αὐτῇ acts performed after a certain date, and by the τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα acts performed before that date; the psychological truth being that the pleasures or pains, as the case may be, which originally prompt acts, tend to disappear from consciousness, and leave the acts to go on automatically. The pains which prompt early acts of cowardice are very keenly felt; but, as time goes on, cowardly acts are performed on the occasion of less and less painful experiences, till at last we may suppose the perfect δειλός cultivating his δειλία at home in security, studiously avoiding all occasions for its active display in the presence of danger. In such a case the δειλία might be described as αὐτῇ μὲν ἄλυπος. Again, a pleasure like that of

1119 a. 27. drinking brandy, keenly felt at the beginning of the drunkard's progress, disappears almost entirely at last and leaves him the victim of a physical craving—of pain, not of pleasure.

It is to be noted that *ἐκούσιον*, after *ὁμοίως* in § 3, is the reading of Γ, N^b, Ald, mg. O^b, pr. P², NC, B¹, (B¹ has *ἐκούσιον ὃ καὶ κρείττον* in the text; O^b has on the margin *καὶ ἐκούσιον ὃ καὶ κρείττον*); while *φευκτόν* is the reading of Bekker's four MSS., K^b, L^b, M^b, O^b and also of CCC and B².

- a. 33. § 5.] Eudemos (*E. E.* iii. 2. 1230 a. 38—1230. b. 8) has the following account of the derivation and uses of the word *ἀκόλαστος*—*λέγεται δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς. ὃ τε γὰρ μὴ κεκολασμένος πως μὴδ' ἰατρευμένος, ὡσπερ ἄτμητος ὁ μὴ τετμημένος, καὶ τούτων ὁ μὲν δυνατός, ὁ δ' ἀδύνατος· ἄτμητον γὰρ τό τε μὴ δυνάμενον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυνατόν μὲν μὴ τετμημένον δέ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἀκόλαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς δέχασθαι κόλασιν, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ περὶ ἁμαρτίας, περὶ ἧς ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ σώφρων, ὡσπερ οἱ παῖδες. κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκόλασταν. ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον αἱ δυσίαιοι καὶ οἱ ἀνάιοι πάνπαν διὰ κολάσεως.*
- b. 2. δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου] I agree with Grant that 'there can be no doubt that the punishment and unrestrainedness of children is the more concrete and primary idea.' Aristotle seems to make it plain in § 8 which he regards as *πρότερον* and which *ὑστερον*—*ὡσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα . . . οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.*
- b. 9. § 7. ἀνοήτῳ] One without τὸ ἄρχον—νοῦς.
τὸ συγγενές] That which is born with one—connate. He means that the gratification of desire strengthens the natural principle of desire in us. Function reacts on organ. Coraes has—*προβιβάζει τὴν συγγενῆ καὶ ἔμφυτον τῇ παιδικῇ ἡλικίᾳ ἐπιθυμίαν αἰτὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἐνέργειας, ἢ μὴ κολάζηται.*
- b. 13. § 8. ὡσπερ δέ] K^b, O^b, and Camb. have *ὡσπερ δέ*, CCC has *ὡσπερ δή*. Bekker's *ὡσπερ γάρ* is given by L^b, M^b, Γ.
- b. 16. § 9. ἀμφοῖν] *i. e.* The *ἐπιθυμητικόν* and *λόγος*. Cf. vi. 2 2 *δεῖ τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀρεξιν ὀρθήν . . . καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι, τὴν δὲ διώκειν.*

BOOK IV.

Introductory Note.] THE *E. E.* and *M. M.* agree in the following order—*ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, πραότης, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια*: then follow, though not in exactly the same order in each treatise, the *παθητικὰ μεσότητες*—*νέμεσις, αἰδώς, φιλία, σεμνότης, ἀλήθεια, and εὐτραπέλια*. The *Nicomachean* order is—*ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, φιλοτιμία, πραότης, φιλία, ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπέλια*,—and lastly, *αἰδώς*, distinguished from all the foregoing as a *πάθος*.

In *E. N.* iii. 10. 1 Aristotle seems to give a reason (but see note *ad loc.*) why he begins with *ἀνδρεία* and *σωφροσύνη*—*viz.* *δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ αἱ ἀρεταί*. It is true that all the moral virtues consist in the regulation of τὸ ἄλογον or the element of disorder in man; but *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* represent this element in certain purely animal forms, without the regulation of which, to begin with, the more distinctively human and social virtues could not be acquired. The reasons which make it proper to begin the list with *ἀνδρεία* and *σωφροσύνη* are in favour of giving the third place to *πραότης*, which consists in the regulation of *ὀργή*, a feeling which man shares with the brutes. As *ὀργή*, however, is most often roused by causes which depend for their existence on society, the virtue of *πραότης*, if placed third, makes an easy transition to *ἐλευθεριότης*, and the other virtues which consist no longer in the regulation of purely animal instincts, but of feelings which are of distinctively human origin—*i. e.* do not come into existence except in society—the desire of wealth, the love of display, the desire of honour, the wish to please, and so forth.

Book IV may be said to discuss the virtues which consist in the

regulation of feelings and desires, which, however evolved from animal instincts, owe their present form and force to society. Ἄνδρεία and σωφροσύνη (and perhaps to some extent πραότης), although, as virtues, they are no less social than ελευθεριότης and the rest, are concerned with feelings which have their roots deep in man's animal as distinguished from his social nature¹.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

Liberality (ελευθεριότης) is the observance of the Mean in spending and acquiring 'wealth' (χρήματα)—its more characteristic side however being that which relates to spending, i. e. to the use of 'wealth'—of moderate wealth, it must be understood, not of great wealth. Being the habit of using such wealth properly, its extremes, ἀσωτία and ἀνελευθερία, are the habits of abusing such wealth. The term ἀσωτία, however, is often employed with an implication (συμπλεκόντες, § 3) of ἀκρασία and ἀκολασία, and thus appears in a very bad light. In the strict sense (οἰκείως, § 4), however, the ἀσωτος is one who wastes his substance (§ 5), and so ruins himself—as the etymology of the word shows (ἀ and σάβωω).

The ελευθέριος, then, is concerned with the χρήσις χρημάτων, and is better characterised as one who spends well than as one who acquires well; for to acquire is κτήσις, not χρῆσις—i. e. 'to acquire well' is, at best, the mere refusal to receive except from proper sources, it is not active function. Ἐλευθεριότης will thus realise the characteristic of all ἀρετή—to issue in positive well-doing, rather than to merit the merely negative praise of refraining from evil (§ 7). The ελευθέριος will give τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς (§ 12), i. e. with

¹ See, however, Zeller's *Ph. d. Gr.* 3rd German Ed. p. 634 (Aristotle), note 1, for a criticism of Häcker (*das Eintheilungs- und Anordnungsprincip der moralischen Tugendreihe in der Nikomachischen Ethik*, Berlin, 1863), who adopts a view similar to that advanced above. Zeller's chief point is that if the view were correct, πραότης must come after ἀνδρεία. To this it may be answered—that it could hardly come in between the two Cardinal Virtues ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη: but as a matter of fact comes in after σωφροσύνη in the *E. E.* and *M. M.*—a point which Zeller does not mention. Aristotle indeed interpolates the virtues of the Fourth Book between the discussion of ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη and that of δικαιοσύνη and φρόνησις: but this is because, I would urge, the virtues of the Fourth Book (like δικαιοσύνη which immediately follows them) are distinguished from ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη by being concerned with the regulation of feelings which owe their appearance to society. The fact that πραότης has the third place in the *E. E.* and *M. M.* seems to me to show that the writers of these treatises think that ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη stand on a different footing from the virtues of the Fourth Book, πραότης occupying an intermediate position.

due regard to the fitness of things, of which his φρόνησις makes him a correct judge. Consequently his liberality must not be estimated from the amount that he gives, but from the relation which the gift bears to his means (§ 19). Hence Tyrants with practically unlimited means are not ἀσωτοι. They cannot 'ruin themselves' by their extravagance (§ 23). The ελευθέριος does not value wealth for its own sake, but only ἕνεκα τῆς δόσεως. Those who have made fortunes have done so by setting a high value on wealth and devoting themselves to its acquisition. They are less likely to be liberal with their money than those who have inherited fortunes (§ 20).

Of the extremes, ἀσωτία is much better than ἀνελευθερία. It runs short of means (§ 30) and, being a generous impulse, may be chastened by age and experience into ελευθεριότης (§§ 30, 31). It also benefits many, by making 'money circulate.' Ἀνελευθερία, however, is incurable, being the vice of old age and helplessness, and of narrow and timid natures, of which nothing can be made (§§ 37-40).

We may note in this account of ελευθεριότης and its extremes—
(1) the stress laid on the point that ελευθεριότης results in a χρήσις χρημάτων. It thus takes its place with the other virtues in a life of doing. The χρηματιστῆς βίος, which may be contrasted with the life of the ελευθέριος, is concerned merely with indefinite κτήσις, and is a life of reception, that is, not properly a Life at all.
(2) The importance attached to force of character. It is better to do what is noble, than to refrain from what is base; and the bold spendthrift is a more hopeful character than the timid niggard.
(3) The remark that the spendthrift 'benefits many,' may be noticed as untrue. Money does more work and 'benefits' more people as 'capital' than it does if scattered about broadcast: cf. Grant's good notes on §§ 31-32 and § 44.

As I observed in note on ii. 7. 2, Aristotle's treatment of ελευθεριότης is as complicated as his treatment of ἀνδρεία: see ii. 7. 4 and iv. i. 29. The ἀσωτος is in excess as regards spending and in defect as regards acquiring; the ἀνελεύθερος is in excess as regards acquiring, and in defect as regards spending. Nor are the two moments of ἀνελευθερία always united in one character. Some exceed in acquisition; others are in defect as regards spending: see iv. i. 38, 39.

§ 1.] The method of exhaustion, by which its object is assigned 1119 b. 22. to ελευθεριότης may be compared with that by which the object of Particular Justice is found—v. 2. 5.

§ 2.] Cf. v. 5. 15.

1119 b. 30. § 3. συμπλέκοντες] 'with an implication'—implying intemperance. Grant compares 'the Prodigal Son.' The historian Theopompus, Aristotle's contemporary, in a passage preserved by Athenaeus (iv. 62), gives a vivid picture of the ἀσωτία of Philip and his friends, which may serve as an illustration of ἀσωτία 'with an implication'—Φίλιππος, ἐπεὶ ἐγκρατῆς πολλῶν ἐγένετο χρημάτων, οὐκ ἀνάλωσεν αὐτὰ ταχέως, ἀλλ' ἐξέβαλε καὶ ἔρριψε, πάντων ἀνθρώπων κάκιστος ὢν οἰκονόμος, οὐ μόνον αὐτός, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ περὶ αὐτόν. ἀπλῶς γὰρ οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἠπίστατο ζῆν ὀρθῶς, οὐδὲ σωφρόνως οἰκεῖν οἰκίαν. τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ αἴτιος ἦν, ἄπληστος καὶ πολυτελής ὢν, προχείρως ἅπαντα ποιοῦν, καὶ κτώμενος καὶ διδούς: στρατιώτης γὰρ ὢν, λογίζεσθαι τὰ προσόντα, καὶ τὰναλισκόμενα δι' ἀσχολίαν οὐκ ἠδύνατο. ἔπειτα δ' οἱ ἐταῖροι αὐτοῦ ἐκ πολλῶν τόπων ἦσαν συνερρηκότες: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς χώρας, οἱ δ' ἐκ Θετταλίας, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος, οὐκ ἀριστίνδην ἐξελεγμένοι, ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἦν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἢ τοῖς βαρβάρους λάσταυρος ἢ βδελυρὸς ἢ θρασὺς τὸν τρόπον, οὗτοι σχεδὸν ἅπαντες εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀθροισθέντες ἐταῖροι Φιλίππου προσηγορεύοντο. εἰ δὲ μὴ καὶ τοιοῦτός τις ἐληλύθει, ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς διαίτης τῆς Μακεδονικῆς ταχέως ἐκείνους ὅμοιος ἐγένετο. τὰ μὲν γὰρ οἱ πόλεμοι καὶ αἱ στρατεῖαι, καὶ αἱ πολυτελεῖαι θρασεῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι προετρέποντο, καὶ ζῆν μὴ κοσμίως ἀλλ' ἀσώτως καὶ τοῖς ληστοῖς παραπλησίως.

b. 33. § 4. οἰκείως] 'they are not properly called ἄσωτοι.'

1120 a. 4. §§ 6-8.] See *Argument* at the beginning of this chapter.

a. 14. § 8. ἔπεται] For the technical use of this term = ὑπάρχειν τι, or κατηγορεῖσθαι τινός, see *An. Pr.* i. 27 and 28 *passim*.

a. 17. § 9. ἦττον προίενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι] 'For men are less inclined to give away (ἦττον προίενται) what is their own, than (μᾶλλον ἢ = ἦ) to abstain from taking what belongs to others.' As Grant and other editors point out μᾶλλον is redundant.

a. 20. § 10. οὐχ ἦττον] = μᾶλλον Ald. Schol.

a. 33. § 16.] Grant has an interesting note on this section in which he calls attention to 'the spirit of manliness and nobility (ἀνδρόδης καὶ φιλόκαλος cf. *Eth.* iv. 4. 3.) which runs through the virtuous characters of Aristotle.' 'The principle of individuality,' he says 'a sense of life and free action (ἐνέργεια), are with Aristotle the basis of morality, and the first requisite to nobleness seems to be self-respect. . . . Christianity says "It is more blessed to give than

to receive" . . . In the Christian sentiment there is so great a 1120 a. 33. harmony between the object and subject, that the subjective side appears to be lost; but in reality it is only lost to be found again, it is diminished to be enhanced. Aristotle's statement would be, "It is better to give than to receive, because it is more noble." This has a slight tendency to give too much weight to the subjective side.' I think not—εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μείζον γὰρ καὶ τελειώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σφῆξεν.

§ 17. ἀναγκαῖον] *i. e.* ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως—materially necessary, b. 1. *if* the beautiful form (τὸ καλόν) is to be realised (see *Met.* Δ. 5. 1015 a. 20).

§ 18. βλέπειν] Bekker reads ἐπιβλέπειν with L^b. Rassow b. 6. (*Forsch.* 59) prefers βλέπειν, the reading of K^b and M^b. CCC, which in this part of the *Ethics* is practically a transcript of the text of K^b (see *Anecd. Oxon.* Classical Series, vol. i. part i. p. 45), omits not only the prefix ἐπι- but also the μὴ immediately preceding.

§ 19. αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν] 'δίδωσιν fort. seclu- b. 9. dendum' Bywater. Retaining δίδωσιν, I would suggest οὗτος in place of αὕτη.

§ 20.] Zell, Coraes, Michelet, and Grant compare Plato, *Rep.* b. 11. 330 B, C, where Socrates (in his conversation with Cephalus) says οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῆ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτὰ (*sc.* τὰ χρήματα): ὡσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ . . . καὶ οἱ πατέρες κ.τ.λ. Cf. also *E. N.* ix. 7. 3.

§ 22. οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα] Cf. note on iii. 11. 8, a. 15 οὐδ' ὅλως b. 21. τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.

§ 24. ἔπεται . . . b. 34. αἰ ἐπόμηναι] See above, note on § 8 b. 32. of this chapter.

§ 27. Σιμωνίδη] 'fort. Σιμωνίδου' Bywater. Coraes quotes 1121 a. 7. Athenaeus xiv. 73 (656) ὄντως δὲ ἦν ὡς ἀληθῶς κίμβιξ ὁ Σιμωνίδης καὶ αἰσχροκερδής, ὡς Χαμαιλέων φησὶν. Ἐν Συρακούσαις γούν τοῦ Ἱέρανος ἀποστέλλοντος αὐτῷ τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν λαμπρῶς, πωλῶν τὰ πλείω ὁ Σιμωνίδης τῶν παρ' ἐκείνου πεμπομένων, ἑαυτῷ μικρὸν μέρος ἀπετίθετο. ἐρομένου δὲ τίνος τὴν αἰτίαν ὅπως, εἶπεν, ἦ τε Ἱέρανος μεγαλοπρέπεια καταφανῆς ἦ, καὶ ἡ ἐμὴ κοσμιότης. Coraes adds—ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας αὐτῷ φιλαργυρίαν ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεστερημένος διὰ τὸ γῆρας ἠδονῶν, ὑπὸ μᾶς ἐτι γηροβοσκέται τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνειν, ὡς φησι Πλούταρχος

1121 a. 7. (Plut. *an seni sit gerenda resp.* 5). Cf. also Stobaeus (*Flor.* i. 240 ed. Meineke) quoted by Coraes—Σιμωνίδης ἐρωτηθεὶς διὰ τὴν ἐσχάτου γήρωσ ὃν φιλάργυρος εἶη κ.τ.λ. Grant quotes *Rhet.* ii. 16. 1391 a. 8 ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πλουσιῶν πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν Ἰέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον γενέσθαι κρείττον πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν· πλούσιον εἰπείν· τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη, ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσιῶν θύραις διατρίβοντας. See also the amusing reference to his love of money in *Rhet.* iii. 2. 1405 b. 24 καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἐδίδου μισθὸν ὀλίγον αὐτῷ ὁ κικήσας τοῖς ὀρεῦσιν, οὐκ ἤθελε ποιεῖν ὡς δυσχεραίνων εἰς ἡμίονους ποιεῖν, ἐπεὶ δ' ἰκανὸν ἔδωκεν, ἐπαίρησε 'χαίρει' ἀλλοποδῶν θύγατραις ἵππων.' καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θυγατέρες ἦσαν.

a. 15. § 29. πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς] See below §§ 41, 42.

a. 16. §§ 30, 31. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας . . . βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου] 'The two sides of ἀσωτία (mentioned in § 29) are very seldom found united in the same person, for it is not easy for one who has no receipts to give to everybody (if he tries, his means soon come to an end—that is, if he is a private individual; and it is only the private individual who can be termed ἀσωτος): where they are united however—that is, in the ἀσωτος proper, we have a character not a little better than that of the ἀνελεύθερος.' The words ταχέως . . . ἀσωτοι εἶναι are parenthetical; and ὁ γε τοιοῦτος is ὁ μηδαμῶθεν λαμβάνων καὶ πᾶσι διδοῦς = the ἀσωτος proper = ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀσωτος of § 32 below. Where (as is generally the case) extravagance goes with indiscriminate acquisition (§§ 33, 34), we have really a bad form of ἀνελευθερία, not something better than ἀνελευθερία. See Rassow *Forsch.* p. 121.

a. 24. § 31. δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ] K^b, CCC, Γ, and Cambr. omit both negatives, with the approval of Rassow (*Forsch.* 59), who is followed by Susemihl. The fault of the ἀσωτος, as Rassow points out, is to give too much and take too little. If he is reformed and becomes like the ἐλευθέριος, he will give the right amount to the right people, and also take the right amount from the right sources—λήψεται ὅθεν δεῖ.

b. 4. § 35. οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα] τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. All MSS. except K^b Ob and CCC, seem to read τούτου αὐτοῦ—which I prefer to τούτου accepted by Sus. and Byw.

b. 16. §§ 38-40.] ἀνελευθερία has two moments: but they do not always coexist in the same character; hence we have two classes

of ἀνελεύθεροι, (1) Those who are conscientious enough—or at least externally irreproachable—in the matter of acquisition, but will not part with what they acquire. (2) Those who are bent upon acquisition, and unscrupulous in the methods which they employ.

§ 39. κίμβικες] Coraes, in his note on this section, explains the use of κίμβιξ = 'niggard,' by pointing to its connexion through the diminutive κίμβικιον with the modern Greek τσιβίκι which means a *dog-tick* or *flea* = the old Greek κροτῶν. *Ἔστι τοίνυν, he says, ὁ κίμβιξ ὁ δίκην κροτῶνος οἰοῦν κεντῶν καὶ ἐκμυζῶν τὰ ἐλάχιστα, ὁ μὴδὲ τὰ λεπτότατα τῶν κερμάτων (small change) παρορῶν, ὃν οἱ Γάλλοι τὴν αὐτὴν μεταφορὰν σώζοντες *pince-maille* καλοῦσι.

κυμινοπρίστης] a cummin-splitter. Cummin, a relish eaten with food.

§ 40. τοκιστὰ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶ] Zell (reading τοκιστὰ b. 34. καὶ τὰ μικρὰ ἐπὶ πολλῶ) supplies δανείζοντες out of τοκιστὰ—'who lend small sums at a high rate of interest.' Michelet prefers to take τὰ μικρὰ ἐπὶ πολλῶ with ἐργαζόμενοι—'who perform small services for a large return'—agreeing with Coraes apparently, who (also reading καὶ τὰ μικρὰ ἐπὶ πολλῶ) says—τοῦτο μὲν σημαίνει, τὰ εὐτελῆ ἐπὶ πολλῆ τιμῇ δίδοντες ἢ ὑπουργοῦντες. I prefer Zell's interpretation, which applies as well to the reading κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶ (Byw.) as to Zell's. For Aristotle's general objection to τόκος see *Pol.* i. 3. 1258 b. 6 ὁ δὲ τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα νομισματος. ὥστε καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ φύσιν οὗτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστίν.

§ 44.] The grounds upon which ἀνελευθερία rather than ἀσωτία is to be regarded as the proper contrary of ἐλευθεριότης are the two specified in ii. 8. 7, 8.

It is only as a character that ἀνελευθερία can be truly described as μείζων κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας. The economic effects of ἀσωτία are unquestionably worse than those of ἀνελευθερία.

With the account of ἐλευθεριότης and its extremes given in this chapter, cf. *E. E.* iii. 4 (a very meagre treatment of the subject), and *M. M.* i. 23, 24. The various forms of ἀνελευθερία are described by Theophrastus (*Char.*) not only in his chapter περὶ ἀνελευθερίας, but also in the chapters περὶ ἀπονοίας, περὶ αἰσχροκερδίας and περὶ μικρολογίας. The following is his description of the αἰσχροκερδής, as translated by Jebb:—

'The avaricious man is one who when he entertains will not set

1122 a. 13. enough bread on the table. He will borrow from a guest staying in the house . . . When he sells wine he will sell it watered to his own friend. He will seize the opportunity of taking his boys to the play when the lessees of the theatre grant free admission . . . He is apt to claim his part of the halfpence found by his servants in the streets and to cry—"Shares in the luck" (*κοινὸν εἶναι φήσας τὸν Ἑρμῆν*) . . . It is just like him too when he is paying a debt of thirty minas to withhold four drachmas (about 3s. out of £120). Then if his sons, through ill health, do not attend the school throughout the month, he will make a proportionate deduction from the payment; and all through Anthesterion he will not send them to their lessons because there are so many festivals, and he does not wish to pay the fees. It is just like him too when a club-dinner is held at his house to secrete some of the fire-wood, lentils, vinegar, salt and lamp-oil placed at his disposal. If a friend or a friend's daughter is to be married he will go abroad a little time before in order to avoid giving a wedding present.¹

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

Μεγαλοπρέπεια—magnificence—differs from *ἐλευθεριότης* in being concerned only with expenditure, and that on a grand scale (§ 1). The *μεγαλοπρεπής* is *ἐλευθέριος*, but the *ἐλευθέριος* is not therefore *μεγαλοπρεπής* (§ 3). Both expend with equal propriety, but the scale on which they do so is different; and the expenditure of the *μεγαλοπρεπής* results in performances, and works, which are beautiful and striking in the public eye, rather than merely useful to individuals, as are the gifts of the *ἐλευθέριος*. *Ἐλευθεριότης* results in a κτήμα useful to the person benefited; whereas *μεγαλοπρέπεια* results in an ἔργον which is the glory and admiration of the city (§ 10). Hence the *μεγαλοπρεπής* must be a rich man, and even a man whose riches have been inherited (§§ 13, 14), otherwise expenditure on a great scale (whether for public objects¹, or on great family occasions, §§ 11–17) would be out of keeping with his condition; but the *ἐλευθέριος* need not be a rich man. The habit of spending money on a great scale with propriety will direct the *μεγαλοπρεπής* even in cases where the expenditure is necessarily small. He is an artist—*ἐπιστήμων ἔοικεν* (§ 5), and will display his superior taste, even in cases in which the *ἐλευθέριος*, strictly so called, can compete with him—*καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον* (§ 10).

¹ What we understand by 'public spirit' enters largely into the notion of *μεγαλοπρέπεια*.

The extremes are βαναυσία or ἀπειροκαλία¹ and μικροπρέπεια. The former results in vulgar display of wealth; the latter falls short of the requirements of great occasion (e.g. a marriage or a θεωρία) by anxiety to do the thing as cheaply as possible.

§ 1. *περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον*] *Aspasius* has *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθεριότης* 1122 a. 21. *περὶ δόσω καὶ λήψω, ἡ δὲ μεγαλοπρέπεια περὶ τὴν δόσω.*

§ 2.] The *τριηραρχία* was one of the extraordinary *λειτουργίαι* at a. 24. Athens. The *τριηραρχος* got the ship, fairly equipped, from the State. The State also paid the crew, and bore the expense of their provisions. The *τριηραρχος* had to maintain the efficiency of the ship for one year, hire the crew, and often pay large bounties in order to induce men to serve; he had also often to advance the money required for pay and provisions. The cost of a trierarchy amounted to about fifty minae. See *Smith's Dictionary of Antiquities*: article *Trierarchia*, and *Jebb's Theophrastus*, p. 253. The *ἀρχιθεωρός* was the leader of a *θεωρία*, or embassy sent by the state to the Great Games, or to consult the oracle at Delphi, or to assist at the celebration of the Delia—the solemn festival of the Ionian confederacy. The *ἀρχιθεωρία* was one of the ordinary, or *ἐγκόκλιοι λειτουργίαι*, which devolved upon the wealthy Athenian citizen. See *Smith's Dict. of Antiquities*, articles—*Delia*, *Theori*, *Leiturgia*. *Zell* assumes that the *τριηραρχία* would cost more than an *ἀρχιθεωρία*: *Grant* reverses this opinion. The *Delian ἀρχιθεωρία* probably cost more than a *τριηραρχία*: some other *ἀρχιθεωρία* probably less.

§ 3. *πολλάκι κ.τ.λ.*] from *Od.* xvii. 419, a. 27.
*καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ποτε οἶκον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔναιον
ὄλβιος ἀφνειόν, καὶ πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτην.*

§ 4. *οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι . . . λαμπρυνόμεναι*] *Asp.* has—*βαναν-* a. 32. *σίαν . . . προσηύχοντι τινα οὐσαν μεγέθους τοῦ ἐν δαπανήμασιν ἀξίον· ἐν οἷς γὰρ οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὡς δεῖ λαμπρύνεται.*

ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν] *K^b, O^b, Camb., and CCC* read a. 33. *ὑπὲρ* for *περὶ*. *Susemihl* (followed by *Bywater*) attaches so much

¹ In the *E. E.* (iii. 6) *ὁ ἐπὶ τὸ μέζον* is said to be *ἀνώνυμος*, but to resemble the *ἀπειροκαλος* and *σαλάκων*: in the *ὑπογραφή*, however, the habit is called *δαπανηρία* (*E. E.* ii. 3). In the *M. M.* (i. 26) the habit is called *σαλακωνεία* (1192 a. 37—*K^b* however reads *ἀλαζωνείας* here, and *ἀλαζών* for *σαλάκων* in 1192 b. 2 and 3). The *σαλάκων*, or swaggerer, is coupled with the *σόλοικος*, or vulgar person, in *Rhet.* ii. 16. 1391 a. 4.

1122 a. 33. weight to the joint authority of K^b and O^b here, that he accepts *ὑπέρ* from them. He may be quite right in doing so: but I think he ought to do more, and bracket the clause (suspicious in itself) in which *ὑπέρ* appears. See note on iii. 3. 2.

b. 4. § 6.] Rassow (*Forsch.* 75) inserts *εἰ πρόπον* between *πρέπον* and *τῷ ἔργῳ* (1122 b. 4), believing that no sense can be got out of the clause *οὕτω γὰρ . . . ἔργῳ* as it stands. Is this so? Aristotle says that the *δαπάναι* (answering to the *ἐνέργειαι* mentioned in the line above) of the *μεγαλοπρεπῆς* are (as his name implies) *μεγάλαι* and *πρέπουσαι*. The *ἔργα* or objects (answering to the *ὧν ἐστίν* above) of his *δαπάναι* will therefore be *μεγάλα*, for unless they are *μεγάλα*, we cannot speak of a *μέγα δαπάνημα* in the sense in which we wish *μέγα* to be here understood—*i. e.* in the sense of *μέγα καὶ πρόπον τῷ ἔργῳ*—not only great materially (for the *δαπάναι* of the *βάναντος* are great materially), but having its material greatness plainly justified by the greatness of its object.

Münsher and Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 75) omit *καί* (b. 1) before *ὧν ἐστίν*: wrongly I think. A *ἕξις* (like an organ) is to be understood in relation to its functions, *and* to its objects, or the environment for which it is suited.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ may be taken as a reference to the account of the nature and formation of the *ἠθικαὶ ἕξεις* with which Aristotle began this division (Books ii—iv) of his Treatise.

b. 12. § 10. *ἐν τούτοις δὲ κ.τ.λ.*] *Ἐν τούτοις i. e. ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.* Peters translates—‘So the magnificent man must be liberal also; for the liberal man too will spend the right amount in the right manner; only, both the amount and the manner being right, magnificence is distinguished from liberality (which has the same¹ sphere of action) by greatness—I mean by actual magnitude of amount spent: and secondly, where the amount spent is the same, the result of the magnificent man’s expenditure will be more magnificent.’ This seems to be the only rendering which the words as they stand admit of: *οἷον μέγεθος* is expegetic of *τὸ μέγα*, and *τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὐσης* is a genitive absolute. The rendering of Lambinus—*sed in his quidquid magni est magnifici proprium est, veluti magnitudo liberalitatis circa haec versantis,*

¹ Here Peters translates Bekker’s *ταῦτά*.

which makes the gen. *ἐλευθεριότητος* depend on *μέγεθος*, can hardly 1122 b. 12. be right. I am inclined, however, to suspect the text, and to think that Coraes is right in trying to restore a verb to govern *μέγεθος*. He suggests *σχοῦσης* for *οὐσης* and has the following note: *Σχοῦσης ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐσης· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἐξηγήσαιτο τὸ πολλὰ τοῖς κριτικοῖς παρασχὼν πράγματα χωρίου τούτου. ὁ νοῦς, ἐπεὶ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἐστὶν ἀναγκαιὸς καὶ ἐλευθέριος, κατ’ οὐδέν τε ἐκείνου διαφέρει ἕτερον, πλὴν ὅτι ἐν μεγάλοις καὶ μεγάλων ἔνεκα δαπανᾷ, εἴη ἂν ἢ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐλευθεριότητος σχοῦσα μέγεθος· τούτῃσιν ἢ δαπάνη ἐν οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ μετρία μὲν οὐσα ἐλευθεριότης κεκλήσεται, προσλαβοῦσα δὲ μέγεθος καλεῖσθω μεγαλοπρέπεια.* Rassow (*Forsch.* 92) adopts the method of emendation indicated by Coraes, and conjectures *λαβοῦσης* for *οὐσης*, comparing such uses as *λαμβάνειν ἀξίῃσιν, τελειοῦσιν, τέλος, τοῦ μεγέθους τέλος, ὕψος*. Susemihl accepts Rassow’s *λαβοῦσης* into his text. Thus *μεγαλοπρέπεια* ‘ist gewissermassen eine *ἐλευθεριότης* in grossem Stil.’ The reading *ταῦτα* (accepted by Rassow, Susemihl and Bywater) has the support of all MSS. apparently, except H^a, CCC, and rec. K^b, which have *ταῦτά* adopted by Bekker.

Whether we leave the text as it stands with *οὐσης*, or read *λαβοῦσης*, we have to remember that the *μέγα*, or *μέγεθος*, characteristic of *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, is not material bulk, as such, but *the grandeur* which belongs to material bulk subserving a worthy end. ‘Magnificence,’ says Grant, ‘differs from Liberality not in degree, but in kind, being a display of more genius and imagination on the same objects, and thus with the same expense producing a more striking result.’ Grant reads *περὶ ταῦτά*—but even this ought not to be rendered ‘on the same objects.’ The *ἐλευθέριος* and the *μεγαλοπρεπῆς* do not spend ‘on the same objects,’ but ‘both spend the right amount in the right manner,’ on their different objects.

οὐ γὰρ ἢ αὐτῇ κ.τ.λ.] This explains how it is that *ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης* b. 14. *δαπάνης* the magnificent man produces a finer result than the liberal man. The result produced by the liberal man is merely a *κτῆμα*—something that is materially useful to the recipient, and has its market value, whereas the result produced by the magnificent man is of the nature of a work of art. It is *θαυμαστόν*—‘displays genius and imagination.’

The words with which this section ends are variously given by the MSS—K^b, O^b, Γ, CCC, and Cambr. give *καὶ ἔστω ἔργον ἀρετῆς*,

- 1122 b. 14. μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἐν μεγέθει, adopted by Bekker and Bywater: L^b, M^b, have καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου μεγαλοπρέπεια ἀρετὴ ἐν μεγέθει, adopted by Susemihl and Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2, p. 638, note 4). Zeller translates 'die Grossartigkeit des Werkes besteht in einer im Grosse sich darstellenden Trefflichkeit.' I prefer Bekker's reading; but perhaps ἡ has dropped out between ἀρετὴ and μεγαλοπρέπεια. The words ἐν μεγέθει qualify the predicate ἔργου ἀρετὴ.
- b. 19. § 11. τὰ τίμια] as distinguished from τῶν δὲ ἰδίων § 15. See viii. 14. 3, where τιμὴ is said to be the return which Society makes to its benefactors. There ought to be a comma (Bekker has none) after θεούς,—ἀναθήματα, κατασκευαί (*construiones templorum* Lamb., *arae aedificatae* Victor.), and θυσίαι being the three subdivisions of τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεούς.
- b. 22. χορηγεῖν] See Smith's *Dict. of Antiq.* article *Choregus*. The χορηγία was one of the most expensive λειτουργίαι. The duty of the χορηγός, who was appointed by his Tribe, was to provide choruses for tragedies, and comedies, and other public functions. He had to pay the χοροδιδάσκαλος and the choreutae, supplying the latter with proper food, and with the necessary dresses and masks. Even the prize which the most successful χορηγός received, (a tripod) he had to pay for himself. For the expenses of the χορηγία, see Haigh, *Attic Theatre*, p. 82 sqq.
- b. 23. ἐστιῶν τὴν πόλιν] It would seem that Aristotle uses this expression to distinguish the λειτουργία referred to, from the less splendid ἐστιῶν τὴν φυλὴν, one of the regular λειτουργίαι, which consisted in giving a feast to one's tribesmen. See Smith's *Dict. of Ant.* article *Hestiasis*.
- b. 24. § 12. ἀναφέρεται] The subject of this verb is τὰ δαπανήματα, and τὸ τίς κ.τ.λ. is in apposition to τὸν πράττοντα.
- b. 29. § 14. πρέπει δὲ [καὶ] οἷς] Bywater brackets καί. I think that its omission is a great improvement.
- b. 30. προϋπάρχει] Cf. *E. E.* iii. 6. 1233 b. 11 τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ἔφετο Θεμιστοκλεῖ πρέπειν ἢ ἐποίησατο Ὀλυμπίαζε διὰ τὴν προϋπάρξασαν ταπεινότητα, ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι: with which Fritzsche compares *Plut. Them.* 5—εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἔλθων ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ διαμυλλόμενος τῷ Κίμωνι περὶ δέιπνα καὶ σκηναὶς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην λαμπρότητα καὶ παρασκευὴν, οὐκ

ἤρκεσε τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὄντι νέφ και ἀπ' οἰκίας μεγάλης φέοντο 1122 b. 30. δεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα συγχαρεῖν ὁ δὲ μήπω γνώριμος γεγονὼς ἀλλὰ καὶ δοκῶν ἐξ οὐχ ὑπαρχόντων παρ' ἀξίαν ἐπαίρεσθαι, προσωφλίσκεαν ἀλαζονείαν.

ἡ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν] ἡ διὰ τινος τῶν ἔτι ζώντων αὐτοῖς οἰκείων καὶ b. 31. συγγενῶν, Coraes. 'Their connections'—Peters.

§ 15. τῶν δὲ ἰδίων] Aristotle here passes from the highest objects b. 35. of μεγαλοπρέπεια (τὰ περὶ θεούς, and the great λειτουργίαι), to those of second rank—the celebration of a marriage, the entertainment of private friends, the furnishing of one's house, &c.

§ 17. καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων] I follow Susemihl and Bywater 1123 a. 10. in reading ἐπεὶ for ἐπί, and make the apodosis begin at διὰ τοῦτο § 19. I find that CCC has γρ. ἐπεὶ on the margin for insertion before¹ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων: but all MSS. seem to read ἐπί. Peters (reading ἐπί) translates—'And in his expenditure every detail will be great after its kind, great expenditure on a great occasion being the most magnificent, and then in a less degree that which is great for the occasion, whatever it be.'

ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει] ὅστε εἶναι τὰ ἔργα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς a. 11. μεγάλα καὶ θυμαστά, πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ συγκρινόμενα τάφων μὲν οἰκοδομήματα πρὸς τάφους, ναῶν πρὸς ναοὺς, καὶ γεφύρας πρὸς γεφύρας, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. Paraph.

τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα] οἷον ἐν ναφ μεγάλη δαπάνη. Coraes. I do a. 12. not think that Bywater's insertion of ἀπλῶς after μεγαλοπρεπέστατον is necessary. I understand μεγαλοπρεπές, not μεγαλοπρεπέστατον, as the predicate of τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα.

ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα] ἐν δὲ τοῖς μικροῖς, τὸ ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς μέγα, ὅστε τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ τῶν ἄλλων μικρὰ παραβαλλόμενον μέγιστον εἶναι. Coraes.

§ 20. ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἐστιῶν] "Ερανος being a club where a. 22. each member entertained in turn, or an entertainment where each guest contributed, it was of course bad taste to eclipse the rest in splendour.' Grant.

ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων] The πάροδος was the entrance a. 23. of the chorus in the orchestra, and the first song sung on entrance—

¹ Possibly instead of ἐπί: but the three dots referring to the γρ. are under the καί.

1128 a. 23. defined in *Poet.* 12. 1452 b. 22 *πάροδος μὲν ἢ πρώτη λέξις ὄλου χοροῦ.* Zell and Coraes, however, are of opinion that here *πάροδος* means the part of the theatre at which the chorus entered, and that the 'purple' is not the dress of the choreutae, but the hangings of this part, which, in the case of comic representations, were usually skins. That hangings are here intended seems to be the view both of the Ald. Schol. and of the Par. The former has—*σύνηθες ἐν κωμῳδία παραπετάσματα δέρρεις ποιεῖν οὐ πορφυρίδας*: and the Par. has—*ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδίας ἀντὶ κωδίων* (sheep skins), *ἃ παραπετάσματα ἦν ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς, πορφυρίδας ἔχει, καθάπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς.* Zell quotes Lysias (699) for the cost of a comic choregia—*κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν Κηφισοδότῳ ἐνίκων καὶ ἀνήλωσα σὺν τῇ τῆς σκευῆς ἀναθεῖαι ἑκατάδεκα μῶας*—i.e. about £64. The cost of a tragic choregia would be much greater.

Bywater restores *Μεγαροῖ* from *K^b*, in place of the *Μεγαρεῖς* of other MSS. Pr. CCC has *Μεγαροῖ*.

a. 31. § 22.] *Μεγαλοπρέπεια* and its extremes are discussed in *E. E.* iii. 6, and in *M. M.* i. 26 shortly, and in an inferior manner.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

The μεγαλόψυχος, or great-souled man, deems himself worthy of that which is highest, being worthy of it, as distinguished from the χαῖνος, or vain man, on the one side, who thinks too highly of himself, and the μικρόψυχος, or small-souled man, on the other side, who thinks too little of himself.

That which is highest—among external good things—is honour. It is this which the μεγαλόψυχος rightly deems himself worthy of. Μεγαλοψυχία, then, may be defined as a mediocrity where honour and dishonour are concerned.

Rightly deeming himself worthy of that which is highest, the μεγαλόψυχος must be a truly virtuous man; and his μεγαλοψυχία will lend distinction to the virtues, without which it cannot itself exist.

But, although he deems himself worthy of the highest honour, the μεγαλόψυχος does not make honour his all-in-all. Since, then, even honour is not all-in-all to him, he will not be likely to think too highly of inferior good things. The consciousness of his own commanding personality will be enough for him. This consciousness will reveal itself externally in the independence of his demeanour,

and the distinction of his bearing. He will accept the honour which he receives from good men, not as adequate to his desert, but as the best thing which they can offer. The opinion of ordinary men—favourable or unfavourable—he will look down upon. (Here he is apt to be imitated by those who are not really μεγαλόψυχοι. But he has a right to look down on other men.) He will rather do good offices than have them done to him. He will remember those whom he has benefited, but those who have benefited him he will easily forget. He will be haughty and reserved with the great, and easy with those of middle-estate. He will not enter into competition with others for honour. He will reserve himself for great occasions of acting, and great danger; but when the great danger comes he will not grudge his life. He will love and hate openly. He will speak and act the truth—except in so far as he keeps ordinary people at a distance by his irony. He will never be found looking up to people or things with awe and wonder. Remembering evil, personal talk, praise, blame, complaint, will all be far from his nature.

His walk will be slow, his voice deep, his manner of speaking calm and measured.

The extremes—the vain man, and the small-souled man, are not exactly vicious characters—they are not evil-doers: but they are in error. The small-souled man deprives himself of what is his due, from not 'knowing himself.' He is not silly; but he is backward. His poor opinion of himself, however, makes him a worse man in time. The vain man, on the other hand, is silly. His lack of self-knowledge is conspicuous. He is always being shown-up, as he strives, by dress, and all kinds of ostentation, to make people think highly of him.

Μικροψυχία, however, is the real opposite of μεγαλοψυχία, for μικροψυχία is more common than χαννότης, and worse.

Introductory Note.] THE picture of the *μεγαλόψυχος* given in this chapter is a creation of art, intended to present a great philosophical truth with concrete evidence to the imagination. We must therefore be careful not to look at it as if it were a portrait-sketch after the manner of Theophrastus, or stood on the same plane with the other character-pictures given in the Fourth Book.

The *μεγαλόψυχος* accepts the highest honour, though falling short of his deserts, because men have nothing better to give him. He remembers those whom he has benefited, but not those from whom he has received benefits. To the many he is ironical. He does not give way to admiration, for in his eyes nothing is great. This spirit in a real man would be intolerable. But Aristotle's *μεγαλόψυχος* is not a real man. He is an ideal creation in philosophy, as Philoctetes or Antigone is in tragedy. He is Aristotle's concrete presentation of that *θεωρία* which is essential to human excellence. He 'contemplates' the *κόσμος* or beautiful harmony of his own nature, and allows nothing external to it

to dominate his thought or conduct. He thus realises *αὐτάρκεια* or autonomy, and 'possesses all the virtues' in a fuller sense than other virtuous men, who are conscious of the moral law merely through their *φρόνησις*, or *practical* insight and self-knowledge. The *μεγαλόψυχος* is a man of the highest *speculative* power. Like Spinoza's ideal, he has the *scientia intuitiva*, and sees in every virtuous act the whole world of human nature clearly, which good men of less speculative power see only dimly. The ever-present spectacle of 'the moral law within,' by its sublimity, exalts his mind; while the exaltation of mind, or *μεγαλοψυχία*, reveals itself outwardly in the dignity and distinction of his bearing. High speculative power being thus essential to *μεγαλοψυχία*, it is not every virtuous man who can be *μεγαλόψυχος*.

It is impossible to determine how far Aristotle was guided in his delineation of the *μεγαλόψυχος* by reference to particular individuals known to him. There certainly seem to be touches in the work suggested by such a reference; but it may be said, I think, that the work loses, rather than gains, by these attempts at realism, and that the impression which they convey, that we have before us a real and possible man, who, as described, would be intolerable, is unfortunate, and has contributed to the misunderstanding of the significance of *μεγαλοψυχία* in Aristotle's Ethical System. The measured movements, and the deep voice, make us think of a real man: but, after all, they are only the buskins and mask of an ideal character. Aristotle, we may be sure, was as fully aware of the ideality of his *μεγαλόψυχος*, or man who is a law to himself, as Kant was of the ideality of his Good Will: but Aristotle, unlike Kant, had undertaken to picture the ideal of moral autonomy, for the eye, as it were, and could not withstand the temptation of putting in touches more suitable to a psychological and physiological description, than to the representation of an ethical ideal.

Hegel's view, that Alexander the Great was Aristotle's model, is a particularly unfortunate one. The impetuous genius, and the vices, of Alexander distinguish him, in the most marked manner, from the harmoniously developed *μεγαλόψυχος*¹. Nor must too much be made of the examples of *μεγαλοψυχία*—Alcibiades, Achilles, Ajax, Lysander, and Socrates—given, in a purely

¹ For other objections to Hegel's view see Teichmüller *Literarische Fehden*, p. 192.

logical context, in *An. Post.* ii. 13. 97 b. 18; for no one of these characters answers to the description here given. The description of the *μεγαλόψυχος* in the *Ethics* is rather the *mise en scène* of Aristotle's doctrine of the *αὐτάρκεια* of the *εὐδαίμων* in the Life of Reason, than a portrait-sketch after the manner of Theophrastus.

§ 4. *σώφρων*] here means 'modest,' 'knowing his place'—1123 b. 5. as each of the classes in Plato's State, in virtue of its *σωφροσύνη*, 'knows its own place.'

§ 5. *τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι*] The editors refer to *Poet.* 7. b. 7. 1450 b. 36 *τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστί.*

§ 6. *οὐ πᾶς χαῖνος*] *i. e.* a man may think too much of himself, b. 9. without going the stupid length of vanity.

§ 8. *τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος*] Cf. ii. 6. 17. b. 13. As 'a great man' he stands on a pinnacle; as 'a virtuous character' he occupies the mean. His position, as he himself is conscious of it, and as it strikes the imagination of the admiring beholder, is one of incomparable preeminence; but to the moral analyst it suggests difficulties of detail in which the *χαῖνος* and the *μικρόψυχος* fail—and in which the 'virtuous character' himself *might have failed*.

§ 10. *ἢ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ*] 'Worth' is a b. 17. *relative* term—*i. e.* it cannot be understood except as entitling its possessor to 'something'; and this 'something' has to be specified. Being something which the person 'worthy of it' gets, it cannot be a good thing of the soul, or of the body; it must, therefore, be one of τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ.

τιμῇ] When *μεγαλοψυχία* is said to be *περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας*, we b. 20. must remember that *τιμῇ* is after all only a *symbol* of the reward to which the worth of the *μεγαλόψυχος* is entitled. *Τιμῇ* regarded at an end in itself in the *πολιτικὸς βίος* turns out to be something precarious, *ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ* (i. 5. 4). The true reward is *εὐδαιμονία* or the *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν* itself. This is indeed *τίμιον* (i. 12) and an end in itself, as the gods, to whom we do not give *ἔπαυος*, but assign *τιμῇ*, are ends in themselves, not means to our advantage. The *τιμῇ* which is assigned to the *μεγαλόψυχος* must therefore be understood in connexion with the

1123 b. 20. technical use of the term *τίμον* as explained in *E. N.* i. 12. The self-sufficing personality of the *μεγαλόψυχος* inspires reverence. The outward expressions of this reverence are in themselves nothing to the *μεγαλόψυχος*, but he receives them, as the gods receive our homage, not because they need it, but because we offer it, as the best thing we have to offer. But if the world is unappreciative and withholds the homage due to his character, the *μεγαλόψυχος* is not troubled. He goes on his way like Plato's embodiment of the 'autonomy of the Will'—*ὁ ἐπιστήμην λαβών* (*Rép.* 362 and 366), who walks through life with the inward consciousness of justice, and the reputation of injustice.

b. 22. § 11. *τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα [οἱ μεγάλοι] ἀξιούσιν ἑαυτούς*] Bywater brackets *οἱ μεγάλοι*—rightly. It probably represents an interpolated *οἱ μεγάλοι*.

b. 25. § 12. *ἀξίωμα*] 'non est *sui aestimatio*, sed ipsa *dignitas*'—Michelet, rightly.

b. 26. § 13. *οὐ μὴν τόν γε μεγαλόψυχον*] *πρός* ought perhaps to be restored to the text before *τόν*. K^b omits *γε*.

b. 30. § 14. *τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη ἀρετῇ μέγα*] The virtues of the *μεγαλόψυχος* are exalted by his clear consciousness of their systematic unity. An error, which might escape the notice of the ordinarily virtuous man, cannot escape his notice, but is instantly seen in its bearing upon the whole of life. He has always the 'Representation of Law Universal' before his eyes. It must be admitted that the *μεγαλόψυχος* is not easily understood by us, and does not command our modern sympathy. The whole man is ideal; whereas we prefer to idealise one trait, leaving the rest of the character still human, and prone to error. We are tempted to apply to the faultless *μεγαλόψυχος* our saying—'Pride goes before a fall,' forgetting that *ex hypothesi* he cannot fall, as a god cannot die.

We, in modern times, are dominated by two great conceptions, to which Aristotle is a stranger—the conception of Social Progress, and that of Human Brotherhood. The *μεγαλόψυχος*, with 'all the virtues,' answers to the conception of a stationary social order. He lives in a glorious present which has no need of a future. But in the mind of the modern social reformer, new ideas appear,

as disturbing elements, among the old ideas which reflect actually 1123 b. 30. present conditions. These new ideas he must cherish, and give himself up to. He must be willing to correspond badly with the present, to incur odium, to make himself ridiculous—all for the sake of a future, which he may not, perhaps cannot, live to see. Here, evidently, there is no room for 'all the virtues.'

The other great conception of modern times—that of the Brotherhood of men, especially as it gives reality in our eyes to the misery that we see around us, is equally opposed to the Aristotelian ideal of 'all the virtues.' If these miserables are to be succoured, it must be by men who devote themselves to the work entirely, without thought of 'culture.'

§ 15. *παρασεῖσαντι*] here used absolutely as in *Probl.* v. 8. b. 31. 881 b. 6 *ὁ δὲ θάπτον θεῖ παρασεῖων ἢ μὴ παρασεῖων*: but the full construction has *χείρας*, cf. *περὶ πορείας ζῳῶν* 3. 705 a. 17 *καὶ οἱ θεοῦτες θάπτον θεοῦσι παρασεῖοντες τὰς χεῖρας*. The editors compare Theoph. *Char.* *περὶ ἀδολοσχίας*—*παρασεῖσαντα δὲ χρῆ τοὺς τοιοῦτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ διαράμενον* (*sc. τὰ σκέλη*—'with long steps,') *ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, ὅστις ἀπύρετος βούλεται εἶναι*.

ϕ' γ' οὐδὲν μέγα] The reading of Ob, CCC and K^b man. alt.; b. 32. Bekker omits the γ' wrongly: see Rassow, *Forsch.* 60.

§ 16. *κόσμος*] The beauty and order of the virtues which is the 1124 a. 1. object and work of Reason.

καλοκαγαθίας] This term does not seem to have the technical a. 4. meaning for Aristotle, which it afterwards bears in the *E. E.* (H. 15. 1248 b. 8 ff.) In the *E. E.* it is that *ἔξις* which enables a man to see the ultimate *σκοπός* or *ἔρος*—the Divine Nature. It is a kind of *amor intellectualis Dei*. Here, however, and in *E. N.* x. 9. 3 (the only other place where the word occurs in the *E. N.*) 'no special import is given to the word. It seems to imply a sort of elevated virtue.' (Grant.) To Aristotle as to Plato the *καλός τε καγαθός* is 'very much what we mean by a "gentleman."' (Grant.) The writer of the *M. M.* (ii. 9) describes the *καλός καὶ ἀγαθός* as the man for whom *all* things really good in life are good—*ἔστιν οὖν ὁ καλὸς καγαθός ϕ' τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς καλὰ καλὰ ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος γὰρ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός. ϕ' δὲ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ μὴ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ, οὐκ ἔστι καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ ὑγίαιεν ἂν δόξειεν ϕ' τὰ ἀπλῶς ὑγιεινὰ μὴ ὑγιεινὰ ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ ὁ πλοῦτος*

1124 a. 4. καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ παραγινόμενά τινα βλάπτειεν, οὐκ ἂν αἰρετὰ εἶη, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα αὐτὸν μὴ βλάψει, βουλήσεται αὐτῷ εἶναι. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷος ὑποσσελλόμενος τι τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἂν δόξειε καλὸς κἀγαθὸς εἶναι· ἀλλ' ὅ τὰγαθὰ πάντα ὄντα ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μὴ διασφθίρεται, οἷον ὑπὸ πλοῦτου καὶ ἀρχῆς, ὁ τοιοῦτος καλὸς κἀγαθός (M.M. 1207 b. 31—1208 a. 4). This description of the καλὸς κἀγαθός as the man in perfect correspondence with the most brilliant social circumstances—not obliged to ‘furl his sails’—to deny himself good because it hurts him, comes very near what was Aristotle’s thought when he wrote χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷον τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.

a. 7. § 17. ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς] equivalent to καλοκαγαθία as understood in the present context.

a. 17. § 18. ὡς μέγιστον ὄν] These words have caused difficulty to the editors; and Ramsauer proposes the omission of ὡς. Peters following the Par. translates—‘Seeing that not even honour affects him as if it were a very important thing.’ This interpretation is supported by the following ὃ δὴ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρὸν ἐστίν. Coraes, however, following Lambinus, interprets differently, taking ὡς not in the sense of ‘as if,’ but closely with the superlative μέγιστον—οὐδὲ περὶ τὴν τιμὴν, καίπερ ὄν ὡς μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οὕτως ἔξει ὥστε πέρα τοῦ μετρίου χაίρειν, τυγχάνων, ἢ λυπείσθαι, στερούμενος. I have no hesitation in accepting the Paraphrast’s interpretation—οὐ γὰρ μέγιστον ἠγήσεται τὴν τιμὴν καὶ οὕτω περὶ αὐτὴν ἔξει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν. It is true that τιμὴ is μέγιστον τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν (§ 10): but ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμὴ (§ 17).

a. 20. § 19. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν] The force of δοκεῖ must be observed here. Μεγαλοψυχία as popularly conceived is enhanced by prosperity: but true μεγαλοψυχία with its παντελής ἀρετὴ is independent of fortuitous aid.

The force of the passive verbs ἀξιοῦνται and τιμῶνται in this section and in § 20, as explained by Ramsauer, is also to be observed—
‘a. 21 ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς . . . a. 24 τιμῶνται . . . a. 25 τιμητέος . . .
a. 26 ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς: observandum genus passivum verborum. Prius igitur iste quidem de honoribus cogitare videtur qui sibi ab aliis offeruntur, ut deinde (vs. 27 ἑαυτοῦς ἀξιοῦσιν) et ipse audeat eosdem sibi vindicare. Id quod secus erat in vera virtute, quippe

qua ab initio ὁ ἀξίως ὢν αὐτὸς ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτὸν μεγάλων (1123 b. 2), non 1124 a. 20. egens ille testimonio aliorum.’

ἢ πλουτοῦντες] Rassow (*Forsch.* 60) rightly omits the article a. 22. before πλουτοῦντες, with K^b, M^b, Camb., and CCC. Οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες are together distinguished from οἱ εὐγενεῖς. The article before πλουτοῦντες would have been right, if καὶ instead of ἢ had been used.

τιμητός] Bekker reads τιμητέος. τιμητός is given by pr. K^b, M^b, a. 25. Asp. NC, B¹.

§ 20. ἀμφῷ] ὃ δὲ ἀμφῷ πρόσσεσι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθὰ μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς τοῦ τὴν ἀρετὴν μόνον ἔχοντος. Par.

§ 21. ὑπερόπται] Jebb (*Theophrastus* p. 186) compares the a. 29. ὑπερηφανία, or arrogance, of Theophrastus with the parody of μεγαλοψυχία described in this section. ‘Ο δὲ ὑπερήφανος says Theophrastus τοῦσδε τις οἷος . . . εὐ ποιήσας μεμνησθαι φάσκειν—‘he will profess to recollect benefits which he has conferred—i. e.,’ says Jebb (p. 187), ‘he will remind others in a patronizing manner that he has placed them under obligations; which may or may not be true, for the ambiguous φάσκειν, “to allege,” leaves it doubtful. This trait illustrates the difference between arrogance and Lofty-mindedness. It is characteristic of the Lofty-minded man, as Aristotle observes, to remember whom he has benefited. The arrogant man (who is a bad imitator of the Lofty-minded) does not only remember;—he proclaims that he remembers.’

καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται] οἱ has been received into the text by Bekker, Susemihl and Bywater, on the authority of K^b. It is given also by Camb.; but all other MSS., apparently, read καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. I feel considerable doubt about the reception of οἱ. Michelet’s defence of καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ seems to me to be a strong one. ‘K^b οἱ ante τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ addit, quam lectionem Cardwellus et Bekkerus in textum receperunt. Male. Καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ est causa, cur ii, qui virtute orbatī sunt, contemptores et contumeliosi fiant: utpote habentes etiam externa bona; ad γίνονται igitur supples subjectum e praecedentibus (οἱ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς). Addentibus οἱ, alterum καὶ rejiciendum esset.’ This καὶ is marked for omission by a later hand in CCC. If we suppose the original text to have been—ὑπερόπται

1124 a. 29. δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται (sc. οἱ ἀνευ ἀρετῆς), we may explain the words καὶ οἱ as fragments of an ancient blunder ὑβριστικάι with the final αι corrected οἱ above the line. But there is no strong objection, I think, to the retention of the καί. If it belonged to the original text, the blunder ὑβριστικάι would be almost inevitable: and the correction of the final αι into οἱ would follow as a matter of course.

The readings ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες κακά (Par. 1417, Ald., Coraes) γίνονται are worth noticing only as κακοὶ (Γ, Zell) showing that the clause is one which puzzled scribes.

b. 5. § 22. ὁ μὲν γάρ] Susemihl and Bywater read ὁ μὲν γάρ on the authority of K^b. The first hand in CCC likewise gives ὁ μὲν γάρ. So far as sense is concerned, I do not think that there is much to choose between this and Bekker's ὁ δέ.

b. 7. § 23. μικροκίνδυνος] This is the reading of K^b, Camb., CCC, and B¹. The other MSS. seem to agree in giving πυκροκίνδυνος. The Par. and Asp. also read πυκροκίνδυνος. It is difficult to decide between the two readings.

b. 9. πάντως] 'at all costs,' Peters.

§ 24.] Grant remarks that 'the principle of independence appears here in an extreme form.' But we must remember that Aristotle is putting on the stage for us his doctrine that the chief end of man is ἐνέργεια not πάθος: we must not criticise the 'character' in which this doctrine has been embodied, as if he were a person whom we might meet in real life. At the same time, it must be admitted that it is more difficult not to criticise the μεγαλόφρωνος in this way, than it is to appreciate correctly an abstractly presented ideal like that of Spinoza or Kant.

b. 11. οὕτω γάρ οἱ προσοφλήσει] Bywater introduces οἱ, given by K^b, CCC, and Camb. I feel very doubtful about it in Aristotle.

b. 13. § 25. ὦν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὗ] This is true in tendency of us all—as Menander says (Meineke iv. 345)—

ἐπιλανθάνονται πάντες οἱ παθόντες ἐδ.

Münscher's insertion of ὑφ' before ὦν is a tempting but perhaps not strictly necessary emendation. Bywater reads οὗ for the οὖς of the codd. after μνημονεύειν: and ἀκούειν for ἀκούει.

Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διῷ] In general terms she does 1124 b. 15. (Π. i. 503-4 ἔποτε δὴ σε μετ' ἀθανάτουσιν ὄησα, ἢ ἔπει ἢ ἔργῳ), as Coraes points out: λείπεται οὖν, he adds, μνημονικὸν ἀμάρτημα ὑπολαμβάνειν τοῦ φιλοσόφου τὸ προκείμενον.

Λάκωνες] This again, Coraes remarks, is perhaps a μνημονικὸν b. 16. ἀμάρτημα—that is, if the reference is to the circumstance narrated by Xenophon (*Hellen.* vi. 5. 33, 34) of Spartan envoys (together with envoys from Corinth and Phlius) coming to Athens to ask for aid against the Thebans, b. c. 369; for, in Xenophon's summary of the Spartan speeches, the services rendered to Athens by Sparta are very prominent (see Grote's *Greece* part ii. ch. 78. vol. vii. 205). As for the historian Callisthenes, referred to by the Ald. Schol. *ad loc.*, we cannot be sure that the Schol. reports him correctly. At any rate the close verbal agreement with Aristotle's present statement is suspicious. The words of the Schol. are—τὸ δὲ περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων τοιοῦτον ἱστορεῖ Καλλισθένης ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, ὅτι Θεβαίων εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν εἰσβαλλόντων, ἔπεμψαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους συμμαχίας δεόμενοι, λέγοντες ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅσα μὲν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πεποιθήσαν ἐδ ταύτων ἐπελάθοντο ἔκόντες, ἀ δ' αὐτοὶ χρηστὰ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐπεπόνθεσαν ταύτων ἐμέμνητο, ὡς διὰ ταύτων αὐτοὺς ἐπαξόμενοι πρὸς τὴν συμμαχίαν μᾶλλον.

§ 26. ἐπ' ἐκείνοις] Susemihl and Bywater accept ἐπ' ἐκείνοις b. 21. the reading of K^b, O^b, CCC, and Camb. In the next line the MSS. seem all to agree in reading ἐν. I much prefer ἐν ἐκείνοις.

§ 28. καὶ ἀμελεῖν] restored by Bywater from K^b. I prefer the b. 27. μέλει of the other MSS., and would close the parenthesis with φοβουμένου.

παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἀλθευτικὸς] b. 29. This is Bywater's reading for παρ. γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν διὰ καὶ ἀλ., which Bekker, and originally Susemihl, accepted on the sole authority of γρ. Par. 1856. There is no passage in the *E. N.* where the MSS. exhibit such variety (see Susemihl's *E. N. app. crit.* and especially his *E. E.* Appendix ii, where he abandons Bekker's reading). As the meaning given is in all cases practically the same, I think that we cannot do better than accept Bywater's

1124 b. 29. choice—without assuming that it is exactly what Aristotle wrote.

b. 30. ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν] See below chapter 7. Bywater brackets εἰρωνεία δέ which all MSS. give after εἰρωνείαν, except N^b, which gives εἰρωνά δέ, accepted by Bekker. Susemihl's suggestion—εἰρων δέ is worth consideration I think. Perhaps εἰρων γάρ.

b. 31. § 29. πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἄλλ' ἢ φίλον] 'He cannot fashion his life to suit another, except he be a friend' (Peters), i. e. he cannot make himself *relative to* (πρὸς τι) any one who is less than his ἕτερος α ὁ τός. See ix. 9. 10 ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν.

1125 a. 8. § 31. εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν] Coraes is undoubtedly wrong with εἰ μὴ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ὕβρισθῆν. Peters has 'except with the express purpose of giving offence.' I much prefer Jebb's 'unless it be to show his scorn' (*Theoph.* p. 35).

a. 15. § 34. σύντονος] 'excited,' Peters.

Zell refers to the *Physiognomonica*, where the bodily characteristics attending the various virtues and vices are described. Although the characteristics of the μεγαλόψυχος are not described, those of the μικρόψυχος are in ch. 3. 808 a. 29 μικροψύχου σημεῖα μικρομελής, μικρογάφυρος ('small and round,' *Liddell and Scott*) ἰσχυρός, μικρόματος καὶ μικροπρόσωπος, οἷος ἂν εἴη Κορίνθιος ἢ Λευκάδιος. The characteristics of the κόσμιος, however, answer partly to those assigned here to the μεγαλόψυχος—κοσμίου σημεῖα ἐν ταῖς κινήσει βραδύς, καὶ διάλεκτος βραδεία καὶ φωνὴ πνευματώδης καὶ ἀσμενής κ.τ.λ. 807 b. 33. Zell and Coraes refer also to *de Gen. An.* v. 7. 786 b. 35 δοκεῖ γενναιοτέρας εἶναι φύσεως ἢ βαρυφωνία καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι τὸ βαρὺ τῶν συντόνων βέλτιον τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον ἐν ὑπεροχῇ, ἢ δὲ βαρύτης ὑπεροχῆ τις.

a. 18. § 35. οὐδ' οὗτοι] no more than the ἕξεις of μικροπρέπεια and βαναυσία are κακία in the strict sense. See above ch. 2, § 22.

a. 21. καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτὸν] Coraes in defending this infinitive against the v. l. ἀγνοεῖ, makes it depend on εἶκε. Grant and Peters however make its construction the same as that of ἀξιοῦν. In any case, the particles καί—δέ (see Eucken *de partic. usu* p. 32) introduce

words—ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν—which explain wherein the inferiority of the 1125 a. 21. μικρόψυχος really consists.

§ 36. χαῦνοι] Jebb (*Theoph.* p. 198) compares the μικροφιλότιμος a. 27. of Theophrastus with the χαῦνος, remarking that 'the μικροφιλότιμος does not necessarily, like the χαῦνος, overrate *himself*; he only overrates those things on which he founds his claim to honour.' 'The man of Petty ambition (μικροφιλότιμος),' says Theophrastus (Jebb's translation, p. 99), 'is one who when asked to dinner will be anxious to be placed near the host at table . . . In the Market Place he will frequent the bankers' tables; in the gymnasium he will haunt those places where the young men take exercise; in the theatre when there is a representation he will sit near the Generals . . . Also he is very much the person to keep a monkey; to get a Satyr ape, Sicilian doves, deer-horn dice, Thurian vases of the approved rotundity, walking-sticks with the true Laconian curve, and a curtain with Persians embroidered on it . . . When he has sacrificed an ox he will nail up the skin of the forehead wreathed with large garlands opposite the entrance, in order that those who come in may see that he has sacrificed an ox. When he has been taking part in a procession of the knights, he will give the rest of his accoutrements to his slave to carry home; but after putting on his cloak, will walk about the market-place in his spurs.' The χαῦνος as such does not occur among the portraits of Theophrastus.

οὐ γὰρ ἀξιοὶ ὄντες] Bywater follows K^b (and CCC) in reading οὐ. a. 28. Bekker, following all other MSS., reads ὡς. Cf. ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες two lines above, I suspect that an original ὡς fell out after ἐπιφανῶς, and a corrector, seeing something amiss, inserted οὐ in the archetype of K^b.

σχήματα] 'outward show,' Jebb (*Theoph.* p. 198).

a. 30.

περὶ αὐτῶν] περὶ αὐτῶν is Bekker's reading: but περὶ αὐτῶν (*sc.* a. 32. περὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων) gives much better sense, and is defended by Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 60. Cf. the Par. πειράται φανερά ποιεῖν αἰεὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα ἑαυτοῦ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν αἰεὶ λέγει.

§ 37.] Μικροψυχία is worse than χαυνότης, and more common: it is accordingly the real contrary of μεγαλοψυχία. 'Want of

1125 a. 2. elevated aims,' says Grant *ad loc.*, 'want of effort of will, of individuality, these are indeed fatal deficiencies as regards the attainment of what is fine and noble in character.' *Μικροψυχία*, like *ἀνελευθερία*, is the characteristic of a weak and narrow nature, of which nothing can be made. *Χαυνότης*, like *ἀσωτία*, may perhaps disappear as age and experience indicate to a man his true level. Not that the *χαῦνος* will thus become *μεγαλόψυχος*. *Μεγαλόψυχία* requires such high and singular endowments that a man cannot become *μεγαλόψυχος* by the simple process of moderating youthful *χαυνότης*, as it is suggested (iv. τ. 31) he may become *ελευθέριος* by the decay of his *ἀσωτία*. *Μεγαλόψυχος nascitur non fit*. A man with the speculative endowment of the *μεγαλόψυχος* can never have been really vain, even in the years of youthful inexperience. But if we descend to a lower intellectual and moral level, we may see the vain youth becoming a man who thinks well of himself, but not too well, and is able and ready to play his part in life with spirit. The *μικρόψυχος*, however, has not the *amour propre*, and personal force, necessary for the struggle which results in fine social types: he becomes worse, as time goes on, and he falls further and further out of the running. It must be observed, however, that *μικροψυχία* may imply either a general feebleness of character—in which sense it is indeed a hopeless state; or mere backwardness (*ὀκητροί* § 35) in the social struggle, which is not inconsistent with latent strength. It is also to be observed that *μικροψυχία* of this latter kind, *i.e.* mere social backwardness, would be a greater hindrance to the attainment of 'excellence,' as Aristotle understood 'excellence,' *i.e.* the possession of 'all the virtues' which put a man *en évidence* in a brilliant society, than it is to that self-denying devotion to the public good which is now recognised as the chief element in Virtue.

Μεγαλοψυχία is discussed in *E.E.* iii. 5 (in an inferior manner) and in *M.M.* i. 25.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

There is an ἀνόνημος ἀρετή (we may perhaps call it Proper Ambition), the mean between φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία, which stands to μεγαλοψυχία in respect of τιμή as ελευθεριότης stands to μεγαλοπρέπεια in respect of δαπάνη. Ἐλευθεριότης is concerned with comparatively small δαπανήματα, the anonymous mean between φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία, with the honours which are within the reach of the ordinary citizen—honours which a man cannot take his proper share in social life without aspiring to.

Introductory Note.] The comparison of the *ελευθέριος* and the *μεγαλοπρεπής* brought out more than a quantitative difference, or difference in the amounts expended. The *μεγαλοπρεπής*, we saw, is an artist, and his performances differ qualitatively from those of the *ελευθέριος*. Much more striking is the qualitative difference between the respective objects of the *μεγαλόψυχος* and the *ἀνόνημος* of this chapter. The statement that the *μεγαλόψυχος* is concerned with *μεγάλη τιμή* and the *ἀνόνημος* with *μικρά τιμή* (ii. 7. 8) takes us only a short way. It is a different *kind* of *τιμή* with which each is concerned. The *τιμή* which the *μεγαλόψυχος* accepts is but 'the guinea stamp,' which symbolises his intrinsic worth. His object is, not this *τιμή*, but the personality—the *εὐδαιμονία* to which it is rendered. But the *ἀνόνημος* of this chapter seeks another kind of *τιμή*—ordinary social recognition; not, indeed, that he may enjoy it selfishly, but that he may be better able to influence society for good, just as the *ελευθέριος* seeks to have money that he may be liberal with it. Neither he, nor the *ελευθέριος*, as such, has that sense of Form, which enables the *μεγαλοπρεπής* to make an artistic use of wealth, and in the *μεγαλόψυχος* appears as *scientia intuitiva*—the intuition of Life as a Whole. It is therefore somewhat misleading to coordinate *μεγαλοψυχία* and the virtue of this chapter, as Aristotle does here, and the writer of ii. 7. 8 does, describing the former simply as *περὶ τιμῆν ὅσα μεγάλην*, and the latter as *περὶ μικρὰν ὅσα*. The virtue of this chapter is the quality of the 'successful man,' who makes a career for himself,

but in a public-spirited way: μεγαλοψυχία is Goethe's Im Ganzen Guten Wahren resolut zu leben; or Spinoza's *Amor intellectualis Dei*, or the καλοκάγαθία of Eudemos.

1125 b. 1. § 1. καὶ περὶ ταύτην] Ramsauer reads τιμὴν for ταύτην, because ταύτην relates not to τιμὴν but to τιμὴν μεγάλην, and brackets the clause ἡ μὲν οὖν . . . εἴρηται, (ch. 3, § 38), because μεγαλοψυχία has not been described in this Book as περὶ μεγάλην τιμὴν, although in ii. 7. 8 it is so described. If ii. 7 is genuine—and Ramsauer seems to accept it as such—I cannot see why Aristotle should not be allowed to refer to it here in ὡσπερ εἴρηται, and καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη. Of course if we accept the view of Monro (*Journal of Philology* vi. 185 sqq.), and reject ii. 7. 8 as an interpolation, the case is different. If we could read μικράν for ταύτην Ramsauer's grammatical difficulty would be removed, and the presence of the clause containing μεγάλην perhaps made more acceptable. It is to be noted that this chapter adds scarcely anything new to the sketch (itself comparatively full) in ii. 7. 8, 9: it is also to be noted that its subject is not treated of, either in the *E. E.* or in the *M. M.* It is perhaps allowable to suspect that this chapter was inserted here after the whole Book was written: and that there is some connexion between its late insertion, and the comparative fulness of the summary in ii. 7. 8, with which, moreover, it stands in close verbal relationship. I have no theory to put forward: but my suspicions make me inclined to accept as genuine the clause (a. 34, 35) bracketed by Ramsauer, as well as the clauses καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη (§ 1) and ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπομεν (§ 4) bracketed by Monro (*l. c.*). Grant's note on καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις points, I believe, in the right direction. 'Cf. *Eth.* ii. 7. 8. This expression might seem to suggest that the present passage was written after an interval; it is repeated in § 4.'

b. 9. § 3. καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ] Ramsauer refers to the μικροφιλοτιμία of Theophrastus defined (*Char. μικροφ.*) as ὄρεξις τιμῆς ἀνελεύθερος.

b. 14. § 4. πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτιοῦτου λεγομένου] When we say that a man is 'fond of,' we may mean that he is 'too fond of,' or 'laudably fond of.' In some connexions the prefix φιλο- is unambiguously meant in a good sense—*e. g.* in the term φιλομαθής—

or in a bad sense—*e. g.* in the term φίλοιμος: but in other connexions it is doubtful in which sense it is meant—*e. g.* in the term φιλότιμος. Bywater's τὸ φιλότιμον for the τὸν φ. of the codd. in line 15 is a distinct improvement.

ἐπαινούντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μάλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί] The many are regarded as being deficient in ambition and its kindred public-spirit. They are devoted too much to κέρδος or material interests: see *Pol.* ii. 4. 1266 b. 38 εἴ τι στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητά τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τοῦναντίον δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον, οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀνισον, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἴσαι.

ἐρήμης] The allusion is doubtless to the ἐρήμη δίκη or action in which one party does not appear and judgment goes against him by default. Its own special name 'does not appear' to defend the mean against the claims of the extremes.

§ 5. ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ] restored by Sus. and Byw. for Bekker's ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ ὡς δεῖ. The inference marked by δὴ is required. ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ is given by NC, B², and CCC: and Cambr. has ἔστι δὴ ἢ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.

§ 6. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' κ.τ.λ.] even in the ordinary case of the virtue having a name: thus ὁ ἀνδρείος πρὸς τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, ii. 8.².

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

The adjective πρᾶος, which we apply to 'the good-tempered man' who occupies the mean position between the man 'who shows excessive or ill-directed anger,' and the man 'who cannot be provoked to anger,' is not strictly appropriate, connoting, as it does, a reprehensible 'mildness' or 'insensibility': however it may be taken, in the absence of a better term, to describe the man who occupies the mean, for after all he bears more resemblance to the 'mild' than to the 'ill-tempered' man. Of 'ill-tempered' men there are several varieties—the ὀργίλος, ἀκρόχολος, πικρός, and χαλεπός. On the other side, the 'mild character' may go the length of being ἀνδραποδώδης (§ 6), or may shade into the mean state. The abstract noun πραΰτης, it would seem, is available for the μέση ἕξις, but the adjective πρᾶος has associations which make it somewhat inapplicable to the man who is μέσος.

Introductory Note.] The close connexion between ἀνδρεία and θυμός or ὀργή (see iii. 8. 12) naturally suggests a different place on the list for πραΐτης. The writers of the *E.E.* and *M.M.*, as we have seen, place it after σωφροσύνη: but perhaps Aristotle is after all justified in placing it where he does, inasmuch as it 'inclines towards the defect' (§ 1) and so involves συγγνώμη (§ 4)—sympathy or fellow-feeling—a principle of conduct which exists only for the πολιτικὸν ζῶον.

1125 b. 28. § 1. ἀνόνημον οὖσαν] The ἔλλειψις has no name: it is however described below in § 5 as ἀοργησία τις. The writer of ii. 7. 10 (whether Aristotle, or another) is scarcely more definite. The ἔξεις he finds without names; but he gives them names σαφηνείας ἕνεκα. Thus he says τὴν μεσότητα πραΐτητα καλέσωμεν, and ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία ἔστω.

b. 30. § 2. τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ] and so various kinds of ὀργιλότης may be distinguished.

b. 33. § 3. βούλεται κ.τ.λ.] 'being πρᾶος means being ἀτάραχος etc.'

1126 a. 2. § 4. οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικός] i.e. where the τιμωρία would be justified.

a. 7. § 6. οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός] Here Aristotle seems to touch upon the 'final cause of anger,' which Grant tells us is not included in the present enquiry.

a. 8. § 7. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολή κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται . . . οὐ μὴν ἅπαντ' αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει] This distinction will not apply in the case of the ἔλλειψις, which shows itself κατὰ πάντα, and in the same man.

a. 13. § 8. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται] The ὀργίλος here is 'the quick-tempered man,' the term being used in a specific sense, whereas in § 2 the ὑπερβολή as a genus is called ὀργιλότης τις, and in ii. 7. 10 the terms ὀργίλος and ὀργιλότης are used in the generic sense.

a. 17. ἀνταποδιδόασιν ἢ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν δξύτητα] Coraë describes ἢ φανεροί εἰσι as χωρίων ἕποπον. A later hand in CCC inserts καὶ after ἢ. If the text is sound, we must suppose ἢ φανεροί εἰσι to qualify ἀνταποδιδόασιν adverbially and to stand for φανερώς.

a. 23. § 10. τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν] see *de Part. An.* iii. 11. 673 b. 7, where

τὸ κοῖφον is opposed to τῷ ποιῶντι βάρος, that which is indigestible. 1126 a. 23. The πικρός has as it were a load of indigestible anger in him—ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέσαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ.

§ 11. χαλεπούς] How does the χαλεπός differ from the πικρός? a. 26. Both keep up their angry feelings; but it does not appear that the χαλεπός, like the πικρός, conceals his displeasure. The writing however is very careless; for in the next § the whole genus of οἱ ὑπερβάλλοντες περὶ ὀργάς seems to be covered by οἱ χαλεποί. In *E.E.* iii. 3. 1231 b. 25 we find—ὁ πρᾶος μέσος τοῦ χαλεποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους.

§ 13. οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον κ.τ.λ.] The passage beginning here and a. 32. extending to the end of § 14—ἀνθεκτέον, occurs almost in the same words in ii. 9. §§ 7, 8 and 9. See Rassow's *Forsch.* p. 16. Rassow thinks that the proper locus of the passage is in the Second Book.

ἀνδράδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν] as opposed to ἀνδραποδάδεις § 6, b. 1. Ramsauer notes.

ὁ δὲ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥᾶδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦ- b. 2. ραι] The same construction occurs in the twin-passage ii. 9. 8 ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτός οὐ ῥᾶδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίζαι. For the usage of ἀποδοῦναι (here = ἀφορίζαι) see note on ii. 1. 8. Grant translates here—'to lay down in the abstract.'

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα κἀν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις] see note on b. 3. ii. 9. 8. The codd. seem all to have καὶ τῇ αἰσθ., but I believe that Ramsauer (followed by Byw.) is right in inserting ἐν before τῇ αἰσθήσει. I would suggest further that a comma be placed after ἕκαστα, so as to give the meaning which we have in ii. 9. 8 τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις where the ἐν before τῇ αἰσθήσει means 'rests with,' 'depends on'; while that before τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα means simply 'in' or 'among.' This is plainly the meaning required in iv. 5. 13 also. The κρίσις is not ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα in the sense of 'resting with them,' as it is ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει: but if we follow the codd., we are, I think, obliged to give the preposition, as expressed before τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, the sense which it is about to bear as understood before τῇ αἰσθήσει—viz. the sense of 'rests with.'

1120 b. 4. § 14.] By the frequently employed terms *ἐπαινετόν* and *ψεκτόν*, Aristotle indicates, with sufficient clearness, the moral standard which he recognises. The praise or blame of social equals is given, according as we conform to, or transgress, the prevailing νόμος of the society in which we live. The prevailing νόμος of a society which flourishes cannot be bad: it must embody much of the φυσικὸν δίκαιον. Actions are good or bad, according as they fall in with, or conflict with, an existing system of Greek Life, assumed to be good as a system, and final as a system, although capable of improvement in details. Any radical improvement of the existing system was inconceivable to Aristotle.

Ἠραδότης is described (*third* on the list) in *E. E.* iii. 3 and *M. M.* i. 22.

CHAPTER VI.

Argument and Introductory Note.] The ἀρεταί described in this chapter, and in the two following chapters, concern 'one's deportment in society' (Grant). That they do not stand on the same level of moral importance as the ἀρεταί hitherto discussed is recognised by the writer of the *E. E.* when he styles them παθητικά μεσότητες—ἐπαινεταί, but not ἀρεταί: ἀνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ (*E. E.* iii. 7. 1234 a. 24), and by the writer of the *M. M.* when he says (i. 32. 1193 a. 35) εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὐταὶ ἀρεταὶ ἢ μὴ ἀρεταί, ἄλλος ἂν εἴη λόγος.

This chapter is concerned with the general subject of 'agreeable manners.' The man with agreeable manners has a certain sympathy (to be distinguished from the affection of Friendship) with those whom he meets in society, which causes him to 'get on well' with them. This, however, he does without sacrificing his personal dignity. He makes himself pleasant in society, without over-complaisancy or flattery. Nor is it only by a sense of his own personal dignity that he is guided in the manifestation of his sympathy: but also by the desire of keeping up a high standard of manners and conduct in other people; for he will not make himself pleasant, when by doing so, he would encourage something decidedly objectionable. He occupies the mean position between

the over complaisant man, and the man with disagreeable manners, who does not 'get on well' with people.

Chapter 7 treats of another element in 'one's deportment in society'—the straightforward unaffected presentation of oneself as one really is—opposed to swagger and self-exaltation on the one side, and self-depreciation on the other.

Chapter 8 treats of the third element in 'one's deportment in society'—conversational brilliancy.

In ii. 7. 11 the three ἀρεταί of social deportment are given in a different order (ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπελία, φιλία) determined by a division of τὸ περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν into τὸ περὶ τὰληθές and τὸ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ, and a subdivision of the latter into τὸ ἐν παιδιᾷ and τὸ ἐν πῦσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον.

It is to be observed, however, that the same order as that of ii. 7. 11 is suggested in iv. 8. 12, where Aristotle sums up his account of the ἀρεταί of social deportment—τρεις οὖν αἱ εἰρημένα ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀληθείαν ἐστίν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.

Aristotle's scheme in iv. 6 is—

δύσκολος or δύσερις—ἀνώνυμος—ἄρεσκος and κολαξ.

In ii. 7. 13 the ἀνώνυμος is called φίλος, and his ζῆσι, φιλία.

In the *E. E.*, however, we have a distinction drawn between φιλία and σεμνότης thus—

ἔχθρα—φιλία—κολακεία
αἰθάδεια—σεμνότης—ἀρέσκεια.

See *E. E.* iii. 7. 1233 b. 29 φιλία δὲ μεσότης ἔχθρας καὶ κολακείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐχερῶς ἅπαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμιλῶν κολαξ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἀπάσας ἀντικρούων ἀπεχθητικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ πρὸς ἅσπασαν ἡδονὴν μίτ' ἀκολουθῶν μίτ' ἀντιτείνων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον βέλτιστον, φίλος. σεμνότης δὲ μεσότης αἰθαδέας καὶ ἀρεσκείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἕτερον ζῶν ἀλλὰ καταφρονητικὸς αἰθαδέης, ὁ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ πάντων ἐλάττων ἄρεσκος, ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους οὕτως ἔχων σεμνός.

The writer of the *M. M.* (i. 28 and 31), making the same distinction, explains it thus—σεμνότης is the μεσότης περὶ τὰς ἐντεύξεις: φιλία, περὶ πράξεις καὶ λόγους. The αἰθαδέης is described (*M. M.* i. 28. 1192 b. 31) as οἷος μηθεὶ ἐντυχεῖν μηδὲ διαλεγῆναι: the ἄρεσκος as οἷος πᾶσιν ὁμιλεῖν καὶ πάντως καὶ πανταχῆ: the σεμνός as οὐκ εἰς

πάντας ἀλλ' εἰς τοὺς ἀξίους. Under the name of *σεμνός*, then, the *ἀνώμνος* of Aristotle's scheme is regarded as *one who knows how to maintain his personal dignity*. Under the name of *φίλος* (*M. M.* i. 31) the same man is regarded as *one who gets on well with people*. The *ἀπεχθητικός*, however, and the *αὐθάδης* are different men, the former being aggressively rude, the latter only surly when approached: so also the *κόλαξ* and *ἄρεσκος* are different men, the former having an object to gain by his flattery, the latter being overcomplaisant without ulterior object.

1126 b. 10. § 4.] In ii. 7. 13, as noted above, the *μέσος* is simply called *φίλος*, and his virtue *φιλία* (so also in *E. E.* and *M. M.*). Here, however, 'the man with agreeable manners' is said to resemble the *ἐπιεικής φίλος*, but to differ in being *ἄνευ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὀμιλεῖ*.

b. 23. § 5. οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι] 'for it is not from any feeling of friendship or of enmity that he permits this [or objects to that]—always with perfect propriety—but because he is the well-mannered man we are describing (τοιοῦτος).' The logical balance of the sentence requires ἢ *δυσχεραίνει* after *δεῖ*, b. 24, answering to *ἐχθαίρειν* as *ἀποδέχεται* does to *φιλεῖν*. The Paraphrast sees this: his words are—*οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ στέργειν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα, ἢ ψέγει κ.τ.λ.*

1127 a. 7. § 9. τοῦ δὲ συνηθύνοντος ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δὲ] Cf. iii. i. 13 τοῦ δὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δέ.

a. 8. ἄρεσκος] See Theophrastus (*Char. περὶ ἀρεσκείας*), who defines *ἀρέσκεια* as *ἔντευξις οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ ἠδονῆς παρασκευαστική*. 'Complaisance,' he says (Jebb's Transl. p. 85), 'may be defined as a mode of address calculated to give pleasure, but not with the best tendency. The complaisant man is very much the kind of person who will hail one afar off with "my dear fellow"; and after a large display of respect, seize and hold one by both hands. He will attend you a little way, and ask *when* he is to see you, and will take his leave with a compliment on his lips. Also when he is called in to an arbitration he will seek to please not only his principal, but the adversary as well, in order that he may be deemed impartial. He will say too that foreigners speak more justly than his fellow-citizens.'

In a note on the character of *ἀρέσκεια* Jebb remarks (p. 181)—

'The Flatterer, according to Aristotle, flatters for money or what 1127 a. e. money buys; the Complaisant man "aims at being pleasant with no further object" (*μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι*). This is a fault (1) because to combat the wishes of others is sometimes a duty to them and to oneself: thus Aristotle's Perfectly-behaved man is one who will occasionally "make difficulties" (*δυσχεραίνει*) for either reason or both. (2) Because the primary object of the Complaisant man is, not that others may be pleased, but that he may be pleasant. He desires popularity, either from mere vanity or for the sake of influence. When, therefore, he is said to aim at being pleasant "without further object" this does not exclude a selfish object. To be thought pleasant is itself the object which he most covets. He is unmercenary, as contrasted with the Flatterer; but he is not disinterested.' Jebb goes on to notice two salient points of difference between the *κόλαξ* and the *ἄρεσκος* as portrayed by Theophrastus: (1) The *κόλαξ* treats his patron as a superior; the *ἄρεσκος* treats his associate as an equal for whom he has a warm regard. (2) The *κόλαξ* attaches himself to one patron; the *ἄρεσκος* desires to be on cordial terms with as many persons as possible.

κόλαξ] *Κολακεία* is defined by Theophrastus as *ὀμιλίαν αἰσχροῦν* a. 10. *συμφέρουσαν δὲ τῷ κολακεύοντι*. 'The Flatterer,' he says (Jebb's Translation p. 81), 'is a person who will say as he walks with another, "Do you observe how people are looking at you? This happens to no man in Athens but you. A compliment was paid to you yesterday in the Porch. More than thirty persons were sitting there: the question was started, who is our foremost man? Every one mentioned you first, and ended by coming back to your name." With these and like words, he will remove a morsel of wool from his patron's coat; or if a speck of chaff has been laid on the other's hair by the wind, he will pick it off: adding with a laugh, "Do you see? because I have not met you for two days, you have had your beard full of white hairs; although no one has darker hair for his years than you." Then he will request the company to be silent while the great man is speaking, and will praise him too in his hearing, and mark his approbation at a pause with "True"; or he will laugh at a frigid joke, and stuff his cloak into his mouth as if he could not repress his amusement.' In his note on this character, Jebb remarks (p. 178)—'The notion conveyed by the term *κολακεία* is not precisely what we usually mean by

1127 a. 10. 'flattery,' but something coarser. It meant a sort of extravagant toadyism practised not as a fine art, but simply as an industry—as a recognised method of obtaining a livelihood. This tone is unconsciously illustrated by Athenaeus, when in his reminiscences of eminent Flatterers (vi. pp. 248–260) he speaks of "Cheirisophus the Flatterer of Dionysius," "Callicrates the Flatterer of Ptolemy," "Anaxarchus one of the flatterers of Alexander." These men had, as it were, been preferred to permanent posts.

Athenaeus (vi. 80, 261) quotes lines of the comic poet Anaxandrides in which *κολακεία* is presented as a sort of *τέχνη* or trade—*τῇ δ' ἀλαζονείᾳ μετὰ τὴν κολακείαν χώραν δίδωσιν Ἀναξανδρίδης ὁ κωμωδιοποιὸς ἐν Φαρμακομάντει, λέγων οὕτως*

ὅτι εἴμ' ἀλαζών, ταῦτ' ἐπιτιμᾶς; ἀλλὰ τί;
νικῶ γὰρ αὕτη τὰς τέχνας πάσας πολὺ,
μετὰ τὴν κολακείαν ἦδε μὲν γὰρ διαφέρει.

Again (vi. 73, 258) Athenaeus quotes Antiphanes to the same effect—*Ἀντιφάνης δ' ἐν Δημνίαις τέχνην τινὰ ὑποτίθεται τὴν κολακείαν εἶναι, ἐν οἷς λέγει*

εἶτ' ἔστιν ἢ γένοιτ' ἂν ἠδίων τέχνη,
ἢ πρόσθοδος ἄλλη, τοῦ κολακεύειν εὐφροῦς,
ὁ ζωγράφος πονεῖ τι καὶ πικραίνεται,
ὁ γεωργὸς ἐν ὄσοις ἐστὶ κινδύνους πάλιν·
πρόσεστι πᾶσιν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ πόνος·
ἡμῖν δὲ μετὰ γέλωτος ὁ βίος καὶ τρυφῆς·
οὐ γὰρ τὸ μέγιστον ἔργον ἐστὶ παιδιά,
ἄδρον γελάσαι, σκῶψαί τιν', ἐκπιεῖν πολύν,
οὐκ ἠδύ; ἐμοὶ μὲν μετὰ τὸ πλουτεῖν δεύτερον.

Plutarch (*de adulatore et amico* ch. 7) describes the *κόλαξ* in the following terms—*ὁ δὲ κόλαξ ἄτε δὴ μίαν ἐστίαν ἦθους οὐκ ἔχων μόνιμον, οὐδὲ ἐαυτῷ βίον ζητῶν αἰρετόν, ἀλλ' ἐτέρῳ καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον πλάττων καὶ προσαρμόζων ἐαυτόν, οὐκ ἀπλοῦς οὐδὲ εἷς, ἀλλὰ παντοδαπὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ποικίλος, εἰς ἄλλον ἐκ ἄλλου τύπον, ὡσπερ τὸ μεταιρόμενον ὕδωρ, περιρρέων αἰεὶ καὶ μετασχηματιζόμενον τοῖς ὑποδεχομένοις.* Alcibiades is adduced as the great *κόλαξ*, who changed his manners with his place, living elegantly at Athens, and austere at Sparta; fighting and drinking in Thrace, and giving himself up to oriental luxury in Asia. In his treatise *de Amicorum multitudine* ch. 9, Plutarch again employs the expression *ἴδιαν ἦθους ἐστίαν οὐκ ἔχοντος*, applying it to the man who is *μετάβολος καὶ παντοδαπός*, without the special

implication of *κολακεία*. The treatise *de adulatore et amico* contains 1127 a. 10. the philosophy of *κολακεία* (which it presents as a phase of 'heteronomy'), and throws considerable light on the peripatetic theory of *αὐτάρκεια*¹.

δύσκολος] Eudemus and the writer of the *M. M.*, as we have seen, oppose the *αὐθάδης* to the *ἄρεσκος* and the *ἀπεχθητικός* to the *κόλαξ*.

The *αὐθάδης* is the man who 'pleases himself.' As Jebb (*Theoph.* p. 184) remarks, he 'acts chiefly from a desire to be left alone . . . he repels advances, but he does not take liberties.' He is described by Theophrastus (*αὐθάδεια*) in the following terms—'The surly man is one who when asked where so-and-so is, will say, "Don't bother me"; or when spoken to will not reply . . . He cannot forgive a person who has besmirched him by accident, or pushed him, or trodden upon his foot . . . when he stumbles in the street he is apt to swear at the stone. He will not endure to wait long for anyone; nor will he consent to sing, or to recite, or to dance. He is apt also not to pray to the gods.' (Jebb's Transl. p. 87.)

In illustration of the Eudemian terminology, according to which *αὐθάδεια* is one of the extremes where *σεμνότης* is the mean, see the lines of Eubulus preserved by Athenaeus (vi. 76, 260)—

ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς σεμνοῖς μὲν αὐθαδέστερος,
καὶ τοῖς κόλαξι πᾶσι τοῖς σκόπτουσί τε
ἑαυτὸν εὐόργητος.

The dangerous proximity of *ἀρέσκεια* to *κολακεία* is implied in the following line of Anaxandrides (apud Ath. vi. 66, 255)—

τὸ γὰρ κολακεύειν νῦν ἀρέσκειν ὄνομ' ἔχει.

¹ Clearchus of Soli (Aristotle's pupil) is quoted by Athen. vi. 66, 255 as follows:—*κόλαξ μὲν οὐδεὶς διαρκεῖ πρὸς φίλιαν καταναλίσκεν γὰρ ὁ χρόνος τὸ τοῦ προσποιήματος αὐτῶν ψεῦδος· ὁ δ' ἐραστὴς κόλαξ ἐστὶ φίλιος δι' ἑρᾶν ἢ κάλλος.* In another fragment, preserved by Athenaeus (vi. 67, 255), Clearchus says—*τὴν κολακείαν ταπεινὰ ποιεῖν τὰ ἦθη τῶν κολάκων, καταφρονητικῶν ὄντων τῶν περὶ αὐτούς. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ πᾶν ὑπομένειν εἰδόμενα οἷα τολμῶσι. τὰ δὲ τῶν κολακευομένων ἐμφυσιωμένων τῇ κολακείᾳ, χαίνους καὶ κενούς ποιοῦντα, πάντων ἐν ἵπεροχῇ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι κατασκευάζεσθαι.* On Clearchus see Bernays, *Theophrastus über Frömmigkeit*, p. 110.

CHAPTER VII.

Argument and Introductory Note.] The ἀθηναϊκός, who realises the mean between ἀλαζονεία and εἰρωνεία, is straightforward in conversation and demeanour, where no important interests are involved. Of course he will be truthful where they are; but this kind of truthfulness belongs properly to the virtue of justice (§§ 7, 8). Here we are concerned merely with the habit of presenting oneself in society as one really is, neither better nor worse.

The ἀλαζών—the Boaster or ‘Swaggerer’ (see Jebb’s *Theoph.* p. 193) is of three kinds, according to this chapter—(1) ὁ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος μηδενὸς ἕνεκα: (§ 10); (2) ὁ δόξης ἕνεκα ἀλαζονεύμενος, (3) ὁ κέρδους ἕνεκα ἀλαζονεύμενος. In all three cases the ἀλαζών pretends to the possession of ἔνδοξα, or qualities held in repute, which he either does not possess at all, or possesses to a smaller extent than he would have it believed (§ 2). Ὁ δόξης ἕνεκα pretends to those qualities which are admired and praised; ὁ κέρδους ἕνεκα, to qualities agreeable and useful to others, the absence of which can be concealed—such as prophetic or medical skill (§ 13).

The ἀλαζών described by Theophrastus belongs to the second kind. ‘When he is living in a hired house he will say (to anyone who does not know better) that it is the family mansion; but that he means to sell it, as he finds it too small for his entertainments.’ (Jebb’s Translation p. 97.)

The εἰρων, as here described by Aristotle, depreciates himself by denying the possession of qualities held in repute, or making them out less than they are. He is better than the ἀλαζών, being more refined; he does not seek profit by his irony, nor even repute, for qualities held in repute are what he especially disclaims (§ 14). Excessive irony or self-depreciation, however, passes easily into swagger (§ 15). ‘The general characteristic of [Aristotle’s] Ironical man,’ says Jebb (*Theoph.* p. 190), ‘is that he holds in reserve, for whatever purpose, something of his available power. This purpose may be an earnest dialectical one, like that of Socrates. Or it may be to avoid ostentation and check impertinence; as Aristotle’s lofty-minded man is ‘ironical’ to the common crowd

(*Eth.* iv. 3. 28). Or the purpose may be merely playful; as Anacharsis in Lucian says that the Athenians were reputed ‘ironical’ in conversation (*Anach.* c. 15).’ Jebb finds the picture of the εἰρων drawn by Theophrastus strikingly inadequate as judged by Aristotle’s standard. Theophrastus ‘describes merely a person who takes a cynical pleasure in misleading or inconveniencing others by the concealment of his real feelings and intentions.’ According to O. Ribbeck (*Rheinisches Museum* 1876, vol. xxxi. pp. 381 sqq., über den Begriff des εἰρων) the εἰρων is mentioned for the first time in Greek literature in Aristoph. *Nub.* 449. The scholiast on this passage has—εἰρων ὁ πάντα παίζων καὶ διαχλευάζων, εἰρωνεύμενος ἀπατών, ἱποκριτής. The Fox is the type of the εἰρων: cf. Philemon, *Fragm.* οὐκ ἔστ’ ἀλώπηξ ἢ μὲν εἰρων τῇ φύσει, | ἢ δ’ αὐθέ-
κιστος; Neither Plato nor Xenophon, according to Ribbeck, makes Socrates call himself εἰρων. The term was really one of reproach applied by his contemporaries who thought that he outwitted them. Plato uses εἰρωνεία, εἰρωνικός, or εἰρωνεύεσθαι in a bad sense in *Soph.* 268 A, *Legg.* 908 D, *Rep.* 337 A (the passage in which Thrasymachus says to Socrates ὁ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, αὐτῆ ἐκείνη ἢ εἰωθῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐγὼ ἤδη τε καὶ τοῦτοις προῖδλον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἰθελήσῃς, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσῃς ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἰ τίς τί σε ἐρωτᾷ), *Sympos.* 216 E. Cf. Aristoph. *Aves* 1211, Plato, *Apol.* 38 A. The notion of εἰρωνεία was, however, ennobled by the character of Socrates, and by the representation which Plato gave of him. In the *Eth. Nic.* εἰρωνεία has the old meaning in so far as it involves a divergence from truth; but when the εἰρων is said to be χαριέστερος, as φεύγων τὸ ὀγκηρόν, his character is taken in a better and finer sense. Aristotle is the first to make Socrates the type of true refined Irony. But Theoph. understands ‘irony’ ‘in a sense almost wholly bad,’ as Jebb remarks (*Theoph.* p. 191).

§ 1.] Imelmann (*obs. crit.* p. 12), followed by Rasso (*Forsch.* 1127 a. 13. p. 17), distinguishes two introductory passages in this section, (1) περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ . . . συνιδόντες, and (2) ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν . . . προσποιή-
ματι. Imelmann (*l. c.*) inserts καὶ τῆς εἰρωνείας after ἀλαζονείας in line 1127 a. 13; and Rasso, Susemihl, and Bywater (the last omitting τῆς) accept the emendation.

καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι] προσποίημα is something *unduly* assumed, a. 20. something *pretended to*: hence here it refers properly only to the

1127 a. 20. *ψευδομένων*, and strictly only to the *ἀλαζών*, for *ἀρνεῖσθαι* not *προσποιεῖσθαι* is characteristic of the *εἴρων* (§ 3). The words *τῷ προσποιήματι* limit the scope of *ψευδομένων ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι*—‘those who are untruthful in what they say and do, I mean in the matter of personal pretensions.’ The *καί* however (which Imelmann *obs. crit.* p. 12 wishes to omit) seems to me to be necessary before *τῷ προσποιήματι*.

a. 21. § 2. *ἐνδόξων*] ‘things held in esteem.’ The commoner meaning of *τὰ ἐνδοξα* in Aristotle is of course that of ‘probable opinions.’

a. 23. § 4. *αἰθέκαστος*] In the good sense here intended, the *αἰθέκαστος* is ‘the man who appears in his own character.’ The term was also used in a bad sense as equivalent sometimes to *βίαιος*, sometimes to *ιδιογνώμων*, sometimes to *αἰθάδης*—see uses collected by Zell and Coraes. It is contrasted with *εἴρων* in the fragment of Philemon quoted above.

a. 24. *καὶ τῷ βίῳ*] Bywater’s note is ‘fort. *κἂν τῷ βίῳ*.’

a. 25. *ὁμολογῶν*] Ramsauer notes the care with which the three verbs are used—*ὁμολογεῖ* of the *ἀληθευτικός*, *ἀρνεῖται* of the *εἴρων*, and *προσποιεῖται* of the *ἀλαζών*.

a. 28. § 6.] It is not necessary to point to a base ulterior object, for the sake of which the *ψευδομένοι* choose *τὸ ψεῦδος*, in order to establish the position that they are *ψεκτοί*: for *τὸ ψεῦδος in itself* is *φᾶνλον καὶ ψεκτόν*: and those who choose it *μηθενὸς ἕνεκα* (and there are such), are *φᾶνλοι τὴν ἕξιν* and *ψεκτοί*. Similarly, the man who is *ἀληθευτικός*, where no great interests are involved, simply because it is his habit to stick to the truth as such, is *ἐπαινετός*.

a. 33. § 7. *ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις*] The Par. has *ἔστι τοίνυν ἀληθευτικός, οὐχ ὁ ἀληθεύων ἐν ταῖς συμφωνίαις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις τοιοῦτοις ὅσα εἰς δικαιοσύνην ἢ ἀδικίαν συντείνει . . . ἀλλ’ ὅστις ἄνευ ἀνάγκης ἢ νομίμου ἢ δικαίου ἢ ἄλλον τινὸς πολιτικοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει διὰ μόνον τὸ ἔχειν ἕξιν τῆς τῶν αὐτοῦ ἀρετῆς*.

b. 5. § 8. *ὡς γὰρ αἰσχροὺς κ.τ.λ.*] The man who shrinks from *τὸ ψεῦδος* as such, in circumstances in which it cannot be called *αἰσχρόν*, as not involving serious social consequences, will *à fortiori* shrink from it in those circumstances in which the verdict of society is severely against it: see the Par. *οἱ γὰρ φιλαλήθεις καὶ ἐν οἷς οὐκ*

ἔστιν ἀνάγκη, πολλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν οἷς ἀληθεύειν ἀνάγκη διὰ τὸ πολιτικόν 1127 b. 5. *ἀγαθόν ὅς γὰρ εὐλαβεῖται τὸ ψεῦδος καθ’ ἑαυτό, διότι κακόν, ὅταν καὶ αἰσχρόν τὸ αὐτὸ γένηται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἢ κακόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκῆ τοιοῦτον, πῶς οὐ φεύξεται πάση δυνάμει;*

§ 9. *ἀποκλίνει*] I have no hesitation in accepting Coraes’ *ἀπο-* b. 8. *κλινεί*, which is moreover supported by the Par., *ὅς, εἰ δεήσει παρεκκλινῶναι τοῦ μέσου, πρὸς τὴν ἑλλειψιν οὐ πρὸς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν νεύσει*.

§ 10. *μηθενὸς ἕνεκα*] It is difficult to suppose the case of a man b. 10. who magnifies his *ὑπάρχοντα*, without thinking of his own *δόξα* or *τιμή* as thereby enhanced. Perhaps we may say that *ὁ δόξης ἢ τιμῆς ἕνεκα ἀλαζονεύμενος* is the man, who, with a definite scheme of social success before his eyes, is always ‘advertising’ himself by a consistent course of swagger—*e.g.* the rich parvenu carefully affecting country tastes in order to get into county society: whereas *ὁ μηθενὸς ἕνεκα ἀλαζονεύμενος* is the man who boasts, not indeed without some idea of enhancing his reputation, but without a definite scheme of social success before his eyes.

§ 11. *ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών*] The text would be much better without these b. 12. words: but if we retain them, we must understand them to refer to ‘the Boaster proper,’ *i.e.* the man who boasts without any *definite* end to be served, as distinguished from the man who boasts for reputation, and the man who boasts for gain. ‘The man who boasts for reputation is not very blameworthy, any more than the simple boaster (*ὁ ἀλαζών*) is; the man who boasts for gain, however, is more reprehensible. But, whether a man boast from simple love of untruth (*ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων = ὁ ἀλαζών*) or with the ulterior object of reputation or gain (*ὁ δὲ δόξης κ.τ.λ.*), we must remember that his boasting is the expression of a character, not the practice of an art, and therefore comes in for blame.’

§ 12.] The clause *οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ’ κ.τ.λ.* is added, lest too b. 14. much should be made of the admission—*οὐ λίαν ψεκτός*: see *Top.* iv. 5. 126 a. 30 *ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ψεκτῶν ἢ ψευκτῶν εἰς δυνάμιν ἢ δυνάτων ἔθηκεν, οἷον τὸν σοφιστὴν ἢ διάβολον ἢ κλέπτην τὸν δυνάμενον τὰ ἀλλότρια ὑφαρνεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ. . . . πάντες γὰρ οἱ φᾶνλοι κατὰ προαίρεσιν λέγονται*.

‘*ἀλαζονεία* is after all a fixed moral habit, not, as might perhaps be supposed from its less offensive forms, a mere *faculty* like that

1127 b. 14. of the disputant (*διαλεκτική*), which can be employed without raising a moral issue. *Σοφιστική*, not *διαλεκτική*, is its true parallel.

For the doctrine that *προαιρέσεις*, not *δυνάμεις*, are the objects of moral judgments, Zell, Michelet, Grant, and Ramsauer refer to *Τορ.* iv. 5. 126 a. 30 (quoted above) and *Rhet.* i. 1. 1355 b. 20 *σοφιστής μὲν κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν*—‘the Sophist is distinguished,’ as Grant puts it, ‘from the Dialectician not intellectually but morally.’

Bywater makes the words *οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει . . . ἀλαζῶν ἐστὶν* parenthetical; Bekker places a comma after *ἐστὶν* b. 15, and, like Bywater, takes *ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης* with what follows. I prefer to take the words *ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης*, as = *ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔξω καὶ τῷ τοιοῦδε εἶναι*, and refer *ὁ μὲν* and *ὁ δὲ* to *ὁ ἀλαζῶν* l. 14, not to the *ψεύστης*. I would therefore punctuate thus—*οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαίρεσει (κατὰ τὴν ἔξω γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιοῦδε εἶναι ἀλαζῶν ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης), ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους*. If we refer *ὁ μὲν* and *ὁ δὲ* to the *ψεύστης*, we distinguish the person described as *τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων* from the *ἀλαζῶν* proper¹ of § 10, and make *ὁ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους*, not an *ἀλαζῶν*, but a person fraudulent in another way. But is it likely that when he wrote *ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων*, Aristotle was thinking of another *ψεύστης*, distinct from the one whom he had just described in almost identical terms (*οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαυε τῷ ψεύδει* b. 10) in § 10; and, although the methods employed by *ψεύστης* and by *ἀλαζῶν* respectively, where *κέρδος* is concerned, may be distinguished, how is the *ψεύστης, quia δόξης ὀρεγόμενος*, to be distinguished from *ὁ δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονεύμενος*? It is perhaps worth noticing also that the definition of the *ἄνθρωπος ψευδής* in *Met.* Δ. 29 seems to be against the identification of the *δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους* here (b. 16) with the *ψεύστης* as distinguished from the *ἀλαζῶν*—see *Met.* Δ. 29. 1025 a. 2 *ἄνθρωπος δὲ ψευδής, ὁ εὐχερῆς καὶ προαιρετικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτό*—on which Alexander (ed. Bonitz p. 402) has the following comment—*λέγεται ἄνθρωπος*

¹ Stahr interprets the words *ὡς ὁ ἀλαζῶν* in § 11 as if they implied that the term *ἀλαζῶν* is not properly applied to the *μηδενὸς ἕνεκα προποιοῦμενος*, but only to the *δόξης ἕνεκα*. This is surely wrong. ‘Thut er es aber aus einer bestimmten Absicht, so ist wieder ein Unterschied, will er sich nämlich damit bloss Ansehen und Ehre geben, wie der eigentliche Prahler, so ist er nicht allzuhart zu beurtheilen.’

ψευδής . . . ἢ εὐχερῆς πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδεσθαι καὶ τούτου προαιρετικὸς καὶ 1127 b. 14. χαίρων τῷ ψεῦδεσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι, οἷον κέρδος ἢ μισθόν τινα· οὗτος γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶ ψευδής οὐδὲ φιλοψευδής, ἀλλὰ φιλοκερδῆς ἢ εἶ τι τοιούτων ἐστὶν.

The Paraph. Heliodorus avoids the error of making *ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους* a species of *ὁ ψεύστης* (as distinguished from *ὁ ἀλαζῶν*), by referring *ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων* to the *ψεύστης* and *ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους* to the *ἀλαζῶν*: he says *καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἔξω ὁ ἀλαζῶν γίνεταί, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ψεύστης, ὅς οὐ δόξης ἕνεκα ἢ χρημάτων προσποιεῖται, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ψεύδους ἕνεκα μόνον.*

§ 13. *οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς πέλας καὶ διαλαθεῖν* b. 19. *ἐστὶ μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἱατρόν]* So Bywater, following K^b, which (with CCC) omits *αἰ* before *διαλαθεῖν*, and *ἦ* before *ἱατρόν*. Bekker follows the other MSS in reading *αἰ* and *ἦ*. Susemihl reads *αἰ*, but not *ἦ*. It is to be noted that pr. K^b has *ὧν ἡδεὶ ἀπόλαυσις*, CCC *ὧν ἡ δεῖ ἀπόλαυσις*, and Cambr. *ὧν ἡδεῖα ἀπόλαυσις*, and that NC, B¹, B², Γ, H^a, N^b, Ald., Hel., have *οἷον ἱατρόν ἢ μάντιν σοφόν*, and O^b has *οἷον μάντιν ἢ ἱατρόν σοφόν*.

As regards the omission of *ἦ* (which seems to rest on three authorities, K^b, CCC, and Aspasius—he has *τοιούτων δὲ μαντική, ἱατρική, σοφία*)—a point is certainly made by the inclusion in the list of impostors of a third variety—the learned impostor—*σοφός* or *σοφιστής*: but, on the other hand, it might be argued that it is necessary to qualify at least *ἱατρόν* by an adjective expressing the *skill* which is pretended to; that it is not being a doctor, but being a good doctor, which is the pretence that escapes detection. The *ἦ* might very easily drop out, and, once out, would be likely to remain out, because it seemed so natural to include the Sophist among notable impostors. K^b's omission of *ἦ* ought not to weigh too much with us. It may be only one of the numerous blundering omissions for which the MS is remarkable: and perhaps the omission of *αἰ* may belong to the same class. On the other hand, what K^b adds or substitutes is entitled to great attention; and so, I think that Ramsauer's conjecture—*ὧν ἦδη ἀπόλαυσις*—is not to be overlooked.

It seems to be generally assumed (*e.g.* by Stahr and Peters) that *ὄντα* is neut. pl. In that case the words *οἷον μάντιν κ.τ.λ.* follow awkwardly. On the other hand, if we take *ὄντα* as masc. sing., there is some difficulty in connecting the clause—*καὶ*

1127 b. 19. (or καὶ ἀ) διαλαθεῖν κ.τ.λ. with what goes before, so as to allow us to translate—‘They pretend to have qualities from which other people derive advantage, and to be what one may not-be, and yet never be found out, e.g. a good doctor.’

b. 21. προσποιούνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα] τὰ τοιαῦτα = τὸ μάντιν σοφὸν ἢ ἱατρὸν εἶναι, and τὰ εἰρημένα = ἀπόλαυσις τοῖς πέλας and τὸ διαλαθεῖν μὴ ὄντα. We must understand Aristotle to say that οἱ κέρδους ἕνεκα are the largest class (οἱ πλείστοι) of ἀλαζόνες.

b. 25. § 14. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται] Jebb (*Theoph.* p. 190) seems to give the exact force of this remark—‘And moreover it is *creditable* things which such persons especially disclaim.’ This is an additional reason for regarding them as χαριέστεροι.

ἔρον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει] In the next section we are told that εἰρωνεία may become ἀλαζονεία, if excessive. In Plutarch, *adv. Colotem* 18, we actually find the style of Socrates described as ἀλαζών—πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀλαζόνες οἱ Σωκράτους λόγοι, μηδὲν αὐτοῦ εἶδέναι φάσκοντος, ἀλλὰ μανθάνειν αἰεὶ καὶ ζητεῖν τὸ ἀληθές;

b. 26. § 15. οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερά [προσποιούμενοι] See the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant. The difficulty is that ἀπαρνεῖσθαι not προσποιεῖσθαι is the term regularly used by Aristotle¹ in connexion with the εἶρων. On the other hand, however, Theophrastus defines εἰρωνεία as προσποίησις ἐπὶ χεῖρον πράξεων καὶ λόγων, and in the present section Aristotle is showing how εἰρωνεία passes into ἀλαζονεία. Those εἰρωνες who not only deny the possession of great qualities, but, in order to lend plausibility to their denial, seriously affect small merits or accomplishments, which might be allowed ‘to go without saying’ (τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερά), as if these were their only good qualities, are humbugs. Ramsauer throws out the suggestion that the words οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ . . . εὐκαταφρόνητοι εἶσιν have accidentally been removed from their proper place after εἰρημένα § 13; but he does not press the suggestion. It seems, however, worth consideration: φανερά would make a good antithesis to διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα. Bywater (following Vahlen) cuts the knot by bracketing προσποιούμενοι.

¹ In ii. 7. 12, however, εἰρωνεία is defined as προσποίησις ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον.

βαυκοπανούργοι] The derivation of this word is obscure. The 1127 b. 27. Ald. Schol. has βαυκοπανούργους . . . τοὺς σεμνοπανούργους βαυκὸν γὰρ ἔλεγον οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸν τρυφερόν. See also *Liddell and Scott*, s. v. βαυκός ‘prudish,’ ‘affected.’ The general idea seems to be that of silly affected humbugs, contemptible for their little transparent artifices.

ἡ τῶν Λακόνων ἐσθής] not as worn by the Spartans themselves, b. 28. but as imitated by certain Athenians. See Coraes, *ad loc.* τοὺς Ἀθηναίους λακωνικῶς βιούοντας Ἀθηναίους αἰνίττεται, ὧν καὶ Δημοσθένης (1267. 21) καθάπτεται, ἴσασιν ἡμῶν, ὡς ἐγὼ νομίζω, πολλοὶ καὶ τὸν Διότιμον, καὶ τὸν Ἀρχεβιάδην, καὶ τὸν Χαιρέτιμον, τὸν ἐπιπόδιον τουτονί, οἱ μεθ’ ἡμέραν μὲν ἐσκυθρωπάκασιν, καὶ λακωνίζω φασί, καὶ τρίβωνας ἔχουσι, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὑποδέδενται ἐπειδὴν δὲ συλλεγῶσιν, καὶ μεθ’ ἀλλήλων γέρονται, κακῶν καὶ αἰσχροῶν οὐδὲν ἐλλείπουσι.

§ 17. χείρων γάρ] sc. τοῦ εἶρωνος.

b. 32.

CHAPTER VIII.

Argument and Introductory Note.] The εὐτράπελος, or ἐπιδέξιος, is the man whose conversation in society is easy, bright and playful, contributing to the pleasure and amusement of the company, without offending against good taste, or hurting susceptibilities. Especially in the sallies of pleasantry of which persons present (himself included) are the objects, will he show graceful tact—never saying anything that his victim, being a man of taste, does not enjoy: and tacitly imposing his own rule of good taste upon those who attack him in turn. The βωμολόχος is the buffoon, or ‘funny man,’ whose pleasantry is coarse and offensive, and practised in and out of season. The ἄργιος or ἄγρικός (ἄγρικός in *E. E.*, *M. M.*, and *E. N.* ii. 7. 13), presumably so called as being contrasted with the ἀστείος, is the dull man, who, like a rustic in polite society, sits silent, unable to follow, or contribute to easy conversation, and ‘incapable,’ as Grant puts it, ‘of either making or appreciating a joke.’ The βδελυρία and ἀγροικία of Theophrastus do not present many points of likeness to Aristotle’s extremes.

Looking back over the list which ends with εὐτραπέλια, we seem to see in the ἀρεταὶ of the Fourth Book, not *virtues* in our sense,

but qualities forming the dignified and brilliant member of polite society. 'The Gentleman,' always conscious of what is due to himself, seems to be presented as the ideal of 'the good man.' But we must not let this ideal of 'the Gentleman' mislead us in our interpretation of Aristotle. We must not overlook the way in which *all* 'the qualities of the Gentleman' (even the most superficial of them) are made to subserve earnest aims.

Ἐλευθεριότης is essentially the habit of doing good with one's money, and implies fellow-feeling regulated by discrimination of desert, and a large perception of the public issues involved in the smallest act of giving. Μεγαλοπρέπεια is essentially the virtue of the man of public spirit, who undertakes a λειτουργία, on the proper performance of which the credit and advantage of his city depend. The φιλότιμος shows how personal ambition may be reconciled with enthusiasm for the common good. The πρῶτος is, above all, συγγνωμονικός—a man who has sympathies which enable him to understand others, and bear with them. The φίλος and the ἀληθευτικός set the example of dignified, and at the same time kindly and straightforward, manners, and so perform a moral work of the highest importance, making men understand one another better, and respect one another more. Finally the εὐτράπελος performs an important function, by lightening the incubus of ennui which tends to oppress life. He contributes to that ἀνάπαυσις which is sought not for its own sake, but because it makes us more capable of the performance of the earnest duties of life: παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάξῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχει δοκεῖ ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιὰ, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις γίνεται γὰρ ἔνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας (*E. N.* x. 6. 6).

Thus, in all cases, we are brought back to the standard of the Noble Life, or Hellenic Culture. Those who participate in this culture know when it is realised in the habits of a member of their society, and praise his habits accordingly—τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν (*i.* 13. 20).

1128 a. 1. § 1. οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὡς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν] In the *E. E.* (*iii.* 7. 1234 a. 14) two kinds of εὐτραπελία are distinguished—that of the man who knows how to receive pleasantry—and that of the man who knows how to originate it. The former consists in being able to enjoy a polite and delicate σκῶμμα—even when it

raises a laugh against oneself; the latter consists in being able to 1128 a. 1. originate a σκῶμμα which its victim, being a man of good taste, will enjoy. οὔσης δὲ διττῆς τῆς εὐτραπελίας (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶ τῷ γελοῖον καὶ τῷ εἰς αὐτόν, ἐὰν ἢ τοιοῦδί, ὃν ἐν τῷ σκῶμμα ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι), ἕτεροι μὲν εἰσιν ἀλλήλων, ἀμφοτέραι μὲντοι μεσότητες. καὶ γὰρ τὸν δυνάμενον τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι ἐφ' ὅσοις ἡσθήσεται ὁ εὖ κρίνων, κἴν εἰς αὐτόν ἢ τὸ γελοῖον, μέσος ἔσται τοῦ φορτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ. ὁ δ' ὅρος οὗτος βελτίων ἢ τὸ μὴ λυπηρὸν εἶναι τὸ λεχθὲν τῷ σκαπομένῳ ὅτι ὀποιοῦν· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τῷ ἐν μεσότητι ὄντι ἡρέσκεν οὗτος γὰρ κείνῃ εὖ. The same distinction is made in *M. M.* i. 30. 1193 a. 17 ἔσται δὲ ὁ εὐτράπελος διττῶς πως λεγόμενος καὶ γὰρ ὁ δυνάμενος σκῶψαι ἐμμελῶς, καὶ ὃς ἂν ὑπομείνῃ σκαποτόμενος εὐτράπελος.

ἐν τοιούτοις . . . τοιούτων] Masc. The kind of company will a. 2. make a difference.

§ 3. βωμολόχοι] The βωμολόχος is literally one who hangs about a. 4. the altars to steal or beg what is offered on them: then, metaphorically, a low-fellow who will do anything to get a meal—a 'loafer': and, still more metaphorically, a person who will say anything to raise a laugh—a low jester. See *Liddell and Scott*, s. v.

ἄγροικοι] The reading of K^b and CCC, restored to the text a. 9. by Bywater, in place of Bekker's ἄγριοι, given by all other MSS. See on the use of the term ἄγροικοι in Aristotle, note on *iii.* 11. 7.

οἶον εὐτροποι] Grant gives us a neat rendering here—'they are a. 10. called witty, by a name that implies their happy turns.'

§ 4. καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες] a. 14. And also εὐτραπελία is sometimes used in a bad sense—as in *N. T.* *Eph.* 5. 4 (quoted by Giphanius), where it is coupled with μορολογία, and means low jesting.

§ 5. ἐλευθερίου] K^b (followed by CCC) has ἐλευθέρον. In either a. 20. case 'gentleman' is the meaning.

§ 6. τῶν κωμωδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν] Ramsauer quotes a. 22. *Rep.* 395 E, where κωμωδεῖν is used as synonymous with αἰσχρολογία

1128 a. 22. and κατηγορεῖν—κατηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κωμφοῦντάς ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογούντας. Cf. HOR. A. P. 281

‘Successit vetus his comoedia, non sine multa
Laude; sed in vitium libertas excidit et vim
Dignam lege regi; lex est accepta chorusque
Turpiter obticuit sublato jure nocendi.’

On which Orelli quotes Cic. *de Rep.* 4. 10. 33 ‘apud quos (Graecos antiquiores) fuit etiam lege concessum, ut quod vellet comoedia de quo vellet (*praeterquam de archonte*: Schol. Aristoph. *Nub.* 31) nominatim diceret. Quem illa non attingit, vel potius, quem non vexavit? cui pepercit?’—and Suidas, ‘*Ἀντίμαχος*’ (B. C. 417-404?) ἐδόκει οὗτος ψήφισμα πεποιηκέναι, μὴ δεῖν κωμφοῦν ἐξ ὀνόματος. For τὸ κωμφοῦν ἐξ ὀνόματος of the Old Comedy, the New Comedy substituted ἰπὸνοια—allusion—in the case of things as well as persons.

a. 25. § 7. τὸν εἰς σκώπτουσα.] Is the conversation of εὐτράπελοι merely a game of polite personal banter? We can hardly suppose that Aristotle means this. ‘Ὁ εἰς σκώπτων rather is one whose conversation plays gracefully round things and people—sometimes round even serious things and people—presenting them in new and amusing—but not therefore ridiculous—lights; he is a sort of Dialectician, too, in the world of fancy; for he shapes no course for his conversation beforehand, but goes as the winds waft him. He is in short the charming talker, whom we like to listen to, for other reasons, and because he is always willing to listen to us. The meagre accounts of the εὐτράπελος in the *E. E.* (iii. 7) and *M. M.* (i. 30) present him merely as one who can give and take polite personal banter.

The definition of εὐτραπελία in *Rhet.* ii. 12. 1389 b. 11 as πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις must be taken in its context; the εὐτράπελοι whom Aristotle has immediately in view there are impulsive but gentlemanly youths. The εὐτραπελία of the Fourth Book is an ἀρετή of the man of the world, and ‘πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις’ describes only one aspect of his conversational ‘versatility.’

a. 27. ἢ καὶ τέρπειν.] Eudemus (as quoted in note on § 1) lays stress on the pleasure which the εὐτράπελος gives τῷ εὐ κρίνοντι.

a. 29. § 9. οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει.] Following the Paraphrast’s οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἐρεῖ, Coraes reads οὐ δὴ πᾶν λέξει. Others have proposed ἀκούσεται for ποιήσει. Ποιήσει seems to me to be the right word in this place, after the preceding ποιεῖν.

§ 10. ἔνια δ’ οὐδ’ ἂν ἀκούσαι] The rule in respect of τὸ ἀκούειν is, 1128 b. 1. it would appear, not so strict as that in respect of τὸ λέγειν.

ἄγροικος] Bywater: ἄγριος (Bekker) is the reading of K^b and b. 2. CCC (as of all other MSS.), although in § 3 both K^b and CCC read ἄγροικοι. Is this ἄγροικοι in § 3 a corruption of ἄγριοι καί?

§ 12.] See *Introductory Note* to iv. 6. The ἀρεταί of social b. 4. department are given here in the same order as in ii. 7. 11—viz. ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπελία, φιλία.

CHAPTER IX.

[*Argument and Introductory Note.*] The passage ii. 7. 15, in which the discussion of νέμεσις follows that of αἰδώς in § 14, prepares us for a discussion of νέμεσις in the present context also. But the Fourth Book, as we have it, ends without even mentioning νέμεσις. It seems probable that the accident which deprived us of the Nicomachean books answering to v, vi, vii, deprived us of the last part of iv, treating of νέμεσις: (iv. 9. 8 is perhaps an editor’s interpolation). Perhaps, indeed, part of the discussion of αἰδώς is lost; for it is to be noted that there is no mention of the ἀναίσχυντος and καταπλήξ as extremes, where the αἰδήμων is μέσος. At the same time, we cannot feel sure that it was Aristotle’s intention here to represent the αἰδήμων definitely as μέσος. So far as the discussion goes, αἰδώς appears merely as a provisionally good feeling, admirable only in the young: whereas in the *E. E.* and *M. M.* the αἰδήμων is evidently regarded as a mature man, no less than the φίλος, ἀληθής, and εὐτράπελος,—as the man who has just the right amount of self-assurance, who is not either regardless of what people think of him, or too shy and sensitive to put himself forward at all. See *M. M.* i. 29. 1193 a. 1 sqq. αἰδώς δ’ ἐστὶ μεσότης ἀναίσχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως, ἔστιν δὲ περὶ πράξεις καὶ λόγους [i. e. it is definitely one of the ἀρεταί, so-called, of ‘one’s deportment in society’]. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀναίσχυντός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν παντὶ καὶ πρὸς πάντας λέγων καὶ πράττων ἅ ἔτυχεν, ὁ δὲ καταπεπληγμένος ὁ ἐναντίος τούτῳ, ὁ πάντα καὶ πρὸς πάντας εὐλαβούμενος καὶ πράξει καὶ εἰπεῖν (ἄπρακτος γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁ πάντα καταπληγτόμενος) ἢ δὲ αἰδώς καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων μεσότης τις τούτων. οὔτε γὰρ ἅπαντα καὶ πάντως, ὡς ὁ ἀναίσχυντος, καὶ ἐρεῖ καὶ

πράξει, οὔτε ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ, ἐν παντί καὶ πάντως εἰλαβηθήσεται, ἀλλὰ πράξει καὶ ἐρεῖ ἐν οἷς δεῖ καὶ ἂ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ. So also *E. E.* iii. 7. 1233 b. 26 sqq. αἰδῶς δὲ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμίας φροντίζων δόξης ἀναισχυντος, ὁ δὲ πάσης ὁμοίως καταπλήξ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν αἰδήμων. (This is all that we have about αἰδῶς in the *E. E.*) The same extremes are given in ii. 7. 14, where presumably the view of the αἰδήμων is the same—viz. that he is a mature man on the same level with the εὐτραπέλος, &c. All that we can say, then, is that in the Fourth Book, at least so far as we have it, αἰδῶς is looked at from a different point of view: and that the discussion of it, so far as it goes, cannot be regarded as paralleled by the discussion in the later treatises. In the *E. E.* and *M. M.* both αἰδῶς and νέμεις appear among the so-called παθητικὰ μεσότητες—ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπελία, φιλία, and σεμνότης: whereas the subject of the 9th chapter of the Fourth Book is carefully distinguished from the foregoing ἀρεταί, its discussion forming a sort of appendix to the Book. Αἰδῶς, as presented in this chapter, is a natural shrinking from incurring the bad opinion of other people, which is useful in those whose morality is not yet assured, as preventing them from doing things which would bring them into disgrace: but it is only thus provisionally useful. The time ought to come when one, as a matter of fact, does not do, or think of doing, such things. This is the strong position which Aristotle takes up. But it suits most men to look at αἰδῶς differently, and to argue thus—‘I have done wrong, but I am ashamed. I have done a bad thing, but I am not such a bad man after all, because I am ashamed. This bad thing done by me is not so bad as the same thing done by my neighbour, who does not seem to be ashamed of having done it.’ Aristotle in this chapter declares himself—as we might expect—against this substitution of the subject’s feeling in the place of an objective moral standard. He sees that the man who thus palliates a bad action, and gives himself, as it were, absolution for it, will be prepared, with a light heart, to repeat it; and that αἰδῶς, though at first a protection, may become a snare. We can understand therefore the anxiety which he shows throughout the chapter to make it quite plain that αἰδῶς is not a virtue. He feels that the point is one of great practical importance, because it suits human weakness so well to make it out a virtue.

For ποῖα αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀναισχυνοῦσιν καὶ πρὸς τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες see the interesting chapter *Rhet.* ii. 6. 1383 b. 12 sqq.

§ 1. πάθει] See note on ii. 7. 14.

φόβος τις ἀδοξίας] Ramsauer refers to Plato, *Legg.* i. 646 E. φοβούμεθα δὲ γε πολλάκις δόξαν, ἠγούμενοι δοξάζεσθαι κακοὶ πράττοντες ἢ λέγοντές τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν· ἐν δὲ καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε, οἷμαι δὲ καὶ πάντες, αἰσχύνην. In *Rhet.* ii. 6, referred to above, the definition (1383 b. 13) does not include the term φόβος—ἔστω δὲ αἰσχύνῃ λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων. In *Top.* iv. 5. 126 a. 6 (referred to by Ramsauer) doubt seems to be thrown on the propriety of including the term φόβος in the definition—ἐὰν οὖν τις τὴν αἰσχύνην φόβον εἶπῃ ἢ τὴν ὀργὴν λύπην οὐ συμβήσεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος ὑπάρχειν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ αἰσχύνῃ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, ὁ δὲ φόβος ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ, καὶ ἢ μὲν λύπη ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ (ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἡδονή), ἢ δ’ ὀργὴ ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ, ὥστ’ οὐ γένη τὰ ἀποδοθέντα, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοῖς εἶδοσι πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. In strict conformity with this view that αἰσχύνῃ is ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ we have a second definition in *Rhet.* ii. 6. 1384 a. 23 ἐπεὶ περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνῃ, καὶ ταύτης αὐτῆς χάριν ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων κ.τ.λ. It is to be noted, however, that the definition with which *Rhet.* ii. 6 opens (1383 b. 13, quoted above) contains the word φαινόμενα.

§ 2. ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθος μᾶλλον ἢ ἕξεως εἶναι] Ramsauer compares b. 15. *de An.* i. 1. 403 a. 16 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμῶς, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τοῖς σώματι τὸ σῶμα. It is of course only a ἕξις of the ψυχῇ which is contrasted here, in this way, with a πάθος, for there are bodily ἕξεις.

§ 3. διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ b. 17. κωλύεσθαι] This regulation of πάθος by πάθος is the only regulation possible at first, but must not be acquiesced in as a permanent form of moral government. The φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ which is constituted by the *de facto* prevalence of good over bad feelings, does not make a man good in his own right. Οὐχ οἶδ’ ἂν εἶναι κυρίως ἀνὴρ φρονήσεως vi. 13. 6).

§ 5. οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα] This seems to bind down the ἐπιεικῆς b. 24. to a very strict observance of conventional propriety; but probably Aristotle only means that the ἐπιεικῆς will avoid vulgarity as well as immorality—e.g. as the Ald. Schol. says, he will not eat in the market-place—like the βδελυρός of Theophrastus, who, πληθοῦσης τῆς ἀγορᾶς, προσελθὼν πρὸς τὰ κάρνα ἢ τὰ μῆλα ἢ τὰ ἀκρόδρυα, ἐστήκως

- 1128 b. 24. τραυματίζεται, ἀμα τῷ παλοῦντι προσλαλῶν. Rasso (Forsch. 93) is probably correct in reading οὐδ' for οὐκ before αἰσχυντέον.
- b. 25. § 6. φαύλου δὲ καὶ] Rasso (Forsch. 93) conjectures διὰ for καὶ here, and supplies with φαύλου not simply ἐστὶ but αἰσχύνῃ ἐστὶ. Susemihl adopts Rasso's διὰ, and makes the words οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον § 4 . . . αἰσχυντέον § 5 parenthetical. I think that Rasso's διὰ, though a legitimate and tempting conjecture, is not strictly necessary. The same may be said of Bywater's suggestion—καὶ τῷ.
- b. 28. ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις γὰρ ἢ αἰδῶς] In *Rhet.* ii. 6. 1384 a. 16-22, as Ramsauer notes, ἀκούσια are mentioned which cause αἰσχύνῃ. K^b CCC, Paris 1853, and NC read ἀκουσίοις.
- b. 29. § 7. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικὲς] 'good *if*': but the ἀρεταὶ are good without an *if*.
- b. 32. τὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα] Bywater (with K^b and Cambr.). I much prefer Bekker's τὸ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα.
- b. 33. § 8.] I think that this § is an editor's interpolation. A case, however, might conceivably be made out for the retention of οὐκ ἐστὶ δ' οὐδ' ἢ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετὴ, ἀλλὰ τις μκτὴ: the argument being—'even ἐγκράτεια is not an ἀρετὴ, so *a fortiori* αἰδῶς is not. The ἐγκρατής has bad desires which he resists stoutly and successfully; the αἰδούμενος who makes a virtue of his αἰδῶς has bad desires which he seeks to palliate.'

BOOK V.

MICHAEL EPH. introduces this Book as follows:—ἐν τῷ παρόντι πέμπτῳ βιβλίῳ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων πραγματείας πρόθεσις ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς μερικωτέρας δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ συστοίχου ταύτης δικαίου τῶν ἀντικειμένων τε τοῖσις ἀδικίας καὶ ἀδίκου· διττὴ γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη λέγεται, ἢ τε ὅλη ἀρετὴ καὶ ἢ προκειμένη, ἥτις καὶ ἀντιδιήρηται τῇ φρονήσει τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ, ὧν ἐκάστη, πρὸς τὸ δικαιοσύνη λέγεσθαι, καὶ ἰδίως ἢ μὲν φρόνησις, ἢ δὲ ἀνδρεία ἢ δὲ σωφροσύνη ὀνομάζεται· ἢ δὲ προκειμένη ἀρετὴ δικαιοσύνη μὲν λέγεται καὶ ὀνομάζεται τῷ τῆς ὅλης δικαιοσύνης ὀνόματι· ὄνομα δ' ἴδιον οὐκ ἐκλήρωσατο, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος ὁ Ὀλυμπιονίκης οὐ Σωκράτης οὐ Πλάτων οὐκ Ἀριστείδης ἀλλὰ τῷ κοινῷ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ὀνόματι ἄνθρωπος ὀνομάζεται, οὕτω καὶ ἡ παρούσα ἀρετὴ δικαιοσύνη καλεῖται τῷ κοινῷ τῆς ὅλης δικαιοσύνης ὀνόματι· εἰσὶ δὲ αὐτῆς μέρη δύο, τὸ τε διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν.

For a summary of the Peripatetic teaching περὶ δικαιοσύνης see *M. M.* i. 33.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

Concerning Justice and Injustice. Let us, according to the method hitherto adopted, start from the commonly given descriptions of the states in question.

Justice then is commonly described as 'a state which makes us able to perform just acts; which makes us act justly and wish what is just.' A corresponding description is given of injustice. Here the words 'and wish what is just' are important, serving to mark the distinction between a state or habit on the one hand and a science or faculty on the other. A science or faculty (e. g. ἰατρικὴ) can produce either of two contraries, but a state or habit (whether physical like

ἰσμία, or moral like *δικαιοσύνη*) is a bent towards¹ the production of one class of effects only. We may gather then from the commonly given description of justice that it is not a faculty which enables us to perform just or unjust acts indifferently.

So much for the ethical import of the 'description.' But from the merely logical point of view it is to be noted that since, as we have just observed, science is of contraries, the science or knowledge of a state or habit will be that of its contrary also. It is also to be noted that the knowledge of a state or habit throws light upon its material conditions, and a knowledge of these upon the state or habit: if e.g. we know that being in good training is having firm flesh, we know that being in bad training is having soft flesh; and we also know that things good for training are things which produce firmness of flesh. It is generally the case that if one of two contraries has various meanings the other has correspondingly various meanings.

Now injustice has two meanings, for the unjust man is (1) the man who transgresses the law and (2) the man who takes too much or is unfair. Consequently the just man is (1) the man who observes the law and (2) the man who is fair. Qua 'disposed to take too much' the unjust man will have to do with external good things. But since the unjust man is also disposed to take too little of that which is evil, the wider designation 'unfair' is more accurately applied to him, including as it does both 'disposed to take too much of that which is good' and 'disposed to take too little of that which is evil.'

Concerning justice in the first sense of the term. Since the just man is the man who observes the law, all that is in accordance with the law is 'just' in one sense of the term. Since then the laws cover the whole field of conduct, inculcating all the virtues and forbidding all the vices, justice in this sense is complete virtue—complete virtue, however, viewed not as a simple possession, but as putting its possessor in a certain relation to other people. In short, the just man in this first sense is the man who 'can use his virtue towards other people.' This is why 'ruling over other people tests a man's justice'; and why justice is sometimes thought to differ from all the other virtues in being 'the good of other people.' This first kind of justice then is not a part of virtue (i.e. a virtue) but virtue (i.e. the virtuous character) as a whole; and the contrary, injustice, is not a part of vice but vice as a whole. The difference between virtue (i.e. the virtuous character as a whole) and this kind of justice is constituted by a difference in the point of view from which each is regarded. Regarded simply as the possession of the good man his moral character as a whole is called virtuous; regarded as placing him in certain relations to other people it is called just.

1129 a. 3. § 1. *περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης κ.τ.λ.*] *τὸ δίκαιον* is the principle of justice, or justice in the abstract; *δικαιοσύνη* is the habit of acting in accordance with the principle.

Grant and Ramsauer refer to *E. N.* ii. 7. 16 *περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης*,

¹ *Βούλεται* expresses the steady tendency of any natural law (cf. v. 5. 14 *βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον*), not merely the consistent wish of the moral agent.

ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐρούμεν πῶς 1129 a. 3. *μεσότητές εἰσιν.* Grant remarks that *πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν*; is a slightly different question from *ποία μεσότης*; and Ramsauer says 'caute dictum *ποία μεσότης*,' because it will be shown v. 5. 17 that *ἡ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τις ἐστίν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μένου ἐστίν—i.e. τοῦ ἴσου* between *τὸ πλεον* and *τὸ ἔλαττον*. The doctrine of v. 5. 17, however, relates only to particular justice, no attempt being made, according to Ramsauer, in the Fifth Book, to show that universal justice is a *μεσότης*, whereas in ii. 7. 16 both kinds of justice are contemplated as *μεσότητες*. Hence Ramsauer thinks that the words *πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν* (ii. 7. 16) are spurious. Surely this is a very unsafe line of criticism. If the Fifth Book was not written by the author of the Second Book, the inconsistency noticed by Ramsauer, if inconsistency it be, need not surprise us. If, as Ramsauer is inclined to believe (p. 281), the Fifth Book was written by the author of the Second Book, are the two passages really so inconsistent that to remove the inconsistency we must alter the text? Particular Justice may perhaps be a *μεσότης* in a sense somewhat different from that in which the other *ἀρεταὶ* coordinate with it are *μεσότητες*: but universal justice, at any rate, being the manifestation in society of all the *ἀρεταί*, is a *μεσότης* just as its constituent elements—*ἀνδρεία*, *σωφροσύνη*, &c., are severally *μεσότητες*—i.e. it is a *μεσότης περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη*. When we call a man *ἀνδρεῖος* we think of him specially as one who observes moderation in relation to certain particular *πράξεις* and *πάθη*: when we call him *δίκαιος* in the wide sense we think of him as one who observes moderation in relation to all *πράξεις* and *πάθη* generally. This is so obvious that the writer of the Fifth Book does not think it necessary to make any definite statement on the subject: although he comes very near to doing so when he says ch. 2. § 6 *ἢ δὲ (i.e. Universal Justice) περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος—i.e. the δίκαιος* is related to all his circumstances *ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος*. I am therefore disinclined to follow Grant and Ramsauer in attaching any special significance to *ποία* here. It seems to follow very naturally the *ποιίας* of the preceding line, to which no one thinks of attaching any special significance.

§ 2. *κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον*] i.e. the method of taking the a. 6. *ἔνδοξα* or *λεγόμενα* περὶ αὐτῆς (cf. § 3 below *ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας . . . βουλομένους λέγειν*), and testing them by their conformity with

1129 a. 6. philosophical ideas, which, in their turn, are often modified in accordance with the *ἔνδοξα* or *λεγόμενα*: cf. *E. N.* i. 8. 1 *σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγόμενων περὶ αὐτῆς*: τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεὶ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰληθές. Cf. note on vii. 1. 5.

a. 9. § 3. καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια . . . τὰ ἀδίκαια] This is added, Mich. Eph. says, to distinguish the *ἕξις*—*δικαιοσύνη*—from a *δύναμις* (or *ἐπιστήμη*):—*οὐκ ἐν τῷ βούλεσθαι πράττειν ἐστὶν τὸ εἶναι ἐκείναις (i. e. ταῖς δυνάμεισι καὶ ἐπιστήμαισι) ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι*: ὁ γὰρ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἔχων, κἂν μὴ βούληται ὑγιαίνειν, ἰατρός ἐστὶ καὶ λέγεται, ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύναμις ἔχων, κἂν μὴ ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων λέγῃ ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀδικῶν, ῥήτωρ ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅπως κἂν δύνηται ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τε δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδικῶν ῥήτωρ ἐστὶ. δίκαιος δὲ ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν δυνάμενος (which is all that the expression *πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων* by itself without the addition *καὶ βούλονται κ.τ.λ.* implies): δύναται γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀδικὸς ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ δίκαιός ἐστιν ὁ βουλόμενος: βούλεται δὲ ὁ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχων τὴν *εἰρημένην*. The Paraph. Heliodorus has remarks to the same effect.

This view of the force of *καὶ βούλονται* seems to me to explain the connexion *οὐδὲ γὰρ* § 4 naturally and adequately, and to make it unnecessary, with Jackson (*Book V.* introd. pp. xv, xvi), to interpolate v. 9. §§ 14–16, 1137 a. 4–26 between § 3 and § 4 here. It may be true that ‘the doctrine of ch. 1. § 4, is necessary to complete the argument of ch. 9. § 16,’ and it is interesting to note that this was the opinion of Mich. Eph. ‘who, though he does not suspect any displacement, is nevertheless careful in commenting on the latter passage to quote the former.’ But it is necessary to remember in connexion with this quotation that he has already explained to his own satisfaction the immediate sequence of § 4 upon § 3 in ch. 1.

For the popular view here appealed to, that Justice implies *βούλησις*, i. e. a definite moral bent, and is therefore not a *δύναμις* or *ἐπιστήμη* cf. Philemon (quoted by Stobaeus, *Flor.* vol. i. p. 189, ed. Meineke) *ἀνὴρ δίκαιός ἐστιν οὐχ ὁ μὴ ἀδικῶν | ἀλλ’ ὅστις ἀδικεῖν δυνάμενος μὴ βούλεται*, and Menander (Meineke iv. 344) *δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν οὐκ ἐπίσταται τρόπος*. The term *προαιρείται* would probably have been preferred by the writer here as more technically correct than *βούλεται*, had he wished to give an accurate definition of justice: as it is, he merely quotes popular language: cf. v. 8. 11 *δίκαιος ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ*, and v. 5. 17 *καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ’ ἣν ὁ*

1129 a. 9. δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου. At the same time it is to be noted that in v. 11. 6, the impossibility of *τὸ εἶναι ἀδικεῖν* is proved by reference to the fact (stated in v. 9. 5 and 6) that no man *wishes* (*βούλεται*) to be injured; the absence of *βούλησις* shows that there is no *ἀδικία πρὸς ἑαυτόν*. *Προαίρεσις*, however, seems to be the accepted term in the two Aristotelian passages which state most explicitly the distinction now before us between a moral habit and a faculty—viz. *E. N.* iv. 7. 12 *οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει*: κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν, and *Top.* iv. 5. 126 a. 30 *ὄραν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ψεκτῶν ἢ φευκτῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἔθηκεν* (sc. one’s opponent in a dialectical encounter), *οἷον τὸν σοφιστὴν ἢ διάβολον ἢ κλέπτην τὸν δυνάμενον λάβρα τὰ ἀλλότρι κλέπτει*. οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων τῷ δυνατὸς εἶναι τι τούτων τοιοῦτος λέγεται: δύναται μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος τὰ φαῦλα δρᾶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰσὶ τοιούτοι: πάντες γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι κατὰ προαίρεσιν λέγονται. The distinction between moral character on the one hand and intellectual ability or professional skill on the other, which is formulated by Aristotle in the above passages, was one which the Greek mind found it difficult or inconvenient to keep in view, if we may judge from Plato’s evidently strong desire to bring it home to his readers: see *Rep.* 332 D *τὸ τοῖς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει; Δοκεῖ μοι*. *Τίς οὖν δυνατώτατος κάμνοντας φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγίειαν; Ἰατρός . . . 335 D οὐ θερμότητος, οἶμαι, ἔργον ψύχειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου*. *Ναί*. *Οὐδὲ ξηρότητος ὑγραίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου*. *Πάνυ γε*. *Οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλέπτειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου*. *Φαίνεται*. *Ὅ δὲ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός; Πάνυ γε*. *Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλέπτειν ἔργον, ὃ Πολέμαρχε, οὔτε φίλον οὔτ’ ἄλλον οἰδένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου*. *Gorgias* 460 C *Σω*. *Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν; Γορ*. *Φαίνεται γε*. *Σω*. *οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν*. *Γορ*. *Ἀνάγκη*. *Σω*. *τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι*. *Γορ*. *Ναί*. *Σω*. *οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν*. Gorgias then contradicts himself by saying that the *ῥητορικὸς* may use his art *ἀδικῶς*—the intention of the whole passage being to bring vividly before us ‘the old confusion of the Arts and the Virtues’ (Jowett iii. 12). Cf. also *Meno* 90 B, where it is argued that virtue is not an accomplishment which can be taught, else good men would surely teach their sons to be virtuous. So far from being an accomplishment which can be acquired, it is rather a divine gift or inspiration. At any rate, it is not something which the sophists can teach, as riding-masters

1129 a. 9. teach the art of riding: see also *E. N.* v. 9. 16 τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται εἶναι οὐθέν ἦτρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐθέν ἦτρον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δύναται ἂν ἕκαστον πράξει τούτων, and Grant's note *ad loc.*—The opinion that justice implies its contrary as if it were an art (δύναμις) would be a consequence of the Socratic doctrine that justice is knowledge. Plato saw what this doctrine led to and drew out the paradoxical conclusion, *Rep.* p. 334 a, *Hipp. Min.* pp. 375. 6. The Aristotelian theory that justice is a moral state (ἕξις) set the difficulty at rest. To this last remark it is necessary to add that Plato, although he has no technical terms in which to express his view, sees as clearly as Aristotle that justice is a state involving the harmony of the whole man, and resulting from life-long intelligent obedience to νόμος. If justice were the dexterity of a single faculty, easily imparted in a few lessons by the Professors of ῥητορική, then ῥητορική would be the sovereign science, as these Professors maintain. But πολιτική is the sovereign science, and ῥητορική is ancillary: see *Politicus* 304 C D E, and note on *E. N.* i. 2. 6.

a. 11. § 4.] See *Met.* θ. 2. 1046 b. 1 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἐνδύμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἄλογοι αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι δυνάμεις εἰσὶν ἄρχαι γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἰσὶν ἐν ἄλλῃ ἢ ἄλλο, καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δ' ἄλογοι μία ἐνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἢ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγείας. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν, πλὴν οὐχ ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ἀμφοῖν, ἔστι δ' ὡς τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος μᾶλλον. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιστήμας εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, εἶναι δὲ τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰς τοῦ δὲ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς· καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτό, τοῦ δὲ τρόπον τινα κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἀποφάσει γὰρ καὶ ἀποφορᾷ δηλοῖ τὸ ἐναντίον· ἡ γὰρ στέρησις ἡ πρώτη τὸ ἐναντίον, αὕτη δ' ἀποφορᾷ θατέρου. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἢ δ' ἐπιστήμη δύναμις τῷ λόγον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχήν, τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν ὑγίειαν μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ ψυκτικὸν ψυχρότητα, ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων ἄμφω. From this passage it is plain that the δυνάμεις of the present section are αἱ μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις, and it is probable that the ἐπιστήμαι which the writer has more prominently in view are αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι, such as ἰατρική, *i. e.* those which are ἀρχαὶ μεταβλητικαὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ ἢ ἄλλο—although, of course, the remark τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτῆ is true of science generally. Thus the ἐπιστήμη οἱ δύναμις μετὰ λόγου—ἰατρική, apprehending the ἄλογος δύναμις—τὸ θερμαντικόν, apprehends also its contrary τὸ ψυκτικόν, and according

as it employs the one or the other will produce θερμότης or ψυχρότης 1129 a. in the patient—always a definite result from the means taken, since αἱ ἄλογοι δυνάμεις μία ἐνός. In *Met.* θ. 2 the contrast is that between an ἄλογος δύναμις such as τὸ ὑγιεινόν (*i. e.* τὸ ποιητικὸν ὑγείας) and a δύναμις μετὰ λόγου, such as ἰατρική: in the passage before us (*Eth.* v. i. 4) the contrast is between a ἕξις, such as ὑγεία, and a δύναμις μετὰ λόγου, such as ἰατρική. As the ἄλογος δύναμις—τὸ ὑγιεινόν produces only ὑγεία (*Met.*), so the ἕξις—ὑγεία (*Eth.*) produces only ὑγιεινά (*i. e.* τὰ σημαντικὰ ὑγείας—see *Top.* i. 15. 106 b. 35 τὸ ὑγιεινὸν τὸ μὲν ὑγείας ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ φυλακτικόν, τὸ δὲ σημαντικόν. Cf. *Met.* γ. 2. 1003 a. 35, *Met.* κ. 3. 1061 a. 6). For the doctrine τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη the editors refer to *An. Pr.* 24 a. 21, 48 b. 5, 50 a. 19, *Phys.* viii. 1. 251 a. 30, *de An.* 427 b. 5; and Jackson refers also to Plato, *Phaedo* 97 D, and *Charmides* 166 E. The reason why τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη is stated in the passage *Met.* θ. 2. 1046 b. 1-20 quoted above—*viz.* λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν. For στέρησις see *Met.* Δ. 22, and cf. *Top.* vi. 9, where rules are given for the definition of τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν λεγόμενα.

ἕξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 95, note) a. 14. supports the conjecture of Muretus—ἕξις δ' ἡ αὐτῆ τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ. On the margin of his copy Muretus found the note of a scribe to the effect that some MSS. have ἀντί instead of ἐναντία. This suggested to Muretus that an original αὐτῆ became ἀντί, which in its turn became ἐναντία. H^a actually reads ἡ αὐτῆ.

ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν] Cf. *Top.* i. 15. 106 b. 34 τὸ ὑγιεινῶς ἢ ποιητικῶς a. 16. ἢ φυλακτικῶς ἢ σημαντικῶς ῥηθήσεται.

§ 5. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται . . .] The transition here, a. 17. though suggested by the ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτῆ εἶναι of § 4, is very abrupt, and even inconsequent. After telling us in §§ 3 and 4 that 'the ἕξις Justice does not result in both δίκαια and ἀδίκαια, but only in the former, herein differing from a δύναμις μετὰ λόγου like ἰατρική, which can produce either health or sickness, and, generally, from an ἐπιστήμη which, if it knows the ἕξις, also knows the στέρησις of the ἕξις,' the writer seems to be suddenly struck by the logical importance of this last point (that the knowledge of the ἕξις is the knowledge of its στέρησις) for his present purpose (the joint investigation of δικαιοσύνη and ἀδικία), and enlarges on it

1129 a. 17. throughout §§ 5, 6, and 7, dismissing entirely the really important ethical doctrine (the difference between *ἔξις* and *δύναμις* or *ἐπιστήμη*) which he has only just raised in §§ 3 and 4. Inconsequent, however, though the transition marked by *μὲν οὖν* certainly is, we can understand how it might seem a perfectly natural one to a writer whose critical faculty was overweighed by his knowledge of peripatetic doctrine. According to that doctrine *ἔξις* or 'possession' is related not only to certain definite *ἐκτά* (*i. e.* τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν) which may be safely inferred from it (as in turn it may be inferred from them as symptoms), but also to the *στέρησις* or 'privation' of that of which as *ἔξις* it is the 'possession.' True, the relation between *ἔξις* and *ἐκτά* is something very different from that between *ἔξις* and *στέρησις*: but the writer of the Fifth Book is not the man to discriminate in such a case. He sees no inconsequence in the remark that 'a *ἔξις* does not produce contraries—but the knowledge of a *ἔξις* is the knowledge of its *ἐναντία ἔξις* or of its *στέρησις*.'

The writer's implication, however, in §§ 5, 6, 7, and 8—that the knowledge of *δικαιοσύνη* is the knowledge of *ἀδικία*, and *vice versa*—must be accepted with a reservation. It has only a logical value. Definitions of the two *ἔξεις*, embodying and rationalising popular opinion, may indeed be arrived at by one enquiry. We may save ourselves the trouble of making two enquiries. But it is only the just man, as such, who really knows what Justice is. The dialectical outsider, as such, can only rationalise the popular *ὑπολήψεις ἅς ἔχομεν περὶ τοῦ δίκαιου*, as he may equally well rationalise the *ὑπολήψεις περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου*. As the just man, however, is not ideally just, but has to struggle with the forces of evil, he will also know *ἀδικία*, and he will know it *in its essence*, because the essence of *ἀδικία* is that it opposes itself to *δικαιοσύνη*. The just man knows *ἀδικία* essentially because he knows it for what it really is—as the enemy of *δικαιοσύνη*. But it is not conversely true that the knowledge of *ἀδικία* which the *ἄδικος* possesses is also the knowledge of *δικαιοσύνη*. He sees in *δικαιοσύνη* only the enemy of *ἀδικία*: but this is to see only an accident of *δικαιοσύνη*, which is essentially *καλλίστη*—a beautiful organising principle—*καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὐθ' ἔφος οὕτω θαυμαστός*. The *ἄδικος* in short knows the *sanction* of the just law—the punishment which it inflicts, but not the just law *itself*, as such: see Plato, *Rep.* iii. 409 D, E *πονηρία μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τε καὶ αὐτὴν οὐποτ' ἂν γνώη, ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόνῳ ἅμα αὐτῆς τε καὶ πονηρίας ἐπιστήμην λήψεται*.

τῶν ὑποκειμένων] Fritzsche quotes *Met.* A. 2. 982 a. 23 ὁ τὴν 1129 a. 19. καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἔχων οἰδέ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα, where τὰ ὑποκείμενα are the particular cases or facts which fall under the general rule or principle. In his note on the passage, Bonitz, while showing how the term naturally lends itself to this sense (the extension of the logical subject—τὸ ὑποκείμενον is narrower than that of the predicate), remarks that it is a sense which it does not bear elsewhere (*i. e.* than in *Met.* A. 2), so far as he knows, in Aristotle's writings. Nor is it easy to see how here (*E. N.* v. 1. 5) it can mean merely particular cases or symptoms—τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως, for ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν plainly takes up ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, and τὸ εὐεκτικόν is immediately afterwards explained as τὸ ποιητικόν. Peters translates—'A habit is often known by the opposite habit, and often by its causes and results'; and Jackson says: 'τὰ ὑποκείμενα include not merely manifestations and symptoms of the *ἔξις* in question, but also its causes and conditions. In fact the *ὑποκείμενα* of *ὑγίεια* (to take a particular example) are τὰ ὑγεινά in the various kindred senses of *φυλακτικά*, *ποιητικά*, *σημαντικά*, and *δεκτικά ὑγείας*. For these senses of *ὑγεινά* cf. *Met.* iii. 2. p. 1003 a. 34, x. 3. p. 1061 a. 5, *Top.* i. 15. p. 106, b. 35.' I am inclined to think that if the writer had intended to use *ὑποκείμενα* here for *εὐεκτικά* in this very wide sense of the latter term, he would not immediately have added καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικόν τὸ ποιητικόν κ.τ.λ. I prefer to understand τὰ ὑποκείμενα as the material conditions of *εὐεξία* (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως of *Phys.* ii. 9. 199 b. 34–200 b. 8, τὸ οὐ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὐ of *Met.* A. 7. 1072 b. 12, τὸ ὡς ὅλη λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ κινήσεις αἱ ταύτης of *Phys.* ii. 9. 200 a. 31)—the necessary food, &c., used as means or material (τὸ ποιητικόν *εὐεξίας*) by the *γυμναστής* or trainer who is the efficient cause of *εὐεξία*: cf. *Pol.* Δ. 1. 1238 b. 25 τὴν κρατίστην τε ἀπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην οὐ δεῖ λελθῆναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικόν. Fritzsche (whom Grant follows) is supported in his (I think, erroneous) view of the meaning of *ὑποκείμενα* here by Mich. Eph. who has—*γνωρίζεται ἡ ἔξις . . . ἤδη ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὴν ἐκτῶν, καὶ τὰ ἐκτὰ ἐκ τῆς ἔξεως*. The Paraph. Heliodorus, however, is right—*γνώσκονται δὲ αἱ ἔξεις καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτῶν ἔξις μὲν γὰρ φέρε εἰπεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια, ἐκτῶν δὲ τὸ ὑγεινῶν ὁ πρὸς ὑγίειαν φέρει· εἰ γὰρ γινώσκουμεν ὑγεινῶν εἶναι τὸ ποιητικόν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκὶ γινώσκουμεν εὐεξίαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν σαρκὶ πυκνότητα*. The Paraph., it will be observed, is guilty of a little confusion here in his use of the terms *ὑγίεια* and *εὐεξία*: see *Top.* v. 7. 137 a. 3, quoted by Zell, ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως

1129 a. 19. ἔχει ἰατρός τε πρὸς τὸ ποιητικὸς ὑγείας εἶναι καὶ γυμναστὴς πρὸς τὸ ποιητικὸς εὐεξίας, ἔστι δ' ἴδιον γυμναστοῦ τὸ ποιητικὸν εἶναι εὐεξίας, εἴη ἂν ἴδιον ἰατροῦ τὸ ποιητικὸν εἶναι ὑγείας.

a. 21. πυκνότης] Zell quotes *Physiognomonica* 806 b. 22, where σκληρά is coupled with εὐεκτική as applied to σάρξ.

a. 23. § 6. ἀκολουθεῖ κ.τ.λ.] *Top.* i. 15. 106 b. 21 ἐπι ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἔξιν λεγομένων ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰ γὰρ θάτερον πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ λοιπόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται κατὰ τε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι πλεοναχῶς ῥηθήσεται κατὰ τε ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα.

a. 24. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] because there are exceptions to the above rule: see *Top.* i. 15. 106 b. 2 τῷ μὲν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν φιλεῖν τὸ μισεῖν ἐναντίον τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν οὐδέν—*i. e.* φιλεῖν is used πλεοναχῶς (= 'to love' and 'to kiss'), but μισεῖν the θάτερον is not.

a. 25. οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον] This is the reading of H^a M^b N^b Q^b B¹ adopted by Bekker and Bywater. But K^b, P^b, Camb. read οἷον εἰ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, and L^b (followed by Jackson) reads οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία: *i. e.* we have τὸ ἄδικον and ἡ ἀδικία, but their contraries τὸ δίκαιον and ἡ δικαιοσύνη are absent from K^b P^b Camb., and ἡ δικαιοσύνη is absent from L^b. I would suggest that the archetype of K^b P^b Camb., which was throughout distinguished for the unusual frequency with which it omitted words and clauses, omitted τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καί, the original reading being οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία. The plural θάτερα (given by all MSS. apparently, except H^a and Γ, which have θάτερον—adopted by Bywater—in both places) would perhaps be thus accounted for: *cf.* for similar plurals *E. N.* v. 2. 9. 1130 b. 14 καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταυτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα.

a. 27. § 7. διὰ τὸ σύνεγγος εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν λαιθάει] *sc.* ἡ ὁμωνυμία—'the equivocation,' τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν being = τὰ δμώνυμα: 'because the things called by the same name (τὰ δμώνυμα) stand very close to each other, the equivocal use of the name escapes notice.' Ὅμωνυμα are things which have nothing but the name in common, as Man and Picture, each of which is called ζῷον. Συνώνυμα are things which have a common name and a common nature, as Man and Ox: each not only is called, but is ζῷον: see *Cat.* I.

ἢ α. 1 ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὡν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὃ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος 1129 a. 27. ἕτερος . . . συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὡν τὸ τε ὄνομα κοινόν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός. In *Top.* i. 15. 107 a. 3 Aristotle illustrates the equivocal uses of the term ἀγαθόν under various Categories, and remarks that a term which is applied to several objects, each of which belongs to a different Category, is employed equivocally, *i. e.* with a different meaning in each Category—σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν κατὰ τοῦνομα κατηγοριῶν, εἰ ταυτὰ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ πάντων· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταυτὰ, δῆλον ὅτι ὁμώνυμον τὸ λεγόμενον, οἷον τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐν ἐδέσματι μὲν τὸ ποιητικὸν ἡδονῆς, ἐν ἰατρικῇ δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν ὑγείας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ποῦαν εἶναι, οἷον σάφρονα ἢ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δικαίαν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου. ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ τὸ ποτέ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ ἀγαθόν· ἀγαθόν γὰρ λέγεται τὸ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ· πολλακίς δὲ τὸ ποσόν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ μετρίου· λέγεται γὰρ τὸ μέτριον ἀγαθόν. ὥστε ὁμώνυμον τὸ ἀγαθόν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκόν ἐπὶ σώματος μὲν χρῶμα, ἐπὶ δὲ φωνῆς τὸ εἴηκοον· παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀξύ· οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεται· φωνῆ μὲν γὰρ ὀξεία ἢ ταχεία, καθάπερ φασὶν οἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀρμονικοί, γωνία δ' ὀξεία ἢ ἐλάσσων ὀρθῆς, μάχαιρα δὲ ἡ ὀξυγώνιος. The Categories are thus an important instrument in the hands of the Dialectician when engaged with the second of the four processes mentioned in *Top.* i. 13. 105 a. 21 as constituting the dialectical method—τὰ δὲ ὄργανα δι' ὧν εὐπορήσομεν τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐστὶ τέτταρα, ἐν μὲν τὸ προτάσεις λαβεῖν, δεύτερον δὲ ποσαχῶς ἕκαστον λέγεται δύνασθαι διελεῖν, τρίτον τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν, τέταρτον δ' ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέψις. In connexion with this practical employment in dialectic of the Categories as means of distinguishing τὰ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενα, it may be noted as not without significance that the Treatise on the Categories itself (whether written by Aristotle or not matters little) begins with the words δμώνυμα λέγεται.

With διὰ τὸ σύνεγγος εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν Jackson compares *Phys.* vii. 4. 249 a. 23 εἰσὶ τε τῶν ὁμωνυμιῶν αἱ μὲν πολλὰ ἀπέχουσαι, αἱ δὲ ἔχουσαι τινα ὁμοιότητα, αἱ δ' ἐγγὺς ἢ γένει ἢ ἀναλογία, διὸ οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὁμωνυμίαι εἶναι οὐσαι.

καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δήλη μάλλον (ἢ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλή a. 23. ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν)] It is not where the δμώνυμα are particulars plainly distinguished by their 'outward appearance' (Peters), *e. g.* Collarbone and Key, that ὁμωνυμία is dangerous. It is when we are dealing with abstractions or general notions that it is likely to escape our notice and lead us into error: see *An. Post.* ii. 13.

1120 a. 28. 97 b. 30 αἱ ὁμωνυμίας λαμβάνουσι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς καθόλου ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις. Undetected ὁμωνυμία prevents the discovery of truth by causing us to connect together notions or facts which have nothing or little in common. From the comparison of such notions or facts no scientific results can be obtained, since scientific discovery requires the comparison of things which are similar (ἢ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέψις), their similarity, as science understands similarity, being that which strikes us after we have carefully noted their differences (τὰς διαφορὰς εἰρεῖν); while it is impossible to note their differences till we have cleared the ground by dissolving any false associations due to ὁμωνυμία which may exist in our minds (παραχῶς ἕκαστον λέγεται διελεῖν): see *Top.* i. 13. 105 a. 21 quoted above. Ὀμώνυμα, in short, as such, are not comparable for scientific purposes: but τὸ συνώνυμον πᾶν συμβλητόν *Top.* i. 15. 107 b. 17.

δήλη μᾶλλον] 'Comparatively plain.' Grant. Cf. *De Gen. et Cor.* 321 b. 30 ἢ γὰρ ἕλλη ἐτέρα οὐσα δήλη μᾶλλον τοῦ εἶδους ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐπὶ σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν. Spengel suggests (wrongly) μᾶλλον δήλη (*Arist. Studien Nic. Eth.* i. p. 207) for δήλη μᾶλλον—'Das letzte Wort (μᾶλλον) gehört nicht zu δήλη, sondern zu πόρρω, so viel als πορρωτέρω. Seine jetzige Stellung ist kaum zu rechtfertigen, vielleicht genügt es ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω μᾶλλον δήλη zu setzen.'

a. 30. κλείς] Zell and others quote Plutarch, *Reg. et imp. arophihegmatia* 9 τῆς δὲ κλειδὸς αὐτῷ (Philip) κατεαγείσης ἐν πολέμῳ, καὶ τοῦ θεραπεύοντος ἰατροῦ πάντως τι καθ' ἡμέραν αἰτοῦντος, Λάμβανε, ἔφη, ὅσα βούλει τὴν γὰρ κλείν ἔχεις.

When ἡ καθόλου δικαιοσύνη and ἡ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνη are here said to be ὁμώνυμα, it is obvious that the term is not to be taken in the strict sense of ἓν τὸ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν (*Cat.* i. 1 a. 1), i. e. of τὰ κυρίως ὁμώνυμα λεγόμενα ἃ ἔστι τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης (Alexander Aph. *Met.* p. 197, line 12, ed. Bonitz); for, as Mich. Eph. says in his note on the present passage—τῶν δικαιοσυνῶν . . . ἢ μὲν ἔστιν ὡσπερ γένος δικαιοσύνη κατὰ πάσης ἀρετῆς, ἢ δὲ ὡσπερ ταύτης εἶδος. ὥστε ὡς μὲν γένος καὶ εἶδος συνώνυμα ἔσονται ἐπιδέχονται γὰρ τὰ εἶδη τῶν τῶν γενῶν ὀρισμῶν. Below (v. 2. 6, on which see note) they are actually called συνώνυμα. In fact, the two kinds of δικαιοσύνη (or of ἀδικία) are said to be ὁμώνυμα with as much or as little right as the things called ἀγαθὰ are said in *Top.* i. 15. 107 a. 3-17 to be ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενα. The statement made 107 a. 11 ὥστε ὁμώνυμον τὸ ἀγαθόν certainly cannot be reconciled with *E. N.* i. 6. 12. 1096 b. 27 οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε (*sc.* τὸ

ἀγαθόν) τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις, unless we allow a latitude in 1120 a. 30. the use of the term ὁμώνυμα which the definition in *Cat.* i. 1 a. 1 does not prepare us for. The ὁμώνυμα of that definition are merely τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, whereas the kinds of justice (like the various ἀγαθὰ) are only called ὁμώνυμα by an exaggeration, perhaps justified by the circumstance that the points in which they differ are very apt to be overlooked. In strict Aristotelian language they are neither ὁμώνυμα nor yet συνώνυμα, but τὰ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα—see *Met.* Z. 4. 1030 b. 2 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικὸν σῶμα καὶ ἔργον καὶ σκεῦος λέγεται οὔτε ὁμωνύμως οὔτε καθ' ἐν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐν—on which Alexander (p. 441. 13, ed. Bonitz) has οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἰατρικὸν σῶμα καὶ σκεῦος οὔτε ὁμωνύμως λέγεται οὔτε καθ' ἐν καὶ συνώνυμως [cf. Alex. *Met.* p. 199. 20 καθ' ἐν μὲν λεγόμενα λέγει τὰ συνώνυμα καὶ ὑφ' ἐν τι κοινὸν τεταγμένα γένος], ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐν, ἦγον ὡς τὰ ἀφ' ἐνός τε καὶ πρὸς ἐν—e. g. a drug, a bandage, and a lancet are all called ἰατρικά because they are ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, depend upon, are prescribed by, or used by medical science: exercise, fresh air, and food are all called ὑγιεινά because they are πρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν, have Health in view as their end: see Alex. *Met.* 197. 2 τὰ δὲ ἀφ' ἐνός τε καὶ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα οὔτε τὴν τῶν συνωνύμων ἰσοτιμίαν πρὸς τὸ κατηγοροῦμενον σώζει· πρὸς ἀλλήλα, οὔτε πάλιν ἔχει τὴν τῶν ὁμωνύμων ἄκρατόν τε καὶ ἄμικτον ἑτερότητα, ἀλλ' ἔστι τις αὐτοῖς κοινωμία κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ταῦτα ἃ λέγεται τῷ εἶναι τινα φύσιν ἐκείνου τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ταύτην ἐν τοῦτοις πως ἐνορῶσθαι πᾶσιν, ἀφ' οὐ ὄντα ἢ πρὸς ὃ λόγον ἔχοντά τινα διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος κεκοινώνηκεν αὐτοῦ . . . οὐ μόνον ὄνοματος κεκοινώνηκε τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἀλλήλα ὡς τὰ κυρίως ὁμώνυμα λεγόμενα ἃ ἔστι τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰτίαν τινα ἔχει τοῦ ὁμοίως ἀλλήλοις ὀνομάσθαι.

Thus ἡ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰχένα τῶν ζῴων and ἡ τὰς θύρας κλείουσιν are both called κλείς and are ὁμώνυμα: horse and ox are both called ζῴων and are συνώνυμα or καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα: a bandage and a drug are both called ἰατρικά, and are ἀφ' ἐνός καὶ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα. It is under this third head, then, that the two kinds of justice really fall. Ὁ ἴσος, the fair man, and ὁ νόμιμος, the man who has all the social ἀρεταί, are both called δίκαιοι, because the moral quality or complex of qualities characterised in each case is ἀφ' ἐνός, i. e. ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς—is produced by the chief science; and is an instrument in its hands πρὸς ἐν, i. e. πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. Similarly Eudemus and the writer of *M. M.* describe the kinds of φιλία as πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα—*E. E. N.* 2. 1236 a. 16 ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἶδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ' ἐν ἀπίστας μῆδ' ὡς εἶδη ἐνός γένους, μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως πρὸς

1129 a. 30. μίαν γάρ τινα λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὡσπερ τὸ ἱατρικόν. Cf. *M. M.* ii. 11. 1209 a. 19-31. Similarly Alex. (*Met.* p. 197) places τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ σχῆμα, and ὁ ἀριθμὸς under τὰ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα. For the sense, however, in which Particular and Universal Justice may be called συνώνυμα see note on v. 2. 6.

a. 31. § 8. ποσαχῶς] τὸ ποσαχῶς ἕκαστον λέγεται διελεῖν is the second of the four ὄργανα δι' ὧν εὐπορήσομεν τῶν συλλογισμῶν enumerated in *Top.* i. 13. 105 a. 23. The first—τὸ προτάσεις λαβεῖν—has been employed in § 3.

a. 32. καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος] NC, Par. 1853, Bywater: other MSS., however, have the article before ἄνισος: and K^b and CCC for καὶ ὁ ἄνισος read καὶ ἄδικος, a circumstance which may be thought to favour the view of Trendelenburg, Ramsauer, and Jackson, who reject καὶ ὁ ἄνισος. 'These words (καὶ ὁ ἄνισος),' says Jackson, 'which after Trendelenburg I have bracketed, but which Bekker retains, cannot be said to destroy the sense, as they might be taken as an explanation of ὁ πλεονέκτης [this apparently is the view of the scribe of NC and Bywater, who omit the article before ἄνισος]. But they are certainly awkward, especially as the same idea is introduced with a justificatory explanation in § 11. See Trendelenburg's *Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie* ii. 354. I conceive that the scribe, not seeing that the word πλεονέκτης suggested ἴσος as its correlative, bridged the apparent gap by anticipating § 11.' On the other hand, Hampke, with the approval of Spengel (*Aristotelische Studien* i. 207), brackets the words καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης. Their omission would, of course, make the clause more symmetrical: but the opening words of § 9 seem to show that they must be retained. On the whole, the omission of the article before ἄνισος seems to be the easiest way out of the difficulty. For a remarkable criticism of τὸ ἀδικεῖν = τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν see Plato, *Gorgias* 483 B-484 B: the gist of it is contained in the following words—νόμος μὲν τοῦτο ἀδικον καὶ αἰσχρὸν λέγεται τὸ πλεόν ζητεῖν ἔχει τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν ἢ δέ γε, οἴμαι, φύσις αὐτῆ ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιον ἐστὶ τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλεόν ἔχει καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχού ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν δλαῖς ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέρριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχει καὶ πλεόν ἔχει. Cf. Menander (*Meineke* iv. 359) ἰσότητα δ' αἴρου καὶ πλεονεξίαν φύγε.

b. 1. § 9. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος] Τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀδικον is τὸ ἄνισον. But τὸ ἄνισον, which is the generic term (τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν

§ 11), has two species, τὸ πλεόν and τὸ μείον. As, however, the man 1129 b. 1. who habitually disregards ἰσότης almost invariably does so for his own advantage, τὸ πλεόν is practically identical with τὸ ἄνισον. The ἄνισος with whom we are practically concerned is the πλεονέκτης. The μειονέκτης—the man who will not stand up for his rights when he knows that he is being unfairly treated—is not often met with, and may be neglected. Not to be confounded with the μειονεξία properly so-called of the man who (reluctantly, of course—see V. 9 and 11) allows himself to be unfairly treated is the merely apparent μειονεξία of the man who chooses τὸ μείον κακόν, for this is really πλεονεξία. L^b and B³ read καί (adopted by Bekker) before πλεονέκτης: this καί might be defended as accentuating the term πλεονέκτης, and calling attention to the fact that the ἄνισος with whom we have practically to do is the πλεονέκτης not the μειονέκτης—'Since the unjust man is not merely unfair (ἄνισος) but unfair to his own advantage (καὶ πλεονέκτης).'

περὶ τὰγαθὰ ἔσται] Cf. *Rép.* 359 C τὴν πλεονεξίαν πᾶσα φύσις b. 2. διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμος δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμήν.

οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα . . .] The πλεονέκτης seeks to have more than his fair share of τὰ ἔκτος ἀγαθὰ. To seek to have τὰ περιψυχὴν (see *E. N.* i. 8. 2) in as large measure as possible is not πλεονεξία: see *E. N.* ix. 8. 11. 1169 a. 34 ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται εαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλεόν νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλων εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται ὡς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή. These ἔκτος ἀγαθὰ are ἀπλῶς αἰεὶ ἀγαθὰ, τινὲ δ' οὐκ αἰεὶ—i. e. they are *in themselves* good things, although *in certain relations* (which must be specified in each case) they may be evils. Thus it would be absurd to call 'money' a bad thing. The term 'money,' taken by itself without qualification (ἀπλῶς), suggests the idea of something good; although when we qualify it, and speak of 'the profligate's money' (τῷ), it suggests the idea of something bad: cf. *Top.* ii. 11. 115 b. 33 ὁ ἄν μηδενὸς προστιθεμένου δοκῆ εἶναι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἀπλῶς ῥηθήσεται.

Πλεονεξία puts into practice the false theory of life which is criticised in *E. N.* i. 10. That theory placed εὐδαιμονία in external εὐτυχία—in the mere presence of (as distinguished from the proper use of) those things ὧν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς (*E. N.* i. 9. 7. 1099 b. 27—cf. the ἀναγκαῖα ἐξ ὑποθέσεως of *Phys.* ii. 9, and τὸ οὐ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ of *Met.* A. 7.

1129 b. 2. 1072 b. 12). This false theory of life, then, the *πλεονέκτης* puts into practice, making the accumulation of these external good things, which are only *means* to the noble life, his end. He pursues τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ without considering whether they are or are not, as possessed by him, conducive to his own true welfare (αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ)—*i. e.* conducive to the ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετήν. Of all the forms of vice, his is the most *unprincipled*—involves the most systematic neglect of the ideal, and is the most degrading to the moral character, inasmuch as it is the abuse of those external good things which are materially necessary to the practice not only of justice but of all the other social virtues. Mich. Eph. has the following note here—εἰπὼν τὸν πλεονέκτην ἄδικον εἶναι περὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ, λέγει μὴ περὶ πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεονέκτην εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ ἢ τοῦ ῥήτορος ἱατρικώτερος ἢ ῥητορικώτερος σπεύδει γενέσθαι, οὔτε τοῦ μουσικοῦ μουσικώτερος καὶ τὸ πλεόν τούτων ἐν τούτοις ἔχειν· ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκείνα τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεονεκτεῖ ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς καὶ τῇ ἐαυτῶν φύσει ἀγαθὰ, τοῖς φαύλοις δὲ καὶ μοχθηροῖς οὐκ ἀγαθὰ. εἰσὶ δὲ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἰγίεια πλοῦτος κάλλος εὐγένεια ἀρχὴ ἐξουσία, ἃ τῇ ἐαυτῶν φύσει ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τοῖς φαύλοις κακὰ ἐστὶ· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν αἰσχος νόσος πένια.

b. 5. ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαι μὲν . . . αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ] A man, while choosing poverty and obscurity if these conduce to his true welfare,—the performance of duty,—ought to aspire to a life in which that welfare is more brilliantly realised through the proper use of wealth and social advantages.

Πλεονεξία then is related only to τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. There is no room for it, according to the Aristotelian doctrine, where the ἀρεταί are concerned. The μεγαλόψυχος in asserting a victorious personality before his contemporaries is not a πλεονέκτης, although ἐαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ πλεόν νέμων. We are tempted to ask, if not Aristotle, at least ourselves, the question—Is this self-centred culture which must have wealth and leisure, and must, on pain of losing its beautiful balance, shut its eyes to the surrounding misery and squalor, not a refined form of πλεονεξία after all? Or perhaps the more pressing question is that concerning 'the modern man,' in the notion of whose personality we include industrial and commercial success—distinguished by Aristotle as merely ἀναγκαῖον (or even βίαιον) from the καλόν, or life of culture, which constitutes the true personality of his citizen—If culture is perhaps πλεονεξία, what shall we say of the personality which

is constituted by the consciousness of success in commercial and industrial competition, and by the influence which attends such success? But the question is a far wider one than at first sight appears. It is the law not only of human society, but of the natural world, that the strong take to themselves the lion's share, and have become strong by doing so. Are we or are we not to have Types distinguished from their fellows by strength and beauty? It is practically to this final issue that the question is pushed in the remarkable passage quoted from the *Gorgias*—483 B, C, D—end of note on v. 1. 8.

§ 10.] Cf. *E. N.* v. 3. 15, 16.

b. 6.

§ 11.] After κοινόν all MSS. apparently except K^b and CCC b. 11. insert (with certain variations) the words καὶ παράνομος· τοῦτο γὰρ [ἢ παρανομία ἢ τοῖς ἄνιστοις] περιέχει πᾶσαν ἀδικίαν καὶ κοινόν ἐστὶ πάσης ἀδικίας. CCC, however, has these words on the margin, in the hand apparently of the original scribe.

§ 12. πὼς δίκαια] πὼς is added because all enactments are not just in the sense of aiming at the maintenance of ἰσότης. Many of them have no reference to the requirements of Particular Justice: they are just *in a certain sense*—*i. e.* they are just in the wide and loose sense, not in the narrow and technical sense. See Mich. Eph.—πρόσκειται δὲ τό πὼς δίκαιον, ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίως λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην πάντα τὰ νόμιμα δίκαια, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς. Πὼς = κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην is further explained by the words which follow in § 13, b. 17 ὥστε ἓνα μὲν τρόπον κ.τ.λ., where the μὲν is answered by ζητοῦμεν δὲ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην in chapter 2, § 1: but see below, note on § 13, b. 17.

§ 13. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων] 'The view given here of law,' says Grant, 'which is expressed still more strongly below, ch. 11, § 1, is quite different from modern views. Law is here represented as a positive system (though the instances quoted of its formulæ are all negative, μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν, &c.), aiming at the regulation of the whole of life, sometimes, however, with a bias of class-interests, and sometimes only roughly executed (ἀπεσχεδιασμένος). This educational and dogmatic character of the law was clearly exemplified to the greatest extent in the Spartan institutions. Athens rather prided herself (according to the wise remarks which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles) on leaving

1129 b. 14. greater liberty to the individual. But Plato and Aristotle both made the mistake of wishing for an entire state-control over individual life.' Cf. *E. N.* x. 9. 9 οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἐν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον. It must be remembered, however, in connexion with the statement οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων, that νόμος has a much wider meaning than *law*, and includes also all that we understand by *custom* as sanctioned by public opinion. However desirable Aristotle may have considered the extension of the sphere of law in the strict sense of the term, he could not have affirmed with any show of truth that 'the laws, as a matter of fact, have something to say about all that we do'—although it would be true to affirm that 'custom (whether sanctioned by law or by public opinion) has.' How largely the idea of *custom* enters into the connotation of νόμος may be seen from the statement *E. N.* v. 11. 1 ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει ὁ νόμος, ἀπαγορεύει, which is not true if νόμος be translated by *law*, but strictly true if it be understood generally as *custom*: e. g. custom or fashion does not tell Oxford undergraduates to go down to the River in academical dress; it therefore forbids them to do so. Nor do the Statutes of the University tell them; but the Statutes do not therefore forbid them. The Statutes are neutral in this matter, as in many other matters in which fashion takes a side. But see note on v. 11. 1, discussing Jackson's opinion.

b. 15. στοχαζόμενοι . . . τρόπον τοιοῦτον] As Rassow points out (*Forsch.* p. 76) the reference here is to the distinction between ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι in which the rulers rule for the good of all (τὸ συμφέρον πᾶσι) and παρεκβάσεις in which they rule for their own advantage (τὸ συμφέρον τοῖς κυρίοις); see *Pol.* iii. 6. 1276 a. 17 φανερόν τοῖν ὡς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν αὐταὶ μὲν ὀρθαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὕσαι κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον . . . iii. 7. 1279 a. 28 ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἰς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὀρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις: and cf. *E. N.* viii. 10.

Spengel (p. 207), supposing that the reference is to Democracy (πᾶσι), Aristocracy (τοῖς ἀρίστοις or τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετὴν), and Oligarchy or Monarchy (τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον), proposes to omit ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις or κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ, on the ground that

τοῖς ἀρίστοις = τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετὴν. Rassow prefers the omission 1129 b. 15. of the words ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις, and Jackson and Susemihl bracket them. Bywater, on the other hand, brackets the words κατ' ἀρετὴν, which are omitted by K^b and CCC. I venture to think that their omission by K^b is a blunder. Bekker, followed by Susemihl, places a comma after κυρίοις, and Rassow says 'κυρίοις mit κατ' ἀρετὴν zu verbinden verbietet der Sprachgebrauch, und Bekker ist vollkommen in seinem Rechte, wenn er vor κατ' ἀρετὴν ein Komma setzt.' But why should κατ' ἀρετὴν not relate to τοῖς κυρίοις, or even to τοῖς ἀρίστοις? See *Pol.* Δ. 5. 1293 b. 3 τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν. It seems to me to be the safer course to leave the text as it stands (either with κατ' ἀρετὴν or with ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν) in all MSS. except K^b and CCC, taking τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον πᾶσι to refer to the end of the ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι, and τὸ συμφέρον τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον to refer to the ends of the παρεκβάσεις: τοῖς ἀρίστοις, of course, not being the ἀριστοὶ ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν of *Pol.* Δ. 5, but the ἀριστοὶ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν = τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινα τρόπον τοιοῦτον, where the words κατ' ἀρετὴν must be understood to refer to the standard of high birth and military excellence, and the words κατ' ἄλλον τινα τρόπον τοιοῦτον to the other grounds—especially wealth—on the strength of which men claim to rule. The word τοιοῦτον seems to show that the writer thought of πολιτικὴ δύναμις and πλοῦτος rather than of ελευθερία (see *Pol.* Δ. 6. 1294 a. 10 ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν ὄρος ἀρετῆς, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δῆμον δὲ ελευθερία: cf. *E. N.* v. 3. 7)—i. e. of tyranny and of better and worse oligarchies, rather than of democracy, in which last the κοινὸν συμφέρον appears at least to be more regarded. I cannot, however, agree with those (e. g. Michelet and Spengel) who make the writer refer in the words τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον πᾶσι to the end of democracy. The antithesis between πᾶσι and τοῖς κυρίοις κατὰ κ.τ.λ. is so sharply pointed that we must believe the writer to have in his mind the distinction between ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι and παρεκβάσεις.

ὅστε ἓνα μὲν τρόπον κ.τ.λ.] As I have said, these words explain b. 17. the πῶς δίκαια = κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην δίκαια of the last §, μὲν being answered by δέ in ch. 2, § 1, 1130 a. 14. Jackson, however, opposes ἓνα μὲν τρόπον and προστάττει δέ (§ 14, 1129 b.

1129 b. 17. 19) and compares ch. 2, §§ 10, 11. 1130 b. 22 *σχεδόν* . . . 26 *κοινόν*—where *νόμιμα*, which promote virtue through education, are distinguished from *νόμιμα* which enforce the different virtues. I think that the broad distinction in v. 2. 10, 11 is rather between *τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενα*¹, and *τὰ ποιητικά τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς*—between the acts which proceed from, and the agencies which produce, virtue. These agencies are chiefly educational: but it is not, I take it, the writer's object to make a point of distinguishing between 'the indirect encouragement of the particular virtues by means of educational enactments' and their 'direct encouragement' (Jackson, p. 74) by means of commands and prohibitions, however important the distinction in itself may be; he merely wishes to show that both *τὰ πραττόμενα* (whether performed in consequence of the agent's possession of ὅλη ἀρετή, or merely in external conformity with its requirements—for ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς admits of both meanings: cf. *τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς* as a description of *τὰ ἰατρικὰ ὄργανα*) and *τὰ ποιητικά* (which are chiefly educational enactments) are called *νόμιμα*, and thus to exhibit the extent of the denotation of the term *νόμιμα*. Similarly in the passage before us (v. 1. 13, 14), I think that the words *προσάττει δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, instead of containing a statement contrasted with that introduced by the words *ἕνα μὲν τρόπον*, merely go into the details suggested by the words *καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς*. The *μόρια τῆς εὐδαιμονίας* (in Eudemian phraseology nearly = *τὰ μόρια τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς*, see *E. N.* vi. 12. 5) are the separate *ἀρεταί* enumerated in § 14, which are implanted by education (lasting throughout the whole lifetime of the citizen, see *E. N.* x. 9. 9) and enforced by law. In its educational, as well as in its strictly legal capacity, *νόμος* may be said *προσάττειν τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν* . . . *καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος κ.τ.λ.* Cf. *E. N.* ii. 6. 7 οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μυαῖ φαγείν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἐξ μῶς προσάξει—where the ἀλείπτης stands to the physique in the same relation in which *νόμος* in its educational capacity stands to the

¹ Instead of *πραττόμενα* corr. K^b, P^b, Ald., NC, CCC, B¹,³ and Γ read *προσταττόμενα*, adopted by Bywater, and apparently preferred by Susemihl (see Susem. *E. N. addend. et corr.* p. 246), who would substitute ὑπό (the reading of CCC) for ἀπὸ 1130 b. 22. Although the MS. authority seems on the whole to be against *προσταττόμενα*, that would not settle the matter between two such easily confounded words as *πραττόμενα* and *προσταττόμενα*. But internal evidence seems to me to be strongly in favour of *τὰ πραττόμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς* as contrasted with *τὰ ποιητικά τῆς ἀρετῆς*.

moral character: cf. also *E. N.* iii. 12. 8 ὡπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ 1129 b. 17. *κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν κ.τ.λ.*—where *προστάγματα* are evidently contemplated as *τὰ ποιητικά τῆς ἀρετῆς*. The writer of the *M. M.* i. 33. 1193 b. 2 evidently treats *προσάττει δὲ κ.τ.λ.* as explanatory of, not as in any way contrasted with, *ἕνα μὲν τρόπον κ.τ.λ.* He writes—*ἔστι δὲ διττὸν τὸ δίκαιον, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ νόμον. δίκαια γὰρ φασὶν εἶναι ἃ ὁ νόμος προσάττει· ὁ δὲ νόμος κελεύει τὰνδρεία πράττειν καὶ τὰ σώφρονα καὶ ἀπλῶς ἅπαντα ὅσα κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς λέγεται· διὸ καὶ, φασὶν, δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τελεία τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ δίκαια μὲν ἐστὶν ἃ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ νόμος τὰ κατὰ πάσας ἀρετὰς ὄντα προσάττει, ὁ ἄρα τοῖς κατὰ νόμον ἐμμένων δικαίως τελείως σπουδαῖος ἔσται, ὥστε ὁ δίκαιος καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τελεία τις ἀρετὴ ἐστίν· ἐν μὲν δὲ τι δίκαιον ἐν τε τούτοις ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ τούτο τὸ δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν περὶ ταῦτα δικαιοσύνην ζητοῦμεν.* Here plainly ἐν μὲν δὲ = ἕνα μὲν τρόπον of the passage before us (*E. N.* v. 1. 13) and ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ κ.τ.λ. = ζητοῦμεν δὲ γε κ.τ.λ. of *E. N.* v. 2. 1. 1130 a. 14.

τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς] Cf. *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 18 sqq.

b. 18.

§ 14.] See Fritzsche's note here for references to enactments b. 19. against the offences mentioned, and Muretus *ad loc.* Before *κατὰ 1129 b. 23* Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 60) advocates the insertion of *τά* read by L^b.

§ 15. ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον] The writer of the *M. M.*, b. 26. in the passage parallel to this, goes out of his way to distinguish ἡ ὅλη δικαιοσύνη from ἡ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνη in a somewhat misleading manner. His words are (i. 33. 1193 b. 12)—*κατὰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ δίκαια (i. e. τὰ νόμιμα generally) ἔστιν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὄντα δίκαιον εἶναι (ὁ γὰρ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος)· ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον ἄλλο τοῦ ἐρημένου κατὰ νόμον δίκαιον ἐστίν οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον δίκαιος οὖσιν καθ' αὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον· τούτο δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ ζητούμενος δίκαιος καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν περὶ ταῦτα.* Here he says that the temperate man may, *quā* temperate man, be virtuous *καθ' ἑαυτὸν* as well as *πρὸς ἕτερον*, whereas the fair man cannot, *quā* fair, be virtuous *καθ' ἑαυτὸν*, but is necessarily conceived as standing in a relation *πρὸς ἕτερον*. It is true, perhaps, that a man's temperance or intemperance *concerns* himself, at least immediately, more than it concerns other people; whereas his fairness or unfairness refers immediately and essentially to the interests of other people, *i. e.* cannot be conceived without reference to these interests: this,

1129 b. 26. however, is not what the writer of the present passage (*E. N.* v. 1. 15) is thinking of; but of *ἄλλη δικαιοσύνη* as distinguished from the co-extensive *ἄλλη ἀρετή* by being *πρὸς ἕτερον* (see § 20 of this chapter, and note). 'This Justice, then,' he says, 'is perfect excellence—perfect excellence, however, viewed not as a simple possession, but as putting its possessor in a certain relation to others.' I think that this statement (as well as that in § 20) is best explained by reference to the fact that the Aristotelian logic assigns *ἕξις* not only to the category of *ποιότης* (*Cat.* 8), but also to that of *πρὸς τι* (*Cat.* 7). As *ἐπιστήμη* is at once a *quality* of the *ἐπιστημῶν* and a *relation* in which he stands to the *ἐπιστητόν*, so *τελεία ἀρετή* is at once a *quality* of the *νόμος* and a *relation* in which he stands to the social environment which requires that quality. So, the colour of a flower is at once that which is simply red or blue, and that which attracts the bees.

The distinction, however, here drawn between *τελεία ἀρετή ἀπλῶς* and *τελεία ἀρετή πρὸς ἕτερον = δικαιοσύνη*, is merely a logical one, and we must not think of the *man* who has *δικαιοσύνη* as distinguished from the *man* who has *τελεία ἀρετή*. *Τελεία ἀρετή*, because *τελεία*, *i. e.* because it is the perfect organisation of all the special *ἀρεταί*, will maintain its possessor in active relations with the social environment in correspondence with which its development has been perfected: there cannot, in short, be *τελεία ἀρετή* without *ἡ τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις*. But the man whose *ἀρετή* is *ἀτελής*, *i. e.* the man in whom certain 'virtues' exist separately without having been organised in correspondence with the social environment as one great whole, will make a merely private and personal use of his 'virtues'—*e. g.* he will perform acts of 'courage' only when his own personal interests are concerned—when his *amour propre* is wounded—when he is angry—when he is afraid; he will be 'fair' to his friends, but unfair to strangers: 'temperate' so long as he is among his neighbours and acquaintances,—in short, he is one of those who *ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι*, *ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν*—'he can use his virtue, such as it is, in a narrow domestic way, but not as a citizen widely related to fellow citizens.'

With the *τελεία ἀρετή* of the present section compare the *καλοκαγαθία* of *E. E.* θ. 3. 1248 b. 8—1249 a. 16, which is described as *ἀρετὴ τέλειος*, and distinguished from the *ἕξις πολιτικὴ* of the Laconians and others who choose the *ἀρεταί* and the *ἔργα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς* not

καλοῦ ἕνεκα, but for the sake of *τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ—τιμὴ, πλοῦτος, σώματος* 1129 b. 26. *ἀρεταί, εὐτυχία, δυνάμεις*. Such are *ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες . . . καλοκαγαθίαν δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν*.

καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος κ.τ.λ.] Zell and Fritzsche quote *Iliad* xxii. 317 b. 28.

οἷος δ' ἀστὴρ εἶσι μετ' ἀστρασι νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ
Ἔσπερος, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσταται ἀστὴρ.

The comparison is assigned to Euripides by the New College Oxon. Scholiast Cod. 240 (see Bywater, *Hermes* v. 356) καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος· τοῦτο ἐξ Εὐριπίδου σοφῶς (*sic*) Μελομένηνης· λέγει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ δικαιοσύνας δὲ χρῆσεν πρόσωπον. Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* i. 6 (vol. i. p. 5. ed. Kirchhoff) ὡς καλὸν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης πρόσωπον καὶ οὔτε ἔσπερος οὔτε ἐφῶς οὔτω καλά: cf. *Enn.* vi. 6 (vol. ii. p. 67, Kirchhoff) δικαιοσύνη . . . ἥς ὡς ἀληθῶς καλὸν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ οὔτε ἔσπερος . . .

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετῇ ἐν] ἀρετῇ ἔστω is the reading b. 29. of Γ M^b Ald. Heliod. adopted by Bergk (*Poet. Lyr.* p. 360, 390). The authorship of the line is very doubtful: see New College Oxon. Schol. (Bywater, *Hermes* v. 356) καὶ παρομοιαζόμενοι φασὶ (originally φασὶν) τοῦτο Θεόγμου· εἴρηται δὲ οὕτως· βούλεο δ' εὐσεβέως ὀλίγοις σὺν χρήμασι οἰκεῖν ἢ πλοῦτεω ἀδίκως χρήματα πασάμενος ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσα ἀρετή. χώραν μέντοι παρομοίας ἐπέχει καὶ μέμνηται αὐτῆς ὡς παρομοίας Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ἡθῶν (originally θεῶν), ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἠθικῶν ὡς Φωκυλίδης αὐτοῦ μέμνηται. καὶ ἵσως καὶ Φωκυλίδης αὐτῷ ἐχρήσατο. Iamblichus (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. i. pp. 193, 4, ed. Meineke) refers to it as 'an old saying'—Ἰαμβλίχου ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς τῆς πρὸς Ἀνατολίον περὶ δικαιοσύνης· ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ τῶν ὄλων ἀρετῶν τέλος καὶ τὴν συναγωγὴν αὐτῶν συμπασῶν, ἐν ἧ δὴ πᾶσαι ἔνεσι συλλήβδην κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον, γένοιτο ἂν τις εἰς τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀγόμενος.

καὶ τελεία μάλιστα . . . ἀδυνατοῦσιν] These words have given the b. 30. critics much trouble. The difficulty is thus stated by Jackson (pp. 69, 70)—'From the opening words of this §, as well as from the argument generally, it is clear that the phrase *πρὸς ἕτερον* does not explain *τελεία*, but differentiates *δικαιοσύνη* from *τελεία ἀρετή*. This being so, it follows that the words *ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστὶν* do not justify the statement *καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή*, and that the words *ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν κ.τ.λ.* do not justify the statement *τελεία δ' ἐστίν*.' Jackson proposes to remove the difficulty by transposing

1129 b. 30. the words *καὶ τελεία μάλιστα* and *τελεία δ' ἐστίν*. Other critics make other suggestions (see Susemihl, *app. crit. ad loc.* for an exhaustive list of their views). I believe that Ueberweg's simple suggestion—the insertion of *τελεία* after *χρήσις ἐστίν*—which had occurred to me independently, is the best solution of the difficulty. If we make this insertion the meaning of the passage will be—'Justice is perfect excellence in the highest sense of the word "perfect" (*τελεία μάλιστα*), because it is the perfect employment (*χρήσις τελεία*) of perfect excellence, *i. e.* its employment not merely in one's own affairs but towards one's neighbour.' The clause *ὅτι δ' ἔχων κ.τ.λ.* explains *τελεία δ' ἐστὶ* (*sc. χρήσις*).

b. 31. *χρήσις*] 'The phrase *ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρήσις ἐστίν* [*sc. ἡ δικαιοσύνη*],' says Jackson (p. 70), 'is strange, since *χρήσις* is almost equivalent to *ἐνέργεια* (*Berlin Index*, s. v.), and a *ἔξις* can scarcely be identified with an *ἐνέργεια*; but cf. 2, § 10 quoted above. Apparently in this place *δικαιοσύνη* is the practice of the virtue, not the virtue itself. Aristotle would not have expressed himself so loosely.' The expression is certainly loose; but we ought not to go the length of supposing that 'in this place *δικαιοσύνη* is the practice of the virtue, not the virtue itself,'—for the writer immediately adds words which show that he is thinking of *δικαιοσύνη* as a *ἔξις*—*ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι*.

1130 a. 1. § 16. *ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει*] This—the reading of K^b—may be accepted as most probably correct. Susemihl prefers *ἀρχὰ τὸν ἄνδρα δείξει*. Zell quotes after Muretus *e proverbiis Graecis*—*ἀρχὴ τὸν ἄνδρα δείκνυσι, ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιεικῶν, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ ἀρχῇ βιαιῶν γενομένων*.

a. 2. *ἦδη*] 'because the officer is *ex hypothesi* in relation to others and a member of a community,' Jackson.

a. 3. § 17. *ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν*] The editors quote Plato, *Rep.* 343 C . . . *ἀγνοεῖς* (says Thrasymachus) *ὅτι ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος συμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθόμενου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη, ἢ δὲ ἀδικία τοῦναντίον*. Cf. *Gorgias* 483, and *E. N.* v. 6. 6 and 7.

'*Ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν ἢ δικαιοσύνη* expresses, in the portable form of an epigram or proverb, that view of life which is worked out on a larger scale in the various systems of 'ethical atomism' with which the student of the History of Philosophy is familiar. That view

of life—however expressed—assumes that self-love is the ultimate 1130 a. 3. spring of action. Another proverbial expression of the same view is 'Honesty is the Best Policy.' It is assumed that honesty or justice is something which a man *gives away* to his neighbour, for which he must be careful to get an adequate return; and the proverb asserts that, as a matter of fact, he *does* get such a return. The saying *ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν ἢ δικαιοσύνη*, on the other hand, suggests that he does *not* get an adequate return. It expresses the abstract point of view from which the poor man regards the capitalist, and generally the socially weaker the socially stronger; while the proverb 'Honesty is the Best Policy' expresses the desire (associated with an equally abstract or selfish point of view) of the man, whose position is already assured, that the political and economical *régime* under which he knows that he personally will continue to flourish may be maintained. Both proverbs represent the just man as an isolated individual who thinks only of himself—who knows that he is making a good bargain, or regrets that he is forced to make a bad one. The final cause of just action—*τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον* (see *Pol.* iii. 6. 1279 a. 17) is entirely ignored by these proverbs. The hope of gain or the fear of superior strength, by itself, could not make men act 'justly'; they would cheat, or perish in the attempt to resist, rather than act 'justly,' if hope of gain or fear of force were their only motive. If men act 'justly' it is because they really believe that *κάλλιστον τὸ δίκαιότατον*, and are drawn, *κατὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς θέειν*, to act in harmony with the law of that beautiful system in which they live and have their being; cf. Green's *Works* vol. ii. pp. 427 (Principles of Political Obligation: G. Will, not Force, is the basis of the State).

ἄλλω γὰρ . . . κοινῶν] *κοινῶν* is the reading of Γ, Ald., Heliod., a. 4. B¹, NC, accepted by Michelet. The weight of external authority is thus strongly in favour of *κοινῶν*, but such authority cannot be regarded as decisive here. The best MS. might easily omit the second of the two identical syllables in *κοινῶν*, or make *κοινῶν* into *κοινῶ* by dittograph. Accordingly we must allow internal considerations to decide between *κοινῶν* and *κοινῶν*. Michelet in support of *κοινῶν* says—'ἡ ἀρχοντι ἢ κοινῶν referendum est ad duplex civitatum genus quod Aristoteles *Pol.* iii. 7 exponit . . . *κοινῶν* non esset diversum ab ἀρχοντι cum ii, penes quos summa imperii est, participes sint civitatis (*κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πόλεως*).' Jackson reading

1130 a. 4. *κοινωνῶ* says—The alteration (Michelet's) is unnecessary. The words *ἢ ἀρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῶ* may be paraphrased: "either that of the governing class in the case of a *παρεκβεβηκυῖα πολιτεία*, or that of his fellow citizens in the case of a *πολιτεία ὀρθή*." Thus both Michelet and Jackson agree in recognising a reference to the distinction between those states in which the governors rule for the public good, and those in which they rule for their own private advantage. But is it likely that this Aristotelian distinction is referred to in a clause which states the ground on which (*γάρ*) some have maintained the very unaristotelian doctrine that justice is *ἄλλότριον ἀγαθόν*? It seems better to take the words to mean simply that the just man does what is to the advantage of another, that other being either his ruler (*ἀρχοντι*) or his neighbour (*κοινωνῶ*). In obeying the definite commands of his ruler he benefits his ruler; in dealing honestly with his neighbour he benefits his neighbour; but in neither case benefits himself. Further, the distinction between the *παρεκβεβηκυῖα πολιτεία* and the *ὀρθή πολιτεία* turns on a difference in the conduct of the *ἀρχοντες*: but the subject of *πράττει* is the *ἀρχόμενος*, or the justice of the *ἀρχόμενος*.

Reference to the distinction between the *παρεκβεβηκυῖα πολιτεία* and the *ὀρθαί πολιτεία* being thus excluded, we may decide in favour of the reading *κοινωνῶ*. The reading *κοινῶ*, originally due to a clerical slip, would maintain itself because it seemed to refer more pointedly than *κοινωνῶ* to this distinction which was not seen to be out of place in the context.

a. 6. § 18. *ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους*] Jackson says, 'The first *καὶ* means "even," *i. e.* "not merely towards his neighbour but"; not "both," because friends are looked upon as part of the man himself (ix. 4. 5) and therefore cannot be identified with the *ἕτερος*.' Rassow also (*Forsch.* p. 61), in answer to Nötel who would (with NC) omit the first *καὶ* and (with Mb) the second *πρὸς*, says—'was hindert, das erste *καὶ* in der Bedeutung von *vel* zu fassen?' I cannot help thinking that Rassow and Jackson are wrong here, and that we must take the first *καὶ* in the sense of 'both,' and *τοὺς φίλους* in the sense of 'his neighbours.' The writer is speaking about the *κάκιστος*, and it would be out of place in connexion with *him* to think of the doctrine of the identity of the *αὐτός* and the *φίλος*, which is formulated—as in the passage quoted here by Jackson (ix. 4. 5 *ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός*)—to

describe the relation between *good* men. The Paraph. Heliodorus 1130 a. 6. seems to me to be right with—*ὁ μὲν οὖν ἑαυτὸν τε βλάπτων τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ καὶ τοὺς φίλους κάκιστος· ὁ δὲ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς οὐ πρὸς τὸ οἰκείον κεχρημένος συμφέρων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀριστος ἐστί.*

ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 61) seems to be right in a. 7. preferring *ἀλλ' ὁ πρὸς ἕτερον*, the reading of r, H^a, N^b, O^b. He remarks that Bekker's *ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον* could stand only if the foregoing words were *ὁ μὴ πρὸς αὐτόν*. NC has *ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ πρὸς ἕτερον*.

§ 19. *οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετή*] Cf. *E. N.* vi. 12. 5 μέρος a. 9. *γὰρ οὐσα (sc. ἡ σοφία) τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς κ.τ.λ.*, where it would appear that *ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή* is the possession of all the *ἀρεταί*—*διανοητικαί* and *ἠθικαί*. The *ἀρετή* of τὸ *θρηπτικὸν μέρος (ἐγγίεια)*, however, is not an element in *ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή*: cf. *E. E.* ii. 1. 1219 b. 20 *εἴ τι μόριον ἐστί ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ θρηπτικόν, ἢ τούτου ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἔστι μόριον τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς, ὡς περ οὐδ' ἡ τοῦ σώματος*. Here (v. 1. 19) *δικαιοσύνη* in the wide sense of the term is identified with *ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή*: and if we are to bind the writer to the meaning given to *ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή* in *E. N.* vi and in *E. E.* ii quoted above, we must suppose that the *χρησις πρὸς ἕτερον* of intellectual as well as of moral excellence is included in the conception of universal *δικαιοσύνη*.

§ 20. *ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν πρὸς a. 12. ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ἢ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἀπλῶς, ἀρετή*] Grant brings out the meaning of this sentence with sufficient clearness—'But what the difference is between virtue and this kind of justice is clear from what we have said already. They are the same, only conceived differently; viewed as a relation to others, the state is justice; viewed as a state of the mind simply, it is virtue.' Here the comma is rightly placed after, not (as by Bekker) before, *ἀπλῶς*. Cf. *Μετ.* A. 10. 1075 b. 2 *τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ποιεῖ (ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς) τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῆ δ' ἀρχὴ καὶ ὡς κινούσα (συνάγει γὰρ) καὶ ὡς ὕλη· μόριον γὰρ τοῦ μίγματος· εἰ δὴ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκε καὶ ὡς ὕλη ἀρχὴ εἶναι καὶ ὡς κινῶντι, ἀλλὰ τό γε εἶναι οὐ ταυτό*—on which Bonitz says—'His verbis (τό γε εἶναι οὐ ταυτό) *notionis* significari diversitatem, quasi dicat: οὐ ταυτό ἐστί τὸ εἶναι ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶναι κινῶντι, apparet coll. *Τορ.* v. 4. 133 b. 33 *ἀλλ' ἄλλο λέγεται τῷ ἕτερον αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ εἶναι· οὐ ταυτό γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων τε τὸ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι καὶ λευκῶ ἀνθρώπων τὸ*

1130 a. 12. εἶναι λευκῆ ἀνθρώπων: *Phys.* iii. 3. 202 a. 20, b. 9, 12, 16, ubi promiscue usurpantur τὸ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό et ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός sive εἰς: i. 3. 186 a. 31. al.' Cf. also the following passages quoted by the various editors—*De An.* ii. 12. 424 a. 25, iii. 2. 425 b. 25 (ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μία, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ ταυτὸν αὐταῖς): *E. N.* vi. 8. 1: *De Mem.* i. 450 b. 21 (τὸ ἐν τῷ πίνακι γεγραμμένον ζῶν καὶ ζῶν ἐστὶ καὶ εἰκὼν τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἐν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἄμφω· τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταυτὸν ἐστὶν ἄμφω, καὶ ἐστὶ θεωρεῖν ὡς ζῶν καὶ ὡς εἰκόνα): *De Juv. et Sen.* i. 467 b. 25 (where it is pointed out that τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἐν may be τῶ εἶναι πλείω καὶ ἕτερα).

That *notion* or *conception* is meant by τὸ εἶναι in the present section (v. i. 20) is evident, I think, from the above parallels. Michelet, however, makes τὸ εἶναι here the 'sensible substance' as distinguished from the notion or λόγος, and quotes *Met.* M. 3. 1077 b. 12 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὕτε οὐσίαι μᾶλλον τῶν σωμάτων εἰσὶν, οὕτε πρότερα τῶ εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶ λόγῳ μόνον, οὕτε κειρωσμένα πού εἶναι δυνατόν, εἴρηται ἰκανῶς—adding, 'hoc loco τὸ εἶναι de sensibili substantia praedicatur quae per se existere queat: magnitudines autem mathematicae per se existere non posse dicuntur, sed a sensibilibus substantia sustentantur.' Similarly he explains the passage *De An.* iii. 2. 425 b. 25—αἰσθησις and αἰσθητὸν exist separately—τὸ εἶναι οὐ ταυτὸν αὐταῖς, but each *quod* separately existing is only a δύναμις. In actuality or ἐνέργεια, i. e. in real essence they are one. After all, this differs only verbally from Trendelenburg's explanation (*De An.* p. 435, first ed.)—'ubi res in sensum agit, sensus vero rem suscipit, ibi res et sensus in unum quasi concurrunt, ut utriusque actio quasi unam efficiat (ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ καὶ μία), utriusque vero natura per se diversa sit (τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ ταυτὸν αὐταῖς).' Then turning to the passage *E. N.* v. i. 20 Michelet says—'Notione et substantia virtus et iusticia universalis sunt idem, modo et ratione existendi (τῶ εἶναι) tantum differunt. Firmatur hic sensus τοῦ εἶναι ipsa explicatione quae sequitur, cum verba ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον existendi rationem alteram, alteram vocabula ἡ δὲ τοιαύδε ἕξις ἀπλῶς declarent. Sed non abnuerim hic diversis existendi modis etiam diversam essentiam contineri.' This last sentence seems to bear out the remark made above that the difference between Michelet's explanation of τὸ εἶναι in *De An.* iii. 2, and that of Trendelenburg and others, who take it as = *notion*, is really only verbal. The truth is that εἶναι is a term which takes its colour from its context, as a technical term of such common extraction might be expected to do. Sometimes

it means what a thing *is to the senses*, sometimes, what it *is to the scientific understanding*. However, in the majority of cases in which it is used *carefully* (as in the formula τὸ δ' εἶναι ἕτερον αὐτοῖς) it must be understood to mean what the thing *is to the scientific understanding*—i. e. as = τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, or λόγος. See Trendelenburg, *Rhein. Mus.* 1828, vol. ii. pp. 480, 481.

Turning now to *E. N.* v. i. 20, we may say that virtue and universal justice are the same state conceived from different points of view, just as the same road is regarded differently by the man who stands at the top of the hill and by the man who stands at the bottom: see *Met.* K. 10. 1066 a. 33 and *Phys.* iii. 3. 202 a. 20 καὶ τὸ ἄναπτες καὶ τὸ κάναπτες· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν, ὁ μέντοι λόγος οὐχ εἰς (*Phys.*), or ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι οὐχ ἐν (*Met.*). To the one man the road *is* downhill; to the other it *is* uphill. What the road *is* is different for each.

Virtue and universal justice, then, being the same state conceived from different points of view, virtue is the state conceived simply as a state; justice is the state conceived as putting its possessor in a certain relation to society. Here the difference τῶ εἶναι between virtue and justice is evidently that between things assigned to different γένη τῶν ὄντων (see *Met.* Δ. 28. 1028 b. 13), to the category of quality and to the category of relation respectively. Now, as was pointed out in note on v. i. 15, ἕξις is assigned not only to the category of ποιότης (*Cat.* 8), but also to that of πρὸς τι (*Cat.* 7). The moral ἕξις, then, considered under the category of ποιότης, is simply the *quality*, ἀρετή, and nothing more (ἀπλῶς); considered under the category of πρὸς τι, it is this quality viewed as putting its subject in a certain *relation to others*—δικαιοσύνη: and, being in different categories, ἀρετή and δικαιοσύνη differ τῶ εἶναι, for the categories are the κατηγορία τοῦ ὄντος (*Met.* Θ. 1. 1045 b. 28) 'h. e. modi quibus esse aliquid dicimus' (Bonitz, *ad loc.*). Cf. *Met.* Δ. 7. 1017 a. 22 καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ εἶναι λέγεται ὅσαπτερ σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας· ὅσαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται τοσαυταχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει· ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν τί ἐστὶ σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ ποίον, τὰ δὲ ποσόν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι, τὰ δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, τὰ δὲ πού, τὰ δὲ ποτέ, ἐκάστῳ τούτων τὸ εἶναι ταῦτό σημαίνει: on which Alexander (331 l. 27) has—τὴν γὰρ οἰκείαν ὑπορξὴν ἐκάστου σημαίνει τὸ ὄν ὁμώνυμον . . . δεκαχῶς καὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ εἶναι βηθήσεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῇ οὐσίᾳ συντασσόμενον εἶναι τὴν οὐσιώδη ὑπαρξὴν σημαίνει, τῶ δὲ ποσῶ τὴν ὡς ποσοῦ κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Met.* Γ. 2. 1003 b. 5 καὶ τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μὲν, ἀλλ' ἅπαν

1130 a. 12, πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας κ.τ.λ. Cf. *An. Pr.* i. 37. 49 a. 6 τὸ δὲ ὑπάρχειν τὸδε τῷδε καὶ τὸ ἀληθεύειν τὸδε κατὰ τοῦδε τοσαυταχῶς ληπτέον ὅσαχῶς αἱ κατηγορίαι δῆμηνται.

Mich. Eph. has the following comment on the present section—*τῷ μὲν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔν ἐστι (sc. ἀρετῇ and δικαιοσύνη), πῆ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ὡς ἕξις ψυχῆς σκοπῆται ἀρίστη καὶ μηδὲν πλέον, ἀρετῇ λέγεται, ὅταν δὲ ὡς χρῆσις πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη ὀνομάζεται.*

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

Concerning the second kind of justice, i.e. the justice which is a particular virtue, not the virtuous character as a whole: and concerning the corresponding injustice.

There is such a kind of injustice, for 'taking too much' is a distinct kind of wrong doing, which has as much right to be assigned to its own vice as running away in battle, and using abusive language, have to be assigned to their respective vices. In these latter cases it is true that we have special names cowardice and bad temper for the vices; whereas for the vice which disposes a man to take too much we have no special name, only the general name of all vice—injustice. But the absence of a special name must not be allowed to make us overlook the existence of the vice, which not only has its own acts which cannot be mistaken, but even displays itself sometimes in acts commonly assigned to other vices, as e.g. when adultery is committed for gain, not from lust. In short, when a man has taken more than his share of gain we say that he is unjust, as we say that he is cowardly when he runs away in battle, or profligate when he has committed adultery. Thus we must distinguish injustice in the specific sense, and injustice in the generic sense—two states which have the same name and involve the same notion of 'relation towards other people,' but differ in that injustice in the specific sense is concerned with social position, money, and other external good things, which men take pleasure in acquiring too much of at the expense of their neighbours, whereas injustice in the generic sense is concerned with the whole sphere of man's activity as a moral agent.

'Contrary to law' being the whole under which 'unfair' falls as a part, particular injustice, which is relative to the unfair, will be a 'part' of universal injustice, which is relative to that which is contrary to law. Similarly, particular justice is a part of universal justice. With universal injustice, then, which is coextensive with that vice against which all legislation and state educa-

tion are directed, and with universal justice, which is coextensive with that virtue which all legislation and state education strive to produce, we have now no more to do: nor shall we at present discuss the question whether there is or is not another kind of virtue—that of the good man, as such,—produced by other agencies than those of legislation and state education:—our present subject is particular justice.

Particular justice is of two kinds, (1) distributive, and (2) corrective: and corrective justice finds a place both in (a) voluntary transactions (e.g. buying, lending), and in (b) involuntary transactions, whether these latter imply stealth and deception, as theft, or violence, as murder.

§ 1. τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην] Spengel (p. 207) rejects 1130 a. 14. ἀρετῆς as an explanatory addition. The passages collected by Waitz (*Organon* i. 375) and Eucken (*über den Sprachgebrauch des Ar.* p. 24 sq.), to whom Jackson (*ad loc.*) refers, for the equivalence of ἐν μέρει and κατὰ μέρος, give no instance of ἐν μέρει with a genitive; but below § 3. 1130 a. 23 we have καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου = ὡς μέρος τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου.

§§ 2-5.] Nötel (*Quaest. Arist. Specimen* p. 11) would omit § 5, a. 16. because it merely repeats the argument of § 2. But we must not press the writer too hard in a passage like this, remembering that we have here merely to do with σημεῖα, and that grounds which might easily be shown to be logically identical, may present themselves superficially in popular thought and language as different, and hence may be used as distinct σημεῖα by a method which appeals to such thought and language. The writer wishes to show that there is such a vice as 'particular injustice.' In § 2 he enumerates the various acts which are considered wrong (*i.e.* unjust in the general sense), and assigns them to the special vices from which they spring, in order to show that the act of 'taking too much' (ὅταν πλεονεκτῇ) exists as a wrong act distinct from the others, and is left without an explaining vice, unless we admit the existence of 'particular injustice' (ἡ ἐν μέρει ἀδικία). In § 4 he shows further that this vice of particular injustice must sometimes be assumed to account for acts which seem at first sight to proceed from other vices—as when an act of adultery does not proceed from ἀκολασία but from the desire of gain—τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα: and in § 5 he finally clinches the matter by means of this term κερδαίνειν, which has turned up in § 4, pointing out that, as we always refer other wrong actions (ἀδικήματα) to their definite vices—adultery to ἀκολασία, flight to δειλία, so, as a matter of fact, we always refer an

1130 a. 16. act from which a man derives gain unfairly (*εἰ ἐκέρδανεν*) to *ἀδικία*. The reference here is evidently to as definite a vice as it is in the case of adultery or flight; but this definite vice has only the *general name* 'injustice'—*ἀδικία*. The name therefore is to be understood here in a *specific sense*. He has, in short, found that *κερδαίνειν* has a well-recognised coordinate place in popular language by the side of *μοιχεύειν*, &c., and gives as definite a sense to the *ἀδικία* from which it proceeds as is possessed by *ἀκολασία*, &c. At the same time it must be conceded to those who, with Nötel, would omit § 5, that its omission would not materially weaken the argument. Its retention, however, is to be defended on the ground that, occurring in a passage which appeals to popular language, it makes use of the term *κερδαίνειν*, whereas the term employed in § 2 is *πλεονεκτεῖν*. The difference between *πλεονεκτεῖν* and *κερδαίνειν* may not be great; but we must remember that *κέρδος* is a term which is to hold a prominent place in the subsequent discussion of particular justice, and is worth dwelling on in an introductory passage like the present¹. Before leaving this question of the relation of § 5 to the preceding sections, we must notice Susemihl's attempt to meet Nötel's difficulty by placing a comma after *κερδαίνειν* 1130 a. 28, and reading *ὅτι* for *ἔτι* in the same line. I do not think the change necessary, and Susemihl is mistaken in saying that K^b has *ὅτι* here. It is in line 24, not in line 28, that K^b has *ὅτι* for *ἔτι*.

a. 22. § 2. καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν] καὶ = ἦτοι.

a. 27. § 4. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν] *sc.* ἄδικος λέγεται. Fritzsche.

a. 33. § 6. συνώνυμος . . . δύναμιν] Cf. *E. N.* v. 1. 7, where universal and particular injustice were said to be *ὁμώνυμα*, and see note *ad loc.*, in which it was pointed out that, as there regarded, they are more properly τὰ πρὸς ἕν λεγόμενα than *ὁμώνυμα*. Here, however, they are regarded from a somewhat different logical point of view, and can, with technical correctness, be called *συνώνυμα*. They are regarded, in short, as belonging to the same Category (*ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει*)—that of Relation (*ἄμφω ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν*);

¹ Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 17) says '1130 a. 28-32 (§ 5) ist wohl mit Unrecht von Nötel als Wiederholung von 1130 a. 16-22 (§ 2) verdächtigt. So verwandt nämlich die beiden Abschnitte dem Inhalte nach sind, so ist doch noch ein Unterschied der Gedanken zu erkennen.' Unfortunately Rassow does not explain his view of the nature of this difference.

and thus having the same *τί ἐστιν* or *οὐσία* (viz. the *τί ἐστιν* or *οὐσία* 1130 a. 33. characteristic of the *σχῆμα*, *γένος*, or Category of *πρὸς τι*), they are properly *συνώνυμα*: for (*Cat.* 1. 1 a. 6) *συνώνυμα λέγεται ὡν τὸ τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός*. For the doctrine that the *τί ἐστιν* which the *ὁρισμὸς* declares has a different character in each category see *Met. Z.* 4. 1030 a. 17 καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται: καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστὶ ἕνα μὲν τρόπον σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τότε τι, ἄλλον δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν κατηγορουμένων, ποσόν, ποιόν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πρώτως τοῖς δ' ἐπομένως, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, πῶς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποιὸν ἐροίμεθ' ἂν τί ἐστὶν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν τῶν τί ἐστὶ μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς.

On the passage before us (v. 2. 6) Mich. Eph. has the following—*ἔθος δὲ Ἀριστοτέλει συνώνυμα λέγειν, καὶ τὰ ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν λεγόμενα, ἃ ὡς ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, μεταξύ ἐστὶ τῶν τε συνωνύμων καὶ τῶν κυρίως ὁμωνύμων, ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λέγεται. ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον. ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοῦ παρόντος βιβλίου μέχρι καὶ τοῦδε τὴν ἐν μέρει κακίαν συνώνυμον λέγει τῇ ὅλη κακίᾳ, ἥτοι τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀδικίαν τῇ ὅλῃ ἀδικίᾳ, εἰσὶ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ συνώνυμοι, ἀλλὰ μέσαι τῶν συνωνύμων καὶ ὁμωνύμων. δι' ὧν παρατίθεται ἐμφαίνει ὡς οὐχ ἀπλῶς συνωνύμως τὰς ἀδικίας ἐκάλει, ἀλλὰ πῆ, ὅλα ἐστὶ τὰ ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν, ἃ τῶν μὲν τινὰ συνώνυμα ἐστὶν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικά δέδεικται, τρόπον δὲ τινὰ ὁμώνυμα. καθ' ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ὁ ὁρισμὸς αὐτῶν, ὡς αὐτὸς φησὶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ, κατὰ τοῦτο συνώνυμον ἐστὶ. πῶς δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ ἐν τίνι γένει ἐδήλωσεν εἰπὼν—ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον, ἢ τε κοινῇ ἀδικίᾳ, καὶ ἢ κατὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἢ ἐπὶ μέρος λέγομεν. ἀμφότεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀδικίαι ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἁμαρτάνειν τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσι. κατὰ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο συνώνυμοι εἰσὶ. καθ' ὅσον δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν μέρει ἀδικία ἢ κατὰ πλεονεξίαν περὶ τιμὴν ἐστὶ καὶ χρήματα—λέγει δ' ἂν τιμὴν καὶ χρήματα τὰ τυχερὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν—ἐν οἷς δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους ἢ πλεονεξία, ἢ δὲ καθόλου ἀδικία περὶ πάντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ νόμιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος, κατὰ δὴ τοῦτο πάλιν ὁμώνυμοι εἰσὶν αἱ ἀδικίαι. It will be observed that Mich. Eph. here describes the common *γένος* or category of the two kinds of justice as a common *εἶναι*.*

περὶ τιμὴν . . . καὶ δι' ἡδονήν] Here apparently the *sphere* and the *b. 2. motive* of particular injustice are distinguished: but the Paraph. Heliod. has ἡ μὲν μερικὴ περὶ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν ἢ περὶ ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους.

The *ἄδικος*, in the specific sense, actuated by the desire of 'gain,' seeks to have more than his share of social consideration, money,

1130 b. 2. or personal security (e.g. he tries to avoid risks which he should share equally with his fellow-citizens); the *ἄδικος* in the wide sense of the term is he who fails in all, or some, of those various social relations in which the good man succeeds.

b. 6. §§ 7-11.] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 17) suspects the whole passage, 1130 b. 6 ὅτι . . . 1130 b. 29 παντί. After refusing to accept Nötel's view that 1130 a. 28-32 is a repetition of 1130 a. 16-22, he says 'Eher hat man Grund, an der ersten Hälfte des folgenden Capitels (bis 1130 b. 29) Anstoss zu nehmen, die den Charakter grosser Breite und Weitschweifigkeit trägt und die sich ohne alle Beeinträchtigung des Gedankenganges aus dem Texte ausscheiden lässt. So sind die Worte (Z. 16) ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον κ.τ.λ. ganz leer, da schon das vorhergehende Capitel von der justitia particularis gehandelt hat. Vor allem befremdend aber ist das Zurückkommen auf das νόμιμον δίκαιον, über das schon, p. 1129 b. 11 ff. des längeren gesprochen ist.' The passage is certainly chargeable with the faults here brought against it by Rassow; but to bracket it, with Susemihl, is to pledge oneself to a more definite theory of the authorship and composition of this Book than I am prepared to do.

b. 7. παρὰ τὴν ὄλην ἀρετήν] Spengel (pp. 207, 8) rejects ἀρετήν as a blundering insertion: it is δικαιοσύνην which must be understood after ὄλην.

τίς δὲ καὶ ποία τις] For this phrase see note on *E. N.* i. 7. 19, a. 31.

b. 8. § 8. διώρισταί κ.τ.λ.] 'now, two senses of "the unjust" have been distinguished, viz. "the illegal" and "the unfair."'

b. 10. § 9. ἐπεὶ . . . b. 14. ὅλα] Bekker's text here is ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλεόν οὐ ταῦτόν ἀλλ' ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἅπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλεόν), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταῦτά, ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη, τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα. This text seems to be given, without admixture, only by L^b and N^b. All other MSS. mix it up more or less with readings belonging to the text adopted by Bywater. The only possible explanation of the text given by L^b and N^b is that offered by Mich. Eph. and accepted by Michelet and Grant—viz. that as the ἄνισον is a genus under which the πλεόν falls as a species (the ἔλαττον being the other

species), so universal justice is a genus under which particular 1130 b. 10. justice falls as a species (courage, temperance, &c. being the other species),—'what is said about "more" and "unequal" having nothing to do with πλεονεξία, but being simply an illustration of a part included by a whole'—Grant: or, as Mich. Eph. puts it—ἐξ ἀναλόγου τινὸς δέικνυσι τὴν διαφορὰν τῆς τε μερικῆς ἀδικίας καὶ τῆς μερικῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ὄλης, δυνάμει λέγων, ὡς τὸ πλεόν πρὸς τὸ ἄνισον οὕτως ἡ μερικὴ δικαιοσύνη πρὸς τὴν ὄλην δικαιοσύνην. Now, putting aside for the moment the question of the MS. authority for the text which calls for this interpretation, we may note the following difficulties connected with the interpretation itself in its context. In § 8 τὸ ἄνισον marks the sphere of particular injustice: here, in the very next section, we are asked to believe that it 'has nothing to do with πλεονεξία,' but is introduced (with τὸ πλεόν) simply as 'an illustration.' And of what? Of the relation of part to whole: as if that required illustration. Further, ἐπεὶ is a conjunction which introduces a reason, not a mere illustration or parallel. Again,—although this may perhaps seem a small point—if τὸ ἄνισον is the genus or whole, and τὸ πλεόν the species or part, the order being (1) ἄνισον and (2) πλεόν, why have we this order reversed in the explaining clause ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον? (cf. Jackson, p. 74, who notices this last point).

From this review of the ἀπορίαι suggested by the interpretation of it we see that Bekker's text cannot possibly be right. The protasis introduced by ἐπεὶ must give the reason for the apodosis καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταῦτά ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα¹: but the relation of the ἄνισον to the πλεόν as Mich. Eph., Michelet, and Grant explain it (and their explanation is the only one consistent with the parenthesis of Bekker's text), is not a reason. Accordingly Bekker's text must be altered so as to make ἐπεὶ introduce a reason. Now, the reason why particular justice is a 'part' of universal justice can only be that it is (as notion—τὸ ἄδικον, and state—ἡ ἀδικία) related to a definite part of that field of conduct with the entire extent of which universal justice is concerned. The text adopted by Jackson, Susemihl, Ramsauer, and Bywater, with ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον κ.τ.λ., supplies this reason. Another internal ground for reading παράνομον, though a small one in com-

¹ I shall give my reason below for beginning the apodosis here, with most editors, not at ὥστε (line 16) with Jackson and Susemihl, who substitute a comma for Bekker's full stop after δικαιοσύνης (line 16).

1130 b. 10. parison with that just mentioned, is that the words *ὡς μέρος πρὸς* (or *καὶ*) *ἄλον* given by all MSS. no longer seem to reverse the proper order of the two terms. So much for the internal grounds in favour of the *παράνομον* text.

For the external grounds in its favour see Bywater's *app. crit. ad loc.*, and Jackson's note, pp. 73, 74. It may be added that CCC agrees with K^b P^b and Camb. in reading *παράνομον πλέον*, and with K^b in reading *καὶ πρὸς*.

It remains to notice Spengel's view of this passage (pp. 208, 9) — a view which, I think, cannot be summarily rejected as wrong, although the MS. evidence seems to me to be rather against it than for it. At any rate it is a view which, whether right or wrong, is most instructive as a specimen of textual criticism. It is simply that the parenthesis (*τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἅπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλέον*) is a later interpolation introduced to explain the foregoing words, *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλέον*, by a scribe who understood them as Mich. Eph. does. The parenthesis omitted, the sentence runs clearly, and may be paraphrased thus—*ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον—τουτέστι τὸ πλέον—οὐ ταῦτόν τῷ παρανόμῳ ἀλλ' ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ἄλον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταῦτά κ.τ.λ.* Spengel's words are—'Man streiche den Erklärungssatz *τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἅπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλέον* und alles ist richtig . . . Nicht den Unterschied von *ἄνισον* und *πλέον* will Aristoteles geben, sondern den von *παράνομον* und *ἄνισον*; er sagt, dieses *ἄνισον* oder *πλέον* (dieses hebt er hervor, weil die Ungerechtigkeit zumeist in der *πλεονεξία* besteht) ist nur ein Theil von dem *παράνομον*, folglich das Fehlen in diesem nur *ὡς μέρος* von dem gesammten *παράνομον*, d. h. die specielle *ἀδικία* von der gesammten *ἀδικία*.' The reading *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον* Spengel regards as due merely to the attempt to mend a text already put out of joint by the interpolated parenthesis, which itself, instead of being struck out, was altered into *τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνισον ἅπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἅπαν ἄνισον*. There is perhaps no place in the *E. N.* where the MSS. show so much confusion as they do here¹, and I am far from feeling sure that the *παράνομον* text which I have adopted is *verbally* correct, although there can

¹ Of this confusion the Paraphrast's hopelessly unmeaning note is a fair measure—*ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλέον οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ ἄνισῳ, ἀλλ' ἐστι τὸ μὲν ἄνισον ὡσπερ ἄλον, τὸ δὲ πλέον ὡς μέρος: (τὸ γὰρ πλέον καὶ ἄνισον, οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἄνισον πλέον) ἐστι τις ἀδικία καὶ περὶ τὸ ἄνισον ἄλλη αἰ οὐκ ἂν εἶεν αἰ αὐταὶ ἀδικίαι· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν περὶ τὸ πλέον μερικῇ ἔσται ἀδικία, ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄνισον ἀδικία, καθόλου.*

be no doubt that the meaning which it gives is that which the writer 1130 b. 10. wished to convey. Spengel's text, however, gives this meaning equally well; but, as I have said, I think that the MS. evidence (such as it is) is rather against than for it. It is only this scruple which retains me from going even further than Spengel—viz. from striking out, not only the parenthesis, but the words *καὶ τὸ πλέον*, which he supposes to have suggested the parenthesis. K^b and CCC with *καὶ πρὸς* might then be explained as giving a reading in which *καὶ*, necessitated by the insertion of *either καὶ τὸ πλέον or καὶ τὸ παράνομον*, had established itself without extruding *πρὸς*, which would alone be admissible if *neither καὶ τὸ πλέον nor καὶ τὸ παράνομον* were allowed a place in the text.

ᾧστε . . . b. 18. ὡσαύτως] Rasso (p. 17) says 'Diese Worte sind b. 16. ganz leer, da schon das vorhergehende Capitel von der *justicia particularis* gehandelt hat'; and Ramsauer brackets them saying—'Quae deinceps, l. 16, adjungitur sententia (*ᾧστε . . . ὡσαύτως*) hoc quidem loco post reliqua interposita, imprimis postquam bis dictum est *ζητούμεν δὲ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην* (a. 14) *et τίς δὲ καὶ ὅποια τις ληπτέον* (b. 7) ita est inanis ut ne excusari quidem possit.' If this judgment is correct (and it may well be), the question of making the apodosis begin with *ᾧστε* does not arise. As, however, 'bracketing' is a somewhat gratuitous act in the case of a sentence belonging to such a loosely organised passage as the present (§§ 7–11), it is perhaps better to leave the words *ᾧστε . . . ὡσαύτως* in the text—not as introducing an apodosis (Jackson and Sussehl), but as a statement made in consequence of the conclusion *καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία* b. 13 . . . *δικαιοσύνης* b. 16, which is the real apodosis to the protasis introduced, b. 10, by *ἐπεὶ*. That apodosis stated that particular justice is a *μέρος* of universal justice; then follows the clause before us which runs—'So (*ᾧστε*), since this *ἐν μέρει* justice exists, as distinguished above, we must discuss it.'

§ 10. *διοριστέον*] Rasso (*Forsch.* p. 93) conjectures *ἀφοριστέον*, b. 22. referring to *ἀφείσθω* in b. 20 above, and comparing *E. N.* i. 7. 12. 1098 a. 1. I think that *διοριστέον* is right, and that the clause means—'And how the justice and injustice corresponding to these states are to be determined is easily explained': then follows the explanatory clause with *γάρ*. The *διορισμός* here is easy, and is given on the spot; not so in the case mentioned in the next section, where it has to be postponed—*ἕστερον διοριστέον* 1130 b. 28.

1130 b. 22. σχεδόν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων] 'the great majority of the acts which are "according to law."' Mich. Eph. explains σχεδόν here by pointing out that there are νόμιμα which refer, not to the moral conduct of the citizens, but to the practice of the various arts and trades: he says—ἔστι δ' ὅν τινα τῶν νομίμων ἃ οὐ περὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ ζῆν διορίζεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πῶς ἂν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι καὶ ἐνάρετοι γένοιτο οἱ πολῖται, εἰσηγούνται. ὁ γὰρ ἔμφρων νομοθέτης οὐ μόνον περὶ τούτων νομοθετεῖ καθ' ἃ δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς τῆς αὐτῆς πολιτείας μετέχοντας, οἷον περὶ οἰκοδόμων, περὶ ὑφαντῶν, περὶ ἀπλῶς πάντων τεχνιτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ γεωργῶν καὶ στρατηγῶν καὶ ἐμποριῶν, καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν δι' ὧν οἱ πολῖται συνίστανται, οὐ μόνον δὴ περὶ τούτων νομοθετεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ πρότερον περὶ τῆς παιδείας τῶν μελλόντων ἔσσεσθαι ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ νομίμων πολιτῶν προαγορεύει. For τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενα (οἱ προσταττόμενα) in this §, and τὰ ποιητικά τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς in § 11, see note on v. i. 13. b. 17. For καθ' ἐκάστην . . . κωλύει ὁ νόμος see same note.

b. 26. § 11. παιδεῖαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν] 'The education of a man as a citizen'—Peters: *i. e.* his education for (πρὸς) the life which he must lead as a member of the state, or πολιτικὴ κοινωνία.

τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον παιδείας] 'the education of the individual as such'—Peters.

b. 27. ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι] 'simply a good man'—*i. e.* 'good' in the sense in which we use the term when we apply it to a man without the πρόσθεσις of such qualifying circumstances as we specify when, *e. g.* we call him 'good, as the citizen of an oligarchical state': for 'good' means one thing when applied to the citizen of an oligarchical state, and another thing when applied to the citizen of a democratical state—*i. e.* 'a good citizen' is a man who helps to maintain a particular social system, whether that system be good or bad: see *Pol. Γ. 2. 1276 b. 28 τῶν πολιτῶν . . . ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστὶ, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία: διόπερ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. εἴπερ ὅν ἔστι πλείω πολιτείας εἶδη, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν. τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμέν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν. ὅτι μὲν ὅν ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὄντα σπουδαῖον μὴ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ, φανερόν. What then is this ἀρετὴ καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ—this goodness without qualification καθ' ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι? In the *Politics* Aristotle certainly identifies it with the goodness of a certain citizen, *viz.* the citizen of the Best, *i. e.* the Aristocratical State: *Pol. Δ. 5. 1293 b. 3 τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν**

ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν 1130 b. 27. ἀνδρῶν μόνον δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν' ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἐστι, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσι τὴν αὐτῶν. Cf. *Pol. Γ. 7. 1283 b. 43 πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχεω καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐστί, καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχεω πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν.* This identification of the good citizen and the good man in the aristocratical state depends on Aristotle's doctrine that in that state the rulers are not a privileged caste distinct from the ruled, but the elders of a homogeneous people (*i. e.* a people consisting of citizens *who are all good*, *Pol. Η. 12. 1332 a. 32 ἀλλὰ μὴν σπουδαῖα γε πόλις ἐστὶ τῷ τοῦς πολίτας τοῦς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους' ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολῖται μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας*)—the *natural*, not the arbitrarily constituted rulers. This result, however, he reaches through a dialectical process of considerable complexity: see *Pol. Γ. 2. 1276 b. 40 ἐπειδὴ ἀδύνατον ὁμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοῦς πολίτας, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀρετὴ μία πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ: but perhaps, he continues, we may identify the goodness of the good man and the goodness of a particular citizen—*viz.* the citizen who is a 'good ruler'—1277 a. 13 ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμέν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα σπουδαῖον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον: then 1277 a. 20 εἰ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἄρχοντός τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οἷχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἂν εἴη ἀπλῶς πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς, τινὸς μόνου πολίτου' οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχοντος καὶ πολίτου. In the aristocratical state, however, the rulers are men who have learnt to rule well by being well ruled. The education in the ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἄρχοντος is begun and carried on in the person of the ἀρχόμενος. The distinction between ἄρχων and ἀρχόμενος is not an absolute one—the ἀρχόμενος is δυνάμει the ἄρχων. If we regard especially the continuity of the citizen's life in the Best State (and in the Best State—ἡ κατὰ φύσιν πόλις—the citizen's life is a continuous natural development), we shall say that the ἀρετὴ of the citizen and the ἀρετὴ of the good man, are identical; if we give prominence to the fact that there are always two generations—the younger and the older—the former of which is educated and ruled by the latter, we shall say that the ἀρετὴ of the good man (= good ruler), and the ἀρετὴ of the citizen, are different. See *Pol. Γ. 2. 1277 b. 7 ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ καθ' ἣν ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀρχόμενον μαθεῖν . . . διὸ**

1180 b. 27. λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ ἄρξαι μὴ ἀρχθέντα. τούτων δὲ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἑτέρα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου τὸ τὴν τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφο: then 1277 b. 25 ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἔουκε ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δὲ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθῆς: ὡσπερ γὰρ αὐλοποῖδς ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δὲ ἄρχων αὐλητῆς ὁ χρώμενος. πότερον μὲν οὖν ἡ αὕτη ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ ἑτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὕτη καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων. Cf. also *Pol.* H. 13. 1332 b. 32 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀναμφισβήτητον . . . ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαίρεσιν, ποιήσασα τῷ γένει ταῦτ' ὅ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὧν τοῖς μὲν ἄρχεσθαι πρέπει τοῖς δ' ἄρχειν . . . ἔστι μὲν ἄρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φητέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἑτέροις. ὥστε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ἔστιν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἑτέραν εἶναι. τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναι φασι δεῖν πρότερον . . . 1333 a. 11 ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι φημεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός, τὸν δ' αὐτὸν ἀρχόμενον τε δεῖν γίνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄρχοντα ὕστερον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως ἀνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γίνωνται, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς. The outcome of all is that the legislator should strive to make his fellow-citizens *good men*. The answer given by the *Politics* to the question before us is—that it is *πολιτικὴ*, and no other agency, which conducts the *παιδεία καθ' ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐστί*. The virtue of the perfectly good man is determined πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην *πολιτείαν*—*Pol.* Γ. 12. 1288 a. 39 φανερόν ἐστι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιω συστήσειεν ἂν τις ἀριστοκρατουμένη ἢ βασιλευομένη, ὥστε ἔσται καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἦθη ταῦτ' ἀσχεδὸν τὰ ποιῶντα σπουδαῖον ἀνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιῶντα πολιτικόν. But the writer of the Fifth Book of the *Ethics*, in the alternative ἢ ἑτέρας (v. 2. 11), seems to suggest a point of view which is foreign to the *Politics*—viz. that the good man may possibly spring up under influences, and manifest his goodness under conditions with which the legislator has nothing to do. This seems to be the suggestion thrown out in the present passage; and it may be thought that this suggestion appears as a definite doctrine at the end of the *E. E.* where the place of *καλοκαγαθία* is determined. But we must not make too much of the difference between the *καλοκαγαθία* of Eudemus and the ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός of the *Politics*. In both conceptions we have an ideal excellence which man approaches along the line traced for

him by *πολιτικὴ*. Aristotle indeed describes the Chief End of man 1130 b. 27. as *θεωρία τις* (*E. N.* x. 8. 8), and Eudemus as τὸ τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν (*E. E.* Θ. 3. 1249 b. 20); but these descriptions must not be allowed to mislead us. If the systems of Aristotle and of Eudemus, as wholes, have any weight, it is to impress the conviction that the Chief End, however described, is not something which we must pass through and out of social life to reach; but that, on the contrary, it is social life itself at its best. It is true that Aristotle's theory of the Best Life, as a theory, is defective. He is forced to pronounce the life 'impossible,' because theoretically he regards it as a *fixed type* of excellence. But his practice carries him beyond his theory. He urges us to *strive after* the ideal although it is 'impossible of attainment' (*E. N.* x. 7. 8). He thus divines that the ideal is, after all, not something *unrealisable*; that, on the contrary, *it is being always realised* in the amelioration of the life itself which we have inherited and transmit: just as the type *Horse* is not something *χωριστόν* which all horses *fail of attaining to*, but rather that which they *perfect* in their generations.

We may take it then that there can be no doubt about the view of Aristotle and Eudemus. In so far as a man is σπουδαῖος or καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς it is *πολιτικὴ* which makes him such.

If the writer of v. 2. 11 is neither Aristotle nor Eudemus, it is impossible of course to determine his view, as he does not return to the subject. He seems to *suggest* a view different from that of Aristotle and Eudemus: but, as he belongs at least to their school, the presumption is that he really shared their view, and that, after all, ἢ ἑτέρας is surplusage. Grant seems to make too much of the present passage when he founds on it the statement 'Eudemus [with whom he identifies the Writer of the Fifth Book] would seem to have wished to take up the question where Aristotle left it, and—with the view of giving a separate existence to *Morals* as a science—to ask whether there is not a kind of education, not falling within the province of *Politics*, which aims at producing the virtues of the individual man, as distinct from those of the citizen.'

οὐ γὰρ ἴσως . . . παντὶ] This is Aristotle's view as expressed b. 28. e. g. in *Pol.* Γ. 2. 1276 b. 34 (quoted in last note) ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὄντα σπουδαῖον μὴ κεκτήσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ, φανερόν—a view which we have seen is not inconsistent with the doctrine that the ἀρετὴ καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ is the work of *πολιτικὴ*: but the writer of the passage before us (v. 2. 11) adduces it as if

1130 b. 28. it raised a presumption in favour of the supposition that an agency different from πολιτική may be instrumental in producing such ἀρετή. There is indeed much confusion of thought in the passage, and to found on it any conclusion so important as that regarding the writer's doctrine of the relation between 'Politics' and 'Morals' seems to be a very hazardous proceeding. The confusion is increased by the Paraph. Heliod. who seems to think that the reference is to a distinction between the good man and the good citizen similar to that drawn already (v. i. 20) between ἀρετή and δικαιοσύνη.

The phrase τὸ ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι is equivalent to 'the notion "good man"'—'the being a good man': see *de An.* ii. i. 412 b. 12 ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἢ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἢ ψυχὴ τοῦτο. *An. Post.* ii. 4. 91 b. 4 τὸ ζῶν εἶναι κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀληθές γὰρ πάν τὸ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ζῶν εἶναι, ὡς περ καὶ πάντα ἀνθρώπου ζῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε ἐν εἶναι. *Met.* Γ. 4. 1006 b. 22 εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνει ἕτερον τὸ ἀνθρώπος καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀνθρώπος δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπου τοῦ εἶναι ἀνθρώπου ὥστ' ἔσται τὸ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι μὴ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἐν γὰρ ἔσται:—and further on 1007 a. 20 ὅλος δ' ἀναροῦσιν οἱ τοῦτο λέγοντες οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι πάντα γὰρ ἀνάγκη συμβεβηκέναι φάσκειν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ ὅπερ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἢ ζῶν εἶναι τί ἦν εἶναι μὴ εἶναι. *Met.* Z. 15. 1039 b. 20 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ οὐσία ἑτέρα τὸ τε σύνολον καὶ ὁ λόγος (λέγω δ' ὅτι ἢ μὲν οὕτως ἐστὶν οὐσία σὺν τῇ ὕλη συνειλημμένος ὁ λόγος, ἢ δὲ ὁ λόγος ὅλος), ὅσαι μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγονται, τούτων μὲν ἔστι φθορά· καὶ γὰρ γενέσεις τοῦ δὲ λόγου οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὥστε φθείρεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ γενέσεις (οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ οἰκία εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆδε τῆ οἰκία) ἀλλ' ἀνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν· δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι οὐθεὶς ταῦτα γενεᾶ οὐδὲ ποιεῖ. *Phys.* iii. 5. 204 a. 23 τὸ γὰρ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρον τὸ αὐτό, εἴπερ οὐσία τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου—i. e. the notion of infinity and infinity are identical, for infinity is nothing but a notion—can never be concretely realised as an actual thing: see *Met.* Θ. 6. 1048 b. 14 τὸ δ' ἄπειρον οὐχ οὕτω δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ ἐσόμενον χωριστόν, ἀλλὰ γνώσει: cf. *Met.* Z. 6. 1031 b. 11 ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἶναι, ὅσα μὴ καθ' ἄλλο λέγεται ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ πρῶτα. On the formula generally see Trendelenburg, *de An.* iii. 4. 7. (429 b. 10.) p. 472, first ed.

b. 30. § 12.] Particular Justice, concerned, as we have seen (v. i. 9), with τὰγαθὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία ἂ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθὰ, τινὲ δ' οὐκ αἰεὶ, is now divided into two species: (1) Distributive Justice manifested in the fair apportionment of these good things (social

position, property, and all other material advantages) among the 1130 b. 30. members of the Community, according to their deserts: (2) Corrective Justice concerned with the rectification of results at variance with the principle of fair apportionment which arise out of acts performed by members of the Community in the various circumstances in which, as individuals, they 'have to do with one another.' The term συναλλάγμα = *contractus* of Roman Law. The relation between these two species of Particular Justice is well stated by Trendelenburg, *Hist. Beiträge zur Phil.* vol. iii. p. 412: τὸ διανέμειν καθ' ἀξίαν is the primary form of Particular Justice: the διανομή may take place in the exchanges of trade (ἀλλακτικὴ δικαιοσύνη), or in the allotment of common goods (διανεμητικὴ τῶν κοινῶν): the secondary form of Particular Justice is ἡ διορθωτικὴ: it comes into operation when the just relations according to the primary form are disturbed, and equalises the unequal.

§ 13. τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο] The members of the social κοινωμία, as 1131 a. 1. individuals, 'have to do with one another' (συναλλάττονται) in circumstances which may be assigned to one or other of two main heads, according as the will of both parties (ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα), or of one party only—the other party being unwilling—(ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα) is concerned in what is done. As results at variance with the principle of fair apportionment arise in each of these two sets of circumstances, and must be rectified, there will also be two kinds of Corrective Justice.

It is easy to see how the results of ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα (assault, theft, &c.) are such as need rectification, and that it is in the *criminal* court that they are rectified. Ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα (buying and selling, letting, &c.), on the other hand, being those in which both parties enter voluntarily into certain arrangements in view of results agreeable to both, might seem from their very nature to give results needing no rectification. It sometimes happens, however, without the fault of either contracting party, that a result other than that originally in view, and not agreeable to one of the parties, follows from an arrangement; and it may be right that a *civil* court should consider whether the result (unfortunate for one of the parties) should be rectified, and, if so, to what extent: e. g. A takes the lease of a farm from B for a number of years at a rent suitable to good times: if times become bad beyond all reasonable calculation, it may be right that A should be able to have the

1131 a. 1. question of the reduction of his rent judicially decided. It may perhaps be thought that a better instance of τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐκούσiais συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν might have been selected than this which suggests 'interference with the freedom of contract.' It is, however, the 'rectification' in the civil court which corresponds most logically with the 'rectification' made in the criminal court—it is the rectification of the original συναλλάγμα itself. But I suspect that the writer of the present passage had not such a case of rectification by the civil court in his mind when he drew up his list of ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα here, but that he thought rather of the enforcement of the terms of such συναλλάγματα, and the settlement of disputes regarding their meaning, in the civil court (cf. v. 4. 7. 1132 a. 19 ὅταν ἀμφισβητώσω ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσι)—e.g. a tenant and landlord differ about the effect of a clause in their signed agreement, and take their dispute for settlement to a civil court; or a debt is recovered in a civil court. This last instance shows also how imperceptible the line may be dividing ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα, which require enforcement, from τὰ λαθραία among ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα, for the man who has to be sued for the payment of a debt is sometimes not easily distinguishable from the man who intended from the beginning to cheat his creditor.

The judicial enforcement, then, of the terms of an ἐκούσιον συναλλάγμα, and their judicial interpretation, must be distinguished from the judicial rectification of the terms themselves. But we must understand the phrase 'rectification of the terms themselves' to denote not only the judicial alteration of unfair terms already arranged (e.g. refusal of law courts to enforce agreements to pay interest above a certain rate; judicial revision of rents which have become too high—after all a comparatively rare and somewhat questionable kind of 'rectification'), but also the prevention, by other than judicial means, of unfair arrangements which would inevitably be made if certain checks and methods of procedure did not exist. And here we can see that it is in the institution of νόμισμα that the principle of Corrective Justice is most largely and effectively embodied. On a system of barter almost every exchange involves a result at variance with the principle of fair apportionment. It is impossible, on such a system, to make really fair exchanges, there being objectively no common measure of the things exchanged, the accidents of temporary need and passing whim dominating all transactions. But the institution of νόμισμα

compels men to exchange on a uniform system, and therefore 1131 a. 1. fairly. It may be regarded as an omnipresent court of 'diorthotic justice'—'diorthotic' in the sense of *keeping straight* what would otherwise inevitably go wrong. It does not enforce or interpret the terms of arrangements already made, but provides *ab initio* that the terms shall be of a certain kind—i. e. reasonably fair, thus interfering, not indeed with 'free,' but with haphazard contract. And that the writer of the Fifth Book regarded the institution of νόμισμα in this light is probable from the similarity of the terms in which he describes its function with those in which he describes the function of the δικαστής, E. N. v. 4. 6. 1132 a. 18 ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητώσω, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἵνα ἵνα ἔστιν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὁ γὰρ δικαστής βούλεται εἶναι ὡς δίκαιον ἔμφυχον καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνοι μεσιδίου, ὡς εἶναι τοῦ μέσου τύχῳσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευξόμενοι μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, ἔπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής ὁ δὲ δικαστής ἐπανισοῖ κ.τ.λ.—and E. N. v. 5. 10. 1133 a. 19 διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἔστιν ἀλλαγὴ. ἐφ' ὃ τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεται πως μέσον πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, πόσα ἅπτα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκίᾳ ἢ τροφῇ: cf. v. 5. 14, 15. 1133 b. 14 ff. What has been said of νόμισμα—the 'medium of exchange' *par excellence*—as 'diorthotic' applies to other contrivances—of which the railroad and the advertisement may be taken as two typical examples—whereby exchange is made easier, and the producer is consequently enabled to count on getting a fairer return for his commodity than he otherwise would get—i. e. on getting more nearly the share properly due to his ἀξία, or economic worth, in the industrial community.

In connexion with what has been said it may be convenient here merely to mention a point to which we shall have to return afterwards—viz. that, while the assignment of shares of booty to those who have taken part in a successful expedition, and the distribution of social distinctions among citizens, are very obvious cases of διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν (the agency of the central public authority being clearly seen in the definite order that such and such a distribution of booty shall be made, and in the constitutional law which provides that such and such gradations of social rank shall be recognised), yet there is another and more important case of διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν—the distribution of wages and profits among the members of the industrial community ac-

1131 a 1. cording to 'economic laws'—which is apt to escape observation as a case of *διανομή ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν*, because the existence of common property to be divided, and the agency of the state in dividing it, are not so immediately obvious as they are in the other cases. It is important, therefore, to call attention here to the fact that the exchange of products between individuals is by far the most important state agency at work in the distribution of the rewards of labour. The farmer receives the reward of his labour in the form of the coat *which a settled social system allows him to get in exchange for his corn from the tailor.* *Νόμισμα* and the other 'media of exchange' alluded to above are thus 'dianemetic' as well as 'diorthotic' agencies. As promoting exchange *νόμισμα* is a 'dianemetic' agency; but as keeping the exchange or distribution fair in circumstances in which unfair assignments would, but for its intervention, inevitably occur, it is a 'diorthotic' agency. Its 'dianemetic' and 'diorthotic' functions are after all only logically separate; its concrete work is to *promote the fair distribution of the national wealth by means of the exchange of commodities.*

- a. 3. *δανεισμός*] 'lending at interest.' Jackson, Peters.
- a. 4. *χρήσις*] 'lending without interest.' Jackson, Peters. *Χρήσις* is the *commodatum* of Roman law, distinguished from *mutuum* by not being concerned, as *mutuum* is, with things *quae pondere numero mensurave constant*—e.g. wine and corn. The actual bushel of corn received by the person who benefits by the *mutuum* is not returned by him, but *another* bushel equivalent to it; the person, however, who benefits by a *commodatum* must restore *the very thing* which he has borrowed—e.g. the book. *Commodatum* differs from *locatio* in being gratuitous. See Smith's *Dict. of Cl. Antiquities: Article COMMODATUM.*

- a. 5. *τῶν δ' ἀκουσίῳ*] Mich. Eph. has *πὸς συναλλάγματα ταῦτα λέγεται; ἢ ὅτι ὁ κλέψας ἀντὶ τῶν κλεμμάτων ὃ τε μὲν δίδωσιν ἕτερα ἅτινα ὃ τε δὲ μαστιγοῦνται, καὶ γέγονε τρόπον τινα δόσις καὶ λήψις . . . λαβὼν γὰρ χρήματα ἢ ἄλλο τι ὁ κλέψας δέδωκεν ἀντ' ἐκείνων εὐθύνας.*

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

Concerning Distributive Justice. Injustice being inequality, or too much to A and too little to B, justice will be equality, or the mean between too much to A and too little to B; i. e. it will involve four terms at least—two persons and two shares. If the persons are of equal merit, they will, in a just distribution, receive equal shares; if of unequal merit, they will receive proportionally unequal shares—in other words, in a just distribution the ratio between the persons and that between the shares will be equal. Although all men admit that distribution ought to be 'in proportion to merit (κατ' ἀξίαν); they are not agreed as to what constitutes merit. Democrats, oligarchs, and aristocrats adopt different standards of merit in their distributions of the good things of life.

The just then is that which is 'in a proportion'; for concrete things (such as persons and their shares) stand in relations of proportion to one another no less than abstract numbers do.

The 'proportion' to which distributive justice conforms is that which mathematicians call geometrical proportion—discrete, with four terms, not continuous, for although continuous proportion has really four terms, it obtains that number by employing one term twice, whereas in the formula of distributive justice the four terms are separately present from the beginning—A and B the persons, and γ and δ their respective shares. Starting then from

$$A : B :: \gamma : \delta$$

we get alternando

$$A : \gamma :: B : \delta$$

and componendo

$$A + \gamma : B + \delta :: A : B$$

where the conjunction of A and γ and of B and δ (i. e. the assignment of γ to A and of δ to B) represents just distribution, i. e. distribution 'according to merit.'

Unjust distribution violates this proportion, i. e. gives the one party too much good (or too little evil) in proportion to his merit, and the other too little good (or too much evil).

GRANT introduces this chapter with an excellent note, in which he refers to Plato, *Gorgias* 507 E, and *Laws* 757 B, as foreshadowing the Aristotelian doctrine of Distributive Justice: also to *Pol. I.* 5. 1280 a. 6 sqq., where 'though the name of distributive justice does not occur, yet the *idea* of it is fully developed.'

1131 a. 10. §§ 1-5.] The argument is—τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον: but τὸ ἴσον is μέσον: therefore τὸ δίκαιον is μέσον as well as ἴσον. When, however, we speak of 'equal' (ἴσον), or 'a mean between' (μέσον), we imply at least two things. But τὸ δίκαιον is more than an ἴσον or μέσον implying at least two things. As has been pointed out before (v. 1. 20, v. 2. 6), it has its εἶναι, or δύναμις, ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον: i. e. it implies a relation between persons. In other words, τὸ δίκαιον must be regarded under the two categories of Quantity¹ and of Relation: it is an equality of things which involves a fair relation between persons. Hence it implies four terms—two things and two persons, at least.

a. 13. § 3. ἀνευ λόγου] 'without proof.'

a. 16. § 4. καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ τισίν] K^b and CCC seem to stand alone in omitting καὶ πρὸς τι, and L^b in omitting καὶ τισίν. Bekker, following K^b, brackets καὶ πρὸς τι, Jackson follows L^b in omitting καὶ τισίν, while Ramsauer and Susemihl omit the whole clause καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ τισίν. This last omission is, I think, unjustifiable. The argument of §§ 1-5 seems to require an explicit statement of the point that τὸ δίκαιον is to be regarded not only under the category of Quantity as ἴσον, but also under that of Relation—πρὸς τι. Moreover, the writer of the *M.M.* (i. 33. 1193 b. 31, quoted here by Jackson in his important note) lays great stress upon this point in the argument—τὸ δὲ γε ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν ἐγγίνεται τὸ ἄρα πρὸς ἕτερον ἴσον εἶναι δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ δίκαιος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐν δίκαιῳ καὶ ἴσῳ καὶ ἐν μεσότητι (καὶ Susem.) τὸ μὲν δίκαιον [ἐν om. Susem.] τισὶ λέγεται δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἴσον ἐν τισιν ἴσον, τὸ δὲ μέσον τισὶ μέσον ὥστ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἔσται καὶ πρὸς τινας καὶ ἐν τισίν. Jackson therefore retains καὶ πρὸς τι as the equivalent of the πρὸς ἕτερον of the *M.M.* This is unquestionably right: but it may be doubted whether he is right in omitting καὶ τισίν 'as a gloss anticipatory of ἡ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν.' The equivalent expression καὶ τισίν is certainly unnecessary after καὶ πρὸς τι: but it is in the manner of the writer to add such unnecessary explanations. As for the omission of καὶ πρὸς τι by K^b—very little weight indeed should be attached to the omissions of K^b. They are generally

¹ See *Met. Δ.* 15. 1021 a. 11 ταῦτά μὲν γὰρ ἐν μία ἢ οὐσία, ὅμοια δ' ἐν ἡ ποιότητι μία, ἴσα δὲ ἐν τῷ ποσῶν ἐν.

² CCC in Book V has not independent authority. It is probably a transcript of a transcript of K^b; see *English MSS. of Nic. Eth. Anecd. Ox.* p. 45.

as insignificant as its actual readings are significant. What is really important is that the argument absolutely requires καὶ πρὸς τι (whatever may be thought of the origin of the gloss καὶ τισίν), and that the writer of the *M.M.* seems to have read πρὸς τι (or πρὸς τινας?).

§ 5. καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα] ἐν οἷς = τὰ πράγματα. Jackson (fol. a. 20. lowered by Susemihl) brackets the words τὰ πράγματα as a gloss on ἐν οἷς.

§ 6. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς] 'There will be the same "equality" between the persons and between the things': i. e. if the persons, as comparable κοινωνοὶ of the same social system, are absolutely equal, their shares will be also (ἡ αὐτῇ) absolutely equal: if they are not absolutely equal, but stand in a certain definite ratio of superiority and inferiority, their shares will also stand in the same (ἡ αὐτῇ) ratio. Μάχαι καὶ ἐγκλήματα arise when the ratio, whatever it be, subsisting between the persons is not observed exactly (ἡ αὐτῇ) in the apportionment of the shares. Ramsauer's note on ἡ αὐτῇ ἰσότης is good—'Intelliges vocem ἡ αὐτῇ additum ad ἰσότης tollere quasi notionem ipsius paritatis: "eodem modo quo haec paria vel erunt vel non erunt, et illa vel erunt vel non erunt." ἴσα enim revera neque homines nec res, sed hinc ratio inter homines, illinc inter res ratio; et est ἡ ἀναλογία ἰσότης λόγων, vs. 31.'

ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει]. 'I omit,' says a. 21. Jackson, 'the words τὰ ἐν οἷς which appear in all the MSS. except K^b [and CCC], and in Bekker's text, in order that here, as in the sentences before and after, the persons may take precedence of the things distributed.' Susemihl and Ramsauer also omit the words. Certainly 'the persons should take precedence of the things' here; but even with the omission of τὰ ἐν οἷς the clause is not satisfactory. Ἐκεῖνα referring to the more remote οἷς is then indeed correct: but instead of καὶ ἐκεῖνα we ought to have καὶ ταῦτα referring to the nearer ἐν οἷς.

ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι κ.τ.λ.] Cf. *Pol. E. I.* 1301 b. 28 ὅπως γὰρ a. 22. τὸ ἴσον ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν.

§ 7. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δηλον] τοῦτο is the fact stated a. 24. above in § 5, that τὸ δίκαιον involves at least two persons and two things so related that there is ἡ αὐτῇ ἰσότης between the persons and

1131 a. 24. between the things. This fact becomes more significant if we realise clearly that it implies that τὸ δίκαιον is ἀνάλογόν τι—for ἀναλογία we already know as mathematicians is ἰσότης λόγων καὶ ἐν τέτταρῳ ελαχίστοις. Now, that τὸ δίκαιον, with its two persons and two things, is ἀνάλογόν τι is obvious from our use of the expression κατ' ἀξίαν, 'according to merit.' When we say that A and B are rewarded each 'according to his merit' (whatever that may be), we mean that each receives his 'just' reward. But when A and B are rewarded each 'according to his merit,' reward α (i. e. A's reward) stands to reward β (i. e. B's reward) in the same ratio (λόγος) as A's merit stands to B's. Hence, just distribution of rewards being distribution 'according to merit' involves the ἀναλογία, or ἰσότης λόγων—A : B :: α : β. By means of the expression κατ' ἀξίαν, then, the writer is enabled to substitute for the ἡ αἰτιῆ ἰσότης of § 6 the more appropriate ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος of § 10.

For the expression κατ' ἀξίαν, as used in the *E. N.*, see the following passages quoted by Ramsauer in his note on v. 3. 7—viz. 1115 b. 19, where the ἀνδρείος is said κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχειν καὶ πράττειν, i. e. in the manner indicated and required by λόγος, which grasps life as a whole, and gives each feeling and action its due place in the ensemble:—1119 a. 19, where the σόφρων is said μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾶν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας, i. e. than they deserve:—1122 a. 26, where we have the expression κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν: and 1100 a. 25 βίον τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν: cf. also *E. E.* iii. 6. 1233 b. 6 ὁ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, μεγαλοπρεπῆς: τὸ γὰρ πρέπον κατ' ἀξίαν ἐστίν: οὐδὲν γὰρ πρέπει τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν: also *E. E.* iii. 7. 1233 b. 19 ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ' ἀξίαν εἰ πράττουσιν ἐστίν: also *E. E.* viii. 3. 1249 a. 7 τῷ κατ' ἀξίαν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἄξιός ἐστι τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ: καλὸν γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἄξιός ἐστι τὸ οὗτος τούτων καὶ τὸ πρέπον καλόν: πρέπει δὲ ταῦτα τούτῳ, πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια, δύναμις. In all these passages κατ' ἀξίαν means 'according to merit,' or 'suitably to desert'—whether the 'merit' or 'desert' be the ground on which recognition is due to a person in the social κοινωνία, or the reason why a feeling, an action, or a circumstance should have a certain place assigned to it in the ensemble of ὁ ἀνθρώπος βίος. The expression κατ' ἀξίαν thus necessarily connotes the idea of 'proportion'; hence we find the phrase τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον = 'the equality which characterises proportion,' i. e. ἰσότης λόγων: see *Pol. E. I.* 1301 b. 29 ἔστι δὲ διττὸν τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῶ τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ ἀριθμῶ μὲν τὸ πλῆθει ἢ μεγέθει ταῦτ' οὐ καὶ ἴσον, κατ'

ἀξίαν δὲ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ, οἷον ὑπερέχει κατ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν ἴσῳ τὰ τρία τοῖν δυοῖν 1131 a. 24. καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἐνός, λόγῳ δὲ τὰ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἐνός: ἴσον γὰρ μέρος τὰ δύο τῶν τεττάρων καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖν δυοῖν: ἀμφὼ γὰρ ἡμίση. Equality is either (1) numerical equality (τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἴσον), or (2) equality of ratios (τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον).

τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν κ.τ.λ.] That 'the recognition of a. 26. merit' is the principle on which all just distribution must proceed is universally admitted; but men are not agreed as to 'what constitutes merit'—as to what is the underlying condition (ὑπάρχειν—bracketed, however, by Bywater: it is omitted by Ob, Pb, Kb, and CCC, the two last having κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι per dittographiam¹ in its place) of preferential recognition. Those who think that the masses should rule hold that the being a free man (ἐλευθερία) is by itself a 'merit' overshadowing all other 'merits,' and entitling its possessor to share equally with all other 'free' members of the state: oligarchs think that the rich are entitled to more recognition than other members of the state; some, again, think that high birth constitutes a superior claim; and those who favour the rule of the Best and most Virtuous identify the highest 'merit' with goodness and culture: see *Pol. I.* 5. 1280 a. 7–1281 a. 8, where it is pointed out that οἱ ὀλιγαρχικοί make the mistake of supposing that if a man is 'superior' in a certain respect (i. e. in respect of wealth) he is superior in all respects; and οἱ δημοκρατικοί the mistake of supposing that if men are equal in one respect (i. e. in respect of being free men) they are equal in all respects. Both ignore the vital point (τὸ κυριώτατον, 1280 a. 25), that the State is an institution for the furtherance of human perfection, not an insurance or joint-stock company. Cf. also *Pol. I.* 7. 1282 b. 23 sqq., where the various claims to social recognition are examined. Does any superiority, he asks, give a man a right to a higher position in the State? Surely not. We cannot give a man a higher position on account of his finer complexion or superior stature. We do not give a better flute, among equal players, to the high-born player. In short, only those superiorities must be taken into account which have a distinct connexion with the well-being of the State. Noble birth, Freedom, and Wealth are superiorities which have a distinct connexion with the existence and well-being of the State, and their claims to recognition are accordingly pronounced

¹ This dittograph may have accidentally extruded ὑπάρχειν. Ob and Pb are scarcely independent evidence.

1131 a. 26. reasonable. There cannot be a city consisting entirely of poor men, or of slaves; and without ἀρετή, hereditary and acquired, there can be no good administration of the resources and energy supplied by wealth and freedom. Freedom, wealth, and high birth are all factors in the well-being of the State, if ἀρετή—enlightened moral interest in the κοινή συμφέρον—be present to coordinate them. The class which possesses this ἀρετή ‘merits’ the highest place in the State, just because it is its supremacy alone which ensures that other classes shall also receive what they severally ‘merit’ in the διανομή τῶν κοινῶν. The rule of ἀρετή is ἡ ὀρθὴ πολιτεία. But where the coordinating principle of ἀρετή is absent, freedom, wealth, and high birth struggle each for mastery: and, through various processes of στάσις, various παρεκβεβηκυῖαι πολιτεῖαι are consolidated, according as this, that, or the other ἀξία has succeeded, for the time, in securing exclusive recognition to itself.

In connexion with the use made of mathematical formulae by the writer of the Fifth Book it is interesting to note the elaboration with which his example is followed by a later writer on Justice, the Pseudo-Archytas, quoted by Stobaeus (*Flor.* vol. ii. p. 137, ed. Meineke, Mullach, *Fragm. Phil.* i. 560):—‘Ἀρχύτας Πυθαγορείου ἐκ τοῦ περὶ νόμου καὶ δικαιοσύνης· διὰ τὸ δίκαιον τοὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατικόν, τοὶ δὲ δημοκρατικόν, τοὶ δὲ ὀλιγαρχικόν ποιοῦντι. καὶ τὸ ἀριστοκρατικόν κατὰν ἵππεων ἀνεαντιαν μεσότατα· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μέσοι μέσους τῶς λόγως, τοῖς δὲ μήσοι μέσους διανέμει ἢ ἀναλογία αὐτὰ· τὸ δὲ δημοκρατικόν κατὰν γεωμετρικόν· ἐν γὰρ ταῦτα τοὶ λόγοι ἴσοι τῶν μεζόνων καὶ μῆδων μεγεθῶν· τὸ δὲ ὀλιγαρχικόν καὶ τυραννικόν κατὰν ἀριθμητικόν· ἀντιάζει γὰρ αὐτὰ τῆ ἵππεων ἀνεαντιαν· τοῖς γὰρ μήσοι μέσους τῶς λόγως, τοῖς δὲ μέσοι μῆδους. ταὶ μὲν ὦν ἰδέαι τὰς διανομῆς ποσαῦται· ταὶ δὲ εἰκόνες ἐν ταῖς πολιτεῖαις καὶ τοῖς οἴκοις θεωροῦνται. τιμαὶ τε γὰρ καὶ κολάσεις καὶ ἀρχαὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσω τοῖς μέσοι καὶ μήσοι διανέμονται, ἢ ἐξ ἀνίσω ἢ τῆ ἀρετῆ ἵππεων ἢ τῆ πλούτῃ ἢ καὶ δυνάμει. τὸ μὲν ὦν ἐξ ἴσω δημοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀνίσω ἀριστοκρατικόν ἢ ὀλιγαρχικόν. See Mullach, *Fragm. Ph.* ii. 119, for an account of these three μεσότητες or ἀναλογίαι (in music)—(1) ἢ ἀριθμητικὰ, in which as the first term exceeds the second, so the second exceeds the third—*e.g.* 6, 4, 2. Here, as Nicomachus Gerasenus (*ἀριθμητικὴ εἰσαγωγή* p. 132, ed. Hoche) says, ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττωσι ὄροις μείζονες οἱ λόγοι, ἐλάττωτες δὲ ἐν τοῖς μείζονσι, *i.e.* the ratio 6 : 4 is smaller than the ratio 4 : 2; or as Archytas (?) quoted by Mullach (ii. 119) says, τὸ τῶν μεζόνων ὄρων διάστημα μείον, τὸ δὲ τῶν μειόνων μείζον· (2) ἢ γεωμετρικὰ, where οἱ μείζονες ἴσον ποιοῦνται τὸ διάστημα καὶ οἱ μείους· *e.g.* 8, 4, 2, ratio 8 : 4

being = ratio 4 : 2; (3) ἢ ὑπεναντία ἂν καλοῦμεν ἀρμονικόν (Archytas 1131 a. 26. apud Mullach ii. 119) ὅκα ἔωντι τοιοῦτοι ὥστε ᾧ ἂν πρῶτος ὄρος τῶ δευτέρω ὑπερέχει ἑαυτῶ μέρει, ταῦτα ὁ μέσος τῶ τρίτῳ ὑπερέχει τῆ τρίτῳ μέρει. γίνεται δὲ ἐν ταῦτα τῆ ἀνυλογία τὸ τῶν μεζόνων ὄρων διάστημα μείζον, τὸ δὲ τῶν μειόνων μείον: *e.g.* 12, 8, 6, where 12 exceeds 8 by $\frac{2}{3}$ rd of itself, and 8 exceeds 6 by $\frac{1}{3}$ rd of 6, and the ratio 12 : 8 is greater than the ratio 8 : 6.

§ 8. μοναδικῶ ἀριθμῶ . . . ὅλως ἀριθμῶ] ‘Proportion’ is not a. 30. peculiar to ‘number’ in pure arithmetic where μονάδες, or abstract ‘ones,’ indivisible and always equal to one another, are counted; but belongs to *all* ‘number’—*i.e.* also to ‘number’ as realised in concrete and unequally-sized things. This statement (introduced by γάρ) is added to meet a possible objection—that the schema of Proportion, applicable to numbers formed by the addition of abstract units (μονάδες), is not applicable to the concrete οἷς and ἐν οἷς with which τὸ δίκαιον is concerned. Mich. Eph. has the following commentary here—μοναδικὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγω ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν, οἷον τὴν δεκάδα, ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν τοὺς δέκα ἵππους ἢ τοὺς δέκα ἄνδρας, ὅς καὶ κυρίως ἀριθμὸς λέγεται . . . ὅλως δὲ ἀριθμοὶ λέγονται τὰ ἀριθμήματα, οἷον τοὺς δέκα βόους ἢ ἀνθρώπους. ἀναλογία γὰρ φησιν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐκ μονάδων συγκειμένων καὶ ὡς μέτρων λαμβανόμενων ἀριθμῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἢ καὶ ἠριθμημένων. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ὡς μέτρων ἀριθμῶν ἔστι τις ἀναλογία, ὡς ὁ ἢ (8) πρὸς τὸν δ' (4), ὡς ὁ δ' (6) πρὸς τὸν γ' (3), οὕτως ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἵππων, κυνῶν, γραμμῶν ἐπιπέδων, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὦν ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῦτοις ἀναλογία ἐστὶν· ἔχουσι γὰρ ἀριθμὸν. δεῖ γὰρ ἵνα ἀναλογία τις ᾖ, ἀριθμῶν τινα εἶναι. Cf. Bonitz on *Met.* M. 6. 1080 b. 19. p. 545, ‘Ejusmodi numeris [*i.e.* the “extended units” of the Pythagoreans—τὸν γὰρ ὅλον οὐρανὸν κατασκευάζουσιν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν, πλὴν οὐ μοναδικῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν μέγεθος, 1080 b. 17] Ar. opponit τοὺς μοναδικούς ἀριθμούς, *i.e.* eos numeros, quibus non certae quaedam res (cf. *N.* 5. 1092 b. 19: ἀεὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅς ἂν ᾖ τῶν ὄρων ἐστὶν, ἢ πύρινος ἢ γήινος ἢ μοναδικός), sed ipsae unitates, abstractae ab omni rerum qualitate et varietate, individuae (cf. 8. 1083 b. 17) neque inter se distinctae (cf. 7. 1082 b. 16) numerentur. Ac talem quidem numerum quum investiget scientia arithmetica, eundem numerum ἀριθμητικόν et μοναδικόν appellat, cf. 8. 1083 b. 17.’ Cf. Zell, ‘ἀριθμοὶ μοναδικοί sunt quos nostrates dicunt unbenannte Zahlen; numeri nude positi sine rebus numerandis.’ Jackson (p. 81) refers to Plato, *Philab.* 56 D, ‘where arithmeticians who deal with μονάδας ἀνίσους

1131 a. 30. such as two armies, two oxen, &c., are distinguished from arithmeticians who deal with *μονάδες* which are all alike.

a. 31. ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων] See Euclid, v. Def. 3 λόγος ἐστὶ δύο μεγεθῶν ὁμογενῶν ἢ κατὰ πληκτικότητα πρὸς ἄλληλα ποιά σχέσις: and v. Def. 8 ἀναλογία δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν λόγων ταυτότης (v. l. ὁμοιότης). In his note here Mich. Eph. says—τὸ ἰσότης ἀντὶ τοῦ ὁμοιότης ἀναλογία γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν λόγων ὁμοιότης—the reason for preferring *ὁμοιότης* to *ἰσότης* apparently being that in *γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία* we have to do not with ἡ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰσότης, *i. e.* not with two equal quantities or ἀριθμοί, *e. g.* $4 = 4$, but with two qualitatively identical ratios each of which yet involves different arithmetical conditions: *e. g.* the ratio $2 : 4$ is qualitatively identical with the ratio $5 : 10$; but each ratio is realised in quantitatively different terms. Now, if 2 and 4 be taken to represent the sides of one (say, right-angled) parallelogram, and 5 and 10 the sides of another, the two parallelograms (which thus represent diagrammatically the ἀναλογία $2 : 4 :: 5 : 10$) are, in mathematical language, *similar* (ὁμοία), though of course not *equal* (ἴσα): see Euclid, vi. Def. 1. It is probable then that Mich. Eph. had 'similar' geometrical figures in view when he chose *ὁμοιότης* instead of *ἰσότης* to express the *qualitative sameness* of the λόγοι in *γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία*: and in this usage he is supported by the authority of *Met.* Δ. 15. 1021 a. 11 ταῦτά μὲν γὰρ ὄν μία ἡ οὐσία, ὁμοία δ' ὄν ἡ ποιότης μία, ἴσα δὲ ὄν τὸ ποσὸν ἔν: cf. Mich. Eph. on v. 2. 12 ὅταν τοῖσιν τῇ μὲν ποιότητι διαφέρωσι τῇ αὐτῇ, τῇ δὲ ποσότητι μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ ἢ τοιαύτη ἀναλογία γεωμετρικὴ καλεῖται . . . ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία ἐστὶν ἡ ποσοῦ μὲν ἴσου ἐν ταῖς διαφοραῖς, ποιοῦ δὲ μὴ ἴσου ἢ μὴ ὁμοίου μετέχουσα.

a. 32. § 9. ἡ μὲν οὖν διηρημένη . . . συνεχῆς] See Nicomachus Gerasenus ἀριθ. εἰσαγωγή ii. 21. §§ 5, 6. p. 121, ed. Hoche—*συνημμένη ἀναλογία* (= *συνεχῆς* of the present passage) οἶον α, β, δ (*i. e.* 1, 2, 4) κατὰ ποιότητα . . . , κατὰ ποσότητα δὲ α, β, γ (*i. e.* 1, 2, 3). Διεzeugμένη (= *διηρημένη* here) . . . οἶον κατὰ μὲν τὸ ποῖον α, β, δ, η (*i. e.* 1 : 2 :: 4 : 8), κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν οὕτως α, β, γ, δ (*i. e.* 1, 2, 3, 4). The statement τῷ ἐνὶ ὡς δυοὶ χρῆται καὶ δις λέγει, made by the writer of the Fifth Book here must, of course, be taken as made with exclusive reference to the *συνεχῆς ἀναλογία* at present before him—viz. ἡ *συνεχῆς* (οἱ *συνημμένη*) ἢ κατὰ ποιότητα.

b. 1. ὡς ἡ τοῦ α . . . τοῦ γ] Jackson has an important note here: 'Throughout §§ 9, 11, 12, where I have given ordinal numbers [he

reads ἡ τοῦ πρώτου, &c., for ἡ τοῦ α, &c.], most of the editors write 1131 b. 1. cardinals (α, β, γ, δ). In order to avoid the arithmetical absurdity ($1 : 2 = 3 : 4$) thus produced, I proposed in the *Journal of Philology* 1872. iv. 310, to write (with Fritzsche) Α, Β, Γ, Δ: but on further consideration I am convinced that πρώτου, δευτέρου κ.τ.λ. should be substituted. The otherwise strange phrases ὁ α ὄρος, τοῦ α ὄρου in §§ 11, 12 suggest this alteration, and it is confirmed by several MSS., H^a and K^b [and CCC] throughout §§ 9, 11, 12, and P^b and N^b in §§ 9, 12, writing ordinals in full, whilst P^b pr. man. gives sometimes ordinals in full, sometimes α, β, γ, δ with superposed marks which may perhaps represent the terminations of ordinals, cf. Bast, *Comment. Palaeogr.* p. 850 [NC has ordinals in three places, and B¹ in two.] Michael Ephesius and Averroes seem to have had ordinals. I follow Jackson in preferring the ordinals. As to the phrases ἡ τοῦ α (*i. e.* πρώτου, τὴν τοῦ β (*i. e.* δευτέρου)—Jackson asks, 'can they mean "the line which we take for our first term," "the line which we take for our second term"?' Mich. Eph. comments as follows—τὸ δὲ τῆς λέξεως τῆς οἶον ὡς ἡ τοῦ πρώτου πρὸς τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἡ τοῦ πρώτου ὄρου σχέσις τοῦ ὀκτῶ πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον τὸν δ (qu. τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου τοῦ δ), οὕτως ἡ τοῦ δευτέρου τοῦ δ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τρίτου τοῦ β. But is this not a misuse of the word σχέσις? Cf. Eucl. *EL* v. Def. 3 quoted above. At any rate we may safely reject the alternative suggestion of Grant that *στιγμῆ* is to be supplied, as well as his theory that the proportionals are algebraical quantities.' I have little doubt that the reference here is to *γραμμαί*, and that the writer has in his mind the *συνεχῆς ἀναλογία κατὰ ποιότητα* of the problem of *τετραγωνισμός* (Euclid, *EL* ii. 14, cf. vi. 13) in which the longer side of a rectangular parallelogram stands to a μέση γραμμῆ as the μέση γρ. stands to the shorter side: see *de An.* ii. 2. 413 a. 17 τί ἐστὶ τετραγωνισμός; τὸ ἴσον ἑτερομήκει ὀρθογώνιον εἶναι ἰσόπλευρον. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὄρος λόγος τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁ τετραγωνισμός μέσης εὐρείας, τοῦ πράγματος λέγει τὸ αὐτῶν.

§ 10. διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ α] 'for the same distinction b. 5. obtains between the persons and between the things.' Here ὁμοίως marks the *qualitative sameness* of the λόγοι: see note on § 8, a. 31. Jackson quotes *Pol.* Γ. 5. 1280 a. 17 διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς.

§§ 11, 12, 13.] To take the Paraphrast's examples—α = Achilles

1131 b. 5. (100); β = Ajax (50); γ = reward of Achilles (10); δ = reward of Ajax (5):

$$(1) a : \beta = \gamma : \delta$$

(2) ἐναλλάξ—alternando (Euclid v. 16.)

$$a : \gamma = \beta : \delta$$

(3) ὥστε τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον (sc. ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον § 13) —componendo (Eucl. v. Def. 16).

$$a + \gamma : \beta + \delta = a : \beta.$$

The just distribution consists in putting together a and γ , β and δ : . . . ἢ ἄρα τοῦ a ὅρου τῷ γ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι (§ 12).

b. 7. § 11. τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον] This phrase is elliptical: supply ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον as in § 13.

b. 8. ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει] 'this is the combination which the distribution effects.' Bywater's suggestion ἄπερ (*i.e.* the two terms united in the ὅλον: see his *Contributions to the Text. Crit. of Nic. Eth.* p. 44) is tempting.

b. 9. § 12. σύζευξις] This, Jackson points out, is Euclid's σύνθεσις (v. Def. 16): cf. συντεθῆ here. In Nic. Ger. ii. 23. 5. p. 125, Hoche, σύνθεσις is *multiplication*, not addition.

b. 10. καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, (τὸ δ' ἄδικον) τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον] so Bywater, following Γ, which gives the words τὸ δ' ἄδικον, and K^b, L^b, Γ, which read τὸ before παρὰ for the τοῦ of M^b and other MSS.

b. 13. § 13. γεωμετρικὴν] ἡ ἀναλογία ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποῖόν is called 'geometrical' on account of the large place which it occupies in geometry (see *e.g.* Eucl. Books v and vi), as compared with ἡ ἀναλογία ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, contrasted as ἀριθμητική. Ἀριθμός is ποσόν, whereas the 'similar figures' of geometrical proportion fall, as σχήματα, under the category of ποιότης (see *Cat.* 8. 10 a. 11). For γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία as ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποῖόν see Nicom. Ger. ii. 24. pp. 126, 127, Hoche—ἔστι δὲ ἡ γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία ὅταν . . . ποσότητι μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ διαφέρωσιν οἱ ὅροι ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ λόγου ποιότητι τῇ αὐτῇ, ἐναντίως ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀριθμητικῆς ὤφθη . . . αὖν β, δ, η, ὃν γὰρ λόγον ἔχει ὁ η πρὸς τὸν δ, τοῦτον καὶ ὁ δ πρὸς τὸν β καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, οὐ μὴν ἴσην ποσότητα μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων ἔχουσιν.

The Aristotelian explanation of Distributive Justice as κατὰ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν is derived from Plato: see *Gorgias* 507 and

Latous 757 quoted by Fritzsche, and by Grant in his introductory note to this chapter. Cf. Plutarch, *Sympos.* viii. Quaest. 2, who asks why Plato represents God as a geometer. Among various explanations τοῦ αἰεὶ γεωμετερεῖν τὸν θεόν he gives the following (*Symp.* viii. Q. 2. ch. 2, quoted by Fritzsche)—ὁ γὰρ Δευκουργος, οἶσθα δῆπουθεν, ὅτι τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν, ὡς δημοκρατικὴν καὶ ὀχλικὴν οὖσαν [but cf. the Pseudo-Archytas quoted above in note on v. 3. 7, a. 26], ἐξέβαλεν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαιμόνος' ἐπεισήγαγε δὲ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν, ὀλιγαρχία σφόδρον καὶ βασιλεία νομίμη πρόπευσαν' ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῶ τὸ ἴσον, ἡ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονέμει. καὶ οὐ πάντα ὁμοῦ μίγνυσιν, ἀλλὰ ἐστὶ χρηστῶν καὶ ποιητῶν εὐσημος ἐν αὐτῇ διάκρισις, οὐ ζυγίσις, οὐδὲ κλήροις, ἀρετῆς δὲ καὶ κακίας διαφορᾷ τὸ οἰκείον αἰεὶ διαλαχανόντων. ταύτην ὁ θεὸς ἐπάγει τὴν ἀναλογίαν τοῖς πράγμασι, δίκην καὶ νέμεσιν, ὃ φίλε Τυνδαρή, προσαγορευομένην, καὶ διδάσκουσιν ἡμᾶς τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ ἴσον δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι δίκαιον. ἦν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ διώκουσιν ἰσότητά, πασῶν ἀδικιῶν οὖσαν μεγίστην, ὁ θεὸς ἐξείρατον ὡς ἄνυστόν ἐστι, τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν διαφυλάττει, γεωμετρικῶς τῷ κατὰ λόγον καὶ κατὰ νόμον ὀριζόμενος. Cf. Plutarch, *de Fraternali Amore* 12 (quoted by Zell, p. 173) ὁ μὲν οὖν Σόλων ἀποφηνάμενος περὶ πολιτείας, ὡς ἰσότης στάσις οὐ ποιεῖ, λίαν ἔδοξεν ὀχλικῶς, ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ δημοκρατικὴν ἐπεισάγειν ἀναλογίαν ἀντὶ τῆς καλῆς γεωμετρικῆς.

§ 14. ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχῆς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία] Of course the γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία of distributive justice with its two persons and two things is not συνεχῆς: but there are cases in which γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία is συνεχῆς—see Nicom. Geras. quoted above in note on v. 3. 9, a. 32—the μέση γραμμὴ of Eucl. vi. 13 is one term used twice.

γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δ' ἔλαττον] Injustice in distribution being the violation of proportion, 'it follows from this (ἄρα) that, in an unjust distribution, one term is made too large, and the other too small'—*i.e.* if the distribution is unjust the ὅλον $a + \gamma$ will be made too large, and the ὅλον $\beta + \delta$ too small, or *vice versa*, in proportion to the relation subsisting between a and β (ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον). The inference γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δ' ἔλαττον becomes clearer if we supply in thought τὸ δ' ἀνάλογον μέσον (cf. line 11 above) immediately before γίνεται.

ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει]. 'And this is also what actually takes place'—*i.e.* 'actually takes place' (ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει), as well as 'may be inferred from premisses' (λόγῳ

1131 b. 18. συμβαίνει) in the proof τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δ' ἔλαττον.

b. 20. §§ 15, 16.] 'A repetition of ch. 1, § 10,' Grant.

b. 23. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μείζον] τὸ μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν μείζον ἀγαθόν.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

The other kind of particular justice is that which 'corrects' inequalities arising out of transactions, voluntary and involuntary, between individuals. Justice in 'correction' is equality—not, however, that of ratios, as in geometrical ἀναλογία, but the equality which obtains in arithmetical ἀναλογία, where the mean is equally distant from each extreme. Thus the judge who 'corrects' an inequality arising out of a transaction neglects the possible inequality in 'merit' of the parties (which he could not do if 'distribution' had to be made), and takes account only of the difference produced by this particular transaction in the positions of parties whom he views simply as persons equally entitled to the undiminished possession of the ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ which happen to belong to them. The equality $x=x$, which subsisted before the transaction made a difference in the positions of the parties, is the arithmetical mean between their positions $x+1$ and $x-1$ after the transaction. The judge tries to make their positions equal again by reducing them to the arithmetical mean x , i. e. by taking from A's too-much ($x+1$) that part of it (1), which was acquired at B's expense, and adding it to B's too-little ($x-1$). If we call A the 'gainer' and B the 'loser' by the transaction, we may define 'corrective justice' as the mean between gain and loss. Accordingly when people think that they are 'losers' they appeal to the judge or 'middle-man,' as to the embodiment of the just mean. We must remember, however, in defining corrective justice as the mean between gain and loss, that, on the one hand, it is only as something which has a value to be afterwards paid for in the criminal court, that a blow can be called the 'gain' of the assailant and the 'loss' of his victim; and, on the other hand, that 'gain' and 'loss' in the original sense of the terms, i. e. gain and loss incidental to trade, are not unjust, and therefore need no 'correction.'

1131 b. 25. § 1. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τὸ διορθωτικόν κ.τ.λ.] See note on v. 2. 13. When distribution has to be made it is 'just' to give to each recipient a share proportioned to his 'merit': this is τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον, and its formula, as we have seen, is ἡ γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία. When a συνάλλαγμα between A and B has resulted in

the transference of part of A's merited share of τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ to 1131 b. 25. B, it is 'just' to correct the anomaly by transferring back to A from B either the part in question, or its equivalent. This is τὸ διορθωτικόν (or ἐπανορθωτικόν, § 6) δίκαιον. Its mathematical formula is ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία (or μεσότης); for A and B are no longer regarded as possibly *unequally-meritorious* recipients in a distribution to be made, but as persons *equally entitled* to enjoy the undiminished possession of the shares, large or small, *which they have respectively received*: accordingly when, as the result of a συνάλλαγμα, B's share is increased at the expense of A's, the reduced share of A and the increased share of B will appear as extremes between which the equality of A and B, as persons entitled to the undiminished possession of their shares, will fall as the 'arithmetical mean.' Let $x = x$ represent the equality in the eye of the law of A and B, as persons entitled to the undiminished possession of their respective shares—an equality which is not affected by the differences in personal character, working power, rank, &c., which would have to be considered if A and B came up as recipients in a distribution: a συνάλλαγμα between them reduces A's x to $x-1$ and increases B's x to $x+1$. It is 'just' to 'correct' this inequality, and the correction is made by striking the 'arithmetical mean' x between $x-1$ and $x+1$, i. e. by restoring, in short, the parties to the positions which they each occupied before the συνάλλαγμα.

In his note on this § Jackson quotes the following passage from Grant *ad loc.*—'The term "corrective justice" is itself an unfortunate name, because it appears only to lay down principles for restitution, and therefore implies wrong. Thus it has a tendency to confine the view to "involuntary transactions," instead of stating what must be the principle of the just in all the dealings between man and man.' On this Jackson remarks—'Apparently Grant forgets that it is the original transaction which is said to be either voluntary or involuntary, and that it is the rectification of wrong arising out of the original transaction with which corrective justice is concerned.' The example which Jackson gives of the rectification of 'wrong arising out of' a voluntary transaction is 'A borrows money from B (who is here ἐκὼν) and does not fulfil his engagement to repay the loan at a certain time; corrective justice takes from A the proper amount and restores it to B.' Here I would submit that A's non-fulfilment of his engagement is not a 'wrong arising out of the original transaction' in the same sense in which e.g. the loss

1131 b. 25. of my purse is a wrong arising out of the 'original transaction' with the pickpocket. A's non-fulfilment of his engagement (his ability to repay being assumed) introduces a *new* relation, or *συναλλάγμα*, between the parties, being a form of *κλοπή*, and belonging to the *λαθραία* division of *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα*, not to the class of *ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα*. It is properly this new *ἀκούσιον συναλλάγμα* out of which the wrong rectified in Jackson's example arises. At the same time I am ready to admit that Jackson's example of the *διόρθωσις* of 'wrong arising out of a voluntary transaction' is probably one which the writer of the Fifth Book would have accepted. As I remarked in my note on v. 2. 13, he probably thought rather of the enforcement against fraudulent or potentially fraudulent parties, of the original terms of *ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα*, and the settlement of disputes regarding the meaning of the original terms in the civil courts, than of the judicial rectification of unfortunate results, for which neither party is to blame, arising out of the *συναλλάγματα*—the terms of the *συναλλάγματα* not being in dispute—as e. g. when a Land Court 'rectifies' the result of a lease contracted in the open market. As it is, however, he gives no *examples* of *τὸ διορθωτικὸν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐκούσιοις συναλλάγμασι*¹. I limit myself to saying that he gives no *examples*, for I think that Grant goes too far when he asserts that 'all that is said [in this chapter] applies only to the "involuntary transactions."' I take it that the words in § 7—*ὅταν ἀμφισβητήσωσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσι*—may refer to 'voluntary' as well as to 'involuntary transactions.'

b. 26. § 2.] By *ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν διανομή* we must understand much more than the distribution made by some obvious central authority, such as a general who distributes prize money, or a board of directors who apportion dividends: far the most important form of the *διανομή ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν* is 'the distribution of wealth' which results from the operation of the 'economic laws' regulating wages and profits. The good workman contributes more (cf. the *εἰσενεχθέντα* of this passage) than the indifferent workman to the development of that wealth of the nation which is, as it were, the material body to which the State, as *ψυχή*, gives life and reality; and accordingly his reward is greater. Any attempt to interfere

¹ It is worth noticing that the difficulty of bringing the recovery of debt within the scope of judicial *διόρθωσις* was felt; see *E. N.* ix. 1. 9.

with the wages or profits determined by free competition is an attempt to disturb a *γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία*, and to violate *τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον*. No such attempt can, in the nature of things, succeed permanently, its hope being, not to change a merely conventional principle of *διανομή*, but to defeat the law of the victory of the strongest.

It is interesting to compare in this connexion the remarkable passage, *M. M.* i. 33. 1193 b. 36–1194 a. 25, in which distributive justice is described as determining the returns of labour, and regulating the exchanges which in *E. N.* v are discussed in the chapter on *τὸ ἀντιπεποθὸς* (ch. 5). The writer of the *M. M.* differs from the writer of *E. N.* v in confining the principle of *τὸ ἀντιπεποθὸς* to criminal cases, *M. M.* i. 33. 1194 a. 29–1194 b. 2.

§ 3. *κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν*] Mich. Eph. defines *ἀριθ. ἀναλογία* as 1132 a. 1. follows: *ἀναλογία ἀριθμητικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ποσοῦ μὲν ἴσου ἐν ταῖς διαφοραῖς, ποιοῦ δὲ μὴ ἴσου ἢ μὴ ὁμοίου μετέχουσα*: cf. Nicom. Ger. p. 124, ed. Hoche, *ἔστιν οὖν ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης, ὅταν τριῶν ἢ πλείονων ὄρων ἐφεξῆς ἀλλήλοις κειμένων ἐπινοουμένων ἢ αὐτῇ κατὰ ποσότητα διαφορὰ εὐρίσκηται μεταξὺ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχουσα, μὴ μόντοι λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ὄροις πρὸς ἀλλήλους γίνηται οἷον α, β, γ, δ, ε. . . μετέχει ἄρα ἡ τοιαύτη ποσοῦ μὲν ἴσου ἐν ταῖς διαφοραῖς ποιοῦ δὲ οὐκέτι ἴσου διὰ τοῦτο ἀριθμητικὴ εἰ δ' ἔμπαλι ποιοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου μετέχε, ποσοῦ δ' οὐ, ἦν ἂν γεωμετρικὴ ἀντὶ ἀριθμητικῆς.*

οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.] When one man injures another man a. 2. (the examples in this § and the next are *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα* exclusively), no account is taken of the possibly unequal 'worth' of the persons as recipients in a distribution, but only of 'the difference produced by the hurt' (*τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν*) in the positions of parties who are *equally* entitled to enjoy the possession of their own.

In his note on this §, Grant says: 'Corrective justice is here said to regard each case impersonally as an affair of loss and gain, and between these it strikes the middle point. It is the moral worth of persons that is ignored (*εἰ ἐπιεικῆς φαῦλον κ.τ.λ.*), for we find afterwards, ch. 5. §§ 3–4, that a consideration of the position and circumstances of persons *does* come in to modify the estimate of the loss sustained from an indignity, &c. It must be remembered, however, that in the cases here alluded to by Grant (v. 5. 4 *οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν . . . καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν*), 'the loss sustained [*sc. by the*

1132 a. 2. *individual himself*] from an indignity' is not the most important thing to be estimated, but rather the *public evil* arising from acts which tend to diminish the authority and *prestige* of a magistrate. I do not think that it is fair to the writer to assume (as Grant seems to do) that he regards in v. 5. 4 merely the individual's personal loss, and not also the public evil involved in the offence; but it must be admitted that he does not see at all clearly that the case *εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν* is not *sui generis*. Even when one ordinary citizen injures another ordinary citizen, the true nature of the situation created is misrepresented by the term *συνάλλαγμα* applied to it. We are not concerned merely with a relation between two individuals *in vacuo*, but with a sore in the body politic, which must be healed by means which take account of the whole organism. *Διόρθωσις* is much more than making the *ἀδικῶν* give 'compensation' to the *ἀδικούμενος*—indeed it is sometimes impossible to 'compensate' him at all. The words before us here (v. 4. 3)—*οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.*—are significant, as showing how abstract the writer's notion of *τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον* is. He is thinking here only of the 'compensation' given to the individual. The good moral character of the *ἀδικῶν* does not indeed make the wrong which he inflicts one for which the *ἀδικούμενος* should get less 'compensation' than for an equal wrong inflicted by a bad man; but the claims of the *ἀδικούμενος* to compensation having been satisfied, it still remains to be considered by the 'court of correction' how far society has been endangered by the offence, and how much ought to be added to the penalty on that account; and here 'previous good character' is not irrelevant. The formula of the *ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης* seems to me to have stood in the way of the writer's taking a complete view of the nature of 'Corrective Justice.'

a. 7. § 4. *καὶ γὰρ ὅταν κ.τ.λ.*] 'for even when one man is struck, and another strikes, or one man kills, and another is killed, it is a case of unequal division between patient and agent'—*i. e.* the situation created by a theft is only a more obvious, but not a more real, case of 'unequal division' than that created by an assault or a murder.

a. 9. ἀλλὰ πειράται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους] I am inclined (though with considerable hesitation) to agree with Münscher (*Quaest. Crit.* p. 70) and Jackson that *ζημία* is not (as Mich. Eph. and others suppose) the instrumental dative here = 'by the penalty

which he (the judge) inflicts,' but the impaired position of the injured party, as opposed to the *κέρδος*, or augmented position of the injuring party. The fact that in the context *ζημία* describes the position of the injured party seems to favour this view. Jackson's rendering is—'*i. e.* πειράται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν τὸ κέρδος ἀφαιρῶν αὐτοῦ. "He endeavours to equalise the unjustly augmented advantages of the one (τὸ κέρδος) and the unjustly impaired advantages of the other (τὴν ζημίαν) by taking from the former and giving to the latter." The gen. ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους (not ἀφαιρῶν τὸ κέρδος) seems to show that *κέρδος* stands here for the *whole* position of the πλέον ἔχων, not for the unjustly obtained *part* of it.

§§ 5, 6. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν . . . καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία a. 10. τὸ δὲ κέρδος] The terms *ζημία* and *κέρδος* are applied strictly (*οἰκείως*) only where A has come out of an *ἐκούσιον συνάλλαγμα* poorer (in respect of ἀργύριον ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον), while B has come out of it richer; still, metaphorically we speak of the *ζημία* of the man who has been struck, and of the *κέρδος* of the man who has struck him: it is not, however, till the damage done comes to be estimated, that the terms are thus metaphorically applied: *i. e.* the infliction of a wound could not be described as *κέρδος* to the person inflicting it, except for the reason that it has a value in the criminal court and has there to be paid for: see Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 122)—'Trendelenburg (*Hist. Beiträge zur Ph.* iii. p. 425) denkt bei *μετρηθῆ* an schätzbare Klagen, und interpretirt im übrigen wie Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire: mais quand le juge a pu mesurer le dommage éprouvé, le profit de l'un devient sa perte, et la perte de l'autre devient son profit. Aber diese Auffassung ist schon wegen γέ unmöglich. Nach meiner Ansicht ist zu übersetzen: aber erst dann nennt man das eine *ζημία*, das andere *κέρδος*, wenn das Erlittene gemessen ist.' Another objection to the view of Trendelenburg and Saint-Hilaire is that although the judge's rectification is certainly called (*καλεῖται*) *ζημία* (*i. e.* = penalty) so far as the *παράξας* is concerned, its result for the *παθῶν* is never called *κέρδος*.

§ 6. ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν . . . κέρδους] I do not think that a. 18. there is any significance in the substitution here of *ἐπανορθωτικὸν* for *διορθωτικὸν*. A comparison of the words before us with § 14 below *ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον* is well fitted to exhibit the difficulty in which the writer is placed by his conception of *τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐκούσιαις συναλ-*

1132 a. 18. *λέγασαι*. In the clause before us (§ 6) we naturally assume that, in accordance with the statement made at the beginning of this chapter, τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον is τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους, not only in ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα (from which the examples are exclusively taken), but also in ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα. In § 13, however, he tells us that ζημία and κέρδος originally and properly mean that loss and gain (having less and having more than one started with) which the law, so far from attempting to correct, *permits* in voluntary exchanges, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀνείσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν δέδωκεν ὁ νόμος, and that, where an attempt is made by the law to correct ζημία and κέρδος, it is not ζημία and κέρδος in such voluntary transactions as buying and selling, but in *involuntary* transactions; his final summing-up being (§ 14) ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον—'accordingly (corrective) justice is the mean between gain of a certain kind and loss of a certain kind, *i. e.* between gain and loss in involuntary transactions.' Here τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον, referring to and explaining κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας τινὸς, is an inexact abbreviation for τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκούσιαις συναλλάγμασι: so the Paraph.—ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι' λέγω δὲ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκούσιαις συναλλάγμασι . . . τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐκούσιαις συναλλάγμασι κέρδος οὔτε ἄδικόν ἐστιν οὔτε εὐθύνεται' τούτων γὰρ ἄδειαν ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος. It is difficult to reconcile this summing-up with the position from which the writer starts, that corrective justice is the rectification of inequalities arising ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐκούσιαις καὶ τοῖς ἀκούσιαις: but see note on v. 4. 14, b. 18 where Jackson's view is discussed.

- a. 22. § 7. καὶ ζητούσι δικαστὴν μέσον] Fritzsche quotes Thuc. iv. 83 ἐτοῖμος ὢν Βρασιδᾶ μέσφ δικαστῆ ἐπιτρέπειν.
- a. 23. μεσιδίου] Zell quotes *Pol. E.* 5. 1306 a. 28 ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐχειρίζουσι τὴν φυλακὴν στρατιώταις καὶ ἄρχοντι μεσιδίφ.
- a. 28. § 8. δίχα διαιρεθῆ] 'to divide into two *equal* parts,' Jackson, who refers to Eucl. *El.* i. 10, i. 9, iii. 30: cf. also Nic. Ger. ἀριθ. εἰσαγ. i. 8. 4, p. 15, Hoche.
- a. 29. § 9.] The sentence τὸ δ' ἴσον . . . ἀναλογίαν Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 30) supposes to have changed places with διὰ τοῦτο . . . διχαστής—'Die richtige Gedankenfolge wird hergestellt, wenn der Satz διὰ τοῦτο—διχαστής vor den Satz τὸ δ' ἴσον—ἀναλογίαν gestellt und an

die etymologische Bemerkung angeschlossen wird, zu der er ganz 1132 a. 29. ersichtlich gehört. Erst dann gewinnt sowohl διὰ τοῦτο, als γὰρ seine richtige Beziehung.'

διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται . . . διχαστής] See Alex. *Met.* p. 718. a. 30. 1. ed. Bonitz (on 1078 b. 21) δικαιοσύνη γὰρ φασιν [οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι] ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς ὁ διαιρῶν τὴν δεκάδα δίχα. Cf. also *Theol. Arith.* p. 12 (Ast's edition), quoted here by Jackson, *Δίκη τε, οἰονεὶ δίχη καὶ ἴσος κ.τ.λ.* It is scarcely necessary to remind the student that the original meaning of δίκη is *custom* or *usage*—cf. *δίκη βορῶν*, 'the way of mortals'; and that consequently δίκαιον = νόμιμον is earlier than δίκαιον = ἴσον.

§ 12. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν α α . . . κ.τ.λ.] 'The lines (γραμμαί) over b. 6. which we write α . . . α, β . . . β,' *i. e.* 'the lines α α, β β.' As Jackson remarks, 'the genitive and the dative appear to be used indifferently in such phrases'; hence, in b. 7. τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ γ δ (O^b and CCC—though in CCC there are traces of erasure after φ) ought to be read for Bekker's τὸ ἐφ' ὧν γ δ. 'It will be observed,' Jackson notes, 'that the whole lines are described as ἡ α α, κ.τ.λ., and the segments of them as τὸ α ε, κ.τ.λ. Thus ἡ α α is what Euclid would call ἡ α α γραμμῆ, τὸ α ε what he would call τὸ α ε τμήμα.'

ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν . . . b. 11. τοιοῦτον] All b. 9. MSS. give these words, both here, and (*without ἄν*) in ch. 5. § 9. 1133 a. 14, where they are explicable in the context. Here they are clearly out of place, and must have crept by some accident into the archetype of all existing MSS. If we suppose that in the MS. from which the archetype was copied, the text from 1132 b. 11 ἐλλήλυθε to 1133 a. 14 ἴσασθῆναι exactly filled the reverse side of one folio (A), and the obverse side of the next folio (B), we can see that the copyist, reaching τῷ γ δ 1132 b. 9 at the bottom of the obverse side of folio A, and accidentally turning over two leaves (A and B), instead of one¹, would find the words ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. 1133 a. 14 at the top of the reverse side of folio B, and might transcribe them after γ δ 1132 b. 9, before he found out his mistake. If he marked them for omission, the next transcriber might easily fail to notice his mark.

The words having thus established themselves in v. 4. 12, their

¹ Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 38 note) gives an instance of this accident in the case of N^b.

1132 b. 9. occurrence again in v. 5. 9 would, of course, be a difficulty for later scribes; and I cannot help thinking that the omission of *ἄν* in the latter place was an awkward attempt on the part of a later, but very early scribe (for *all* the MSS¹, and the Aldine edition omit *ἄν* 1133 a. 15) to minimise the difficulty by making the writer appear to refer back with the imperfect *ἀνηροῦντο* to a statement already made. The result is, of course, an unjustifiable sentence. Aristotle *alludes* with the imperfect *ἦν* to a doctrine previously stated, but if he wishes to quote the exact words of a previous sentence he does so with *ὡς ἐλέγομεν πρότερον*, or some such phrase. It is conceivable, however, that a copyist in difficulty might ignore this distinction. At any rate I feel sure that it was by no mere accident, but on a *theory* of some kind or other, that a succession of scribes down to the time of the Aldine edition steadily refused to admit the grammatically necessary *ἄν* in v. 5. 9, while they read it in v. 4. 12.

Whether the clause is genuine even in v. 5. 9 will be examined in the note on that §. The foregoing hypothesis to account for its presence in v. 4. 12 assumes only that it was present in v. 5. 9 before it appeared in v. 4. 12, but not that it is genuine, *i. e.* was always present, in v. 5. 9.

b. 11. §§ 13, 14.] See note on v. 4. 6, a. 18.

b. 15. § 13. ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν] Grant has a good note here—"In commerce of all kinds the law allows one to gain as much as one can. In involuntary transactions the law allows no gain to be made, but brings things always back to their level. This non-interference of the law with bargains becomes, if carried out, the principle of free-trade."

b. 16. § 14. ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ' αὐτὰ (τὰ add. Rassow, Bywater) δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασὶν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιόσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν] Bekker's full stop before ὅταν b. 16 should be removed: see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 94.

On the *αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν* [or *αὐτῶν*] of the MSS., I quote Jackson's note, in which he gives the various interpretations which the editors have offered of the words, and adds an interpretation of his own—"αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται." The editors all read *δι' αὐτῶν*, and most take these words in connection with *αὐτά*. "Nemo interpretum haec

¹ Jackson states that all the ten MSS. (including K^b) examined by him omit *ἄν* here. I can add that CCC and B¹²³ also omit it.

verba intellexit," says Michelet. "Felicianus vertit: *sed sua cuique per se ipsa evaserint*; Argyropylus: *sed sua per se ipsa sunt facta*; Lambinus: *sed paria paribus respondent*. Cum § 13 dixisset, nomina κέρβος et ζημία orta esse ex contractibus voluntariis, iam § 14 proponit, ea nomina translata esse ad obligationes ex delicto, ita ut in iis solis usurpentur. Verte: *ubi vero neque plus neque minus habent, praeterquam quae per se ipsos facta sint*, &c." Rassow (*Forschungen*, p. 94) proposes to insert *τά* before *δι' αὐτῶν* [Bywater adopts Rassow's *τά*], and to translate "das was man durch seine eigene Arbeit besass." Grant would construe "but result in being themselves by means of reciprocity, *i. e.* by mutual giving and taking, *ἑαυτῶν* being equivalent to *ἀλλήλων*." Finally, as I learn from a note to Williams' translation, Professor Chandler reads *δι' αὐτῶν*, and translates "But when, by buying and selling (*δι' αὐτῶν*), men have got neither more nor less than they had at first, but exactly the same." Agreeing with Professor Chandler in his rendering of *πλέον*, *ἔλαττον*, and *αὐτά* (*sc. τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς*), I take *δι' αὐτῶν γένηται* to mean "comes into their possession." If we can say *δι' αὐτῶν εἶναι* "to be in their possession" *Polit.* vii. (vi.) 4. p. 182. 28, viii. (v.) 1. p. 194. 23. 6. p. 206. 2 (see Eucken, *über den Sprachgebrauch des A.* ii. 38), surely *δι' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι* must also be admissible. The sentence thus means, as it ought to do, "But when people get what is their own, they are said to have what is their own." Cf. *Polit.* viii. (v.) 7. p. 208. 26 *μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατ' ἄξίαν ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ αὐτῶν*. It may be conceded that *δι' αὐτῶν γένηται* would in certain contexts be good Greek for 'comes into their possession,' although it is to be noted that the idea of 'management,' in addition to that of mere 'possession,' seems to be conveyed in the passages on which Jackson relies; the difficulty, however, of accepting Jackson's interpretation of the words in the present case is that of breaking up the phrase *αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν* [or *αὐτῶν*], which seems to be an organic whole. The passages quoted by Jackson, after Eucken, perhaps throw light on *δι' αὐτῶν* [or *αὐτῶν*] *γένηται*, but not on *αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν* [or *αὐτῶν*]-viz. *Pol.* 1306 a. 16 *τῆς πολιτείας δι' ὀλίγων οὔσης*: 1301 b. 12 *τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν προαιροῦνται τὴν αὐτὴν δι' αὐτῶν δὲ εἶναι βούλονται*: 1293 a. 28 *τὸ δι' αὐτῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχειν*. It seems to me that *αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν* cannot be broken up, and that *αὐτῶν* is necessarily neuter, referring to the same subject as *αὐτά*. The phrase does not, it would appear, occur elsewhere in the Aristotelian Corpus; but in Theophrastus, *Met.* i. 1 (Brandis, p. 309) we have, *οὔτ' ἄγον εὐσημος*

1132 b. 16. ἡ [sc. τῶν μαθηματικῶν] συναφή τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς . . . οἷον γὰρ μεμηχανημένα δοκεῖ δι' ἡμῶν εἶναι σχήματά τε καὶ μορφὰς καὶ λόγους περιτιθέντων, αὐτὰ δὲ δι' αὐτῶν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει φύσιν: i. e. geometrical truths are thought to be arbitrarily constructed by us, and to have *in and of themselves* no independent reality: cf. also Plutarch, *Consol. ad Apollon.* I οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν ἰατρῶν πρὸς τὰς ἀθροίας τῶν ρευμάτων ἐπιφορὰς εὐθὺς προσφέρουσι τὰς διὰ τῶν φαρμάκων βοήθειάς, ἀλλ' ἕωσι τὸ βαρῦνον τῆς φλεγμονῆς διὰ τῆς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐπιχρίστων ἐπιπέσεως αὐτὸ δι' αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν πέψιν.

I take αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν [or αὐτῶν] then in the present passage as one expression in which δι' αὐτῶν strengthens αὐτά, and explain: 'But when there has resulted neither more nor less [than what they started with], but simply the original amount itself'—i. e. the original amount not affected from without in any way, but remaining 'in and through itself' the same. Rassow's easy emendation gives good sense, but I prefer the αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν of the codd. explained as above.

b. 18. ὥστε κέρδους . . . ὕστερον] see note on v. 4. 6, a. 18. Jackson's view alluded to at the end of that note is as follows, p. 86 'τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον] This is not inconsistent with 2. § 13 and 4. § 1, because, whether the original transaction was ἀκούσιον or ἐκούσιον, the result must have been παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον in regard to the person injured, else there would be nothing to rectify': and he translates the clause—'Thus τὸ [διορθωτικόν] δίκαιον is a mean between a sort of profit and a sort of loss in matters which are not voluntary—the possession of exactly as much after the transaction as before it.' Jackson's point here then is that τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον is not, as the Paraph. assumes it to be, equivalent to τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συναλλάγμασι, but serves to mark that kind of ζημία (resulting, it may be, from an ἐκούσιον συναλλάγμα) which the losing party resents, and can have judicially rectified, as distinguished from that other kind of ζημία which he accepts as bad luck in business. I admit that this interpretation of τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον is ingenious, and would be plausible, if we could be sure that we were dealing here with the unbroken statement of a consistent doctrine of corrective justice. In the absence, however, of anything like certainty on this point, I think that it is safer to explain the two passages, §§ 5, 6, and §§ 13, 14 (whether written by the same author or not cannot be settled, and does not matter much) independently of each other. Sections 5 and 6 regard the κέρδος and ζημία, between which τὸ

ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον is said to be τὸ μέσον, as *eminently* the κέρδος and ζημία which result from ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα: and *illegal* κέρδος and ζημία arising out of ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα, though theoretically implied, are not prominent in the writer's mind. Sections 13 and 14, I think, are to the following effect—'ζημία and κέρδος strictly so called are in voluntary exchanges, and are allowed, i. e. are "just": hence where ζημία and κέρδος are not allowed, i. e. are "unjust," they are so called in a metaphorical sense, i. e. they are the ζημία and κέρδος which result from *involuntary transactions*.' These are undoubtedly the most eminent examples of 'unjust' ζημία and κέρδος—and the passage, I believe, confines itself to them; whether because the writer purposely limited his statement, or because the sections (13, 14) are, as Ramsauer supposes p. 315, fragmentary, I do not undertake to decide. The consistency of ch. 4 would have to be much more evident, I think, than it is, to make it likely that τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον is not opposed to τῆς ἐκούσιου ἀλλαγῆς b. 13, and does not stand for τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συναλλάγμασι.

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

Some have thought that 'suffering or receiving in return,' meaning by this 'suffering or receiving the same in return,' is an adequate definition of justice. But this definition does not explain the nature either of distributive or of corrective justice. Corrective justice does not proceed on the principle of 'an eye for an eye'; it takes account of circumstances and motives, and also makes the offender suffer, not the same thing, but that which is equivalent; and it is a return equivalent to the product of his labour, but not the same in kind, which distributive justice assigns to each member of the community; in other words, the subsistence of the social community requires that each labourer shall receive from other labourers in exchange for his product, not the same product, but an equivalent amount of other products. Thus, if labourers A and B, and their respective products a and B, be arranged in a square

A B

a B

we may say that exchange is 'cross-conjunction,' i. e. the conjunction of A and B and B and a. Since, however, the values of the unit products of different labourers differ, there could be no fair exchange unless it were possible to determine in each case what amount of one product is equivalent to what

amount of another product. This is possible by means of money, which is a 'medium of exchange' or 'common measure of things exchanged.' Of course 'need' or 'demand' is the real medium; and money is merely its conventional representative; but it is necessary to 'represent' or 'universalize' need; since need in the concrete, i.e. the need of this particular product, varies too much to be a standard of value, whereas money which enables a man to get anything he needs is something which he always needs equally—or nearly equally (for the value of money fluctuates slightly); i.e. money is something which he is always willing to take in exchange for his product.

From what has been said it is plain that 'doing justice' is striking the mean between the position of the party who injures and that of the party who is injured, and that the habit of justice is a mean state, not however in the same sense in which the other virtues are mean states, but because, in the apportionment of external good things, it produces a mean, i.e. always assigns an amount which is the mean between the too much and the too little which injustice assigns. The just man deliberately assigns to himself and to others that amount which is exactly proportioned to his and their 'merit' in each case, neither too much nor too little. The unjust man deliberately assigns too much of that which is good, and too little of that which is evil, to himself; and where he does not himself come in for a share, tends to give undue preference to one or other of the two parties between whom he makes distribution.

1132 b. 21. § 1. τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθός] The writer having explained the two εἶδη of Particular Justice, now proceeds in ch. 5 to discuss certain points, some connected with Distributive Justice, and some with Corrective Justice, which might have been discussed in chapters 3 and 4 under their own heads, but seem to come before the reader more naturally and suggestively when allowed to arise out of the criticism of a famous theory of justice with which he is already familiar.


Τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθός, literally 'that which has suffered or received in return,' is somewhat strangely used instead of τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθέναι. 'ἀντιπεπονηθέναι in mathematics¹ is 'to be reciprocally proportional': ἀντιπεπόνησις is 'reciprocal proportion'; and τὰ ἀντιπεπονηθότα are 'magnitudes which are reciprocally proportional': see Euclid, *El.* vi. Def. 2.—'Two sides of one figure are said to be reciprocally proportional to two sides of another, when one of the sides of the first is to one of the sides of the second, as the remaining side of the second is to the remaining side of the first.' The enunciation of Euclid *El.* vi. 15 is τῶν ἴσων καὶ μίαν μῆ ἴσην ἔχόντων γωνίαν τριγώνων ἀντιπεπόνησιν αἱ πλευραὶ αἱ περὶ τὰς ἴσας γωνίας· καὶ ὅν μίαν μῆ ἴσην ἔχόντων γωνίαν τριγώνων ἀντιπεπόνησιν αἱ πλευραὶ αἱ περὶ τὰς ἴσας γωνίας, ἴσα ἐστὶν ἐκείνα.

¹ I wish to acknowledge indebtedness to Jackson's note, p. 93.

Let (1) and (2) be equal triangles having angles *A* and *X* 1132 b. 21. equal.

Then $AB : XF :: XZ : AC$.

Or let $AB : XF :: XZ : AC$, and angle $A = X$, then the triangles are equal.



Here the ἀντιπεπόνησις, or 'reciprocal proportion,' consists in this, that if triangle (1) is superior in respect of its side *AB* to (2) in respect of its side *XF*, on the other hand (2) is equally superior in respect of its side *XZ* to (1) in respect of its side *AC*.

In mathematics the term ἀντιπεπονηθός, ἀντιπεπονηθέναι, or ἀντιπεπόνησις, thus means unambiguously 'reciprocal proportion.' But when we apply this technical mathematical term to express the concrete case of the 'just reciprocation' which ought to subsist between two persons, it immediately becomes ambiguous. When we say that 'it is just that *A* should get or suffer in return what he has given to or inflicted upon *B*,' do we mean that he should get or suffer *the same thing, or something different but 'equivalent'?* And if something different, but 'equivalent,' what is to be the standard of equivalence? In the so-called ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα a natural instinct of the primitive man calls aloud for 'the same thing.' This instinct found formal expression in the law, 'an eye for an eye,' of ancient penal codes, and still asserts itself in those modern codes which retain the death-punishment for murder. It was only comparatively late reflection which suggested that the ends of criminal justice were, in most cases at least, best served by a retribution equivalent to the injury, but not the same in kind. In the case of the ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα, however, men necessarily saw from the very first that ἀνταπόδοσις could not be corn for corn, but must be corn for something else, and that the ἀνταπόδοσις would be fair, only if the *value* of the corn given in return equalled the *value* of the thing received. Thus the notion of *value*, ἀξία, proportion, forced itself upon them from the very first in the case of ἐκούσια

1132 b. 21. συναλλάγματα, but was long absent from their reflection upon ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα.

In the present passage the writer accuses the Pythagoreans, together with others, of confounding justice with 'simple reciprocation'; 'simple reciprocation' being 'retaliation,' or that reciprocation which proceeds according to the principle of 'an eye for an eye.' 'But there are some who think that simple reciprocation, or "suffering the same in return," is all that is involved in the notion of justice. This was the opinion of the Pythagoreans, who defined justice simply (*i. e.* without any πρόσθεσις or qualification) as "reciprocation," or "suffering the same in return"—an opinion which in § 3 is identified with that of the line εἴ κε πάθοι κ.τ.λ. Here then the charge brought against the Pythagoreans is that they confounded justice, as a whole, with the *lex talionis* which, as we have seen, recommends itself to a primitive instinct as the law of ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα. The writer's criticism (§§ 2-5), and consequent construction (§§ 6 &c.)—in which the famous conception of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός is not cast aside, but skilfully used—consist in turning the reader from these ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα which are so misleading in this connexion, if attended to exclusively, and asking him to observe τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός in ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα as well, in order to obtain there a truer view of its nature, and return with this truer view to the explanation of it in the ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα.

It seems to be very likely, however, that, in charging the Pythagoreans with the identification of 'justice' and 'retaliation,' the writer is mistaken. There can be no doubt, of course, that they spoke of justice as ἀντιπεπονθός: but it is probable that, in doing so, they thought merely of the mathematical implication of the term, without pledging themselves to the doctrine of 'an eye for an eye,' or indeed to any doctrine which could be said to have much ethical significance. This would be entirely in keeping with their treatment of the other 'virtues,' which they explained fantastically, by mathematical formulae, without, apparently, paying much attention to their concrete content: see Alex. on *Met. A. 5.* 985 b. 26 (quoted by Jackson from Zeller i. 360) τῆς μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης ἴδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες εἶναι τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός τε καὶ ἴσον, ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τοῦτο εὐρίσκοντες ὄν, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν ἰσάκεις ἴσον ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον ἔλεγον εἶναι δικαιοσύνην . . . τοῦτον δὲ οἱ μὲν τὸν τέσσαρα ἔλεγον . . . οἱ δὲ τὸν ἐννέα: see also *Theol. Arith.* p. 28 (Ast), quoted by Jackson, 'where the Pythagorean definition of justice is said to be δύναμις

ἀποδόσεως τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ προσήκοντος, ἐμπεριεχομένη ἀριθμοῦ τετραγώνου 1132 b. 21. περισσοῦ μεσότητι.' The other virtues were similarly formulated: see *M. M.* i. 1. 1182 a. 11 πρῶτος μὲν οὖν ἐνεχέρησεν ὁ Πυθαγόρας περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δέ: τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων οὐκ οἰκείαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο: οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκεις ἴσος. I think then that there is good reason for doubting whether the Pythagoreans with their mathematical expression τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, pledged themselves to the doctrine of simple retaliation with which the writer of the Fifth Book charges them. At any rate the pseudo-Archytas (apud Stob. *Flor.* ii. 138 ed. Meineke), who, I suppose, hoped to pass for a Pythagorean, gives a very different account of the expression from that ascribed to the Pythagoreans by the writer of the Fifth Book. Discoursing περὶ νόμον καὶ δικαιοσύνης, this 'Pythagorean' says δεῖ δὴ τὸν νόμον τὸν κάρρονα καὶ τὰν πόλιν ἐκ πασῶν σύνθετον εἶμεν τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν: καὶ ἔξεν τι βασιλῆας καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας: ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμόνῃ: τοὶ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεῖς τῆς μοναρχίας, τοὶ δὲ γέροντες τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας, τοὶ δὲ ἔφοροι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἵππαγρέται δὲ καὶ κόροι τῆς δημοκρατίας: δεῖ τοίνυν τὸν νόμον μὴ μόνον ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν ἦμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀντιπεπονθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῶ μερέεσσιν [legem igitur oportet non solum bonam et honestam esse, sed etiam singulis suis sive reipublicae partibus oppositam—Mullach, *Frag. Phil.* i. 560]. οὗτος γὰρ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ βέλαιος: τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθῆναι λέγω αὐτῶ, καὶ ἄρχεν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι τὰν αὐτῶν ἀρχάν [partibus singulis eam oppositam esse dico, ita ut idem magistratus aliis imperet aliis obediat], ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ εὐνομοστάτῃ Λακεδαιμόνῃ: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ βασιλεῦσιν τοὶ ἔφοροι ἀντικίθηται, τοῖσι δ' οἱ γέροντες, μέσοι δ' οἱ κόροι καὶ ἵππαγρέται: ἐφ' ὃ γὰρ ἂν ῥέψωντι τοὶ πλεονεκτέοντες τῶν ἀρχόντων, οὗτοι τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑποτίθενται.

ἀντιπεπονθός ἄλλῳ] ἄλλῳ seems to be given only by K^b P^b and b. 23. CCC¹; and Jackson omits it, 'because it is grammatically impossible to combine it with ἀντιπεπονθός.' (The ἀντιπεπονθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῶ μερέεσσιν of the ps.-Archytas quoted above seems to show that it is not impossible.) He suspects 'that ἄλλῳ is a corruption of ἄλλως prefixed to one of the double readings which in the following sentence are preserved by P^b, and therefore may have occurred in the common progenitor of P^b and K^b.' The reading of P^b is ἀντιπεπονθός ἄλλῳ, τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθός οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νόμιμον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολιτικόν, πολιτικόν δὲ λέγω τὸ κοινωκόν, τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθός,

¹ B¹ has ἄλλων.

1132 b. 23. κ.τ.λ. Camb. has the same interpolation (with νόμικον sic, for νόμιμον), and on the margin, in a later hand, the word περιττεύει.

§ 2. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει] 'receiving, or suffering, the same in return' is a definition of justice which is inapplicable, whether we consider justice as distributive or corrective; and there is no third kind of justice. Mich. Eph. has an interesting note here—αἰτιάται δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τῶν Πυθαγορείων τὸ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς δίκαιον, καὶ μὴ διορίσαι, μηδὲ προσθεῖναι τὸ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν· τὸ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἀντιπᾶσχει ἕκαστον ὃ πεποίηκεν οὐδαμῶς δίκαιον. οὗ σημείον παρέθετο τὸ μὴ ἐφαρμόττειν αὐτὸ μήτε τῷ διανεμητικῷ δικαίῳ μήτε τῷ διορθωτικῷ εἰς ἃ τὸ δίκαιον διήρηται· ἀλλὰ πῶς οὐκ ἐφαρμόζει ἐκείνοις; ἢ ὅτι ἐκείνων ἐκάτερον ἐν ἀναλογία ἐστὶ, τὸ μὲν γὰρ γεωμετρικῆ τὸ δ' ἀριθμητικῆ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν οὐδετέρῳ τῶν ἀναλογιῶν ὑποπίπτει, ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ταῦτόν τῷ διανεμητικῷ οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν δῆλον· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἦν τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀντιπεπονθότι οὐκ ἔστι· ποῦ γὰρ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν εἰ δοῖλος εὐγενῆ καὶ σπουδαῖον μίαν πληγὴν πλήξει, καὶ αὐτὸν μίαν ἀντιπληγῆναι, ἢ εἰ ἰερέα λακτίσει ἀντιλακτισθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ διορθωτικῷ ταῦτόν τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ διορθωτικὸν οὐτ' αὐτὰ ἀξιοῖ ἀντιπᾶσχειν τοὺς ποιήσαντας· οὐ γὰρ ὀδόντα ἀντὶ ὀδόντος ἀξιοῖ ἐξαίρειν, ἀλλὰ τιμᾶσθαι πόσον καὶ οἷον ἀξίος ὁ ὀδὸν ἢ ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς, ἢ εἴτι ἂν ἢ τὸ μέλος, οἷον εἰ δέκα νομισμάτων, ταῦτα ὑπατεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιήσαντος καὶ δίδουσι τῷ πεπονθότι τὴν στέρησιν τοῦ ὀδόντος ἢ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ. It will be noticed that Mich. Eph. in this passage thinks of a 'Distribution of Punishments' κατ' ἀξίαν. He says that to punish, on the ἀντιπεπονθὸς principle, a slave who strikes a gentleman would be inconsistent with the διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον. The Paraphrast is, I think, more fortunate in his illustration. He says—Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει οὐδενὶ εἴδει τοῦ δικαίου, οὔτε γὰρ τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ διορθωτικόν· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς διανομῆς οὐ δυνατόν ἀεὶ τὸν πολίτην ἐκείνα πάσχειν εὐ ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἄπερ ἐποίησεν· εἰ γὰρ τύραννον ἀπέκτεινε, πῶς τὸ αὐτὸ πείνεται; 'Receiving the same in return' is an erroneous account of distributive justice, because in it the dividend which a man receives ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ is not the same in kind as the contribution which he makes to the common capital: e.g. the musician is not paid in music, but in money according to his skill. It is also an erroneous account of corrective justice, because it makes punishment merely a matter of immediate personal revenge, ignoring the interests of society, which demand the establishment of an impartial court able

to take account of the position and circumstances of the parties as 1132 b. 23. members of the State, and to estimate carefully degrees of responsibility.

§ 3. καίτοι βούλονταί γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ Ῥαδαμάνθους δίκαιον] b. 25. i. e. the Pythagoreans appeal to the venerable authority of Rhadamanthus.

τά ρ'] the conjecture of Coraes and Jackson for the τὰ κ' of the b. 27. MSS. is probably correct.

δικὴ κ' ἰθεία] Fritzsche quotes Hom. *Hymn. in Cer.* 152 ἰθείῃσι δίκησι, and compares Latin *rectus*, Germ. *Recht*.

§ 4. πολλοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ] i. e. in many cases just correction b. 28. and simple retaliation do not agree. The examples introduced by οἷον seem to refer only to correction, unless we are to follow Mich. Eph. in thinking of a 'distribution of punishments.'

οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων κ.τ.λ.] As was pointed out in note on v. 4. 3. the writer, in this remark, probably recognises the public aspect of punishment. Hitherto he has described punishment or 'correction' as affecting the ἀδικῶν and ἀδικούμενος only. We can in this instance see the advantage of the method in morals which builds upon foundations discovered by the examination of ἔνδοξα. Had the writer not found the so-called Pythagorean position imperfect, it would perhaps not have occurred to him to remove a vital imperfection in his own theory of 'correction,' even in the slight and insufficient way in which he does so in the present passage. The Paraph. Heliodorus has a discriminating note here—ὁ γὰρ τὸν ἄρχοντα τυπτήσας, τὴν τάξιν τῆς πολιτείας ἀνείλε, καὶ οὐ τυπτήσεται, ἀλλ' ἀποκτανθήσεται· καὶ ὁ τὸν γάμον τοῦ πέλας διαφθείρας, πείνεται μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς κακῶς, οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ δέ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀλόγον. Cf. *Probl.* ΚΘ. 14. 952 b. 28 (referred to by Fritzsche) οἷον καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τις ἄρχοντα κακῶς εἴπῃ, μεγάλα τὰ ἐπιτίμια, ἐὰν δὲ τις ἰδιώτην, οὐδὲν καὶ καλῶς· οἷεται γὰρ τότε οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸν ἄρχοντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν τὸν κατηγοροῦντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὑβρίζειν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ λιμένι κλέπτοντα οὐ μόνον τὸν ἰδιώτην βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν αἰσχύνειν.

§ 5. ἔτι τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολὺ] The Par. b. 30. Heliod. merely says εἰ δὲ τις καὶ ἀκούσιως καὶ ἀγνοῶν ἔβλαψε τὸν πέλας, οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ὁμοίως ἀντιβλαθῆναι, and Mich. Eph. says εἰ . . . ἐκὼν δέδρακεν ἢ ἄκων ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐπανορθωτικῷ δικαίῳ ἐξετάζεται, καὶ εἰ μὲν

1182 b. 30. εἰρήθη ἐκὼν δράσας εἰθύνεται μείζονως εἰ δ' ἄκων μετριοτέρως· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀντιπεπονητός οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐξετάζεται. So far as the impulse to retaliate in kind is an irrational one, it will not stop to enquire whether an injury is intended (ἐκούσιον), or is merely due to accident (ἀκούσιον); but perhaps the words before us imply something more than this, which the writer of the *M. M.* (i. 33. 1194 a. 37) has expressed—οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, εἴ τις τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐξέκοψεν τινός, ἀντεκοπήναι μόνον, ἀλλὰ πλείονα παθεῖν, ἀκολουθήσαντα τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ἤρξε πρότερος καὶ ἠδίκησεν, i. e. if justice is 'receiving the same in return,' the aggressor whose assault is voluntary, and perhaps entirely unprovoked, will suffer in return exactly what he has inflicted on his perhaps innocent victim: but he ought to suffer more.

b. 31. § 6. ἀλλ' . . . ἡ πόλις] The editors quote *Pol. B. 2. 1261 a. 30* διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονητός σώζει τὰς πόλεις ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικαῖς εἴρηται πρότερον—where τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονητός = τὸ ἀντιπεπονητός κατ' ἀναλογίαν of the present passage.

τὴν πόλιν is probably to be supplied as the object of συνέχει.

τὸ ἀντιπεπονητός κατ' ἰσότητα is 'receiving *the same* in return'—a conception which does not explain either punishment, or the distribution of profits, wages, and rewards generally, according to the 'merit' of the recipient. τὸ ἀντιπεπονητός κατ' ἀναλογίαν is 'receiving that which is *equivalent* to what one has done.' Just punishment, notwithstanding the venerable authority of the natural man to the contrary, proceeds upon this latter principle: it is not a *wound* such as he has inflicted that the assailant receives in return, but a damage *equivalent to the injury caused by the wound*: the mere repetition of the wound itself is not equivalent to the injury caused, which includes not only the suffering of the individual assaulted, but something much greater—the violence done to public order. As for the 'distribution of wealth'—it obviously proceeds on the principle of 'receiving that which is equivalent to what one has done.' The carpenter *e.g.* contributes to the national well-being by his work, and receives in return for his contribution, not his own product back again, but its equivalent in the shape of the products of other workmen who are not carpenters. He *apparently* receives this equivalent from the individuals with whom he deals in the so-called ἀλλακτικαὶ κοινωνίαι into which he enters for the disposal of his product: but in truth these ἀλλαγᾶι are only the machinery, so to speak, of the vast διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν in which the members of

the State receive according to their εἰσενεχθέντα. It is only as 1182 b. 31. members of the 'social organism' that individuals have anything to exchange. What they seem, as mere individuals, to do, they really do as expressing the State which sustains them. But 'the State,' like Nature, *lebt in lauter Kindern—und die Mutter—wo ist sie?* It is this intangibility of 'the State' which, it would seem, has led some editors (*e.g.* Jackson) to distinguish for the writer of the Fifth Book *three* kinds of particular justice—distributive, corrective, and commercial (*i.e.* τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς κοινωνίαις). This view errs in failing to recognise in ἡ ἐκούσιος ἀλλαγὴ the most important instance of ἡ διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν—that in which the 'distribution of wealth' is made according to 'economic laws' which express the 'will of the State,' or reveal its essence, more significantly than any legislative or executive measures dealing with 'distribution' can do. The law which sustains the State as an organism is 'reaction equivalent to action' (τὸ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον). A is benefited by B's action in a certain way, and must benefit him in return equally, but not in the same way—that is to say, if the relation between them be a commercial one, or one of friendship κατ' ὑπεροχὴν (*E. N.* viii. 7, §§ 1, 2), for in perfect friendship (and in the most genuine form of friendship διὰ τὸ ἡδύ) τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν (*E. N.* viii. 6. 7). A benefits B by the product of his labour; B must benefit A equally by the product of his (different) labour. It may be that A's unit product is the result of more labour or skill than B's unit product; it is evident, then, that B must compensate for the inferior value of his units by their greater number, if there is to be any μετάδοσις between him and A. Thus the qualitatively different products of A and B must be equalised (τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον § 8), the process of equalisation starting from an estimate of the labour and skill which A and B have put into their respective products—*i.e.* an estimate of *the cost of production* in each case, which gives what economists call *the natural value* of each product¹. About the natural value oscillates *the market value*, as the relation between supply and demand varies from time to time. When the market value of A's unit product (*e.g.* house) has been compared

¹ Need, or Demand, is of course always assumed as the final cause of production. A thing which is 'costly to produce,' and is yet produced, is 'needed' much. Labour is what Aristotle would call τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον—the material cause of production, and must be paid for; but Need is the final cause.


1132 b. 31. with that of B's unit product (pair of shoes), as it can be easily and accurately compared in a society which employs νόμισμα, or 'a medium of exchange,' when, consequently, it has been determined πόσα ἄλλα ὑποδήματα ἴσον οἰκία (§ 10), then the μετάδοσις which follows will realise the law of τὸ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον, or of 'equivalent effects produced by each upon each.'

The fundamental importance in the social organism of this law of τὸ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον is indicated by Plato in his theory of the division of labour as characteristic of ἡ ἀναγκαιότητα πόλις: see *Rep.* 369 B γίνεται τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις . . . 370 B ὅταν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰς μίαν. Cf. *Pol.* B. I. 1261 a. 22 οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐκ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἴδει διαφερόντων. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. ἕτερον γὰρ συμμαχία καὶ πόλις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ χρήσιμον, κἂν ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἶδει (βοηθείας γὰρ χάριν ἢ συμμαχία πέφυκεν), ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμὸς πλείον ἐλκύσει (διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνος . . .) ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ ἐν γενέσθαι, εἶδει διαφέρει. διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεποιθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον.

1133 a. 1. δουλεία] *i. e.* so far as a man is not in a position to assert himself against competitors in legitimate business, and to defend himself by invoking the assistance of the law against those who treat him unjustly, to that extent he is not really a 'member' of the πόλις, but outside it, as a δούλος is. To be really a *citizen*, a man must be able to hold his own in the city—*i. e.* be in a position to perform his function in the body politic.

a. 3. § 7. διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται] Mich. Eph. explains ἐμποδὼν by ἐν τῷ μέσῳ, the Paraph. Helioid. by ἐν ἐκάστη τῶν πόλεων, and the Schol. Par. (according to Zell) by μεταξύ τῶν πόλεων. Jackson, translating 'in some frequented place,' adds that 'the word does not seem very appropriate,' and suggests ἐν πόλεσιν. He refers to Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας (*Gomperz Herkulianische Studien*, ii. 81)—τὸν Δία νόμον φησὶν εἶναι καὶ τὰς Χάριτας τὰς ἡμετέρας καταρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀναποδόσεις τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν. Pausanias saw a representation of the Graces (attributed to Socrates) in the Propylaea of the Athenian Acropolis (ix. 35). The position of this group answered well to the description ἐμποδὼν given here. It may be noted also that certain Athenian coins bore representations of the Graces: see Miss Harrison's *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*, p. 376.

§ 8. ποιεῖ δὲ . . . σύζευξις] 'The exchange of equivalent products (the quantity and quality of the one product being reciprocally proportional to the quantity and quality of the other product) is effected by conjoining, or adding together, the diametrically opposite terms.' Let οἰκοδόμος A, σκυτοτόμος B, οἰκία Γ, and ὑπόδημα Δ stand at the four corners of a square thus, so that his product is placed immediately beneath each workman. Exchange of products then is effected by conjoining, or adding together, A and Δ, B and Γ, the terms which stand at the diametrically opposite corners:—or more simply, λαμβάνει ὁ οἰκοδόμος παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκείνῳ μεταδίδωσι τὸ αὐτοῦ.



Jackson is certainly justified in taking exception to Grant's translation of ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις—'joining the diagonal of a square,' because the mathematical term for the junction of the diagonal is ἐπίζευξις, not σύζευξις. But Grant's explanatory note gives, I think, the writer's meaning (which indeed is obvious) more correctly than Jackson seems to admit. Grant, after drawing and lettering a diagram as I have done above, says 'The joining of the diagonal gives each producer some of the other's work, and thus an exchange is made; but the respective value of the commodities must be first adjusted, else there can be no fair exchange.' This note explanatory of the diagram which he has drawn, seems to me to clear Grant at least from the charge which Jackson brings against 'the editors' that 'they fail to show why "the junction of the diagonal" is mentioned.' Nor do I think that the Paraph. Heliodorus either lays himself open to Jackson's charge. His words are—Δεῖ τοῖνυν ἐν ταῖς χάρεσι τηρεῖν τὴν ἰσότητά' πλὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἣν ποιεῖ ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις: διάμετρος μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς γωνίας τοῦ παραλληλογράμμου ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναντίου γωνίαν ἐπίζευγνυμένη εὐθεῖα. ἔστω δὲ ὥσπερ τετράγωνον οἱ τέσσαρες ὄροι ὁ οἰκοδόμος, ὁ σκυτοτόμος, τὸ ὑπόδημα, ἡ οἰκία ὁ οἰκοδόμος μὲν ἐφ' οὗ τὸ α, σκυτοτόμος δὲ ἐφ' οὗ τὸ γ, οἰκία ἐφ' οὗ τὸ β, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' οὗ τὸ δ' ἐπεὶ τοῖνυν ὑπὸ τὸν σκυτοτόμον τὸ ὑπόδημα τίθεται, ὥσπερ τὸ δ ὑπὸ τὸ γ, καὶ ὑπὸ τὸν οἰκοδόμον ἡ οἰκία, ὥσπερ τὸ β ὑπὸ τὸ α, ἐν ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαις συναφθήσεται μὲν ὁ οἰκοδόμος τοῖς ὑποδήμασιν, ὥσπερ

1133 a. 5. συνάπτεται τὸ α τῷ δ' ὁ δὲ σκοτοτόμος τῇ οἰκίᾳ, ὥσπερ τὸ γ τῷ β. καὶ οὕτως ἔσονται αἱ κοινωνίαι κατὰ διάμετρον οὐ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ ἀνάλογα.

Again, I cannot follow Jackson when he says 'ἐφ' ᾧ Α κ. τ. λ. are lines, not, as in Grant's figure, points: for if we take points as our proportionals, what is the use of introducing the notion of proportion at all?' If lines had been intended, should we not have had ἐφ' ᾧ Α κ. τ. λ.? Moreover, Grant does not take 'points' (in the mathematical sense) for proportionals, but quantities (ᾠροι) marked Α Β Γ Δ, and arranged for convenience round the corners of a square. The 'joining the diagonal' is indeed an unfortunate translation, because it suggests a geometrical construction as such—viz. the process of connecting the points Α and Δ, Β and Γ, considered merely as geometrical points, by the diagonals ΑΔ and ΒΓ—it is unfortunate, that is to say, because it suggests what is known by the technical name of ἐπίστυξις, whereas the writer (as Grant, in spite of his unfortunate translation, sees well enough) has before his mind not a geometrical square, as such, but only a square arrangement of terms or ᾠροι, and means, not that geometrical point Α is joined to geometrical point Δ by the geometrical line ΑΔ, but that the term Δ, representing a certain quantity, is added to the term Α, which also represents a certain quantity: to express which meaning he uses the same word, σύστυξις, as he used before in v. 3. 12 ἡ ἄρα τοῦ α ᾠρον τῷ γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύστυξις τὸ ἐν τῇ διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστιν. In the present passage he might have said—ἡ τοῦ α ᾠρον τῷ δ (sc. ἰσασμένῳ § 12) καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ γ σύστυξις τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀλλαγῇ δίκαιόν ἐστιν. This latter σύστυξις, however, is, according to the square arrangement of the ᾠροι adopted, distinguished as ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύστυξις¹. It must be understood

¹ In his interesting note (p. 95) on ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύστυξις, Jackson refers to *E. E.* vii. 10. 1242 b. 6 ff.—where we are told that in an unequal friendship the ὑπερέχων conceives his claims to be represented by the formula ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττω οὕτω τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐλάττωτος γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ, but that the ὑπερεχόμενος τοῦναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον σύστυξιν. That is to say, if Α and Β are the persons, C and D their claims, Α, the superior in rank, thinking himself entitled to superior advantages, argues that $\frac{A+C}{B+D} = \frac{A}{B}$, or $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{C}{D}$: on the other hand Β, the inferior,

holding that "noblesse oblige," maintains that $\frac{A+D}{B+C} = \frac{A}{B}$, or $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{D}{C}$.

These opposing views are reconciled here in the same way as in the *Nic. Eth.*,

that the remark ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατὰ διὰ- 1133 a. 5. μετρον σύστυξις, assumes that Γ and Δ have been 'equalised': i. e. that $\Delta = x\delta = \Gamma$, where δ stands for the shoemaker's unit product, one pair of shoes, and Γ for the builder's unit, one house. By multiplying his δ's by x, the shoemaker Β makes himself as good a man, for the occasion of this particular ἀλλακτικῆ κοινωνία, as the builder Α; accordingly, Α being = Β, and $x\delta = \Delta = \Gamma$, we get the following ἀναλογίαι:—


$$(1) A : B :: \Delta : \Gamma$$

$$(2) A : \Delta :: B : \Gamma$$

$$(3) A + \Delta : B + \Gamma :: A : B$$

i. e. two persons who are, for the occasion, exactly equal, get, in a distribution made according to γεωμετρικῆ ἀναλογία, exactly equal shares, Α's share being paid in Β's wares and Β's share in Α's wares.

Let Α be a workman of exceptional skill whose day's work is worth Β's week's work. Α's economic ἀξία will thus be six times as great as Β's, if we consider Α and Β as contributing throughout a lifetime to the sum of the national well-being; and Α's entire receipts will be six times as large as Β's; but that part of his entire receipts which Α gets in the form of Β's product, and that part of his entire receipts which Β gets in the form of Α's product, must be earned by exactly equivalent labour on the part of Α and of Β respectively: what Α receives (πάσχει) from Β, and what he does (ποιεῖ), i. e. causes Β to receive, must exactly balance each other, the superiority of Α's quality being compensated for by the superiority of Β's quantity; i. e. Α's quantity and quality being reciprocally proportional to Β's quantity and quality. Α and Β are thus, *quâ* exchanging equivalent products, i. e. for the occasion, ἴσοι. Let the lines ΑΑ' and ΒΒ' represent by their lengths (ΑΑ' being the longer) the estimated total value of the labour performed in the working years of a man's life by these workmen Α and Β respectively: and let the equal parts Α'x, taken from ΑΑ', and Β'x, taken from ΒΒ', represent by their equal length the equal value of the products which Α and Β exchange. It is plain here



i. e. the ὑπερεχόμενος is held to be entitled to superior service, the ὑπερέχων to superior respect; and consequently κέρδος and τιμὴ must be bartered against one another, just as the house and the shoes are bartered in commerce.²

1133 a. 5. that although $A'x$ is equal to $B'x$, it bears a smaller proportion to AA' than $B'x$ does to BB' . This means that the exchange of equivalent products 'takes more out of' B than 'out of' A. A and B are indeed *for the occasion* ἴσοι, else they could not be *κοινωνοί* (see § 12): but, regarded *generally* as shareholders receiving dividends in virtue of labour contributed to the common fund of the national well-being, they are not ἴσοι: A is superior to B; and it may be a question for B, considering his economic inferiority to A, whether he can afford *to equal himself for the occasion* to A, *i. e.* whether he can afford to deal with A at all.

The double point of view from which (as I have tried to show) the *κοινωνοί* in an ἀλλαγὴ must be regarded—as (possibly) unequal workers in the economic field, and yet as equal for the purpose of the particular exchange—is excellently presented by the writer of the *M.M.* in a passage (i. 33. 1193 b. 38–1194 a. 25) which should be carefully compared with the passage now before us—
τὸ δ' ἀνάλογον ἐν τέτταρσι . . . ἔστιν δ' ἡ ἀναλογία αὐτῆ· ὡς γὰρ ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ, οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ· ὁμοίως τῷ σκυτεῖ, τῷ ὑφάντῃ, τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀναλογία πρὸς ἀλλήλους γίνεται· καὶ συνέχει δὴ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀναλογία τὴν πολιτείαν. ὥστε τὸ δίκαιον ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ ἀνάλογον. τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον συνέχει τὰς πολιτείας, τὸ αὐτὸ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ἀνάλογον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ οἰκοδόμος πλείονος ἀξίον ποιεῖ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἢ ὁ σκυτεὺς, καὶ ἦν ἔργον ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι [καὶ] τῷ σκυτεῖ πρὸς τὸν οἰκοδόμον, ἀνθ' ὑποδημάτων δ' οὐκ ἦν οἰκίαν λαβεῖν, ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐνόμισαν, οὐ ταῦτα πάντα ὀνητὰ ἐστίν, ἀργύριον προσαγορεύσαντες νόμισμα, τούτῳ χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστον ἐκάστου δίδόντας τὴν ἀλλαγὴν ποιεῖσθαι παρ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ τούτῳ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν.

a. 9. τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον . . . τὸ αὐτοῦ] Bywater after M^b Γ. Bekker, following K^b, L^b, O^b, reads τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργον. Bekker's τὸ αὐτοῦ adopted by Bywater does not seem to have any MS. authority, except, apparently, that of Γ. All Bekker's MSS. give τοῦ αὐτοῦ. See Bywater's *Contrib. to Text. Crit. of the Nic. Eth.* p. 45.

a. 10. τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον] is the equality obtained by taking account of the relation which subsists between the unit products of A and B in respect of value (their value being determined by 'the worth of the persons,' or, in modern phraseology, by the cost of production and conditions of the market), and, if they are of unequal value, multiplying the less valuable product, so as to get

a resultant equivalent to the more valuable. This equality must exist (ἦ), before a just exchange can take place (γένηται).

τὸ λεγόμενον] a fair exchange—ἡ ἀντίδοσις ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν. a. 11.

συμμένει] *sc.* ἡ κοινωνία. a. 12.

§ 9. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο . . . καὶ τοιοῦτον] See note on 4, § 12, b. 9, a. 14. where it was said that the words, as they occur here, 'are explicable in the context.' More, I think, cannot be said for them. The passage would run better without them. The sentence, a. 16 οὐ γὰρ . . . ἴσασθῆναι must be taken closely with the sentence οὐθέν γὰρ κωλύει . . . ἴσασθῆναι, a. 14 at the end of § 8, which it explains: 'there is nothing to prevent the product of one of the two contracting parties being better than that of the other (§ 8); for contracts are between those who, like physician and husbandman, differ, and are consequently often *not* equal' (§ 9). The sequence of thought traced in the above paraphrase suffers from the parenthesis of the words before us; and it may be that they are interpolated here, as well as in ch. 4, § 12. Here, however, they make a natural enough side remark or note, which could not be said for them in ch. 4, § 12: a scholastic note about the relation of τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον is not entirely out of place in a discussion of τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς or τὸ ἀντιποιεῖν. In view, then, of the fact that, to say the least, they are parenthetical here, it will be convenient to explain these words as they might be explained in accordance with Aristotelian doctrine, if they stood as an isolated aphorism without context.

Accepting the insertion of δ before ἐποίηι (see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 18), I would render the aphorism as follows—'The arts would perish, unless, as the active element put forth action in each case to such and such an extent and in such and such a mode, the passive element received the impression of this action (ἐπάσχε τοῦτο) conformably in each case to the extent and to the mode.' In other words—The existence of the arts depends upon the presence of two elements, an active and a passive, so related that, while the former exerts a force which in each case is definite in amount and mode, the latter receives an impression which corresponds exactly to the amount and mode of the force in each case exerted: *e.g.* there could be no art of sculpture, if marble yielded to the force of the chisel in a less or in a greater degree (εἰ μὴ ἐπάσχε τοῦτο τοσοῦτον)

1133 a. 14. than that measured by the ποιητικὴ αἰτία, ἢ ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ,—the will of the artist; or if it failed to assume a form representing his idea (εἰ μὴ ἔπασχε τοῦτο τοιοῦτον).

This seems to me to be the natural interpretation of the words before us, considered, as I believe they ought to be considered, apart from their present context, as an Aristotelian aphorism, embodying the doctrine stated or illustrated in such passages as the following:—*de An.* iii. 5, 430 a. 10 ἐπεὶ δ' ὡς περ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἐκάστῳ γένοι (τοῦτο δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκείνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἢ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπωνθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξισ τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργεῖα χρώματα, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀμυγῆς καὶ ἀπαθῆς, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὄν ἐνεργεῖα. ἀεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιεῖν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης (here the νοῦς παθητικός is said to be so called τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι under the plastic power of that other νοῦς—or aspect of νοῦς—which is what it is τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν: moreover we are warned against supposing the relation between the active and the passive Reason to be that of ἀντιπεπονθέναί, for we are expressly told that the active Reason is ἀπαθῆς): *Met.* θ. 5, 1048 a. 13 τὸ δυνατόν κατὰ λόγον ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὀρέγηται, οὐ τ' ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔχει δὲ παρόντος τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ὠδὲ ἔχοντος ποιεῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ποιεῖν οὐ δυνήσεται (i. e. the δύναμις μετὰ λόγου of the τεχνίτης realises itself in a given ποίησις only if the material receptive of the influence of that particular ποίησις be present): *Cat.* 4. 2 a. 3 ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον τέμνει, καίει· πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεται, καίεται. With these Aristotelian passages may be compared a passage in Plato's *Gorgias* 476 B–D (referred to by Ramsauer in his note on *E. N.* v. 4. 12), which recalls the phraseology of the Aristotelian passages, and more especially of *E. N.* v. 5. 9, so strongly that it seems certain that it served as a model. Σω. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τότε ἄρα εἴ τις τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιούντος; Πωλ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Σω. ἄρα τοῦτο πάσχον, ὃ τὸ ποιεῖν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον, οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιεῖν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι; Πωλ. ἀνάγκη. Σω. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὃ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι; Πωλ. ναί. Σω. τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἂν τὸ τύπτων ποιῆ; Πωλ. πάνυ γε. Σω. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ καί τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι; Πωλ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Σω. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε καίει ἢ ἀλγευῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καύμενον,

ὡς ἂν τὸ καὶν κάη; Πωλ. πάνυ γε. Σω. οὐκοῦν καί, εἰ τέμνει τις, ὁ αὐτὸς 1133 a. 14. λόγος; τέμνεται γὰρ τι. Πωλ. ναί. Σω. καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμήμα ἢ ἀλγευῶν, τοιοῦτον τμήμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον, οἷον τὸ τέμνον τέμνει; Πωλ. φαίνεται. Σω. συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον περὶ πάντων· οἷον ἂν ποιῆ τὸ ποιεῖν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν. Πωλ. ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ.

In these passages, which may be taken as fairly representing what Aristotle, following Plato, has to say about the relation between τὸ ποιεῖν and τὸ πάσχον, we find nothing about the *reaction* of the latter upon the former: τὸ πάσχον is simply that which πάσχει: it is not represented as, in its turn, a ποιεῖν which makes the original ποιεῖν a πάσχον: and I cannot see how more can be fairly got out of the passage (v. 5. 9) before us, than out of these passages, or out of the Platonic passage which it resembles so closely in phraseology. But those who try to explain the passage before us *in its context*, find it necessary to believe that it implies the doctrine of the *reaction* of the πάσχον upon the ποιεῖν. Thus Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 18) says—'Der Gedanke, den man nach dem Zusammenhange erwartet, ist dieser: die Künste würden nicht bestehen können, wenn sich nicht eine völlige Gleichheit der Leistungen und Gegenleistungen herstellen liesse. Deutlicher würde dies ausgedrückt sein, wenn für ἐπάσχε etwa ἀντεποῖει oder ἀντιπεδῶν gesetzt wäre; aber auch so, wie die Worte lauten, scheinen sie mir dem geforderten Gedanken zu entsprechen. Man muss nur bedenken, dass, wie es bei dem ἀντιπεπονθός nōthig ist, beide Theile geben und empfangen, dass also das ποιεῖν auch ein πάσχον und das πάσχον auch ein ποιεῖν ist.' Jackson, agreeing with Rassow that this is the meaning of the passage, is constrained however to admit that it is not one which 'the text naturally and properly bears.' He endeavours to extract the meaning by altering the punctuation: see his note pp. 97, 98. But, it may be asked, if ἐπάσχε = ἀντεποῖει, what does ἐπάσχε τοιοῦτον mean? Κοινωνός B may be said ἀντιποιεῖν τοσοῦτον ὅσον ποιεῖ κοινωνός A, but not τοιοῦτον οἷον. The point is that the κοινωνοὶ exchange *qualitatively different* products.

While maintaining, then, that the present passage ought not to be forced to mean more than it expresses—viz. that, as τὸ ποιεῖν (e. g. the seal) acts, so τὸ πάσχον (e. g. the wax), *quā* δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἶδους, is affected by its action; while deprecating, therefore, the attempt to reconcile the present passage with its context by making

1193 a. 14. *ἔπαρχε=ἀντεποίει*—against the evidence afforded by the representative passages quoted above, in which (in *de An.* iii. 5 expressly) τὸ ποιῶν is presented as ἀπαθές: while maintaining, in short, that the passage before us has nothing to do with τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός or mutual action and passion, but only with the relation between the agent considered simply as agent, and the patient considered simply as patient, I do not forget that the distinction of agent and patient is merely a logical one (cf. *Theaet.* 157 A), and that, in the concrete worlds of nature and of art, the so-called patient, in receiving the impress of the so-called agent, becomes in turn the good of the agent—that which perfects the agent: thus, the artist gives form to the marble, and the formed marble in return is the glory of the artist: the root nourishes the leaf, and the leaf gives life to the root: each is for the sake of each; each is both maker and thing made.

In opening these remarks I said that 'a scholastic note about the relation between τὸ ποιῶν and τὸ πάσχων is not entirely out of place in a discussion of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός.' It is not entirely out of place, inasmuch as the simple relation of ποιῶν to πάσχων is implied in the double relation of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθέναι: but it is so unnecessary that it seems probable that we have to do with an interpolation here as well as in v. 4. 12. Ramsauer, indeed (p. 319), regards the words with as much suspicion here as in v. 4. 12. On one ground only do I think that the genuineness of the words as they occur in v. 5. 9 may be plausibly maintained. It may be argued that the writer wishes to show that τὸ ἀντιπεπονθέναι must be between ἕτεροι, and that to do so he refers parenthetically to the simple relation between ποιῶν and πάσχων which according to *de Gen. et Corr.* i. 7. 323 b. 31 are τῷ γένοι μὲν ὁμοιον καὶ ταυτό, τῷ δ' εἶδει ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐναντίον: as if he said—the parties to an ἀλλαγῆ, each of whom is a ποιῶν acting upon the other as a πάσχων, must indeed belong to the same social system of fellow-workers (τῷ γένοι ὁμοιοι), but must be of different trades (τῷ εἶδει ἀνόμοιοι), otherwise they could not act and react. This is practically the line of interpretation followed by Mich. Eph¹.

This defence of the genuineness of the words before us is, as I have said, plausible; but I cannot attach much weight to it

¹ Mich. Eph. does not comment on the words before us when he comes to v. 5. 9. His note on v. 4. 12 however deals with them in connexion both with τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον (the subject of their context in v. 4. 12), and with ἀλλακτικὰ κοινωνία (the subject of their context in v. 5. 9).

against the reasons which seem to me to make for their spuriousness here, as well as in ch. 4, § 12.

§§ 10-15.] Only things, or amounts of things, which are equal in value, are normally exchangeable. There must therefore be some means of comparing things, in order to ascertain, in each case, whether they are equal or unequal in value; and when they are found to be unequal, there must be some means of equalising them. In the first place, the unit product of A must be compared with the unit product of B in respect of 'cost of production'—i.e. the labour (including ability, risk, time, &c.) involved in the production of each from beginning to end must be estimated, and the result of the estimate, in each case, must be numerically expressed. Let the cost of producing A's unit product *a* and B's unit product *b* be the same. If B needs *a* as much as A needs *b*, *a* and *b* are of equal value (for the purpose of the particular exchange), and may accordingly be exchanged. But if A needs *b*, while B does not need *a* at all, or so much, what can A do? He must (were special need the 'medium of exchange') either fail to obtain *b*, or obtain it at a ruinous cost; and, in conceivable circumstances, he might find himself compelled to obtain it even at such a cost. But the institution of money removes the difficulty by substituting general need for special need as 'the medium of exchange' or 'bond.' Although B may not need *a* at all, or so much as A needs *b*, he always needs something equivalent to *a* as much as A needs *b*. A can always obtain *b* from him in exchange for that amount of money which is earned by labour equal to the labour required to produce *b*: for B, although he does not need *a*, is always willing to take A's money made by selling *a* to those who need it, because this money enables him to obtain *c*, which he needs, from its producer, who, again, may not need *b*, but is always willing to take B's money, in order to obtain for himself *x*, which he needs. Thus all men may be said always to 'need' equal sums of money equally; but particular products, though representing the same labour, i.e. having the same 'natural value,' are often 'needed unequally': hence, if A needs *b* very much, and B needs *a* very little, and A can procure *b* only by getting B to take a certain amount of *a*, it is evident that the result of exchange will be that A has too little in proportion to his labour, and B too much. Under a system of mere barter every transaction thus tends to result in inequality. But by means of a

1133 a. 19. system of *σύμβολα* which entitle the bearer to anything he happens to need, the fluctuating standard, dependent on the varying relation between A's need of the particular product *b* and B's need of the particular product *a*, is superseded by the fixed standard constituted by the circumstance that A's need of *b* is always equalled by B's need of *something* which he cannot obtain without the money obtained by selling *b* to A. Money is a system of *σύμβολα*, or tickets, enabling the bearer to get what he happens to need. These *σύμβολα* being, in their higher denominations, of precious metal, their number cannot, in a short time, be largely increased, and therefore bears a tolerably constant relation to the sum-total of exchangeable products of industry existing at a given time. Thus the various unit products come, according to the labour expended upon them and the demand for them, to be associated with definite parts of the sum-total of money existing in the community at a given time. In this way the value of each unit product is expressed in money, and it becomes easy to compare as to value products which seemed incomparable:—*πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι ἂν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγὴ* (§ 10) . . . *δεῖ ἄρα ἐν τινὶ πάντα μετρεῖσθαι . . . τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῆς μὲν ἀληθείας ἢ χρεῖας ἢ πάντα συνέχει* (§ 11) . . . *τῆς μὲν οὖν ἀληθείας ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐνδέχεται ἰκανῶς* (§ 14) . . . *οἷον δ' ἐπάλλαγμα τῆς χρεῖας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην* (§ 11) . . . *πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν* (§ 10). Money, as a *calculus*, makes it easy to compare products; but without this calculus it would still have been possible to compare them roughly, by taking account of the labour expended upon them. It would, however, be impossible to exchange them fairly—indeed it would often be impossible to exchange them at all—without money as a system of *σύμβολα*. It is important to distinguish between these two functions of money—(1) as supplying a calculus (*μετρεῖται πάντα νομίσματι* § 15), and (2) as guaranteeing the satisfaction of any need (*οἷον ἐγγυητὴς ἡμῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἂν δεηθῆ* § 14). In respect of both functions money is, as remarked above in note on v. 2. 13, a. 1, an ever-present diorthotic judge preventing the unfair distribution of the rewards of labour, which, on a system of barter, would be inevitable—*i.e.* without the aid of the calculus supplied by money, men would only be able to compare products so roughly that the exchange of them would, in most cases, result in one party getting too much and the other too little; and without a system of

σύμβολα, a producer would often be unable to dispose of his pro- 1133 a. 19. duct, or be obliged to dispose of it to someone who did not need it much, and therefore made only an inadequate return for it. That the writer of the Fifth Book himself thought of *νόμισμα* as a 'diorthotic' agency seems, as was remarked in note on v. 2. 13, to be a fair inference from the similarity of the terms in which he describes its functions, with those in which he describes the function of the *δικαστής*: see *E. N.* v. 4. 6. 1132 a. 18 sqq., and v. 5. 10. 1133 a. 19 sqq.

Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 18, 19) believes that in §§ 10-16 the same thought is repeated in three parallel passages, no one of which has greater claims to be considered genuine than the other two have. These passages, which he prints in parallel columns, are—

(1) § 10. 1133 a. 19 διὸ . . . 25 ἔσται.

(2) §§ 11-14. 1133 a. 25 δεῖ . . . b. 14 μάλλον.

(3) §§ 14-16. 1133 b. 14 διὸ δεῖ . . . 28 κλίνας.

It is certainly true that §§ 10-16 are full of repetitions. But what is the character of these repetitions? They seem to me to be various expressions of the thought—'there must be a fixed standard of comparison,' and so far I agree with Rassow; but I differ from him in thinking that each repetition, by its slightly altered form, suggests a fresh point of view important in the doctrine of currency. Thus in the first of Rassow's parallel passages the train of thought is—'products must be *συμβλητὰ*: so there must be a *μέσον, i.e.* one standard: this is *νόμισμα*, which measures.' In the second passage the train of thought is—'But what do we mean by saying that *νόμισμα* becomes the standard of measurement? The true standard is *χρεία*: *νόμισμα* is its conventional representative: and the advantages of having this conventional representative of *χρεία* are great: *χρεία* itself is subject to great fluctuations, whereas its representative is not; and, when sometimes the absence of *χρεία* would put a stop to business, the presence of the representative guarantees its continuance—*οἷον ἐγγυητὴς ἐστ' ἡμῖν*.' Rassow's third passage is distinguished by the introduction of the term *σύμμετρα*—'since *νόμισμα* is a *μέτρον*, the things which it measures must be *σύμμετρα*. But how can things so different as corn and shoes have a common measure? Are they not heterogeneous? *Quid* useful, and *ἐν χρεία*, they are homogeneous: and *νόμισμα* enables us to compare and measure them in respect of their common quality of usefulness.' I do not pretend that the repetitions (especially in

1133 a. 10. the third passage) do not give reason for the suspicion that §§ 10-16 have come down to us in a somewhat altered form; but I maintain that new points arise in every passage in the midst of the repetitions. I cannot therefore follow Jackson when he says (p. 98) that 'the chapter would gain in perspicuity if §§ 11-16 were rejected.' Probably the Fifth Book itself would gain in perspicuity if half of it were rejected. But it is not a question of 'perspicuity.' If §§ 11-16 were rejected the discussion of currency would lack several highly important topics which are not touched in § 10, but are at least dealt with—whether perspicuously or not is another question—in §§ 11-16.

a. 20. § 10. γίνεται πως μέσον πάντα γὰρ μετρέει, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν] Mich. Eph. points the analogy between νόμισμα and the δικαστής thus: καὶ ὅπως ὅπως τὰ νομίσματα ἀνάλογον ἐστὶ τῷ δικαστῇ· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐπανορθωτικοῦ δικαίου τῆ τοῦ δικαστοῦ μεσότητι ἐγνώσκωμεν πόσον δεῖ ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ πλεονέκτου καὶ προσθεῖναι τῷ ἀδικηθέντι μέσον γὰρ πίπτων ὁ δικαστής τοῦ ἡδίκηκός τε καὶ ἡδικημένου, ἐπολεῖ ἀμφοτέρων τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν δὴλην, οὕτως κἀνταῦθα τῆ παραθέσει τῶν νομισμάτων, εὗρομεν τὴν τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ὑπεροχὴν· καλῶς ἄρα εἴρηκεν ὅτι γίνεται πως μέσον τὸ νόμισμα. κανὼν γὰρ καὶ κριτήριον γίνεται τῆς ἀρετῆς τοῦ οἰκοδόμου καὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων, ὡς καὶ ὁ δικαστής τῆς πλεονεξίας καὶ μειονεξίας.

a. 22. δεῖ τοίνυν . . . τροφήν] *i. e.* (given normal conditions of the market) as the labour required for the production of the house (this is what the writer means by οἰκοδόμος) is to the labour required for the production of the pair of shoes, so must the number of pairs of shoes be to unity—*i. e.* to the one house. In other words—the sum obtained from the sale of this number of pairs of shoes will be equal to the value of the house: or, when the shoemaker comes forward with this sum, he is equal to the builder and can deal with him, the ἀναλογία being as given by the writer of *M. M.* (i. 33. 1194 a. 13) ὡς ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ, οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ.

a. 27. § 11. εἰ γὰρ . . . ἢ αὐτή] Without need there would be no exchange at all; with unequal need (εἰ μὴ ὁμοίως δεῶντο), exchange would not be the same as it is—*i. e.* unequal instead of equal products would be exchanged. I doubt much whether ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτή, as the alternative of ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, can have *directly* the meaning

which Ramsauer gives it—'Si aut nulla *χρεία* fuerit, aut alterius 1133 a. 27. multo minor, cessaret commercium aut ad paritatem non perveniret (οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ ἀλλαγῆ).'

ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς *χρείας*] That which represents need as medium a. 20. of exchange: what Plato (*Rep.* 371 B) calls *ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐνεκα*—a ticket received in view of future *χρεία*, where there is no present *χρεία*.

κατὰ συνθήκην] 'by agreement among men'—cf. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως § 15.

ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστὶ . . . ἄχρηστον] cf. *Pol.* i. 3. 1257 b. a. 30. 8 καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλὰκις τιθέασι νομίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ' οὐδὲν, ὅτι μεταβεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐδενὸς ἀξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ, καὶ νομίσματος πλοῦτων πολλὰκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄπορον τοιοῦτον εἶναι πλοῦτον οὐ εὐπωρῶν λιμῶ ἀπολείπει, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδα ἐκέκον μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς πάντων αὐτῷ γινομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. It is only this or that particular monetary system which is νόμῳ and can be changed and disused; the institution of money itself is φύσει, just as speech is φύσει; *i. e.* like speech, it is essential to the realisation of that πολιτικὴ κοινωνία in which man attains his true φύσις. With a system of barter, as with a system of dumb signs, man could never have become a πολίτης, but would have remained an isolated savage. And it is easy to exaggerate the change which νόμος or agreement can produce even in a given monetary system. Speaking generally, we may say that agreement cannot supersede the precious metals. If they are to be superseded, it will be, not by agreement, but by the operation of a natural law. As things are, however, and have always hitherto been, it is as 'natural,' *i. e.* as necessary, that standard coins should be made of a precious metal, as that knives should be made of a hard metal. The statement ἐφ' ἡμῖν ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον applies only to tokens made of a base metal, and to paper. Gold and silver have 'an intrinsic value' which cannot be taken from them—the value which belongs to them as practically the *only* materials of which standard coins can be made. They have, of course, a further intrinsic value as materials of which articles other than coins are made; but it is not going too far to

1133 a. 30. say that if coins ceased to be made of them, they would cease to be 'precious' metals. Since then a currency is necessary to that πολιτικὴ κοινωνία in which man realises his φύσις, and since a currency must be based on the employment of the 'precious metals,' we may say that money made of these metals is 'natural.'

a. 31. § 12. ἔσται δὴ . . . γεωργῶ] As the labour required for the production of the more valuable unit stands to the labour required for the production of the less valuable, so must the number of the less valuable units stand to unity. This will be a case of ἀντιπεπονηθός, or reciprocal proportion, for the number of the less valuable units will compensate for their qualitative inferiority. The Paraph. Heliod. has—κείσθω δὴ τὸν γεωργὸν πρὸς τὸν σκυτεῖα διπλάσιον λόγον ἔχειν, ἔσται δὴ καὶ ὁ σίτος διπλάσιος τῇ ἀξίᾳ τῶν ὑποδημάτων εἰ τοίνυν ἔσται ὡς γεωργὸς πρὸς τὸν σκυτεῖα, τὰ ὑποδήματα πρὸς τὴν τροφήν ἢ τὸν σίτον, διπλασίονα ἔσται τὰ ὑποδήματα τοῦ σίτου, καὶ οὕτως ἔσονται ἀξια τοῦ σίτου. As we have seen, the writer of the *M. M.* expresses the proportion thus—ὡς ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ (i. 33. 1194 a. 13).

b. 1. εἰς σχῆμα . . . ἰσασμένον δ] I believe that this puzzling sentence merely puts into other words what has already been said in § 8—viz. that it must be settled *before the exchange* how many of B's qualitatively inferior units are equivalent to A's unit, the ἀντιπεπονηθός κατ' ἀναλογίαν, or ἰσορροπος ἀλλαγῆ as the Paraph. Heliodorus calls it, depending on this equivalence. Let A = οἰκοδόμος, B = σκυτοτόμος, Γ = οἰκία, Δ = ὑπόδημα. Since A : B :: Γ : Δ, the simple σύζευξις of distributive justice will be expressed by A + Γ : B + Δ :: A : B, where A and B have the results of their industry (ἔχουσι τὰ αὐτῶν), and do not exchange (οἶκ ἀλλάττονται). An exchange is effected by σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον, but the σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον must not be made till Δ (the qualitatively inferior unit) has been multiplied to give a resultant equivalent to Γ: i. e. the σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον must not be made unless A and Γ, B and Δ, are reciprocally proportional magnitudes, thus—A : B :: Δ (ἰσασμένον) : Γ. This A : B :: Δ (ἰσασμ.) : Γ is the σχῆμα τῆς ἀναλογίας to which the terms 'must not be brought after the exchange (ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται)' i. e. to which they must be brought *before* the exchange, when A has still his Γ, and B his Δ's. It is only then that it is possible (by 'the higgling of the market') to make Δ equal to Γ, and so to make A and B ἴσοι. A and B having thus been made ἴσοι, are κοιωνοί, or

can exchange fairly. In other words, having first brought the terms to the ἀναλογία A : B :: Δ (ἰσασμένον) : Γ, we may proceed, through A : Δ (ἰσ.) :: B : Γ, to the σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον A + Δ (ἰσασμένον) : B + Γ :: A : B. But if exchange take place without a previous equalisation of Δ to Γ, and A get simple Δ (one pair of shoes) and B get Γ (a house), A and B are placed in the position of extremes, or ἄκρα, in relation to the μέσον or ἴσον which the exchange has ignored; and of these ἄκρα B 'will have both superiorities'—will have the advantage over A in the transaction by the two parts mentioned in ch. 4, § 10; for, A with his house and B with his (say) 1000 pairs of shoes being ἴσοι, the house has been taken from A and given to B, who still practically retains all his shoes—999. In fact, whenever an article is sold too cheap, the buyer ἔχει ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς—(1) that part of the article for which he has not paid, and (2) the money which he ought to have paid for that part. In this interpretation I have followed, in the main, the lines laid down by Jackson, who starts from the view of H. Richards (*Journal of Philology*, 1872, iv. 150) that ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς is to be explained by reference to the δυοὶ τοῦτοις ἐπερέχει θάτερον of v. 4. 10. 1132 a. 33.

The words before us, as thus explained, seem to state, in unnecessarily obscure language, the obvious truth that wares must be equalized *before* they are exchanged: and I should have less confidence than I have that they do not mean something more profound, were it not for the circumstance that in *E. N.* ix. 1. §§ 8, 9 a remark to nearly the same effect is made in plain language. The question there propounded is—When there is no previous διωμολογία, who is to fix the value of the return expected by the giver—the giver or the receiver? The receiver; but he must make the value of the return equal to what he valued the gift at *before he got it*—δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσοῦτον τιμᾶν ὅσον ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἀξίον, ἀλλ' ὅσον πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα. He must put himself back in the position in which he would have been if he had had to 'higgle in the market' about the price of the article.

The explanations offered by Mich. Eph. and Michelet on the one hand, and by Grant and Peters on the other, both ignore the reference to ch. 4. § 10 in ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς, and therefore, as it seems to me, miss the writer's simple (though hidden) point. Mich. Eph. says that if no previous equalization has taken place, but the οἰκοδόμος gets a pair of shoes, and the σκυτεῖς a house, *each*

1133 b. 1. *of the terms* (as if he read *ἐκάτερον*), viz. *οικοδόμος* and *σκυτεὺς*, will exhibit both *ὑπερβολή* and *ἐλλειψις* (*ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς*)—the *οικοδόμος* exhibiting *ὑπερβολή* *quā* superior producer and *ἐλλειψις* *quā* receiving only one pair of shoes; the *σκυτεὺς* exhibiting *ἐλλειψις* *quā* inferior producer and *ὑπερβολή* *quā* receiving a house. His words are: ἡ ὑπεροχὴ λέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως· καὶ ἔθος ἐστὶ λέγειν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ἐδόθη αὐτῷ πολλά· καὶ ἔμπαλι εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ἐδόθη αὐτῷ ὀλίγα. καὶ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὅδε πλούσιος ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὅδε πένης, ἴσον λέγοντες τῷ λίαν ἔχει ὅδε χρήματα πολλά, καὶ λίαν ὅδε ὀλίγα. καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς λέξεως τοιοῦτον· ὁ δὲ λέγει τοιοῦτον ἂν εἴη. τὰς ἀναλογίας τῶν τεχνιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἃ ἐργάζονται δεῖ ποιεῖν πρὸ τοῦ ἀλλάξασθαι κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον. γνωμένης γὰρ τῆς ἀναλογίας πρὸ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τῆς ἀνταλλαγῆς, ἔσται ἡ ἀντίδοσις καὶ ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἴση καὶ δικαία. καὶ εἰς τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἀναλογίας ἀναχθήσεται ὡς εἶναι ὡς ὁ οικοδόμος πρὸς τὸν σκυτοτόμον, οὕτως ὁ οικοδόμος μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα μετὰ τῶν ὑποδημάτων. ὡς γὰρ ὑπερέχει ὁ γεωργὸς τοῦ σκυτέως, οὕτω καὶ ὁ γεωργὸς μετὰ τοῦ σίτου, τοῦ σκυτέως μετὰ τῶν ὑποδημάτων, πρὸ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς δηλονότι. καὶ δεῖ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀνισότητα τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ἰσασθῆναι. ἰσασθῆσεται δὲ οὕτως. ἐπεὶ γὰρ διπλῆ ἐστὶν ἡ οἰκία τῶν ὑποδημάτων, ἂν διπλασιασθῇ τὰ ὑποδήματα, β' ὄντα καὶ γένηται δ', ἔσται δ' ὑποδήματα ἴσα τῇ οἰκίᾳ· καὶ οὕτως τῆς ἰσότητος γεγονυίας εἰ λήψεται ὁ μὲν οικοδόμος τὰ δ' ὑποδήματα, καὶ ὁ σκυτεὺς τὴν οἰκίαν, ἔσται ὁ οικοδόμος μετὰ τῶν δ' ὑποδημάτων ἴσος τῷ σκυτεῖ μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας, ἐπεὶ γὰρ διὰ τὴν τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ὑπεροχὴν ἐλέγετο ὁ οικοδόμος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ σκυτέως, ἰσασθέντων τῶν ὑποδημάτων τῇ οἰκίᾳ, ἔσται ὁ οικοδόμος ἴσος τῷ σκυτεῖ· τοῖς δὲ ἴσοις ἴσα ἐὰν προστεθῇ, τὰ ὅλα ἴσα ἔσται· εἴη ἂν καὶ ὁ οικοδόμος μετὰ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἴσος τῷ σκυτεῖ μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας. δεῖ οὖν φησὶν πρὸ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀναλογίαν, καὶ ἰσάζειν δι' αὐτῆς τὰ τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀμφοτέρας ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχάς· τουτέστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ χωρὶς ἀναλογίας ἀλλάξονται, ἐκάτερα τῶν ἄκρων, ἦται ὁ οικοδόμος καὶ ὁ σκυτεὺς, ἀμφοτέρας ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχάς· ἂν γὰρ λάβῃ ὁ οικοδόμος τὰ β' ὑποδήματα, ἔσται μὲν ὑπερέχων ὡς οικοδόμος, ὑπερεχόμενος δὲ καὶ ἐλλείπων ὡς τὰ β' ὑποδήματα ἔχων· καὶ ὁ σκυτεὺς ὁμοίως· ὡς μὲν σκυτεὺς ἐλλείπων καὶ ὑπερεχόμενος, ὡς δὲ ἔχων τὴν οἰκίαν ὑπερέχων. ὥστε τοὺς οὕτως ἀπλῶς δηλονότι ἀλλασσομένους, μάταιον ἐστὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀλλαγὴν περᾶσθαι εἰς σχῆμα ἄγεω ἀναλογίας, καὶ οὐ μόνον μάταιον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατον· οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς τῆς δίχα ἀναλογίας γεγονυίας εἶναι ὡς ὁ οικοδόμος πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα, οὕτως ὁ οικοδόμος μετὰ τῶν β' ὑποδημάτων πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας, διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀλλασσομένων ἀνισότητα. ὅτι δὲ δύναται ἰσασθῆναι τὰ ὑποδήματα τῇ οἰκίᾳ, εἴρηται. διὰ γὰρ τῶν νομισμά-

των, ἢ ἄλλου τινός. Michelet follows Mich. Eph. Grant's view is 1133 b. 1. different. He says—'After an exchange has been made, or, in short, after the price of an article has once been expressed in money, it is no longer the time to talk of "the quality of labour," or for either side to claim an advantage on this account. If he did he would have "both superiorities" reckoned to him, *i. e.* his own superiority over the other producer, and the superiority of his product over that of the other. . . . ὅταν ἀλλάξονται can mean nothing else than "when they *have* exchanged", ὅταν with the aorist implying a completed act. It seems unnecessary to say that the value of a thing is not to be settled after it is sold. Rather it is after the goods have come to market, and had a market price put upon them, that considerations of their production must cease. The expression, therefore, is not clear, but the above interpretation seems the most natural that can be given of the passage. . . . "Both the superiorities" must be those named or implied in §§ 8–10, the superiority of the one product over the other, and the superiority of the one producer over the other.' Peters follows Grant in explaining *ἀμφοτέρας ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχάς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον* to mean that 'one of the two parties would get both the advantages—*i. e.* have his superiority counted twice over. His (*e. g.* the husbandman's) superiority over the other party (the shoemaker) has been already taken into account in fixing the price of a quarter of corn as equal to three pairs of shoes: this is one advantage which is fairly his; but it would be plainly unfair if, at the time of exchange, the husbandman were to demand 50s. worth of shoes for 25s. worth of corn, on the ground that he was twice as good a man: *cf.* Munro, *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, vol. ii.'

οὐ δεῖ . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ] for this construction *cf. de Gen. et Corr. i. 4. 319 b. 23.*

εἰ δὲ μὴ . . . ἄκρον] Grant, Jackson, Susemihl, and Bywater treat these words as parenthetical, remove Bekker's full stop after *ἄκρον*, and place a full stop after *αὐτῶν* b. 3 instead of Bekker's comma. I do not think that it makes much difference whether we accept this or Bekker's punctuation. In any case, *ὅταν ἀλλάξονται* and *ὅταν ἔχωσι* are contrasted, and *αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης* is that of Δ made equal to (*ἰσασμένον*) Γ. While A and B still retain their respective Γ and Δ, they are in a position to determine how many

1133 b. 1. Δ's shall be held equal to Γ, *i. e.* they can make themselves (*ad hoc*) ἴσοι, for as the Schol. puts it—ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ὑπεροχὴν ἐλέγετο ὁ οἰκοδόμος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ σκυτεώς, ἰσασθέντων τῶν ὑποδημάτων τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἔσται ὁ οἰκοδόμος ἴσος τῷ σκυτεῖ. Having made themselves ἴσοι in this way, they can become κοινωνοί in a mutually satisfactory ἀλλαγῇ.

b. 8. § 13. ὡσπερ . . . ἐξαγωγῆν] Bekker follows K^b in reading ἐξαγωγῆς. With ἐξαγωγῆς the construction is—ὡσπερ (*sc.* ἀλλάττονται) ὅταν οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηται τις οἶον οἴνου, δίδόντες (*sc.* οἴνου) σίτου ἐξαγωγῆς—‘giving wine in return for the privilege of exporting corn.’ Jackson, reading ἐξαγωγῆν, objects to ἐξαγωγῆς on two grounds, (1) because the separation of the words οἶον οἴνου from δίδόντες, which ἐξαγωγῆς involves, complicates the sentence unnecessarily, and (2) because ‘the weight as well as the bulk of the MS. authority is against ἐξαγωγῆς.’¹ Ἐξαγωγῆν is certainly the easier reading: but a difficult reading given by K^b alone comes with great weight. An original ἐξαγωγῆς would inevitably be changed into ἐξαγωγῆν, as soon as a scribe, aware that ἐξαγωγή does not mean ‘a cargo,’ but ‘the privilege of exporting,’ and that therefore ἐξαγωγῆς could not be the partitive genitive, took οἶον οἴνου with δίδόντες instead of with οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηται τις. On the whole, I am not willing to reject ἐξαγωγῆς without scruple, though, of course, the circumstance that δίδονα ἐξαγωγῆν is a regular phrase is in favour of reading ἐξαγωγῆν as the object of δίδόντες. Ἐξαγωγή is ‘the privilege of exporting’: see Isocrates, *Trapez.* 370 b. ἄξιον δὲ καὶ Σατύρου (Satyrus I, king of Bosphorus B. C. 407–393) καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐνθυμηθῆναι, οἱ πάντα τὸν χρόνον περὶ πλείστου τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡμᾶς ποιοῦνται, καὶ πολλάκις ἦδη διὰ σπάνυ σίτου τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἐμπόρων ναὺς κενὰς ἐκπέμποντες, ἡμῖν ἐξαγωγῆν ἔδοσαν. It is doubtless this Black Sea trade which the writer of the Fifth Book has in his mind here.

The plural δίδόντες, which ‘belongs grammatically to both the parties concerned, whereas in sense it refers only to one of them’ (Jackson), need not surprise us.²

b. 10. δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι] τοῦτο is the inequality of the σίτος and οἶνος which must be equalised.

¹ Pr., K^b seems to stand alone with ἐξαγωγῆς: CCC has ἐξαγωγῆν—one of the few cases in which it varies from K^b in the Fifth Book.

² This note on 1133 b. 8 was written before the publication of Bywater's *Contributions* (see p. 46), and is printed without alteration. Bywater supposes that ἐξαγωγῆς represents a blunder—ἐξ ἀγωγῆς, and (to account for δίδόντες) suspects a lacuna between the two halves of the passage.

§ 14. ἐγγυητής] The χρεῖα which νόμισμα represents is the 1133 b. 12. abiding need of *something*, as distinguished from the fluctuating need of *this particular thing*: see the Paraph. Heliodorus—ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις ὁ μὲν γεωργὸς δέεται τοῦ ἔργου τοῦ τέκτονος, ὁ δὲ τέκτων οὐ δέεται τοῦ γεωργικοῦ, ἵνα τὰ ἀλλάγματα καὶ αἱ κοινωναὶ μὴ τότε κωλύονται, παρελήφθη τὸ νόμισμα· καὶ τοῦτο διδοῦς ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ τέκτονι, λαμβάνει παρ' ἐκείνου τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον· ὃ δὲ τὸ νόμισμα καθάπερ ἐγγυητής ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸν τέκτονα, ὅτι ἐπειδὰν τῶν τοῦ γεωργικοῦ δεηθῇ, δι' αὐτοῦ λήφεται παρὰ τοῦ γεωργοῦ ὧν ἐν χρεῖα κατέστη. καὶ οὕτω κἀνταῦθα διὰ τὴν μέλλουσαν τοῦ τέκτονος χρεῖαν ἢ ἀλλαγῇ καὶ ἢ κοινωνία γίνεται. Καὶ τὸ νόμισμα δυνάμει ἐστὶ πάντα σχεδὸν ὧν δέεται ἕκαστος.

δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 94) suggests αἰεὶ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι ἔσται λαβεῖν.

πάσχει . . . μένειν μᾶλλον] Money is affected in the same way b. 13. as other commodities are¹, but not to the same extent—*i. e.* it fluctuates in value as the demand for it, or need of it, is greater or less. Its natural tendency, however, is to fluctuate less in value than other commodities. Mich. Eph. has the following note—πότε δύναται πλεῖον τὸ νόμισμα ἢ πότε ἔλαττον ἢ οὐδέν; ἢ ἐν μὲν ταῖς εὐθηνείαις πολὺ δύναται, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄγαν σιτοδείαις καὶ ἀφορίαις πάντων τῶν καρπῶν οὐδέν; οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν ἐχόντων σίτον μὴ ἀρκοῦντα ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ἀνταλλάσσειν τότε προθυμεῖται. In a passage very similar to the above the Paraph. Heliodorus expressly gives as the reason why νόμισμα is more stable in value than other commodities, the fact that it is δυνάμει πάντα σχεδὸν ὧν δέεται ἕκαστος. It represents the ever-present need of something as distinguished from the passing need of this thing. Accordingly, so long as the relation between the quantity of exchangeable commodities and the quantity of νόμισμα in the community remains pretty constant, the value of a given piece of money does not fluctuate seriously. Mich. Eph. and the Paraph., it will be observed, allude only to variations in the quantity of exchangeable commodities, apparently assuming that variations in the quantity of νόμισμα may be neglected. These latter variations, however, are far more serious than might at first be supposed. Under the conditions of modern trade, sudden rises and falls in what is really the quantity of νόμισμα

¹ Bywater (*Contributions* p. 46) suspects τὸ αὐτὸ as an alternative reading for τοῦτο, and suggests that πάσχει may be taken absolutely = ‘is subject to modification or change.’

1133 b. 13. in the community take place to such an extent that, had they come within the observation of the sceptical Greek, they must have made the plausible *λῆρος τὸ νόμισμα* seem more plausible than ever. Under the conditions of modern trade the tolerably constant quantity of visible tangible money (which the ancients regarded exclusively) is increased by a singularly fluctuating quantity of invisible intangible money—*i. e.* by *Credit*, which now swells to enormous proportions, and raises all prices, *i. e.* diminishes the value of a given standard coin, now contracts, and lowers all prices, leaving the holders of standard coins in possession of the field—*i. e.* with coins of augmented value. ‘In consequence of changes in credit alone,’ says Giffen (*Essays in Finance*, p. 294), ‘the serviceableness of the same quantity of money varies indefinitely in comparatively short periods; the scale of prices is in constant oscillation; no conceivable changes in the quantity of money itself could at all have the effects which are constantly being produced by changes in credit alone.’ ‘When credit is good all prices rise, that is, the standard depreciates in value’ (p. 200).

b. 18. *μὴ οὐσίας συμμετρίας*] Cf. Plato, *Laws* 918 B *πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εὐεργέτης πᾶς ὅς ἂν οὐσίαν χρημάτων ὠντινωτοῦν ἀσύμμετρον οὖσαν καὶ ἀνόμαλον ὁμαλήν τε καὶ σύμμετρον ἀπεργάζεται; τοῦτο ἡμῖν χρὴ φάναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος ἀπεργάζεσθαι δύναμιν, καὶ τὸν ἔμπορον ἐπὶ τούτῳ τετάχθαι δεῖ λέγειν’ καὶ μισθωτὸς καὶ πανδοκεὺς καὶ ἄλλα, τὰ μὲν εὐσχημονέστερα, τὰ δὲ ἀσχημονέστερα γιγνόμενα, τοῦτό γε πάντα δύναται, πᾶσιν ἐπικουρίαν ταῖς χρείαις ἐξευπορεῖν καὶ ὁμαλότητα ταῖς οὐσίαις.*

τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ . . . ἰκανῶς] Things so different as wine and corn are not commensurable in the strict sense of the term, for they are not homogeneous in the strict sense: *practically*, however (*ἐνδέχεται ἰκανῶς*), they are commensurable, because practically homogeneous—*i. e.* homogeneous as being *both useful*. Money is the measure of their common usefulness: see Mich. Eph. *τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα, σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, εἰ κυρίως σύμμετρα τὰ ὁμογενῆ δύναται γενέσθαι, οἷον ἀριθμοὶ ἀριθμοῖς, καὶ μεγέθη μεγέθεσι’ τὰ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τοσοῦτον διεστώτα, ἀδύνατον σύμμετρα γενέσθαι’ τὰ γὰρ σύμμετρα κοινῶ μόνον καταμετροῦνται, ἀριθμοὶ ἀριθμῶ, τὰ μεγέθη μεγέθει τὸ δὲ νόμισμα οὐκ ἔστι μόνον τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀλλαγῇ’ οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἔστι μόνον, οὔτε τοῦ οἴνου’ ἦν γὰρ ἂν ἡ οἴνος ἢ ὑπόδημα. οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός’ γίνεται δὲ μέτρον τῆς κατὰ τὴν χρείαν αὐτῶν συμμετρίας—*i. e.* money measures them both *quā* needed or useful: being needed*

or useful is their common quality. Cf. also Acciaiolus *ad loc.*—1133 b. 18. ‘Res quae sunt diversorum generum et rationum non videntur mensurari posse ex parte naturae (only ex instituto hominum), quia mensura debet esse de genere eorum quae mesurantur; ut quantitas continua mesuratur quantitate continua, non discreta. Nam si res per mensuram debent mesurari, habere debent illam mensuram quae fit pars illarum rerum. Quare nummus ipse medius cadit inter res mesurandas propter indigentiam: quia imponitur pretium alteri rei, et sic etiam alteri, et in nummo et pretio conveniunt, et hoc pacto ex instituto est nummus quodammodo mensura.’

§ 15.] *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*] *i. e.* κατὰ συνθήκην, § 11.

b. 21.

ἢ ἴσον] ‘that is, equal to.’

b. 24.

§ 16.] For the history of exchange see *Pol.* i. 3. 1257, a. 6–41. b. 26. The passage ends with—*ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας . . . ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρήσις’ οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἔκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαιῶν’ διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτόν τι συνέθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοῖς δίδουσι καὶ λαμβάνουσι, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτῶν ὅν εἶχε τὴν χρείαν εὐμεταχειρίστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οἷον σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ὀρισθὲν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῶ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον καὶ χαρακτηριστῆρα ἐπιβαλόντων, ὡ’ ἀπολύτη τῆς μετρήσεως αὐτοῦς’ ὃ γὰρ χαρακτήρ ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημείου.*

πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι] Bywater (*Contrib.* p. 47) suggests *πρὶν ἢ τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι*.

§ 17. *ἢ δικαιοπραγία*] ‘doing justice,’ Peters. The man who ‘does justice,’ as judge, strikes the mean between the position of the party who injures and the position of the party who is injured; and, in his private capacity, neither injures other people, nor allows himself to be injured by them—*ἢ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἔστι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι*. At the end of next § 1134 a. 12, however, we have *τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μείζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν*, from which it would seem that in the passage before us *δικαιοπραγία* might have been used instead of *δικαιοπραγία*.

ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη . . . ἄκρων] Rassow (*Forsch.* 61) seems to be right in preferring the reading adopted by Susemihl and Bywater to Bekker’s *ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἔστιν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρότερον ἀρεταῖς, κ.τ.λ.*

b. 30.

b. 32.

1133 b. 32. — The Paraph. Heliodorus explains the sentence as follows—καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστὶν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς προτέροις ἀρεταῖς τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἐκάστη μέση ἐστὶ δύο κακιῶν τὴν μὲν ὑπερβάλλουσα τῆς δὲ ἐλλείπουσα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ σωφροσύνη μεταξὺ τῆς ἠλιθιότητος καὶ τῆς ἀκολασίας ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ ἀνδρία μεταξὺ τῆς δειλίας καὶ τῆς θρασύτητος, καὶ αἱ ἄλλα ὁμοίως· ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἔχει παρ' ἐκάτερα δύο κακίας αἷς ἀντίκειται, ἀλλὰ μόνῃ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἀντίκειται· μέση δὲ ἐστὶν, ὅτι τῆς ἀδικίας ἀνισότητα εἰσαγωγῆς, τὸ ἴσον αὐτῇ ζητεῖ καὶ τούτου ἐστὶ ποιητικῆ. ὁ δὲ ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτῇ μὲν μεσότης ἐστὶν· ἡ δὲ ἀδικία ἀκρότης, ὅτι τῶν ἄκρων ἐστὶ. Mich. Eph. has a note to the same effect—viz. that every one of the other virtues has two vices contrary to it, but justice has only one vice (ἀδικία), and this one vice, he explains, θεωρεῖται ἐν τῷ ἀδικούντι καὶ ἀδικούμενῳ, ὧν ὁ μὲν ἀδικῶν ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ πλεόν ἔχων, ὁ δὲ ἀδικούμενος ὁ τὸ ἐλάττων. This is not correct, for the ἔξις of ἀδικία, of which he is speaking, is not seen in the ἀδικούμενος at all, but in the ἀδικῶν, who manifests himself in acts both of ὑπερβολή and of ἐλλείψις—in taking too much good and too little evil as his own share; and, where his own share is not involved, in assigning to other people too much or too little good or evil. Peters, who follows the Par. and Mich. Eph., translates—'We see also that the virtue justice is moderation [or a mode of observing the mean], but not quite in the same way as the other virtues hitherto spoken of. It does indeed observe a mean, but both the extremes fall under the single vice of injustice'—and in a note he adds the following explanation—'whereas in other fields the two extremes are chosen by different and opposite characters (e. g. the cowardly and the foolhardy), the unjust man chooses both, too much good to himself and too little to his neighbour¹, too little evil to himself and too much to his neighbour, too much good to his partisan and too little to his opponent.' According to this view, then, of the passage before us, the point is in the words ἡ δὲ ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων: 'justice is not a μεσότης in quite the same way as the other virtues are μεσότητες, because, although "it does indeed observe a mean," "both the extremes fall under the single vice of injustice."' Is it this alone that constitutes the difference? I think not. The chief point of difference, as it seems to me, is marked by the words ὅτι μέσον ἐστὶν, and a difference of

¹ 'Too much good to himself' and 'too little to his neighbour' are only verbally two. The one thing which he does in all cases is to choose too much good to himself at the expense of other people.'

1133 b. 32. merely secondary importance is constituted by the fact that 'both the extremes fall under the single vice of injustice.' That the stress is upon ὅτι μέσον ἐστὶν is plain from the words ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψις ἢ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἐστὶν in § 18; i. e. δικαιοσύνη is a μεσότης because τοῦ μέσου ἐστὶ, just as ἀδικία is ὑπερβολὴ and ἐλλείψις because ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἐστὶ. That ἀδικία ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἐστὶ (i. e. ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων ἐστὶ) is another, and, I think, subordinate point of difference.

In what sense, then, can δικαιοσύνη be said τοῦ μέσου εἶναι in which ἀνδρεία is not? The gloss τουτέστιν ἴσου which some MSS. read after τοῦ μέσου ἐστὶν, and Mich. Eph. recognises, seems to me to answer this question. All the virtues, δικαιοσύνη included, are indeed μεσότητες περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, i. e. they are μεσότητες in the sense of being μετριότερες—phases of man's adaptation to a difficult social environment; but δικαιοσύνη is a μεσότης also in a more literal sense of the term, in as much as it realises itself in a definitely measurable external μέσον, i. e. in the choice of that which is objectively ἴσον. Justice (the writer confines himself here to Particular Justice) is that one of the virtues which is concerned with the ἴσον as distinguished from the other νόμιμα. The just man is μέσος in a sense in which the σάφρων e. g. is not μέσος—i. e. he is μέσος καὶ ἴσος. There is nothing, in short, in the passage before us, which is not implied in the division of τὸ δίκαιον into τὸ νόμιμον and τὸ ἴσον.

I take it then that the meaning which the writer wishes to convey is that the μεσότης Particular Justice differs from the other virtuous μεσότητες (1) in realising itself in the production of that to which, as μέσον or ἴσον, a definite numerical value can be assigned; and (2) in having (nominally) only one ἐναντία κακία—ἀδικία or 'unfairness,' productive of objective measurable inequality: but surely this does not amount to a virtual admission, that 'the original theory of ἀρετή as a μεσότης is a failure so far as justice is concerned' (Jackson, p. 100). If there is any hesitation in the present passage about applying the term μεσότης to δικαιοσύνη, the same hesitation exists about applying it to ἀρετή generally; for in *E. N.* ii. 6. 13 we read μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, στοχαστικῆ γε οὕσα τοῦ μέσου. Justice, equally with the other moral ἀρεταί, is a ἔξις προαιρετικῆ ἐν μεσότητι οὕσα—a habit of regulating conduct by reason in the midst of temptations held out by the sensibility. It is the regulation of those feelings which, if unregulated, lead a man to act wrongly

1133 b. 32. in relation to property, as *σωφροσύνη* is the regulation of those which, if unregulated, lead him to act wrongly in relation to bodily pleasure. The *σώφρων* does what is objectively right in circumstances which are such that we cannot test the rightness of his acts by exact measurement (cf. iv. 5. 13 *οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι κ.τ.λ. . . ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα κὰν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσει*); whereas the *δίκαιος* does what is objectively right in circumstances which allow us generally to test the rightness of his acts by figures. His action, in short, produces an *ἴσον*—a quantitative result—which may be calculated beforehand. *Δικαιοσύνη* is a *μεσότης* (or mode of adaptation to the social environment) manifesting itself externally in acts of *measurably equal division*; *σωφροσύνη* is a *μεσότης* (or mode of adaptation to social environment) manifesting itself in acts the rightness of which can be judged only by the qualitative test of *αἰσθησις* (iv. 5. 13, ii. 9. 8). The recognition of this difference surely does not amount to a virtual admission that 'the original theory of *ἀρετή* as a *μεσότης* is a failure so far as justice is concerned.' If narrow technical ground be taken, and it be urged that *δικαιοσύνη* is not a *μεσότης* in the true sense because it has only one extreme, *ἀδικία*, it may be answered that, although the possibility of *μειονεξία* as the contrary of *πλεονεξία* is perhaps excluded by the result reached in chapters 9 and 11 of this Book, yet two kinds of unfairness to other people may be logically distinguished—that of giving strangers (from whom one has nothing to expect) too little, and that of giving friends (from whom one has expectations) too much, and that the one or the other of these kinds of unfairness may be specially characteristic of a given *ἄδικος*.

It remains to notice Grant's view. He says—'Justice is a mean state or balance in a different sense from the other virtues. It is not a balance in the mind, but rather the will to comply with what society and circumstances pronounce to be fair (*τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν*). Justice, according to this view, is compliance with an external standard. While in courage, temperance, and the like, there is a blooming of the individual character, each man being a law to himself, in justice there is an abnegation of individuality, in obedience to a standard which is one and the same for all. It must be remembered that the account of *ἐπιείκεια* in this book supplements that of justice and takes off from its otherwise over-legal character.'

I think that the habit of justice is as truly 'a balance in the

mind' as the other virtuous habits are—*i. e.* it is one of the modes 1133 b. 32. in which the civilised man has learnt to control his sensibility, in the interest of the System of Life which Reason presents to him. Inasmuch as this System is an objective order of things, it is 'an external standard,' to which the *σπουδαῖος*, not merely *quod δίκαιος*, but *quod* possessing the other virtues, conforms himself. In conforming himself, whether as *σώφρων*, or as *ἀνδρείος*, or as *δίκαιος*, to the objective standard of Reason, he 'is a law to himself,' because he realises his true self in so doing: and the only 'abnegation of individuality' to which he submits (and he submits to it *quod σώφρων* or *ἀνδρείος* as well as *quod δίκαιος*) is the abnegation of his merely sensitive nature. His true 'individuality'—his rational nature, he cannot abnegate. Finally, it is very misleading to distinguish the standard of justice, as 'one and the same for all,' from that of temperance or courage. The standard of the Noble Life is an indivisible whole, one and the same for all men who have the eye of Reason to see it clearly. Each of two good men who are friends is a *ἕτερος αὐτός* to the other. Both live up to one and the same objective standard, and, in living up to it, are a law to themselves.

κατὰ προαίρεσιν] See note on v. 1. 3.

1134 a. 2.

§ 18. ἡ δ' ἀδικία τοῦναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου] *i. e.* ἡ δ' ἀδικία τοῦναντίον α. 6. ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ ἄδικος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ ἀδίκου.

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων . . . ἔτυχεν] 'Where other people are concerned a. 11. (*i. e.* where the unjust man himself as *διανεμὸν* does not take a share), although the result, as a whole, is the same (*i. e.* the violation of proportion), the way in which the proportion is violated (*i. e.* whether the unjust man gives A or B the unfair advantage) is a matter of chance.' Here, in accordance with the doctrine of v. chapters 9 and 11, the writer assumes that *μειονεξία*—the habit of accepting less than one's due—does not exist (see note on v. 1. 9, b. 1). I think that it has as much right to formal recognition as the equally obscure *ἀναισθησία* of *E. N.* iii. 11. 7.

τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος . . . μείζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν] The *result* of injustice a. 12. (*τὸ ἀδικημα*) is an unequal division, wherein the part which is too small is 'being injured,' and the part which is too large is 'injuring.' There is no reference here, as some commentators seem to think, to the question, whether *ἀδικεῖν* or *ἀδικεῖσθαι* is the *greater evil*, dis-

1134 a. 12. cussed in v. 11, §§ 7 and 8. The writer here simply analyses the formal content of the notion ἀδικημα, as he has analysed in § 17 that of the notion δικαιοπραγία.

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

*But a man may perform an act which is unjust without being unjust himself. By what mark, then, shall we know the acts which stamp the man who performs them as unjust? There is no distinguishing mark attaching to the acts. The acts are outwardly the same of the man who yields to a sudden passion, and of the man who deliberately chooses; and yet the latter is and the former is not 'an unjust man' * * * * **

But we must remember that hitherto we have described justice in the abstract only, and that we have to complete our account by saying something about justice as concretely realised in the state—civil justice.

Civil justice is the bond which unites, in a common life, persons who are free and equal. This common life is its own end, or self-sufficient. It is regulated not from without, but by the inner principle of its own nature—Law. Conformity with law, then, is civil justice. But where there is law and justice, we, as a matter of fact, find also injustice. We find that individuals tend to seek their own private good, and must be restrained by the law of their common life. Accordingly we do not allow the individual as such to rule, for he would become a tyrant; but we set the law or the constitution over the ruler, making him thus the guardian of justice and equality; giving him, however, a recompense in the form of honour and privilege, lest, being but human, he should say—'What am I profited if I am just and do not take advantage of my position to give myself more than my share of good things?' Indeed there are rulers who are not satisfied with all the honour and privilege that can be bestowed upon them, but, becoming tyrants, recompense themselves for their trouble by more solid advantages at the expense of their subjects.

Between those who are not free and equal persons associated in a commonwealth regulated by the law of its own constitution, the relations are 'just' only in a metaphorical sense. Thus it is only in a metaphorical sense that we can speak of 'justice' in the relation subsisting between (1) husband and wife, (2) father and child, (3) master and slave. These relations are characterised by the power of the paterfamilias over his own, not by the unanimity of independent persons. The relation between husband and wife, however, resembles that between fellow-citizens more nearly than do the relations between father and child and between master and slave.

1134 a. 17. §§ 1, 2.] I believe, with Rassow (p. 38), Jackson (p. xvii, &c.), and Ramsauer that these sections are foreign to the present

context; but I do not venture to designate any other context 1134 a. 17. in the Fifth Book as their original locus. They certainly refer to a subject which is discussed in chapter 8; but this does not seem to me to warrant Jackson's insertion of them in § 8 of that chapter after βλάβη: for why should it be assumed that, being interpolated where we now find them, they belong originally to the Fifth Book at all? It is often tolerably safe to say that a passage is an interpolation; but almost always unsafe to assign it to another locus. The student may refer to Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 35 &c.) for an excellent examination of the various views which have been advanced concerning the locus of the sections before us. He regards the examination of these views as principally useful in showing 'wie wenig wir im Stande sind mit Sicherheit zu urtheilen'—a valuable lesson, where 'dislocations in the text' are concerned.

The passage before us, then, is best regarded as a fragment. It may be paraphrased as follows—'Since one may perform an unjust act, and yet not be an unjust man, by what mark shall we know, under the various categories of crime, those unjust acts, the performance of which is, of itself, sufficient to stamp the agent as an unjust man in this or that respect—as a thief e.g., or an adulterer, or a robber? Surely the criterion is not to be found in the acts. Two men may perform, from different motives, acts which are externally indistinguishable. One man may steal under the influence of a pressing, but transitory, feeling; the other from deliberate choice. The former is not a thief; the latter is: but their acts are indistinguishable.'

On the words ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει which are equivalent to ἢ κατὰ μὲν τὰς πράξεις οὐδὲν διοίσει Mich. Eph. has the following note:—ἦν ἂν σαφεστέρα ἢ λέξεις εἰ οὕτω πῶς εἶχεν' ἐπεὶ ἀδικήματα ἐστὶ τὸ κλέπτειν τὸ μοιχεύειν τὸ πορνεύειν τὸ ἱεροσυλᾶν καὶ ἄλλως πάντα τὰ παράνομα, ποῖα ἐκ τούτων πράττων τις ἀδικεῖ, καὶ ποῖα ὁμοίως οὐκ ἀδικεῖ; εἰσὶ γὰρ τινὰ ἀδικα ἃ πράττει μὲν τις, ἀδικος δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ. πῶς δὴ τοῦτο; ὅτι οὐκ εἰς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀποσκοποῦντες τὰ πράγματα κρίνομεν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα. ὁ γὰρ τοῦ μαυρομένου τὴν μάχαιραν κλέψας μεθ' ἧς ἐμελλεν εαυτὸν ἀνελεῖν, ἐκλεψεν μὲν, κλέπτῃς δ' οὐκ ἔστι, ἀλλὰ μάλλον σωτὴρ καὶ εὐεργέτης, οὐδὲ μοιχὸς ὁ τὴν πλουσίαν διαφθείρας ἐπιθυμία χρημάτων, ἀλλὰ φιλοχρήματος. ἐρωτήσας δὴ ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν, ἀδικος ἐστίν, ἀποκρίνεται λέγων' ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; ἐστὶ δὲ ὁ λέγει. οὕτω μὲν, δίχῃ προσδιορισμοῦ λεγόμενον, δόξειεν ἂν μηδεμίαν ἔχειν διαφορὰν, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὸν

1184 a. 17. ἄδικόν τι πράττοντα εὐθὺ καὶ ἄδικον εἶναι. εἰ δὲ τις ἐπιβλέπει εἰς τὸ τέλος καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ ἄδικον, εὐρήσει πολλοὺς ἄδικα μὲν πράττοντας, ἀδίκους δὲ μὴ ὄντας.

Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 37) supposes, with Muretus, that some words have fallen out after *διοίσει*, because 'In dem mit γάρ angefügten Beispiele wird nämlich nicht, wie man erwarten sollte, angegeben, worin der ἀδικῶν dem ἄδικος gleich, sondern worin er von ihm verschieden ist.' Muretus (p. 430) restores the clause thus—*ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἐπιβλέποντι δὲ εἰς τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα διοίσει*, and suggests that the repeated *διοίσει* occasioned the omission. I do not think that it is necessary to suppose an omission. The words καὶ γὰρ ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικί κ.τ.λ. are equivalent to καὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ (*i. e.* τὸ συγγενέσθαι γυναικί) πράττουσιν ὃ τε διὰ πάθος ποίων καὶ ὁ προαιρούμενος, ὡν ὁ μὲν προαιρούμενος ἄδικος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ διὰ πάθος οὔ, and explain ἢ οὕτω μὲν (*i. e.* κατὰ τὰς πράξεις) οὐδὲν διοίσει;

a. 20. οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχήν] Cf. *E. N.* iii. 3. 17 πάεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον.

a. 22. § 2. οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ] Münscher, Hampke, and Ramsauer bracket these words, because, the case of the *μοιχός* having been already selected in § 1 to illustrate the point under consideration, cannot again be used as an *additional* illustration. Rassow merely notes the remarkable carelessness revealed by the words: 'eine auffallende Nachlässigkeit ist es, wenn in den letzten Worten neben dem κλέπτῃς der μοιχός genannt wird, ungeachtet das μοιχεύειν in Vorhergehenden als Beispiel benutzt ist'—(*Forsch.* p. 37). Those who *bracket* words like these in the Fifth Book take too little account, I think, of the carelessness of the writer, or writers. The substitution of οὐ (*K^b, P^b, Camb., CCC Sus., Byw.*) for Bekker's οὐδὲ before κλέπτῃς, however, makes the whole clause less awkward.

a. 23. § 3. πῶς μὲν οὖν . . . πρότερον] Here, again, we have a section which is bracketed as an interpolation by many editors. It differs, however, from §§ 1 and 2 in this important respect—it does not contain a piece of argument foreign to the context, but merely surprises the reader by reminding him rather irrelevantly of a previous discussion. It is therefore not so obviously an interpolation as §§ 1 and 2. At the same time, I would say that it is probably one of those rather numerous recapitulatory and connecting sentences which we may

attribute to the care of an early editor, who, finding *δεῖ δὲ μὴ λαθῆναι*—1134 a. 23. *νεῖν κ.τ.λ.* a somewhat abrupt beginning, inserted words to facilitate the transition to τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον from that aspect of τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον which had been discussed in the previous chapter under the head of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός. I therefore think that it is unnecessary to try, with Jackson, to find another locus for the words before us. Jackson places them at the beginning of ch. 10 (on *ἐπιείκεια*), where they do very well—but, as the head of one statue may sometimes be made, by a clever restoration, to do very well on the body of another.

It is worth mentioning that the writer of the *M. M.* does not recognise §§ 1 and 2, but passes *immediately* from his criticism of the Pythagorean ἀντιπεπονθός to τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. His criticism of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός ends i. 33. 1194 b. 2; and at 1194 b. 3 we read—*ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον πολλαχῶς λέγεται, διοριστέον ἂν εἴη ὑπὲρ ποίου δικαίου ἐστὶν ἢ σκέψις· ἔστι δὲ δίκαιόν τι, ὡς φασίν, οἰκίτη πρὸς δεσπότην καὶ υἱὸς πρὸς πατέρα. τὸ δ' ἐν τοῦτοις δίκαιον ὁμωνύμως ἂν δόξειεν λέγεσθαι τῷ πολιτικῷ δικαίῳ (ἔστιν γὰρ (τὸ) δίκαιον, ὑπὲρ οὗ ἐστὶν ἢ σκέψις, τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον).* We may suppose the writer of the *M. M.* with a text of the Fifth Book before him in which chapter 6 *began* with a reference to the subject of chapter 5—*πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον εἰρηται.* Such a connecting clause might well be genuine. But, whatever its origin may be, I feel sure that it was written to stand *here*—that is, to make the transition from the subject of ch. 5 to that of ch. 6.

§ 4. δεῖ δὲ μὴ . . . πολιτικὸν δίκαιον] 'It must be remembered, a. 24. however, that our subject is not only Justice in the abstract, but Justice as concretely realised in the State'—*i. e.* 'not only what is just in itself, but what is just as between citizens.' Hitherto the *formal conditions* of Particular Justice have been discussed—*i. e.* the ἀναλογίαι, geometrical, arithmetical, and reciprocal, which it involves have been explained; the writer now proceeds to indicate the mode of its concrete appearance—to sketch its natural history in the State. It was, of course, impossible to explain its formal conditions without frequent references to its concrete manifestation in the State; but as yet there has been no connected treatment of the latter. With the antithesis τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον—τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον we may compare the antithesis ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ἀπλῶς—ὁ ἀγαθὸς πολίτης, as presented in v. 2. 11, and in the passages quoted

1184 a. 24. in the note thereon. The *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἀπλῶς* is the ideally good man, the man who is conceived as realising perfectly (*sc. ἐν τῇ ἀρίστη πολιτείᾳ τῇ κατ' εὐχὴν*) the formal notion of goodness; the *ἀγαθὸς πολίτης* is the man who corresponds accurately with the conditions of a given *πολιτεία*, good or bad, but, except as citizen of *ἡ ἀρίστη πόλις*, realises the formal notion of goodness more or less imperfectly. The conditions of even the best existing *πολιτεία* are such as always to prevent the actual coincidence of the *ἀρετὴ* of the *πολίτης* with that of the *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἀπλῶς*. Similarly, it is only in *ἡ πολιτεία ἡ κατὰ φύσιν* (see v. 7. 5) that *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* coincides with *τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον*. That is, *it is possible to conceive ideal circumstances* in which the justice of citizens realises perfectly the formal notion of justice. The definition of this formal notion, carefully elaborated in chapters 1–5, is epitomised with sufficient accuracy in ch. 5, § 17 *καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη . . . πρὸς ἄλλον*.

What, then, are the conditions of the (doubtless imperfect) realisation of Justice in the State? Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the present chapter answer this question. Justice is realised in the common life, under *νόμος*, of individuals who are free and equal. The individual, left to himself, is not *πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δίκαιου καὶ διαιμερικὸς τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν*, as the definition of *τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον* requires. The constraint of *νόμος* is necessary to make him act justly—*i. e.* *νόμος*, or *λόγος*, representing the race, must supersede *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*, the individual: and since, after all, individuals must be entrusted, as *ἄρχοντες*, with the administration of this *νόμος*, a sop must be offered to their thwarted *πλεονεξία* in the shape of *μισθὸς τις*; though, even with this, they often become *τύραννοι*. It is only in the *πολιτεία κατ' εὐχὴν*, where *λόγος* rules in the soul of every citizen, that a system of external restraints and inducements is unnecessary.

From the discussion of *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* the writer passes naturally to that of the relations between the various members of the *οἰκία*, which is the unit *κοινωνία* out of which the *πόλις* has grown.

Distinguishing, then, *τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον* and *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* as the formal notion of justice, and its (necessarily imperfect) realisation in the State, I cannot agree—(1) with Michelet, who says (pp. 177, 178) '*Id justum quod quaerimus est et simpliciter justum et civile justum, ita ut materia hujus libri non sit duplex justum, ut partitur Acciajolus, simpliciter justum et justum civile; jus enim civile est ipsum simpliciter justum vel, ut dicit Paraphrastes, κυρίως δίκαιον. Sed justum civile est id simpliciter justum, quod non propositio*

tantum et animis agentium continetur, sed etiam legibus sancitum 1184 a. 24. est'; or (2) with Grant, who says, '*τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον* is opposed to *τὸ καθ' ομοιότητα*. It is not meant here to separate *τὸ ἀπ. δίκ.* from *τὸ πολ. δίκ.*: rather it is implied that they are both the same. The only justice that can be called so without a figure of speech is that between fellow-citizens'; or (3) with Rassow, who says (*Forsch.* p. 123), '*τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον* und *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* sind verschiedene Ausdrücke für dieselbe Sache, was u. a. Hildenbrand und Trendelenburg verkannt haben. Der Gegensatz, um den es sich hier handelt, ist der zwischen dem *ἀπλῶς δίκαιον* und dem *δίκαιον καθ' ομοιότητα*. Das erstere ist eben das politische Recht, das zweite das väterliche, das häusliche und das Herrenrecht. So richtig Zeller (*Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 2. p. 500), und Grant'; or (4) with Peters, who says (p. 161, note), 'These are not two distinct kinds of justice; justice proper, he means to say, implies a state.'

In opposition to these views, then, I believe that *τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον* and *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* are here distinguished as the formal notion (*τί ἦν εἶναι ὡς οὐσία ἕνεκ ὕλης*)¹ and the concrete realisation (*σύνολον*). It is only in the ideal State that *τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον* and *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* coincide—that is, they never actually coincide. In actual States those individualistic tendencies which are specially dwelt on below in §§ 4–7, as characteristic of the persons between whom *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* (*as distinguished from τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον*) subsists, are never eliminated.

ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου] The *ἐπὶ* is a dittogr. of *ἔστιν*. *Βίος* is here a. 26. man's life as a *πολιτικὸν ζῆλον*: cf. *E. N.* x. 6. 8 *εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδω μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου*.

πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν] cf. *Pol.* Γ. 1. 1275 b. 17 *τίς μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν' ᾧ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἤδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἰκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἶπεν—and Pol. A. 1. 1252 b. 28 ἡ δ' ἐκ πλείονων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις ἤδη, πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας—and Pol. Γ. 5. 1280 b. 29 φανερόν τοῖνον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν' ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴτερ' ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων τούτων ἀπάντων ἤδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὐ*

¹ Of course the formal notion of justice cannot be conceived independently of the formal notion of the State.

1134 a. 26. ζῆν κοινωμία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίας καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αἰτὸν καὶ ἓνα κατοικοῦντων τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις. διὸ κηδεῖαί τ' ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φατρίαὶ καὶ θυσία καὶ διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γένων καὶ κοινῶν κοινωμία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους (χάριν). τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων [χάριν] θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωμίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν—and *E. N.* i. 7. 6 τὸ δ' αὐτάρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ δῶλος τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. The state (ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωμία) is an organism (αὐτάρκες τι), and the law of its members is τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.

a. 27. ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμὸν] Each member of the social organism must, in order to be a member at all, have an initiative of his own (ἐλευθερία), which he exercises for the common good. This initiative cannot be exercised by an individual whose inferiority, in πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ or δύναμις, to the other individuals with whom he is associated, sinks beneath a certain level, fixed differently in different πολιτεῖαι. All individuals on, and above, this level are *equally members* of the social organism (ἴσοι), inasmuch as each one of them, *quā* βίον κοινῶν or καλῶν πράξεων μετέχων, initiates, in his own sphere, a social function essential to the σωτηρία of the commonwealth, even as each member of a ship's crew contributes his share to the prosperity of the voyage: see *Pol.* Γ. 2. 1276 b. 26 ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν πάντων (i. e. τῶν πλωτήρων, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν) . . . ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωμίας ἔργον ἐστὶ, κοινωμία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία. Mechanical pressure from without (τυραννίς), taking the place of, or limiting, the constitutional action (βίος) of its members, is foreign to the conception of the State as αὐτάρκες τι, or an organism. The individual member is indeed limited—but by the immanent law of the organism to which he belongs (νόμος), and that, not in his ἐλευθερία, which is realised in obedience to the law of the organism, but in his tendency to πλεονεξία.

The δοῦλος has no initiative which can be exercised for the good of the State. He does not live for the State, but for his master; and the law which regulates his function is an external

one—the will of his master. To occupy a status which places 1134 a. 27. life above the will of a master is, then, the first condition of citizenship. All who occupy this status are, of course, *equally free*; but it is only in a pure democracy that they are *politically equal*—*Pol.* E. I. 1301 a. 29 δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσους ὄντων ὄντας ὀλεσθαι ἀπλῶς ἴσους εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἀπλῶς ἴσοι εἶναι νομίζουσιν). Such a democracy makes all its freemen *absolutely equal citizens*—ἴσους κατ' ἀριθμὸν. Other constitutions recognise *grades* among freemen constituted by differences of birth, culture, or wealth. Some of these constitutions draw such a sharp line between the highest grade and the grades beneath it, as to exclude from the functions of the citizen all except those who are ἴσοι within the limits of the highest grade. Here, again, οἱ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας may be said to be absolutely equal—ἴσοι κατ' ἀριθμὸν, the freemen belonging to the lower grades not coming into comparison with them at all. But there are certain other constitutions—the so-called mixed constitutions (*Pol.* Δ. 6 and 7), which include within the pale of effective citizenship the members of several grades. Their citizens are ἴσοι κατ' ἀναλογίαν, i. e. ἴσοι inasmuch as they all perform political functions, and are comparable on this common ground; ἴσοι κατ' ἀναλογίαν, because comparison shows grades in the dignity and importance of their respective functions. Strictly then, it is incorrect to identify, as Mich. Eph. does, the ἴσοι κατ' ἀριθμὸν of the present passage, with the citizens of a pure democracy, and the ἴσοι κατ' ἀναλογίαν with those of an oligarchy or aristocracy. The citizens of a pure democracy are, of course, ἴσοι κατ' ἀριθμὸν—'on a footing of absolute equality' (Peters), but so are the members of a close oligarchy, for they are themselves a homogeneous body of peers, and those whom they exclude from all share in the government of the city cannot be compared with them in an ἀναλογία having for its basis political ἀξία. It is only in a mixed constitution that we can correctly speak of the citizens as being ἴσοι κατ' ἀναλογίαν—'on a footing of proportionate equality' (Peters). As a matter of fact, however, most of the 'aristocracies' and 'oligarchies' noticed by Aristotle in the *Politics* are mixed constitutions, recognising grades within the body of effective citizens, and the description ἴσοι κατ' ἀναλογίαν is therefore applicable to their citizens; while the description ἴσοι κατ' ἀριθμὸν remains as *especially* applicable to the citizens of a pure democracy, as described in *Pol.* Z. I. 1317 a. 40—1318 a. 10.

1134 a. 29. ἀλλά τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα] Freeman, standing on a footing of equality either absolute or proportionate, are related by political ties (τούτους ἐστὶ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον); i.e. they are persons whose unanimity (ὁμόνοια, see *E. N.* ix. 6) can create and maintain a πολιτεία. What such persons do *quā* μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας, and in accordance with its spirit and requirements, is just in the political sense of the term. And this is the proper sense of the term; for man's true nature, or form, is realised in the performance of political function (φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος). But, that man may be able to realise his true form in the creation and maintenance of a πολιτεία, certain material conditions are necessary, the most important of which is that the οἰκίαι, or families, of which the πόλις is composed, shall be well regulated. In the οἰκία the citizen, as husband, father, and master, no longer μετέχει βίου with free equals τοῦ εἰ ζῆν ἕνεκα, but exercises authority, τῆς ἀναγκαίας ζωῆς χάριν, over inferiors, some of whom are not even free. It is in another, that is in a metaphorical sense (καθ' ὁμοιότητα), then, that the term just must be applied to the relations subsisting between him and these inferiors.

a. 30. οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς] καὶ indicates that δίκαιον and νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς are merely different expressions for the same relation. 'Just relations' are equivalent to 'relations constituted by νόμος.' Persons οἷς νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς are persons whose conduct is determined, not by individual impulse, or by the force of a master, but by the manifold influences (examples, customs, laws, ideals) exerted by a system of common life, which they have been born into, and are 'of one mind' (ὁμονοοῦσι) to maintain and adorn.

a. 31. νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἀδικία] This is not to be understood, as by Michelet, to mean that νόμος presupposes ἀδικία—'legem propter injuriam institutam esse.' The social order is not a mere police system for the suppression of injustice—*Pol.* Γ. 5. 1280 b. 29 φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτούς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων τούτων ἀπάντων ἤδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εἰ ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. Νόμος is essentially the law of man's rational self-realisation, as πολιτικὸν ζῆον: but since he is impeded in his rational self-realisation by the irrational part of his nature, this law of his self-realisation is forced

to assume, as δίκη, judicial functions, and, for this reason, is often 1134 a. 31. (wrongly) regarded as nothing but a repressive agency operating ἐν οἷς ἀδικία. The words before us seem to imply this opinion; and so do the remarks which follow in §§ 5, 6, and 7. Νόμος seems to be presented as an invention specially introduced to combat πλεονεξία, as Hobbes' commonwealth is introduced to put an end to the evils of the state of nature. But the Aristotelian conception of νόμος, as elsewhere presented (e.g. in *Pol.* Γ. 11. 1287 a. 28 ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελύειν ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελύειν προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίων· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιούτων, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας διαφθείρει. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν) gives such prominence to its god-like, that is, creative and constitutive efficiency, that we must not find too much fault with the phraseology of the present passage, which, after all, is intended (as I believe) to point the distinction between τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, justice in the abstract, and τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, justice in the concrete, and does so by insisting on the highly complex character of the conditions which determine the manifestation of the latter. The presence of ἀδικία among those οἷς νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς is the ὄλη (or constitutes the greater part of the ὄλη) which prevents, even in the so-called ὀρθαὶ πολιτεία, the perfect realisation of τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον in τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.

ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία . . . οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία] This clause is rejected a. 32. by Zell, Jackson, and others from the present context. I am inclined to agree with Ramsauer, who brackets only the latter half of it (made parenthetical by Sus. and Bywater), viz. ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία. These words might very naturally have been added, for the sake of antithesis, by a scribe who remembered the ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἀδικον εἶναι of § 1. Without them, the passage runs smoothly, τοῦτο (which cannot in any case refer to ἀδικία, for ἀδικία is not the act of τὸ νέμειν) referring to the immediately preceding τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

τὸ πλεον αὐτῷ νέμειν] From these words it would appear that the a. 33. writer in this discussion of τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον has merely particular justice in view.

ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν] M. Eph. says—λέγει δὲ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ τὰ τῆ a. 34. ἑαυτῶν φύσει τοιαῦτα, ἃ καὶ ὡς δυνάμεις λέγεται καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ οἷον πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια, πενία, δυσγένεια, καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ καὶ πάλιν κακὰ. συντελοῦσι

1134 a. 34. γὰρ τῷ μὲν σπουδαίῳ πρὸς τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείας, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ εἰς τὰς κατὰ κακίαν.

a. 35. § 5. διὸ . . . τύραννος] See *Pol.* Γ. 10. 1286 a. 8, where the question is put—πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεισθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων; and *Pol.* Γ. 11. 1287 a. 18, where the general conclusion is reached τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἓνα τινά, the reason being that τῷ μὲν νόμῳ τὸ παθητικὸν οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' ἔχειν πᾶσαν (Γ. 10. 1286 a. 18)—a reason further insisted on in a passage (Γ. 11. 1287 a. 28) quoted above, note on a. 31. It must be remembered, however, that the conclusion τὸν νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἓνα τινά is true, not of all communities, but of those composed of ὄμοιοι καὶ ἴσοι: see *Pol.* Γ. 11. 1287 b. 41 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένον γε φανερόν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε συμφέρον ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον ἓνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ ὄντων νόμων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμον ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἂν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀμείνων ᾖ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ' ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέον. The exception here alluded to is explained as follows—Γ. 11. 1288 a. 15 ὅταν ᾖ γένος ὄλον ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἓνα τινά συμβῆ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον ὥσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάντων καὶ βασιλεῖα τὸν ἓνα τοῦτον. With Aristotle's discussion of the question πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεισθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων, Jackson compares the discussions in Plato, *Politicus* 293 E sqq., and in *Legg.* 874 E sqq. The latter passage especially is worth careful study in connexion with Aristotle's view. As to the point raised by Plato ποῖα δὴ νομοθετήτων τε καὶ ποῖα ἀποδοτέων κρίνειν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις (*Legg.* 876 A), Aristotle expresses the following opinion in *Rhet.* 1. 1. 1354 a. 31 μάλιστα μὲν οὖν προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται, πάντα διορίζειν αὐτούς, καὶ ὅτι ἐλάχιστα καταλείπειν ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι. We shall return to this subject in the chapter on ἐπιείκεια (v. 10).

λόγον] MS. authority is strongly in favour of λόγον against νόμον: and cf. *E. N.* x. 9. 12 ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ.

ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ] i. e. ἑαυτῷ τὸ πλεον νέμει.

b. 1. γίνεται τύραννος] τυραννίς is the worst of those παρεκβεβηκεῖναι πολιτεῖαι in which the governors rule for their own advantage, not

for the common good: see *E. N.* viii. 10. 2 ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ 1134 b. 1. ἑαυτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων—cf. *Pol.* Γ. 5. 1279 b. 6 ἢ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος.

§§ 6, 7.] There exists a general opinion (δοκεῖ) that one gets no b. 2. advantage from being just—that, in fact, one merely confers advantage on other people, justice being 'the good of other people.' Since rulers are apt to share this opinion, the State, in order to secure their services, must remunerate them with honour and privilege: as it is, there are rulers who are not satisfied with such intangible remuneration, but become tyrants and remunerate themselves by plundering the State. Here the clauses οὐ γὰρ νέμει . . . πρότερον express the reasoning of the persons who hold the opinion (δοκεῖ), οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλεον, εἶπερ δίκαιος, and are rightly treated by Susemihl and Bywater as parenthetical: while the words μισθὸς ἄρα κ.τ.λ. give the practical conclusion which the writer draws from the undoubted fact of the existence of this opinion. It is an opinion which in his view implies a false theory of life; nevertheless it exists, and a practical legislator must take account of it, and try to avert its worst consequences.

§ 6. διὸ ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ] Bekker's ποιεῖ seems to be entirely without b. 4. MS. authority. Shall we then accept ποιεῖ, for which the MS. authority is unimpeachable? It is difficult to refuse to do so. At the same time, ποιεῖ and ποιεῖ are palaeographically very like. Were it not for the MS. consensus in favour of ποιεῖ, I should decide for ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ = ἐτέρῳ τὸ πλεον νέμει, because it answers to ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ = ἑαυτῷ τὸ πλεον νέμει in § 5, and because ποιεῖ seems to me to be an unsuitable word to express the action of τὸ νέμειν with which the work of the just ruler is here identified. Ramsauer thinks that it is self-evident that ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ cannot = ἐτέρῳ τὸ πλεον νέμει, although αὐτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ above is rightly, he admits, taken as = ἑαυτῷ τὸ πλεον νέμει. I confess that I cannot see the ground on which this distinction is made. But even granting that ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ could not mean ἐτέρῳ τὸ πλεον νέμει, we might argue that the words in *Rep.* 343 C οἱ δ' ἀρχόμενοι ποιούσι τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον are in favour of reading ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ here = ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ τὸ συμφέρον. However, for the reasons against ποιεῖ (which, after all,—whether from accident or not—has no MS. backing) see Jackson's note *ad loc.*

1134 b. 5. ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν] See note on v. i. 17, a. 3.

b. 6. § 7. μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας] 'Here, as in the unequal friendships, the assistance rendered by the superior and the honour and respect which compensate it are equated by means of τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς' (Jackson). 'The exchange of equivalent amounts of honour and just government' describes the relation between ἄρχων and ἀρχόμενοι, as it is conceived by those who hold that justice is ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν—a good thing handed over to one's neighbour, for which one must be careful to get from him an adequate return. Nor is the writer himself unwilling to regard the relation as an *exchange*; for the inference μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος is undoubtedly his. He believes that in society, as it is, the ruler must be remunerated with honour of a more or less material or external kind. But the more perfect society becomes—the more 'constitutional' government becomes, the less appropriate becomes the formula of 'exchange' to the relation between ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενοι. The τιμὴ which the ruler who is nobly φιλότιμος, or, it may be, μεγαλόψυχος, seeks, is not an external reward, but the approbation of his own 'conscience.' He gives his services to the State, because he is 'public-spirited' or 'patriotic.' And, further, those whom he rules are not a passive caste of mere ἀρχόμενοι. They too are public-spirited, and patriotic, and *help* him to rule. Indeed, where the relation between ruler and ruled is not, to a considerable extent, one of *mutual help* in the work of carrying out a system of common life, τυραννίς, in some form or other, must inevitably supervene. If the ruled are those who do not *help*, but merely *remunerate* the ruler, the latter is sure to bid for ever higher 'remuneration.' 'Remuneration' is, indeed, *materially necessary* in the case of the ἄρχων, as in that of the *ιατρός*. But, as οἱ χαριέντες τῶν *ιατρῶν* do not follow their profession *for the sake of* the fees, so the true ἄρχων does not govern for the sake of 'honour.' The final cause of his government is the public good, not his own advantage. In a noble community the good ruler is the object of the highest τιμὴ—the loyal devotion of his people. But how absurd it would be to say that he rules *for the sake of* their devotion! His consciousness of it is only an ἐπιγνώμενόν τι τέλος: his real τέλος is the ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν which results in the welfare of his loyal and devoted people. Thus the relation between ruler and ruled is misrepresented in its *essential character* when it is simply described as an 'exchange.' As an exchange it certainly presents itself *concretely* to the interested

parties; and the wise legislator tries to make it appear to them 1134 b. 6. a tolerably fair exchange; but, even in the worst πολιτεία that still deserves the name, the fact that there is government at all implies a *nisus* towards social organisation, which is no more accounted for by the self-seeking of the governors, than the existence of *ιατρικὴ* is explained by the fact that it is practised as a *μισθαρικὴ τέχνη*.

§§ 8, 9.] Passing from the πόλις to its unit the οἰκία, we find three b. 8. kinds of δίκαιον, resembling that between πολῖται and yet differing from it—viz one kind appearing in the relation between husband and wife (τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον), another in the relation between father and children (τὸ πατρικὸν δίκαιον), and another in the relation between master and slaves (τὸ δεσποτικόν). These three kinds of δίκαιον resemble the δίκαιον between πολῖται, in so far as they appear in relations involving the conduct of a πολίτης (the paterfamilias) towards those who, though not πολῖται, are individuals ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις: they differ from it, because the relations in which they appear are not between ελεύθεροι καὶ ἴσοι—not between independent persons standing on a footing of equality. The slave and the child, as such, are not independent persons, but are, as it were, parts of the paterfamilias: he cannot therefore *injure* them, any more than he can injure himself: if we speak of justice or injustice appearing in his conduct towards them, it must be in a metaphorical sense. It is only towards his *fellow-citizens* that a man can act justly or unjustly in the strict sense. Justice, strictly so called, appears in those relations which exist between men *quā* rational beings, striving to attain εὐδαιμονία by united action; it does not, except in a metaphorical sense, appear in those domestic relations, which, after all, are common to the irrational animals with man. For the three μέρη τῆς οἰκίας cf. *Pol. A.* 2. 1253 b. 1–10, and *Pol. A.* 5. 1259 a. 37; in both passages οἰκονομική is divided into three parts—δεσποτικὴ, πατρικὴ, and γαμικὴ: cf. also *E. N.* viii. 10. §§ 4–6 for the analogues of these three domestic relations in πολιτεία.

§ 8. ταῦτόν τούτοις] Ramsauer conjectures ταῦτόν τούτοφ.

b. 9.

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπλῶς] Peters takes ἀπλῶς with ἀδικία—'We cannot speak (without qualification) of injustice towards what is part of one's self': but it perhaps ought to be taken with τὰ αὐτοῦ (*sc.* μέρη), which would then be distinguished,

1184 b. 9. as 'parts strictly so called,' from slave or child which is ὡσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ: so, apparently, *M. M.* i. 33. 1194 b. 10-14.

b. 10. κτήμα] 'slave.' For the rationale of this use of the term see *Pol. A.* 4. 1253 b. 23 sqq., and cf. *Oecon.* i. 5. 1344 a. 23.

b. 11. ἕως ἄν ἡ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῆ] Reading μή before χωρισθῆ (*L^b, M^b*), we must translate ἕως—'so long as.' But the omission of μή (*K^b, O^b*) is strongly supported by *M. M.* i. 33. 1194 b. 14, 15 ὡσπερ γὰρ μέρος τί ἐστι τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός· πλὴν ὅταν ἤδη λάβῃ τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τάξιν καὶ χωρισθῆ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τότε ἤδη ἐν ἰσότητι καὶ ὁμοιότητι ἐστὶ τῷ πατρί.

ὡσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ] See *Pol. A.* 4. 1254 a. 9 τὸ δὲ κτήμα λέγεται ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ μόνιον. τό τε γὰρ μόνιον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόνιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλου· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κτήμα· διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου δεσπότης μόνον, ἐκείνου δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· ὁ δὲ δούλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότην δούλος ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως ἐκείνου. τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον (ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἀλλ' ἄλλου ἄνθρωπος ὢν, οὗτος φύσει δούλος ἐστίν, ἄλλου δ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, ὅς ἂν κτήμα ἢ [δούλος ἐστίν], κτήμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν). In *E. N.* viii. 12. 2, 3 a physiological explanation of στοργή (the germ of all social feeling) is found in the fact that τὸ τέκνον ἐξ αὐτοῦ, *i. e.* μέρος αὐτοῦ.

αὐτὸν δ' οὐδεὶς προαιρέεται βλάπτειν] This anticipates the conclusion reached in chapters 9 and 11. Βλάπτειν (*sc.* παρὰ τὸν νόμον) μετὰ προαιρέσεως = ἀδικεῖν.

b. 12. § 9. διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν] Ramsauer's conjecture αὐτά, adopted by Susemihl, is very tempting, the argument being—'Since no man chooses to harm himself, and since his slaves and children are parts of himself, it follows (*διό*) that he cannot be unjust towards them (*αὐτά*)—*i. e.* civil justice and injustice do not appear in his relations to them—οὐδ' ἄρα ἀδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικὸν (*sc.* πρὸς αὐτά).'

b. 13. κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει . . .] A reference to § 4. For a discussion of the question, How far Aristotle is right in holding that νόμος πρὸς αὐτοὺς has nothing to do with the maintenance and regulation of the relation between master and slave, see note on *E. N.* viii. 11. 7. That faithful slaves have rights the recognition of which tends to place them in a quasi-political position, is admitted in *Oecon.* i. 5. 1344 b. 14 χρῆ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὀρίσθαι πᾶσιν. δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κείσθαι ἄλλο.

That the State has a right—*e. g.* in the interest of humanity—to 1134 b. 13. interfere with a man's treatment of his slaves is, of course, another matter, and does not imply that *between* him and his slaves there is νόμος: for the State may also interfere with his treatment of animals: cf. Ramsauer—'ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος. 'Εν οἷς: etenim περὶ αὐτῶν, velut περὶ τεκνοποιίας, τροφῆς, παιδείας, leges esse, quibus parentes vel etiam heri quam maxime obligati sint, infitiri sane non est in animo.'

οὔτοι δ' ἦσαν . . . ἄρχεσθαι] This remark has not been made in b. 14. the *Ethics*: but cf. *Pol. Γ.* 7. 1283 b. 42 πολίτης δὲ κοινῆ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐστὶ, καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν.

διὸ μᾶλλον . . . καὶ κτήματα] This is the doctrine of *Pol. A.* 5. b. 15. 1259 a. 39 καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχειν καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἀμφόυν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς. Mich. Eph. has the following note here—ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἰσότης, καθὼ ἀμφὼ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἔστι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ οικονομικὸν δίκαιον, ἄλλο δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ ἰσότητι εἰσὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὡς παρὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα ἄρχειν, δεῖ μέντοι καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν τινῶν· τῶν θεραπειῶν δηλονότι καὶ τῆς τῶν εἰσκομιζομένων σωτηρίας καὶ φυλακῆς.

τὸ οικονομικὸν δίκαιον] According to *Pol. A.* 5 οικονομική is the b. 17. genus, and δεσποτική, πατρική, and γαμική the species.

The following is the version which the writer of the *M. M.* (i. 33. 1194 b. 5-29) gives of this chapter—ἔστιν δὲ δίκαιόν τι, ὡς φασίν, οἰκέτη πρὸς δεσπότην καὶ υἱὸς πρὸς πατέρα. τὸ δ' ἐν τούτοις δίκαιον ἁμωνύμως ἂν δόξειεν λέγεσθαι τῷ πολιτικῷ δικαίῳ (ἔστιν γὰρ (τὸ) δίκαιον, ὑπὲρ οὗ ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον)· τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐστὶν ἐν ἰσότητι (κοινωνοὶ γὰρ οἱ πολιταῖαι τινες, καὶ ὅμοιοι βούλονται εἶναι τῇ φύσει, τῷ δὲ τρόπῳ ἕτεροι), τῷ δὲ υἱὸς πρὸς πατέρα καὶ οἰκέτη πρὸς δεσπότην οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐθέν. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ ποδὶ τῷ ἐμῷ πρὸς ἐμὲ οὔτε τῇ χειρὶ, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ' ἐκάστῳ τῶν μοριῶν· ὡσαύτως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἔχειν καὶ ὁ υἱὸς πρὸς πατέρα· ὡσπερ γὰρ μέρος τί ἐστὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός· πλὴν ὅταν ἤδη λάβῃ τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τάξιν καὶ χωρισθῆ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τότε ἤδη ἐν ἰσότητι καὶ ὁμοιότητι ἐστὶν τῷ πατρί· οἱ δὲ πολῖται τοιοῦτοί τινες ἐθέλουσιν εἶναι. ὡς δ' αὐτῶς οὐδ' οἰκέτη πρὸς δεσπότην ἐστὶ δίκαιον διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν· τοῦ γὰρ δεσπότητος τί ἐστὶν ὁ οἰκέτης. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ δίκαιον, τὸ οικονομικὸν δίκαιον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστίν. οὐ τοῦτο δὲ γε ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ

1134 b. 17. τὸ πολιτικὸν ἐν ἰσότητι γὰρ καὶ ὁμοιότητι τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον ἔοικεν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἐν γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς κοινωνίᾳ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἕγγυς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου· χεῖρον μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ γυνὴ τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' οἰκειότερον, καὶ μετέχει ἰσότητός πως μᾶλλον, διότι ἕγγυς τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ὁ βίος αὐτῶν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ γυναικί πρὸς ἄνδρα μάλιστα πως ἦδη τῶν ἄλλων πολιτικὸν ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶ δίκαιον τὸ ἐν πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ ὄν, ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁ δίκαιος περὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον ἔσται.

CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

In civil justice there are two elements, a natural and a conventional. That which is naturally just is always and everywhere equally just, whether people deem it just or not; that which is only conventionally just was originally indifferent, and has been made just by law or fashion. Some maintain that there are no human institutions which are more than conventionally just, arguing that what is naturally of a certain kind is so invariably (e.g. fire is invariably hot), whereas the justice of human institutions varies—what is right at home is not necessarily right in Persia. To this it may be replied: The Divine nature is indeed invariable; but we are here concerned with human institutions: their justice certainly varies; but this does not prove that there is not a natural as well as a conventional element in them; for in the concrete world variations are natural. Which are natural and which merely conventional among human institutions, although both those which are natural and those which are conventional vary, is as plain as it is which hand is naturally the stronger, although either may be the stronger. In proportion as a given constitution falls short of the ideal constitution, its institutions will exhibit more of the conventional element.

A just rule is a universal which has just acts under it as particulars. 'Unjust act' and 'unjust rule'—'act of justice' and 'just rule' differ. The 'unjust rule,' whether unjust naturally or conventionally, is prior to the 'unjust act.' Similarly, the 'just rule' is prior to the 'act of justice,' or rather to the 'just act,' for the expression 'act of justice' ought to be retained to mark the rectification of an unjust act.

b. 18. § 1.] That which is *naturally* right (τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον) is right in itself always and everywhere, whether it be deemed right or no; that which is *conventionally* right (τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον), in itself neither

right nor wrong, has been made right by the νόμος of a community, 1184 b. 18. and continues to be right only so long as the νόμος declares it to be right. It is perhaps scarcely necessary to point out that νομικόν, as here distinguished from φυσικόν, must not be confounded with νόμιμον as distinguished from ἴσον in v. i. 8. Τὰ νόμιμα are all those things which are recognised as right by the law and fashion (νόμος) of a community; some of these are *naturally*, or in themselves, right (φύσει δίκαια), others are only *conventionally* right (νόμῳ δίκαια). It is also to be noticed that (here in § 1) the writer, in describing τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον, seems to have in view only things which, being in themselves *neither right nor wrong*, are made right by νόμος. He apparently forgets that also things which are in themselves *wrong* often become conventionally right. But in § 5 he uses words which may be understood to imply that both things indifferent and things wrong may become νόμῳ δίκαια—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταῦτα πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρίστη. Here the reference must be to the παρεκβεβηκυῖαι πολιτεῖαι in which much that is παρὰ φύσιν, or in itself wrong, is deemed right, *i. e.* is conventionally right—in which, in fact, the *bad man* is the good citizen. The more perfect a πολιτεία is—*i. e.* the nearer it approaches to the ideal of ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρίστη, the more fully will its νόμιμα realise the requirements of τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον, the element of νομικὸν δίκαιον in its institutions and customs being small and consisting of what was originally *indifferent*, rather than of what is in itself *wrong*.

τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ] K^b and CCC omit these words, and read γὰρ before φυσικόν. The omission may be easily explained as a slip of the eye caused by the similarity of the last words of ch. 6 and the omitted first words of ch. 7. K^b has frequent omissions of this kind. On the other hand, the interpolation of πολιτικοῦ here, per dittographiam, would be very natural. At any rate, it seems certain that the writer of the *M. M.* read here τοῦ δὲ δικαίου instead of τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου, for his version (i. 33. 1194 b. 30) not only begins—τῶν δὲ δικαίων ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ νόμῳ, but ends (1195 a. 5) with words which, if they mean anything, mean that it is not τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον which is divisible into τὸ φυσικόν and τὸ νομικόν δίκαιον.—βέλτιον οὖν δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ νόμον. ἀλλ' ὁ ζητούμεν, δίκαιόν ἐστι πολιτικόν· τὸ δὲ πολιτικὸν ἐστὶ τὸ νόμῳ, οὐ τὸ φύσει.

1134 b. 18. The difference between the Fifth Book with τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου κ.τ.λ. and the *M. M.* with τὸ πολιτικὸν ἐστὶ τὸ νόμος οὐ τὸ φύσει seems to be due to the fact that the writer of the *M. M.* does not keep clearly before his mind the distinction which the writer of the Fifth Book marks by the terms νόμιμον and νομικόν.

b. 22. μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι.] Jackson's note is—'the editors point out that this passage is inconsistent with Herod. vi. 79 ἄποινα δὲ ἐστὶ Πελοποννησίοισι δύο μνᾶι τεταγμένα κατ' ἄνδρα αἰχμάλωτον ἐκτίνειν, and v. 77 χρόνῳ δὲ ἔλυσάν σφεας διμνέως ἀποτιμησάμενοι. But, as Blakesley remarks, the prisoners in the latter case being the Chalcidian Hippobotae, two minae "may be considered as the ransom of a man-at-arms, not of an inferior soldier." One mina, then, may have been the ransom of men of the lowest rank.'

ἢ τὸ αἶγα . . . πρόβατα.] Jackson's note here is—'On the strength of Herodot. ii. 42 ἔσοι μὲν δὴ Διὸς Θηβαίους ἰδρυνται ἱρὸν ἢ νομοῦ τοῦ Θηβαίου εἰσί, οὗτοι μὲν νυν πάντες ὄτων ἀπεχόμενοι αἶγας θύουσι, Muretus proposed to read αἶγα Διὶ θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ πρόβατα. Cf. *N. E.* ix. 2. § 6, de *Mirabilibus* 844 a. 35. (In Athen. iv. 138 f. θύουσι δ' ἐν ταῖς κοπίσιν αἶγας ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν ἱερεῖον Zeus is not the divinity honoured.) But the addition of Διὶ does not explain the awkward antithesis of the singular αἶγα and the plural δύο πρόβατα. Is it possible that ἀλλὰ μὴ is a corruption of μίαν ἢ? Τὸ αἶγας θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ πρόβατα μὴδ' ἐς might be suggested; but Zell's conclusion is perhaps the safest—'Mureti conjectura admodum blanditur; sed cum Aristoteles aliam rem h. l. significare potuerit sibi et popularibus suis tam notam, quam nobis nunc ignotam, ab auctoritate codicum recedere nolui.'

b. 23. θύειν Βρασιδα.] See Thuc. v. 11.

b. 24. τὰ ψηφισματώδη] The distinction between a νόμος which embodies the permanent necessities of the State and is presumably in accordance with 'the natural fitness of things,' and a ψήφισμα which meets an unexpected and presumably temporary condition of affairs, is a commonplace in Greek political thought. One of the characteristics which mark the declension from φύσις of ἡ ἐσχάτη δημοκρατία is that government by ψηφίσματα, or special decrees of the people, has taken the place of the rule of νόμος, or the Constitution: see *Pol. Δ.* 4. 1292 a. 2 ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, εἰν μόνον ἢ πολιτίης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον'

ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὰλλα μὲν εἶναι ταῦτά, κύριον δ' εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος 1134 b. 24. καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ' οἱ βελτιωτοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσὶν ἐν προεδρίᾳ. ὅπου δ' οἱ νόμοι μὴ εἰσι κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί. μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἰς ἐκ πολλῶν. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοι εἰσιν οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες. Ὅμηρος δὲ ποῖαν λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι πολυκοιρανίην, πότερον ταύτην ἢ ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἕκαστος, ἄδελον. ὁ δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος, ἅτε μόναρχος ὢν, ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός, ὥστε οἱ κόλακες ἔντιμοι, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ δῆμος οὗτος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχῶν τῇ τυραννίδι. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἦθος τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἄμφω δεσποτικά τῶν βελτιόνων, καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὰ ἐπιτάγματα, καὶ ὁ δημαγωγός καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον. καὶ μάλιστα δ' ἑκάτεροι (παρ') ἑκατέρους ἰσχύουσιν, οἱ μὲν κόλακες παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις, οἱ δὲ δημαγωγοὶ τοῖς δῆμοις τοῖς τοιοῦτοις. But, although *government by ψηφίσματα* is thus opposed to that by νόμος, as caprice is opposed to reason, it is none the less true that a *single ψήφισμα* may be the vehicle of reason—may secure the realisation of that which is really or 'naturally' right, in an exceptional case which the general rule laid down by νόμος could not meet: see v. 10. 6.

§ 2. ἐνίοις.] See note on *E. N.* i. 3. 2. Cf. Grant, *Ethics*, Essay ii. vol. i. p. 150 on the opposition between Law and Nature.

ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] The εἶναι referred to argue—Nature is invariable; the institutions of men (τὰ δίκαια) vary; therefore they have no 'natural' foundation. The writer meets this argument in §§ 3 and 4, by pointing out that 'being variable' and 'having a natural foundation' are not incompatible characteristics. While all human institutions (as distinguished from the functions of the godhead) are 'variable,' some of them are 'natural' and some of them are 'conventional.' Which are 'natural' and which 'conventional' is as plain as it is which hand is 'naturally' the stronger.

καὶ ἐν Πέρσiais.] The editors compare the *Minos* 315 E—316 A, b. 26. where these words occur in a similar context.

§ 3. τοῦτο δ' . . . b. 30 οὐ φύσει.] This is a very awkward passage. b. 27. Τοῦτο is apparently τὰ δίκαια κινεῖσθαι. This statement is untrue, and yet true in a sense. 'Among the gods' κινεῖται τὰ δίκαια οὐδαμῶς—i. e. justice in the abstract is 'eternal and immutable';

1134 b. 27. 'among men,' however, *κινήτων πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον*—all human institutions are mutable; but not mutable in the sense of being entirely arbitrary: their mutability is not inconsistent with τὸ εἶναι τι καὶ φύσει in them. In the sphere of mathematics, and in the sphere of inorganic nature (*e.g.* τὸ πῦρ), there are no variations; but in the sphere of biological adaptation, to which τὰ δίκαια—man's actions—belong, *variations are natural*. Then follow the words ἀλλ' ὁμῶς . . . οὐ φύσει, which are unnecessary because they have been anticipated by the words ἔστι μὲν τι καὶ φύσει. Jackson makes the whole section τοῦτο δ' . . . οὐ φύσει parenthetical; but this, after all, removes formally rather than practically the difficulty inherent in the sequence—παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἔστι μὲν τι καὶ φύσει, κινήτων μόντοι πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὁμῶς ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. However, we must not expect too much logical order from the present writer, who, moreover, expresses himself so awkwardly as to seem guilty of the inaccuracy of ascribing δίκαια (through ἀκίνητα δίκαια) to the gods, contrary to the express teaching of his school (see *E.N.* x. 1178 b. 10). It is to relieve him of responsibility for such an inaccuracy that Susemihl brackets the whole clause καίτοι παρά γε 28 . . . οὐ φύσει 30. But perhaps we need not understand κινεῖται τὰ δίκαια after οὐδαμῶς 29, with Grant, Jackson, Susemihl, and Peters. It may be allowable to supply κινεῖται τὸ φύσει.

b. 34. § 4. πάντας] Bekker reads τίνας, against all the MSS. apparently, and against *M.M.* i. 33. 1194 b. 33.

1135 a. 2. § 5. ἀνούνηται . . . πωλοῦσιν] *sc.* οἱ ἔμποροι, Jackson. Dealers buying up corn or wine in large quantities compute by means of large units of measurement; but when they retail their stock they find it convenient to use smaller units—*e.g.* bottles instead of hogsheads. It may be useful to append here the passage in which the writer of the *M.M.* discusses the distinction between τὸ φύσει δίκαιον and τὸ νόμῳ δίκαιον—i. 33. 1194 b. 30 τῶν δὲ δικαίων ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν φύσει τὰ δὲ νόμῳ. δεῖ δ' οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ ὡς μηδέποτε ἂν μεταπεσόντα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ φύσει ὕψα μεταλαμβάνουσι μεταβολῆς. λέγω δ' οἷον εἰ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ μελετῶμεν πάντες αἰεὶ βάλλειν, γινοίμεθα ἂν ἀμφιδέξιοι· ἀλλὰ φύσει γε ἀριστερὰ ἐστίν, καὶ τὰ δεξιὰ οὐδὲν ἤττον φύσει βελτίω ἐστὶ τῆς ἀριστερᾶς, κἂν πάντα ποιῶμεν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ καθάπερ τῇ δεξιᾷ. οὐδ' ὅτι μεταπίπτουσι, διὰ τοῦτο οἶκ' ἔστιν φύσει· ἀλλ' εἰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺν καὶ τὸν πλείω χρόνον οὕτω διαμένει ἡ ἀριστερὰ ὅσα ἀριστερὰ καὶ ἡ δεξιὰ δεξιὰ, τοῦτο φύσει ἐστίν. ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει δικαίων, μὴ, εἰ μεταβάλλει διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν

χρήσιν, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιον φύσει, ἀλλ' ἔστιν. τὸ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 1135 a. 2. πολὺ διαμένον, τοῦτο φύσει δίκαιον προφανές. ὁ γὰρ ἂν ἡμεῖς θώμεθα καὶ νομίσωμεν, τοῦτο καὶ ἔστι δίκαιον ἤδη καὶ καλοῦμεν κατὰ νόμον δίκαιον. βέλτιον οὖν δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ νόμον. ἀλλ' ὁ ζητοῦμεν, δίκαιόν ἐστι πολιτικόν. τὸ δὲ πολιτικόν ἔστιν τὸ νόμῳ, οὐ τὸ φύσει.

§§ 6 and 7.] 'We have a transition of subject now,' says Grant, a. 5. 'a return from the digression on civil justice, to inquire into individual responsibility, &c. The transition is made by saying that the principles of justice and injustice (τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ ἄδικον) are universals, and differ from just and unjust acts.' See *M.M.* i. 33. 1195 a. 8 τὸ δ' ἄδικον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκημα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὕτω ταυτόν, οὐκ ἔστι δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄδικόν ἐστιν τὸ νόμῳ ὀρισμένον, οἷον τὸ τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποστερῆσαι ἄδικον ἐστὶ, τὸ δ' ἀδίκημά ἐστιν τὸ ἤδη ἀδίκως τι πράξει. ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ δικαιοπράγημα οὐ ταυτόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον τὸ τῷ νόμῳ ὀρισμένον, τὸ δὲ δικαιοπράγημα τὸ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν.

§ 7. καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν . . . ἐπισκεπτέον] Ramsauer is perhaps a. 13. right in suspecting that these words are interpolated. The word ὕστερον can scarcely point to anything so near as the following chapter, to which Zell and Michelet make it refer. The *Politics* ('intended book or books περὶ νόμων' Jackson) or *Rhet.* (i. 13. 1373 b. 1 sqq.) could not be referred to in this way by the writer of the Fifth Book.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Just and unjust acts being what we have described, to act justly or unjustly a man must perform them voluntarily. If he perform them involuntarily, they are accidentally or nominally, not really, just or unjust acts; i.e. they are merely just or unjust acts, not his just or unjust acts. Thus, if a man restore a deposit involuntarily under compulsion, he 'acts justly' in a nominal, not in a real sense. Further, a voluntary act may be done either with or without deliberate choice, i.e. either after we have turned it over in our minds, or without previous thought. Now, to apply these distinctions to the classification of the ways in which one member of society may 'hurt' another—

(1) *When one man hurts another without knowing that he is doing so, and in circumstances in which he could not be expected to know, we say that 'an accident' has happened.*

(2) But when he might have known, though acting without evil intent, we say that his act is 'culpable'—for an act which can be traced to something in the man (here to his not knowing when he might have known) is 'culpable,' an act which is due to something external to the man (e.g. to his not knowing when it was impossible for him to know) is a mere 'accident.'

(3) When a man hurts another knowingly, but without premeditation, e.g. in anger, his act is an 'act of injustice,' but he is not himself in virtue of it 'an unjust man.'

(4) If, however, he hurt, deliberately choosing to do so, i.e. with premeditation, he is 'an unjust man,' and his act is an 'act of injustice' in the strict sense, i.e. one for which strictly no excuse can be found. But where sudden anger causes a man to inflict hurt, premeditation is excluded, and an extenuating circumstance may be found in the provocation which roused his anger; for anger arises when a man thinks that he is unjustly treated; and in judging the act which springs from his anger, we have to ask—'Has he been unjustly treated?—How far has he received real provocation?' Here it is evident that both parties may dispute in good faith, each believing that he has justice on his side. Not so where the question is not about the justice of an admitted act, but whether (e.g. in a business transaction) something has been done or not, e.g. if A asserts that he has paid B, and B denies A's assertion, one of the parties must be deliberately trying to treat the other unjustly, unless the whole dispute be due to a slip of memory.

It is of course with the discrimination of the different degrees of guilt attaching to voluntary transgressions that a court of criminal justice has mainly to do. But there are certain involuntary actions which it cannot overlook—those involuntary actions which are not done accidentally in consequence of an excusable ignorance of mere particulars, but are blindly and ignorantly done under the influence of brutal and unnatural impulses.

1135 a. 15. § 1.] *Rhet.* i. 13 should be read carefully with this chapter. The following is the version of the subject of this chapter given by the writer of the *M. M.*—he does not seem to have had the chapter before him in the form in which we have it—*M. M.* i. 33. 1195 a. 14 πότε οὖν τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ πότε οὐ; ὡς ἀπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅταν πράττη κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ ἐκουσίως (τὸ δὲ ἐκουσίως ὃ ἦν, εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω ἡμῖν), καὶ ὅταν εἰδῶς καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα, οὕτως δίκαιον πράττει. ὁμοίως καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ ἀδίκος ἔσται ὁ εἰδῶς καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα. ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐν τούτων εἰδῶς πράξῃ τι ἀδικον, ἀδικος μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀτυχῆς δέ. εἰ γὰρ οὐόμενος τὸν πολέμιον ἀποκτείνειν τὸν πατέρα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀδικον μὲν τι ἔπραξεν, ἀδικεῖ μὲντοι οὐθένα, ἀτυχεῖ δέ. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὰ ἀδικα πράττοντα ἐν τῷ ἀγνοεῖν ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὃ καὶ μικρὸν ἐπάνω ἐλέγετο, ὅταν μὴ εἰδῶς μὴθ' ὄν βλάπτει μὴθ' ᾧ μὴθ' οὐ ἔνεκεν· ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τὴν ἀγνοίαν διοριστέον ἐστίν, πῶς ἂν γινόμενης τῆς ἀγνοίας, ὄν βλάπτει, οὐκ ἀδικήσει. ἔστω δὴ οὗτος ὁ διορισμός. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἀγνοία αἰτία ἦ τοῦ πράξαι τι, οὐχ ἑκὼν τοῦτο πράττει, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖ· ὅταν δὲ τῆς ἀγνοίας αὐτὸς ἦ

αἴτιος, καὶ πράττη τι κατὰ τὴν ἀγνοίαν ἧς αὐτὸς αἴτιος ἐστίν, οὗτος ἤδη 1135 a. 15. ἀδικεῖ, καὶ δικαίως ἀδικος ὁ τοιοῦτος κληθήσεται. οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν μεθύοντων. οἱ γὰρ μεθύοντες καὶ πράξαντες τι κακὸν ἀδικούσιν· τῆς γὰρ ἀγνοίας αὐτοὶ εἰσιν αἴτιοι· ἐξῆν γὰρ αὐτοῖς μὴ πίνειν τοσοῦτον, ὥστ' ἀγνοήσαντας τύπτειν τὸν πατέρα. ὁμοίως [καὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγνοίων δοῦναι μὲν γίνονται δι' αὐτοῦς, οἱ κατὰ ταύτας ἀδικούντες ἀδικοὶ· ὄν δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ εἰσιν αἴτιοι, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀγνοία κακείνοις ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῖς πράξασιν τοῦ πράξαι, οὐκ ἀδικοὶ. ἔστιν δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ἀγνοία ἡ φυσικὴ, οἷον τὰ παῖδια ἀγροῦντα τοὺς πατέρας τύπτουσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐν τούτοις ἀγνοία φυσικὴ οὐσα οὐ ποιεῖ διὰ τὴν πράξιν ταύτην τὰ παῖδια λέγεσθαι ἀδίκα· ἡ γὰρ ἀγνοία αἰτία τοῦ πράττειν ταῦτα, τῆς δ' ἀγνοίας οὐκ αὐτὰ αἴτια, διὰ οὐδ' ἀδίκα λέγονται.

§ 1. ἑκὼν] see *Rhet.* i. 13. 1373 b. 27 ἐστὶ δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ α. 17. ἐκόντος τὰ ἀδίκα πάσχω· τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὠρισται πρότερον ἐκούσιον εἶναι.

οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε . . . πράττουσιν] i. e. τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δίκαια ἢ α. 18. ἀδίκα πράττουσιν.

§ 2. ἔσται τι ἀδικον] i. e. ἀδικον κατὰ συμβεβηκός. a. 22.

§ 3. πρότερον] cf. *E. E.* ii. 9. 1225 b. 1. sq. and *E. N.* iii. 1. 20. a. 23.

οὐδ' ἔνεκα . . . τίνος ἔνεκα] the tendency or result of the act: see a. 25. Grant's note on iii. 1. 18.

κακείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βία] 'mistake and a. 26. compulsion being excluded in each case.' Τύπτειν τὸν πατέρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός would be to beat him, mistaking him for some one else; τύπτειν τὸν πατέρα βία, to beat him in the circumstances described in line 27. Mich. Eph. is right in explaining μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός here as equivalent to μὴ δι' ἀγνοίαν. His words are—τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰδέναί τὰ καθέκαστα· κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ γνωρίζου ἂν τις ταῦτα ὄν ἡ ἀγνοία ἀκούσιον ἐποίησε τὸ γινόμενον, οὕτως ὡς αὐτὸς δείκνυσιν· ὁ γὰρ τὸν πατέρα τύπτων ἐν νυκτομαχίᾳ, καὶ γνωρίζων μὲν ὅτι ἄνθρωπον τύπτει, ἀγνοῶν δὲ ὅτι ὄν τύπτει ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἂν εἴη περὶ τὸν πατέρα ἢ πράξις, ὡς πρὸς μὲν ἄνθρωπον καθ' αὐτό, ὡς δὲ πρὸς πατέρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥστε καὶ ἀκούσιος ἢ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὕβρις τοῦ υἱοῦ.

τὸ δὲ ἀγνοοῦμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοοῦμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, ἢ βία, a. 31. ἀκούσιον] Have we a three-fold or a two-fold division of ἀκούσια here? Mich. Eph. tells us—a two-fold division. He says—δεῖ δὲ ἐν τῇ λέξει τῇ ἢ βία ἀντὶ τοῦ ἢ τὸ ἀλλὰ γράφειν . . . τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ βία ἀκούσιον. According to this view, then, ἢ is not disjunctive but explanatory, and we have the old division into τὰ δι' ἀγνοίαν and τὰ

1135 a. 31. βία. I have little doubt that a three-fold division is really intended, the clause πολλά γάρ κ.τ.λ. explaining and giving illustrations of τὸ μὴ ἀγροούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, as distinguished from both τὸ ἀγροούμενον and τὸ βία. Τὰ φύσει ὑπάρχοντα are opposed to τὸ βία (cf. for this opposition *Met.* i. i. 1052 a. 23 εἰ τι φύσει τοιοῦτον καὶ μὴ βία, *Phys.* i. 5. 205 b. 5 εἴη γὰρ ἂν τί που βία καὶ οὐχ οὐ πέφυκεν). So far as τὰ βίαια are concerned, πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν εἰδότες: but these βίαια are not the only 'involuntary actions' which we perform εἰδότες: πολλά γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπάρχόντων (as well as τὰ βίαια) are involuntary, and yet εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν. The words ὦν οὐθέν οὐθ' ἐκούσιον οὐτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν Rasso (Forsch. p. 95) has shown conclusively, I think, to be wrong. Γηρᾶν and ἀποθνήσκειν belong to the same class of φυσικά as θερμαίνεσθαι, ἀλγεῖν, and πεινῆν, which in *E. N.* iii. 5. 7 are said to be μήτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν μήθ' ἐκούσια, the implication being that they are ἀκούσια. Accordingly Rasso proposes to read here ὦν οὐθέν οὐθ' ἐκούσιον οὐτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν instead of the ὦν οὐθέν οὐθ' ἐκούσιον οὐτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν of the MSS. Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* p. 211) had proposed simply to read ὦν οὐθέν ἐκούσιόν ἐστιν, ὡς τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. Οὐτ' ἀκούσιον is, I think, plainly an interpolation; and the passage iii. 5. 7. 1113 b. 19 sqq., quoted by Rasso, is certainly in favour of his conjecture οὐτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐθ' ἐκούσιον, for the collocation occurs twice in it. But looking simply at the palaeographical conditions of the present passage itself, should we not be safer in accepting Spengel's suggestion? ¹

b. 3. § 4. καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός] The force of καί (omitted however by H^a, M^b, Q, CCC) is explained by Mich. Eph.—καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβ. καὶ τὸ καθ' αὐτό. CCC and P^b read καί after ὁμοίως.

For the distinction drawn here see Plato, *Legg.* ix. 862 B σχεδὸν γάρ, ὃ φίλοι, οὐτ' εἴ τις τῶν δίδωσι τι τῶν ὄντων οὐτ' εἰ τοῦναντίον ἀφαίρειται, δίκαιον ἀπλῶς ἢ ἀδικον χρητὸν τοιοῦτον οὕτω λέγειν, ἀλλ' εἴαν ἦβει καὶ δικαίῳ τρόπῳ χρώμενός τις ἀφελῆ τινά τι καὶ βλάβη, τοῦτό ἐστι τῶ νομοθέτη θεατέον, καὶ πρὸς δύο ταῦτα δὴ βλέπτεον, πρὸς τε ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην.

b. 8. § 5.] Cf. *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 b. 30 ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄν ἢ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν, εἴαν τις πράττη ἢ ἀπρακτῆ δι' αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ δι'

¹ If it be thought still safer to retain the reading of the MSS., we must remember that the clause πολλά γάρ καὶ κ.τ.λ. is introduced to explain a list of ἀκούσια, and therefore can only mean that these φύσει ὑπάρχοντα are not voluntary. Jackson's parenthesis a. 19 ἀδίκημα—a. 33 ἀκούσιον, separating this clause from what immediately precedes, cannot, I think, be right.

ἀγροίαν, ἐκὼν πράττει ἢ ἀπρακτεῖ, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων πράττομεν οὐ βουλευσάμενοι οὐδὲ προνοήσαντες, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν προαιρετὸν ἅπαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον μὴ προαιρετὸν, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν πάντα ἐκούσια εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἀκούσια μὴ πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν. Cf. *E. N.* iii. 2. 16 ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται (τὸ προαιρετὸν), τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετὸν· ἀλλ' ἀρά γε τὸ προβουλευμένον;

§§ 6-9.] There are three forms of βλάβη—viz. ἀτύχημα, ἀμάρτημα, b. 11. and ἀδίκημα. When the hurt is inflicted μετ' ἀγνοίας and the agent is not the cause of the ἀγνοία—the circumstances being such that he could not be expected to foresee what is going to happen—the hurt is an ἀτύχημα, an *accident*, or misadventure. It belongs to the class of τὰ δι' ἀγροίαν (*E. N.* iii. i. 13). When the hurt is inflicted μετ' ἀγνοίας, but the agent is the cause of the ἀγνοία (*i. e.* acts ἀγνοῶν—*E. E.* ii. 9, *E. N.* iii. i. 14—as a drunken man does—but not with the ἀγνοία of the μοχθηρός—*E. N.* iii. i. 14—for the words ἄνευ δὲ κακίας exclude that kind of ignorance), and might be expected, but for this voluntary ἀγνοία, to foresee what is going to happen, the hurt is a ἀμάρτημα—*culpable*. When a man inflicts hurt εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, under the sudden influence of one of the natural elementary passions of human nature—especially θυμός—the hurt is an ἀδίκημα—an *injury*. But we cannot infer from an injury inflicted under such circumstances that the agent is a bad or unjust man. If, however, the injury is inflicted deliberately, with premeditation, then we may infer that the agent is a bad or unjust man.

There are thus really *four* kinds of βλάβη which a court of justice has to distinguish. A hurts B. It is for the court to find out whether the hurt is an ἀτύχημα, or a ἀμάρτημα, or an ἀδίκημα ἄνευ προνοίας, or an ἀδίκημα ἐκ προνοίας.

§ 6. βλαβῶν] βλάβη is hurt or damage as such generically; while wilful hurt, *i. e.* injury, is ἀδίκημα: see *Liddell and Scott* s. v. βλάβη.

μετ' ἀγνοίας] not, as Rams. seems to think, equivalent to δι' b. 12. ἀγροίαν. The writer uses μετ' ἀγνοίας as a neutral phrase to cover τὰ δι' ἀγροίαν, *i. e.* ἀτυχήματα, and ἂ ἀγνοῶν πράττει, *i. e.* ἀμαρτήματα strictly so called.

ἀμαρτήματα] 'here includes ἀτυχήματα as well as ἀμαρτήματα in the narrower sense in which the word is used in § 7.' Jackson.

ἢ οὐχ ᾧ] ὡς vulg. Rasso (*Forsch.* p. 61) restores ᾧ, the reading b. 16. of K^b (and CCC), as being consistent with τοῦτοφ, line 14 above.

1185 b. 16. § 7. ὅταν . . . ἀμαρτήματα] The editors compare *Rhet.* i. 13. 1374 b. 6 ἔστιν ἀτύχηματα μὲν ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἀμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τε ἐστίν· τὰ γὰρ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας. Ramsauer very appositely quotes *Phys.* B. 197 a. 18 καὶ τὸ φάναι εἶναι τι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ὀρθῶς. ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἢ τῶν αἰεὶ ὄντων, ἢ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἢ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις. παρὰ ταῦτα. The Paraph. Heliod. illustrates the difference between ἀτύχημα (τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν) and ἀμαρτήματα (τὸ ἀγνοοῦντα πράττειν) as follows—Καὶ ἀμαρτήματα μὲν ἐστίν, ὅταν τις βλάβη τινὰ ἀκουσίως μὲν, παρασχῶν δὲ τινα τῆς βλάβης αἰτίαν· οἷον, εἴ τις ἐν ὄψι τοξεύων, ἐν ἢ ἐνεδέχεται ἄνθρωπον παριέναι, ἐφόνευσέ τινα· οὗτος γὰρ ἄκων μὲν ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, παρέσχε δὲ αἰτίαν τοῦ φόνου τὸ ἐν τοιοῦτ' ὄψι τοξεύειν. Ἀτύχημα δὲ ἐστίν, ὅταν παρὰ πᾶσαν προσδοκίαν ἢ βλάβη συμβῇ. οἷον, εἴ τις τοξεύων ἐπ' ἐρημίας, οὕτω συμβάν, παριόντα τινὰ ἀπέκτεινεν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ παράλογός τις ἢ βλάβη συνέβη καὶ παράδοξος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐς αὐτὸ συνετέλεσεν ὁ βλάψας, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν ἢ αἰτία πᾶσα τοῦ φόνου.

b. 17. ἄνευ δὲ κακίας] added (as μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας is added in the passage quoted from the *Rhet.*) to exclude the chronic ἄγνοια of the μοχθηρός, as distinguished from the temporary ἄγνοια of the μεθύων. What is called in *E. N.* iii. 1. 14 the ἄγνοια of ὀργή is also excluded: for the θυμῷ ποιῶν is said in § 8 of the present chapter to act εἰδῶς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ. In *E. N.* iii. 1. 14 he is coupled with the μεθύων as ἀγνοῶν—see Jackson's note on v. 8. 6, in which he calls attention to this difference between the 'Aristotelian' view and the 'Eudemian.' It is to be noted, however, that in § 12 of the present chapter the writer speaks of those who act διὰ πάθος (μήτε φυσικὸν μὴ ἄνθρώπων, it is true) as ἀγνοοῦντες.

We are to understand the ἀμαρτήματα, then, of this section as βλάβαι inflicted by a drunken or careless (but not necessarily vicious) person. Such a person would be *culpa reus*, in the language of Roman law. βλάβαι inflicted under the influence of anger belong to the class of ἀδικήματα—injuriae dolo commissae—not to that of ἀμαρτήματα. Ἀτύχημα is the *casus* of Roman Law: cf. Gaius iii. § 211 (p. 227, ed. Gneist)—'Is injuria autem occidere intelligitur cujus dolo (resulting in ἀδικήματα) aut culpa (resulting in ἀμαρτήματα) id acciderit, nec ulla alia lege damnum (i. e. βλάβη) quod sine injuria datur reprehenditur: itaque impunitus est qui sine culpa et dolo malo, casu (resulting in ἀτύχημα) quodam damnum committit.'

Cf. Menander apud Stob. *Ecl. Phys.* ii. 8 (Meineke, vol. iv. p. 198) 1185 b. 17. ἀτύχημα κἀδικήματα διαφορὰν ἔχει | τὸ μὲν διὰ τύχην γίγνεται, τὸ δ' αἰρέσει. The following passage from Justinian iv. 3. §§ 3–8 (p. 227, ed. Gneist) may be compared to illustrate the nature of *culpa* (resulting in ἀμαρτήματα), and its difference from *casus* (resulting in ἀτύχημα)—'Ac ne is quidem hac lege tenetur qui casu occidit, si modo culpa ejus nulla inveniatur Itaque si quis, dum jaculis ludit vel exercitatur, transeuntem servum tuum trajecerit, distinguitur. Nam si id a milite quidem in campo, eoque ubi solitum est exercitari, admissum est, nulla culpa ejus intelligitur; si alius tale quid admiserit, culpa reus est. Idem juris est et de milite, si is in alio loco quam qui exercitandis militibus destinatus est id admisit. Item si putator ex arbore dejecto ramo servum tuum transeuntem occiderit, si prope viam publicam aut vicinalem id factum est, neque proclamavit, ut casus evitari possit, culpa reus est; si proclamavit, neque ille curavit cavere, extra culpam est putator. Aequae extra culpam esse intelligitur, si seorsum a via forte vel in medio fundo caedebat, licet non proclamavit, quia eo loco nulli extraneo jus fuerat versandi. Praeterea si medicus qui servum tuum secuit dereliquerit curationem, atque ob id mortuus fuerit servus, culpa reus est. Imperitia quoque culpa annumeratur, veluti si medicus ideo servum tuum occiderit, quod eum male secuerit aut perperam ei medicamentum dederit. Impetu quoque mularum quas mulio propter imperitiam retinere non potuerit, si servus tuus oppressus fuerit, culpa reus est mulio. Sed et si propter infirmitatem retinere eas non potuerit, cum alius firmior retinere potuisset, aequae culpa tenetur. Eadem placuerunt de eo quoque qui cum equo veheretur impetum ejus aut propter infirmitatem aut propter imperitiam suam retinere non potuerit.'

ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τῆς αἰτίας] 'It is plain,' says b. 18. Jackson, 'that this sentence ought to restate the distinction already drawn between ἀτύχημα and ἀμαρτήματα: but it is difficult to see how ὅταν ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τῆς αἰτίας—so the MSS., except H^a M^b [and B²] (which have κακίας), and all the editors—can be equivalent to μὴ παραλόγως, and ὅταν ἔξωθεν to παραλόγως. Moreover, ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς αἰτίας is a strange phrase. Hence I have supposed αἰτίας to be a corruption of ἀγνοίας, and I find the strongest possible confirmation of my conjecture both in the *E. N.* and in the *M. M.* Cf. *E. N.* iii. 5. § 8: also § 7: and *M. M.* i. 33. 1195 a. 27 . . . b. 4.' Susemihl

1185 b. 18. adopts Jackson's *ἀγνοίας*. It is true that ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς αἰτίας (= *principium causae*) is a strange phrase; and I should feel tempted to mend it, either by substituting another word for αἰτίας¹, or by retaining αἰτίας in another sense, as equivalent to *criminis* instead of *causae*, were it not for the fact that I find Hippocrates (περὶ ἀρχαῖς ἰητρικῆς 1. ed. Littré vol. i. p. 570) using the same expression ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς αἰτίας = *principium causae*—ὁμοίως ἐπεχείρησαν περὶ ἰητρικῆς λέγειν ἢ γράφειν, ὑπόθεσιν σφίσιν αὐτέοισιν ὑποθέμενοι τῷ λόγῳ, θερμόν, ἢ ψυχρόν, ἢ ὑγρόν, ἢ ξηρόν, ἢ ἄλλ' ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλωσιν, ἐς βραχὺ ἄγοντες, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αἰτίας τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισι τῶν νόσων τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου, καὶ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτέην, ἐν ἣ δύο προβέμενοι, ἐν πολλοῖσι μὲν καὶ οἷσι λέγουσι καταφανέες εἰσὶν ἀμαρτάνοντες. The fact that the phrase does elsewhere occur (though not in the Aristotelian writings), to my mind turns the balance in favour of retaining it here.

b. 20. § 8. εἰδώς] 'Thus ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν is accounted εἰδώς. In *N. E.* iii. 1. § 14 he is classed with the μεθύων as an ἀγνοῶν: ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἀγνοίαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα ποιεῖν ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἀγνοίαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τε τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδώς δέ, ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν.' Jackson, *ad loc.*

b. 21. ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] Jackson points out that this second ὅσα is the subject of συμβαίνει. He accordingly removes Bekker's commas after πάθη and φυσικὰ. Mich. Eph. distinguishes between φυσικὰ and ἀναγκαῖα πάθη—εἰσὶ δὲ πάθη φυσικὰ, ἔρωτες, λύπαι, φόβοι· ἀναγκαῖα δὲ πείνα δίψα: but I think it is doubtful whether any distinction is intended. The writer probably wishes merely to point out that certain normal appetites (called indifferently φυσικὰ or ἀναγκαῖα) common to all men, breaking out suddenly to seek satisfaction, may occasion injurious acts which must be treated differently in the criminal court from injurious acts deliberately planned for the satisfaction of these (natural) or other (factitious) appetites. It is true, however, that in vii. 4. 2 the ἀναγκαῖα with which the ἀκρατῆς ἀπλῶς is concerned are identified with τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρεῖαν, and that another sphere is

¹ E. g. αἰκίας: this term (see v. 2. 13), well known to Athenian law, occurs in Plato, *Legg.* ix, to which the present chapter is so deeply indebted; and in *Pol.* ii. 4. 1262 a. 26 αἰκία committed by persons who are ἀγνοοῦντες are distinctly contemplated. H^a, M^b, and B^c, with κακίας, might be supposed to exhibit a divergent form, which, when compared with the αἰτίας of other MSS., would point to an original αἰκίας.

assigned to the ἀκρατῆς θυμοῦ. Accordingly, if it is necessary to suppose that the writer means to distinguish ἀναγκαῖα and φυσικὰ here, it would be true to say that (as Jackson explains *ad loc.* p. 112) φυσικὰ πάθη are ὅσα κοινὰ πᾶσι καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοινὰ (*E. N.* vii. 6. 2), and ἀναγκαῖα πάθη a species of the φυσικὰ, including ἐπιθυμίας αἰ περὶ τὴν τροφήν κ.τ.λ.

οὐ μέντοι πῶ ἀδικοὶ διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί: οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἢ βλάβη¹ ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀδικῶς καὶ μοχθηρῶς] *i. e.* the merely instinctive operation of these natural passions, resulting in injurious acts, does not argue a bad character. It is when these passions are made 'objects of reflection,' and when the means of gratifying them to the injury of other people are deliberately sought out, that we can infer a bad character. It is obvious that among these natural passions there are some which call in the aid of reflection more readily than others: *cf.* vii. 6. 3, where ἐπιθυμία generally, as distinguished from θυμός, is described as ἐπίβουλος. Hence the prominence given in the present passage to τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ as examples of τὰ μὴ ἐκ προνοίας.

For the distinction between injurious acts produced by the unpremeditated operation of ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ πάθη, and injury inflicted deliberately—especially in the form of *συκοφαντία*—in order to gratify spite or greed, see *Probl.* KΘ. 13. 951 b. 27 (quoted by Zell and Ramsauer)—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δι' ὀργὴν καὶ διὰ φόβον καὶ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ δι' ἄλλα πολλὰ γίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐκ προνοίας: τὸ δὲ ἀδικῶς ἐγκαλεῖν ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἐκ προνοίας ἐστίν.

§ 9. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται] τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ, b. 25. acts done in the heat of sudden anger. In the *Laws* (ix. 866 D—867 B—a passage referred to by Bywater, *Journal of Philology*, 1874, v. 115, and, after him, by Jackson, for the explanation of ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγροεῖ at the end of § 10 below), Plato distinguishes between two classes of οἱ θυμῷ ποιῶντες, *viz.* οἱ ἐξαίφνης καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτως πράττοντες, and οἱ μετ' ἐπιβουλῆς ὕστερον χρόνῳ τιμωρούμενοι. His words are—'Ἐὰν δ' ἄρα τις αὐτόχειρ μὲν κτείη ἐλεύθερον, θυμῷ δὲ ἢ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἐκπραχθέν, διχῆ δὲ πρῶτον τὸ τοιοῦτον διαλαβεῖν. θυμῷ γὰρ διή πέπρακται καὶ τοῖς ὅσοι ἂν ἐξαίφνης μὲν καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτως τοῦ ἀποκτεῖναι πληγαῖς ἢ τινι τοιοῦτῳ διαφθειρώσῃ τινα παραχρῆμα τῆς ὀργῆς γενομένης, μεταμελειά τε εἰδὺς τοῦ πεπραγμένου γίγνηται, θυμῷ δὲ καὶ ὅσοι προπηλακισθέντες λόγῳ ἢ καὶ ἀτίμοις ἔργοις, μεταδιώκοντες

¹ Jackson inserts ch. 6. §§ 1 and 2 here: see his Introduction, pp. xvii–xix.

1135 b. 25. τὴν τιμωρίαν, ὕστερον ἀποκτείνουσί τινα βουληθέντες κτείνειν, καὶ τὸ πεπραγμένον αὐτοῖς ἀμεταμέλητον γίνηται. διττοὺς μὲν δὴ τοὺς φόνους, ὡς ἔοικε, θετέον, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀμφοτέρους θυμῷ γεγονότας, μεταξύ δὲ που τοῦ τε ἔκουσιον καὶ ἀκουσίον δικαιοτάτ' ἂν λεγομένους. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰκὼν ἐστ' ἑκάτερος· ὁ μὲν τὸν θυμὸν φυλάττων καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἐξαίφνης ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς ὕστερον χρόνῳ τιμωρούμενος ἔκουσίῳ ἔοικεν, ὁ δὲ ἀταμιεύτως ταῖς ὀργαῖς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα εὐθὺς χρώμενος ἀπροβουλεύτως ὁμοίως μὲν ἀκουσίῳ, ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' οὗτος αὐτὸ παντάπασι ἀκούσιος ἀλλ' εἰκὼν ἀκουσίῳ. διὸ χαλεποὶ διορίζειν οἱ τῷ θυμῷ πραχθέντες φόνου, πότερον ἔκουσιος αὐτοῦς ἢ τινος ὡς ἀκουσίους νομοθετητέον. βέλτιστον μὴν καὶ ἀληθέστατον εἰς εἰκόνα μὲν ἀμφω θείναι, τεμνὴν δὲ αὐτὰ χωρὶς τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ ἀπροβουλίᾳ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετ' ἐπιβουλῆς τε καὶ ὀργῆς κτείνασι τὰς τιμωρίας χαλεπωτέρας, τοῖς δὲ ἀπροβουλεύτως τε καὶ ἐξαίφνης πραοτέρας νομοθετεῖν. According to Jackson the ἐπιβουλεύσας (§ 10, 1135 b. 33)—'the man who deliberately attacks his neighbour [whether by way of revenge, or otherwise]' cannot plead ἄγνοια—mistake about injury received—because he 'has had time to consider the matter.' Surely it is often the case that 'time to consider the matter' does not contribute to the discovery of the original mistake, especially if a man 'broods over his supposed wrong before he retaliates.' The retaliatory act of such a man is, of course, ἐκ προνοίας, and must be more severely judged than the sudden act of the θυμῷ ποιῶν: still such an ἐπιβουλεύσας may plead ἄγνοια: he may say, with truth, that he planned revenge because he thought that he had been injured—the question before the court is still περὶ τοῦ δικαίου, not περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι. For this reason I am inclined to think that the ἐπιβουλεύσας of § 10, 1135 b. 33 is not 'the man who takes time to retaliate,' but rather the συκοφαντῶν or ἀδικῶς ἐγκαλῶν of *Probl.* κθ. 13, 952 a. 1 sqq.

[§§ 9, 10.] In trying a case of assault, the court, having first satisfied itself that the assault, alleged by the ὀργίσας as διώκων, and admitted by the θυμῷ ποιῶν as φεύγων, was committed in the heat of sudden anger, and therefore without premeditation, allows the θυμῷ ποιῶν to plead in justification of his offence so committed, and in mitigation of its penalty, that the ὀργίσας provoked it by what either really was unjust treatment, or might naturally in the circumstances be mistaken for unjust treatment. The question before the court is—Was there provocation, or apparent provocation, sufficient to justify the assault in any degree?—περὶ τοῦ δικαίου

ἀμφισβητεῖται. The finding may be that the διώκων is μοχθηρός, but 1135 b. 25. cannot be that the φεύγων is μοχθηρός. It is only in cases where the fact of the offence alleged by the διώκων is denied by the φεύγων (ὅταν περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητῶσι), that one or other of the two parties (it is uncertain which) must be μοχθηρός, and guilty of deliberately wronging the other—either the διώκων in bringing an accusation which he knows to be false, or the φεύγων in having committed an offence which he does not attempt to justify, but denies; see *Rhet.* iii. 17. 1417 b. 27 (quoted by Jackson)—μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβητήσει (i. e. τῇ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι) μόνῃ τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι ποιηρόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστὼ ἄγνοια αἰτία, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητοῖεν: cf. *Pol.* Δ. 13. 1300 b. 25 (quoted by Grant, Jackson and Ramsauer) περὶ τε τῶν ἐκ προνοίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκουσίων, καὶ ὅσα ὁμολογεῖται μὲν, ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου.

I said above that I do not agree with Bywater and Jackson in identifying the ἐπιβουλεύσας of § 10 either entirely or partly with the man 'who takes time to retaliate'—ὁ τὸν θυμὸν φυλάττων καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἐξαίφνης, ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς ὕστερον χρόνῳ τιμωρούμενος of *Legg.* ix. 867 A. 'The man who takes time to retaliate'—ὁ μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς τιμωρούμενος—does not lose sight of the φαινόμενη ἀδικία, because he 'takes time'; and his act of retaliation is, as often as not, done openly, and its reason avowed afterwards. The issue before the court would then be περὶ τοῦ δικαίου and not περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι. But the ἐπιβουλεύσας of § 10, I take it, as contrasted with the θυμῷ ποιῶν (ὁ οὐόμενος ἀδικεῖσθαι) is a person whose conduct does not raise the issue περὶ τοῦ δικαίου. He cannot therefore be identified with the μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς τιμωρούμενος who avows his premeditated act, and pleads justification—with success, as we sometimes see in the French and Italian law-courts. Nor can it be right to identify him (as the Paraph. does) with the ὀργίσας, who may be entirely innocent of the ἀδικία attributed to him by the θυμῷ ποιῶν. It only remains that we identify him with the man who deliberately injures his neighbour not by way of revenge for real or imagined wrong. A good example of such an ἐπιβουλεύσας is ὁ ἀδικῶς ἐγκαλῶν, or ὁ συκοφαντῶν of *Probl.* κθ. 13. 951 b. 29, and 952 a. 1, who, as διώκων, accuses the φεύγων of having done something, which the latter denies having done. In such an ἀμφισβήτησις περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι, if the jurors' votes are divided equally for the διώκων and for the φεύγων, the verdict is, of course, given in favour of the

1135 b. 25. latter—but the writer is at pains to explain why—because the *διώκων*, if he has really brought a false accusation against the *φεύγων*, must be held to have done so knowingly and *ἐκ προνοίας*, whereas the *φεύγων*, if he committed the offence charged, may have committed it *ἄνευ προνοίας*. The passage runs as follows—*τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δι' ὀργὴν καὶ διὰ φόβον καὶ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ δι' ἄλλα πολλὰ γίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐκ προνοίας· τὸ δὲ ἀδικῶς ἐγκαλεῖν ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἐκ προνοίας ἐστίν. ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἴσαι αἱ ψῆφοι γεγόνασι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικῶς τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα ἐγκαλεῖν καὶ τὸν φεύγοντα ἀδικεῖν, φαύλου κριθέντος τοῦ ἀδικῶς ἐγκαλοῦντος τὸ νικᾶν τῷ φεύγοντι ὁ νομοθέτης ἀπένειμεν. . . 952 a. Ἴτι μείζω μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ ἐκ προνοίας ἀδικῶν ἢ ὁ μὴ ἐκ προνοίας. ὁ μὲν δὴ συκοφαντῶν αἰὲ ἐκ προνοίας ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἑτερόν τι ἀδικῶν τὰ μὲν δι' ἀνάγκην τὰ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὰ δὲ ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἀδικεῖν αὐτῷ συμπίπτει. ὅταν δὲ ἴσαι ἀδικεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀδικεῖν μὲν οὐ μέντοι γε ἐκ προνοίας, ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἀδικεῖν μείζω κέκριται ὁ διώκων τοῦ φεύγοντος, εἰκότως ὁ νομοθέτης νικᾶν ἔκρινε τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω ἀδικοῦντα.*

The *ἐπιβουλεύσας*, then, being the man who deliberately injures his neighbour (by bringing a false accusation against him, or otherwise) without having received provocation, the *ὁ μὲν* b. 33 will be the *θυμῷ ποιῶν*—the man who retaliates in the heat of anger—and the *ὁ δὲ* will be the *ἐπιβουλεύσας* as just described. I think that the whole passage from *διὸ* b. 25 to *ὁ δ' οὖν* 1136 a. 1 is of the nature of a parenthesis; and that the words *ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ* a. 1 resume the main thread of the discussion by repeating, in a slightly altered form, what had been said before the parenthesis, viz. *ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀδικῶς καὶ μοχθηρὸς* b. 25. The sense of the whole parenthesis from *διὸ* to *ὁ δ' οὖν* may be brought out thus—An act done in the heat of anger is not treated at law as an act premeditated by the agent: for (1) it arises from provocation received from another; and (2) the agent as *φεύγων* admits the act, and pleads in justification the provocation which he has received. He stands on an entirely different footing from that one of the two parties in an *ἀμφισβήτησις περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι* who is proved guilty—for one or other of them *must* be guilty of premeditated wrong—either the *φεύγων* of committing an act which he knows cannot be justified, and therefore denies, or the *διώκων* of bringing an accusation which he knows to be false. The party found guilty in such a case differs from the *θυμῷ ποιῶν* in not being unaware of having plotted an injury (*ὁ δὲ ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ*), and in not thinking that he has received an injury which justifies his act

(ὁ μὲν [i. e. ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν] οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' [i. e. ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας] οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ). 1135 b. 25.

Mich. Eph., Coraes, Michelet, Nötel, and Peters, refer *ὁ μὲν* and *ὁ δὲ* to the *ὀργίσας* and the *θυμῷ ποιῶν* (they differ, however, as to which is which), thus treating the words *ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ* as parenthetical (Nötel rejects them from the text—*Quaestio-num Aristotelearum specimen*, p. 43). The objection to this interpretation is that the *ὀργίσας* may or may not be conscious of having done something to merit the retaliation of the *θυμῷ ποιῶν*, and accordingly the statement *ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι* would not always be true of him. But it is always true of the *θυμῷ ποιῶν*, whose sudden *ὀργή* is *ἐπὶ φαινομένη ἀδικία*. Nor could the words *ὁ δ' οὖν* (sc. *οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι*¹) always apply to the *ὀργίσας*. If he is conscious of having done nothing to merit the attack of the *θυμῷ ποιῶν*, he will think that he has been unjustly treated. It seems plain, then, that the words *ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι* refer to the *θυμῷ ποιῶν*, and the words *ὁ δ' οὖν* to the *ἐπιβουλεύσας*, who, as I have tried to show, is neither the man 'who takes time to retaliate' (Jackson), nor the *ὀργίσας*, but that one of the two parties in an *ἀμφισβήτησις περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι* who is proved to be *μοχθηρὸς*. The words *ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ* are thus not to be treated as parenthetical.

ἐπὶ φαινομένη κ.τ.λ.] Fritzsche compares *E. N.* vii. 6. 1.

b. 28.

ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι] The Paraph. Heliod. has—*οὐ γὰρ, ὥσπερ* b. 29. *ἐν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις συναλλάγμασιν ἔχει, οὕτω κἀνταῦθα ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις γίνεται· ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἡ πράξις ἀμφισβητεῖται· οἷον, εἰ ἔλαβε τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἢ τὸ δάνειον, καὶ λαβὼν οὐκ ἀπέδωκε, κἀν τοῦτο δευχθῆ, πονηρὸς εἶθός καὶ ἀδικός ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἐπιλαθόμενος ἀρνεῖται—i. e.* the reference is to *ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα*—*e. g.* B sues A for an alleged debt; and A swears that he has already paid it: one of the two must be *μοχθηρὸς*, unless the one in error has simply forgotten the circumstance in dispute—B the circumstance of his having been paid, or A the circumstance of his not having paid.

ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθησιν αὐτὸ δρῶσιν] 'I think,' says Jackson *ad loc.*, b. 31. 'that the subject of *δρῶσιν* is *ὁ τε ὀργίσας καὶ ὁ ὀργισθείς*, who do not raise the issue of fact unless they do it through forgetfulness, *i. e.*

¹ This seems to be the only legitimate way of completing the clause. Nötel (p. 43) supplies *οἴεται ἐκεῖνον ἀδικεῖσθαι*, in the interest of his interpretation of the passage.

1135 b. 31. the forgetfulness which results from anger. These words are commonly understood to refer to the two parties concerned in a *συναλλάγμα*, "ubi fieri non potest quin eorum alter qui ita controversantur pravus sit, nisi forte oblivio intercessit" (Victorius on *Rhet.* iii. 17): but (1) why is *αὐτὸ δρῶσω* in the plural? and (2) what precise idea do these words convey? According to my interpretation, they stand for *περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητῶσιν*. I confess that I do not see any difficulty in reconciling the plural with the common interpretation. The words *ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν* are added to qualify the immediately preceding statement, *ὡν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν*, the subject of *δρῶσω* being *οἱ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦντες*, and *αὐτὸ* being *τὸ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητεῖν*. It is practically, if not exclusively, among *ἀμφισβητήσεις* arising out of *έκούσια συναλλάγματα* that these exceptional cases of *τὸ διὰ λήθην δρᾶν* will occur. It is just possible, however, that in an action arising out of an *έκούσιον συναλλάγμα*, such as assault, the *θυμῶ ποιῶν* might *διὰ λήθην* maintain erroneously that he had not committed the assault.

- 1136 a. 1. § 11. *καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' κ.τ.λ.*] These words, as Ramsauer and Jackson point out, are closely connected with the immediately preceding *ἀδικεῖ*, after which, accordingly, a comma, not a full stop (Bekker), should be placed.
- a. 2. *ὅταν παρὰ . . . ἴσον*] when his act is inconsistent with the *γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία* of Distributive Justice, or the *ἀριθμητικὴ ἰσότης* of Corrective Justice.
- a. 3. *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ*] This answers to *ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ* above.
- a. 4. *δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ*] as distinguished from *προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ*.
- a. 5. § 12.] This section states the principle according to which *συγγνώμη* is to be extended to actions or withheld from them, and, as Ramsauer points out, naturally follows sections in which the writer has laid down principles in accordance with which degrees of guilt may be discriminated in a court of justice: '*συγγνώμη enim necessario ad τὸν κρίνοντα pertinet.*' Jackson has an important note here—'These words [*τῶν δ' έκούσιων*] answer to *τῶν δὲ έκούσιων* in § 5: but it must be observed that the *έκούσια* of the present section include actions which do not appear at all in the foregoing classification. The *ὅσα μὴ μόνον άγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' άγνοίαν άμαρτάνουσιν*

are the *άτυχήματα* of § 7: the *ὅσα μὴ δι' άγνοίαν, ἀλλ' άγνοοῦντες μὲν* 1136 a. 5. *διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' άνθρωπικόν* are neither the *άμαρτήματα* nor the *άδικήματα* of §§ 7, 8, but acts characteristic of the inhuman *πάθη* . . . compare vii. 5. The acts in question are *έκούσια* because the perpetrators of them are not responsible agents, but they are not *συγγνωμονικά*, because they are even more detestable than ordinary vicious acts.' Cf. Grant *ad loc.*—'The police-courts afford frequent instances of the infliction of brutal injuries which are "not forgivable," though the perpetrators seem hardly responsible beings.' Mich. Eph. accordingly is wrong when he says—*έκούσια νῦν εἴκοι λέγειν πάντα τὰ παρὰ προαίρεσιν γινόμενα: τὰ γὰρ κατὰ πάθος γινόμενα πρὸ ὀλίγου έκούσια μὲν εἶπεν άπροαίρετα δέ. νῦν δὲ τοῖς άκουσίοις ὑπάγει καὶ ταῦτα: καὶ θαναστὸν οὐδέν εἰ έκούσια λέγων ταῦτα πάλιν έκούσια φησιν: έκούσια μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι καθ' ὅσον οὐ δι' άγνοίαν γίνεται, έκούσια δὲ αὐ πάλιν καθ' ὅσον οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν: wrong also, when he illustrates *τὰ διὰ πάθος μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' άνθρώπινον* by *τὸ τοιαῦδε τροφῆς ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ τοιωδέ τινος πόματος, οἷον σαρκὸς πέρδικος καὶ οἴνου γλυκέος*, adding that *ὁ διὰ ταῦτα άμαρτήσας οὐκ ἐστὶ συγγνώμης άξιος*. If the *μήτε φυσικά μήτ' άνθρώπινα πάθη* of the present section are thus, as Mich. Eph. explains, merely the *ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπιθετοὶ ἐπιθυμίαι* of iii. 11. 1, and not *τὰ θηριώδη πάθη* of vii. 5, it would not perhaps be inconsistent with the terminology of Book iii to say that the man who acts under their influence does so *άγνοῶν*, and it is not inconceivable that even the writer of the present section might—carelessly perhaps—say so; but it would be in direct opposition to the doctrine common to the Fifth and Third Books to speak of the *ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπιθετοὶ ἐπιθυμίαι* as producing acts which are *έκούσια*. Since the acts are said to be *έκούσια*, we can only understand that the *μήτε φυσικά μήτ' άνθρώπινα πάθη* which cause them are *θηριώδη πάθη*.*

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

It may make our conception clearer of the relation between 'treating unjustly' and 'being treated unjustly,' if we try to answer, or at least to state, distinctly some difficult questions connected with the subject—

Can a man consent to be treated unjustly?

Or is it always against his will that a man is treated unjustly?

Or is it sometimes with his consent, and sometimes against his will, that a man is treated unjustly?

'Treating unjustly' is always a voluntary act: from which it might be inferred that 'being treated unjustly' is always against the sufferer's will. But on the other hand, although 'treating justly' is always a voluntary act, we find that just treatment is not always voluntarily accepted—for the criminal who is punished is treated justly against his will. What is true, then, of 'being treated justly' may be true also of 'being treated unjustly'—it may be true that sometimes a man receives unjust treatment voluntarily, and sometimes against his will. But when we are told that a man sometimes receives unjust treatment voluntarily, we must refer to a former distinction, and ask—Is the unjust treatment inflicted by an unjust agent, i. e. by one who deliberately intends to inflict unjust treatment? For if not, then it is only nominally and not really that the sufferer is 'treated unjustly,' and it may be true that he voluntarily accepts what is thus nominally unjust treatment, although he could not voluntarily accept what is really unjust treatment, viz. treatment intended to injure him—i. e. could not accept it as intended. Take the case of the incontinent man: with full knowledge of all the circumstances he voluntarily hurts himself, or allows another to hurt him: therefore, it may be argued, a man can voluntarily treat himself unjustly, or injure himself, and voluntarily accept injury from another. But does such a man wish to be treated unjustly, i. e. does he make his own loss or ruin his end? Surely not. He still wishes for his own good, i. e. makes his good his end. What he voluntarily inflicts upon himself, or allows another to inflict, is hurt, not injury. Our answer, then, to the question, Can a man consent to be unjustly treated or injured? is 'No,' for he cannot wish to be injured, i. e. he cannot make his own loss or ruin his end. In short, whenever a man is injured, there must be another person to injure him by acting against his wish, i. e. by ignoring his personality. Accordingly, when a man 'gives away gold for brass,' or, as the equitable man often does, assigns to himself in a distribution less than his legitimate share, he is not really injuring himself. He does not make his own loss or ruin his end; nay, he may have his own good in the form of popularity or honour distinctly in view.

In distribution the charge of injustice attaches to the distributor, not to the party to whom he has awarded too much: and it is never himself but always other people that the distributor injures. If he distribute unfairly, under compulsion or in unavoidable ignorance of essential circumstances, the distribution is of course in itself an unfair one, but the distributor is not held to be an unfair man. If, however, he distribute or decide unfairly with full knowledge of what he is doing, he has generally a personal interest in the form which his award takes—appropriating to himself, if not a bribe, its equivalent in the gratitude of the favoured party, or in the satisfaction of his spite against the unfairly treated party.

Neglect of the distinction on which we have insisted between the nominally and the really just or unjust act, has given rise to the opinion that it is an easy matter to perform just acts, and that the just man has the faculty of performing both just and unjust acts. But, to be really just, acts must be performed by a just man, and a just man is the result of long and difficult training, as a good

doctor is the result of long study and experience. Moreover, the formed character of the just man is not a faculty capable of producing contraries, but manifests itself only in just acts.

Justice exists only for a being whose participation in the enjoyment of good things may be greater and less than his desert, i. e. it exists for the normal man, not for the gods whose desert is infinitely great—not for the incurably wicked who are harmed by the smallest share of such good things.

§ 1. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισταί] See *Argument* of this 1136 a. 10. chapter *sub init.* for the connexion with the subject of last chapter. In that chapter certain principles by which δίκασται must be guided in estimating the guilt of various offences were laid down. The present chapter pursues the same subject, discussing questions evidently important for δίκασται—viz. How far can a man consent to receive injury? If he consent, is he really injured, and does the offender really injure him, or only do him harm? Or, must we look more to the intention of the offender than to the consent (whatever that may mean) of the sufferer, in estimating the guilt of the offender? Ramsauer indicates the connexion between this chapter and the last by the words—'Judicis vero quantum intersit, si verum sit volenti non fieri injuriam, nemo non videt.'

Εὐριπίδης εἶρηκε] Mich. Eph. has—παράθεται τὰ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἰαμβεῖα α. 11. ἐκ τοῦ Βελλεροφῶντος εἰς πίστευω τοῦ ἔστιν ἐκότα ἀδικεῖσθαι. Wagner (*Eurip. Fr.* p. 40), followed by Dindorf (*Eur. Fragm.* Ἀλκμαίων Α εἰ Β) supposes that we have two lines of a στιχομυθία from the Ἀλκμαίων δὲ διὰ Ψωφίδος (referred to in *E.N.* iii. 1. 8). The first line (in which he reads κατέκταν for the κατέκτα of the extant MSS.—the MS. from which the *vet. trans.* is derived seems to have had κατέκταν) he assigns to Alcmaeon (who has killed his mother), and the second line (after which he places a note of interrogation) he assigns to Phegeus. Fritzsche, adopting a conjecture of Grotius, inserts οὐ before θέλουσαν (codd.), comparing Eurip. *Hippol.* 319 φίλος μ' ἀπόλλυσ' οὐχ ἐκούσαν οὐχ ἐκών. Sussemihl also reads ἢ οὐ θέλουσαν: Jackson and Bywater read ἢ οὐχ ἐκούσαν.

§§ 1, 2. πότερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] The reasoning may be exhibited as a. 15. follows:—

ἀδικεῖν is always ἐκούσιον: Is ἀδικεῖσθαι then always ἀκούσιον? Or, is it sometimes ἐκούσιον, sometimes ἀκούσιον?

Perhaps the analogy of δικαιπραγεῖν and δικαιοῦσθαι may help us:—δικαιοπραγεῖν is always ἐκούσιον: But, do we find that δικαιοῦσθαι is always ἐκούσιον?

1136 a. 15. No: *δικαιούσθαι* is sometimes *εκούσιον*, sometimes *ἀκούσιον*:

So, the analogy of *δικαιοπραγείν* and *δικαιούσθαι* does not favour the inference that, because *ἀδικεῖν* is *always* *εκούσιον*, *ἀδικεῖσθαι* is *always* *ἀκούσιον*. It rather favours the inference that *ἀδικεῖσθαι* is sometimes *ἀκούσιον*, sometimes *εκούσιον*.

a. 16. § 1. καὶ ἄρα κ.τ.λ.] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 40) raises a difficulty here. If the question *πότερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* be answered to the effect that *ἀδικεῖσθαι* is *πάν ἀκούσιον*, the question *καὶ ἄρα πάν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως*; is excluded: if, on the other hand, it be answered that *ἀδικεῖσθαι* is not *πάν ἀκούσιον*, what is the use of going on to ask whether it is *τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον*? No one, surely, would suppose that it could be *πάν ἐκείνως*—*i. e.* *πάν ἐκούσιον*.

The confusion indicated by Rassow doubtless exists. But it need not surprise us. It is caused by the writer's formalism. He makes a point of stating all the formally possible alternatives. There seems to be no suspicion about the substantial soundness of the text, although the words *ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πάν ἐκούσιον* l. 17 are probably a dittograph of the identical words in the line above.

a. 17. ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον;] 'or is *ἀδικεῖσθαι* sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary?'

a. 19. § 2. ὡστ' εὐλόγον ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον, τὸ τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ δικαιούσθαι ἢ ἐκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι.] Bywater, following K^b [and CCC], omits *τὸ* before *δικαιούσθαι*. This seems to dispose of the difficulty which Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 96) finds in taking *τ'* as coupling the whole clause *τὸ τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι . . . ἀκούσιον εἶναι* with what goes immediately before, and to make it unnecessary to consider the conjecture—*καί* for *καθ'* before *ἑκάτερον*—with which he proposes to meet the difficulty.

a. 23. § 3. ἔπειτα κ.τ.λ.] I hardly think that Bywater's *ἔπειτα* (to correspond with *πρῶτον μὲν* a. 11), for the *ἐπεὶ* of the codd., is a necessary change. See *Argument* of this chapter (§§ 3-6) for the further step taken in the discussion here. The writer's feeling when he wrote *ἐπεὶ* may be expressed thus—'*ἀδικεῖσθαι* is really (*ὡς ἀληθῶς*) always *ἀκούσιον*: and cases adduced to prove that it is *not always* *ἀκούσιον* (just as *δικαιούσθαι* is *not always* *εκούσιον*) are deceptive: for (*ἐπεὶ* § 3), if we examine them, we shall find that they are only cases of *ἀδικοῦ πάσχειν*, not of *ἀδικεῖσθαι*. Now, *ἀδικοῦ πράττειν* carries with it only *ἀδικοῦ πάσχειν*, not *ἀδικεῖσθαι*. To injure B, A must hurt him

wishing to hurt him. If A hurt B without wishing to hurt him 1136 a. 23. then B is hurt (*βλάπτεται, ἄδικοῦ πάσχει*), but not injured (*οὐκ ἀδικεῖται*) by A. To apply this principle to the case of the *ἀκρατής* so commonly adduced to prove *ὅτι ἔστιν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι*, or *ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν*—the *ἀκρατής* either hurts himself *proprio motu* (§ 4), or allows another person to persuade him to hurt himself (§ 5). His act is admittedly voluntary. But what is its real object, as that object presents itself to him at the moment of action? His own pleasure, not his hurt. He does not wish to hurt himself, or be hurt by another person; he merely desires pleasure. When he is hurt by himself, his passive side cannot complain of injury (*τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι*), for his active side, not being able to wish what his passive side is unwilling to suffer, cannot wish to hurt the latter. Hence *οὐκ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν*. But where the *ἀκρατής* is not agent and patient in one, but patient yielding to the solicitations of another person, he may receive injury (*τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι*) from that other person in so far as he is seduced to do, because pleasant to his feeling, what his tempter, even while he tempts him, knows to be hurtful, perhaps ruinous to his person. He is injured (*ἀδικεῖται*), because his tempter injures him (*ἀδικεῖ*). But he cannot be his tempter's *accomplice* against himself. He is with his tempter as holding out a pleasure to feeling, but not as ignoring his person: *οὐκ ἀδικεῖται ἐκὼν ὁ ἀκρατής ὑπ' ἄλλου*.'

Jackson explains the present passage by distinguishing two successive stages in *τὰ καθ' ἀκρασίαν*. 'According to Eudemus,' he says, p. 117, 'we must distinguish in *τὰ καθ' ἀκρασίαν* two successive stages: (1) that in which the *βούλησις* resists, and therefore the man is *ἄκων*, and (2) that in which, the *βούλησις* having given way to the *ἐπιθυμία*, the man is *ἐκὼν*, but *οὐθὲν παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν*. Thus the *ἀκρατής* is not *simultaneously* *ἐκὼν* and *παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πάσχων*, and therefore the phenomena of *ἀκρασία* do not countenance the theory that a man may *ἐκὼν ἀδικεῖσθαι*':—and again p. 118, 'in the first stage A is not *ἐκὼν*, because *βούλησις*, being dominant, resists: in the second stage A is *ἐκὼν* but not *ἀδικούμενος*, because *ἐπιθυμία*, being dominant, assents to B's solicitations, *βούλησις* having now given way.' Of course it is quite true that in the *ἀκρατής* there is a struggle between *ἐπιθυμία* and *λόγος*, in which the former eventually prevails. This struggle takes time, and two stages may very properly be distinguished in it. But it is scarcely correct to speak of the *ἀκρατής* being 'not *ἐκὼν*' in the first stage—*i. e.*

1136 a. 23. *before* he acts. A man is *έκών*, or not *έκών*, properly only at the moment of acting (see iii. 1. 6). Now, it is agreed that the *άκρατής* at the moment of acting is *έκών*—whether he tempt himself, or be tempted by another. The question is—what is *the real object* of his voluntary action, as that object presents itself to him at the moment of acting? His real object, thus determined, is present pleasure, not his own hurt. He acts to satisfy an isolated *έπιθυμία*, not to do harm to his personality, as that is represented to him, more or less adequately, by his *βούλησις*—the principle of self-conservation within him. In yielding incontinently to pleasure he indeed violates the principle of self-conservation within him by a voluntary act, but without realising that he does so. Hence, in the language of the present passage, *οὐκ άδικεί αυτός αυτόν*—when acting alone he does not plot his own hurt; and *οὐκ άδικείται έκών*—when yielding to the solicitations of another he does not conspire with that other to hurt himself.

a. 26. *έπ' άμφοτέρων*] *i. e.* *έπί του πράττειν και επί του πάσχειν*. As Mich. Eph. explains—*ένδέχεται τον δικαιούμενον κατά συμβεβηκός μεταλαμβάνειν του δικαίου, όταν ό δικαιοπραγών κατά συμβεβηκός δικαιοπραγή—i. e.* when the agent *πράττει οὐς συμβέβηκε δικαίους είναι* (v. 8. 1), the patient *πάσχει οὐς συμβέβηκε δικαίους είναι*.

a. 27. *έπί των άδικών*] The omission of *έπί* has been suggested. The suggestion is plausible: but the MSS. are apparently all against it.

a. 29. *άδύνατον γάρ κ.τ.λ.*] Fritzsche and Grant quote *Rhet.* i. 13. 1373 b. 27 *έστι δὴ τὸ άδικείσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ έκόντος τὰ άδικα πάσχειν*.

a. 31. § 4. *άπλῶς*] explained by Mich. Eph. as=*άνευ προσθήκης*, 'without qualification.' The qualification or addition necessary is supplied in § 5—*παρά την εκείνου βούλησιν*. 'Αδικείν is not simply hurting voluntarily, but hurting voluntarily for the sake of hurting. The victim cannot, without denying his own personality, be a party to this. He must always wish to be himself intact. That *βούλησις*, as distinguished from *έπιθυμία*, expresses—often inadequately enough—the personality or self is a doctrine which Aristotle shares with Plato: see notes on iii. 4. It plays a great part also in the philosophy of Plotinus—*cf.* especially a passage *Enn.* vi. 8. p. 747 sqq., the key-note of which is—*οὐχ ὅπερ έτυχέν έστιν, άλλ' ὅπερ ἤβουλήθη αυτός*.

a. 34. *έστι δὲ και τούτο έν των άπορουμένων*] Discussed afterwards in

chapter 11. The words before us come in strangely here. They 1136 a. 34. seem to refer back to a list of *άπορούμενα*: but no list has been given.

§ 5. *ό διορισμός*] = *όρισμός*: viz. that given at the beginning b. 3. of § 4.

§ 6. *βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν . . . οὐδείς γάρ βούλεται*] *βλάπτεσθαι* may b. 5. be *έκούσιον*, but *άδικείσθαι* cannot be: for no one can conspire against his own personality. The words *οὐδείς γάρ βούλεται*, 'no man knowingly denies his own personality'—'no man makes his own hurt his end' (see iii. 4. 1 *ή δὲ βούλησις του τέλους έστιν*), are equivalent to *άδικείται οὐδείς έκών*—'no man submits voluntarily to hurt which he feels to be simply hurt, and knows that his assailant regards as simply hurt.'

οὔτε γάρ βούλεται . . . πράττειν πράττει] *cf.* *E. E.* ii. 7. 1223 b. 7. b. 6 *βούλεται δ' οὐδείς ό οίεται είναι κακόν. αλλά μὴν ό άκρατεύόμενος οὐχ ά βούλεται ποιεί τὸ γάρ παρ' ό οίεται βέλτιστον είναι πράττειν δι' έπιθυμίαν άκρατεύεσθαι έστιν*.

οὐχ ά οίεται] This is the reading of K^b alone, preferred by b. 8. Bekker and Bywater. Other MSS. read *ό οὐκ*, preferred by Jackson and Susemihl. Jackson however calls attention to *E. E.* ii. 7. 1223 b. 7, where *ό άκρατεύόμενος οὐχ ά βούλεται ποιεί* seems to be in favour of Bekker's preference.

§ 7. 'Ομηρος] *Iliad* vi. 236.

b. 9.

§ 8. *έτι δ' ὦν προειλόμεθα δύο έστιν ειπείν*] The first of these two b. 15. questions (*πότερον ποτ' άδικεί ό νείμας*) has not been mentioned before as a question to be discussed; and the second (*εί έστιν αυτόν αυτόν άδικείν*) has already been partly discussed (§§ 4 sqq.) in connexion with the question *εί έστιν έκόντ' άδικείσθαι*, from which, however, the writer evidently wishes to distinguish it, for he says *περί μὲν οὖν του άδικείσθαι ότι οὐχ έκούσιον δήλον. έτι δ' ὦν κ.τ.λ.*

The word *προειλόμεθα* is certainly strange in the absence of a definite list of *άπορίαι* to which reference might be made—as Ramsauer says, 'Contra usum Aristotelis est ad προαιρεσίν τινα quam inter scribendum habuerit animo absconditam se verbis revocare'. Perhaps Zell is right in supposing the reference to be to § 1 of the present chapter—*άπορήσειε δ' αν τις ει ίκωνός διώρισται περι του άδικείσθαι και άδικείν*: πρώτον μὲν ει έστιν . . . έκόντα άδικείσθαι.

- 1136 b. 15. Having discussed this first question, and summed up the result with *περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὅτι οὐχ ἐκούσιον δῆλον* (§ 8), he goes on with *ἔτι δ' ὦν* to discuss two other questions contemplated (but not announced) at the beginning of the chapter.
- b. 17. § 9. *εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται*] 'These questions seem to be connected, for if . . .', Jackson.
τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν] the former alternative in the first question, viz. *ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας*—explained by the exegetical clause *καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλεόν*.
- b. 21. *ἐλαττωτικός*] see v. 10. 8.
τοῦτο] τὸ ἔλαττον αὐτῷ νέμειν. This statement must not be taken ἀπλῶς. We must qualify it with the πρόσθεσις, e. g. *τοῦ ὠφελίμου—ἐτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ πλεονεκτεῖ, οἶον τοῦ καλοῦ*.
- b. 22. *τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ*] ἀπλῶς is perhaps used here to distinguish the καλόν itself, truly so called, from δόξα the appearance of it.
- b. 23. *λύεται κατὰ*] Bekker inserts *καὶ* before *κατὰ* without MS. authority Jackson's note is '*καὶ O^b?*'
τὸν διορισμόν] § 5 above.
- b. 24. *διὰ γε τοῦτο*] i. e. in consequence of τὸ ἔλαττον αὐτῷ νέμειν.
- b. 25. § 10. *φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ . . .*] He has hitherto treated the first of the two questions stated in § 8 in its bearing on the second. He now treats it on its own account.
- b. 26. *ἔχων ἀεὶ*] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 61) expunges *ἀεὶ*, conjecturing (with much plausibility, I think) that it is the corruption of an old ditto-graph *ἀδικεῖ* which K^b now alone retains (in place of *ἀεὶ* after *ἔχων*). If we retain *ἀεὶ* we can hardly take it, with Zell, as in the idiom *ὁ ἀεὶ ἄρχων*: the meaning must be that, although the πλεόν ἔχων is often a πλεονέκτης in the ordinary sense of that term, he is not *always* so.
- b. 27. *ὑπάρχει*] Grammatically *ὑπάρχει* goes with the second *ᾧ* as well as with the first; but logically it goes with the first only, thus—*οὐ γὰρ ᾧ τὸ ἀδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐκούσιως τοῦτο ποιῶν*. It is not the material presence of τὸ ἀδικον in a man's circumstances (*ὑπάρχοντα*), but its formal presence in his disposition, and efficiency in his will, which makes the ἀδικῶν. I think that Jackson is wrong

with *ᾧ τὸ ἀδικον* [*sc. ποιεῖν*] *ὑπάρχει*—note on § 11. The reading 1136 b. 27. *ἀδικον ἔχω ὑπάρχει* given by pr. K^b suggests *ἀδικον ἔχειν ὑπάρχει*, which would be a tolerably satisfactory reading, although the special force of *ὑπάρχει* as opposed to *ποιεῖν* would be lost.

τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως] *τοῦτο* is τὸ ἐκόντα ποιεῖν—'the b. 28. initiation of a voluntary agent (*τὸ ἐκόντα ποιεῖν*) is the efficient cause of the action; and this resides in the distributor, not in the receiver.'

§ 11. *οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἀδिका*] Zell and Michelet make b. 31. the λαμβάνων the subject of these verbs. As a slave, at the bidding of his master, may perform an unjust act, without being himself chargeable with injustice, so the λαμβάνων may participate in an unjust act (*ποιεῖν τὰ ἀδिका*), without being himself unjust in respect of it (*ἀδικεῖν*). Mich. Eph., Grant, and Ramsauer, on the other hand, make the διανέμων the subject. This latter is the more plausible construction of the two, because the διανέμων is the subject in § 10 and also in §§ 12 and 13, and because it does not require us to stretch the meaning of *ποιεῖν* so as to include what is after all *πάσχειν*. Jackson adopts a third course. He takes the § closely in connexion with § 10, omits *ἔτι* (as a dittograph of the first two letters of *ἐπέει*), and makes *ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης* the subjects of the verbs *ἀδικεῖ* and *ποιεῖ*. 'I suppose the sentence thus altered,' he says, 'to be a justification of the distinction just made between *ᾧ τὸ ἀδικον* [*sc. ποιεῖν*] *ὑπάρχει* and *ᾧ τὸ ἐκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν*. The Paraph. seems to have understood the sentence as I do.' The following are the Paraphrast's words—*Φαίνεται δέ, ὅτι ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ καθ' αὐτό, ὁ δὲ λαμβάνων κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἀδικεῖ καθ' αὐτό, ὡς ἐκὼν τοῦτο ποιεῖ. Ἐκὼν δὲ τις ποιεῖ, ὅταν ἢ παρ' αὐτῷ τῆς πράξεως ἡ αἰτία καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ποιεῖν τῆς δὲ διανομῆς ἡ ἀρχὴ παρὰ τῷ διανέμοντι· ὁ ἄρα διανέμων τὸ πλεόν ἀδικεῖ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ δεχόμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχή, καθὼς εἴρηται. Οὐ γὰρ ὁ ποιῶν τὰ ἀδिका ἀδικεῖν λέγεται, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὡς περ λέγεται καὶ ἡ χεὶρ φονεῦεν, ἢ μάχαιρα, ἢ λίθος, παρ' οἷς οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τοῦ φόνου, οὐδὲ ἀφ' ἐαυτῶν πράττουσιν ἀδिका μὲν γὰρ ποιούσιν, ἀδικοῦσι δὲ οὐδαμῶς.*

It seems to me that we cannot thus regard the λαμβάνων or ἔχων as a ποιῶν, and take *ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης* as parallel to him. But it would be possible to follow Jackson in omitting *ἔτι*, and making *ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης* the subjects of the verbs, and yet not regard these agents as parallel to the λαμβάνων. One might regard them

1136 b. 31. as examples of τὰ ποιῶντα in the sense of ὄργανα, as distinguished from τὰ ποιῶντα κυρίως, or ἀρχαὶ ὄθεν πρώτως ἢ κινήσεις, to which latter class the διανεμῶν, as ἐκῶν, has been assigned. Thus the words ὄθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως in § 10 would suggest § 11, and the connexion between the two §§ might be exhibited thus—‘the ποιεῖν of the διανεμῶν, as voluntary initiator or ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, is ποιεῖν in the primary sense, for (ἐπεὶ) ποιεῖν has a secondary sense in which ὄργανα are said ποιεῖν.’ For ἐπεὶ introducing a similar parenthesis, see *E. N.* vii. 12. 2, b. 36. But is it necessary to omit ἔτι, and refuse to regard the sentence as simply saying—‘If the διανεμῶν be a mere instrument in the hands of another οὐκ ἀδικεῖ but ποιεῖ τὰ ἄδικα’? The case indeed seems hardly worth mentioning: but is it less worth mentioning than that—εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν, mentioned in § 12? Jackson’s note on § 12 is—‘The argument is contained in the words εἰ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. The words εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν—τὸ πρῶτον merely set aside the case of ignorance as irrelevant to our present remarks.’ Why then, it may be asked, may not § 11 merely set aside the case of compulsion as irrelevant to our present remarks? It is indeed quite in the writer’s manner to give us a complete list of formally possible cases.

On the whole, then, I am inclined, with Mich. Eph., Grant, and Ramsauer, to make ὁ διανεμῶν (conceived as ποιῶν ἄλλου ἐπιτάξαντος) the subject of ἀδικεῖ and ποιεῖ—as if we read, ἔτι, ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος—ἐπιτάξαντος μὲν οὖν εἰ ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα. The reading of K^b N^b P^b and New Coll.—μὲν after ἐπιτάξαντος instead of after ἀδικεῖ—is worth notice as pointing to a ‘fault’ in the juncture of the vulgate.

For τὰ ἄψυχα b. 30, cf. *Mét.* A. I. 981 a. 30 διὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι νομιζόμεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν, τοὺς δ’ ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἕνα, ποιεῖν μὲν, οὐκ εἰδὸτα δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ ποιεῖ, οἷον καί τι τὸ πῦρ. Fritzsche refers to Plato *Legg.* ix. 873 E εἰ μὲν δὲ ἄψυχόν τι ψυχῆς ἄνθρωπον στερήσῃ . . . δικαστὴν μὲν αὐτῷ καθίξέτω τῶν γεγυῆτων τὸν ἐγγύτατα ὁ προσήκων γένηται. He refers also to Pausan. vi. 11 Δράκων Ἀθηναίους θεσμούς γραφῆς φοβηκούς, ὑπερώρισε καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα, εἰ γε ἐμπεσόν τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποκτείνεεν ἄνθρωπον—also to Aeschines *Contra Ctes.* 244 καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη δευρόν, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ τὰ μὲν ξύλα καὶ τοὺς λίθους καὶ τὸν σίδηρον, τὰ ἄφωνα καὶ ἀγνώμονα, εἰ μὲν ἐμπεσόντα

ἀποκτείνῃ, ὑπερορίζομεν, καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸν διαχρήσῃται, τὴν χεῖρα τὴν τοῦτο 1136 b. 31. πράξασαν χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος θάπτομεν Δημοσθένην δέ . . . : see also the Ἀθ. πολιτεία ch. 57 p. 145 ed. princ. δικάζει δ’ ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ οἱ φυλοβασιλεῖς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀψύχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων—and Pausan. i. 28 τὸ δ’ ἐν Πρυτανείῳ καλούμενον, ἔνθα τῷ σιδήρῳ καὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἀψύχοις δικάζουσιν.

§ 12. ἀγνοῶν] ἢ ἀγνοία ἢ καθ’ ἕκαστα, not ἢ καθόλου, must be understood here. An unjust decision made in unavoidable ignorance of particulars is not unjust in the eye of the law of the State (τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον), but nevertheless it violates ‘the fitness of things’ (τὸ πρῶτον, i. e. τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον). The Paraph. seems to be wrong in supplying τοὺς νόμους after ἀγνοῶν. Of a judge who decided in ignorance of the νόμοι of his State it could hardly be said οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον. In *M. M.* i. 33. 1196 b. 1 the distinction marked here by the words οὐδ’ ἄδικος ἢ κρίσις ἔστιν, ἔστι δ’ ὡς ἄδικος is explained thus—ἔστι μὲν ἢ ἀδικεῖ ἔστι δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἀδικεῖ· ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τῇ φύσει ὄν δίκαιον μὴ ἔκρινεν ταύτῃ μὲν ἀδικεῖ, ἢ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ δοκοῦν εἶναι δίκαιον, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ.

πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτός] If the διανεμῶν, with full knowledge of the 1137 a. 1. law under which he is acting, and of the circumstances of the particular case, make an unfair distribution between A and B, he must do so to serve some personal end. Not only will the favoured party ἔχει τὸ πλεόν (perhaps without being chargeable with ἀδικία), but more than that (κατὰ), the διανεμῶν himself too will ἔχει τὸ πλεόν.

§ 13. τοῦ ἀδικήματος] the material result of τὸ ἀδικεῖν—the unfair a. 2. share assigned to the favoured party.

διὰ ταῦτα] διὰ χάριν ἢ τιμωρίαν.

καὶ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐκείνῳ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας] This is the reading of K^b a. 3. adopted by Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 62) and Bywater, ἐπ’ ἐκείνῳ meaning ἐπὶ τῷ μερίσασθαι τοῦ ἀδικήματος. The reading of other MSS. is ἐπ’ ἐκείνων ὁ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας, where ἐκείνων are οἱ μεριστάμενοι τοῦ ἀδικήματος—the unfair distributor and the favoured receiver who share between them the profits of the transaction, the former getting a bribe, the latter too large a share in the distribution. Jackson paraphrases this § well—‘If the judge secures to himself χάρις or τιμωρία by giving an unjust award, he is just as much a πλεονέκτης as if he were to share the plunder with the receiver. For it is not essential that the unjust distributor should take a share

1137 a. 3. of the property distributed, since even if his share takes a more substantial form than *χάρις* and *τιμωρία*, he may receive it, not in land (land being the article distributed), but in money.'

a. 4. §§ 14-16.] Jackson places these §§ after ch. 1. § 3, giving his reasons for doing so on pp. xiii-xvi of his *Introduction*. I am ready to admit that these §§ suit the context of the first chapter better than they suit that of the ninth; but I cannot admit that this proves, or even renders probable, the conclusion that the first chapter is their original locus. The Fifth Book, especially in its latter part, is, to my mind, a collection of materials waiting for arrangement, rather than a treatise which has fallen into disarrangement. Nothing that I have read (English or foreign) on the subject of 'Dislocations in the Text' has made me doubt the correctness of what, after all, is bound to be the *prima facie* view—that the order (or disorder) of the Fifth Book is *substantially* that in which the original compiler threw his materials. There are doubtless many omissions and interpolations in the text as we have it which add to the original confusion of the compilation: but the numerous transplantations (often of short passages to distant places), which we are asked by certain modern critics to assume, are quite a different thing. It may be admitted, however, that the place which the chapter on *ἐπιείκεια* now occupies (cutting in two, as it does, the discussion of *τὸ ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι* and *τὸ αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν*) is inconsistent even with the low standard of arrangement actually attained in the Book.

a. 7. § 14. καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον] I agree with Williams against Jackson that this means 'delivering a bribe'—a vicious action, like the other actions mentioned—perhaps suggested by the *ἀργύριον* of § 13.

a. 8. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὄδῳ ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε βράδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς] The Paraph. Heliodorus has—*τὸ μὲν γὰρ πράξει τὰ δίκαια ἢ τὰ ἄδικοι, καὶ ἢ δοῦναι ἀργύριον ἢ πατάξει τὸν πλησίον, βράδιόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦ βουλομένου τὸ δὲ ἢ δικαιοσύνης ἔξιν ἔχων ἢ ἀδικίας, ὁ χρόνον καὶ ἀσκήσεως δεῖται, δι' ἃς ἔξεις ἢ δίκαιός τις ἢ ἄδικος λέγεται, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ὥστε ἅμα τῷ βυλεῖσθαι καὶ βράδιον εἶναι κτήσασθαι.*

a. 9. § 15.] See *E. N.* ii. 4. §§ 3-6.

a. 11. ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ' κ.τ.λ.] 'but it is only *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* that actions prescribed by law are identical with *τὰ δίκαια*' (Jackson). It is not

enough, in order to perform 'just actions,' to find out the actions 1137 a. 11. which the law declares to be just, and perform them according to pattern. Actions are 'just' only when they spring from the habit of justice, which no mere study of the requirements of the law will give a man.

νεμόμενα] Perhaps suggested by the *διανεμόνα* of §§ 8-13. K^b, a. 13. M^b, H^a have *γενόμενα*, which seems to be a mere blunder.

τοῦτο δὴ πλέον ἔργον κ.τ.λ.] Bywater (*Contrib.* p. 49) says—'in lieu of *τοῦτο δὲ* I restore *τοῦτο δὴ*, or if any one prefers it, *τοῦτο [δέ]*, in order to keep up the correspondence in construction and sense between this clause and that which comes just after, in l. 16: in the one case an act is said to be *πλέον ἔργον κτέ.* and in the other *τοσοῦτον ἔργον κτέ.*' This seems decisive against Bekker's *συνιέναι*. ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ πὼς πραττόμενα καὶ πὼς νεμόμενα δίκαια' *τοῦτο δὲ κ.τ.λ.* With either text, however, the meaning is—To learn to 'know' *δίκαια*, as the *φρόνιμος* (who must have the *ἔξις* of *δικαιοσύνη*) knows them, is more difficult than to learn to know *ὑγιεινά* as the experienced *ιατρός* 'knows' them. The commentators compare *M. M.* ii. 3. 1199 a. 27 οὐ γὰρ σκοπεῖ ὁ ἄδικος οὐδὲ δύναται κρίνειν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτάνει. τῆς δὲ φρονήσεως τοῦτο ἐστὶ, τὸ ὀρθῶς δύνασθαι ταῦτα θεωρεῖν, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν κατ' ἰατρικὴν τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγιείας ποιητικὸν οἴδαμεν ἅπαντες, ὅτι ἐλλέβορος καὶ τὸ ἐλατήριον καὶ αἱ τομαὶ καὶ αἱ καύσεις ὑγιεινὰ εἰσιν καὶ ὑγιείας ποιητικά, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἔχομεν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οἴδαμεν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἰατρός οἶδεν τίνι ἐστὶ τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν καὶ πότε καὶ πὼς διακειμένῳ· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ἤδη ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς ὑγιεινὰ εἰδότες ὅμως οὐκ ἔχομεν οὐδὲ παρακολουθεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη· ὡς δ' αὐτὸς ὁ ἄδικος. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡ τυραννὶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ ἐξουσία, οἶδεν ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἢ μὴ, ἢ πότε, ἢ πὼς διακειμένῳ, οὐκέτι οἶδεν. Jackson quotes Plato, *Phaedr.* 268 A-C, where the person who ἐκ βιβλίου ποθεν ἀκούσας ἢ περιτυχῶν φαρμακίους ἰατρός οἴεται εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἐπάων τῆς τέχνης is described as *μαινόμενος*.

§ 16. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο] τὸ οἰεῖσθαι ἐφ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν. The a. 17. opinion criticised in this § ignores the distinction between a *δύναμις* and a *ἔξις* stated in v. 1. 4—*δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντιῶν ἢ αὐτῆ εἶναι, ἔξις δ' ἢ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντιῶν οὐ*. 'This opinion that justice implies its contrary, as if it were an art (*δύναμις*), would be a consequence,' says Grant, 'of the Socratic doctrine that justice is knowledge. Plato saw what this doctrine led to, and drew out

1137 a. 17. the paradoxical conclusion, *Rep.* 334 A (εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ κλέπτειν δεινός), *Hipp. Min.* 375-6 (οὐκοῦν ἢ δυνατωτέρα καὶ σοφωτέρα αὕτη (sc. ψυχὴ) ἀμείνων οὐσα ἐφάνη καὶ ἀμφότερα μᾶλλον δυναμένη ποιεῖν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ περὶ πᾶσαν ἐργασίαν 375 E). The Aristotelian theory, that justice is a moral state (ἔξις) set the difficulty at rest.

a. 26. § 17.] Jackson places this § in chapter 1, § 9 after τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ (see his *Intro.* p. xvi).

τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν] Mich. Eph. points out that τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ or 'things good in themselves' are of two kinds—viz. (1) things good in themselves in the sense of being always and without qualification good—the ἀρεταί and the ἐέργειαι κατ' αὐτὰς: and (2) things good in themselves in the sense of being good in the abstract, but not necessarily good in all circumstances—money good in itself, or generally, but bad in the possession of the profligate. It is with τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ in this second sense that δικαιοσύνη has to do: for in respect of τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ in the first sense there can be no πλεονεξία. His note is interesting and may be transcribed—ἦν ἂν σαφεστέρα ἢ λέξις, εἰ οὕτως πως εἶχεν τῶν δίκαιων τὸ μὲν ὡς εἴρηται νευμητικόν, τὸ δ' ἐπανορθωτικόν ταῦτα δὲ τὸ διανεμητικόν καὶ τὸ ἐπανορθωτικόν ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν τοῖς μετέχουσι τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ κυρίως τὰ τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει ἀγαθὰ, οἷον αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ κατ' αὐτὰς ἐέργειαι· δεύτερον δὲ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ τὰ ὀργανικὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν οὐ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν. τίνα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ ὀργανικὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, σαφηρίζων, ἐπίγαγεν ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, πλοῦτος τιμαί, δυναστεία πολιτικὴ, ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῖς ταῖς ἀρεταῖς· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὀρισμέναις οὐσαις καὶ μεσοτήτεσιν, ὡς δέδεικται, ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν οἷς δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἐν τούτοις καὶ τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ μειονεκτεῖν. κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' οὐ γίνεται πλεονεξία. οὐ γὰρ οἷον τε τινὸς ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν βιασάμενον τὸν ἔχοντα, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ κτημάτων γίνεταί· ἐν γὰρ τούτοις καθ' ὅραν ἀφαιρεῖται βία ὅδε τοῦδε τὸ χωρίον τὴν ἀμπελὸν τινος, τὰ λοιπά. τὴν ἀνδρείαν τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἀφελείσθαι, ἢ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος βία οὐδεὶς δύναται. ἂν οὖν ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν, ἐν τούτοις τὰ δίκαια. τὸ γὰρ δύνασθαι τούτων τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ πλεόν τι ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον, περὶ τὴν τοῦτον νομίην καὶ ἐπαισιωσιν τὰ δίκαια ἐστὶν. ἐπεὶ οἷς γε μηδὲν ἐστὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν, τούτοις οὐδ' ὑπερβολὴ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδ' ἔλλειψις ἐστὶν. εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐταί, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐπανορθωτικόν ἢ τὸ διανεμητικόν δίκαιον. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐν οἷς οὐ

πλοῦτος, οὐ δόξα, οὐ τιμὴ, οὐκ ἀρχή, οὐκ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν, 1137 a. 26. οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὔτε διανεμητικόν οὔτε διορθωτικόν ὑπάρχει. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἷς ἐστὶν, οὐσι δὲ ἀνάτοις ὑπὸ τρυφῆς καὶ ἀκολασίας καὶ πάσης ἀσελγείας, οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν δίκαιόν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν] K^b and L^b omit ἐν a. 27. τούτοις. I do not think that ἐν τούτοις = ἐν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῖς, although coming immediately after ἐν τούτοις = the persons, need trouble us much in careless writing like the present.

μέχρι του] sc. ὠφέλιμα: cf. *E. N.* vii. 13. 4 καὶ εὐτυχία ὑπερβάλλουσα a. 30. ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν κ.τ.λ.

διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν] i.e. man is neither θεός nor θηρίον. 'At present ἐστὶν has no evident subject. Should we read διὰ instead of διὰ? Susemihl (*Bursian's Jahresb.* 1876, p. 278) points out that this alteration was suggested by Zwinger' (Jackson). Is the reading of Γ—τοῦτο δ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν not worth consideration? Τοῦτο would be τὸ μέχρι του ὠφέλιμα εἶναι τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ. On the margin of CCC I find γρ. διὰ τοῦτο δ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν. May not the διὰ of the vulgate represent a dittograph δέ? It is easy to imagine a scribe, with an original μέχρι του τοῦτο δ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν before him, writing μέχρι τοῦτο δὲ τοῦτο δὲ ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν: and it is not a difficult step from this to the μέχρι του διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν of the margin of CCC. The contractions for διὰ and δέ are easily confounded.

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT.

Concerning Equity. The relation of Equity to Justice has caused some difficulty. The two strike us as not being exactly the same; and yet, on the other hand, since 'equitable' is popularly used as a term of praise for 'good,' it seems illogical to distinguish it from 'just,' which, in its wide sense, is the same as 'good.' If 'equitable' and 'just' are to be distinguished, one of them, it would appear, is not 'good'; and if both are 'good,' why distinguish them? The solution of this difficulty is that the 'equitable' and the 'just' are generically the same, i.e. both 'good,' but the 'equitable' is the better. Equity is a higher form of justice; it is not the justice of the letter of the law, but that of the spirit which corrects the letter. The law, by reason of the complicated

nature of its subject-matter, is necessarily general in its terms, and sometimes fails to meet the just claims of an individual case. Here equity steps in and supplies the defect. Indeed there are some cases about which we cannot have a law at all, but must provide for them, as they arise, by special decree. Where the stones are irregularly shaped the builder must use a flexible rule.

The 'equitable' then is 'just,' being better, not than the 'just' as such, but than its necessarily imperfect realisation in law. It is the correction of law where it falls short by reason of its generality. The equitable man is the man who habitually makes such correction, and although he may have the letter of the law on his side, is unwilling to press his legal right harshly, preferring to take less than his due.

Introductory Note.—It seems to be generally agreed that this chapter is misplaced here in the MSS. Jackson puts it at the end of the Book; Ueberweg (*Hist. Phil.* vol. i. p. 147, English Transl.) inserts it (preceded by chapter 9, §§ 14–17, 1137 a. 4–30) after chapter 8, *i. e.* after συγγωμονικά 1136 a. 9. The reasons for preferring Ueberweg's rearrangement are (1) that the constructive treatment of Justice becomes continuous, and the ἀποπαι contained in chapters 9 and 11 of the vulgate form an appendix to the Book: (2) that the remarks on ἐπιείκεια follow closely on the discussion contained in chapter 8. A comparison of *Rhet.* i. 13 makes it probable that they ought to follow even more closely than they do in Ueberweg's rearrangement—*i. e.* that chapter 9, §§ 14–17 ought not to intervene between the end of chapter 8 and the beginning of chapter 10, but be otherwise disposed of—I do not venture to suggest how. In *Rhet.* i. 13 the discussion of ἐπιείκεια arises immediately out of a discussion, closely resembling that in *E. N.* v. 8, of the various degrees of guilt attaching to the βλάβαι which come before the courts of justice. If, as seems probable, the writer of *E. N.* v. 8 had *Rhet.* i. 13 before him, or in his recollection, when he wrote, he would naturally go immediately on from συγγωμονικά (1136 a. 9) to the discussion of ἐπιείκεια.

Ueberweg accounts for the disorder in the text of the last three chapters of *E. N.* v by the misplacement of the leaves of an archetype MS.

It may be only an accidental coincidence—but it seems worth noticing in connexion with this hypothesis of misplaced leaves—that the mass of text from 1176 a. 11 to 1177 a. 30 (*E. N.* x. ch. 5, § 9—ch. 7, § 4) omitted by K^b is twice as large as that contained in the chapter on ἐπιείκεια, v. 10; twice as large as that

contained in v. 11; and equal to that intervening between the end of chapter 8 (1136 a. 9) and the beginning of the chapter on ἐπιείκεια, chapter 10. There are 88 Bekker's lines in the passage (1176 a. 11–1177 a. 30) omitted by K^b; 43 in the chapter on ἐπιείκεια; 43 in the following chapter, v. 11; and 87 from the end of v. 8 to the beginning of v. 10.

The lacuna in K^b was probably caused by the absence of two leaves (each containing about 43 Bekker's lines) from the ancient manuscript of which K^b is a transcript. Fol. 121^r in K^b ends with τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς (1176 a. 11) and fol. 121^v (the other side of the same leaf) begins with μὲν κεχωρηγημένων ὁ μὲν (1177 a. 30), the lacuna not being indicated in any way by the scribe, who, it would seem, was unconscious of its existence.

On the other hand it would be going too far if we were to say that the disorder in the text of v. 9–11 was probably caused by a misplacement of archetype leaves containing each about 43 Bekker's lines. The 'disorder' to be explained by the hypothesis is, after all, not a definite indisputable fact like the lacuna in K^b. At any rate it would be satisfactory, before attaching much importance to the quantitative relation subsisting between the lacuna in K^b and certain passages in v. 9–11, to be able to point to other cases of 'disorder' in the *E. N.* which could be explained by the hypothesis of an archetype leaf of 43 Bekker's lines. I confess that as yet I have not found any such cases. The space intervening between v. 4, 12 (1132 b. 9) and v. 5, 9 (1133 a. 14), to which I turned first, does not seem to have anything to do with an archetype leaf of 43 lines.

I append *Rhet.* i. 13. 1373 b. 25–1374 b. 23 for future reference, and to show how naturally the chapter on ἐπιείκεια takes its place between ch. 8 and ch. 9, after συγγωμονικά 1136 a. 9: πάντων δὴ τῶν ἀδικημάτων διηρημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους, ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, λέγωμεν. ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἐκόντος τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὄρισται πρότερον ἐκούσιον εἶναι. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραὶ εἰσὶν τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ εἶρηται καθ' αὐτὰ πρότερον, καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια, ὅτι ἔστω ὅσα εἰδότες, ὥστ' ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον εἶναι, καὶ ἢ ἀγνοούντος καὶ ἄκοντος ἢ ἐκόντος καὶ εἰδότες, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος. περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥηθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εἶρηται πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ'

ὁμολογοῦντες παλλάκις πεπραχέναι ἢ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ περὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ κλέψαι, καὶ πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ μοιχεῦσαι, ἢ κλέψαι μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι, οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τι, ἢ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ δημοσίαν, ἢ διειλέχθαι μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλ' οὐ προδοῦναι, διὰ ταῦτα δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι, τί κλοπῆ, τί ὑβρις, τί μοιχεία, ὅπως ἕαν τε ὑπάρχειν ἕαν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα δεικνύναι, ἔχωμεν ἐμφανίζουσα τὸ δίκαιον. ἔστι δὲ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου εἶναι καὶ φαῦλον ἢ μὴ ἀδικον ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις· ἐν γὰρ τῇ πραίρεισι ἢ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν, οἷον ὑβρις καὶ κλοπῆ· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξεν πάντως ὑβρίσεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἕνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμίας ἐκείνου ἢ αὐτοῦ ἡσθῆναι. οὐδὲ πάντως, εἰ λάθρα ἔλαβεν, ἔκλεψεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τοῦτου, ἀφ' οὗ ἔλαβε καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἑαυτοῦ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τούτων.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δίκαιων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἦν δύο εἶδη· τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δ' ἀγραφα, περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἀγράφων δύο ἔστιν εἶδη· ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, ἐφ' οἷς ὀνειδῆ καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἀτιμίας καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαί, οἷον τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαντι εὖ καὶ ἀντεπαικῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα καὶ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἴδιου νόμου καὶ γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα. τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἐκόντων τὰ δὲ ἀκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθῃ, ἐκόντων δ' ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται διορίσαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ἢ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ἢ δέ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. καὶ ὅσα μὴ βράδιον διορίσαι δι' ἀπειρίαν, οἷον τὸ τρώσαι σιδήρῳ πηλίκῳ καὶ ποίῳ τινὶ ὑπολείπει γὰρ ἂν ὁ αἶων διαριθμοῦνται. ἂν οὖν ἢ ἀόριστον, δὲν δὲ νομοθετῆσαι, ἀνάγκη ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ὥστε κἂν δακτύλιον ἔχων ἐπάρηται τὴν χεῖρα ἢ πατάξῃ, κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἔνοχος ἔσται καὶ ἀδικεῖ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τοῦτο ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ ἔστι τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, φανερόν ποία ἔστι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ ποιοὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς ἀνθρώποι· ἐφ' οἷς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικῆ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιῶν, μηδὲ τὰ ἀτυχήματα· ἔστιν ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἀμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τε ἔστιν· τὰ γὰρ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας. καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνους συγγνώσκουσι ἐπιεικὲς. καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου σκοπεῖν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὴν πράξιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ μέρος ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, μηδὲ ποῖός τις νῦν, ἀλλὰ ποῖός τις ἦν αἰεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. καὶ τὸ μνημονεῖν μᾶλλον ὧν ἔπαθεν ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, καὶ

ἀγαθῶν ὧν ἔπαθεν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐποίησεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον λόγῳ ἐθέλειν κρῖνεσθαι ἢ ἔργῳ. καὶ τὸ εἰς δίαταν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς δίκην βούλεσθαι ἵεναι· ὁ γὰρ διαιτητῆς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ὄρα, ὁ δὲ δικαστῆς τὸν νόμον· καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα διαιτητῆς εὐρέθη, ὅπως τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἰσχύη. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

In the *M. M.* (ii. i. 1198 b. 24) ἐπιεικεία is discussed in connexion with ἐγνωμοσύνη—i. e. among the intellectual ἐξεις, in a context corresponding to *E. N.* vi. 11. 1.

§ 1. καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] *i. e.* 1137 a. 35. ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα—‘from men (ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον) we transfer the term ἐπιεικὲς to things also (μεταφέρομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα) as a term of praise instead of the term ἀγαθόν’—or ‘we use ἐπιεικὲς as a general term of praise instead of ἀγαθόν.’ See Grant’s note on this §, and Fritzsche’s note on *E. N.* viii. 11. 5 for the history of the meanings of ἐπιεικῆς. Derived from εἰκός, it means originally (as in Homer) ‘meet’ or ‘suitable’—*i. e.* in the particular circumstances of a case. Thus in v. 4. 3 the ἐπιεικῆς is the morally good man as distinguished from the φαῦλος or bad man; in ix. 6. 2 οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, the honourable citizens, are opposed to ὁ δῆμος; while, in the present chapter (§ 8), the ἐπιεικῆς or equitable man is opposed to the ἀκριβοδίκαιος. In all cases the ‘goodness’ marked by the term ἐπιεικὲς would seem to be that which consists in correspondence, as exact as possible, with given conditions, as distinguished from absolute perfection—τὸ ἀκριβές. A man is ἐπιεικῆς quā πολίτης; but it would be a solecism to call him ἐπιεικῆς quā σοφός: and in Isocrates *Helene* 209 a. b τὸ ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν, ‘to form probable opinions’ (Jebb, *Attic Orat.* vol. ii. p. 52), is opposed to τὸ ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι, ‘to have an exact knowledge’: πολὺ κρείττον ἔστι περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι.

τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι] *i. e.* if we follow out the logical implication B. 2. of the conception ἐπιεικὲς.

ἢ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ ἄλλο] b. 4. The easiest way out of the difficulty involved in these words is to omit οὐ δίκαιον with Giphanius, Coraes, and more recent editors. Γ and N^b omit οὐ δίκαιον εἰ, the former having vel enim justum non studiosum, vel epices aliud. Michelet (followed by Fritzsche), retaining the words οὐ δίκαιον εἰ ἄλλο, places the comma after οὐ

7 b. 4. instead of after *δίκαιον*. It is very unsafe, however, to accept as final any suggestion which may be offered for the emendation of a passage like this consisting of short clauses introduced by *ἦ* and *εἰ*. Such clauses were often omitted by scribes, and often repeated. Bywater has perhaps shown proper caution in leaving the text as the majority of the MSS. give it.

b. 8. § 2. *δικαίου τινός*] explained below as *τοῦ νομίμου δικαίου*.

b. 11. §§ 3, 4.] Fritzsche and Jackson compare Plato, *Politicus* 294 A-C; see especially the words—*οἰκοῦν ἀδύνατον εἶ ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ μηδέποτε ἀπλὰ τὸ διὰ παντὸς γιγνόμενον ἀπλοῦν*. Cf. also *Rhet.* i. 13 quoted above in introductory note to this chapter.

b. 13. § 4. *αἴτιον*] ‘Causa unde duplex illud justum existat, ostenditur.’ Ramsauer.

b. 19. *εὐθύς*] See Bonitz on *Met.* γ. 1004 a. 5—‘*ὑπάρχει γὰρ εὐθύς γένη ἔχοντα κ.τ.λ.* Similem usum adverbii *εὐθύς*, cf. *Cat.* 12. 14 a. 32, *An. Pr.* i. 16. 36 a. 6. *Ens et unum, ait, suapte natura, εὐθύς, in genera quaedam dividuntur.*’

τοιαύτη] *ἀόριστος* Paraph.—*ι. ε. περὶ ἧς οὐχ οἶόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου*.

b. 21. § 5. *τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει κ.τ.λ.*] Fritzsche aptly compares here *Rhet.* i. 13. 1374 b. 11 *ἐπεικὲς τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου*.

b. 23. *εἶπεν*] This is the reading of K^b alone. It is to be preferred to the *εἶποι* of all other MSS. ‘because,’ as Jackson says, ‘it is distinctly assumed that the *νομοθέτης* is not present and therefore does not pronounce.’

b. 25. § 6. *οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀμαρτήματος*] τὸ ἀπλῶς *δίκαιον* is justice not qualified in relation to the requirements of this or that particular case—the justice of the general rule; τὸ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς *ἀμάρτημα* is the failure of the general rule, by reason of its generality (*διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς*), to meet the requirements of a particular case: cf. with the *ἀπλῶς* of this passage the use of *ἀπλὰ* in the sentence quoted from the *Politicus* 294 C in note on §§ 3, 4, b. 11. A rule, in so far as it is general and unqualified, cannot fit individual cases, in so far as they are never unqualified, but always particularly qualified—*ἀδύνατον εἶ ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ μηδέποτε ἀπλὰ τὸ διὰ παντὸς γιγνόμενον ἀπλοῦν*.

I cannot agree with Jackson that *ἀμαρτήματος* is suspicious, or 1137 b. 25. that the Paraphrast's *ἀμαρτάνοντος* may possibly be the right reading. ‘*Ἀμάρτημα*, I take it, has been carefully selected to mark the *concrete result* (cf. *ἀδικήματος* v. 9. 13) of the application of the general rule.

διὰ τὸ καθόλου] exactly equivalent to *διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς* above. b. 27.

ψηφίσματος] See note on τὰ *ψηφισματώδη* v. 7. 1, b. 24. b. 29.

§ 7. *τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας ὁ μολίβδινος κανών*] By *Λεσβία οἰκοδομία* we are to understand ‘Cyclopean building’ in which large polygonal stones were employed, and fitted together, as at Tiryns; and the *μολίβδινος κανών* is to be explained as a flexible piece of lead which was first accommodated to the irregular surface of a stone already laid in position, and then applied to other stones with the view of selecting one of them with irregularities which would fit most closely into those of the stone already laid. Fritzsche, in his important note here, quotes an authority who mentions that a flexible rule is still used at Verona when a wall is being built of polygonal stones.

The parallel between the easy morals for which the Lesbians were noted and their *μολίβδινος κανών* was not likely to escape the notice of later littérateurs (see quotations in Zell and Coraes—especially from *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce*, t. ii. ch. 3). Fritzsche cannot be right when he supposes that ‘Cyclopean building’ was called ‘Lesbian’ because its *κανών* was flexible like the Lesbian morality.

The form *οἰκοδομῆς*, which all other MSS. apparently give here for the *οἰκοδομίας* of K^b and P^b, came into use later for *οἰκοδόμησις* or *οἰκοδομία*. If *οἰκοδομῆς* is right here, it is only here that it occurs in the Aristotelian corpus.

Before we pass on, it may be well to notice a fragment of Aeschylus which Grant quotes. He merely appends it to a note in which the ‘Cyclopean’ explanation of *Λεσβία οἰκοδομία* is accepted; but it might perhaps be taken to suggest another explanation. The fragment is given by Dindorf (*Fr.* 72), as from the *Θαλαμοποιί*, in the following form—

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τις Λέσβιον φατνώματι
κῦμα' ἐν τριγώνοις ἐκπεραινέτω ῥυθμοῖς.

The *κῦμα* or *κυμάτιον* is a moulding on an architrave or elsewhere. The Doric *κῦμα* is a simple hollow; the Lesbian an undulating

1187 b. 30. moulding, either concave above and convex below (*cyma recta*), or the reverse (*cyma reversa*). See Smith's *Dict. of Ant.* article *cyma*. Is it suggested that the *μολίβδινος κανών* had anything to do with the Lesbian *kūpa*?

b. 33. § 8.] On the Equity of the Roman Law, see Maine's *Ancient Law*, ch. iii, 'Law of Nature and Equity.'

CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

A man cannot act unjustly towards himself either in the general or in the special sense of 'acting unjustly.' Murder e.g., committed in anger, is unjust in the same general sense in which all other vicious acts forbidden by law are unjust. The man who commits suicide, then, in anger acts unjustly. Towards himself? No. Towards the State; for it is the State that punishes him. Nor can a man act unjustly in the special sense towards himself; for that would mean that the same thing could at once be taken from and given to the same person. Unjust treatment implies at least two persons, one of whom deliberately makes an aggression on the rights of the other. The same person cannot be both aggressor and victim, agent and patient; and moreover, if the agent of injustice, who must be a voluntary agent, were also the patient, then the latter would be a voluntary patient of injustice, which, as we have shown, is impossible. Further, if we pass in review all the modes in which unjust treatment may be received (and it must be received in some particular mode), we find no case in which the agent is also recipient: a man does not commit adultery with his own wife, break into his own house, steal his own money—in short, injure himself in any one of the particular modes in which injury can be inflicted.

The general answer, however, to the question—Can a man inflict injury on himself? is No; for he cannot voluntarily receive injury.

To inflict injury and to receive it are both evil, for both involve a departure from the mean—the agent having too much and the patient too little; but to inflict injury is the worse, for it implies more or less evil in the agent, while receiving injury does not involve evil in the patient. Indirectly, of course, the reception of injury may lead to consequences which are worse for the patient than the infliction of injury is for the agent; but in itself the infliction is a greater evil than the reception of injury.

The view that a man can injure himself owes much of its plausibility to a confusion between the self as a whole and a part of the self. Because the irrational part may encroach upon the just prerogatives of the rational part of

the self, it is thought that a man may act unjustly towards himself. But the supremacy of the rational part over the irrational part is at most only 'just' in the metaphorical sense in which we have seen that the rule of the father over his child or the master over his slave is 'just.'

§ 1. πότερον δ'] This chapter (with the exception of §§ 7 and 8) 1138 a. 4. is placed by Jackson after § 13 in chapter 9.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων] Jackson says 'i.e. from 9, §§ 1-13.' But does not the explanatory clause τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. oblige us to suppose rather that the reference is to the distinction made in ch. 1. § 8 τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον?

οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτινῆναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἢ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει.] a. 6. Jackson's note here is—'οὐ κελεύει' "Does not allow," i.e. forbids. Cf. the well-known use of οὐκ εἶναι as the correlative of κελεύειν. The words ἢ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει are explanatory of the phrase οὐ κελεύει. So Victorius, quoted by Cardwell. Eudemus wishes to say—"What the law bids is δίκαιον, what the law forbids is ἀδίκον." Cf. 1. § 14 προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν . . . ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας, τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων. Not appreciating this idiomatic use of οὐ κελεύει, Grant remarks "the extraordinary assertion is made that whatever the law does not command it forbids. We might well ask, Did the Athenian law command its citizens to breathe, to eat, to sleep, etc.?" This criticism [i.e. Grant's] is endorsed by Rasso (*Forschungen*, p. 42). I cannot believe that the writer's meaning here is correctly represented by the tautology 'What the law does not allow it forbids.' If we understand by νόμος, not merely statute law, but custom and fashion, it is absolutely correct to say 'What νόμος does not enjoin it forbids': see note on οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ πάντων, v. 1. 13, b. 14. As for the 'idiomatic use of οὐ κελεύει'—οὐκ εἶναι means 'forbids'; but does οὐ κελεύει? If exception is to be taken to Grant's remark quoted by Jackson, it is not, I think, on the ground of its non-appreciation of the 'idiomatic use of οὐ κελεύει,' but because it understands νόμος in too narrow a sense—as *law*, not as *law and custom*. The same error deprives Michelet's note of point—'Cum apud Graecos leges non juris tantum, sed virtutis causa ferrentur, legibus praecepta continebantur, quibus magistratus edicebant, quae fieri vellent. Apud nos autem, stricto jure inter Romanos jam orto, lex nihil jubet, sed quae fieri

1138 a. 6. nolit, edicit, ita ut contraria Aristoteli jam nunc obtineat regula: *Quae lex non jubet, permittit.* Nor is it necessary, with Acciaiolus, to suppose that ἄ δὲ μὴ κελεύει ἀπαγορεύει applies only to things obviously wrong. Custom (fashion, public opinion) forbids the most innocent actions, if it does not enjoin them.

a. 12. § 3. ἡ πόλις ζημιοί] The commentators quote Aeschines, *Contra Ctes.* 244, *ἴαν τις αὐτὸν διαχρήσεται, τὴν χεῖρα τὴν τοῦτο πράξασαν χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος θάπτομεν*, and Plato, *Legg.* ix. 873. The pollution of the city caused by the suicide was probably regarded as the chief part of the injury inflicted by his act: other effects would be those noted by Mich. Eph.—*καθ' ὃ ἀφαιρείται τὴν πόλιν στρατηγὸν ἢ στρατιώτην ἢ τεχνίτην ἢ τινα τοιοῦτον.*

a. 14. § 4. ἔτι] In §§ 1-3 the writer has shown that οὐκ ἔστιν ἄδικόν πρὸς αὐτόν, where ἄδικον = παράνομον. He now proceeds to show that the same is true where ἄδικον = ἄνισον.

καθ' ὃ ἄδικος μόνον ὁ ἀδικῶν] μόνον ὁ is the conjecture of Lambinus for the ὁ μόνου of the codd., and is approved by Zell, Ramsauer and Bywater. The meaning is—'Further, if we take ὁ ἀδικῶν in the narrow sense of ἄδικος (ἄδικος μόνον = ἄνισος or πλεονέκτης), and not in the wide sense (ὄλωσ φαῦλος = παράνομος), it is impossible ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτόν.' No MS. apparently gives μόνον ὁ, and all, with two exceptions, ὁ μόνου. The two exceptions are CCC with ἄδικος ὁ μὲν ἀδικῶν, and H^a with ἄδικος ὁ ἀδικῶν. An omitted μόνου supplied above the line or on the margin might very easily get into the wrong place after ὁ; and would retain that place by suggesting to careless scribes and readers that the distinction with which the sentence is concerned is not that between the ἄνισος and the παράνομος, but that between ὁ τὰ ἄδικα πράττων and ὁ ἀδικῶν, as given e.g. in ch. 9. § 3.

a. 15. τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου] Mich. Eph. has—*τοῦτο γὰρ φησιν ἄλλο ἐκείνου· ταντίστιν τοῦτο τὸ κατὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἄδικον ἑτερόν ἐστιν ἐκείνου τοῦ καθόλου ἀδικου.*

a. 16. ἔστι γὰρ πως . . . πονηρίαν] i.e. there is a sense in which the ἄδικος is an offender coordinate with the δειλός e.g., and not an offender generally. Ἀδικία in one sense is πλεονεξία—a specific form of πονηρία, just as δειλία, ἀσωτία, are specific forms. It has however a generic sense also, in which it is equivalent to ὄλη πονηρία.

οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην] κατὰ τὴν μερικὴν ἣτις ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία (Paraph.). 1138 a. 17. I prefer Bekker's punctuation here to Susemihl's and Bywater's. The words ἅμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. are to be taken closely with ὅστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ.

ἀδικεῖ] Kb has ἀδικεῖ ἄν. Can ἄν be a corruption of αὐτόν, which a. 18. the sense requires?

ἅμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] see *M. M.* I. 33. 1196 a. 9 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀδικῶν, ἢ ἀδικεῖ, πλείον ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος, ἢ ἀδικεῖται, ἔλαττον. εἰ ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ, ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ πλείον ἔχει καὶ ἔλαττον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

ἐν πλείοσιν] 'implies more than one person': cf. v. 3. 4. 5. a. 19.

* § 5. ἔτι δὲ . . . πρότερον] 'The words ἐκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως,' a. 20. says Jackson, 'are not necessary to the argument. Indeed τὸ ἀδικεῖν is not necessarily ἐκ προαιρέσεως: I have therefore translated the phrase "voluntary or deliberate, and aggressive."' But see below, note on ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε a. 21.

πρότερον] sc. τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

a. 21.

ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε κ.τ.λ.] Jackson's note here is—'οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσις 8. § 9.' Does this mean that ὁ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιοῦν of the present passage and ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν of 8, § 9 are identical? If they are, then the argument is—'ἀδικεῖν is deliberate and aggressive: for the θυμῷ ποιῶν, who does not act deliberately and is not an aggressor, οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν.' This, however, is hardly consistent with v. 8. 9.

ἔτι εἴη ἄν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι]—which has been shown to be a. 23. impossible ch. 9. §§ 1-6. Ramsauer asks—'quid hoc post verba ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς ἐκῶν, vs. 12?' Surely because it helps to prove the conclusion—that the ἀδικῶν *quā* ἄνισος cannot injure himself. In § 3 it helped to prove another conclusion—that the ἀδικῶν *quā* παράνομος cannot injure himself.

§ 6. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις] 'If, instead of arguing from our conception a. 24. of ἀδικία, we examine special cases of it, we come to the same conclusion' (Jackson). Τὸ ἀποκτινῶναι ἑαυτόν, already discussed in §§ 2 and 3, is, of course one of τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀδικήματα, but it does not stand in the same position as the ἀδικήματα mentioned in this §. As soon as they are mentioned, we see that they are not cases of

1138 a. 24. τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτὸν. But τὸ ἀποκτινύναι ἑαυτὸν looks, at first sight, like a case of τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτὸν, and it is only the reflection—ἡ πόλις ζημιῶι—which makes us aware that it is not. The difference between the ἀδικήματα of the present section and those of which τὸ ἀποκτινύναι ἑαυτὸν in §§ 2 and 3 is an example is that marked in *Rhet.* i. 13. 1373 b. 18 πρὸς οὓς δὲ διώριστα [τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα] διχῶς διώριστα· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς ἓνα τῶν κοινωνούντων, ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν. διὸ καὶ τὰδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἓνα καὶ ὀρισμένον ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν· ὁ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τιτὰ τῶν ὀρισμένων, ὁ δὲ μὴ στρατεύμενος τὸ κοινόν. Thus ὁ σφάπτων ἑαυτὸν injures τὸ κοινόν by depriving it of a soldier. Similarly, the ἀκόλαστος or ἄσωτος who, at first sight, might seem to injure himself, really injures the State by depriving it of the services which health or wealth enables a citizen to render. The μοιχεύων, on the other hand, is regarded rather as injuring an individual. I therefore understand the present § (6) to contain another argument to show that the ἀδικῶν *quid* ἄνισος cannot injure himself—cannot treat himself as another individual whose ‘fair share’ he encroaches upon. The arguments to show that he cannot injure himself *quid* παράνομος were concluded in § 3.

The writer of the *M. M.* would seem to have these two classes of ἀδικήματα—τὰ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν and τὰ πρὸς ἓνα—in his mind. His words are (i. 33. 1195 b. 35)—ἀλλ’ ἴσως ἐνταῦθα πάλιν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, ἄρα γε ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν; ἐκ μὲν δὴ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς σκοπομένηφ ἔοικεν ἐνδέχασθαι. καὶ πάλιν οὕτως. εἰ γὰρ ἃ ὁ νόμος πράττειν τάττει, ταῦτα ἔστιν δίκαια, ὁ μὴ πράττων ταῦτα ἀδικεῖ· καὶ εἰ πρὸς ὃν κελεύει πράττειν, πρὸς τοῦτον εἰ μὴ πράττει, τοῦτον ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δὲ νόμος κελεύει σώφρονα εἶναι, οὐσίαν κεκτησθαι, σώματος ἐπιμελείσθαι, καὶ τἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὃ ἄρα ταῦτα μὴ πράττων ἀδικεῖ αὐτόν. εἰς οὐθένα γὰρ ἄλλον τῶν τοιούτων ἀδικημάτων ἢ ἀναφορὰ ἔστιν—ἀλλὰ μὴ ποτε ταῦτα οὐκ ἀληθῆ ἦν, οὐδ’ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν αὐτόν. τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πλείον ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον, οὐδ’ ἐκόντα ἅμα καὶ ἄκοντα· ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀδικῶν, ἢ ἀδικεῖ, πλείον ἔχει, ὁ δ’ ἀδικούμενος, ἢ ἀδικεῖται, ἔλαττον. εἰ ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ, ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ πλείον ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν.—ἔτι ὁ μὲν ἀδικῶν ἐκὼν ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἀδικούμενος ἄκων ἀδικεῖται, ὥστε εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν, ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἂν ἅμα καὶ ἀκουσίως καὶ ἐκουσίως πράττειν τι τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ’ οὕτως ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν.—ἔτι εἰ τις λαμβάνοι ἐκ

τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων. ἀδικοῦσι γὰρ πάντες ἦτοι παρακαταθήκην 1138 a. 24. ἀποστεροῦντες ἢ μοιχεύοντες ἢ κλέπτοντες ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων ποιούντες· οὐδεὶς δὲ πρόποτε αὐτὸς αὐτὸν παρακαταθήκην ἀπεστέρησεν, οὐδ’ ἐμοίχευσεν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα, οὐδ’ ἔκλεψεν αὐτὸς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ· ὥστε εἰ τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἔστιν, τούτων δὲ μὴθὲν ἐνδέχεται πρὸς αὐτὸν ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

ὅλως κ.τ.λ.] ‘But indeed the question of τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν as a a. 26. whole (*i. e.* whether we understand ἀδικεῖν as παρανομεῖν or as πλεονεκτεῖν) is answered by reference to the definition of ἀδικεῖν (ch. 9. §§ 4, 5), which enabled us to answer the question of τὸ ἐκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι.

Fritzsche has the following note on the words ὅλως δὲ . . . ἀδικεῖσθαι—‘Eadem et sententia est et verba eadem quae p. 1136 b. 23 (coll. p. 1136 b. 3-4) leguntur. Quae si ab eodem scriptore posita esse credimus, magnam habent offensionem, eadem si ab alio Peripatetico (h. e. Eudemo) in simili disputatione adhibita esse sumimus, explicationem habent facilem.’ Fritzsche’s view is that the Fifth Book was written by Aristotle, with the exception of this eleventh chapter, which comes from the lost book of Eudemos *περὶ δικαιοσύνης* (see Fritzsche, *Prolegomena*, p. xlvi).

§§ 7, 8.] Jackson places these sections, ‘which have obviously a. 28. nothing to do with the ἀπορίας raised in ch. 9,’ after ch. 5, § 18. See his *Introduction*, p. xvi. Ramsauer suggests the same locus for them. The writer of the *M. M.* passes on (i. 33. 1196 a. 25) immediately from a discussion parallel to that in ch. 11, §§ 1-6, to the subject dealt with in § 9.

§ 7. καὶ ὅσπερ . . . γυμναστικῆ] These words are probably a note a. 30. from the margin. As they stand, they have no grammatical connexion with the context. A ‘codex perantiquus’ referred to by Lambinus seems to have patched up a connexion by ὅπερ ἔχει ὅσπερ ὑγιεινόν κ.τ.λ. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 77) supplies after μέσου the words τὸ δὲ δικαιοπραγεῖν μέσον.

χείρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν] The commentators refer to Plato, *Gorgias* a. 31. 443 A and 509 C.

κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς] The distinction is not, a. 33. as the Paraph. (in an alternative explanation) says, that between ἡ καθόλου ἀδικία and ἡ μερική, but (as the parenthesis after ἐγγύς

1138 a. 33. shows clearly) that between the *πάθη* which give rise to the voluntary and reprehensible, but not deliberate, acts of the *θυμῷ ποιῶν*, and the *ἕξις προαιρετική* of the *μοχθηρός* (see ch. 8, §§ 8-11). Michael Ephesius is right—*λέγων κακίαν ἀπλῶς τὴν μετὰ προαιρέσεως ὅτι τὸ ἐκούσιον ἔχει, σύνεγγυς δὲ τὴν δίχα προαιρέσεως . . . διότι οὐδὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως πᾶν ἐκούσιον· οἱ γὰρ ὀργιζόμενοι ὡς εἶπε πρότερον ἐκόντες πράττουσιν οὐ μὴν ἐκ προαιρέσεως.* The expression *τελεία κακία*, = *ἡ μετὰ προαιρέσεως*, is, however, misleading, for it suggests (as Ramsauer points out) the *ἅλη κακία* which is opposed to *ἡ τελεία ἀρετή* at the end of the first chapter of this Book.

b. 2. § 8. *ἄλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ*] Science takes no account of τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. It is concerned either with τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, or with τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.

b. 5. § 9.] For 'justice and injustice as between the parts of the soul' the commentators refer to Plato, *Rep.* 432 A, 441 A, 443 C. The writer seems to warn his readers against what he conceives to be the misleading tendency of such a presentation of justice as we have it in the *Republic*. *Metaphorically* we can speak of justice and injustice *between the parts of the soul*. But this is no good reason for affirming that a man can be unjust *in the strict sense to himself*.

b. 7. οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν] *i. e.* not τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον *as well as* τὸ δεσποτικὸν and the other forms distinguished in ch. 6, but the other forms *exclusive of* τὸ πολιτικόν. Thus the writer of the *M. M.* begins his parallel passage (i. 33. 1196 a. 25) with the words—οὐ τό γε πολιτικὸν ἀδίκημα ἀλλὰ τὸ οἰκονομικόν. Stahr translates—'Doch gilt das nicht von der Gerechtigkeit in ihrem ganzen Umfange, sondern nur von derjenigen, wie sie der Herr gegen den Sklaven, der Hausvater gegen die Familie übt.'

b. 8. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις] This must surely mean 'the theories in question'—*i. e.* the Platonic and other theories which speak of justice and injustice subsisting between the parts of the soul. But Mich. Eph. has ὅν λόγον ἔχει ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς δεσπότην τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ λογιζόμενον. τοιαύτην γὰρ διέστηκε ταῦτα διάστασιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ὡς εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον—*i. e.* he apparently takes ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις as meaning 'in this ratio.'

b. 10. βλέπουσι] dat.

δοκεῖ] They think that the man, as a whole, can injure himself, 1138 b. 10. because one part of his soul can have its desire thwarted by the other part. They think that there subsists between these parts a sort of justice like that between ruler and subject. Justice, however, is between persons *οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτοῦς* (v. 6. 4), and 'parts are not persons,' as Peters (p. 179) well puts it. A theory of justice which forgets this is as misleading as a theory of voluntary action which fails to recognise *ἡ ὅλη ψυχὴ*—the organic unity behind the struggle of the 'parts': see *E. E.* ii. 8. 1224 b. 21 (quoted by Jackson)—*ὥστε τὸ μὲν βία ἐκότερον φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκότερον ἄκοντα ποτὲ πράττειν· κεχωρισμένα γὰρ ὄντα ἐκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ἰπ' ἀλλήλων. ὅθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ὅλην μεταφέρουσι ψυχῆν, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τι τοιοῦτον ὄρωσιν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο λέγειν· ἢ δ' ὅλη ἐκούσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βία δ' οὐδέτερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφοτέρα ἔχομεν.*

ὅτι ἐν τούτοις] Jackson brackets ἐν.

τὰς αὐτῶν ὀρέξεις] *i. e.* the *ὀρέξεις* of the several *μέρη*. The *ὄρεξις* b. 11. of the *λόγον ἔχον μέρος* may be thwarted by the *ἄλογον μέρος*, and *vice versa*. 'An *ὄρεξις* is loosely and *κατὰ μεταφοράν* attributed to the *λόγον ἔχον*' (Jackson).

ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχόμενῳ] The editors quote *Pol.* A. 5. 1260 a. 5 ἐν b. 12. ταύτῃ [*i. e.* τῇ ψυχῇ] γὰρ ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον, ὧν ἑτέραν φαιμέν εἶναι ἀρετὴν, οὖν τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἄλογου.

§ 10. τῶν ἠθικῶν] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 62) omits τῶν with L^b and b. 13. M^b [and NC.].

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