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PHÆDO

OR,

The Immortality of the Soul,

BY

PLATO.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK BY
CHARLES S. STANFORD.

A NEW EDITION, ENRICHED WITH ARCHBISHOP FENELON'S "LIFE OF PLATO,"
THE OPINIONS OF ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL, AND MODERN PHILOSOPHERS
AND DIVINES ON THE SOUL'S IMMORTALITY; TOGETHER
WITH NOTES HISTORICAL, BIOGRAPHICAL AND
MYTHOLOGICAL.

Plato, thou reasonest well,
Else whence this pleasing hope, this fond delight,
This longing after immortality?
Or whence this secret dread, and inward horror
Of falling into naught? Why shrinks the soul
Back on herself, and startles at destruction?
'Tis the divinity that stirs within us;
'Tis heaven itself that points out an hereafter,
And intimates eternity to man.—Addison's *Cato*.

Dr. Roger Ascham, on a visit to the family of the Marquis of Dorset, at his seat at Broadgate, found on his arrival that Lady Jane Grey was alone, the rest of the family being engaged in a hunting party; to his great surprise he found her reading the *Phædon* of Plato. She observed to him that the sport which her friends were enjoying was but a shadow compared with the pleasure she received from this sublime author. *David Hume*.


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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
ADVERTISEMENT	v
PREFACE	vi
LIFE OF PLATO	lx
A CATALOGUE OF THE WRITINGS OF PLATO.....	xxi
INTRODUCTION	xxxix
PHEDO; OR, THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL	1
OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENT, INTERMEDIATE, AND MODERN PHILOSOPHERS AND DIVINES, CONCERNING THE IMMOR- TALITY OF THE SOUL	121
NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS	201

ADVERTISEMENT.

ON again* offering to the public this world-renowned treatise of the Athenian philosopher, it is proper to state that particular care has been taken to select a version calculated to impart the most correct idea of the original, and that too in a style likely to find acceptance with the general reader. The high value attached to the *Phædo* is strikingly attested by the numerous English translations of this dialogue that have appeared at various times. Of these there exist not fewer than twenty, some of which may be characterized as barbarous attempts, others as respectable, and a few decidedly meritorious, and stamped with the approbation of the ablest scholars. After collecting and comparing the chief of these performances, the preference was considered due to Mr. Stanford's version, which appeared to combine a faithful exhibition of the sense of the author, with an uncommon degree of force and elegance in its language—excellences not very frequently attained, and evincing a masterly acquaintance with both languages.

A life of the philosopher, written by Archbishop Fenelon, has been prefixed. Notes, historical, biographical, and mythological, have been added, which have been drawn

* An edition of twenty-five hundred copies of the *Phædo* was published in this city in 1833.

chiefly from Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography; Lempriere's Classical Dictionary; Abbé Banier's Mythology of the Ancients; Moreri's Great Historical Dictionary, and Potter's Antiquities of Greece.

An addition, which it was thought might be desirable, has been made, in the shape of an appendix, exhibiting the opinions of the most famous men of ancient and modern times, concerning the soul and its immortality, as well as the ideas prevalent amongst remote nations, besides a selection of Scripture proofs on the subject.

A catalogue of all the books known to have been written on the immortality of the soul and a future state, has been compiled with great diligence, and hereto subjoined. It will be found of signal advantage to those having occasion to consult authors on this subject.

The portrait, in front of the volume, is believed to be the most correct likeness extant of Plato; indeed, the beholder must feel that it realizes his preconceived idea of the author, with his amiable disposition and sublime genius, for its expression is replete with moral and intellectual beauty, betokening one no less to be loved than admired, and such appears eminently to have been the character of Plato. The engraving was taken from the copy of a likeness on a gem, found when excavating some of the ruins of Athens, and purchased from the discoverer by a German nobleman, an enthisiastic collector of such relics.

WILLIAM GOWANS.

PREFACE.

THE following translation being intended to accompany the edition of Plato's Apology, Crito, and Phædo, lately published, with English notes by the same author, it has been thought unnecessary to reprint the arguments of the dialogues, or to illustrate them by any further comment.

The attention of the translator has been principally directed towards preserving, as far as lay in his power, the style and spirit of his author; and while it has been his object on the one hand to avoid that literal adherence to the original which would infallibly render the translation uninviting to the general reader, he has, it is hoped, on the other, kept the text sufficiently in his view to suit the particular purposes of the academic student.

Towards the explanation of such obscurities as occur in the course of the work, he has in very few instances applied his own unassisted powers. Among the many distinguished scholars, of whose labours he has availed himself, the name of Victor Cousin deservedly ranks foremost. The version of this elegant and correct translator has been of the most essential service to him throughout.

But in those parts of the original of which the peculiar doctrines of the Platonic philosophy form the subject, the translator felt that he had a discretion to exercise. He has

taken considerable pains to unfold, without actual paraphrase, the more subtle intricacies of the arguments for the immortality of the soul. These arguments required his closest attention; although those who are acquainted with this part of the philosopher's system are aware that they are too often trivial in proportion as they are perplexing, and sometimes indeed appear to be wrapped in a veil of scholastic mysticism for the purpose of concealing their intrinsic deficiency.

Of the Phædo, however, the nobleness of the design, the importance of the subject, and the steady process of reasoning carried on throughout, must still continue to render it what it has ever been, the admiration of the enlightened world. It is unjust to measure the genius of the ancients, or the works of antiquity, by the standard of modern advancement; and it is as impossible to look without respect upon this monument of all that the most sublime *philosophy* could effect, as to refrain from rejoicing, that on its ruins has since been reared a structure as superior to the ancient edifice in grandeur and proportion, as heaven and divinity tower above man and the proudest of his works.

18, TRINITY COLLEGE,
October 20th, 1835.

LIFE OF PLATO.

PLATO, the sublimity of whose doctrine has procured him the appellation of *The Divine*, was born in the 88th Olympiad. He was descended from one of the most illustrious families in Athens; by his father, whose name was Aristo, he was descended of Codrus; and by his mother, Perictione, of Solon.

As to himself, his name was at first Aristocles; but being tall and robust, and especially as he had a large forehead and broad shoulders, he was afterwards surnamed Plato, by which he was afterwards distinguished.

It is said that, whilst yet in the cradle, bees shed honey on his lips; which was considered as a presage of that astonishing eloquence by which he afterwards distinguished himself above all the Greeks.

During his youth, poetry was his favourite study; and he then composed two tragedies and several elegies, all of which, when he resolved to devote himself to philosophy, he threw into the fire.

When his father presented him to Socrates to form his mind, he was twenty years of age. The night prior to this Socrates had a dream, in which he seemed to have in his bosom a young swan, which, when the feathers were come

upon it, displayed its wings, and, singing with inexpressible sweetness, with intrepid flight raised itself to the highest regions of the air.—That philosopher did not doubt but it referred to Plato, to whom he applied it; considering it as a presage of that unbounded fame which his pupil was destined one day to enjoy.

He adhered inviolably to Socrates, while the latter lived; but after his death he attached himself to Cratylus, who followed the opinions of Heraclitus, and to Hermogenes, who entertained those of Parmenides.*

At the age of twenty-eight, he, with the other followers of Socrates, went to Megara, to study under Euclid; † he next went to Cyrene, where he studied mathematics under Theodorus; from that place he passed into Italy to hear the lessons of Philolaus, Archytas of Tarentum, and Eurytus, the three famous Pythagoreans of that time. Not contented with all he could learn from these great masters, he travelled into Egypt, to receive the instructions of the doctors and priests of that country; and he had formed the design of going to India also, but was prevented by the wars by which Asia was at that time convulsed.

Upon his return to Athens ‡ after all his travels, he settled

* Parmenides flourished about the 99th Olympiad. Plato has testified his regard for him, by having inscribed his dialogue concerning Ideas with his name.—*Vide Diog. Laert.*

† This was a step which, in their situation, prudence would dictate to Plato as well as to the other scholars of Socrates; for, if vengeful odium burst on the head of the venerable Socrates, how much more might it on his followers?—*Vid. Rollin, Anc. Hist. vol. iii. book ix. c. 4. § 7.*

‡ Things had now taken a turn at Athens: "Melitus was condemned to die, and the rest of Socrates's enemies banished: Plutarch observes, that all those who had any share in this black calumny, (against Socrates,) were held in such abomination among the citizens, that no one would give them fire, answer them any question, or go into the

in a quarter called the *Academy*, an unwholesome place, which he purposely chose, as a necessary corrective to that overgrown state of body, with good health, which he then possessed. The remedy had the desired effect; for he there had a quartan ague, which lasted a year and a half; but, by temperance and proper regimen, he managed so well that he recovered from that fever, which confirmed his health and strengthened his constitution.

On three different occasions he served as a soldier: the first time at Tanagra, the second at Corinth, and the third at Delos, in which last expedition his party was victorious. He was three times in Sicily also: on the first occasion, he was induced by curiosity to visit that island, that he might see the volcano of Mount *Ætna*; he was then forty years of age: he appeared, at this time, at the court of Dionysius the elder, tyrant of Sicily, who had expressed a desire to see him.

The freedom with which Plato spoke against tyranny would have cost him his life, had it not been for the good offices of Dion and Aristomenes: Dionysius put him, notwithstanding, into the hands of the Lacedæmonian ambassador Polides, to whom he gave orders to sell him for a slave; by this ambassador he was brought to *Ægina*, where he was sold.—There was in *Ægina* a law by which all Athenians were prohibited, on pain of death, from coming into that island: under pretence of enforcing this law, one Charmander accused him as worthy of being put to death; but some having alleged that the law was made against men and not against philosophers, it was thought fit to

same bath with them, and had the place cleansed where they had bathed, lest they should be polluted by touching it; which drove them to such despair, that many of them killed themselves."—*Rollin. ubi supra.*

profit by the distinction, and, accordingly, to sell him. Happily for him, Anniceris of Cyrene, who was then at Ægina, bought him for twenty *mina*, sent him back to Athens, and thus restored him to his friends.

Polides, the Lacedæmonian, who first sold him, was defeated by Chabrias and afterwards perished by sea, as a punishment for what he had made the philosopher Plato suffer, as (it was pretended) a demon had declared to himself.

Dionysius the elder knowing that he had returned to Athens, and fearing lest he should avenge himself by aspersing his character, condescended to write to him, and in some measure to beg his pardon: Plato, in his answer, assured him that he might keep himself perfectly at ease on that head; for, that *philosophy gave him too much employment to leave him any time to think of him*. Some of his enemies having reproached him for having been abandoned by the tyrant Dionysius, "It is not," said he, "Dionysius that has abandoned Plato; it is Plato who has abandoned Dionysius."

He went a second time into Sicily in the reign of Dionysius the younger, in the hope of inducing that tyrant to restore their liberty to his fellow-citizens, or, at least, to govern his subjects with mildness; but seeing that the tyrant, so far from profiting by his lessons, had banished Dion and was continuing to exercise the same despotism as his father had done, he returned to Athens after a stay of four months, notwithstanding the urgency of the tyrant, who paid him every attention, and who exerted himself to the utmost to detain him.

He returned to the tyrant of Syracuse a third time, urging him to permit the return of Dion, and pressing him to divest himself of the sovereign power; but as Dionysius,

after granting his request, failed in carrying it into effect, he reproached him with breaking his word, and irritated him to such a degree that he was in danger of his life, which he might have perhaps lost, had not Archytas of Tarentum sent an ambassador with a ship, for the express purpose of re-demanding him from the tyrant. At the request of Archytas, Dionysius not only permitted him to return, but furnished the vessel with all provisions necessary for the voyage.

Plato now set off for Athens, with the resolution never again to leave it: he was received there with uncommon marks of distinction; but though strongly urged to take a share in the government, he refused it, thinking it impossible to do any good in it, amid the general depravation of manners which then prevailed.

But nothing is a stronger proof of the high estimation in which he was held in Greece, than what happened to him at the Olympic games: He was received as a god descended from heaven; and all the different nations of Greece, though ever eager to gaze upon spectacles, and though the magnificence of the Olympic games had drawn them together from every quarter, left the chariot-races and the combats of the *Atletæ*, to pay their undivided attention to Plato, and to express the pleasure which they felt on seeing a man whom they had heard utter so many wonderful things.

He spent his life in celibacy, observed the strictest rules of decorum, and never transgressed the laws of continence. Such was his self-command, that even in his youth he was never observed to laugh immoderately; and so completely had he the mastery over his passions, that he was never observed to be angry. Connected with this, is the account given us of a young man who had been brought up with

him; this youth, having been afterwards brought home by his parents, was one day surprised at seeing his father in a rage, and could not refrain remarking, "that he had never seen anything like this in Plato's house." It never happened but once, that he was a little irritated against one of his slaves, who had committed a considerable fault; he made him be corrected by another, saying, that, "as he was a little angry, he himself was not in a capacity to punish him."

Though he was naturally of a melancholy and studious turn of mind, as we are informed by Aristotle,* he was possessed of affability and a certain degree of pleasantry, and amused himself on some occasions with innocent railleries: he sometimes advised Xenocrates and Dion, whose characters he thought too much tinctured with severity, "to sacrifice to the Graces," in order to become more gentle and affable.

He had several scholars, of whom the most distinguished were Speusippus, his nephew, by Potona his sister, who had married Eurimedon; Xenocrates of Chalcedon, and the celebrated Aristotle. It is alleged, that Theophrastus also was among the number of his auditors, and that Demosthenes always considered him as his master. This last, indeed, having taken sanctuary to save himself from the hands of Antipater, when Archias, whom Antipater had sent to seize him, promised him his life to induce him to leave his asylum; "Forbid it, Heaven!" said he, "that after hearing Xenocrates and Plato on the immortality of the soul, I should prefer a shameful life to an honourable death."

Two women likewise have been reckoned among the

* Aristotle was a scholar of Plato's.

number of his disciples; the one was Lasthenia of Mantinea, and the other Axiothea of Phylisia, both of whom used to dress like men, as more suited to the dignity of philosophy, which they professed.

So highly did he value geometry, and so necessary did he deem it to philosophy, that he caused this inscription to be written on the entrance into the Academy: "Let no one enter here who is not conversant in geometry."

All the works of Plato (except his letters, of which twelve only are now extant) are in the form of dialogues. These dialogues may be divided into three kinds: those in which he refutes the sophists; others in which the instruction of youth is his object; and the third kind consists of those which are adapted to persons arrived at maturity. There is still another distinction to be made in these dialogues: for all that Plato says in his own character, in his Letters, in his Books concerning Laws, and in his *Epinomis*, he delivers as his own real and proper doctrine; but what he delivers under borrowed names, as that of Socrates, Timæus, Parmenides, or Zeno, he gives as probable only, without warranting the truth of what is affirmed.

What is said in the character of Socrates, however, in these dialogues, though quite in the style and method which Socrates followed in disputation, we are not to consider as always the true sentiments of that philosopher; since Socrates himself, on reading the dialogue entitled *Lysis* on Friendship, which Plato had written while his master was alive, could not help charging him with misrepresentation, by exclaiming, "Immortal gods! how many things this young man represents me as saying, of which I never so much as thought!"

The style of Plato, according to the testimony of his scholar Aristotle, kept a mean distance, so to speak, be-

tween the elevation of poesy and the simplicity of prose. So admirable was it in the eyes of Cicero, that he makes no hesitation in saying, that were Jupiter to converse in the language of men, he would express himself exactly in Plato's phrase: Panætius used to style him the Homer of philosophers; which coincides very much with the judgment afterwards passed on him by Quintilian, who treats him as divine, and Homeric.

He formed a system of doctrines, composed of the opinions of three philosophers. In what regards physics and sensible objects, he follows the sentiments of Heraclitus: In metaphysics, and those subjects which are addressed exclusively to the intellect, he has taken Pythagoras for his guide: in politics and moral he considered Socrates to be superior to all, and followed him exclusively as his model.

Plato (as Plutarch relates in chap. iii. book 1. *On the opinions of philosophers*) admitted three first principles; *God, matter, idea*: *God*, as the universal intelligence; *matter*, as the substratum or first requisite in generation and corruption; *idea*, as an incorporeal substance, resident in the divine mind.

He indeed acknowledged the world to be the work of a God who created; but did not by that term understand creation in its strict and proper sense: for he supposed that God had only formed or built it, so to speak, out of matter which had eternally pre-existed; so that this God is the Creator of the world in so far only as he has destroyed the chaos and given form to brute, inactive matter; as architects and masons, by cutting and arranging in a certain order, inactive stones, may thus be called the *makers* or *builders* of the house.*

* None of the ancient heathen philosophers ever entertained any sublime notions of the Deity, or creation. That *from nothing, nothing*

It has always been supposed that Plato had some knowledge of the true God, the result either of his own reason or of the writings of the Hebrews, to which he might have had access;* but it must at the same time be granted, that Plato is one of those philosophers of whom Paul speaks when he says, "Knowing God, they glorified him not as God, but indulged the vanity of their own imaginations."†

In fact, he acknowledges, in his *Epinomis*, three kinds of gods: superior, inferior, and intermediate. The superior gods, according to him, inhabit the heavens, and by the excellence of their nature, and by the place in which they reside, are so far exalted above us, that, except by the intervention of the intermediate gods, who inhabit the air,

can be produced, was received as an axiom which it would be madness to dispute; and measuring the power of the Deity by their own, they were in a great measure ignorant of both. Revelation represents the Deity calling existence out of nothing, and creating the world by the word of his power. This is an idea that transcends, in sublimity, all that heathen poets ever sung, or heathen philosophers ever taught.—Longinus, who had seen the Scriptures, says, that the most sublime expression that ever he had seen or heard was that of the Jewish law-giver:—"God said, Let there be light; and there was light."

* Some parts of the Septuagint version of the Old Testament in Greek, might have been seen by Plato while in Egypt, though it certainly was not completed till at least seventy years after his death; for it is most probable, that the version now in question was the production of different and considerably distant periods; and that it was completed and collected, under the patronage of Ptolemy Philadelphus about A. M. 3727, or before Christ 276 years. (Vid. *Stackhouse, Hist. of Bible*, vol. 1. *Apparat.* p. 87. *Rollin Anc. Hist.* vol. vii. (10 vol. cop.) p. 276, and *Bos. edit. of LXX. proleg.*) At the same time, the advocates of Divine Revelation have very little temptation to claim the doctrines of Plato, as peculiar to the Scriptures. Vid. *Shuckford's Connections*, vol. i. pref. p. 51, edit. Lond. 1743.

† Rom. i. 21. Instead of adopting our English translation, I have followed Feneion

and whom he styles dæmons, mankind can hold no intercourse with them.

These dæmons, the superior gods commission as ministers to the human race. They carry the commands of the gods to men; and to the gods, the offerings and vows of men. each has his own department in the government of the world: they preside over oracles and divinations; and are the authors of all the miracles which are performed, and of the prodigies which happen.

There is every reason to believe, that Plato's notions of the second species of gods, were founded on what is said of angels in scripture, of which he had some knowledge; but besides these, he admits a third kind of gods, inferior to the second: these he places in rivers: he contents himself by qualifying them with the title of demi-gods, and assigning them the power of sending dreams and performing other wonders, like the intermediate gods; he says farther, that all the elements and all the parts of the universe are full of these demi-gods, who, according to him, sometimes appear and then vanish from our view: here you have, in all probability, the origin of sylphs, salamanders, the elves, (*ondains*), and the gnomes of the Cabala.*

Plato also taught the doctrine of Mytempsciosis, which he had borrowed from Pythagoras and adapted to his own system; as may be seen in his dialogues entitled Phædo, Phædrus, and Timæus, &c.

Though Plato has composed an excellent dialogue on the immortality of the soul, yet he has fallen into gross errors on this subject, both in relation to the substance of the soul—which he believed to be composed of two parts, the one spiritual, the other corporeal—and in regard to its origin.

* Vid. *Le compte de Gabaëls*, and *Pope's Rape of the Lock*.

considering souls as pre-existing, and derived from heaven, to animate different bodies in succession; and that, after having been purified, they shall return to heaven, from which, at the end of a certain number of years, they shall be again employed to animate, successively, different bodies; so that there would be nothing but a continual round of defilement and purification, and returns to heaven and dismissions to earth, to animate bodies.

As he thought that these souls did not forget, entirely, what they had experienced in the different bodies which they had animated, he pretended, that the knowledge which they acquire is reminiscence of what they had formerly known, rather than new knowledge; and on this gratuitously assumed reminiscence, he founded his dogma of the pre-existence of souls.*

* The reasoning here exhibited, on which Plato founded the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, comes under that species of sophism styled by logicians *reasoning in a circle*.—Thus, the very light of the heathens was darkness; and the foundation of their confidence was nothing more stable than doubt. (*Vid. Tusc. Quest. lib. i.*)—It was reserved for Jesus Christ “to bring life and immortality to light by the gospel.”

Plato supposed the human soul to be an emanation of the divinity: “*Divine particulam auri*,” and that after purification by various transmigrations, it was again re-absorbed into the divine essence.—But this hypothesis, instead of proving, would disprove the immortality of the soul. The emanation of the divinity, for instance, that constituted the soul of Plato, was a distinct individual whilst it animated his body or any other body into which it might afterwards enter; its enjoyments and sufferings were referable to the individual called *self*, by an unavoidable impulse or spontaneity of nature; or, to speak more philosophically, by a continuity of consciousness, linked together by memory and producing an invincible conviction of personal identity: but when re-absorbed into the divine essence, its personal identity and appropriating consciousness must cease with its separate existence; and, to the individual, this is equal to annihilation.

Again, on the supposition that the soul was created, (the only rationa-

But, without dilating any more on the opinions of this philosopher, which he has considerably involved in mysticism, suffice it to say, that his doctrines on many points appeared so novel and so sublime, that during his life they procured him the epithet Divine, and after his death made him to be regarded almost as a god.

He died on his birthday, in the first year of the 108th Olympiad, aged eighty-one years.

or tenable doctrine,) Plato and his disciples allowed that it must perish, "*Vult enim (Panætius scil.) quod nemo negat, quicquid natum est, interire.*"—*Tusc. Disput.* lib. i. 32. The natural tendency of Plato's doctrine, then, is to prove the soul to be mortal, and the Deity mutable and perishable, by an indefinite number of emanations.—It is only by considering the acquisitions of the ancients that we can ascertain our own advantages; and in the case to which we have now been attending, we see how true it is, that even the wisest of them, "by wisdom knew not God;" and that their most laboured arguments to prove the immortality of the soul, went no farther than "a fond desire and longing after immortality."

For a specimen of beautiful confusion, in explaining Plato's doctrine of the immortality of the soul, see CICERO's *Somnium Scipionis*; and, for a proof of its incapability to convince his own mind, see his *Tusculan Questions* lib. i. *sub. init.*

CATALOGUE

OF THE WRITINGS OF

PLATO.

The First Alcibiades.

A Dialogue concerning the nature of Man. The most peculiar principle of all Plato's writings, and the whole theory of this philosopher, is the knowledge of our own nature; for, this being properly established as an hypothesis, we shall be able accurately to learn the good which is adapted to us, and the evil which opposes this good.

The Republic.

The Republic is the most important and the most carefully elaborate in the entire series of the Platonic dialogues, it being the summary of Plato's whole ethical system, and combining the results of most of the other treatises.

The Laws.

Plato having in his imaginary Republic delineated what he conceived to be the best form of government, and prescribed the course of instruction by which the people living under such a polity might be brought up and fitted for it, has in the Laws detailed some of the leading enactments which such a constitution would require. To carry out this idea, he supposes that three elderly statesmen come together, belonging respectively to Athens, Crete, and Lacedæmon; and that the first is requested by the second to lay down a code of laws, which the Cretan is desirous of submitting to his countrymen previous to their re-establishment of a city which had been depopulated. For Clinias had been appointed as one of the

ten commissioners of Cnossus, authorized to draw up a code, such as they might think of themselves, or obtain from any other quarter.

The Epinomis;

Or, The Philosopher. A Nocturnal Conversation. This dialogue is designed as a supplement to the Laws. Its authorship has been attributed to another, namely, Philip Opuntius, a contemporary of Plato. It is highly valuable for its antiquity as well as for its intrinsic merit.

The Timæus.

A Dialogue concerning Nature. This dialogue comprises the full and almost sole development of his speculations on the formation of the universe and the organization of man.

The Critias;

Or, Atlanticus. The Critias can be considered only as an historical, or rather, mythical speculation on the Timæus; and it appears to have been left unfinished at the author's death.

Parmenides;

Or, On Idealities. Being a Dialogue concerning the Gods. Of all the dialogues of Plato, the Parmenides is one of the most remarkable. For not only does it turn upon questions relating to the most abstruse abstractions of metaphysics, but the manner too in which the subject is handled, affords the best illustration of that "sapientiae insanientis"—cleverness without sound sense—in the meshes of which Horace says he was at one time caught, and to which he might have fairly applied his own graphic verse. By a chain of reasoning, where subtleties assume the garb of truths, conclusions are arrived at, so as to fully justify the fear, which Socrates is here feigned to feel, that by pursuing metaphysical inquiries he would fall into the bottomless sea of trifling. Such, at least, seems to have been the fate of every commentator who has ventured to enter the maze of mind which Plato has with such art built up. For neither Proclus and Damascius of the olden time, nor more recently Ficinus; nor, within the last hundred years, Taylor, in England; Schleiermacher and others, in Germany; nor Cousin in France, have been able to understand thoroughly themselves, and to explain satisfactorily to others, what is likely to remain for ever an intellectual puzzle.

It is then a fortunate circumstance for such as may be still disposed to enter the labyrinth, that Stalbaum has furnished them with a clue, by prefixing to his edition of the Parmenides, published at Leipsic in 1848, four books of elaborate Prolegomena, running to 343 octavo pages. For the reader will find there an ample and generally satisfactory discussion on various points connected with the doctrines promulgated in the dialogue.

The Sophist.

A Dialogue on Being. After producing in the Euthdemus some specimens of the apparently clever, but really absurd subtleties of which the Sophists of Greece were wont to make a display, and to gain the admiration of those who could not detect a fallacy, and the contempt of those who could, Plato has in this dialogue pointed out in what class of persons those must be placed who profess to be on all questions of philosophy, politics, and science, equally competent to raise a doubt or to solve one.

The Phædrus.

A Dialogue concerning the Beautiful. Some say that this dialogue is concerning rhetoric, looking only to its beginning and end; others, that it is about the soul, since here especially Socrates demonstrates its immortality; and others, that it is about love, since the beginning and occasion of the dialogue originates from this. For Lysias had written an oration in order to prove that it is not proper to gratify a lover, but one who is not; he being vehemently in love with Phædrus, but pretending that he was not. Wishing, therefore, to withdraw from other lovers, he viciously composed an oration, the design of which was to show that it is requisite rather to gratify one who is not a lover, than one who is, which gave occasion to Socrates to discourse concerning this intemperate love, together with temperate, divine, and enthusiastic love, because it is a love of the latter kind which should be embraced and followed. Others again assert that the dialogue is theological, on account of what is said in the middle of it. But, according to others, its subject is the good, because Socrates says that the supercelestial place has never been celebrated according to its deserts, and that an uncolored and unfigured essence there subsists. And lastly, others assert that it is concerning the beautiful. All these, therefore, form their opinion of the whole scope of the dialogue, from a certain point of it; but which is in the right has never as yet been determined.

Hippias the Greater.

A *Dialogue concerning the Beautiful, considered as subsisting in the Soul.* Of all the dialogues of Plato, the *Hippias Major* is perhaps the one the best calculated to give a correct idea of the easy and playful manner in which Socrates, who confessed he knew nothing, was accustomed to confute those who pretend to know every thing.

The design of the dialogue is gradually to unfold the nature of the beautiful as subsisting in the soul. That this is the real design of it will be at once evident by considering that logical methods are adapted to whatever pertains to the soul, in consequence of its energies being naturally discursive, but do not accord with intellect, because its vision is simple, at once collected, and immediate. Hence the dialogue is replete with trials and confutations, definitions and demonstrations, divisions, compositions, and analyses; but that part of the *Phædrus* in which beauty according to its first substance is discussed, has none of these, because its character is enthusiastic.

The Banquet.

A *Dialogue concerning Love.* This dialogue is a discussion upon love, and it is supposed to have taken place at the house of Agathon, at one of a series of festivals given by the poet, on the occasion of his gaining the prize of tragedy at the Dionysion. The account of the debate on this occasion is supposed to have been given by Apollodorus, a pupil of Socrates, many years after it had taken place, to a companion who was curious to hear it. This Apollodorus appears, both from the style in which he is represented in this piece, as well as from a passage in the *Phædo*, to have been a person of an impassioned and enthusiastic disposition; to borrow an image from the Italian painters, he seems to have been the St. John of the Socratic group.

Theætetus.

A *Dialogue on Science.* Theodorus, a famous geometrician of Cyrene, and a follower of Protagoras, is represented to have met Socrates at Athens, and to have been asked by him whether among his pupils there were any who promised to become eminent. Theodorus particularized one above all the rest, who, while he is speaking, is seen approaching. His name is Theætetus. Socrates, having heard him so highly spoken of by Theodorus, at once opens

upon the subject which he wishes to discuss, and asks what science is. Theætetus, in answer, enumerates several particular sciences, but is soon led to understand that the question is not, how many sciences there are, but what science itself is; and by an instance in point shows that he does so. Still he doubts his own ability to answer the question proposed, but is at length induced to make the attempt by Socrates pleasantly describing himself as inheriting his own mother's skill in midwifery, by which he is able to bring to the birth and deliver the mental conceptions of those whose souls are pregnant with ideas.

The Statesman.

A *Dialogue concerning a Kingdom.* The object of this dialogue is to show that the head of the state, who should be a king, ought to combine not only in his own person, but in that of the people over whom he rules, the two conflicting characters—manliness and moderation. For by such a union alone is it possible to correct the mischiefs arising equally from the excess and deficiency of energy in all matters relating to the well being of a state.

The Minos.

A *Dialogue concerning Law.* This dialogue takes its name, as also does Hipparchus, not from either of the persons introduced in it, but from the Cretan Minos, whose character and laws are mentioned pretty much at large. Socrates, and another Athenian nearly of the same age, who is not named, are considering the nature of laws in it; and the intention of Plato is to show, that there is a law of nature and of truth, common to all men, to which all truly legal institutions must be conformable, and which is the real foundation of them all. Unfortunately the dialogue remains imperfect; it is indeed probable that it was never finished.

The Apology of Socrates.

The elevation and greatness of mind for which Socrates was so justly celebrated by antiquity, are perhaps no where so conspicuously displayed as in this—his *Apology*. In a situation in which death itself was presented to his view, he neither deviates from the most rigid veracity, nor has recourse to any of those abject arts by which in similar circumstances pity is generally solicited and punishment is sometimes averted. His whole discourse, indeed, is full of simplicity and noble grandeur, and is the energetic language of conscious and offended worth.

Crito;

Or, The Duty of a Citizen. It has been remarked by Stalbaum, that Plato had a twofold design in this dialogue, one, and that the primary one, to free Socrates from the imputation of having attempted to corrupt the Athenian youth; the other, to establish the principle that under all circumstances it is the duty of a good citizen to obey the laws of his country. These two points, however, are so closely interwoven with each other, that the general principle appears only to be illustrated by the example of Socrates.

Phædo.

A Dialogue concerning the Immortality of the Soul. The subject of this dialogue between Socrates and a certain number of his disciples, as is well known to every reader, was to prove that the soul of man had an eternal existence after its separation from the body.

Socrates begins by stating that philosophy itself is nothing else than a preparation for death and meditation on death. Death and philosophy have this in common; death separates the soul from the body, philosophy draws off the mind from the bodily things to the contemplation of truth and virtue; for he is not a true philosopher who is led away by bodily pleasures, since the senses are the source of ignorance and all evil; the mind, therefore, is entirely occupied in meditating on death, and freeing itself as much as possible from the body. How, then, can such a man be afraid of death? He who grieves at the approach of death cannot be a true lover of wisdom, but is a lover of his body. And, indeed, most men are temperate through intemperance, that is to say, they abstain from some pleasures that they may more easily and permanently enjoy others. They embrace only a shadow of virtue, not virtue itself, since they estimate the value of all things by the pleasure they afford. Whereas the philosopher purifies his mind from all such things, and pursues virtue and wisdom for their own sakes. This course Socrates himself had pursued to the utmost of his ability, with what success he should shortly know; and on these grounds he did not repine at leaving his friends in this world, being persuaded that in another he should meet with good masters and good friends. This dialogue is no less remarkable for the masterly manner of its composition, than for the different effects which the perusal of it is related to have formerly produced. For the arguments which it contains for the immortality of the soul, are said to have incited Cleombrotus to suicide, and to have dissuaded Olym-

piodorus from its perpetration. Indeed, it is by no means wonderful that a person like Cleombrotus, ignorant (as his conduct evinces) that the death so much inculcated in this dialogue is a philosophic, and not a natural death, should be led to an action which is in most cases highly criminal. This ignorance is not peculiar to Cleombrotus, since I am afraid there are scarcely any of the present day who know that it is one thing for the soul to be separated from the body, and another for the body to be separated from the soul, and that the former is by no means a necessary consequence of the latter.

The Gorgias;

Or, A Dialogue concerning Rhetoric. With respect to the scope of this dialogue, it has appeared to be different to different persons. For some say that the design of Plato was to discourse concerning rhetoric; and thereby inscribe it "Gorgias, or concerning Rhetoric"—for Gorgias was considered a great rhetorician—but improperly, for they characterized the whole from a part. Others again say, the dialogue is concerning justice and injustice; showing that the just are happy, and the unjust unfortunate and miserable. Likewise that by how much the more unjust a man is, by so much the more is he miserable; that in proportion as his injustice is extended by time, in such proportion is he more miserable; and if it were immortal, he would be most miserable.

The dramatic apparatus then is as follows:—Gorgias, the Leontine, came from the Leontines, in Sicily, as an ambassador to the Athenians, respecting a confederation, and the war against the Syracusians. He had also with him Polus, who delighted in rhetoric, and he dwelt in the house of Callicles, the public orator of the Athenians. This Callicles, too, was delighted with skilful rhetoricians, but made pleasure the end of life, and deceived the Athenians, always addressing them in the language of Demosthenes, "What do you wish? What shall I write? In what can I gratify you?" Gorgias, therefore, displayed his art, and so captivated the Athenian people, that they called the days in which he exhibited, *Festivals*, and his periods, *Lamps*. Whence Socrates, perceiving the people thus deceived, and being able to extend good to all youth, framed the design of saving the souls both of the Athenians and of Gorgias himself. Taking therefore with him Chærephilus the philosopher, who is mentioned by Aristophanes, they went to the house of Callicles, and there their conferences and investigations of theorems took place.

The Phædrus.

A Dialogue concerning the Chief Good of Man. The design of this dialogue is to discover what is the chief good of man; and in order to effect this in the most perfect manner, it is divided into twelve parts. In the first part, therefore, Plato proposes the subject of discussion, viz.: What the good of man is, and whether wisdom or pleasure is more conducive to the attainment of this good. In the second part, he explains the condition of a voluptuous life, and also of a life according to wisdom, that it may be seen which of the two most contributes to felicity, and also whether some third state of life will appear, which is better than either of these; and that, if this should be the case, it may be seen whether pleasure or wisdom is more allied to the perfection of this life. In the third part he shows how this discussion should be conducted, and that division and definition should precede demonstration. In the fourth he describes the conditions of the good, and shows that neither wisdom nor pleasure is the chief good of man, &c.

The Second Alcibiades.

A Dialogue concerning Prayer. The Second Alcibiades is on a subject which ranks among the most important to a rational being, for with it is connected piety, which is the summit of virtue. Hence as all nations in the infinity of time past have believed in the existence of certain divine powers superior to man, who beneficently provide for all inferior natures, and defend them from evil; so likewise they worshipped these powers by numerous religious rites, of which prayer formed no inconsiderable part. The exceptions, indeed, to this general belief of mankind are so few that they do not deserve to be noticed. For we may say, with the excellent Maximus Tyrius, that, "if through the whole of time there have been two or three atheists, they were grovelling and insensate men, whose eyes wandered, whose ears were deceived, whose souls were mutilated, a race irrational, barren, and useless, resembling a timid lion, an ox without horns, a bird without wings." All others, as well as those engaged in public affairs, as philosophers who explored the hidden causes of things, most constantly believed that there were gods, viz.: one first ineffable source of all things, and a multitude of divine powers proceeding from and united with him; and always endeavoured to render these divine natures propitious by sacrifice and prayer. Hence, the Chaldeans among the Assyrians, the Brahmins among the Indians, the Druids among

the Gauls, the Magi among the Persians, and the tribe of priests among the Egyptians, constantly applied themselves to the worship of divinity, and venerated and adored the gods by various sacred ceremonies, and ardent and assiduous prayers.

The Euthyphron.

A Dialogue concerning Holiness. We may collect from this dialogue and the Gorgias, that holiness, according to Plato, is that part of justice which attributes to divinity that which is his own. But as man is a composite being, and the different parts of his composition were produced, according to the Platonic theology, from different divinities, perfect piety will consist in consecrating to each deity that part of us which he immediately gave.

Mino;

Or, A Dialogue concerning Virtue. The object of this dialogue is to inquire into the nature of Virtue in the abstract; to ascertain whether it can or can not be taught; and to show that the knowledge we now possess is but the recollection of what the mind was conversant with at some former period. On the first of these points Plato, as usual, arrives at no conclusion. For Socrates, who is merely Plato's mouth-piece, and not, as many imagine, the exponent of his own opinion, never pretended to know anything in the abstract. He was therefore content to show, that for the development of virtue, a correct moral conduct, founded on prudence, temperance, and justice, is all that is requisite.

With regard to the question, whether virtue can or can not be taught, we are told that, as virtue is not a science, it cannot, like a science, be made the subject of teaching, and that the virtuous person is such, rather by act of the deity than by any efforts made by man.

Protagoras;

Or, The Sophist. In this dialogue Socrates relates to a friend, whose name is not given, a discussion which he just had with Protagoras, the Sophist, of Abdera. Hippocrates, a young Athenian, has roused Socrates very early in the morning, and entreated him to accompany him on a visit to Protagoras, who was then at Athens, staying at the house of Callias, and whose pupil he was anxious to become. On arriving there, they find the sophist attended by a crowd of admirers, and moreover Hippias of Elis and

Prodicus of Ceos, surrounded by their respective followers. After Socrates had made known the object of his visit to Protagoras, Callias proposes that the whole party should sit down and listen to the conversation which forms the subject of this dialogue.

Theages.

A Dialogue concerning Political Wisdom. In order to understand the design of this dialogue, it is necessary to observe that wisdom is twofold, the one absolute, the other conditional. The absolute is that which is denominated wisdom simply, and without any addition; but the conditional is that which is not simply called wisdom, but a certain wisdom. The former of these is defined to be knowledge of those things which are the objects of science, and the objects of science are things which possess a necessary eternal and invariable subsistence: such are those luminous causes and principles of things resident in a divine intellect, which Plato denominates ideas, and Aristotle things most honourable by nature. But conditional wisdom is common to all arts; for the summit or perfection of every art is called a certain wisdom. Of all those arts, however, which possess conditional wisdom, the principal is political wisdom, to which the rest are ministrant. This is called as well the political as the royal discipline; of which the subject is a city, the end the common good, and its servants all the arts.

Laches.

A Dialogue concerning Fortitude. As Plato had in the Charmides discussed the question relating to temperance, one of the cardinal virtues, so in the Laches he has taken for his subject another, with the view of showing that it is equally difficult to give a definition of fortitude.

Lysis.

A Dialogue on Friendship. But that we may take a cursory view of the contents of the Lysis, in the first place, Socrates reproves those who pervert the power of love, and, under the pretext of friendship, are subservient to base lust. In the second place, he admonishes those who, looking no higher than corporeal beauty, think themselves worthy to be beloved for this alone. And, in the last place, he indicates to the sagacious a certain path by which friendship may be investigated and discovered. Again, while Socrates ironically derides Hippothales and Ctesiphon, he signifies that they were captivated by base love. And, while in their

presence, he prepares youth for moral discipline, he admonishes lovers how they should live together, and what kind of attachment they should entertain for each other. Having instructed lovers in the second part of the dialogue, he instructs those that are the objects of love; and, by a long series of induction, teaches that wisdom and prudence ought to be explored by friends, which compose the true beauty of the soul, and not the shadowy form of this fleeting body.

Charmides.

A Dialogue on Temperance. Plato in the Cratylus explains the name of temperance, as signifying a certain safety and preservation of prudence. For he considered all truth as naturally inherent in the soul; and that, in consequence of this, the soul, by profoundly looking into herself, will discover every truth. She is, however, impeded from this conversion to herself, by an immoderate love of body and corporeal natures. Hence temperance is in the first place necessary, by which the darkness of perturbation being expelled, the intellect becomes more serene, and is abundantly irradiated with the splendors of divinity. But as Socrates intends to discourse about temperance, he admonishes Charmides to look into himself. For a conversion of the soul into herself is the business of this virtue. And it is said in the Timæus that all our affairs become prosperous from the soul being in harmony with herself, and in concord with respect to the body. The Pythagoreans also assert, that if the soul prudently governs not only her own motions, but those of the body, length of life will be the portion of the latter and perpetual health of both.

Hippias Minor.

A Dialogue concerning Voluntary and Involuntary Error. In this dialogue Hippias the Sophist bears the highest of the two subordinate parts or characters, from him therefore it derives its name; and the brevity of it, in comparison with the other between Socrates and the same Sophist, has occasioned it to be called The Lesser Hippias. The title prefixed to it in all the editions of Plato, which is this—Concerning Lying, or Untruth, is apparently defective, because it expresses only part of the subject; but this being not the proper sense of the word, we have ventured to change the title, and to assign such a one as we think comprehends the whole of the subject, and, in as few words as are requisite to some degree of clearness, shows the nature of it. For in this dialogue it

argued a point which has been long the subject of much controversy, "whether error in the will depends on error in judgment." Socrates takes the affirmative side of the question, and his end in so doing is to prove the necessity of informing the understanding in moral truths, that is, of acquiring moral science; together with the necessity of maintaining the governing part within us in full power over that which is inferior, that is, of acquiring habits of virtue; through want of which science, and of which power of virtue, the philosopher insinuates that man is either led blindly or impelled inevitably into evil.

Euthydemus.

A Dialogue exposing the vain trifling of the Sophists. Plato, having proved in the Meno the impossibility of teaching virtue, in opposition to Gorgias, who boasted he could do it, has in this dialogue shown how equally incompetent were the Sophists of the schools of Protagoras and Prodicus to teach any of the arts and sciences, which they not only said they knew, but the knowledge of which they proclaimed they had the power to impart. For, like some of the schoolmen of the middle ages, they were wont to speak "*de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*," with the view of showing, as Horace has recorded, that a Sophist could with equal readiness become a cobbler or a king, while to their vaunted universality of attainments may be applied the well known lines of Juvenal, in § iii. 73-78, who drew his information partly from personal observation, and partly probably from the perusal of this dialogue of Plato, or the Clouds of Aristophanes; between which there is a curious coincidence, as remarked by Winckelmann in the Prolegomena to the Euthydemus, p. xlv.

In genius quick, of desperate impudence,
Ready in speech, and than Iseus dashing
More torrent-like, what think you is he? say.
He with himself brings whomsoever you will,
Grammarian, orator, geometrician,
Painter, oiled wrestler, soothsayer, rope-dancer
Physician, conjurer. All things he knows.

With regard to the matter of the dialogue, its object is to show that the subtleties on which the Sophists relied to prove and to disprove the same proposition, were in their hands only a play upon words; and that, like all such displays of misplaced ingenuity

they could lead to no practical and useful results on questions relating to intellectual wisdom or political well-being, on both of which conjoined depends the happiness of man. With respect, however, to the manner in which the subject is treated, Plato has here, as in Hippias Major, given up occasionally the character of the serious philosopher and assumed that of the laughing one.

Hipparchus.

A Dialogue on the Love of Gain. The design of the Hipparchus is to show that all men naturally desire good, since even those who wander from it through avarice, wander through a desire of obtaining it, but they err in consequence of mistaking good, which is a mean, for ultimate good. For good is twofold, one being the end, the other subsisting for the sake of the end. Hence the possession of the former is called *beatitudo*, and of the latter *gain*. Hence, too, gain is the acquisition of that good which contributes to the possession of ultimate good. But that which does not contribute to this, is neither useful, nor is the acquisition of it gain. The desire therefore of gain thus defined, and which is naturally inherent in all men, is laudable, but the false opinion is to be reprobated, which, while it is ignorant of the truly useful and lucrative, distorts to things adverse the natural appetite of man.

The Rivals.

A Dialogue concerning Philosophy. The title of the dialogue is generally "Lovers;" and so it is quoted by Olympiodorus. But Proclus calls it "The Rival Lovers;" and this is the name it ought to bear, as shown by the testimony of competent witnesses, produced by Menage on Diog. 4. iii. 5, and his decision has been adopted by all subsequent scholars. The object of the dialogue is to show, that they, who profess to know just so much of difficult arts and sciences as is suited to a person of liberal education, possess that very kind of knowledge, which to all practical purposes is perfectly useless.

Menexenus;

Or, An Oration in praise of those Athenians who died in the service of their Country. The subject of this Oration is the commemoration of all those Athenians, who, from the beginning of the commonwealth to the time of Plato, had died in the service of their country; a subject that takes in so considerable a portion of the history of Athens that I rather choose to refer the reader to those

authors who have treated at large of the transactions of that state, than to set down the several events here alluded to in notes, which would soon swell to a bulk much larger than the Oration itself.

Clitopho.

An Exhortatory Dialogue. This dialogue contains a summary of the leading doctrines promulgated by Socrates, the greater part of which have formed the subject of separate dialogues by Plato and others. Its commencement alone has been preserved; for the remainder was probably lost by its having been written at the end of the Codex Archetypus, that contained the rest of the existing dialogues of Plato; for it would thus be exposed to the greatest chance of suffering from damp and the other accidents to which books are liable in the lapse of years. I say the Codex Archetypus, because it is evident that all the MSS. that have been hitherto collated, are to be traced to such an original, of which the one used by Ficinus was in a more complete state than any that have been examined by Bekker and others, as may be seen from notes appended to the dialogue.

Ion.

A Dialogue concerning Poetry. As regards the object of the dialogue, it may be briefly stated that it is intended to prove, that as a poet is born and not made, so is a poet's interpreter—for partly such was the Rhapsodist of old—and all that which art can do is to slightly improve the talents, given by what Plato calls "a divine allotment."

Cratylus.

A Dialogue on the Rectitude of Names. Plato having on various occasions, and especially in the Sophist and Statesman, applied some of the phenomena of language to the illustration of his argument on questions relating to Dialectics, and Moral and Political Philosophy, has in this dialogue entered more at length on so much of the same subject as is connected with the origin of words in the case of persons, acts, and things.

To this step he was probably led by finding that the Sophists, whom he every where opposes with reason and ridicule united, and whom he hunted down with all the ardour of a philosophical Nimrod, were generally the followers of the school of Parmenides or Heraclitus. Of these, the former asserted that all the phenomena of existence could be explained on the principle that all things are

ever at rest; the latter on the contrary principle, that every thing is in motion. To prove then that both were equally wrong, Plato has recourse to the phenomena of language. For as they formed a part of things in existence, the supporters of those theories ought to be able to explain why certain names were given to certain persons, acts, and things. And so, it would seem, Protagoras did in reality attempt to do in that part of his work under the title of Truth.

Epinomis;

Or, The Philosopher. Although this dialogue is called the *Epinomis*, which might be rendered into English by "A Sequel to the Laws," yet it contains not a single hint for an enactment of any kind. It is in fact little more than a homily, written for the most part on the Laws.

Eryxas.

A Dialogue on Wealth. As regards the subject of this dialogue, it is intended to prove that it is the wise alone that are really the wealthy.

Λακχίδης.

A Dialogue on Death. This dialogue has been so great a favourite with scholars of different countries, that twelve translations have been made of it into Latin, four into German, and two into French. For though Cousin asserts that his own is the only French version, yet he might have known from Fabricius and Fischer, that Dolet had preceded him in 1544; whose tiny volume, that contains a translation likewise of Hipparchus, is so scarce, that no copy of it is to be found in the National Library at Paris, as is stated distinctly in a modern reprint of it; nor is it mentioned, I may add, in the different Catalogues of the British Museum.

in Virtue.

This dialogue is little more than two portions of the *Meno*. It has been considered spurious by some of the best critics.

On Justice.

This dialogue was in existence in the time of Trasylus, from whom Diogenes Laertius drew the greater part of his information relating to the Platonic and pseudo-Platonic writings. Like the preceding dialogue, it is considered spurious.

Syphus.

A Dialogue upon taking Counsel. With regard to the subject matter of the dialogue, it may be expressed in the words of Xenophon in *Cyrop.* 1. 6, 48, that "the wisdom of man no more knows how to choose what is best, than if a person were to do whatever might arise from the throw of a die."

Demodocus.

A Discourse.

Definitions

Of Terms used by Plato.

Timæus the Locrian,

On the Soul of the World and Nature. Of this short treatise, relating to the Cosmogony according to the Pythagorean theory, the authorship used to be attributed to Timæus the Locrian, and until Meiners adduced arguments to show that the work was the production of a more modern writer. The genuine writings of the Locrian philosopher had so completely disappeared before the time of Aristotle, that he seems to have known nothing about them, as may be inferred from what he says in *Metaphysics*, 1. 6. p. 649, B.

Thirteen Epistles.

Namely,—six to Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse; one to Hermias Erastus and Corsicus; two to the kindred and friends of Dion; two to Archytas of Tarentum; one to Arertodorus, and one to Laodamas.

*** *For the benefit of those who would consult the writings of Plato with advantage, the following authors are named as suitable adjuncts.*

Orogenes Laertius, The Life of Plato by.—*Hesychius*, The Life of Plato by.—*Olympiodorus*, The Life of Plato by.—*Fenelon*, Archbishop, The Life of Plato by.—*Stanley, Thomas*, The Life of Plato by.—*Tenneman, G. W.*, The Life of Plato by.—(See *Edwards and Park's Selections from German Literature*. Andover, 1839.) *Alginous*. An Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato.—*Albinus*. An Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato.—*Apuleius*, on the Doctrines of Plato. *Gray, Thomas*.—Some Account of the Dialogues

and Epistles of Plato. *Matthias*.—Preface to the Writings of Plato. *Sydenham Floyer*.—A General View of the Writings of Plato. *Taylor, Thomas*.—Remarks on the Works of, and Introductions to the various Dialogues of Plato.

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Remarks

On the Life and Writings of Plato. With answers to the principal objections against him; and a general view of his Dialogues. 8vo, pp. 320. Edinburgh, 1750.

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Remarks upon Aristotelian and Platonic Ethics, as a branch of the studies pursued in the University of Oxford. 8vo, pp. 83. Oxford, 1837.

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Philosophiæ Platoniciæ. 8vo. Traj., 1827.

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*Timæi**(Sophistæ).* Lexicon Vocum Platoniorum ex Cordæ MS. Edit.
David Ruhnkenius. 8vo, pp. 296. Lugduni, 1789.*Cooper, John G.*

The Life of Socrates, collected from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, and the Dialogues of Plato, and illustrated further by Aristotle, Diodorus Siculus, Cicero, Proclus, Aurelius, Maximus Tyrius, Boethius, Diogenes Laertius, and Aulus Gellius. 8vo. London, 1752.

Wiggan, De G.

A Life of Socrates. 12mo. London, 1840.

And the following translators and commentators:—

Bekker, Schneider, Stellbaum, Schleiermacher, Ficinus, Sarrance, Cousin, Hermæas, and Alexandrian commentators, Ast, Boeckh, Leroy, Fischer, Sydenham and Taylor, Martin, Fabricius, Bibliotheca Græca, Brucker, Ritter, and Stanley's History of Philosophy, and the late English translation by Carey, Davis and Burges, in 6 vols. 1854.

INTRODUCTION.

SOCRATES, in his Apology and in his Crito, teaches us how we ought to form our lives; and here he instructs us how to die, and what thoughts to entertain at the hour of death. By explaining his own views and designs, which were the spring of all his actions, he furnishes us with a proof of the most important of all truths, and of that which ought to regulate our life. For the immortality of the soul is a point of such importance, that it includes all the truths of religion, and all the motives that ought to excite and direct us. So that our first duty is to satisfy ourselves on this point; self-love and mere human interest ought to spur us up to understand it; not to speak, that there is not a more fatal condition than to be ignorant of the nature of death, which appears as terrible as unavoidable. For, according to the notion we have of it, we may draw consequences directly opposite, for managing the conduct of our lives and the choice of our pleasures. Socrates spends the last day of his life in discoursing with his friends upon this great subject. He unfolds all the reasons that require the belief of the immortality of the soul, and

refutes all the objections they moved to the contrary, which are the very same that are made use of at this day. He demonstrates the hope they ought to have of a happier life, and lays before them all that this blessed hope requires to make it solid and lasting, to prevent their being deluded by a vain hope; and, after all, meeting with the punishment allotted to the wicked instead of the rewards provided for the good.

This conference was occasioned by a truth that was casually started, viz.: that a true philosopher ought to desire to die, and to endeavour it. This position, taken literally, seemed to insinuate that a philosopher might lay violent hands on himself. But Socrates makes it out that there is nothing more unjust; and that for so much as man is God's creature and property, he ought not to remove out of this life without his orders. What should it be then that made the philosopher have such a love of death? (It could be nothing but the hope of the good things he expected in another life.) What is the ground of this hope? Here we are presented with the grounds assigned by a heathen philosopher, viz.: man is born to know the truth, but he can never attain to a perfect knowledge of it in this life, by reason that his body is an obstacle. Perfect knowledge is reserved for the life to come.

Then the soul must be immortal, since after death it operates and knows. As for man's being born for the knowledge of truth, that cannot be called in question, since he was born to know God. From

thence it follows, that a true philosopher hates and contemns his body, which stands in the way of his union to God; that he wishes to be rid of it, and looks upon death as a passage to a better life. This solid hope gives being to that true temperance and valour which is the lot of true philosophers; for other men are only valiant through fear, and temperate through intemperance; their virtue is only a slave to vice.

They object to Socrates, that the soul is nothing but a vapour, that vanishes and disperses itself at death. Socrates combats that opinion with one that has a great deal of strength in his mouth, but becomes much stronger when supported by the true religion, which alone can set it in its full light. The argument is this: in nature, contraries produce their opposites; so that death, being an operation of nature, ought to produce life, that being its contrary; and by consequence, the death must be born again. The soul, then, is not dead, since it must revive the body.

Before we proceed farther, it is fit to take notice of an error that is couched under this principle, which only the Christian religion can at once discover and refute; this is what Socrates and all other philosophers are infinitely mistaken in—making death a natural thing, there is nothing more false. Death is so far from being natural, that nature abhors it; and it was far from the design of God in the state in which man was first created. For he created him holy, innocent, and by consequence immortal; it was only sin that brought death into the world. But this

fatal league betwixt sin and death could not triumph over the designs of God, who had created man for immortality. He knew how to snatch the victory out of their hands, by bringing man to life again, even in the shades and horrors of death itself. Thus shall the dead revive at the resurrection, pursuant to the doctrine of the Christians, which teaches that death must give up those it has swallowed down. So that the principle which Socrates did not fully comprehend, is an unshaken truth, which bears the marks of the ancient tradition that the heathens had altered and corrupted.

Another argument alleged by Socrates as a proof of the immortality of the soul, is that of remembrance; which likewise bears the marks of that ancient tradition corrupted by the heathens. To find out the truth couched under this argument, I advance the following conjectures.

It seems the philosophers grounded this opinion of remembrance upon some texts of the Prophets that they did not well understand; such as that of Jeremiah, "Before I formed thee in the belly, I knew thee;" and perhaps their opinion was fortified by the ideas and instinct we have for several things that were never learned in this world. In short, we meet with unquestionable marks of certain resentments that revive some lights within our minds, or the remains of a past grandeur that we have lost by sin. And from whence do these proceed? that inexplicable cipher has no other key but the knowledge of original sin. Our soul was created so as to be

adorned with all manner of knowledge suitable to its nature, and now is sensible of its being deprived of the same. The philosophers felt this misery, and were not admitted to know the true cause; in order to unriddle the mystery, they invented this creation of souls before the body, and a remembrance that is the consequence thereof. But we, who are guided by a surer light, know that if man were not degenerated he would still enjoy the full knowledge of the truths he formerly knew; and if he had never been any other than corrupted, he would have had no idea of these truths. This unties the knot. Man had knowledge before he was corrupted, and after his corruption forgot it. He can recover nothing but confused ideas, and stands in need of a new light to illuminate them. No human reason could have fathomed this. It faintly unravelled part of the mystery, as well as it could, and the explication it gave discovers some footsteps of the ancient truth; for it points both to the first state of happiness and knowledge, and to the second of misery and obscurity. Thus may we make a useful application of the doctrine of remembrance, and the errors of philosophers may oftentimes serve to establish the most incomprehensible truths of the Christian religion, and show that the heathens did not want traditions relating to them.

Another argument is taken from the nature of the soul. Destruction reaches only compound bodies: but we may clearly perceive that the soul is simple and immaterial, and bears a resemblance of some-

thing divine, immortal and intelligent; for it embraces the pure essence of things; it measures all by ideas, which are eternal patterns, and unites itself to them when the body does not hinder it; so that it is spiritual, indissoluble, and consequently immortal, as being not capable of dissolution by any other means than the will of him who created it.

Notwithstanding the force of these proofs, and their tendency to keep up this hope in the soul, Socrates and his friends own, that it is almost impossible to ward off doubts and uncertainties, for our reason is too weak and degenerate to arrive at the full knowledge of truth in this world. So that it is a wise man's business to choose from amongst those arguments of the philosophers for the immortality of the soul, that which to him seems best and most forcible, and capable to conduct him safely through the dangerous shelves of this life, till he obtains a full assurance either of some promise, or by some divine revelation; for that is the only vessel that is secure from danger. By this the most refined paganism pays homage to the Christian religion, and all colour or excuse for incredulity is taken off; for the Christian religion affords promises, revelations, and, which is yet more considerable, the accomplishment of them.

They move two objections to Socrates: one, that the soul is only the harmony resulting from the just proportion of the qualities of the body; the other, that though the soul be more durable than the body, yet it dies at last, after having made use of several

bodies; just as a man dies after he has worn several suits of clothes.

Socrates, before he makes any answer, stops a little and deploras the misfortune of man, who, by hearing the disputes of the ignorant that contradict everything, persuade themselves that there is no such thing as clear, solid, and sensible reason; but that everything is uncertain. Like as those who, being cheated by men, become men-haters; so they, being imposed upon by arguments, become haters of reason; that is, they take up an absolute hatred against all reason in general, and will not hear any argument Socrates makes out the injustice of this procedure. He shows that when two things are equally uncertain, wisdom directs us to choose that which is most advantageous with the least danger. Now, beyond all dispute, such is the immortality of the soul, and therefore it ought to be embraced. For if this opinion prove true after our death, are we not considerable gainers? and if it prove false, what do we lose?

Then he attacks that objection which represents the soul as a harmony, and refutes it by solid and convincing arguments, which at the same time prove the immortality of the soul.

His arguments are these: harmony always depends upon the parts that conspire together, and is never opposite to them; but the soul has no dependence upon the body, and always stands on the opposite side. Harmony admits of less and more, but the soul does not; from whence it would follow that all souls

should be equal, that none of them are vicious, and that the souls of beasts are equally good, and of the same nature with those of men, which is contrary to all reason.

In music, the body commands the harmony; but in nature, the soul commands the body. In music, the harmony can never give a sound contrary to the particular sounds of the parts that bend or unbend, or move; but in nature, the soul has a contrary sound to that of the body; it attacks all passions and desires; it checks, curbs, and punishes the body; so that it must needs be of a very different and opposite nature; which proves its spirituality and divinity. For nothing but what is spiritual and divine can be wholly opposite to what is material and earthly.

The second objection was: That the soul might outlive the body, yet that does not conclude its immortality; since we know nothing to the contrary, but that it dies at last, after having animated the body several times.

In answer to this objection, Socrates says we must trace the first original of the being and corruption of entities. If that be once agreed upon, we shall find no difficulty in determining what things are corruptible and what not. But what path shall we follow in this inquiry? must it be that of physics? These physics are so uncertain, that, instead of being instructive, they only blind and mislead us. This he makes out from his own experience, so that there is a necessity of going beyond this science, and having recourse to metaphysics, which alone can afford us

the certain knowledge of the reasons and causes of beings, and of that which constitutes their essences. For effects may be discovered by their causes; but the causes can never be known by their effects. And upon this account we must have recourse to the divine knowledge, which Anaxagoras was so sensible of that he ushered in his treatise of Physics by this great principle, that knowledge is the cause of being.

But, instead of keeping up to that principle, he fell in again with that of second causes, and by that means deceived the expectations of his hearers.

In order to make out the immortality of the soul, we must correct this order of Anaxagoras, and sound to the bottom of the above-mentioned principle; which, if we do, we shall be satisfied that God placed every thing in the most convenient state. Now this best and most suitable state must be the object of our inquiry, to which purpose we must know wherein the particular good of every particular thing consists, and what the general good of all things is. This discovery will make out the immortality of the soul.

In this view Socrates raises his thoughts to immaterial qualities and eternal ideas; that is, he affirms that there is something that is in itself good, fine, just, and great, which is the first cause; and that all things in this world that are good, fine, just, or great, are only such by the communication of that first cause, since there is no other cause of the existence of things but the participation of the essence proper to each subject.

This participation is so contrived, that contraries are never found in the same subject. From which principle it follows by a necessary consequence, that the soul, which gives life to the body, not as an accidental form that adheres to it, but as a substantial form, subsisting in itself, and living formally by itself, as the corporeal idea, and effectually enlivening the body, can never be subject to death, that being the opposite to life; and that the soul, being incapable of dying, cannot be worsted by any attack of this enemy, and is in effect imperishable, like the immaterial qualities, justice, fortitude, and temperance; but with this difference, that these immaterial qualities subsist independently and of themselves, as being the same thing with God himself; whereas the soul is a created being, that may be dissolved by the will of its Creator. In a word, the soul stands in the same relation to the life of the body, that the idea of God does to the soul.

The only objection they could invent upon this head, was, that the greatness of the subject, and man's natural infirmity, are the two sources of man's distrust and incredulity upon this head. Whereupon Socrates endeavours to dry up these two sources.

He attacks their distrust, by showing that the opinion of the soul's immortality suits all the ideas of God. For by this mortality, virtue would be prejudicial to men of probity, and vice beneficial to the wicked, which cannot be imagined. So that there is a necessity of another life for rewarding the good and punishing the bad. And the soul, being immortal,

carries along with it into the other world its good and bad actions, its virtues and vices, which are the occasion of its eternal happiness or misery. From whence, by a necessary consequence, we may gather what care we ought to take of it in this life.

To put a stop to the torrent of incredulity, he has recourse to two things, which naturally demand a great deference from man, and cannot be denied without a visible authority. The first is, the ceremonies and sacrifices of religion itself, which are only representations of what would be put in execution in hell. The other is the authority of antiquity, which maintained the immortality of the soul; in pursuit of which, he mentions some ancient traditions that point to the truth published by Moses and the prophets, notwithstanding the fables that overwhelm them. Thus we see a Greek philosopher, and no Christian, supplies the want of proof, which is too natural to man, and silences the most obstinate prejudices by having recourse to the oracles of God, which they were in some measure acquainted with; and by so doing, makes answer to Simmias, who had objected that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul stood in need of some promise or divine revelation to procure its reception. Though some blinded Christians reject the authority of our Holy Writ, and refuse to submit to it, yet we see the good Socrates had so much light as to make use of it to support his faith, if I may so speak, and to strengthen this sweet hope of a blessed eternity. He shows that he knew how to distinguish the fabulous part of tradition from

the truth, and affirms nothing but what is conformable to the Scriptures, particularly the last judgment of the good and the bad; necessary purgation of those who depart this life under a load of sin; the eternal torments of those who committed mortal sins in this life; the pardon of venial sins after satisfaction and repentance; the happiness of those who during the whole course of their lives renounced the pleasures of the body, and only courted the pleasure of true knowledge, that is, the knowledge of God; and beautified their souls with proper ornaments, such as temperance, justice, fortitude, liberty, and truth. He does not joke upon the groundless Metempsychosis, or return of souls to animate bodies in this life; but speaks seriously, and shows that after death all is over; the wicked are thrown forever into the bottomless abyss, and the righteous conveyed to the mansions of the blessed. Those who are neither righteous nor wicked, but commit sins in this life which they always repented of, are committed to places of torment till they are sufficiently purified.

When Socrates made an end of his discourse, his friends asked what orders he would give concerning his affairs. The only orders I give, replied he, is to take care of yourselves, and to make yourselves as like to God as possible. Then they asked him how he would be interred? This question offended him. He would not have himself confounded with his corpse, which was only to be interred. And though the expression seems to import little, he showed that

such false expressions gave very dangerous wounds to the souls of men.

He goes and bathes; his wife and children are brought to him; he talks to them a minute, and then dismisses them. Upon his coming out of the bath, the cup is presented to him. He takes it, collects his thoughts within himself, prays, and drinks it off with an admirable tranquillity of mind. Finding that he approaches his end, he gives them to know that he resigned his soul into the hands of him who gave it, and of the true physician who was coming to heal it. This was the exit of Socrates. Paganism never afforded such an admirable example; and yet a certain modern author is so ignorant of its beauty, that he places it infinitely below that of Petronius, the famous disciple of Epicurus. He did not employ the last hours of his life, says that author, in discoursing on the immortality of the soul, but chose a more pleasant death in imitating the sweetness of the swan, and causing some agreeable and touching verses to be recited to him. This was a fine imitation; it seems Petronius sung what they read to him. But this was not all. Nevertheless, continues he, he reserved some minutes for thinking of his affairs, and distributed rewards to some of his slaves and punished others. Let them talk of Socrates, says he, and boast of his constancy and bravery in drinking up the poison! Petronius is not behind him; nay, he is justly entitled to a preference upon the score of his forsaking a life infinitely more delightful than that of the sage of

Greece; and that, too, with the same tranquillity of mind and evenness of temper.

We have no need of long dissertations to make out the vast difference between the death of Socrates and that of this Epicurean, whom Tacitus himself, notwithstanding his paganism, did not dare to applaud. On one side we are presented with the view of a man that spent his last moments in making his friends better; recommending to them the hope of a blessed eternity, and showing what that hope requires of them; a man that died with his eyes intent upon God, praying to him and blessing him, without any reflections upon his enemies who condemned him so unjustly. On the other side, we meet with a voluptuous person, in whom all sentiments of virtue are quite extinguished; who, to be rid of his own fears, occasioned his own death; and in his exit would admit of no other entertainment but agreeable poems and pleasant verses; who spent the last moments of his time in rewarding those of his slaves who doubtless had been the ministers and accomplices of his sensualities, and seeing those punished who perhaps had shown an aversion to his vices. A good death ought to be ushered by a good life. Now, a life spent in vice, effeminacy and debauchery, is much short of one entirely taken up in the exercise of virtue, and the solid pleasure of true knowledge, and adorned with the venerable ornaments of temperance, justice, fortitude, liberty, and truth. One of Socrates' dying words was, that those who entertained bad discourses upon death, wounded the soul very dangerously:

and what would not he have said of those who scruple not to write them?

But it is probable this author did not foresee the consequences of this unjust preference. He wrote like a man of this world, that never knew Socrates. Had he known him, he would certainly have formed a juster judgment; and, in like manner, if he had known Seneca or Plutarch, he would not have equalled or preferred Petronius to them. Had he made the best use of his understanding, he would have seen reasons to doubt, that the Petronius now read is the Petronius of Tacitus, whose death he so much admires; and would have met with some just objections, which at least gave occasion to suspect its being spurious. But to return to Socrates.

His doctrine of death's being no affliction, but, on the contrary, a passage to a happier life, made considerable progress. Some philosophers gave such lively demonstrations of it in their lectures, that the greatest part of their disciples laid violent hands on themselves in order to overtake that happier life. Ptolemæus Philadelphus prohibited Hegisias of Cyrene to teach it in his school, for fear of depeopling his kingdom; and the poets of that prince's court, siding with him, as they commonly do, use all means to decry that doctrine and those who were prevailed upon to embrace it. It was their pernicious complaisance that occasioned what we now read in Callimachus against the immortality of the soul; and, above all, that famous epigram Cicero alleges to have been written against Cleombrotus of Am-

bracia, but was certainly designed likewise against Plato. It is to this purpose: Cleombrotus of Ambracia, having paid his last compliment to the sun, threw himself headlong from the top of a tower into hell; not that he had done any thing worthy of death, but only had read Plato's Treatise on the Immortality of the Soul.

But, after all, it redounds to the glory of Socrates and Plato, and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, that none but such enemies as those oppose it.

PHÆDO;

OR,

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

CHARACTERS IN THE DIALOGUE.

*Echecrates, Phædo, Socrates, Apollodorus, Cebes, Simmias, Crito,
the Officer of the Prison.*

1. ECHECRATES—Were you in personal attendance, Phædo, upon Socrates, on that day in which he drank the hemlock in prison, or did you hear of the matter from another?

PHÆDO—I was there myself, Echecrates.

ECHECRATES—What was the purport of his conversation before he died, and what was the manner of his death?—for I should be glad to hear, since none of the citizens of Phlius at all frequent Athens at present, nor has any foreigner arrived here from thence, for a long time, who could give any more distinct account than that he died from the draught of poison, but of the attendant circumstances he could say nothing.

PHÆDO—Did you not hear of the trial either how it proceeded?

ECHECRATES—Yes; one brought me intelligence of this, and I am surprised that as it terminated some

time since, he appears to have died so long subsequent to it. How did this happen, Phædo?

PHÆDO—Owing to accident, Echecrates; for the poop of the vessel which the Athenians are accustomed to send to Delos chanced to be crowned upon the day preceding the trial.

ECHECRATES—What does this vessel mean?

PHÆDO—It is the same, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus once set out with fourteen in the flower of youth, for Crete, whom he managed to preserve, and was also saved himself. They made a vow, it is said, to Apollo upon that occasion, that in event of their preservation they would dispatch a solemn deputation to Delos, which, ever since then, up to the present time, they send out yearly in honour of the god. When they commence the celebration of this ceremony then, the usage is, during the interval between the arrival of the vessel at Delos, and its return hither, to purify the city and to allow no public execution; but this interval is at times of some duration, when the winds are unfavourable. The commencement of the embassy is notified by the priest of Apollo crowning the poop of the ship, and this happened, as I mentioned, on the day preceding the trial. On this account Socrates had a long interval in prison, between the trial and his death.

2. ECHECRATES—But, Phædo, what were the particulars of his decease? What was said, and done, and which of his intimates were present with him? Or did the Eleven prevent their attendance, and did he die forsaken by his friends?

PHÆDO—By no means; there were some, indeed several, present.

ECHECRATES—Be pleased now to give me the most distinct possible account of each particular, unless you have some business on hands.

PHÆDO—I am quite at leisure, and shall endeavour to tell you all, for to call Socrates to mind, whether speaking myself or listening to another, is ever most delightful to me.

ECHECRATES—Even such as yourself, Phædo, have you to listen to you; but try, with all possible accuracy, to enumerate to me everything.

PHÆDO—In truth I was strangely affected upon my arrival. No feeling of compassion struck me, as one who stood by to witness the last moments of a dearly familiar friend, for the man appeared to me, Echecrates, at perfect ease, both in his manner and discourse, with such an intrepid and noble bearing he met his death; so much so, that it struck me he was not descending to the Shades but by divine direction, and that he, if ever there were one, should be blest in his arrival there. For this reason I was not moved, in any degree, to the compassion which would be natural to one present at a scene so sorrowful, nor yet did I experience the pleasure, as when we were engaged, according to our custom, in philosophical pursuits, although our discourse partook of some such character, but an altogether unaccountable affection seized me, and a species of unusual, mixed feeling, compounded alike of pleasure and of pain, upon reflecting how very soon he was about to die. And

all present were almost similarly disposed, now indeed smiling, and again in tears, but one especially amongst us, Apollodorus; you doubtless know the man and his character.

ECHECRATES—How should I not?

PHÆDO—He indeed resigned himself entirely to these emotions, and the rest, with myself, were perturbed alike.

ECHECRATES—But who besides were present, Phædo?

PHÆDO—Of our countrymen this Apollodorus was present, Critobulus and his father Crito; besides Hermogenes and Epigenes, Æschines and Antisthenes. There were also Ctesippus of the Paianian tribe, Menexenus, and some others of our countrymen; but Plato, I believe, was ill.

ECHECRATES—Were any strangers present?

PHÆDO—Yes; Simmias of Thebes, Cebes and Phædonides, and from Megara, Euclides and Terpsion.

ECHECRATES—Tell me: Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

PHÆDO—No truly; they were said to be in Ægina.

ECHECRATES—Was any one else present?

PHÆDO—I believe those whom I mentioned were almost all that were present.

ECHECRATES—Well now; what was the subject of your conversation?

PHÆDO—I shall endeavour to narrate to you every thing from the commencement. We were constantly

in the habit, both the rest and myself, of visiting Socrates on the preceding days; assembling together at the tribunal where the trial took place, for it was contiguous to the prison, we used to wait every day until the prison was opened, conversing with each other, for it was not opened very early; but as soon as it was so we went in to Socrates and generally passed the day with him. Upon that occasion we assembled at an earlier hour, because on the preceding day, when we were going out of the prison, we understood that the vessel had arrived from Delos, upon which we agreed to return as early as possible on the following day to the usual place. We did so; and the gaoler who used to admit us, coming out, requested us to wait and not seek for admission until he should direct; "For," said he, "the Eleven are unbinding Socrates, and acquainting him that he must die to-day." But after a little time he returned and desired us to enter.

When we had come in we found Socrates just unfettered, and Xantippe—you know her—sitting beside him with his little son. As soon as she observed us she wept aloud, and expressed herself in the customary manner of her sex, saying, "Socrates, now for the last time your friends converse with you and you with them." Upon which Socrates, looking at Crito, said, "Crito, let some one conduct her home." And some of Crito's retinue led her away weeping and lamenting bitterly.

But Socrates sitting up in the bed, bended his leg and rubbed it with his hands, and while doing so,

observed, "How strange, my friends, this thing appears to be which mankind calls pleasure, and how wonderful it is disposed towards that which seems to be its opposite, pain; since they are not inclined both to befall a man at once, but should any pursue and attain the one, he is almost invariably compelled to admit the other, as if they being two were connected by one head. And it seems to me that if Æsop had turned his mind to this he would have composed a fable to the effect that the deity being anxious to reconcile those contending principles, when he failed in the attempt, joined their heads together, so that whomsoever the one should visit the other arrives with immediately after. Even so it appears to me, since I suffered pain in my leg before by reason of the chain, but pleasure seems to have followed in succession now."

4. Upon this Cebes rejoined, "By Jove, Socrates, you have done well to remind me, for several others have asked me already, and Evenus very lately, respecting the poems you have composed, your versification of Æsop's Fables, and the hymn to Apollo, with what object you wrote them after you had come here, having never executed anything of the kind before. If you are at all concerned then in my being enabled to give Evenus an answer when he questions me again, for I know well he will do so, tell me what I am to say." Socrates replied, "Tell him the truth, Cebes, that I did not write them with a view to any competition with him, or his productions, for this I knew should not be any easy task, but investigating

the purport of certain dreams, and acquitting my conscience if this perchance were a branch of the liberal arts which they enjoined me to attend to. But the dreams were of the following character: the same vision came repeatedly during the course of my past life, appearing at various times under various forms, but always with the same injunction, "Socrates, adopt and cultivate the liberal arts." And I indeed imagined that it was animating and encouraging me, as those who cheer on racers at the games, to continue the pursuit in which I had been previously engaged; and that in like manner the vision urged upon me the course in which I was engaged; that is, the study of the liberal arts, since philosophy indeed is the most refined of the liberal arts, and I was intently occupied in this. But now, when the trial was over, and the festival of the deity was delaying my death, I thought that in case the vision had intended by its frequent injunctions the composition of popular poetry, I should not disobey but attempt it. For I deemed it was safer not to depart from hence before I had acquitted my conscience in the composition of some poems in obedience to the dream. Consequently, I first composed one on the deity whose festival was at hand; but after this token of respect to the god, with the impression that it became a poet, if he aspired to the name, to write fictions and not true narratives, besides my not being skilled in the fabulous, I, upon this account, turned into verse the first which occurred of those fables of Æsop which I remembered and was well acquainted with.

5. "Tell this then, Cebes, to Evenus, and wish him health and strength, and say, that if he is wise, he will follow me; but I depart as it appears this day, for the Athenians ordain it so." Upon this Simmias replied, "What is this, Socrates, which you enjoin upon Evenus? I have often met the man before now, and from my general conception of his character he certainly will not willingly take your advice."—"But," said Socrates, "is not Evenus a philosopher?" "To me he seems so," answered Simmias. "Therefore," said he, "both Evenus shall be willing, and every one who participates worthily in this study of philosophy; he shall not certainly, however, lay violent hands upon himself, for this, as it is said, is not to be allowed." Upon saying this he let his legs down from the bed on the ground, and sitting in this posture he proceeded with the remainder of the discussion.

Cebes inquired of him then, "How, Socrates, say you this, that it is not allowable for one to lay hands upon himself, but that a philosopher should be desirous of following one who is going to die?" "What, Cebes," said he, "have not you and Simmias been informed on such subjects after your familiar intimacy with Philolaus?" "Not very distinctly, Socrates." "But I merely speak of these things from hearsay," added Socrates; "what I happen then to have heard there is no objection to my telling. For it is perhaps especially suited to one who is on the eve of departing to another world, to inquire into, and speculate upon his migration thither, of what nature we sup-

pose it to be. What else could one engage in during the time that intervenes till sunset?"

6. "Why then, Socrates," said Cebes, "do they say that it is not allowable for one to dispatch himself? For I have heard, as you asked just now, both from Philolaus when he was in the habit of intercourse with us, and from some others beside, that it was not right to do this; but I never heard anything distinctly from any one on the subject." "You must pursue your inquiry then," said Socrates, "for perhaps you might hear (what you wish). Probably, however, it shall appear strange to you if this alone, of all things, is unexceptionably true (that death is better than life), and that never at any time, as is the case with the rest of human affairs, it should occur that at some times and to some persons only, death is better than life. But it appears strange to you, perhaps, that it is not lawful for those men to whom death is preferable, to confer this favour upon themselves, but that they must await another benefactor." Upon this, Cebes with a gentle smile, speaking in the dialect of his country, said, "I swear by Jupiter it seems so." "And indeed," said Socrates, "at first sight it would appear to be unreasonable; still it has, perhaps, some good grounds. The maxim conveyed in the mysteries, upon this subject, to the effect that we of the human race are in a species of prison, and that it is unlawful to set one's self at liberty and escape from it, seems to me too affected and by no means easy to penetrate. This, however, appears to me to be urged with good reason, that the gods are our guardians,

and that we mortals are part of the household property of the gods. Do you agree with me or not?" "I do," replied Cebes. "Therefore," he continued, "if one of your slaves were to put himself to death without your having signified to him that you wished him to die, should you not be indignant at him, and if you had any means of punishment should you not inflict it?" "Certainly," replied Cebes.—"Perhaps then in this point of view it is not unreasonable to insist that one should not dispatch himself before the deity imposes upon him a necessity of the kind, such as he has imposed at present upon me."

7. "But," said Cebes, "this appears natural enough. With respect, however, to what you said just now that philosophers should show a ready inclination to die; this seems to be absurd, if what we lately admitted is good sense, that the deity is our guardian, and that we are his servants. For that the wisest individuals should feel no dissatisfaction at their departure from this tutelage in which the best of all possible governors, the gods, direct them, is quite against reason. Since no one surely imagines that when he is thus set at liberty he will take better care of himself; some senseless being might perhaps be so convinced that he ought to fly from his master, and would not reflect that he should not abandon a good one, but by all means continue to abide with him, consequently he would inconsiderately leave him, while the rational man would be anxious to remain for ever with one superior to himself. Thus, Socrates, the direct contrary of what was just now

allowed is likely to be the case; for it becomes the wise to feel dissatisfied at death, but the foolish to rejoice."

Socrates, hearing this, appeared to be delighted at the ingenuity of Cebes, and turning his eyes towards us, observed, "Cebes is always starting some points, and is not at all disposed at once to give in to what one has asserted." "But, Socrates," said Simmias, "to me, now, Cebes appears to urge something of importance; for with what object would men who are really wise fly from those masters who are better than themselves, and thoughtlessly abandon them? Cebes also seems to me to direct this argument against yourself, because you bear so quietly your abandonment of us, and those good governors, as you yourself admit, the gods."

"You speak fairly," said Socrates, "and I understand you to mean that I should enter upon my defence in this case as at the tribunal."

"Exactly so," Simmias replied.

8. "Come now," Socrates resumed, "let me essay to plead my cause more persuasively than I did before the judges. For, Simmias and Cebes, were it not that I believe I shall arrive amongst other deities, both wise and good, and further, amongst men who have departed this life, far better than those here, I should be wrong in feeling no discontent at death; but now you are well aware that I expect to arrive amongst good men; yet I would not altogether insist upon this; that I should fall in, however, with admirable masters, the gods, be assured that I should insist on this, if on

anything else of the kind. Wherefore I am not equally discontented (as if I thought the matter were otherwise), and I indulge in good hopes that there is something in reserve for those who die, and that, as was said long since, it is far better for the good than the evil."

"What then, Socrates," said Simmias, "do you meditate departing from us, reserving this consideration to yourself, or would you impart it to us also? For this blessing seems to me a common concern to both, and it shall serve, at the same time, as your defence, if you should convince us of what you assert."

"I shall endeavour to do so," he replied; "but let us, in the first place, attend to Crito here, and see what it is that he, for some time now, seems anxious to say."

"What else, Socrates," said Crito, "than what the person who is to minister the poison to you told me something since, that I should tell you to argue as little as possible. For he says that those who engage in dispute become too warm, and one should not let anything of the kind interfere with the progress of the poison, otherwise, those who did so were sometimes compelled to take two or three draughts."

Socrates replied, "Take your leave of him, and let him attend to his own peculiar province, to supply two draughts, or even three, if it be so required."

"Indeed," said Crito, "I knew you would speak nearly to this effect, but he is troubling me this some time." "Do not mind him," said Socrates.

"But I wish now to unfold to you, as being my judges, the reason why a man, who has in good earnest devoted his life to philosophy, appears to be full of confidence when on the eve of death, and to cherish a favourable hope that he shall secure the greatest possible blessings in another life, after he shall have departed from this. How this, then, should be so, Simmias and Cebes, I shall endeavour to explain.

9. "As many as engage with sincerity in the study of philosophy, appear to leave all others in the dark as to the fact of their applying themselves diligently to no other object than dying and death. If this be true, it surely were absurd throughout their entire life to have nothing else in view but this, and when it had come to feel dissatisfied at what they had formerly so earnestly desired and studied to attain." Upon this Simmias, smiling, said, "By Jove, Socrates, you have made me smile, being by no means at present inclined to do so. For I imagine that the multitude, if they heard this observation, would suppose that it had been justly made in reference to philosophers, and would agree unanimously with you, our own fellow-countrymen in particular, that true philosophers have a desire for death, and they have not left them (the multitude) indeed in the dark as to the fact of their deserving it."

"And they would say the truth, Simmias, with the exception of their not being left in the dark; for they are quite ignorant in what sense true philosophers desire to die, and in what sense they merit it, and

what kind of death. But let us, taking leave of them, address ourselves to each other. Do we imagine death to be anything?" "Something, surely," rejoined Simmias.

"Whether is it anything else than the separation of the soul from the body? And is this death, the body being apart by itself, disunited from the soul, and the soul disunited from the body, existing apart by itself? Is death anything but this?"

"Nothing else than this," he replied.

"Observe now, my good friend, whether you and I agree in our view of the case, for from hence I think we shall come to a better understanding on the subject of our inquiry. Does it seem to you to be consistent with the character of a philosopher to be solicitous about pleasures, as they are called, of this kind, eating and drinking for instance?"

"By no means, Socrates," replied Simmias.

"Well, then; about the pleasures of love?"

"Not at all."

"Well; does such a character appear to you to hold in estimation any other bodily luxuries?—for example, the possession of distinguished robes, sandals and other personal ornaments; whether does he appear to you to value or despise it, at least so far as absolute necessity may not require him to use them?"

"A true philosopher," said Simmias, "appears to me to hold them in contempt."

"Are you, therefore, wholly of opinion that the concern of such a character is not about the body, but

that as far as he can, he stands apart from this, and is altogether devoted to the soul?"

"I am so."

"In matters of this kind, then, is it not in the first place the philosopher evidently, who above all other men, principally absolves the soul from its communion with the body."

"So it appears."

"And the generality of mankind, Simmias, are of opinion, that he who has no pleasure in such things, and does not partake of them, deserves not to live, but that he makes a close approach towards death who feels no concern in any of those pleasures which arise from the body."

"You say so with great truth."

10. "But what of the acquisition of wisdom; is the body an obstacle or not, if one should take it along with him as a partner in his search? What I mean to say is this: do the sight and hearing convey any certainty to mankind, or are they such as the poets incessantly report them, who say that we neither hear nor see anything as it is? And if, indeed, of our corporeal senses these are neither accurate nor distinct, scarcely could the rest be so, for they are all far inferior to these. Do they not seem so to you?"

"They do, indeed."

"When, then," said Socrates, "does the soul attain to the truth? For when it attempts to investigate anything along with the body, it is plain that it is then led astray by it."

"You say true."

"Is it not then by reasoning, if by anything, that reality is made manifest to the soul?"

"Certainly."

"But it reasons most effectually when none of the corporeal senses harass it; neither hearing, sight pain, or pleasure of any kind; but it retires as much as possible within itself, and aims at the knowledge of what is real, taking leave of the body, and as far as it can, abstaining from any union or participation with it."

"Even so."

"Does not the soul of the philosopher in this instance, therefore, show the greatest contempt for the body, and shrink from it, while it seeks to be left alone to itself?"

"It appears so."

"What, then, do you say of what follows, Simmias? Do we assert that justice is anything or not?"

"We say that it is, by Jove."

"And beauty and goodness also?"

"Why not?"

"Did you ever see anything of the kind with your eyes?"

"Never," replied Simmias.

"Have you laid hold of them with any other of your bodily senses?—but I am speaking (not of goodness and beauty only, but) generally, of magnitude, health, strength, and in a word, of the essence of every thing, that is, the real existence of each—whether is their truest character discovered by means

of the body, or does the case stand thus; that whoever amongst us prepares with the greatest caution and accuracy to reflect upon that particular thing by itself about which he is inquiring, he must make the nearest approach to a knowledge of it?"

"By all means, indeed."

"Would he then accomplish this with the least possible alloy, who comes with the aid of the purest reflection to the investigation of every essence, neither employing the sight in the process of reflection, nor bringing in any other sense to share in the process of reasoning, but who using reflection alone and unalloyed, endeavours to investigate every reality by itself and unmixed, abstaining as much as possible from the use of the eyes, and in a word, of every part of the body, as confounding the soul, and preventing, when united to it, its attainment to wisdom and truth? Is not such an one, if any, likely to arrive at what really exists?"

"You speak, Socrates," answered Simmias, "with amazing truth."

11. "It is necessary therefore," Socrates resumed, "that in consequence of all this a certain impression must strike those who are genuine philosophers, of such a nature that they would express themselves mutually to this effect:—A by-path, as it were, appears to conduct us, (out of the common track,) with reason for our guide, in this research; because so long as we are encumbered with the body, and our soul is contaminated by so great corruption, we shall never fully attain to that which we desire, but this

we assert to be the truth. For the body imposes upon us innumerable constraints on account of its necessary support—moreover, should any maladies befall it, they too impede the ardent pursuit of truth, while it fills us up with lusts, desires, fears, chimeras of every kind, and unbounded folly; so that, as is truly observed, there is never, in fact, any possibility by reason of it of our progressing in wisdom. Besides, it is nothing else except the body, and its appetites, that occasions wars, seditions, and contentions; since all wars originate with us through the passion for amassing wealth, and we are compelled to acquire it on account of the body, slaves as we are to our attendance on it; so that owing to the body, and by reason of these its affections, we have no time to spare for philosophy.

“But the last and worst of all is, that if we should obtain any spare time from it, and turn our attention to the investigation of any subject, obtruding itself suddenly, on all occasions, in the midst of our research, it causes disturbance and commotion, and confounds us so that we are disqualified by it for the discernment of the truth. In reality, then, it has been demonstrated to us, that if we are ever likely to arrive at a clear intelligence of anything we must be separated from the body, and contemplate with the soul itself all objects as they are; and then, in all likelihood, we shall enjoy that wisdom which we desire and profess to be enamoured of, when we have departed from this life, as the argument points out, but not while we live here. For if it is impossible to have

any clear intelligence in conjunction with the body, one of two things must follow, either that it is in no case practicable to acquire knowledge, or it is so after death, for then the soul shall be apart from the body, completely independent, but not before. While we are living also, as it appears, we shall make the nearer advances to knowledge the more that we avoid all connection and union with the body—unless when absolute necessity requires—shrink from the contagion of its nature, and keep ourselves pure from its pollutions until the Deity himself shall absolve us from its influence. Thus being undefiled, delivered from the irrationality of the body, in all likelihood we shall be classed with others of a similar stamp, and we shall, of ourselves, have cognizance of every unmixed essence; but this is probably the truth, since it is not allowed the impure to be conversant with what is pure. Such, Simmias, are the expressions which I believe to be incumbent on all true lovers of wisdom to use amongst each other, and the opinions they should entertain; does it not seem so to you?”

“By all means, Socrates.”

12. “Therefore,” he continued, “if this, my friend, be true, there are great hopes for one who shall arrive where I am setting out for now, that there, if anywhere, he shall acquire this abundantly on account of which I have endured such great anxiety during my life past; so that this departure which has been prescribed me now abounds for me in favourable hope, as it should for any Athenian who deems his

mind to have been so regulated that it was the same as cleansed from its impurity."

"Such is indeed the case," said Simmias.

"But does not the purification consist in this, as was observed in an early stage of the discussion, in separating the soul as much as possible from the body, and inuring it to gather and collect itself independently from all parts of the human frame, and to dwell, so far as it can, both at the present and through all future time completely by itself, ransomed as it were from the shackles of the body?"

"Certainly so."

"Is this, therefore, called death, this deliverance and separation of the soul from the body?"

"By all means," said Simmias.

"But the true philosophers alone are mainly desirous at all times to set it free, as I asserted; and this is the identical study of philosophers, the deliverance and separation of the soul from the body, or is it not?"

"So it seems to be."

"Therefore, as I said at the outset, should it appear ridiculous for a man who throughout his existence had so studied to live as if on the very confines of death, to feel annoyed as soon as it had actually come?—Should not this be absurd?"

"How not?"

"In fact then, Simmias, true philosophers are earnestly intent on death, and to them, of all mankind, death is least formidable. But judge from this. If they show an unqualified hostility against the body,

and are desirous to keep the soul entirely by itself, but when the time for this arrives they should give way to dread and discontent, should not their folly be extreme, since they would not depart delighted to that place where on their arrival they have the prospect of attaining to that which they were enamoured of through life—but they were enamoured of wisdom,—and of being liberated from any further association with that to which they were averse? Whether, for the sake of human objects of affection, wives and sons deceased, have numbers of their own free choice desired to descend to Orcus, induced by this very hope of seeing and living together there with those for whom they longed; and shall one who is seriously enamoured of wisdom, and who has strongly entertained a similar expectation that he could find it nowhere else deserving of the name except in Orcus, be indignant at the approach of death, and depart thither in displeasure? We must suppose that he would gladly go, my friend, if he is indeed a philosopher, for he will be firmly convinced of this, that nowhere else but there shall he find wisdom unalloyed. If this be so, as I declared just now, should it not be the height of folly in such a man to be afraid of death?"

13. "It should be so, by Jove," replied Simmias.

"Therefore," he resumed, "should not this be a sufficiently strong proof against a man whom you observed to be dissatisfied when about to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but of the body. But the same man is perhaps a lover of riches and honours,

and looks to the attainment of one or the other of these, or probably both."

"The case stands altogether as you state it."

"Does not fortitude then so called, Simmias, chiefly belong to those who are disposed to the study of philosophy?"

"By all means."

"So likewise that temperance, which even the multitude call by its right name, and which consists in not being transported by the passions, but moderating them with coolness and composure, does it not chiefly belong to those alone who hold the body in contempt, and live in the study of philosophy?"

"Necessarily so."

"For if," he continued, "you are inclined to reflect upon the fortitude and temperance of others, they shall appear to you absurd."

"How so, Socrates?"

"Are you not aware," he replied, "that all others reckon death amongst the great evils?"

"Certainly they do."

"Is it then through dread of greater evils that the brave amongst them endure death, whenever they do so?"

"It is so."

"Therefore all, except the philosophers, are courageous through the act and principle of fear; and yet it is strange enough that one should be courageous through fear and timidity."

"It is surely."

"What then; are not those of well regulated

morals amongst them affected thus?—Are they not temperate through a kind of intemperance? and impossible as we assert this to be, nevertheless it so happens that they have an affection similar to this—that which arises from their senseless temperance, for, dreading to be deprived of other pleasures, which they anxiously desire, they abstain from some while they are under the dominion of others, and though they call it intemperance to be governed by pleasures of any kind, yet it happens to be the case with them, that while under the control of pleasures generally, they merely exercise a control over some. But this is analogous to what was said just now, that in a manner they are made temperate through intemperance."

"So it seems, indeed."

"My dear Simmias, let us beware lest this be not a correct exchange with virtue, the commutation of pleasures with pleasures, pains with pains, and fear with fear, the greater too with the less, like pieces of money, while wisdom is the only sterling coin for which we ought to exchange all things; and for this, and with it, all things in reality are bought and sold, both fortitude, temperance, and justice; and true virtue, in sum, is inseparable from wisdom, whether pleasures, fears, and all things else of the kind, are present or absent; but where they are distinctly separated from wisdom, and mutually interchanged for each other, take care lest this species of virtue be not a mere semblance, and, in reality, servile, while it possesses nothing sound or sincere, whereas true virtue is a complete purification from all the passions, and

temperance, justice, fortitude, and wisdom itself, form the prelude, as it were, to this cleansing from pollution. Wherefore, these celebrated characters who established our initiatory ceremonies appear to have had no mean understanding, but, in fact, to have obscurely hinted long since that whoever descends to Orcus uninitiated and uncleansed, shall grovel in mire; but he who is purified and initiated upon his arrival there, shall abide with the gods. For, say those who preside at the mysteries, *Many indeed bear the wand, but the inspired are few*; and these latter are, in my judgment, none other than the true philosophers, to be enrolled with whom I left no means untried, so far as I was competent through life, but in every way endeavoured to effect it. Whether I directed my endeavours right, and at all prevailed, I shall know distinctly, if the Deity should please, when I shall have descended there, some short time hence as it appears to me.

"Such is the defence I make to you, Simmias and Cebes, for my naturally feeling no displeasure or discontent at taking leave of you and those who are in authority over me here, being convinced that I shall there, no less than here, fall in with excellent masters and friends; but with the multitude this obtains no credence. If then, in the course of this explanation, I appear more deserving of belief to you than to the judges of Athenians it is well."

14. Upon Socrates having thus expressed himself, Cebes rejoined, "All else that you have said, Socrates, appears to me to be advanced with reason, but

those observations upon the soul, meet amongst mankind with the strongest disbelief, being afraid (as they are) lest, on its departure from the body, it should no longer exist, but should perish, and be annihilated upon the same day on which a man dies; and being dispersed immediately on its separation and egress from the body, like a breath or smoke, it should vanish, and have no further being; otherwise, if it existed anywhere independent, concentrated within itself, and removed from the sphere of those evils which you have enumerated just now, great indeed, and cheering should be the hope that that which you say is true. But this requires, probably, no small persuasiveness and proof, that the soul of a deceased man exists, and is capable of certain faculties and reflection."

"You say true, Cebes," replied Socrates; "but what are we to do? Are you willing that we should converse together upon these points, as to the probability that the case stands thus or not?"

"For my part," said Cebes, "I should gladly hear what opinion you entertain upon them."

"I do not imagine," answered Socrates, "that any one, not if he were even a comic poet, would now say that I am trifling, and conversing upon extraneous subjects. If you approve, then, let us examine the question."

15. "But let us examine it in this point of view, whether the souls of the deceased survive in Orcus or not. There is indeed an old tradition which we have called to mind, that souls which set out thither from

hence do survive, and return hither again, and come to life from death. If this be so, then, that the living are reproduced from the dead, must it not be that our souls are in existence there? For if they existed no longer, they could not surely be reproduced; and in support of the truth of this it will be sufficiently strong testimony if it appears palpably clear, that the living are produced from no other source whatever than from the dead. If such be not the case, we must recur to other proofs."

"I agree with you," replied Cebes.

"Do not then," he continued, "examine this matter merely in reference to mankind, if you are anxious to understand it more distinctly, but in reference to all animals and plants, and whatever things, in sum, are generated; let us direct our attention to all, and see if they are, without exception, produced in no other way than contraries from contraries, in the case of those which have any such opposite quality, as, for example, fair is the contrary of foul, justice of injustice, and so in ten thousand other instances. Let us then consider this, whether it is absolutely necessary in the case of as many things as have a contrary, that this contrary should arise from no other source than from a contrary to itself. For instance, when anything becomes greater, must it not follow, that from being previously less it subsequently became greater?"

"Yes."

"So too, if anything becomes less, shall it become so subsequent to its being previously greater?"

"Such is the case," said Cebes.

"And weaker from stronger, swifter from slower?"

"Certainly."

"Well then; if anything becomes worse is it from better, and if juster from more unjust?"

"Why should it not?"

"We are then sufficiently assured of this, that all things are so produced, contraries from contraries?"

"Sufficiently so."

"But further; is there something of this nature in them; for instance, two stages of generation between each pair, as all contraries imply two extremes, from the one to the other, and from the other back again to it? For between the greater and the less intervenes the process of increase and diminution; and do we, therefore, call the one the act of increasing, and the other that of diminishing?"

"Yes," said Cebes.

"So, therefore, with the act of separating and of mixing, of growing cold and growing warm, and all things similarly, even though we should not have names to designate them by at times, still must they not in fact be at all times so disposed as to be produced from each other and that their generation should be reciprocal?"

"By all means," replied Cebes.

16. "What then," said he, "has life any contrary, as sleeping has its contrary, waking?"

"Certainly."

"What is it?"

"Death."

"Are not these then produced from each other, since they are contraries, and the stages of generation between them are two, since they are two themselves."

"How should it be otherwise?"

"I shall tell you then," said Socrates, "one combination of contraries amongst those which I mentioned just now, both itself and its stages of generation, but do you tell me the other. I say then, that sleeping is one thing, and waking another, and that waking is produced from sleeping and sleeping from waking, and that the stages of their generation are, the one falling asleep, and the other awakening. Is this sufficiently clear or not?"

"Quite so indeed."

"Do you now tell me likewise in regard to life and death. Do you not say that death is the contrary of life?"

"I say so."

"And that they are produced from each other?"

"Yes."

"What then is that which is produced from life?"

"Death," said Cebes.

"And that which is produced from death?"

"I must allow," said Cebes, "to be life."

"Then, Cebes, from the dead are living things, and living men produced?"

"It seems so," he replied.

"Therefore," said he, "our souls exist in Orcus (after death)."

"I think so."

"Of their stages of generation, then, is not one, at least, obviously distinct? For dying is surely an intelligible idea, is it not?"

"Certainly it is," said he.

"How then," he continued, "shall we do? Shall we not oppose in turn to this, the contrary process of generation, but shall nature fail in this? Or must we allow some process of generation contrary to dying?"

"By all means."

"What is it then?"

"Reviving."

"Therefore," said he, "if reviving is granted, this should be the process of generation from the dead to the living, namely, reviving?"

"Certainly."

"We allow then in this way that the living are produced from the dead, no less than the dead from the living; but such being the case, it appeared to me to furnish adequate proof that the souls of the deceased exist somewhere, from whence they return again to life."

"Such, Socrates, appears to me to be the necessary result from what has been admitted."

"Observe now, Cebes, that we have not, in my judgment, made these admissions without reason; for if those things which are produced, were not continually to alternate with each other as if revolving in a circle, but the generation were direct from the one (contrary), merely to its opposite, nor should take a circuit and come round again to the first, are you aware that all things at last should assume the same

figure, submit to the same affection, and cease to be produced at all?"

"How say you this?"

"There is no difficulty in comprehending what I say; but if, for instance, falling asleep be granted and that awaking, which is produced from sleeping were not to alternate with it, be assured that all things coming to an end, would render the fable of Endymion a mere jest, and he should no longer be considered of importance, because all things else should be influenced by an affection such as he was, by sleep; further, if all things were confounded together, and never divided asunder, the theory of Anaxagoras should soon be realised, *all should be chaos*. Thus, my dear Cebes, if all things which had partaken of life should die, and when dead should remain in the same state of death, and not revive again, should there not be an unavoidable necessity that everything should perish at last, and nothing revive? For if living things were produced from anything else (than what had died), and those living things should die, what remedy would there be against all things being finally destroyed by death?"

"None whatever, Socrates, in my mind," answered Cebes; "but to me you seem to speak the clearest truth."

"Such," said he, "Cebes, the case unquestionably seems to me, and that we do not acknowledge these things under the influence of delusion, but there is in reality a reviving and producing of the living from the dead, a surviving of the souls of the deceased, and

happiness for the good, but misery for the evil amongst them."

18. "And indeed," rejoined Cebes, "according to that argument, if a true one, which you are in the habit of advancing so frequently, that our knowledge is nothing else but reminiscence, according to this, I say, we must have learned at some former period what we remember now. But this is impossible, unless our souls existed before they appeared in this mortal guise; so that in this way the soul appears somewhat immortal."

"But, Cebes," rejoined Simmias, "what proofs have you of this? Remind me, for I do not well recollect just now."

"To comprise all," answered Cebes, "in one most admirable argument, (it is proved thus) because when men are questioned, if one puts the question fairly, they describe things as they really are; yet if they had not innate discernment, and right reason, they should be quite incapable of this. Further, if one were to try them with geometrical figures, or anything else of the kind, he has the clearest evidence that the case is so."

"If you do not give in to this, Simmias," said Socrates, "see if you will coincide with us upon considering the subject thus. You hesitate to admit that knowledge, so called, is reminiscence?"

"I do not hesitate indeed," said Simmias, "but I require to be made sensible of this very thing, which is the subject of the argument, namely, to be reminded: and though from what Cebes commenced to

say, I even now nearly remember and am inclined to agree, nevertheless, I would now hear how you essay to argue the subject."

"In some measure thus," he replied; "we allow doubtless, that if one be reminded of anything, he must have known it at some time before."

"Certainly."

"Do we allow this also, that when knowledge comes after a certain manner, it is reminiscence? But the manner I speak of is this: if one who has either seen, or heard, or has perceived by any other sense, some one object, should not only have a knowledge of this, but should form a notion of another of which the knowledge was not the same, but quite distinct, do we not with justice affirm that he remembered that of which he so received the notion?"

"How do you mean?"

"Thus, for example; the cognizance of a man is quite different from that of a lyre."

"Why not?"

"Are you aware then, that lovers, when they see a lyre, a piece of dress, or anything else which their favourites are accustomed to use, are thus affected; they recognise the lyre, and form in their minds the image of the girl to whom the lyre belonged? But this is reminiscence; just as any one seeing Simmias is as constantly reminded of Cebes, and so in ten thousand similar instances."

"Ten thousand indeed, by Jove," said Simmias.

"Therefore," he continued, "is not reminiscence something of this nature, especially when one is thus

affected with regard to these things which he has forgotten in the lapse of time, and from having lost sight of them?"

"By all means," he replied.

"Well then," said Socrates, "is it the case that one who sees a horse in a painting, and a lyre likewise, is reminded of a human being, and that one who sees Simmias in a painting is reminded of Cebes?"

"Certainly so."

"And must not one who sees Simmias in a painting, call to mind Simmias himself?"

"It is so indeed," he replied.

19. "Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that reminiscence arises partly from similitude, and partly from contrast?"

"It does so."

"But when one remembers any thing from similitude, is it not necessary that he should be still further affected, so as to consider whether this, as far as regards the likeness, comes short in any respect or not, of that which he remembered?"

"Necessarily so," he replied.

"Observe now," he continued, "if this be so. Do we allow any such thing as equality. I do not mean as between one log or stone, and another log or stone, nor anything of the kind, but something else distinct from all these, equality in the abstract,—do we allow that there is anything of this kind or not?"

"Truly, by Jove, we do allow it," said Simmias, "and to a very great extent too."

"Do we understand what that abstract equality is?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Whence did we derive our knowledge of it? Was it not from what we spoke of just now, that seeing logs or stones or some other objects equal, from these we formed the notion of the former, which is quite distinct from these? Does it not appear to you to be distinct? Consider the matter thus. Do not stones which are equal, and logs which are at times the same, appear at one time to be equal, and another time not?"

"Certainly."

"What then? That which is equal in itself does it ever appear unequal, or does equality seem inequality?"

"Never, Socrates, at any time."

"Therefore," said he, "those things which are equal, and equality in the abstract, are not the same."

"By no means do they appear so to me, Socrates."

"Nevertheless," he continued, "from those equal things, which are quite distinct from that abstract equality, have you not formed your notions and derived your knowledge of it?"

"You say very truly," he replied.

"From some similitude, therefore, or dissimilitude in them?"

"Certainly."

"But," said he, "it makes no difference. When looking at one thing, then, you form from the sight of it the notion of another, whether like or unlike, of necessity that very process must be reminiscence."

"No doubt."

"But what of the following?" he resumed. "Are we affected in any such wise with regard to the equality of the logs, or the equal things which we spoke of just now? Do they appear to us to be equal as equality in itself is, or do they fall short of it in any degree so as not to be such as equality in itself is, or in no degree whatever?"

"They fall short in a great degree indeed," he replied.

"Do we therefore allow that when one, upon seeing any object, has perceived that it aims (as this object which I look at now) at being like to some other existing object, but falls short of it and cannot become any thing such as it is, since it is far inferior to it, it is necessary for one perceiving this to have known beforehand that to which he asserts it to bear a resemblance, but still to be far short of a complete one?"

"It must be so."

"What then? Are we similarly affected, or not, with regard to objects that are equal, and equality in the abstract?"

"We are by all means so."

"Therefore we must have had a previous knowledge of equality before that time when having first seen equal objects, we perceived that all these aimed at a resemblance to equality, but came short of it."

"Such is the case."

"But we allow this also that it is impossible to have formed a perception of, or to perceive this by

any other means than by the sight, touch, or some other of the senses; for I assert the same of all."

"It comes to the same thing, Socrates, as far at least as regards that which the argument tends to establish."

"But we must perceive, then, by the senses, that all things which come under the senses aim at this abstract equality, and are at the same time inferior to it; or how else shall we say it is?"

"It is even thus."

"Therefore, before we began to see and hear, and use our other senses, we must have had knowledge of the nature of this abstract equality, if we were likely so to refer to it those equal objects which come under the senses, as to conclude that they all aimed at being such as the former, but fell short of it far."

"This is a necessary consequence, Socrates, of what was said before."

"Do we not then after our birth immediately see and hear, and exercise our other senses?"

"Assuredly."

"But previous to the exercise of these, as we said, we must have had a knowledge of equality?"

"Yes."

"Therefore we must have had it, as it appears, before we were born?"

"It seems so."

20. "If, then, having received this knowledge before we were born, we were born with it, should we not have known both previous to our birth, and

immediately after, not only what is equal, and greater and smaller, but all things of the kind? For our present discussion is not rather on the subject of equality than on that which is beautiful in itself, good, just, and holy, and, in a word, about all things upon which we set the seal of real existence, both in the questions which we ask, and the replies which we return. So that we must have had knowledge of all these before we were born."

"Such is the case."

"And if having once attained to it we did not as constantly lose it, we should be always born with this knowledge, and retain it always through life; for to know is this, to retain knowledge when one has received it and never to lose it. Do we not call this oblivion, Simmias, the loss of knowledge?"

"Assuredly we call it so, Socrates."

"But if having attained to it before we are born we lose it at our birth, and afterwards, when we exercise our senses upon such things, we recover the knowledge which at one time we previously possessed, would not that which we call learning be the recovering of our own proper knowledge? And if we said that this was to remember, would we call it by its proper name?"

"Certainly."

"For this seemed possible, for one having perceived anything by the sight or hearing, or exercise of any other sense, to form a notion of something different from this, which he had forgotten, and to which this approached nearly as a contrast, or similitude. Where

fore, in a word, one of two things must occur; either we are all born possessing this knowledge, and we retain it through life, or those whom we set down as learning after, do nothing else than remember, and knowledge must be reminiscence."

"Such, Socrates, is certainly the case."

21. "Which of the two then, Simmias, do you choose? That we should be born with this knowledge, or subsequently remember what we had previously known?"

"At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose."

"What now? Can you choose in this case, and what is your opinion concerning it? Can one who has the knowledge give an account of what he knows or not?"

"There is a strong necessity for it, Socrates."

"Do all men appear to you to be competent to give an account of those things which we were speaking of just now?"

"I could wish they were," said Simmias, "but I am far more apprehensive that at this time to-morrow there will be no longer any one here who can do this with effect."

"Do not all men then, Simmias, seem to you to be acquainted with those things?"

"By no means."

"Do they remember, then, what they once learned?"

"It must be so."

"When did our souls attain to this knowledge? Not, surely, since we were born into the world."

"Assuredly not."

"Previously then?"

"Yes."

"Therefore, Simmias, our souls existed before they appeared in this human form, separately from the body, and were possessed of intelligence."

"Unless, perhaps, we receive this knowledge, Socrates, at our birth; for this period yet remains."

"Be it so, my friend; but at what other period (than this) do we lose it? For we are not born with it indeed, as we admitted just now. Do we then lose it at the very moment we receive it? Or can you mention any other time?"

"Not at all, Socrates; I was not aware that I was saying what imports nothing."

22. "Does the case then stand thus between us, Simmias? If those things which we are constantly speaking of really exist, the beautiful, the good, and

* "It cannot then be disputed, that if all those things, which we always have on our tongues, do really exist; to wit, goodness, virtue, and all other essences of the same kind; if it be true, that to them, as to their original types, we refer all the impressions of the senses, which we discover, immediately in ourselves; it must be, as all these things are existent, that the soul exists also, and that it must have existed before we were born; also, if these things do not exist, that all our reasoning leads to a false issue."—*Cousin on the works of Plato.*

It is to be observed, that in the course of this argument, the existence of the subject is to be taken as identical with the existence of its essence. If then the subject exists, its essence exists, and if its essence exists, and the soul had attained to a knowledge of it before birth, consequently the soul has a pre-existence, the point which Socrates wishes in the first instance to prove.

every essence of a similar kind, and to such we refer all those objects that come under the senses, being aware that these essences had a previous existence and were our own, and with them compare these objects, it follows of necessity that as these exist, so our souls also exist before we are born; but if these do not exist, then has this argument been urged in vain. Is such the case, and is there an equal necessity that these objects should exist and our souls also before we are born, and if not the former neither the latter?"

"In the highest degree, Socrates," said Simmias, "there seems to be this necessity, and the argument has an excellent tendency in establishing that our souls exist in like manner previous to our being born, as also the essence of which you are speaking now. Since for my part I hold nothing to be so evidently clear as this, that all such things to the utmost certainty exist, both the beautiful, the good, and the rest which you mentioned just now; and so far as I am concerned, the case is sufficiently proved."

"But how does it strike Cebes?" said Socrates; "for we must convince Cebes too."

"Just as satisfactorily," replied Simmias, "as far as I can judge, although he is the most pertinacious of mankind in his mistrust of argument. Still I think that he has been sufficiently convinced of this, that our souls existed before we were born."

23. "Whether when we die, however, it shall still exist, does not appear to me, Socrates, to have been demonstrated, but that question raised by the multi-

tude, which Cebes mentioned just now, lest at the same time with the decease of the man, the soul should be dispersed, and this should be the end of its existence, is still in the way. For what is to prevent its being born indeed, and made up from some place or other, and existing before it merged into the human body, but when it departs and is separated from this, then to die itself and be destroyed?"

"You say well, Simmias," said Cebes, "for but half, as it were, of what is necessary appears to have been proved, that our souls existed before we were born; but it is requisite to prove further that whenever we die, it shall exist no less than before we were born, if the demonstration is to be made complete."

"This has been demonstrated indeed, Simmias and Cebes," said Socrates, "already, if you are satisfied to connect together this argument with that which we concluded on before, that everything living is produced from the dead. For if the soul has a pre-existence, and it is necessary that on its birth and entrance into life, it should be produced from no other source whatever than from dying and being dead; how must it not of necessity exist even after death, since it must needs be reproduced? That which you require, then, has been already proved."

24. "However, both you and Simmias appear to me as if you would gladly examine into this argument at still greater length, and that you entertain a childish fear lest the wind should in good earnest disperse and dissipate the soul on its departure from the body.

especially if one should not happen to die in a calm, but in anything of a great storm."

"Endeavour then," said Cebes smiling, "to convince us, as if we really dreaded this, or rather as if we entertained no such dread at all, although, perhaps, there is within us something of the child, which fills us with such fears. Let us then endeavour to persuade it not to be afraid of death, as of unsightly spectres."

"You must soothe it by charms then," said Socrates, "until you have subdued its fears by them."

"Whence then, Socrates, shall we procure a charmer skilful in such arts, now that you are leaving us?"

"Greece is wide indeed, Cebes," he answered, "in which such skilful men abound, but there are also many barbarian countries, all of which you ought to search through, seeking such a charmer, sparing neither wealth nor toil, since there is nothing upon which you could more suitably expend your money. But it is necessary that you should yourselves examine into the matter amongst each other, for you could not, perhaps, easily find any more competent than you are, to enter on this office."

"This shall be done indeed," said Cebes; "but let us return from whence we digressed, if so it please you."

"It pleases me indeed; how should it not?"

"You speak fairly," said Cebes.

25. "Therefore," says Socrates, "we ought to put

to ourselves a question of this nature, what is that to which it is suitable to undergo this affection, that of being dispersed, and for what have we reason to fear lest it should be so affected, and for what have we not? And next to consider which of the two the soul is, and thence to feel confident or alarmed in behalf of our souls?"

"You speak truly," said Simmias.

"Whether then is it suitable to that which has been compounded, and that which is naturally compounded, to be thus affected, to be dissolved in the same manner in which it was compounded; but if there be anything simple, to this alone, if anything, it is unsuitable to be thus affected?"

"So it seems to me to be," said Cebes.

"Therefore, whatever things continue always the same, and in the same condition, these above all is it natural to regard as simple, but those things which are variable and never the same, that such should be compound?"

"So at least it appears to me."

"Let us then," he continued, "return to the subject of the former part of our discourse. This essence, which in the course of our questions and answers we defined by saying that *it is*, whether is it always in the same condition and the same, or is it variable? Whether, too, do absolute equality, absolute beauty, and every absolute essence which really exists, admit of any change whatever? Or is every one of those essences which really exists, a simple and unmixed existence, always in the same condition and the same,

and does it never in any degree whatever allow of any alteration?"

"They must remain in the same condition and the same, Socrates," replied Cebes.

"But what are we to say of those many beautiful things,* for instance, human beings, horses, garments, or anything else whatever of the kind, whether they are equal or beautiful, or of all things synonymous with such? Whether do they continue the same, or, in direct contrariety to the former, are they, in a word, never at any time the same, neither with themselves nor with each other?"

"Such is their contrariety," said Cebes; "they never are secure from change."

"These latter then you might either touch, or see, or perceive by any other of the senses, but the former, which remain the same, it is impossible to apprehend in any other way than by reflection, and such as these are invisible and concealed from sight."

26. "You assert," said Simmias, "what is strictly true."

"May we then suppose," he continued, "two species of existences, the one visible, but the other invisible?"

"Let us suppose them," he answered.

"And that the invisible is always the same, but the visible never at any time so?"

* As distinguished from the essences themselves, for instance, beauty, equality, &c.

"Let us," said he, "suppose this also."

"Come now," he continued, "is any thing else the case than that one part of us consists of body and the other of soul?"

"Nothing else," he replied.

"To which of the two, then, shall we say that the body bears the greater resemblance, and is the more closely allied?"

"To the visible," said he, "as must be plain to every one."

"But what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?"

"It is not visible to mankind at least, Socrates," he answered.

"But we were speaking surely of what is visible, and what is not so according to the nature of man. Or do you think it was with a view to any other?"

"It was according to the nature of man."

"What then do we assert of the soul? That it is visible or invisible?"

"Invisible."

"Is it then immaterial?"

"Yes."

"Does the soul therefore bear a greater resemblance to the immaterial than the body, but the latter resemble more the visible?"

"It is imperatively so, Socrates."

27. "Did we not likewise lay this down a short time since, that when the soul makes use of the body to investigate anything, either by the sight hearing, or any other sense,—for to consider any

object through means of the senses, is the same as through means of the body,—it is then indeed forced by the body in the direction of those things which are for ever subject to change, upon which it becomes distracted and confused, and reels as if inebriated, because it is involved in matters of this kind?"

"It is certainly so."

"But when it considers any subject by itself, does it proceed in the direction of what is pure, everlasting, immortal, and immutable, and, as if closely allied to this, does it abide with it ever when it is left to itself and is empowered to do so, and is it relieved of its distraction, and, as being placed in connection with things like itself, is it always identical, and unchangeable with regard to them? And is this condition of the soul called wisdom?"

"You speak, Socrates," said he, "with the utmost fairness and truth."

"To which species of the two, then, both from what was said before, and that just now, does the soul appear to be more like and the more closely allied?"

"Every one, Socrates," he replied, "even the dullest, would in my mind allow, from this mode of investigation, that the soul in every respect bears a greater resemblance to that which is always the same, than to that which is not."

"But what of the body?"

"It more resembles the latter."

28. "But view it also in this light; that when the

soul and body are together, nature enjoins submission and obedience on the one, and on the other authority and command. In this light again, which of the two seems to you to resemble the divine, and which the human? Does it not appear to you that the divine is naturally adapted to govern and guide, but the human to be governed and to serve?"

"So it seems."

"Which, then, does the soul resemble?"

"It is evident, Socrates, that the soul resembles the divine, but the body the human."

"Observe then, Cebes, if such be our conclusion from all that has been said, that the soul bears the strongest resemblance to that which is divine, immortal, intelligent, uniform, indissoluble, always the same and identical with itself; but that the body resembles most that which is human, mortal, unintelligent, multifarious, soluble, and at no time identical with itself. Can we object to this conclusion, my dear Cebes, that it is not fairly drawn?"

"We cannot, Socrates."

29. "What then? When these things are so, is it not natural for the body to be speedily dispersed, and for the soul to be altogether indissoluble, or very near it?"

"Why not?"

"You perceive, then," said he, "that when a man dies, that part of him which is visible, the body which is exposed to the sense of sight; that which we call the corpse, whose nature it is to be dissolved, to fall asunder and be dissipated, does not immediately un-

dergo any of these affections, but lasts for a tolerably long time, and particularly so, if he should die with his body in full vigour, and at a similarly healthy time of life. For when the body has* collapsed and been embalmed, like those who are embalmed in Egypt, it lasts nearly entire for an inconceivable time. But some parts of the body, even though it should decay, the bones, for instance, sinews, and everything of a similar nature, are, nevertheless, in a word, incorruptible; are they not?"

"Yes."

"Is the soul, then, the invisible, that which departs into a region of like nature with itself, excellent, pure, into that which is Hades or invisible in good earnest, to abide with a good and wise deity, (whither, if God will, my own soul too must soon depart,) is this soul of ours, I say, being such in itself and in its nature, on its separation from the body straightway, as the multitude say, likely to be dissipated and destroyed? Far from it, my dear Simmias and Cebes; the case is much more likely to stand thus: if indeed it shall have departed pure, bringing with it nothing belonging to the body as having no voluntary communication with it through life, but flying from it and gathered up within itself as making this its constant care,—but this means nothing else than to philosophise aright, and in reality to study how to die composedly. For would not this (to philosophise right) be studying how to die?"

* The Greek word so translated is opposed in sense to the term rendered "to fall asunder," above.

"By all means, indeed."

"Therefore being so disposed, does it go hence to that which resembles itself, which is invisible, divine, immortal, and wise; on its arrival at which, its condition is one of perfect happiness, being set far apart from error, ignorance, fears, unbridled passions, and the rest of human miseries; and, as is said of the initiated, abiding really for ever with the gods? Must we say that it is so, Cebes, or otherwise?"

80. "We must allow it to be so," said Cebes; "but, in my opinion, if it shall have departed from the body polluted and impure, in consequence of its constant communication with the body, its subservience and attachment to this, and its being imposed on by it, and by its desires and pleasures, so far as to imagine that there is nothing real except what is corporeal, which one may touch and see, eat and drink, and make use of for sensual purposes; but that which is obscured from the sight, and invisible, which is intellectual and comprehensible by the aid of philosophy, being inured to the hatred, terror, and abandonment of this, think you that a soul which is so disposed, would be likely to depart independent and uncontaminated?"

"Not by any means," he replied.

"But enmeshed by the corporeal, which familiar intercourse and union with the body has naturalized to it by continued communication and great assiduity."

"Certainly."

"This, then, my friend, we must regard as oppress-

ive, earth-formed, and visible, of which a soul of such a character being possessed, is weighed down, and forced back again into the visible world through dread of the invisible and of Hades, to linger, as they say, about the sepulchres and tombs, round which some shadowy phantoms of souls have been seen, such spectres as these souls present which have not departed pure from life, but retaining a portion of that which is visible on account of which they are seen themselves."

"This is very likely, Socrates."

"Most likely, Cebes; and further, that these are not the souls of the good, but of the evil; which are compelled to wander about such places, to make atonement for their former wicked mode of life. And they wander about for so long until, at the instigation of the corporeal part which accompanies them, they are again inclosed in a body."

31. "But they are involved, as is natural, in similar dispositions to those which they may have indulged in during their former life."

"What kind of dispositions do you mean, Socrates?"

"That those, for instance, who have been devoted to the exercise of gluttony, insolence and intemperance, and who have taken no thought to check them, should be clothed with the form of asses, and such like beasts, is natural enough; do you not think so?"

"You say what is highly probable indeed."

"But that those who have set the highest price upon injustice, tyranny, and violence, should be clothed in the forms of wolves, hawks, and kites.

Into what shape else can we say that such should merge?"

"Without question, into such shapes as these," said Cebes.

"Is it then evident in all other instances whether each soul departs according to the similarity of its practices?"

"It is evident," he replied; "how should it not?"

"Are not those therefore," said he, "the happiest amongst this class and do they not proceed into the happiest region, who have practised those popular and social virtues which they call moderation and justice, which result from habit and exercise independently of philosophy and reflection?"

"In what respect are these the happiest?"

"Because it is probable that they shall transmigrate* into a like social and civilized class; of bees perhaps, or wasps, or ants, or even back again into the same human species, and upright characters shall be produced from them."

"Probably so."

32. "But it is not lawful for any one, but one who has practised philosophy, and departed completely pure from life, to arrive at the rank of the Gods; (not for any) except the true philosopher. On this account, my friends Simmias and Cebes, those who philosophise aright abstain from the gratification of all the

* "If Pythagoras' transmigration were true, that the souls of men transmigrate into species answering their former natures, some men must live over many serpents."—*Brown's Vulgar Errors*.

bodily appetites, persevere in doing so, and do not resign themselves to them; not being apprehensive of the loss of property, and of poverty, as the multitude are, and the avaricious; nor dreading the disgrace and disrepute of a low estate, like those who aspire after civil offices and dignities, do they on that account stand aloof from them."

"Surely it would not become them to act otherwise, Socrates," said Cebes.

"Assuredly not, by Jove," he replied; "wherefore they who have some concern for their souls, who do not pass their lives in the culture of the body, bidding adieu to all the rest, do not proceed in the same route with them, as being ignorant whither they are going, but impressed with the conviction that resistance should not be offered to philosophy, to the deliverance and purification she affords them, they submit to her direction, and follow her whithersoever she leads the way."

33. "How so, Socrates?"

"I shall tell you," said he. "The lovers of wisdom are aware that philosophy having taken to herself the soul, which was obviously shackled down and cemented to the body, and compelled to view objects through this as through a dungeon, but not of and by itself, which lay grovelling too in utter ignorance; and having observed the influence of this prison-house, how eagerly it is directed towards making the prisoner, as far as possible, a party concerned in rivetting his own chains;—the lovers of wisdom, I say then, are aware that philosophy having taken to herself their souls when in this state, gently admonishes

and endeavours to liberate them, showing that the observation of objects by the aid of the eyes is replete with illusion, and that likewise by the aid of the ears, and the other senses, and advising a disengagement from these, so far as it may not be absolutely necessary to use them, and urging a concentrating and condensing of the soul within itself, and besides a distrust of everything else except itself with regard to whatsoever real, independent essence it may of itself perceive, but whatsoever it may observe, by any other means (than itself), which varies according to those variable means, is in no wise to look on it as true; since such indeed is sensible and visible, but what the soul itself perceives is intelligible and immaterial. The soul of the true philosopher, then, convinced that it ought not to withstand this deliverance, abstains accordingly from pleasures, desires, griefs and fears, so far as it is able, reflecting that when one yields to the excess of joy, fear, sorrow, or desire, he suffers not in consequence merely such evil as one might suppose to result from sickness, or extravagance in gratifying his appetites, but that which of all evils is the gravest and the worst, this he suffers and is not conscious of it."

"What is this, Socrates?" said Cebes.

"That the soul of every man is compelled to give way to the extremes of joy and grief, and further, to the impression that this on account of which it is so strongly affected is most real, and most true, though it is not so. But things like these are principally visible things, are they not?"

"Certainly, indeed."

"Is the soul when under the influence of such affections, then chiefly shackled by the body?"

"How so?"

"Because every pleasure and pain, with a nail as it were, nails and fastens it to the body, and makes it of the nature of the body, while it believes those things to be true which the body asserts to be so. For, from its conformity of opinions, and identity of pleasures, with those of the body, it is forced, I imagine, to become identified with its manners and habits, insomuch, that it never can arrive in Hades pure, but must always depart polluted by the body, so that it speedily sinks again into another body, and grows again as if it had been sown, whence it is deprived of all communion with that which is pure, unspotted, and divine."

"You say most truly, Socrates," said Cebes.

34. "On this account then, Cebes, the true lovers of wisdom are temperate and firm, not for the reason which the multitude give. Do you agree with them?"

"Surely I do not."

"No, truly. But the soul of the philosopher would adopt this line of reasoning, and would not imagine that philosophy indeed ought to set it free, and when she did so, that it should resign itself again to pleasures and to pains, to bind it down and make her service void, as if engaged upon a kind of Penelope's web, but with her plan reversed; on the contrary, calming the passions to rest, taking reason for its guide, being ever intent upon this, the contemplation

of what is true, divine, and unchangeable, and being nourished by it, it thinks that while it lives it ought to live conformably, and when it departs from life, having attained to that which is congenial to and like itself, it shall be released from mortal miseries. From such a regimen as this, Simmias and Cebes, we have no cause to fear that the soul, having attended to it strictly, should dread, lest falling asunder at its departure from the body, it should be dissipated and dispersed by the winds, and exist no more."

35. After Socrates had thus expressed himself, silence ensued for a considerable time, and both Socrates himself, as he appeared, was engaged in meditation upon the subject that had been so discussed, as were also many amongst ourselves. But Cebes and Simmias were conversing for a while together, and Socrates observing them, asked, "What think you of what has been said? Does it appear to have been urged with sufficient effect? For it still presents many doubts and objections, if one would pursue them in adequate detail. If, then, you are engaged in the consideration of any other subject, I have nothing to say; but if you entertain any doubts upon this, do not hesitate yourselves to express and enumerate them, if you think the subject could be placed in a more effective point of view, and to call me in also to your assistance, if you imagine that with my aid you shall have better success."

And Simmias replied, "Indeed, Socrates, I shall tell you the truth. For some time past each of us being in doubt, is pushing forward and urging the

other to question you, on account of our anxiety to hear indeed, and at the same time a hesitation to give you any trouble, as it may not be agreeable to you in your present distress."

Hearing this, he smiled sweetly, and said, "How strange, Simmias! With difficulty, indeed, could I persuade other men that I do not regard my present condition as a calamity, when I am unable to convince even you; but you are apprehensive lest I should be more morosely disposed now than during the former portion of my life. It seems, too, that I appear to you inferior in the art of divination to the swans, who when they perceive that they must die, though given to song before, then sing the most of all, delighted at the prospect of their departure to the deity whose ministers they are. But mankind say falsely of the swans that it is through dread of death, and assert that they sing from grief, bewailing their decease, and do not reflect that no bird sings when it is hungry, or cold, or afflicted with any other pain, not even the nightingale, or swallow, or hoopoe, which sing, they say, a dirge-like strain for grief; but neither do they appear to me to sing for grief, nor swans, but as pertaining to Apollo they are skilled in the divining art, and having a foreknowledge of the bliss in Hades, they express their joy in song on that day rather than at any previous time. But I believe myself to be a fellow-servant of the swans, and consecrated to the same divinity, and that I am no less gifted by my master in the art of divination, nor am I departing life with less good grace than they. On this account,

then, you ought to speak and ask me what you please, while the Athenian Eleven give you leave."

"You say well," said Simmias, "and I shall tell you whence my doubts arise; and he, too, how far he rejects what has been urged. To me it appears, Socrates, and perhaps to you with regard to such matters, that it is either impossible or very difficult to arrive at certainty in the present life, at the same time that it shows a very imbecile character not to examine in every way into what is said concerning them, so as never to desist until one is quite exhausted in the extent of his research. For in regard to such matters it is necessary to accomplish some one of these things; either to learn from others how they stand, or find out upon investigation by one's self, having laid hold on the very best indeed of human reasonings, and the least likely to be confuted, to sail through life embarking in this, as one who risks himself upon a raft, unless one could effect a safer and less hazardous passage in a more secure conveyance, that of some heaven-sent reason. For my part, then, I shall not be ashamed to question you, as you propose, nor shall I have to blame myself in time to come, because I did not say what my opinion is. For, Socrates, when I consider both by myself and with Cebes what has been said, it does not at all appear to me to have been adequately proved."

36. "Perhaps, my friend," said Socrates, "your views are just; but say where the inadequacy lies."

"In this, I think," said he, "that one might use the same argument in respect to harmony, and a lyre

and its chords, that the harmony indeed in a well-tuned lyre is something invisible, incorporeal, very beautiful and divine, but the lyre itself, and its chords, are bodies, and corporeal, compound, earthly, and akin to mortality. When any one, then, has broken the lyre, or cut or rent the chords, were he to insist upon the same line of argument as you, he should assert it to be necessary for that harmony still to exist, and not have been destroyed; for there could be no possibility that the lyre should still exist with its chords torn asunder; and the chords too, which are mortal, (should exist,) but that the harmony of like nature with and allied to the immortal and divine, should perish, being destroyed prior to that which is mortal; but he should assert (I say) that the harmony must still exist somewhere, and that the woodwork and the strings should be decayed before it suffered any change. I think that you have yourself too, Socrates, perceived this, that we suppose for the most part the soul to be something of this nature, that our bodies being, as it were, set in order, and evenly balanced by heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, our souls are a mixture of some such qualities, and a harmony arising from them, when they are duly and justly combined with each other. If, then, the soul is a harmony, it is evident that when our bodies are immoderately relaxed, or overstrained by diseases or any other ills, the soul must immediately perish, divine as it is, like other harmonies, both those of musical sounds, and those which result from all the works of skilful artizans, but the relics of each individual body

must last for a long time until it has been burned or decayed. Consider now what answer we shall make to this argument; if one should require it to be admitted that the soul being a mixture of those qualities in the body, is the first to perish in that which is called death?"

37. Upon this, Socrates looking steadfastly at us, as he generally used to do, and smiling, said, "In truth, Simmias speaks justly. If there is one among you then more ready than me, why did he not answer him? For he seems to have impugned the argument with no mean success. However, it appears to me that we ought to hear from Cebes yet before we make our answer, what charge he has to make against the argument, that during the interval we may consult what we shall say, and then when we have heard them, either to give up to them, if they seem to speak reasonably, or if not, to support the argument. Come then, Cebes," he continued, "tell what it is that perplexed you, so as to occasion your mistrust."

"I shall tell you," replied Cebes. "The argument seems to me to remain in the same place, and to be liable to the same objections which we made before. For, that our souls existed before they merged into this human form, I do not deny to have been very interestingly, and, if it be not too fulsome to add, most convincingly proved; but that it exists anywhere after we die, does not so clearly appear. I do not indeed give in to the objection of Simmias, that the soul is not stronger and more durable than the body, for it seems to me to excel by far all things of the kind. 'Why

then,' might the argument say, 'do you still disbelieve, when you see that on the death of the individual, that which is weaker still exists? But it does not seem necessary to you that the more durable should be still during this interval preserved.' Observe, if I urge anything of weight in answer to this; but, as it appears, I too, as well as Simmias, must avail myself of an illustration of some kind. This subject seems to me to be treated in like manner as one would advance a similar argument in the case of an aged weaver deceased, and say that the man has not perished, but exists probably somewhere, and, as a proof, should adduce the garment which he wore and had woven himself, which was safe, and had not been destroyed; and if one were to doubt him, he would ask whether of the two is the more durable—the human species or the garment which is constantly wanted and worn; but when one answers that the human species is far more durable, he would imagine that it had been proved beyond all question that the man is alive, since that which is less durable was not destroyed. But I do not think that it is so, Simmias; and attend now to what I say. Every one must suppose that one who asserted this, asserted an absurdity. For this weaver having worn out and woven many such garments, perished subsequently to these, however numerous, but prior I imagine to the last, and yet the man is not, on this account, inferior to and frailer than the garment. But the soul, I think, might admit of this same illustration in reference to the body, and any one who applies a similar argument to them would seem to me

to express himself correctly, to the effect that the soul is something durable, but the body frailer and more transitory. But he would further say, that every soul wore out a number of bodies, especially if it lived many years; for if the body is in a state of decline and decay while the man is still alive, but the soul is always weaving anew that part which is worn out, it must follow, of necessity, that when the soul perishes it must have its last garment then, and be destroyed previous to this alone; but on the destruction of the soul, the body must then display the weakness of its nature, and quickly rot away. Wherefore it is not by any means right for one to place implicit faith in this argument, and to feel confident that when we die our souls still exist somewhere. For if one should concede to another who insisted upon still more than you, admitting to him that not only did our souls exist before we were born, but that when we die, there is nothing to prevent the souls of some from existing, and being likely to exist, and being repeatedly born and dying again,—for so strong is it by nature, that the soul can bear up against repeated births;—conceding this, I say, he would not yet allow but that it becomes exhausted after a number of births, and perishes at last altogether in some one of the deaths. But he would say that no one was aware of the precise death and precise dissolution of the body which occasion the destruction of the soul, for it is impossible for any one of us whosoever to be made sensible of it. If this be so, it applies to every one who is bold at the approach of death, that he entertains this confidence on foolish

grounds, unless he can prove that the soul is absolutely immortal and incorruptible; otherwise it follows of course, that one who is on the eve of death must be alarmed on his soul's account, lest it should perish altogether on its immediate disunion from the body."

38. Upon this, all of us who were listening to what they said, were, as we afterwards told each other, most unpleasantly affected; because they seemed to disturb our minds anew, after we had been fully convinced by the preceding arguments, and to reduce us to a mistrust not only of the pre-established reasonings, but of what was likely to be urged in future, on the grounds of our being incompetent judges, or the uncertainty of the facts themselves.

ECHECRATES.—By the Gods! Phædo, I make all allowance for you; for, in some degree, a like reflection strikes myself. What reasoning shall we trust henceforward, since that which Socrates advanced, with such strong semblance of conviction, has now lost all claim on our belief? For this doctrine, that our souls are a kind of harmony, makes a wonderful impression on me at all times as well as now, and it reminded me, as it were, while being developed, that such had been a previous impression of my own. Wherefore I require, as if at the very commencement, some other argument which shall convince me that the soul does not die with the dead. Tell me, then, in the name of Jove, how Socrates followed up the argument?—and whether he, as you say of yourselves, was obviously disconcerted, or not so, but calmly bore the argument out?—and did he do so efficiently or

imperfectly? Tell me everything as accurately as you can.

PHÆDO.—In truth, Echecrates, often as I admired Socrates, I was never more delighted than in being with him on that occasion. That he was able to make a reply is not, perhaps, so surprising; but this I was particularly struck with in the first instance—the pleasure, affability, and approbation, with which he attended to the argument of the young men; in the next place, his sharpness in perceiving how we were affected by their objections; then how skilfully he applied his remedies—recalled us when, as it were, routed and overcome—and encouraged us to accompany him in a concise consideration of the subject.

ECHECRATES.—How was that?

PHÆDO.—I shall tell you. I was sitting beside the bed, upon a low seat; but he was sitting somewhat higher than I was. Stroking my head, then, gently and taking hold of the hair which fell down my neck—for he was accustomed, on occasion, to amuse himself so with my hair—he said, "To-morrow, perhaps, Phædo, you will cut off these comely locks"

"Likely so, Socrates," said I.

"Not, if you take my advice."

"What would you have me do?" said I.

"To-day," he replied, "I shall cut off mine, and you these locks of yours, in case our argument should perish, and we prove unable to revive it. Were I, too, you, and the argument were to escape me, I should bind myself by oath, like the Argives, never to allow my hair to grow until I gained the victory

in my contest with the argument of Simmias and Cebes."

"But," said I, "Hercules himself, even, is said not to have been a match for two."

"Call upon me, then, as an Iolaus," said he, "while it is yet daylight."

"I do call upon you, then," I replied, "not as Hercules upon Iolaus, but Iolaus upon him."

"It will come to the same thing," said he.

39. "But, first of all, let us beware, lest we meet with some mischance."

"What mischance?" said I.

"That," he replied, "of becoming haters of reasoning, as some become haters of men, since there is no greater mishap than this for one to meet with, to hate reasoning. But the hatred of reasoning and hatred of mankind arise from a similar source. For the latter arises in the mind from an excessive and artless conclusion, and the impression that a man is altogether sincere, upright and honest; then, after a little, the discovery that he is vicious, faithless, and changing with the occasion. When one has frequently experienced this, especially at the hands of those men whom he believed to be his dearest and most familiar friends, in the end, after numerous disappointments, he hates the whole race, and is convinced that nothing upright whatsoever is in existence at all. Do you not think that this feeling arises so?"

"Certainly," I replied.

"Is it not a shame, then," he continued—"and plain, too, that such a person endeavours to deal with man-

kind without any judgment on human affairs; for, if he had dealt with them with judgment, such as it really is he should have felt the case to be, that the excessively good and evil are but few in either extreme; but the middle class is very numerous."

"How do you mean?" said I.

"Just as in the case," replied he, "of things that are small and large in extremes. Do you think that there is anything more rare than to discover a man, a dog, or anything whatsoever which is great or small in extremes? Or, again, swift or slow, beautiful or ugly, white or black? Do you not perceive that of all such things the extremes are rare and scarce, but the means are plentiful and abundant?"

"It is certainly so," I replied.

"Think you then," he continued, "if a trial were proposed for a prize in vice, that, in such a case, but very few would appear pre-eminent?"

"It is likely so," said I.

"Very likely," he replied; "yet reasonings do not in this particular resemble the case of mankind, for I merely in this instance was following as you led the way; but so far they bear a resemblance, as in the case where one yields assent to an argument as true, without any judgment in reasoning, and it appears to him a little after to be false, standing to reason at one time and not so at another, and again changing and variable; and especially in the case of those who are conversant with sophistical reasonings, you are aware that in the end they imagine themselves to have become the wisest of all, and alone to have perceived

that neither in material things is there any thing perfect or certain, nor in (abstract) reasonings, but that all existing things are absolutely, like the Euripus, subject to a continual flux and reflux, and never remain in any place for any time."

"What you say," I remarked, "is strictly true."

"It should, surely, then, Phædo," said he, "be a deplorable grievance, if, when a true, certain and intelligible mode of reasoning actually exists, yet in consequence of one's falling in with such a description of arguments as while they remain the same, appear still to be true at one time and at another not, he should not lay the blame upon himself nor upon his own want of judgment, but in the end through vexation should gladly transfer all censure from himself upon the arguments, and pass the remainder of his life in hatred and abuse of them, while he is blinded to the truth and knowledge of what really exists."

"By Jove," said I, "it is grievous indeed."

40. "In the first place, then," said he, "let us be ware of this, and let us not be persuaded that there is a chance of there being nothing sound in arguments, but much rather that we are not yet in sound condition, but must exert ourselves with manly resolute and energy to become so, you and the rest indeed on account of your whole life to come, but I on account of death itself, since I am in danger of deporting myself at present upon the very subject in question, not as a philosopher, but as a caviller, like those who are exceedingly uninformed. For they, when they are disputing about anything, pay

no attention to the bearings of the question on which the argument is based, but make this their principal object, the point of view in which what they have laid down shall appear to those present. And I seem to myself to be likely to differ from such on the present occasion merely in so far; for I shall not endeavour to affect that what I say shall appear to those present to be true, unless the conviction should arise incidentally, but how it shall appear to wear the strongest character of reality to myself. For I am reflecting, my beloved friend, (and observe with what partiality to myself,) that, if what I assert be true, it is well to be persuaded of it; but, if there is nothing that survives the dead, I shall yet, for the period previous to my death, on this account, occasion less annoyance to those present by my complaints. This state of ignorance, however, shall not continue long—it would be bad if so—but in a little time hence shall come to an end. Thus prepared, Simmias and Cebes, I proceed to bear my argument out; but do you, if you will take my advice giving little heed to Socrates but much rather to the truth, if I appear to you to express what is true, agree to it; but, if not, by every argument oppose it, taking good care that I shall not, having deceived at once both myself and you, depart, like the bee, having left a sting behind."

41. "But, to proceed," he continued. "Remind me, in the first place, of what you said, in case I should appear to have forgotten it. Simmias, then, as I judge, is in doubt, and fears lest the soul, although it is more divine and beautiful than the

body, should perish before it, as being in the similitude of a harmony. But, Cebes, indeed, seemed to allow me this, that the soul is more durable than the body, yet nobody knows but that the soul, after the repeated wearing out of several bodies, and having left the last body, then perishes itself; and that this very thing is death, the destruction of the soul, since the body is always in a state of decay. Is this, Simmias and Cebes, what we are to inquire into?"

They both agreed that it was.

"Whether, then," he continued, "do you reject all the preceding arguments, or some of them indeed, and not others?"

"Some we do," they replied, "and others we do not."

"What say you, then," said he, "with regard to that argument in which we asserted that knowledge is reminiscence; and that such being the case, our souls must, of necessity, have existed somewhere before they were imprisoned in the body?"

"For my part," replied Cebes, "I was wonderfully convinced by it then, and I still cling to it closer than to any other."

"And I indeed," said Simmias, "am possessed by the same feeling, and should be much surprised if I ever entertained a different opinion upon this subject."

Upon which Socrates remarked, "But you must, my Theban friend, entertain a different opinion if this impression be firmly fixed with you, that harmony indeed is something compounded, and that the

soul, like a kind of harmony, is composed of the concordant qualities of the body. For you will not surely allow yourself to say that the harmony existed, duly compounded, prior to the existence of these materials from which it should have been composed. Or will you approve of your asserting his?"

"By no means, Socrates," he replied.

"Do you observe, then," he continued, "that this is the natural consequence of what you assert when you say that the soul existed before it merged into the human form and body, but that it is composed of what does not yet exist? However, this harmony of yours is not anything like to that to which you compare it, but the lyre and the chords, and the tones, as yet discordant, come into existence first, and last of all, the harmony is produced and perishes the first. How shall this proposition then accord with the former?"

"Not in any way," replied Simmias.

"And yet," he resumed, "if it is the rule in any other argument, surely one regarding harmony should not admit of discord?"

"It is right that it should not," said Simmias.

"This argument of yours, then," said he, "is not in perfect accord; but observe which of the two propositions do you prefer? that knowledge is reminiscence, or the soul a harmony?"

"The former by much, Socrates," he replied, "for the latter arose in my mind independently of any demonstration, in consequence of a kind of verisimilitude

and speciousness, from which source the opinions of many are derived; but for my part, I am convinced that the arguments which establish their demonstrations by means of verisimilitudes, both in geometry and all other instances, are futile, and especially deceptive, should one be not upon his guard against them. But the argument respecting reminiscence and knowledge has been advanced upon a principle well deserving of assent. For in this way our soul was said to exist previous to its merging into the body, since to it belongs the essence which bears the name of *that which is*. This principle I have, I am persuaded, fully and fitly admitted; it follows then, as it would appear, of necessity, that I must neither allow myself nor any other to assert that the soul is a harmony."

42. "What if you view the question in this light, Simmias," he continued, "does it appear to you to be suited to harmony, or to any other composition to be otherwise disposed than those materials are from which it is produced?"

"By no means."

"Nor yet to do or suffer anything contrary to what those materials do or suffer."

* "The doctrine of Remembrance, (spontaneous Recollection,) and of Science, is founded on a solid principle, a principle which we have already advanced, viz., that our soul of necessity exists before its entrance into the body, since it, *i. e.*, the soul, has in itself, and as it were, a property belonging to it, that class of fundamental ideas which constitute existence, and bear its name."—*V. Cousin's works of Plato*, i. p. 265

He agreed.

"It is not therefore suitable for harmony to take the lead of those things of which it is composed, but to follow them."

He consented.

"It is, then, far from being the case, that harmony is contrariwise produced, or sends forth sounds or in any respect is opposed to its component parts."

"Far from it," he replied.

"What then?" said he; "is not every harmony naturally so far a harmony as it has been duly arranged?"

"I do not understand you," said he.

"Whether," said he, "if it should be more fully and effectively arranged, supposing such a case possible, should not the harmony be fuller and more effective, but if it were in an inferior degree, and less efficiently so, should not the harmony be inferior and less efficient?"

"Certainly."

"Is this then the case with regard to the soul, that, even in the least degree possible, one soul is more fully and effectively this very thing, a soul, or in an inferior degree and less efficiently so than another?"

"Not by any possibility," he replied.

"Come now, by Jove," said he; "is one soul said to be possessed of intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and another of ignorance and vice, and to be evil? And is this said with reason?"

"With reason, no doubt."

"What shall any one of those who pronounce the soul to be a harmony, assert those things to be which exist in the soul, virtue and vice? Will they call the one harmony and the other discord and assert the one soul, the good, to be duly attuned, and to contain within itself, being a harmony, a second harmony, but the other to be itself discordant and to contain no second harmony in it?"

"For my part," said Simmias, "I cannot say so; but it is plain that the advocate of the principle would assert something of the kind."

"But," said he, "it has been already admitted that one soul is not more or less a soul than another; and this amounts to an acknowledgment that one harmony is not more fully and effectively, nor in an inferior degree, nor less efficiently a harmony than another. Is it so?"

"Certainly indeed."

"And that a harmony which is neither in a greater nor in a less degree a harmony, is not in a greater or a less degree arranged to become so. Is this the case?"

"It is so."

"But that which has not been in a greater or a less degree so arranged, does it partake of harmony in a greater or less degree, or has it a just proportion?"

"A just one."

"Therefore, when one soul is not this very thing, a soul, in a greater or less degree than another

soul, it has not been in any respect more or less harmonized?"

"Even so."

"But such being its condition, it cannot partake in a greater degree of harmony or discord than another?"

"Certainly not."

"But again, when such is its condition, can one soul partake to a greater extent of vice or virtue than another, if vice indeed be discord, and virtue harmony?"

"It cannot."

"But the rather, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul at all shall partake of vice, if indeed it be a harmony. For a harmony which is essentially this very thing, a harmony, never at any time could partake of discord."

"Assuredly not."

"Neither indeed could a soul, which is essentially a soul, of vice."

"How could it, indeed, from what has been already established?"

"According to this mode of reasoning, then, shall all the souls of all animals be equally good, provided they are equally disposed by nature to be this very thing, souls?"

"So, Socrates, it seems to me at least."

"Think you," he continued, "that such a position could be fairly urged, and that our reasoning should be subject to such inferences, if the hypothesis be true that the soul is a harmony?"

"Not by any means," he replied.

43. "What, then," said he; "of all these things which are in man, is there anything else except the soul which you assert to exercise supreme authority, especially when it is a prudent one?"

"Nothing else."

"Whether by yielding to the bodily affections, or by resisting them?—I mean, for instance, as in the case of heat and thirst besetting the body, by urging it in an opposite direction, not to drink, and when hunger besets it not to eat; in innumerable other examples, besides, we observe the soul resisting the bodily affections. Do we not?"

"Certainly we do."

"But did we not allow, in the course of our previous reasonings, that the soul, if it were a harmony, could not breathe any tones at variance with the tension, relaxation, vibration, and any other affection to which the elements were liable of which it was composed, but should follow them, and never at any time become their guide?"

"We did admit it," he replied; "how should we do otherwise?"

"What then? Does it not seem to us to act an opposite part now, in its control of all those qualities of which one might pretend it was composed, in its resisting them through the whole course almost of life, and exercising authority in every way over them; punishing some more severely and with pains, (according to the principles of the gymnastic and healing art,) but others more mildly; rebuking in-

deed in part, but in part suggesting warnings to the desires, the angry passions, and the fears, as if, being a distinct existence, it conferred with another object distinct from itself? Something like what Homer has represented in the *Odyssey*, when he speaks of Ulysses, who, 'Striking his breast, in such terms chid his heart, Bear up, my heart; thou hast already borne much worse.' Think you that Homer composed this with the impression that the soul was a harmony and capable of being led by the bodily affections, and not as being competent to lead and govern them, and as being something far more divine in its nature than is consistent with a harmony?"

"By Jove, Socrates, I agree with you."

"Therefore, my excellent friend, it is by no means correct to assert, that the soul is a kind of harmony; for as it appears, we should not agree with Homer the divine poet, nor with ourselves."

He allowed that it was so.

"Very well," resumed Socrates: "as it would seem, the Theban Harmonia has been sufficiently reconciled. But, with regard to Cadmus, how and by what course of reasoning shall we satisfy him?"

"You appear to me," said Cebes, "to be likely to invent some means; at least you have succeeded in this argument against the harmony strangely contrary to my expectation. For, while Simmias was explaining on what points he doubted, I wondered much if one could be able to do anything with his arguments; however, he appeared in the most unaccountable

manner to shrink from the very first onset of your reply. So that I should not be surprised if the same thing should befall the argument of Cadmus."

"My good friend," said Socrates, "speak not in such a laudatory strain, lest some envious power should overturn the argument I am about to urge. These matters, indeed, shall be the province of the gods, but let us, 'advancing hand to hand,' like Homer's heroes, try if you advance anything of consequence. But this is the sum of what you seek after;—You require that our souls should be proved to be imperishable and immortal, if a philosopher, on the eve of death, full of confidence and expectation that after his decease he shall be far happier than if he had died having passed through any other life (than that of a philosopher), is to entertain this confidence on wise and prudent grounds. But the demonstration that the soul is something potent and divine, and that it was yet in existence before we were born ourselves, you say there is nothing to prevent all this from signifying, not that the soul is immortal, but only that it has a long duration, and pre-existed for an immeasurable time, and was both conversant with, and engaged in the execution of many things; yet nothing the more was the soul immortal, but its very entrance into the human body, like a disease, was the very origin of its decay, so that it passes through this life in misery, and perishes finally in that which is called death. But, you assert, it makes no difference whether the soul is united to a body once or frequently, as far as regards our several

apprehensions; for it is right that he should feel afraid unless he is a fool, who is not fully aware and cannot advance a satisfactory argument in favour of the immortality of the soul. Such, Cebes, I think is the character of your objections, and I purposely make frequent repetition of them, that nothing may escape us, and, if you wish, you may add to or take from them."

Upon which Cebes observed, "For my part, at present, I neither wish to subtract from, nor add to them; but they are just what I would urge."

45. Socrates then, after some delay, and pondering somewhat to himself, said, "You inquire, Cebes, into no easy matter, for it is absolutely necessary to discuss the origin of generation and corruption. I shall then, if you please, recount to you how I was affected myself upon these subjects, then if any thing that I say should appear available to you, you shall adopt it to produce conviction in the matter of your discourse."

"I wish, indeed," said Cebes, "to hear you."

"Attend then, as I intend to tell you. When I was a young man, Cebes, I had a wonderful fondness for that wisdom which they call a knowledge of nature. For this appeared to me to be a consummate wisdom, to be acquainted with the causes of every thing, why it is produced, why it perishes, why it continues in existence; and I used to turn my attention constantly from side to side upon my first investigation of such questions as these,—whether, when heat and cold are in a state of corruption, as some asserted, then animated

beings are produced, whether it is owing to the blood that we think, or, whether it is owing to air or fire, or to none of these things, but it is the brain which produces the sensations of hearing, sight, and smell, and from these arise memory, and opinion, and from memory, and opinion, in a state of rest, in the same manner, knowledge is produced. Upon considering, further, the decay of these things, and the affections incidental to the heavens and the earth, I looked upon myself at last as so unsuited to this investigation that nothing could be more so. But of this I shall give you satisfactory proof; for the things which I formerly with certainty knew, as far at least as I appeared to myself and to others, I was then, in consequence of this investigation, so utterly blinded to, that I lost all knowledge of what I supposed myself to be acquainted with before in many other particulars, besides that of the mode of the growth of man. For previous to this I had supposed it evident to every one that it was owing to eating and drinking; since when by reason of nourishment flesh has been added to flesh, bones to bones, and so, in like manner, to every thing else has been added what is of similar nature to it; then the bulk which is (originally) small becomes afterwards great, and thus a man of little size proceeds to become large. Such were my opinions then; do I not seem to you to have entertained them justly?"

"To me, at least, you do," said Cebes.

"But consider the matter still further. I supposed myself sufficiently ascertained of the fact, when a man of large stature stood by one of small, that he ex-

ceeded him by a head, and so with one horse and another; and still more obviously than this, ten appeared to me to exceed eight by the addition of two, and two cubits to exceed one cubit by an excess of half."

"But now," said Cebes, "what is your opinion on these matters?"

"I am far, by Jove, from thinking," he replied, "that I am in any degree conversant with the cause of these things, who cannot satisfy myself even in this—whether, when to one a person has added one, that one to which it was added has become two; or, that one added, and that to which it was added, have become two, on account of the addition of the one to the other. For I wonder if, when each of them was separate, each separately was one, and they were not then two. But when they are joined together, this is the cause of their becoming two, namely, their conjunction by being approximated to each other. Neither, indeed, if any person should divide one (from the other), can I yet be persuaded that this, on the other hand, is the cause, namely, their division, of their becoming two. For this is quite an opposite cause to the former of their becoming two; since then it was because they were mutually conjoined, and added the one to the other; but now it is because the one is divided and separated from the other. Neither am I persuaded yet, according to this system of inquiry, that I know why one is one, nor in a word, anything else, why it is produced, perishes, or exists; but I proceed to compound at random

some other system, while I by no means approve of this.'

46. "But having heard a certain person reading once in a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, to the effect that it is Mind which regulates and is the cause of all things, I was, indeed, delighted with such a theory of causation; and it appeared to me in a manner to be quite just, for Mind to be the cause of everything; and I supposed, if such were the case, that the regulating Mind sets all things in order, and disposes them severally in such a mode as they may best abide in. Should one, then, desire to investigate the cause of everything, how it is produced, or perishes, or exists, he must find out this respecting it, in what manner it is best for it either to exist, or, in any other way, to be passively or actively affected; but, from this mode of consideration, a man must look to nothing else, so far as concerns himself and others, but what is most excellent and the best. Besides, it is necessary for this same person to be acquainted with what is worst, since the knowledge of both one and other is the same. With such impressions, I was delighted to think that I had found an instructor to my mind, Anaxagoras, in the cause of things existing, and that he would explain to me, in the first instance, whether the earth is flat or round, and, when he had explained this, would develop the cause and necessity of its form, going upon the principle of all things being for the better, and consequently that it should be such, for the better, as he would describe it; and, further, if he asserted that it occupied the

centre, that he would unfold how it is for the better that it does so; and, if he would make all these things clear to me, I was fully prepared so as to require no more any other species of cause. With regard to the sun, I was, in like manner, determined to make inquiry; and with regard to the moon and the rest of the planets, their mutual velocity, revolutions, and other affections, in what manner, on occasions, it is best for each of them to be affected, both actively and passively. For I never at all supposed that, when he had declared those things to be controlled by Mind, he would adduce any other cause in their case than that it is so best for them to be arranged as they are; I thought, therefore, that he, ascribing a cause to each thing in particular, and all things in common, would explain in full what was best for each and the general good of all. And I should not, for a great consideration, have parted with my hopes; but, having taken up the work with the greatest earnestness, I perused it as hastily as I could, that I might the sooner be acquainted with the best and the worst.

47. "I was baffled, however, in this wonderful hope, when, in the course of my study, I observe the man making no use whatever of Mind, nor adducing any causes for the regulation of all things, otherwise than assigning the air, atmosphere and water, as causes; besides many other things equally absurd. And to me he appeared to bear the closest resemblance to one who would say, 'Socrates commits all his actions through the operation of Mind;' and, upon

attempting to explain the causes of my several actions, would assert, in the first instance, that the reason why I am now sitting here is because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and the bones are hard indeed, and have their diaphyses separately, one from the other; but the sinews are capable of tension and relaxation, enfolding the bones along with the flesh and skin, which binds them together; when the bones, then, play freely in their joints, the extension and contraction of the sinews give me the power of bending my limbs, and for this reason I am sitting here now in such a posture; and again, he would assign other causes of a like nature for my conversing with you, alleging as causes the sound of the voice, the air, and the faculty of hearing, omitting all mention of the real causes, that since the Athenians thought it better to condemn me, on this account it appeared preferable to me to sit here, and the more honest course to stay and endure the penalty they have prescribed, since, by the Dog, these sinews and bones should have been long ago in Megara or Bœotia, borne thither with the impression that it would be for the best, had I not judged it to be more upright and honourable to undergo whatever punishment the state might direct in preference to escaping by flight like a slave. But to denominate such things causes is exceedingly absurd; yet, if one were to say, that without having such things as bones and sinews, and such like, as I am possessed of, I should not be able to do what I pleased, he would assert the truth; but to assert that it is through them that I effect what

I do, and so far act under the influence of mind, and not from the choice of what is best, should be the highest and most palpable absurdity. For how silly is it that one should be incapable of distinguishing that the real cause is one thing, and that, without which the cause could not ever be a cause, is another; which the majority, feeling for, as it were, in the dark, appear to me, while they call it by a name quite foreign from the true, to designate as the very cause itself. Wherefore, one indeed, encompassing the earth with a vortex of the heavens, makes the earth to remain fixed (in the centre), while another supports it like a broad kneading-trough upon the air, as a base; but the power by which these things are so maintained in the best possible way in which they could be disposed, this they neither inquire into, nor do they suppose that it involves a kind of super human skill, but they imagine that they have found a more powerful, a more enduring, and a more comprehensive Atlas than this; and what is really excellent and suitable, they believe to be incapable of uniting and combining anything whatever. I should therefore have gladly become the disciple of any one, in order to understand the nature of a cause like this; but when I was disappointed of it, and could not find it out of myself, nor learn it from another, would you wish me to show you, Cebes, in what manner I set about a second voyage for the discovery of this cause?"

"Most anxiously I wish it," he replied.

48. "It seemed to me," he continued, "subse

quently, when I had exhausted myself in the investigation of things existing, that I should beware lest I should be affected like those who regard attentively an eclipse of the sun; for some destroy their sight unless they look at its reflection in the water, or some similar medium. With some such feeling then was I impressed, and I feared lest I should altogether be blinded in my soul while examining objects by the sight, and endeavouring to grasp them with each of the senses. I thought then that I should have recourse to the reasons of things, and discover in them the truth of their existence. Perhaps, however, this similitude does not hold good to the full extent of the comparison; for I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in their reasons, is contemplating them more by means of images than he who contemplates them in their effects; I proceeded then in the following way, to lay down, on every occasion, that principle which I judge the most incontrovertible, and whatever things shall appear to me to coincide with this I set down as true, as well in causation as in the case of all things else, but whatever things do not coincide as false. But I am anxious to explain to you more clearly what I mean, for I do not think you understand me now."

"No, by Jove," said Cebes, "not well."

49. "Yet," he continued, "I am not saying anything new, but what always upon other occasions, and in our past discussions, I have never ceased to say. For I proceed to try and explain to you that species of cause which I have concerned myself about,

and revert to those much talked of subjects with which I also set out, supposing that there is beauty in the abstract, goodness, greatness, and all such things, which if you grant me and allow to exist, I hope from hence to discover and demonstrate to you the cause of the immortality of the soul."

"Then come to your conclusion at once," said Cebes, "as I grant you this."

"Observe now," he continued, "what follows from the preceding; if you agree with me on the subject. For it appears to me if there is anything else beautiful besides beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of that (abstract) beauty; and so I assert of everything. Do you agree to such a kind of cause as this?"

"I do," he replied.

"I do not yet," he resumed, "understand, nor am I able to conceive those other subtle causes; but if one were to account to me for the beauty of anything, either from its blooming colour or figure, or anything else of the kind, I bid adieu to extraneous reasons, for I am confounded by all such, but I simply, artlessly, and foolishly perhaps, confine myself to this, that nothing else renders it beautiful but either the presence or participation of that (abstract) beauty, or by whatever means and in whatever manner it is communicated, for upon this I do not yet insist, but merely that through beauty all things beautiful are made so. Since this appears to me to be the safest answer to make to myself and any other also; and holding firmly by this I do not think

that I shall ever fall, but that it is safe for me, and every person whosoever to reply, that through beauty things beautiful are made so. Does it not seem so to you?"

"It does."

"And that through magnitude great things are great, and greater things greater; and through parvitude things less are less?"

"Yes."

"Nor yet would you approve if any said that one is greater than another by the head, and that the less is less by this very same; but you would maintain that you mean nothing else than that every one thing greater than another is greater on no other account than that of magnitude; and on this account, its magnitude, it is greater, but the less is less on no other account than its parvitude, and on this account, its parvitude, it is less: dreading, I imagine, lest any argument of a contrary kind should oppose you, in case you should assert any one to be greater and less by the head, (to the effect that,) in the first instance, the greater is the greater, and the less is the less, owing to the very same thing; and in the next place, that the greater individual is the greater in consequence of the head which is small, but this were indeed a wonder for one to be great owing to something small. Would you not be afraid of this?"

Upon which, Cebes, smiling, replied, "I should indeed."

"Would you not be afraid to say," he continued, "that ten is more than eight by two, and owes its ex-

cess to this, and not to number, and on account of number? And that two cubits are greater than one cubit by half, and not from magnitude? For the fear is the same."

"Certainly," he replied.

"What then? When to one has been added one, would you not hesitate to say whether the addition is the cause of being two, or the division when it has been divided? And would you not loudly insist that you are not aware of any other mode whatever in which each thing exists than by a participation in the essence peculiar to each, of which it partakes, and in this case you are not aware of any other cause of their becoming two, except a participation in duality, of which that must partake which is likely to be two, and in unity whatsoever is likely to be one, but these divisions and additions, and such other subtleties you would bid adieu to, leaving replies upon such matters to wiser than yourself; and would you, being in dread, as the proverb says, of your own shadow and inexperience, clinging firmly to the security which the principle affords, make answer accordingly? But should any one attack this self-same principle, would you not take leave of him, and decline to answer until you had considered the consequences derived from it, whether they agree or differ from each other? And when you should be required to enter upon an explanation of it, would you render it in this manner, by laying down another further principle, whichever may appear the best of the more general, until you have arrived at some satisfactory result, and would

you not, at the same time, avoid making confusion, like the contentious disputants, in treating of the first cause and its consequences, if you were anxious to attain to the truth of things? For those disputants have no consideration, perhaps, nor concern about this subject; since they are quite contented, while in their wisdom they throw all things into a general disorder, to be nevertheless competent to please themselves; but you, if you really belong to the class of philosophers, would act, I imagine, as I advise."

"You speak most truly," replied Simmias and Cebes together.

ECHECRATES.—By Jove, Phædo, they said so justly; for he seems to me to have explained the subject with wonderful clearness to one of even limited intelligence.

PHÆDO.—Such, indeed, was the impression, Echeocrates, of all present.

ECHECRATES.—And such our own, though absent then, at hearing your recital now.

50. But what was the subject of the subsequent discourse?

PHÆDO.—As I remember when these concessions had been made him, and it was admitted that every idea actually exists, and that other things participate in them so as to receive their name, he afterwards asked, "If you assert these matters to be so, whether, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates but less than Phædo, do you not then affirm that both magnitude and parvitude are in Simmias?"

"I do."

"Do you allow, however," said he, "that Simmias' exceeding Socrates is not actually true, as it is said to be in words? For Simmias is not adapted by nature to exceed him in consequence of his being Simmias, but of the magnitude which he has; nor, again, does he exceed Socrates, because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has parvitude in comparison with his magnitude."

"True."

"Neither, indeed, is Simmias exceeded by Phædo, because Phædo is Phædo, but because Phædo has magnitude in comparison with the parvitude of Simmias."

"Such is the case."

"Thus, then, Simmias has the name of being both small and great, since he is between the two, surpassing the parvitude of the one by his magnitude, but yielding to the other a magnitude which surpasses his own parvitude."

Upon this he said with a smile, "I appear to express myself with the accuracy of a written contract, but still things are as I say."

Cebes agreed.

"But I urge them for this reason, because I wish you to be of the same opinion with myself. For it appears to me not only that magnitude itself is never disposed to be at the same time great and small, but that the magnitude also in ourselves never admits the small, nor is disposed to be surpassed; but one of the two cases occurs, either that it retires and withdraws upon the approach of its contrary, the small, or ceases

to exist when it has actually come; but it is not disposed, abiding and admitting parvitude, to be any thing else than what it was before, as I, for instance, having sustained the reception of parvitude, and still continuing to be the same person that I am, am this small person, but that which is great, while it is so, never endures to be small. In like manner the small in us is not disposed at any time to become or to be great, nor any other of things contrary, while it continues to be what it was, to become and be its contrary at the same time, but it retires, indeed, or perishes in this contingency."

"Thus in every way," said Cebes, "it appears to me."

51. Then some one of those present, (but who he was I do not clearly recollect,) when he heard this, said, "In the name of the gods was not the very contrary of what is now asserted laid down in the previous part of the discussion, that the greater is produced from the less, and the less from the greater, and this positively is the mode of generating contraries from contraries? But now it seems to me to be asserted that this never can be so."

Upon which, Socrates, having moved his head forward and listened to him, said, "You have reminded me like a man, however you do not observe the distinction between what is advanced now and what was so then. For then it was argued that a contrary thing is produced from a contrary; but now that contrariety itself can never become its own contrary, neither that which is in ourselves, nor that which is in nature.

For, then, my friend, we were speaking of those things which involve their contraries, calling them by the name of the former; but now we are speaking of those former (contrary essences), by reason of which, being inherent, the things so called retain their name; but those we never at any time asserted to be disposed to admit of mutual generation." At the same time, looking at Cebes, he said, "Have any of these things he mentioned troubled you at all?"

"I am not disposed to be so," said Cebes, "although I by no means deny that there are many things which perplex me."

"We plainly, then," said he, "agreed to acknowledge this, that a contrary can never be its own contrary."

"By all means," he replied.

52. "But observe further if you will agree with me in this. Is there anything you call heat and cold?"

"Certainly."

"The same as snow and fire?"

"Assuredly not."

"Is heat then something different from fire, and cold something different from snow?"

"Yes."

"But this, I think, is evident to you, that snow, while it is snow, can never, having admitted heat, as we said before, continue to be what it was, snow and hot, but on the approach of heat it will either give way to it or be destroyed."

"Certainly so."

"And fire, on the other hand, on the approach of

cold must either give way to it or be destroyed, nor can it ever endure, having admitted cold, to continue to be what it was, fire and cold."

"You say true," said he.

"It happens, therefore," he continued, "in respect to some of such things, that not only the same idea is always designated by the same name, but something else too, which is not indeed the former, but retains its form always so long as it exists. But perhaps what I mean will be still clearer in the following example. The odd (in numbers) must always bear this name which now we give it; must it not?"

"Certainly."

"Must it alone of all things bear this name, for I ask you this also, or is there anything else which is not the same as the odd, yet which we must designate by this name, as well as by its own, because its nature is such as that it never can at any time dispense with the odd? Such I assert to be the case with the number three and many other numbers. But observe now regarding the number three; does it not appear to you that it must be designated always by its own name, as well as by that of the odd, which is not the same as the number three? But still such is the nature of the number three, five, and the entire half of number, that not being the same as the odd, each of them is yet always odd. On the other hand, two, four, and the other whole series of number, though not the same as the even, are nevertheless each of them even. Do you allow this or not?"

"How should I not," he replied.

"Observe now," said he, "what I wish to prove. But it is this, that not only do contraries appear not to receive each other, but as many things also as though not contrary to each other always involve contraries, such do not either appear to receive that idea which is contrary to the idea existing in them selves, but on its approach they perish or recede. Shall we not insist that the number three should perish first, and submit to anything else whatever, before it would endure while it was yet three to become even?"

"Certainly, indeed," said Cebes.

"Nor yet," said he, "is the number two the contrary of the number three."

"Surely not."

"Therefore, not only ideas that are contrary do not await the approach of their contraries, but some other things also do not endure the approach of those which are really contraries."

"You say very truly," he replied.

53. "Do you wish then," he continued, "if we can, that we should define what the nature of these things is?"

"Certainly."

"Would they then be such as to compel whatever they occupied, not only itself to retain its own idea, but always that of something which is itself a contrary?"

"How do you mean?"

"As we said just now. For you are doubtless aware that whatever the idea of three may have

occupied, it is not only necessary for that to be three, but odd besides?"

"Certainly."

"At such, we say now, the idea* contrary to the form which effected this, can never at all arrive."

"No, surely."

"But did the idea of odd make it so?"

"Yes."

"And contrary to this is the idea of even?"

"Yes."

"The idea of even then shall never arrive at being three."

"Never surely."

"Therefore three has not any share in even."

"Not any."

"Three, then, is uneven?"

"Yes."

"That, therefore, which I proposed to determine—what things they are which, though contrary to any contrary, yet do not admit it, as for instance now the number three, though not being the contrary of the even, does not the more admit it, for it always brings a contrary against it, as the number two to the odd, fire to cold, and in many other examples—see now if you determine thus, not only that a contrary does not admit a contrary, but that also which brings any contrary against whatever it

* The idea, or form, contrary to that which made three to be three and odd also; that is, the idea of even can never arrive at anything like odd.

approaches, can never, at any time, receive the contrary of that which is so brought. But think over it again, for it is profitable to give it constant attention. Five will not admit the idea of even, nor ten, its double, the idea of odd; this double too, indeed, which is itself contrary to something else, will not, nevertheless, admit the idea of odd, no more than three-halves, the half, the third, and all such like will admit the idea of the whole, if you follow and agree with me in opinion that the case is so."

"Most distinctly," replied he, "I follow and agree with you."

54. "But, answer me again as from the beginning; and do not reply in the same terms of my question, but in different, after my example. I say this, because I perceive, besides the certain mode of answering which I spoke of at first, another certainty (in answering), arising from what has just been said. For, if you were to ask me, owing to the existence of what in the body it shall be warm, I shall not make you that safe, unlearned answer, that it is owing to heat, but a more subtle one from what has been laid down just now, that it is owing to fire; nor if you should ask me, owing to the existence of what in the body, shall it be sick? I will not answer that it is owing to disease, but to a fever; nor if, owing to the existence of what in number, it shall be odd? I will not say, owing to oddness, but to unity, and so on. But observe now if you sufficiently understand what I mean."

"Quite so," he replied.

"But, answer me," he continued, "owing to the existence of what in a body shall it be a living body?"

"To the existence of soul," he replied.

"Is this then invariably the case?"

"How should it not?" said he.

"Whatever, therefore, the soul may have occupied, does it always bring it life?"

"It does, indeed," he replied.

"Is there anything contrary to life or not?"

"There is," said he.

"What is it?"

"Death."

"Therefore, the soul can never, at any time, admit the contrary of that which it always brings with it, as has been allowed from previous proof?"

"And most convincingly," said Cebes.

55. "What, then? What do we now call that which does not admit the idea of the even?"

"Odd," replied he.

"And that which does not admit the just, nor the graceful?"

"The one ungraceful, and the other unjust."

"Be it so. But by what name do we call that which does not admit death?"

"Immortal."

"Does the soul, then, not admit death?"

"No."

"Is the soul, therefore, immortal?"

"Immortal."

"Be it so," said he. "Shall we say then that this has been now demonstrated? Or how think you of it?"

"Most satisfactorily, Socrates."

"What, then, Cebes?" he continued. "If it is necessary that the odd must be imperishable, must not the number three be imperishable?"

"Why not?"

"If, then, that which is without heat must of necessity be imperishable, when any one applies heat to snow, should not the snow withdraw safe and unmelted? For it could not, indeed, be destroyed, nor yet would it stay to admit the heat."

"You say truly," he replied.

"In like manner, I imagine, if that which is without cold were imperishable, when one should move any cold body to the fire, it should never be extinguished nor destroyed, but should depart quite whole."

"It must be so," said he.

"Must we not," he continued, "express ourselves in like manner in regard to that which is immortal? If, indeed, that which is immortal is also imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish, when death comes against it; for, from what has been already laid down, it shall not admit death, nor become dead, just as three, we said, shall never be even, nor yet the odd (be even), nor shall fire be cold, neither, indeed, the heat that is in the fire. But some one may say, granting that the odd does not become even on the approach of the even, as has been allowed, what is

there to prevent, on the annihilation of the odd, the even succeeding in its stead? With one who urged such an objection, we cannot contend that it is not annihilated, for the odd is not imperishable, otherwise if we established this, we could have easily argued, that on the approach of the even, the odd, and the three (merely) disappear; and so we could have argued with regard to fire, heat, and the rest. Could we not?"

"Certainly, indeed."

"And so now, consequently, with regard to the immortal; if we allow it to be imperishable, the soul, in addition to its being immortal, must be imperishable likewise; otherwise we must have recourse to another argument."

"But there is no necessity," said he, "as far as regards this at least; for scarcely could anything reject decay if that which is immortal and eternal shall endure it."

56. "The Deity, indeed," said Socrates, "and life itself, and if there is anything else immortal, must be confessed by all to be at no time annihilated."

"By all men, indeed, by Jove," said he, "and still more, as I imagine, by the gods."

"Since, then, the immortal is also incorruptible, must not the soul, since it is immortal, be likewise imperishable?"

"There is strong necessity for it."

"Therefore, on the approach of death to man, that which is mortal of him dies, as it appears; but that which is immortal departs safe and incorrupt, having withdrawn from death."

"So it appears."

"Unquestionably, then, Cebes," said he, "the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls shall, in reality, exist in Hades."

"I cannot, for my part, Socrates, say anything against this, nor refuse consenting to your arguments. But if Simmias here, or any other has aught to say, it were better not be silent, since I know not to what other time, beyond the present, one could defer it, if he wished to speak or hear further on such subjects."

"Nor yet am I," said Simmias, "disposed at all to dissent from what has been said; however, from the grandeur of the subject of our discussion, and my low estimate of human weakness, I am forced to remain still (to a degree) incredulous upon the matter in debate."

"You do not, Simmias," said Socrates, "speak on other things only, but on this also well, and credible as these first principles may be, they must yet be reviewed with greater care; and when you have sifted them sufficiently, you will, as I imagine, adopt my course of reasoning, as far as it is possible for man to do so, and if once this very case becomes distinctly plain you will inquire no further."

"You speak true," said he.

57. "But it is right, my friends," he continued, "for us to reflect that since the soul is immortal it requires our anxious care, not merely for this interval which we call life, but always; and we must now suppose the danger to be great should one neglect it."

For if death were a deliverance from every thing, it should be great gain for the wicked to be delivered, by death, at once from the body and their iniquity along with the soul; but now, since the soul appears to be immortal, it can have no other refuge nor safety from evil except in remaining as good and wise as possible. For the soul descends to Orcus with nothing else but the results of its mode of discipline and education, which are said to be either of the greatest advantage or injury to the departed, at the very outset of his journey thither. But it is thus said; that each man's demon, who was assigned to him while living, proceeds to conduct him, after death, to a certain place where they must assemble together for judgment, and proceed to Orcus, accompanied by that guide upon whom it was enjoined to lead them there from hence. But having there received their deserts, and remained for the time prescribed, the guide conducts them back again after many and long revolutions of ages. But the passage is not such as the Telephus of Æschylus describes it; for he says, 'It is a simple path that leads to Orcus;' but to me it appears to be neither simple nor one, for there had been no need of guides since no one could possibly go astray when there is but the one road. But it seems now to have numbers of sections and circuits; I say this from conjecture, in consequence of the funeral sacrifices and ceremonies here. The soul, then, that is temperate and wise, follows willingly its guide, and is fully conscious of its immediate destiny; but that which has a passionate desire for the body, as I said before, clinging to it

devotedly for a long time, in a visible quarter, after violent resistance and intense suffering, is forcibly, and with difficulty, led away by its appointed demon. But on its arrival amongst the other souls, impure indeed and guilty of some such crime as the participation in unrighteous murders, or the commission of any such iniquities as are similar to them, and the work of congenial souls, every one flies and turns away from it with aversion, and shrinks from becoming either its fellow-traveller or guide, but it strays about involved in utter perplexity, until a certain period has elapsed, on the expiration of which it is of necessity carried into an abode suitable to it; but the soul that has led a pure and well-regulated life, having the gods for associates and guides, proceeds to inhabit a region adapted to each like itself."

58. "But there are many and wonderful regions in the earth, and it is itself, neither in regard to its nature or magnitude, such as it is supposed by those who are in the habit of describing it, as I have heard a certain person declare."

Upon which, Simmias said, "How do you mean, Socrates? For I have heard a good deal respecting the earth; not, however, those things which you are persuaded of, so that I would gladly hear them."

"But, indeed, Simmias, it does not seem to me to require the art of Glaucus to narrate what these things are; but to prove them true seems to me more difficult than is consistent with the art of Glaucus, and I should, perhaps, be just as incompetent to do so, as

even had I the knowledge the remaining portion of my life appears to be inadequate to the extended nature of the subject. What I am persuaded, however, that the form of the earth is, and what its different regions, there is nothing to prevent my telling."

"But this," said Simmias, "is enough."

"I am convinced then," he continued, "in the first place, that if the earth is of a spherical form in the centre of the universe, it has no need of air, nor any other sustaining force to prevent its falling, but the similitude of the universe on all sides to itself, and the equilibrium of the earth itself is quite sufficient to support it; for anything in a state of equilibrium being placed in the centre of something like itself, cannot incline more or less to any side, but being alike on all sides remains unmoved. This I am in the first place convinced of."

"And justly," said Simmias.

"Besides," said he, "that it is of considerable size, and that we are inhabiting a very small portion of it, from Phasis as far as the pillars of Hercules, dwelling by the sea like ants or frogs about a marsh; and that there are many others in different directions who inhabit numbers of such regions as our own. For in every direction round the earth there are numerous cavities, diversified both in their shape and size, into which water, clouds, and air flow together; but the pure earth itself rests still in the pure firmament, in which are the stars, and which the majority of those who are

accustomed to treat of such subjects call by the name of æther, of which the former are but the grounds, and are perpetually flowing into these cavities of the earth. Therefore, that we are unconscious to ourselves of our inhabiting the cavities of the earth, and imagine that we are dwelling upon its surface, just as if one who lived in the midst of the bottom of the sea were to suppose that he was living on the sea, and observing the sun and the rest of the planets through the water, would imagine the sea to be sky, but owing to indolence and imbecility should have never arrived at the surface of the sea, nor, having risen and emerged from the sea, have beheld the region here, how much purer and more beautiful it is than that with them, nor should have ever heard of it from one who had beheld it. But we are just affected the same way, for while dwelling in some cavity of the earth we imagine that we live upon its surface, and call the air sky, as if through this, being the firmament, the planets moved. And this amounts to our being incompetent, through imbecility and indolence, to arrive at the upper part of the air, since if one were to ascend to its surface, or reach it by the assistance of wings, he should behold on his emerging, —as with us the fishes emerging from the sea observe what is here—so, I say, one should behold the things that are there, and if our nature were capable of enduring the sight, one should perceive that that is in reality the heavens, in reality the light, and in reality the earth. For this (our) earth,

indeed, and stones, and the whole region here, are decayed and corroded, as things are in the sea by the brine; and nothing at all worthy of consideration exists in the sea, nor, in a word, has it any thing perfect, but there are submarine caverns, and sand, and slime in abundance, and filth wherever there may be earth also; and they are not in any degree to be compared with the specimens of the beautiful with us. But the things formerly spoken of would appear, on the other hand, still further to excel the things with us. Whence, if we are to tell a pleasing fable, Simmias, it is worth while to hear what kind the things are on the surface of the earth, beneath the firmament."

"In truth, Socrates," said Simmias, "we would gladly hear this fable."

59. "In the first place then, my friend, this earth is said to be similar in its appearance, should one survey it from above, to balls made of twelve pieces of differently coloured leather, variegated, marked out with dyes, of which the colours which the painters use are like samples. But there the whole earth consists of such, and far more brilliant and chaster than those here; for one part of the earth is purple, of wonderful beauty, another golden, a third, so far as it is white, whiter than chalk or snow, besides its being made up in like manner of other colours, and those more numerous and beautiful than we have ever seen. And these its very cavities too, filled as they are with water and air, show a kind of colour, refulgent amid the diversity of other colours, so that it presents one

continually variegated aspect. But in this earth, being such as I describe, are produced analogous plants, trees, flowers, and fruits; and the mountains and stones have both polish and transparency, and the more beautiful colours; of which these well-known little stones here which are so highly prized are merely fragments, cornelian, jasper, emeralds, and all such like. But there is nothing there which is not of this character, and still more beautiful than these. And the reason of it is, because those stones are pure, and neither corroded nor decayed, like these here, by rottenness nor brine, which descend here together, and produce deformity and disease in the stones, the earth, and other things, in animals and even plants. But the earth itself is adorned with all these things, and with gold, moreover, and silver, and other matters of the kind. For they are naturally conspicuous, being many in number, and large, and on all sides of the earth, so that to behold it is a sight to make spectators blest. But there are many other animals upon it besides men, who inhabit partly the central portion of the earth, partly live bordering on the air as we do on the sea, and partly on the islands near the mainland, which the air surrounds; in a word, that which with us and for our necessities is water and sea, is air with them, while our air is their æther. But their seasons are of such a temperature, that they are exempt from disease, and live for a much longer period than those here, and excel us in sight, hearing, wisdom, and all such like, by as great an interval as the air surpasses water, and the æther air in purity. And

they have temples of the gods, and shrines in which the gods in reality abide, and colloquial intercourse, oracular responses, visions of the gods, and such like communications take place between the one and the other. Besides, the sun, the moon, and stars are seen by them such as they really are, and the rest of their felicity is conformable to this."

60. "And such is the nature of the whole earth, and those things around the earth; but there are in it, throughout its cavities, many places around its entire compass, some deeper and broader than this region wherein we are dwelling, others deeper and having a more narrow aperture than this region of ours, and others of a more shallow depth and broader. But all these are mutually perforated under the earth in various directions, some with more narrow, and others with broader openings; they have conduits also, by which means a vast body of water flows from one cavity into another, as into basins, as also perennial rivers of enormous size under the earth, and waters hot and cold; moreover, fire in great quantities, and large streams of fire, many too of liquid mud, some thinner and some more miry; like the streams of mud which precede the burning torrent of lava in Sicily, and the torrent of lava itself; with which, further, these places severally are filled, to whichever each time the overflow may chance to come. But all these move up and down, as it were from a kind of libration existing in the earth. And this libration is owing to a certain innate property in the earth. Among the chasms in the earth, there is one especially

large, which penetrates quite through the entire earth; this Homer makes mention of, speaking of it as 'Far removed, where there is a profound abyss beneath the earth;' which elsewhere he, as well as many others of the poets, have called Tartarus. Into this chasm, then, all the rivers flow together, and issue forth from it again; and each of them partakes of the nature of that earth, whatever its kind, through which they flow. But this is the reason of all the streams issuing out from thence and flowing in, because this liquid mass has neither bottom nor base. Hence it librates and fluctuates up and down, and the air and wind around it do the same; for they accompany it both when it moves with violence towards the upper and towards the lower parts of the earth; and as in the case of persons respiring, the wind being in constant motion is continually breathed out and drawn in, so there also, the wind partaking of the movements of the liquid mass occasions fearful and tremendous storms by its exits and its entrances. When, therefore, the water rushing with violence descends into that place which is called the lower region, then having passed through the earth it flows into the beds of the rivers there, and fills them up in the manner of those who pump up the water from the hold of a ship; as soon then as it leaves the region there, and turns its course this way, it fills the beds of the rivers here again, and when they have been filled, they flow through the channels and through the earth, and arriving at those places into which severally they make their way, they cause seas, lakes, streams, and foun

tains. But when they sink into the earth again from thence, some, indeed, having encompassed places of greater size and number, and others fewer places, and of less extent, they are emptied into Tartarus again, some far deeper down than they were drawn up, and others at less depth, but they are all emptied below the point of their* discharge. And some, indeed, issue out exactly opposite their point of † influx, and others at the same side; there are some too which, having described a complete circle, coiling either once or oftener around the earth, like serpents, when they have descended as low as possible empty themselves into Tartarus again. But it is possible to descend in either direction as far as the centre, and not beyond it; for in either direction an ascent is presented to the rivers on both sides.

61. "The rest of the rivers, indeed, are numerous, large, and of various descriptions; but amongst these many there are four rivers in particular, of which the largest truly, which flowing outermost encompasses the earth, is called Ocean; but on the opposite side to this, and with a contrary current, flows Acheron, which traverses several other desert regions, and finally, sinking under the earth, empties itself in the Acherusian lake, where the souls of numbers of the dead descend, and having remained there for a destined period, some for a longer and others for a

* i. e. Their discharge from Tartarus, into the different channels through the earth.

† i. e. Their influx into Tartarus

shorter duration, they are sent back again into the generations of animals. But the third river issues forth between these two, and close to its point of issue it falls into a vast region blazing with enormous fires, and makes a lake larger than our sea, boiling up with water and slime; thence it proceeds in a circular course, turbid and muddy, and making the compass of the earth, it reaches, among other places, the extremity of the Acherusian lake, without mixing, however, with its waters; but after a variety of windings beneath the earth, it is discharged into the depths of Tartarus. And this is the river which they call Pyriphlegethon, whose burning currents emit with violence forcibly separated portions (of the river) in whatever part of the earth they may be. But opposite to this the fourth river empties itself first into a region awful and wild, as they say, of the colour of cyanus, which (region) they call Stygian, and the lake which the river makes by its discharge, Styx. And being emptied here, and endued by the water with a mischievous efficacy, penetrating the earth, it proceeds by a circular course to meet Pyriphlegethon, and encounters it in the Acherusian lake, at the opposite extremity; neither does the water of this river mingle with any other, but having made a compass of the earth, it empties itself into Tartarus, opposite to Pyriphlegethon; but the name by which the poets call it is Cocytus.

62. "These things then being so, as soon as the dead arrive at that region whither his dæmon carries each, in the first place those who have led an upright

and a holy life, and those who have lived otherwise are judged. And those who appear to have led a course of life between the two, proceeding to Acheron, and embarking in those conveyances they have, arrive in them at the (Acherusian) lake, and there abide; and when they are purified and have suffered the penalty of their iniquities, if any of them has committed such, they are absolved; they also obtain the reward of their good deeds, each according to his deserts; but those who appear to be incurable on account of their enormous offences, who have committed either many and flagrant sacrileges, or many murders in contempt of justice and the law, or any other similar crimes, these a suitable destiny precipitates into Tartarus, whence they never at any time come forth. But those who appear to have committed remediable indeed but great offences, having, for instance, used some violence under the influence of anger, towards father or mother, or who have become homicides in consequence of any other similar impulse, and when they have repented lead a different life, such must, of necessity, be plunged into Tartarus, and after that they have been so and remained there for a year, the wave casts them forth; the homicides, indeed, into Cocytus, but the parricides and matricides into Pyriphlegethon; and when borne along by those rivers, they have arrived at the Acherusian lake, there they entreat and call aloud, some upon those whom they have slain, others upon those whom they have offended, and they implore and beseech of them by name, to allow them to enter upon the lake, and to

receive them, and if they obtain their leave, they enter upon it, and rest from their sufferings, but if not, they are borne back into Tartarus, and thence again into the rivers, and they never cease from suffering thus until they have appeased those whom they wronged; for this punishment was ordained them by the judges. But whoever may appear to be eminently distinguished for a holy life, these are they who being delivered from those places in the earth, and discharged as it were from dungeons, ascend into a pure abode above, and dwell upon the surface of the earth. And as many of these same as have been completely purified by philosophy, both live throughout all future time without bodies and arrive at still more beautiful abodes than the former, which it is not easy nor have we at the present sufficient time to describe."

63. "But on account of these matters which we have considered, Simmias, we are bound to make every exertion for the acquisition of virtue and wisdom during life; for the prize is glorious, and the hope is great."

"To insist, however, that these things are just as I have described them, becomes not an intelligent man; that either these, however, or something else of the kind, are the circumstances affecting our souls and their abodes, since the soul appears to be assuredly immortal, this appears to me to be both becoming and worth one's while, who so thinks, to run the risk of the belief; for the hazard is honourable, and it is one's duty to apply as charms such impressions to himself,

wherefore I am now for so long a time protracting this discourse. On account of these things, then, that man must have good hopes about his soul who, during life, has bid adieu to all the other pleasures and ornaments of the body as quite extraneous, convinced that they aggravate the evil, but has concerned himself about knowledge, and having adorned his soul, not with extraneous but with its own proper decoration, temperance, justice, fortitude, freedom, and truth, so awaits with patience his passage to Hades, prepared to depart whenever fate may summon him. You then, Simmias and Cebes, and the rest, shall depart each of you at some future time; but fate now summons me, as a tragic writer would say, and it is almost time for me to adjourn to the bath; for I think it better to drink the poison when I have bathed, and not trouble the women to wash a corpse."

64. When he had expressed himself thus, Crito said, "Be it so, Socrates; but what directions do you leave for them or me on the subject of your children or any other matter, by attending to which we may act most agreeably to you?"

"Such as I am always impressing upon you, Crito," he replied; "nothing more; that by taking care of yourselves, you shall adopt a course of conduct most agreeable to me and to mine and to yourselves, even though you should make no such promise now; but if you disregard yourselves, and are unwilling to order your life, as in a beaten track, according to what has been established now and at a former time, no matter how many promises you may have made

at the present time, you shall effect nothing the more."

"We shall exert ourselves then," said he, "to act as you advise; but how shall we bury you?"

"Just as you please," he said, "if only you can catch me and I do not escape from you."

Upon this, smiling gently and looking round on us, he replied, "My friends, I cannot persuade Crito that I am the actual Socrates who is now conferring with you and arranging the several subjects of discussion; but he thinks that I am the person whom he shall behold, a short time hence, a corpse, and he asks how he must bury me. But the argument which I urged at such length and for so long a time, to prove that when I shall have drunk the poison I shall abide with you no more, but shall take my departure hence for the happy state of the blessed, this I appear to press on him in vain, while I console by it, at the same time, both you and myself. Enter then into security for me to Crito of an opposite character to that which he gave the judges. For he, indeed, went security for my stay; but be you my sureties that I shall not remain after I die, but shall take my departure, that Crito may bear the matter more easily, and may not, when he sees my body either burned or interred, be troubled on my account as if I suffered something dreadful, nor say at my funeral that he is laying out Socrates, or bearing him forth, or burying him. For, be assured," said he, "my excellent Crito, that to use improper terms is not only culpable as far as regards itself, but it also works some mischief to our souls. ¶

must be of good heart then, and direct you to bury my body, (not myself,) and to bury it in such a way as may satisfy you and you think to be most consistent with the laws."

65. When he had said this, he arose and went into a certain chamber to bathe, and Crito accompanied him, but he directed us to wait for him. We remained then at one time conversing upon and reviewing the subjects discussed, and again speaking of our misfortune, how severely it had befallen us, fully conscious that being deprived as it were of a parent we should pass like orphans all our future life. But when he had bathed and his children were brought to him—for he had two little sons and one grown up—and his kinswomen had arrived, having conversed with them in presence of Crito, and given them the directions he wished, he desired the women and children to depart and he returned to us himself.

And it was now near sunset; for he had delayed a long time inside. But when he came back from the bath, he sat down, and did not afterwards speak much; and the officer of the Eleven came and stood beside him and said, "Socrates, I shall not reproach you at least with what I condemn in others, their being indignant with and execrating me, when at the command of the magistrates I direct them to drink the poison. But I have found you upon all other occasions during the time of your imprisonment, the most noble, mildest, and most excellent of men who ever entered here, wherefore, at this time, too, I am well assured that

you will not be angry with me but with those who are to blame, for you know well who are so. Now, therefore, since you are aware what I have come to announce, farewell, and try to bear what is inevitable with all possible resignation." Upon this, bursting into tears, he turned away and withdrew.

And Socrates looked towards him and said, "And you, too, farewell, we shall do as you direct." At the same time (turning to us) he said, "How kindly polite this man is; during the whole time (of my imprisonment) he used to visit me, and converse with me occasionally, and proved one of the worthiest of men; how heartily, too, does he lament me now. But come, Crito, let us attend his bidding, and let some one bring the poison, if it has been ground; if not, let the man grind it."

Crito replied, "But I think that the sun is still upon the mountains, and has not sunk as yet. Besides, I am aware that others are in the habit of drinking the poison very late, after they have been commanded to drink it, when they have supped and drunk very freely, and some of them after they have enjoyed the society of those they love. Do not then be in haste; for there is yet time."

And Socrates answered: "Naturally those persons whom you mention, Crito, act this part; for they imagine that they shall be gainers by so doing, and for my part I shall avoid with equal reason acting thus; for I expect to be no otherwise a gainer by drinking the poison a little later, than to appear ridiculous in my own eyes, if still anxious to live,

and sparing that of which no more exists. But go," said he, "obey, and do not thwart me."

66 When Crito heard this, he made signs to an attendant standing near; and the attendant went out, and after a delay of some time, he returned with the person who was to administer the poison, who carried it ready ground in a cup; and, when Socrates saw the man, he said, "Well, now, good friend, what must I do, for you are conversant with these matters?"

"Nothing," he replied, "but walk about when you have drunk the poison until you feel a weight in your legs, then lie down, and so the poison will work of itself." At the same time he held out the cup to Socrates, and he took it, and with the utmost cheerfulness, Echecrates, without the slightest sign of fear or change in his complexion or his face, but looking steadfastly as he was accustomed on the man, he said, "What say you of this cup with regard to our making a libation to any one? Is it lawful, or not?"

"We grind just so much, Socrates," he answered, "as we think sufficient for a draught."

"I understand," said he; "but surely it is both lawful, at least, and expedient to pray to the gods that our journey may be happy hence to them, which I earnestly implore indeed, and may such be the result." And having so said, raising the cup at the same time to his lips, he drained it with the greatest coolness and unconcern.

And for a time, indeed, the greater number of us were just able to refrain from tears, but when we saw

him drink and finish the draught, we could do so no longer, but in spite of myself the tears flowed copiously, so that I covered my face and grieved for myself, not at all indeed for him, but at my own misfortune in having lost so dear a friend. Crito stood up to retire rather sooner than I did, as he had not been able to forbear from tears. But Apollodorus even before this never ceased weeping, and then, too, bursting out into lamentation, bewailing and complaining, he pierced the heart of every one present except Socrates himself. But he said, "What are you doing, my admirable friends? On this account chiefly I dismissed the women in order that they might not commit such foolishness; I have heard, too, that one should die with auspicious language. Be still, then, and be firm."

Upon hearing this we were ashamed, and checked our tears. But when he had walked awhile, as soon as he said his legs grew heavy, he lay down on his back, for so the man directed him. At the same time he who administered the poison, taking hold of him, examined after some interval his feet and legs, and then pressing his foot hard asked if he felt it, and he said not. Afterwards he did the same again with his legs; and so going higher up he showed us that he was growing cold and stiff. He then touched him himself, and said that when the chill reached his heart then he should die. Already the region of the lower belly had grown cold, and having uncovered his face, for he was covered with a garment, he said, —the last words, too, which he uttered,— "Crito, we

owe a cock to Æsculapius; pay it, and by no means neglect it."

"It shall be done," said Crito; "but see if you have any other charge to give."

When he was asked this, he made no further answer: but after a little time he stirred and the attendant uncovered him, and his eyes were fixed; but Crito observing this closed his mouth and eyes.

67. Such was the death, Echecrates, of our friend; a man, the very best of those of whom we had experience then, and moreover the most sensible and just.*

* Xenophon, who knew him well, having been his pupil, gives the following general account of his character and conduct. He was so religious that he did nothing without the advice of the gods. He was so just, that he never injured any person in the smallest matter, but rendered every service in his power to those with whom he had any connection. He was so temperate that he never preferred what was grateful to what was useful. He was so prudent, that he never mistook the worse for the better; nor did he want the advice of others, but always judged for himself. In his conversation, he excelled in defining what was right, and in showing it to others, reproving the vicious, and exhorting to the practice of virtue.

Though the circumstances of Socrates were the reverse of affluent, he would never receive any gratuity for the lessons that he gave, as all other philosophers and public teachers did; and by this means, as he said, he preserved his freedom and independence. When upon his trial he was urged by his friends to supplicate the judges, as was the universal custom, in order to move their compassion, he refused to ask any favour even of them; being of opinion that this was contrary to the laws, according to which, and not according to favour, judges ought to decide.

In all the changes in the political state of the turbulent city of Athens, which were many in the time of Socrates, he adhered inflexi-

bly to what he thought to be just, without being influenced by hope or fear. This was particularly conspicuous on two occasions. The first was when, being one of the judges in the case of the ten generals who were tried for their lives on account of their not collecting and burying the dead after a naval engagement, and all the rest (influenced, no doubt, by the popular clamour against them) condemned them to die, he alone refused to concur in the sentence. Soon after the citizens in general, convinced of the injustice of the sentence, though after it had been carried into execution, approved of his conduct. The other was during the government of the thirty tyrants, when, though in manifest danger of his life, he refused to approve of their measures; and he escaped by nothing but their overthrow, and the city recovering its liberty.

That Socrates at the close of life expressed his satisfaction in his own conduct cannot be thought extraordinary. It was, he observed, in concurrence with the general opinion of his countrymen, and with a declaration of the oracle at Delphi in his favour. For when it was consulted by Chærephon, one of his disciples, the answer was, that there was no person more honourable, more just, or more wise than he.

He put, however, a very modest construction on this oracle; which was that, though he knew no more than other men, he did not, like them, pretend to know more, so that he only knew himself, and his own ignorance, better than other men. His reputation in consequence of it, and of his conduct in general, had no other than the happiest influence upon him. For, addressing his judges he observed, that, "it being a generally received opinion, that he was wiser than other men," he said that "whether that opinion was well founded or not, he thought he ought not to demean himself by any unworthy action."

Notwithstanding Socrates's consciousness of integrity, and general merit, and the good opinion of the wise and virtuous, he was so sensible of the malice of his enemies, that when he was brought before his judges he had no expectation of being acquitted, and therefore he expressed his surprise when he found that he was condemned by a majority of no more than three votes, out of five hundred.

OPINIONS
OF THE
ANCIENT, INTERMEDIATE, AND MODERN PHILOSOPHERS AND DIVINES,
CONCERNING THE
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

Futurity.—"It is indeed a wide ocean," said the Abbé, "full of waves and dangers, storms and tempests; and, like the Atlantic before the adventurous Genoese first crossed it, no one comes back to tell us what is beyond. But as to the eye of Columbus, enlightened by true genius, it was self-evident that, to harmonies with the known world in which he dwelt, there must be another continent beyond the wide Western sea; so, to the eye of the religious man, enlightened by revelation, it is self-evident that beyond the ocean of time there must be another world to equalise all that is unequal in this."

"The soul is an inseparable portion of the great universal mind; in other words, of Brahma. Like the Being from whom it emanates, it is, therefore, indestructible. It knows no distinction of time: it is free, immutable, eternal. The wind cannot pierce it, fire cannot burn it, water cannot drown it, the earth cannot absorb it. It is beyond the reach of the elements, invulnerable, invisible, universal, subsisting in all places, and at all times, and victorious over death."—Sacred Books of the Brahmins.

HOMER AND HORACE.

THERE is in man a desire of immortality. This desire is universal, being found in all who are capable of forming a notion of a hereafter. There never was that person who could subdue it; not even the des

pairing wretch who flies to death for succour, and embraces the hope of annihilation as his only refuge. At the very instant he dreads an immortality which he fears will be miserable, and withdraws himself from a life which he finds so, he wishes there were no such reason for choosing death, and preferring the utter extinction of his being; which is a manifest argument, that he hath not yet put off the general desire of immortality. This desire betrays itself in the most professed enemies to the notion of a future state, and the immortality of the human soul.

Not able to suppress the desire, they only change the object, and from themselves transfer it to their memory. Epicurus, as little as he cared for his soul's living out of his body, was willing to believe that his name would live, and when dying, flattered himself with the thoughts of surviving in the memory of his scholars, and with the reputation which his philosophical works would procure him. And Horace, a disciple of his, built the same hope upon the imperishable immortality of his poems. Says he, "I have erected a monument more lasting than brass, and loftier than the kingly elevated pyramids; which not the wasting rain, nor the unrestrained north, or a numberless series of years, and the flight of time, shall be able to destroy. I shall not wholly die, and a great part of me shall escape the goddess of death."

—*Smart's Translation*, Book 3, Ode 30.

Homer is full of hints and passages that suppose the separate existence of human souls, and there can be little doubt of its being the received opinion of the

age he lived in. Let the following quotations from the works of this wonderful genius suffice—namely, in those remarkable lines which he puts into the mouth of Achilles, after the death of his beloved Patroclus.

'Tis true, 'tis certain; man, though dead, retains
Part of himself; th' immortal mind remains:
The form subsists without the body's aid,
Ærial semblance, and an empty shade!

This night my friend, so late in battle lost,
Stood at my side, a pensive, plaintive ghost;
Even now familiar, as in life, he came,
Alas, how different! yet how like the same.

Pope's Translation, Book 28.

Elysium, or Place of Happiness, where the souls of good men shall inhabit after death.

Elysium shall be thine; the blissful plains
Of utmost earth, where Radamanthus reigns.
Joys ever young, unmix'd with pain or fear,
Fill the wide circle of th' eternal year:
Stern winter smiles on that auspicious clime;
The fields are florid with unfading prime:
From the bleak pole no winds inclement blow,
Mould the round hail, or flake the fleecy snow
But from the breezy deep, the blest inhale
The frequent murmurs of the western gale.*

Odys. 4. v. 76.

* The above quotations embody the sentiments of the Greeks, during the Homeric age, on the immortality of the soul. Plato and other philosophers of his time, appear to differ but little from the great father of poetry, history, and philosophy, on this subject.

"The Soul, being in its nature one simple, uncompounded thing, cannot be divided, nor consequently perish; perishing being nothing else but the separation of those parts which before were some way or other held together. Immortality is an endless progression, or continuance in life. But now, what never had life may be incorruptible; as a point of matter that is without parts, or, if that cannot be, without all pores, so as to be in no danger of a dissolution. Or that which once enjoyed life, may, for what appears at first view, lose it again, the substance remaining safe and uncorrupted. Incorruptibility in a living substance is indeed a good step towards the proof of its immortality, but still is no more than a step."

PHOCYLIDES.

In Phocylides are some sentences which express a clear belief of souls surviving the grave. "Immortal souls," he says, "free from old age, live for ever." "All the dead are equal, but God governs souls." "We hope to see the remains of the dead come out of the earth into light, after which they will be gods; for incorruptible souls remain in the dead. The spirit is the image of God given to mortals." According to this, the soul continues attached to the body some time after it is dead, which was the opinion of the Egyptians, and the cause, as it is thought, of their endeavouring to preserve the bodies so long by embalming them, and keeping them in their houses.—*Gales, Opusc.*

PYTHAGOREANS.

According to the Pythagoreans, the human soul is not of a nature so distinct from the body but that it has both some connection with it, and some properties in common with it. "The source of vice," says Timæus, "is in pleasure and grief, desire and fear, which, being excited in the body, get mixed with the soul, and have obtained various names from their various effects, as love, desire," etc., so that the passions are common to the soul and the body, though they are first excited in the latter.

They maintained, however, the superiority of the mind to the body, as when Archytas says, "In all human things wisdom is most excellent, as the sight is more so than the other senses, the mind than the soul, and the sun than the stars." Here we have two parts of the soul, or of the man, distinguished by their respective names, the former signifying the seat of intelligence, and the other that of mere animal life.

Timæus explains this division of the soul farther, when he says, "One part of the human soul is endowed with reason and intelligence, but the other is without reason, and stupid. The former is the more excellent, but both have their seat about the head, that the other parts of the soul, and of the body too, might be subservient to it, as being under the same tabernacle of the body. But that part of the soul which is without reason, and which is prone to anger, has its seat about the heart; and that which has

concupiscence has its seat about the liver. But the brain is the principle and root of the spinal marrow; and in it the soul has the seat of its government."

Theages divides the soul in the same manner "One of the parts," he says, "has reason, another anger, and the third desire. The virtue of prudence," he says, "belongs to the first part, fortitude to the second, and temperance to the third, and justice is the virtue of the whole soul."

The account given by the *Pythagoreans* of the state of the soul after death, is still more unsatisfactory and inconsistent. According to the golden verses, the soul is immortal. "Science, and ancient and venerable philosophy, free the mind from false and vain opinions and great ignorance, and raise it to the contemplation of divine things; to the knowledge of which, if a man so attain as to be content with his lot, and to rise above the accidents of life, and thus aspire after a moderate and temperate life, he is in the way to true felicity. And certainly, he to whom God has given this lot is led by the truest opinions to the most happy life. But if, on the other hand, any be refractory, and will not obey these sacred precepts, he will be amenable to those laws which denounce both celestial and infernal punishments. Unrelenting punishments await the unhappy manes, and other things mentioned by the Ionic poet, as derived from ancient tradition, by the hearing of which he wished to draw the minds of men to religion and purity. On this account I approve of his conduct. As we cure diseased bodies by unwholesome medicines, if they

will not yield to those that are wholesome, so we restrain minds with deceitful discourses, if they will not yield to true ones. On this account, too, foreign punishments are denounced," that is, such as were believed by foreign nations, "as the transmigrations of souls into various bodies, viz., those of the idle into the bodies of women; murderers, into those of wild beasts; of the libidinous, into those of hogs or bears; of the light and rash, into fowls; of the idle and foolish, into aquatic animals." Certainly the man who could write this, could have no belief in any future punishment of the wicked, whatever he might think of the state of the virtuous after death.

But when the question, "What is death?" was put to Secundus, his answer is decisively against any future state at all. "It is," he says, "an eternal sleep, the dread of the rich, the desire of the poor, the inevitable event, the robber of man, the flight of life, and the dissolution of all things." Such were the comfortless prospects of this philosophy in its most advanced state. What a wretched choice would a Christian make by exchanging his religion for this! —*J. Priestley.*

SOCRATES.

Though Socrates had more just ideas concerning the nature and character of Deity, and also of the nature and obligations of virtue, than the generality of his countrymen, and even of the philosophers, he does not appear to have had any more knowledge than others concerning the great sanction of virtue.

in the doctrine of a future state. In none of his conversations recorded by Xenophon, on the subject of virtue, with young men and others, is there the least mention of it, or allusion to it; which was certainly unavoidable, if he had been really acquainted with it and believed it.

Speaking of the happiness of his virtuous pupils, he mentions the pleasure they would have in this life, and the respect that would be paid to them; and says that, "when they died they would not be without honour consigned to oblivion, but would be for ever celebrated." Having said this, could he have forbore to add their happier condition after death, if he had had any belief of it?

It is particularly remarkable that nothing that Xenophon says as coming from Socrates, not only in his conversations with his pupils, but even at his trial, and the scenes before his death, implies a belief of a future state. All that we have of this kind is from Plato; and though he was present at the trial, and therefore what he says is, no doubt, entitled to a considerable degree of credit, it wants the attestation of another witness; and the want of that of Xenophon is something more than negative; especially as it is well known that Plato did not scruple to put into the mouth of Socrates, language and sentiments that never fell from him, as it is said Socrates himself observed when he was shown the dialogue entitled *Lysis*, in which he is the principal speaker, as he is in many others.

In Plato's celebrated dialogue entitled *Phædon*, in

which he makes Socrates advance arguments in proof of a future state, we want the evidence of some person who was present; for Plato himself was at that time confined by sickness, so that it is very possible, as nothing is said of it by Xenophon, that he might not have held any discourse on the subject at all.

Besides, all that Socrates is represented by Plato to have said on this subject is far from amounting to any thing like certain knowledge and real belief with respect to it, such as appears in the discourses of Jesus, and the writings of the Apostles. Socrates, according to Plato, generally speaks of a future state, and the condition of men in it, as the popular belief, which might be true or false. "If," says he, "what is said be true, we shall in another state die no more." "In death," he says to his judges, "we either lose all sense of things, or, as it is said, go into some other place; and if so, it will be much better; as we shall be out of the power of partial judges, and come before those that are impartial; Minos, Rhadamanthus, Æacus, Triptolemus, and others, who were demigods." Taking his leave of them, he says, "I must now depart to die, while you continue in life; but which of these is better, the gods only can tell; for in my opinion, no man can know this."

His first argument is, that as every thing else in nature has its contrary, death must have it also, and if so, it must be followed by life, as day follows night, and a state of vigilance always follows sleep. But might it not be said that, for the same reason, every thing that is bitter must, some time or other,

become sweet, and every thing that is sweet become bitter?

His second argument is, that all our present acquired knowledge is only the recollection of what we knew before in a former state. But what evidence is there of this?

His third argument is, that only compound substances are liable to corruption, by a separation of the parts of which they consist; but the mind is a simple substance, and therefore cannot be affected by the dissolution of the body in death.

This is certainly the most plausible argument of the three, but it is of too subtle a nature to give much satisfaction. If the mind have several powers and affections, and be furnished with a multiplicity of ideas, there is the same evidence of its being a compound as there is with respect to the body; and if the power of thinking, or mental action, bear any resemblance to corporeal motion, it may cease, and be suspended, though the substance remain.—*J. Priestley.*

PLATO.

The sentiments of Plato concerning the human soul are by no means clear and distinct, nor are they pursued by him to their natural consequences, as they were by the Stoics afterwards.

Matter was always acknowledged to be incapable of any kind of action, and was always thought to be acted upon; whereas, the igneous nature of the soul was supposed to give it natural activity. Agreeably

to this, Plato says, "The soul has the power of moving itself."

He is not uniform in denying what was called passion to the mind. He must, therefore, mean it in a gross sense, when he says, "Where there is passion there must be generation; and this applies to the body," meaning, no doubt, that where there is generation, there must be a succession of beings produced from one another, that the death of some may make room for others; whereas, mind is incapable of any such thing, and, consequently, of that kind of passion which leads to it. It must, therefore, be immortal, and in this doctrine Plato is perfectly uniform and consistent.

"Every soul," he says, "is immortal. That which is always in motion is from eternity, but that which is moved by another must have an end." Accordingly, he mentioned the pre-existence as well as the immortality of the soul; and in the East these two doctrines always went together, and are always ascribed to Pythagoras; the soul and the body being supposed to have only a temporary connection, to answer a particular purpose. "The soul existed," he says, "before bodies were produced, and it is the chief agent in the changes and the ornament of the body."

Agreeably to this doctrine of pre-existence, Plato maintained that all the knowledge we seem to acquire here is only the recollection of what we knew in a former state. "It behoves man," he says, "to understand how many sensations are united in one, and

this is the recollection of what the soul, when in a state of perfection with God, saw before."

So greatly superior, in the idea of all the heathen philosophers, was the soul to the body, the latter being entirely subservient to the former, that we cannot wonder that they considered the soul as the whole self of a man, and the body as a thing foreign to him. "The mind," Plato says, "is all that we call ourselves, and the body attends it," meaning as a servant. "It is only after death," he says, "when it has got rid of the clog of the body, that we can see what the soul really is, whether compound or simple, and the whole of its condition." It is on this supposition of the independence of the mind on the body that he advances one of his arguments for the immortality of the soul. "The soul," he says, "cannot die by any affection of the body, but only by some disorder peculiar to itself. The soul, by the death of the body, does not become more unjust, and the death of the body is not the punishment of its injustice, but other punishments; for death is to it a freedom from every evil. Since, then, neither the death of the body, nor its own depravity, can destroy the soul, it must be immortal."

That the souls of men are emanations from the Supreme Being, the fountain of all intelligence, seems to have been taken for granted by Plato, but I do not find it distinctly expressed in any part of his writings. He seems, however, to allude to it in a passage that I quoted before; but he generally considers it as retaining its individuality after death; as when he says, "In truth, the soul of each of us is

immortal, and goes to the other gods, to give an account of its actions." This agrees with his uniform language about the rewards of virtue, and the punishments of vice after death. Whether souls are to be reunited to their source afterwards, which he probably supposed, as being held to be the necessary consequence of their being originally derived from it, this retribution he must have thought would previously take place.—*J. Priestley.*

ARISTOTLE.

Though Aristotle writes very largely concerning the soul, and, according to his custom, proposes and answers a variety of subtile questions relating to it, his sentiments on the subject are by no means evident, except that they are different from those of Plato, who preceded him, and those of the Stoics, who came after him. Indeed, on all subjects, he seems to have taken pleasure in differing from all others, and appearing as the author of a system of his own.

Though Aristotle did not, with many other philosophers, consider the soul as the whole of a man's self, he acknowledged it to be the principal part of a man. "It is so," he says, "of all animals." "The intellect is immiscible with the body, but the latter has its senses, as the instruments of it." He did not think so meanly of the body as not to be of opinion that it had some properties in common with the soul. "The soul," he says, "has all its affection in common with the body, as anger, gentleness, compassion,

confidence, joy, hatred, and, lastly, love; because in all these cases the body suffers as well as the mind."

The motion of the intellect is always said to consist in thinking, so that when this operation ceases, the soul ceases to exist. He therefore says, "The intellect is always in motion, and an equable one."

According to a metaphysical distinction of Aristotle, and I believe peculiar to him, every substance consists of matter and form. "What then," says he, "is the essence of the soul? If it is said to be form, it is said wisely and rationally, being part of the compound, and not the whole. They think justly who are of opinion that the soul is to be classed with forms. It is not, however, wholly place, but intellectual, nor does it consist in act, but in the power of the forms." This last expression is to me wholly unintelligible. But the opinion that the soul is the form of the body, whatever was really meant by it, was the common language first of the Christian Aristotelians, and then of unbelievers, on the revival of the Aristotelian philosophy in the West. It was condemned at the twelfth Council of Lateran.

Like all other philosophers, Aristotle considered the soul as consisting of different parts, each having its peculiar functions. "Nothing," he says, "is very clear concerning the intellectual or contemplative part of the soul; but it seems to be another kind of soul, and that this is separable," meaning from its other faculties, "immortal, and incorruptible." "The soul," he says, "is divisible into two parts, that which has reason, and that which is without reason," which

he must have learned from the Pythagoreans. "In the part which has reason are the virtues of prudence, wisdom, genius, memory, etc.; but in the part which has not reason, temperance, fortitude, justice, and whatever else is praiseworthy in the class of virtues; since on account of these we are deemed worthy of praise."

Concerning the state of the soul, or of the man, after death, Aristotle is nearly silent; and what he does say, or rather hint, is expressive of much doubt. "If any thing," he says, "be enjoyed by the dead, whether good or evil, it must be very little, either in itself, or to them; not sufficient to make them happy or unhappy, who were not so before." This with respect to the souls, or the shades, of the virtuous, is pretty nearly the sentiment which Homer puts into the mouth of Achilles in the Elysian fields; who says, he had rather be a slave to the meanest person upon earth, than king of all in the regions below.—*J. Priestley*.

EPICURUS.

There is nothing in nature besides body and space. There is nothing but what can be handled, or become the object of our senses—we cannot even form an idea of any thing else—nothing is incorporeal besides a vacuum which only affords room for bodies to move in. They who say the soul is incorporeal talk foolishly. The soul being corporeal, must be a part of the body, as much as the hands or the feet, each having their several functions; and as the soul had no pre-existence, it must have been produced at the same

time with the body, grow up and decay with it. Being a body it must consist of particles of some particular kind of form—and those that constitute the soul, are the smallest and soundest of all; but they must be dispersed when the body dies, as every other part of it is.—*Collection out of Diogenes Learsius.*

PINDAR.

As it will be seen, Pindar supported the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. This belief is urged in his second Olympic Ode, where he sings that "The just enjoy eternal light, and life exempt from cares and labour, among the gods."

STRABO.

Strabo (Geograph. lib. xv.) speaking of the Indian Brachmans, says of them that they, as Plato, compose fables of the incorruptibility of the soul, and of judgments in the infernal shades; yet, to me, it seems not to be doubted, but the belief of the immortality of man's rational soul, is fully as ancient as mankind itself. For, methinks the excellency of its own faculties and operations, above all material agents should be alone sufficient to afford to every contemplative man, certain glimpses of both the divine original and immortality thereof; and the desire of posthumous glory, an affection congenial and natural to all noble minds, together with a secret fear of future unhappiness, common to all, to give pregnant hints of its eternal existence after death.

CYRUS, KING OF PERSIA.

"No! my dear children! I can never be persuaded that the soul lives no longer than it dwells in this mortal body, and that it dies on separation. For I see that the soul communicates vigour and motion to mortal bodies during its continuance in them. Neither can I be persuaded that the soul is divested of intelligence on its separation from this gross, senseless body; but it is probable, that when the soul is separated, it becomes pure and entire, and is then more intelligent. It is evident that, on man's dissolution, every part of him returns to what is of the same nature with itself, except the soul; that alone is invisible, both during its presence here, and at its departure."—*Xenophon.*

CICERO.

"That souls do not cease to exist, we are led to believe by the conduct of all nations; in what seats they reside, and what sorts of beings they are, is to be learned from reason; the ignorance of which gave rise to the fables which were grafted on this belief, and are by wise men justly despised.

"But if we must have recourse to authority, whom can I name of more weight than him* whom Apollo himself pronounced the wisest of men? His testimony imported that the souls of men are divine, and that, being separated from the body, they return to heaven from whence they originally came. This he asserted in all his discourses, and in this opinion

* Socrates.

agreed with all those philosophers whom antiquity has reckoned of the Italic sect, and considered so particularly distinguished.

"But if the consent of all men be the voice of nature, and all men do universally consent, that something belonging to them remains after their departure from life, we cannot but adopt the general opinion.

"But the strongest argument is, that nature herself is tacitly persuaded of the immortality of the soul; which appears from that great concern so generally felt by all, for what shall happen after death. 'He planteth trees which shall benefit another age,' says Statius in his *Synepohebi*—but with what view, unless future ages may in some sense belong to himself?

"Do you think (said Scipio to Lælius) that I should ever have undergone so many labours, day and night, in the senate and in the field, if my glory were to terminate with my life? Would it not have been much better to have spent my days, without labour or contention, in indolence and tranquillity? But my soul lifting herself up, I know not how, always looking forward to posterity, as if, when she shall have departed from the body, she will then at length be but beginning to live. But unless the case be, that our souls are destined to immortality, not that of any person, however excellent, would thus exert itself for the sake of immortal glory.

"Let our minds be so disposed, as to regard that day (the day of our death) as a happy one to our-

selves, dreadful as it is to others. Let us regard death rather as a port of safety, to which we are bound; at which we should wish to arrive, with all the sail we can make."—*Tus Disputations*.

"O blessed day, when I shall arrive at the divine assembly of souls, when I shall leave this vile crowd and earth behind; for there shall I meet not only those noble Romans which I just now mentioned, but also my Cato, than whom a more worthy and pious man the world has not known."—*Cato Major*.

"That you, Africanus, may be more vigorous in defence of the government, know of a certain, that for all them who have saved their country from ruin, signally served its interests, amplified and bettered the condition thereof, there is a determinate seat in Heaven allotted, where they shall enjoy an everlasting age of bliss. And so, Scipio, after the example of your grandfather, and of me who begat you, live justly and piously. It is a piece of justice and piety to be useful to parents and relations; but to be useful to one's country, that's the greatest justice and piety, that's the way to Heaven, and the company of those worthies who have finished their course, and now inhabit that place which you see, pointing to the Galaxy.

"Therefore, if you will lift up your eyes and thoughts towards this eternal seat, seek not the applause of the vulgar, nor place all your hope on those rewards which men bestow on men. You must be won by the charms of virtue alone; as to what others talk of you, let them look to that; but talk of you

they will. The opinion of the world concerning us is bounded within the compass of these countries which we know: no one's fame can be everlasting, it lessens by the death of succeeding generations, till with late posterity 'tis buried. He had no sooner finished this admonition, but I replied: Well, Africanus! If Heaven is open to those who deserve well of their country, I shall now, though I always trod in my father's and your steps, and never degenerated; I shall now, having an eye to the reward before me, contend more earnestly to obtain it. Upon this he urged: Be sure you do so, and reckon that it is not you who are mortal, but only your body; for, it is not the form and figure that appears, which constitutes a man what he is, but it is the mind which is the man; know, then, that thou art a god; at least, if that be a god which lives, and has a sense; which remembers, and takes care of things to come; which rules, commands, and moves the body over which it is set, as the great God moves, commands, and rules the world."

"They have discovered a worthy secret indeed, who have learned, that when they die, they must wholly perish and be no more; which to suppose it true—for I dispute not against it—what have they to rejoice at, and be proud of?"

"If I mistake in thinking the soul of man to be immortal, I mistake with delight; nor would I have this mistake, with which I am pleased, torn from me as long as I live."—*Dream of Scipio.*

PLINY.

"After men are buried, great diversities there arose in opinion what become of their souls and ghosts, wandering some this way, and others that; but this is generally held, that in what estate they were before men were born, in the same they remain when they are dead. For neither body nor soul has any more sense after our dying day than they had before the day of their nativity; but such is the folly and vanity of men, that it extendeth still even to the future time; yea, and in the very time of death flattereth itself with fond imaginations and dreaming of, I know not what life after this. For some attribute immortality to the soul, others devise a certain transfiguration thereof; and there be again who suppose that the ghosts, sequestered from the body, have sense; whereupon they do them honour and worship, making a god of him that is not so much as a man, as if the manner of men's breathing differed from that in any other living creatures, or as if there were not to be found other things in the world that live much longer than men, and yet no man judgeth in them the like immortality; but show me what is the substance or body, as it were of the soul by itself? What kind of matter is it apart from the body? Where lieth her cogitation that she hath? How is her seeing? How is her hearing performed? And what toucheth she? Nay, what is she at all and how is she employed? Or if there be none of this, what goodness can there be without the same? But I would know where she hath her settling or abiding place after her departure

from the body? And what an infinite multitude of souls, like shadows, would there be in so many ages as well past as to come? Now surely these be fantastical toys, devised by men that would live always, and never make an end."—*Natural History*.

TACITUS.

"If in another world there is a pious mansion for the blessed; if, as the wisest men have thought, the soul is not extinguished with the body; may you enjoy a state of eternal felicity! From that station behold your disconsolate family; exalt our minds from fond regret and unavailing grief to the contemplation of your virtue. Those we must not lament; it were impiety to sully them with a tear. To cherish their memory, to embalm them with our praises, and, if our frail condition will permit, to emulate your bright example, will be the truest mark of our respect, the best tribute your family can offer. Your wife will thus preserve the memory of the best of husbands, and thus your daughter will prove her filial piety.

"By dwelling constantly on your words and actions, they will have an illustrious character before their eyes, and not content with the bare image of your mortal frame, they will have what is more valuable, the form and feature of your mind. I do not mean by this to censure the custom of preserving in brass or marble the shape and structure of eminent men; but busts and statues, like their original, are frail and perishable. The soul is formed of finer elements, and its inward form is not to be expressed

by the hand of an artist with unconscious matter: our manners and our morals may in some degree trace the resemblance.

"All of Agricola that gained our love and raised our admiration, still subsists, will ever subsist, preserved in the minds of men, the register of ages, and the records of fame. Others who figured on the stage of life, and were the worthies of a former day, will sink, for the want of a faithful historian, into the common lot of oblivion, inglorious, and unremembered; whereas Agricola, delineated with truth, and fairly consigned to posterity, will survive himself, and triumph over the injuries of time."—*Life of Agricola*.

OVID.

Why thus affrighted at an empty name,
A dream of darkness, a fictitious flame!
Vain themes of wit which but in poems pass,
And fables of a world that never was.
What feels the body when the soul expires,
By time corrupted, and consumed by fires;
Nor dies the spirit, but new life repeats,
In other forms, and only changes seats.
Even I, who these mysterious truths declare,
Was once Euphorbus in the Trojan war, &c.

Then death, so called, is but old matter, dressed
In some new figure and a varied vest,
Thus all things are but altered, nothing dies,
And here and there th' unbody'd spirit flies,
By time, or force, or sickness dispossessed,
And lodges where it lights, in man or beast, &c.

Death, so called, can but the form deface,
The mortal soul flies out in open space,
To seek her fortune in some other place

Dr. Garth's Translation.

BION.

Alas! the meanest flowers which gardens yield—
 The vilest weeds that flourish in the field,
 Which dead in wintry sepulchres appear,
 Revive in spring, and bloom another year:
 But we, the great, the brave, the learned, the wise,
 Soon as the hand of death has closed our eyes,
 In tombs forgotten lie, no suns restore,
 We sleep, forever sleep, to wake no more.

Bion on the death of Moschus.

SENECA.

The place that God has in the world, the mind has in man. He works upon matter, and the mind upon the body. There is nothing improper in endeavouring to ascend from whence we came. Why should we not think there is something divine in a good man, since he is part of God? The whole system is one, and is God. We are his companions, and members of him.

ARRIAN.

My body is not mine; its parts are nothing to me; death is nothing to me, let it come when it will. *He supposes a dialogue between a tyrant and a philosopher that is truly curious for the extravagance of it; the tyrant says, "You shall die." The philosopher replies: "But not lamenting." T. "You shall be in chains." P. "But not whining." T. "You shall be banished." P. "But what hinders my going laughing?" T. "Tell me your secrets." P. "No—that is my power." T. "But I will throw you into chains." P. "What say you, man? You may bind my feet, but Jupiter*

himself cannot change my resolution—*mind, soul.*" T. "I will throw you into prison, and strike off your head." P. "And did I ever say that you could not strike it off?" T. "I will kill you." P. "When did I say that I was immortal? These things must be thought of and meditated upon."

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.

The mind of every man is God, and flowed from the divinity. Thou, my soul, art part of the universe, and wilt vanish into that which produced thee, or rather by some intervening change thou wilt be received into the seminal reason, that is, the source of all reason. It belongs to the mind to be free from error and defect; neither fire, nor external violence, nor calumny, nor anything else, can reach the mind, where, like a sphere, it is compact within itself. The soul endued with reason has the following powers—it sees itself, it forms and limits itself, it makes itself whatever it pleases. Whatever fruit it produces, it reaps itself; whereas other persons gather the fruits of trees, and also whatever is produced from animals. It always gains its purpose, at whatever time its life terminates; so that it is not, as in a dance, or a play, in which the action is sometimes interrupted by incidents, and is therefore imperfect. But wherever it is taken, what precedes is complete and perfect: so that I may say, I have everything that belongs to me within me. Add to this, the mind traverses the whole world, and what surrounds it. It contemplates its form, and, looking forward into eternity

it considers the renovation of the universe at certain intervals.

CATULLUS.

The sun that sinks into the main,
Sets, with fresh light to rise again:
But we, when once our breath is fled,
Die, and are numbered with the dead,
With endless night we close our day,
And sleep eternity away.

Dr. Granger's Translation.

How sublime are the verses Job xiv. 4. "Man cometh forth as a flower, and is cut down; there is hope of a tree, if it be cut down, that it will sprout again, and that the tender branch thereof will not cease; but man dieth and wasteth away; yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he? He lieth down, and riseth not, till the heavens be no more."

POMPEY.

Lucan puts into the mouth of Pompey the following language concerning this subject, the immortality of the soul.

"What mean these terrors of the night? he cries;
Why dance these visions vain before my eyes?
Or endless apathy succeeds to death,
And sense is lost with our expiring breath;
Or if the soul some future life shall know,
To better worlds immortal shall she go:
Whate'er event the doubtful question clears,
Death must be still unworthy of our fears."

N. Rowe's Translation.

MAXIMUS TYRIUS.

Immortality is a necessary consequence of simplicity, and if you will attend I will show how. There is nothing which can destroy its own essence; for if it could it would never have existed at first, but everything that is corrupted, is corrupted by something that is contrary to it. Therefore, whatever is corruptible is dissolvable, and whatever is dissolvable must be compounded of several parts, and that which consists of parts must consist of different parts, but that which consists of different parts can never be the same simple thing. But since the soul is simple, and does not consist of parts, it is therefore uncompounded and consequently indissolvable, incorruptible, and immortal.

LUCRETIIUS.

The body and soul, says Lucretius, are of the same age; their inseparable alliance receives a mutual augmentation, and time subjects them both equally to the infirmities of old age. Is not every man sensible that the spiritual faculty is but of little use in the tender and weak bodies of children? But that the parts being fortified by the increase of a more perfect age, the judgment comes to its full strength, and the productions of the mind are in proportion to the augmentation of the body; but as soon as time begins to make the body feel the shocks of decay, and its strength grows feeble again, the judgment loses its stability; the tongue is only a stammering interpreter of a mind relapsed into its first infancy; and as at the same

time the cause ceases as well as the effects, may we not justly conclude that as smoke vanishes in the air, so the soul, at its retreat, is not exempt from the laws of dissolution?—*Lucretius*, book iii, verse 445.

QUINTILIAN.

The soul is immortal; for whatever moves of itself, is immortal: but the soul moves of itself; the soul is therefore immortal

TERTULLIAN.

The soul is one simple and entire thing of itself, and no more capable of being made up of any extrinsic matter, than it is of being divided in itself, because indeed it is not dissolvable. For if it were compounded it would be capable of dissolution, and if it were capable of dissolution it would not be immortal. Therefore, because it is not mortal, it is neither dissolvable nor divisible. For to be divided is to be dissolved, and to be dissolved is to die.

ST. ATHANASIUS.

The soul of man is intellectual, incorporeal, impassible, immortal substance. The soul moves the body, but is itself moved by nothing else; it follows that it must have a principle of motion within itself, and therefore that it will continue to live and to move of itself after the death and corruption of the body. For the soul cannot die, but it is the body that dies by reason of the soul's departure from it. But if the soul were moved by the body, it would follow, that when

the body which moves it is separated from it, it must die.

But if the soul moves the body, it must much more move itself; and if it have a principle of motion within itself, it must necessarily live after the death of the body; for the motion of the soul is nothing but the life of the soul.

Because the soul is immortal, it is naturally capable of understanding and reasoning about those things which are eternal and immortal. For as the body, because it is mortal, has its senses fitted to perceive fading mortal things, so the soul which contemplates and reasons about immortal things must necessarily be itself immortal and live forever. For those notions and speculations it has concerning immortality never forsake it, but still continuing in it, are, as it were, an earnest and foretaste of its future eternity. And from hence it comes to pass that it has naturally, and from itself, an apprehension and knowledge of God without receiving it by the information and instruction of any one else.

LACTANTIUS.

It is commonly made a question, whether the soul be from the father or from the mother, or proceed from both. But this matter I can easily put out of all doubt. For I affirm that neither of these three things is true, because souls come into bodies neither from both the parents, nor from either of them. For though the body may come from the bodies of parents, because something is contributed towards the production of them from both; yet the soul can-

not proceed from the soul of parents; because nothing can be separated from so little and incomprehensible a thing. Therefore, the business of producing souls belongs solely and entirely to God; according to that of Lucretius:

"Lastly we all from seed celestial rise,
Which Heaven, our common parent, still supplies."

For mortals can produce nothing but what is mortal. Nor ought he to be thought the father of the soul who is by no means sensible of his infusing or inspiring it; nor, if he were sensible of it, could tell how and when it is done. From hence it appears that our souls are not given to us from our parents, but from one and the same God and Father of all, who alone has established and knows the laws of the production of all things.

It remains that I should say somewhat concerning the soul. Although its nature and essence cannot be perceived by us, but yet we cannot but understand that the soul is immortal. For whatever is moved and lives of itself, and can neither be seen nor touched, that must be eternal. But philosophers have not yet agreed what the soul is, nor perhaps ever will agree. For some affirm it is the blood, others that it is fire, others air, from whence it has the name of Animo.

ST. CYPRIAN.

That our death is only a passage to immortality, and that eternal life cannot succeed unless we go out of the world; and that this is not so much our exit

out of this world as our passage into the next, by which, after having finished our course here, we enter upon eternity.

ARNOBIUS.

Most of those things which we believe, your philosophers also thought fit to be believed. For Plato thought as we do, that all our hope is to be placed in God alone; that there will be a resurrection of the dead; and that our souls are immortal.

ISIDORE.

Eternity is no more than everlasting life, and therefore it is commonly used to signify that sort of duration which agrees to that Being that is without beginning and is always the same. But immortality may be affirmed of what has had a beginning but will have no end, as angels and the souls of men; and incorruptibility of those things that are made, but are incapable of being dissolved.

IRENÆUS.

It is the body that dies and is dissolved, but not the soul nor the spirit. For to die is to lose the vital powers, to cease to breathe, to become inanimate and without motion, and to be resolved into its first principles. But this cannot happen to the soul; for it is the breath of life.

ST. AUGUSTINE.

The soul is the life, by which everything that has life is said to live, and everything that is without life, being incapable of it, is said to die, that is, to be

deprived of life. The soul, therefore, cannot die. For if it could be deprived of life, it would not be the soul, but something animated with a soul. But if this be absurd, then the soul cannot be capable of that death, which that which is life itself ought not to fear. For if you suppose the soul then to die, when life is departed from it, that life which forsakes it ought more properly to be called the soul, and so the soul will not be that which is forsaken of life, but the very life itself which departs. For whatever being forsaken of life is said to be dead, that must be understood to be forsaken by the soul. But in regard to the life which departs from such things as die in the very soul itself, therefore, since the soul cannot be parted from itself, it cannot to be sure die.

RUFINUS.

"I hear, also, that there be a question stated concerning the soul. You are the best judges whether you ought to receive or reject the complaints that are brought upon this head. But if my opinion be desired in this matter, I must confess that I have read the several opinions that have been vented upon this subject. Some I have read who affirm that the soul is derived, together with the body, from some seminal principles. And they endeavour to confirm this by what arguments they can. Of this opinion I suppose Tertullian and Lactantius, among the Latin fathers, to have been, together with some others. Others affirm that God still creates and infuses souls into bodies when they are formed in the womb. Others say that

God framed them at first, when he created all things, and now assigns them to bodies according to his pleasure. And this was the opinion of Origen and some others of the Greeks. As for myself, I protest before God, that after having read all these opinions, I have not yet framed any certain and determined notions concerning this question, but leave it to God to know what truth there is in any of them, or to whom he shall please to reveal it. But yet I do not deny that I have read these several opinions, and must confess myself ignorant which is the right; only one thing I am sure of, which the Church also plainly delivers, that God is the Creator both of our souls and bodies."—*Apology to Anastasius the Emperor.*

TATIAN.

The animal soul, O Greeks, is not immortal, but yet capable of existing to eternity. For though the souls of such as know not the truth, die and are dissolved with their bodies, yet they will rise again at the end of the world, and endure death by punishment to eternity. And the souls also of such as have knowledge of the truth, though they will for a time be dissolved, yet they will not die forever.

PLOTINUS.

The regular sort of men beholding the souls of the generality so mutilated and deformed with vice and wickedness, they cannot think of the soul as of any divine and immortal being, though, indeed, they ought to judge of things as they are in their own

naked essences, and not with respect to that which extra-essentially adheres to them; which is a great prejudice to knowledge. Contemplate, therefore, the soul of man, divesting it of all that which itself is not, or let him that does this, view his own soul, then he will believe it to be immortal when he shall behold it first in an intelligible and pure nature; he shall then behold his own intellect contemplating, not any sensible things, but eternal things, that which is eternal, that is, with itself, looking into the intellectual world, being itself made all lucid, intellectual, and shining with the sunbeams of eternal truth, borrowed from the first good, which perpetually rayeth forth his truth upon all intellectual beings. One thus qualified may seem, without any arrogance, to take up the saying of *Empedocles*:—Farewell, all earthly allies, I am henceforth no mortal being, but an immortal angel ascending up into divinity, and reflecting upon that likeness of it which I find in myself.

EGYPTIANS.

The Egyptians esteem Ceres and Bacchus as the great deities of the realms below; they are also the first of mankind who have defended the immortality of the soul. They believe, that on the dissolution of the body the soul immediately enters some other animal, and that, after using as vehicles every species of terrestrial, aquatic, and winged creatures, it finally enters a second time into a human body. They affirm that it undergoes all these changes in the space of three thousand years. This opinion some among the

Greeks have, at different periods of time, adopted as their own; but I shall not, though I am able, specify their names.—*Herodotus*.

HINDOOS.

After death, the person is conveyed by the messengers of Yümū through the air to the place of judgment. After receiving his sentence, he wanders about the earth for twelve months, as an aerial being or ghost; and then takes a body suited to his future condition, whether he ascend to the gods, or suffer in a new body, or be hurled into some hell. This is the doctrine of several pooranūs; others maintain, that immediately after death and judgment, the person suffers the pains of hell, and removes his sin by suffering; and then returns to the earth in some bodily form.

I add a few particulars respecting the transmigration of souls from the work called Kūrmū-vipakū:—He who destroys a sacrifice will be punished in hell; he will afterwards be born again, and remain a fish for three years; and then ascend to human birth, but will be afflicted with a continual flux. He who kills an enemy subdued in war, will be cast into the hell Krūkūchū; after which he will become a bull, a deer, a tiger, a bitch, a fish, a man: in the last state he will die of the palsy. He who eats excellent food without giving any to others, will be punished in hell 30,000 years, and then be born a musk-rat; then a deer; then a man whose body emits an offensive smell, and who prefers bad to excellent food. The

man who refuses to his father and mother the food they desire, will be punished in hell, and afterwards be born a crow; then a man. In the latter birth he will not relish any kind of food. The stealer of a water-pan will be born an alligator, and then a man of a monstrous size. The person who has lived with a woman of superior caste, will endure torments in hell during seventy-one *yoogūs* of the gods; after this, in another hell, he will continue burning like a blade of grass for 100,000 years: he will next be born a worm, and after this ascend to human birth; but his body will be filled with disease. The stealer of rice will sink into hell; will afterwards be born and continue eighteen years a crow; then a heron for twelve years; then a diseased man. He who kills an animal, not designing it for sacrifice, will, in the form of a turtle, be punished in hell; then be born a bull, and then a man afflicted with an incurable distemper. He who kills an animal by holding its breath, or laughs at a *pooranū* at the time of its recital, will, after enduring infernal torments, be born a snake; then a tiger, a cow, a white heron, a crow, and a man having an asthma. He who steals alms will sink into hell, and afterwards be born a blind man, afflicted with a consumption. A beautiful woman who despises her husband, will suffer in hell a variety of torments; she will then be born a female, and, losing her husband very soon after marriage, will long suffer the miseries of widowhood.

The *Ugnee pooranū* says, that a person who loses human birth, passes through 8,000,000 births among

the inferior creatures before he can again obtain human birth: of which he remains 2,100,000 births among the immoveable parts of creation, as stones, trees, &c.; 900,000 among the watery tribes; 1,000,000 among insects, worms, &c.; 1,000,000 among the birds; and 3,000,000 among the beasts. In the ascending scale, if his works be suitable, he continues 400,000 births among the lower castes of men; during 100 births among *brahmās*; and after this he may obtain absorption in *Brūmhū*.

The faith of the Hindoos in the doctrine of the transmigration of souls often appears in their conversation, especially when either prosperous or adverse circumstances have arisen in a family.

Nor ought you to think it extraordinary that a person dies. It is more extraordinary that a person desires to live. If you confine a bird in a cage, though you cherish him with the greatest care, if the door be open he flies away. But though there are nine openings in the body by which the soul may make its escape, and though the person be suffering the deepest distress, yet the soul is not willing to depart;—this desire of life is more wonderful than death itself.—When the soul has taken its flight, then, why should you think it such an extraordinary thing? You are suffering for the sins of many former births; which sins, like a shadow, will pursue you, go where you will, and assume whatever shape you may, till they be expiated by suffering. If this were not so, why is it that a good man suffers, while a wicked man is raised to the pinnacle of prosperity? If men suffered

only for the sins of this life, the good would have nothing but happiness, and the wicked nothing but sorrow.

If a person die an untimely death, it is attributed to crimes committed in a former state of existence. A person born blind, is supposed to have destroyed the eyes of some one in a former birth. A few neighbours sitting together, as a person afflicted with an incurable distemper passes along, observe, "Ah! no doubt, that man was guilty in a former birth of such or such a crime, and now the consequences appear in his present state."

The prosperity of persons, especially if they have suddenly risen from poverty to affluence, frequently gives rise to remarks on the merits of such persons in a former birth. "See," says one, "such a person was poor, and is now worth so many lacks of roopees. He must have performed acts of extraordinary merit in former births, or he could not have so suddenly risen to such a state of affluence." When conversing on this subject with a Hindoo, he instanced the case of Ramū-Hūree-Vishwasū, late of Khūrdah:—"He was so poor," said he, "that he was indebted to others for a place to lodge in. After a few years of service with a European, he obtained a fortune of thirty lacks of roopees. He bought an estate; erected a number of temples to Shivū, and then went to Kashēē (Benares), where he died in a very short time. Such an auspicious life and death can only be attributed to some wonderful acts of devotion or liberality in former births."

A very learned man is complimented with having given learning to others in a former birth.

The shastrūs teach that there are four kinds of happiness after death: 1. That possessed in the heavens of the gods;*—2. That when the person is deified;—3. That which arises from dwelling in the presence of the gods;†—and, 4. In absorption.‡ In the three first, the person is subject to future birth, but not in the last. The three first are obtained by works; the last, by divine wisdom.—*W. Ward's View of the Hindoos.*

* The Mēemangṣū writers have decided, that there is no separate place of future happiness; that whether a person enjoy happiness, or endure misery, the whole is confined to the present life. The pooranūs, on the other hand, declare, that there are many places of happiness and misery, and that persons go to these places after death.

† All raised to heaven are not permitted to approach the god in whose heaven they reside. This privilege belongs only to favourites.

‡ The védantū shastrūs teach, that wherever a person possessing divine wisdom dies, he is immediately received into the divine nature, as air, escaping from a vessel when broken, immediately mixes with the surrounding air. The pooranūs, however, teach, that the soul of such a person ascends to God inhabiting a certain place, and is there absorbed into the divine nature.

Some of the followers of Vishnōo (voishnūvūs) are not pleased with the idea of absorption, or of losing a distinct and conscious state of existence. They are represented as praying thus:—"O Vishnōo! we do not wish for absorption; but for a state of happiness in which we shall for ever see and serve thee as our lord; in which thou wilt continue as our beloved master, and we as thy servants." Agreeably to this prayer, they believe that devoted voishnūvūs after death will be freed from future birth, and remain for ever near Vishnōo in the heaven of this god.

CHINESE.

"The canonical books, especially the *Shu king*, exhort men to fear Tyne—the sovereign being—and though they place the souls of virtuous men near *Shang ti*, yet it does not appear that they have spoken clearly of the everlasting punishment in the life to come. In like manner, though they affirm that the supreme being created all things, yet they have not treated of it so distinctly as to judge whether they mean a true creation or a production of all things out of nothing. However, it must be confessed, that though they are silent as to this point, they have not denied the possibility thereof, nor, like certain Greek philosophers, assert that the matter of the universe is eternal. We likewise do not find, that they have treated explicitly concerning the state of the soul; on the contrary, they seem to have confused notions of it, no way agreeable to the truth; yet it cannot be doubted but that they believe the soul exists after its separation from the body.

"The principles of morality which the *Bonzas* are very careful to inculcate, they say, there is great difference between good and evil; that after death there will be rewards for those who have done well, and punishments for those who have done evil; there are places appointed for the souls of both, wherever they are stationed, according to their merit; and the god *Fo* was born to save mankind, and to bring back those to the way of salvation who had strayed from it; that it was he who expiated their sins, and pro-

cured them a happy new birth in the other world."—*P. J. B. De Haldé's China.*

JAPANESE.

"The most essential points of his (Budsdo, the god of the Japanese) doctrine are as follows:—

"The souls of men and animals are immortal: both are of the same substance, and differ only according to the different objects they are placed in, whether human or animal.

"The souls of men, after their departure from their bodies, are rewarded in a place of happiness or misery, according to their behaviour in this life.

"The place of happiness is called *Gokurakf*, that is, a place of eternal pleasures. As the gods differ in their nature, and the souls of men in the merit of their past actions, so do likewise the degrees of pleasure and happiness in their Elysian Fields, that every one may be rewarded as he deserves. However, the whole place is so thoroughly filled with bliss and pleasure, that each happy inhabitant thinks his portion the best, and, far from envying the happier state of others, wishes only for ever to enjoy his own.

"*Amida* is the sovereign commander of these heavenly stations, (for all his doctrine hath not been introduced by the Brahmins till after our Saviour's glorious resurrection.) He is looked upon as the general patron and protector of human souls, but more particularly as the God and Father of those who happily transmigrate into these places of bliss. Through his,

and his sole mediation, men are to obtain absolution from their sins, and a portion of happiness in the future life.

"Leading a virtuous life, and doing nothing that is contrary to the commandments of the law of *Siaka*, is the only way to become agreeable unto *Amida*, and worthy of eternal happiness.

"All persons, secular or ecclesiastical, who by their sinful life and vicious actions have rendered themselves unworthy of the pleasures prepared for the virtuous, are sent after their death to a place of misery, called *Dsigokf*, there to be confined and tormented, not indeed for ever, but only during a certain undetermined time. As the pleasures of the Elysian Fields differ in degrees, so do likewise the torments in these infernal places. Justice requires that every one should be punished according to the nature and number of his crimes, the number of years he lived in the world, the station he lived in, and the opportunities he had to be virtuous and good.

"When the miserable souls have been confined in these prisons of darkness a time sufficient to expiate their crimes, they are, by virtue of the sentence of *Jemma O*, sent back into the world, to animate, not indeed the bodies of men, but of such vile creatures whose nature and properties are nearly related to their former sinful inclinations, such as, for instance, serpents, toads, insects, birds, fishes, quadrupeds, and the like. From the vilest of these, transmigrating by degrees into others and nobler, they at last are suffered again to enter human bodies, by which means

it is put in their power, either by a good and virtuous life to render themselves worthy of a future uninterrupted state of happiness, or by a new course of vices to expose themselves once more to undergo all the miseries of confinement in a place of torment, succeeded by a new unhappy transmigration."—*E. Kaempfer's Japan*.

JEWISH BELIEF.

The Jews thought the punishments and rewards after life so important a matter, that they counted paradise and hell among the seven things which were created, according to them, before the world. See the *Talmudical treatise Nedarim*, chap. 4, and the *Paraphrast, Jonathan, on Genesis*, chap. 2.

The Rabbins have taught in the Talmudical treatise entitled *Roch Hasschannah*, or the beginning of the year, that there are three sorts of people, the just, the wicked, and those who are betwixt both. The just go immediately to eternal life; the unjust go to hell forever, and the middle sort go thither only for a time; after which they come out again; and since Plato taught the same thing in his *Phædon*, it is conjectured that he had it from a Jewish tradition.

The Rabbins divide their school into two parts; the one they call paradise, and the other hell. These were the different degrees of punishment, of which they fancied the seventh to be eternal, and that the rest had an end. In the same manner the Greeks thought the *hades* contained a place of happiness and a place of punishment, as may be seen by many

passages; and that of Tartarus in the place of punishment contained those whose sins were so great that their torment was eternal, as we may perceive by Plato.

"St. Justin makes use of a remarkable argument to prove at least the possibility of the resurrection, and to show that we ought not to deny it merely because it is not probable. The substance of his argument is as follows. Let us suppose that our souls, as created immediately by God, without being united to the bodies, saw a drop of liquor, such as that whereof men are conceived, and they were shown in some picture a human body and its admirable disposition, and were told that of this liquor might be born a body like ours, could they believe it unless they saw it? Doubtless they would find it very difficult to believe any such thing; yet all know this is true."—*M. Le Clerc's remarks upon Justin Martyr.* Lon. 1704.

"The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God; and there shall no torment touch them. In the sight of the unwise they seem to die; and their departure is taken for misery, and their going from us to be utter destruction: but they are in peace; for though they be punished in the sight of men, yet is their hope full of immortality."—*Book of Wisdom, iii. 1-3.*

For man's body was framed by the great Artificer, who, taking earth, fashioned it into a human shape. But the soul was made of no created matter, but proceeded from the Father and Governor of all. For as to what he says, "He breathed," etc., nothing else can be meant by it, but a divine spirit proceeding and

coming from his blessed and spiritual nature, sent into our bodies as into a colony, for the advantage of mankind, who, although as to their visible part they are mortal, yet as to their invisible part are immortal.
—*Philo the Jew.*

MODERN JEWS' OPINION.

Of Rewards and Punishments, or of the Life to Come.—*Question.*—What ought we to believe in regard to rewards and punishments? *Answer.*—We ought to believe that God, just in his sovereignty, will cause all men, after death, to appear before his tribunal, and will reward or punish them according to the good or evil they have done on earth. Eccles. xii. 14. "For God will bring every work unto judgment with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil." *Q.*—Are there not now on the earth rewards and punishments? *A.*—Certainly. Very often our actions receive in this life reward or punishment; but it is only in the life to come that divine justice will display itself in all its fulness. *Q.*—Ought we then to expect another life after death? *A.*—Yes, undoubtedly. We will continue to live even after our bodies are destroyed, for our soul is immortal. Psalm cxvi. 9. "I will walk before the Lord in the land of the living." [The preceding verse is: "For thou hast delivered my soul from death and my feet from falling."—*Translator.*] *Q.*—What will happen to us at the period of our death? *A.*—We will quit all that we have on earth, our body will be reduced to dust, and our soul will return to God. Eccles. xii. 7. "Then

shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." Psalm lxxiii. 26. "My flesh and my heart faileth; but God is the strength of my heart and my portion for ever." Q.—What duties does this truth, that there will be another life, impose on us? A.—It requires us not to attach ourselves too much to the pleasures (*les biens*) of this world, and to prepare, in proper season, for eternal life, which awaits us. Eccles. ii. 24. "Assuredly, it is not a great good to man to be able to eat and drink and cause his soul to enjoy the fruit of his labour." [This verse, in our Bible, reads thus: "*There is nothing better for a man than that he should eat and drink and that he should make his soul enjoy the fruit of his labour.*" The words are italicized as inserted. If they are left out the two verses will agree, and the text in the Catechism seems to be the true meaning, for the 22d verse is, "For what hath man of all his labour, and of the vexation of his heart wherein he hath laboured under the sun?"—*Translator.*] Q.—With this belief how ought we to conduct ourselves when death deprives us of our parents and friends? A.—We ought to avoid excessive grief, since we know that the soul of our friends will always live, and that it has returned to God, to whom ours will one day also come. Deuteronomy xiv. 1. "Ye are the children of the Lord; ye shall not cut yourselves, nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead." Q.—Will our bodies also one day return to life? A.—Yes; our sages and prophets clearly teach us this. Isaiah xxvi. 19. "Thy dead men shall

live, together with my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in dust." Daniel xii. 2. "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake; some to everlasting life, and some to everlasting shame and contempt." Q.—Do we know the time when the resurrection of our body will take place? A.—No. We do not know the time when God will perform this wonderful work, or the manner in which he will perform it. We are equally ignorant of the time when the other predictions of our prophets will receive their fulfilment. Psalm cxxix. 6. "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain it."—*Dr. Henry Leeb, a Rabbi of the Jews.*

MOHAMMEDANS.

The Mohammedans are firm believers in the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, an intermediate state, and future rewards and punishments. This is established by innumerable passages in the Koran; see also Sale's admirable introduction to the same; and the Moor, Mahomet Rabden's "Mahometism fully explained." The Mohammedan paradise is essentially voluptuous. Their saints are represented as luxuriating amid beautiful gardens carpeted with verdant grass and enameled with flowers, watered with copious streams, canopied with umbrageous trees, whose branches are loaded with luscious fruit, and thousands of bells of various sizes, suspended from them, at every motion of the breeze give out enchanting music. Their bliss is still further enhanced by the sweetest melody and most harmonious strains from

the silver-toned voices of the daughters of Paradise. They feed on the most delicious fruits, and drink water from the most beautiful and precious vessels. Clothed in green silk, they enjoy the perpetual company of young and lovely black-eyed maidens, who have all the perfections imagination can conceive, without any of those mental or physical defects so common to those with whom men have to associate on earth.

DRUIDS' BELIEF.

"The principal point of doctrine of the Druids' system of religion, is a belief in the immortality of the soul; which doctrine, they think, is an incitement to virtue, and has a tendency to lead men to a contempt of death. They hold the transmigration of souls, and teach the youth, committed to their care, concerning the stars and their motions, the magnitude of the earth, the nature of things, and the virtue and power of the immortal gods.

"Lucan mentions the Druids, and their opinion of the soul's immortality.

The Druids now, while arms are heard no more,
Old mysteries and barbarous rites restore :
A tribe, who singular religion love,
And haunt the lonely coverts of the grove.
To these, and these of all mankind alone,
The gods are sure revealed or sure unknown.
If dying mortals' dooms they sing aright,
No ghost descends to dwell in dreadful night
No parting souls to grisly Pluto go,
Nor seek the dreary, silent shades below ;
But forth they fly, immortal in their kind,
And other bodies in new worlds they find.

Thus life forever runs its endless race,
And, like a line, death but divides the space ;
A stop which can but for a moment last,
A point between the present and the past.

N. Rowe's Translation.

"The Druids, the bards, and the people whom they instructed, regarded all nature as the temple of the Divinity. That they had notions of a Supreme Being cannot be doubted, since they believed in the immortality of the soul, and in the rewards and punishments of a future life. Their opinion was, that the clouds were the habitation of souls after their separation from the body. The brave and virtuous were received with joy into the aerial palaces of their fathers, whilst the wicked, the cowardly, and the cruel, were excluded the abode of heroes, and condemned to wander, the sport of every wind. There were different mansions in the palaces of the clouds, the principal of which were assigned to merit and courage; and this idea was a great incitement to the emulation of their warriors. The soul always preserved the same passions which it possessed during life; these aerial palaces offered no other enjoyment than what they had preferred when living. They supposed that winds and storms were under the direction of departed spirits, but their power never extended over man."—*M. l'Abbe de Tressan's Mythology.*

The inhabitants of the Marian Islands, who own no deity, and before the Gospel was preached to them, had not the least idea of religion; they had no temples, altars, sacrifices, or priests; yet believed in the immortality of the soul, and that there is a paradise

and hell. For proof of this M. Bayle quotes le Gobien, *Histoire des Isles Mariennes*, p. 64. edit. de Paris, 1700.

It was the opinion of the Indian Brachmans, the Persian Magi, the Egyptian Gymnosophists, the Jewish Rabbins, some of the Grecian philosophers and Christian fathers, that the souls of men were created all at first and at several times and occasions, upon forfeiture of their better life and condition, dropped down into these terrestrial bodies. This the learned among the Jews made a part of their cabala, and pretend to have received it from their great lawgiver, Moses.—*Bishop Rust.*

AMERICAN INDIANS' BELIEF.

"The Mexican Indians, like most if not all idolatrous nations, had preserved the notion of the *soul's immortality*, and distinguished their places of abode for the soul, when separate from the body. Those of soldiers who died in battle, or in captivity, among their enemies, and those of women who died in labor, went to the house of the Sun, whom they considered the Lord of Glory, and there they led a life of endless delight; where every day, at the appearance of the sun's rays, they hailed his birth with rejoicings and with dances, and the sound of voices and instruments accompanied him to his meridian; then they met with the souls of the women, and with the same festivity accompanied him to his setting. They next supposed that these spirits, after four years of this glorious life, went to animate clouds, and birds of beautiful feather and

sweet song, but always at liberty to rise again to heaven, or to descend upon the earth to warble and suck the flowers.

"The souls of those who were struck by lightning, of those who died by disease, went, with the souls of the children sacrificed to Tlaloc, to a place called Tlalocan, the paradise of that God. This was a cool, shady place, where they had the most delicious repasts, and every other kind of pleasure. Lastly, those who suffered any other kind of death, went to Mictlan, or hell, which they consider to be a place of utter darkness, in the centre of the earth, but where, however, there was no other kind of misery than the darkness just mentioned. All those entitled to a place in Tlalocan were buried, and a rod or bough was placed in their hands, that in that beautiful paradise it might bloom again. The spirits of all those children who had been offered to Tlaloc, were believed to be present at all after sacrifices, under the care of a large and beautiful serpent, called Xiuhcoatl. This serpent was, at other times, supposed to inhabit a cave sacred to the Water God, in the country of the Mistecas. The entrance was concealed and the sanctuary was consequently known but to few; it was necessary first to crawl the space of a musket-shot, and then to walk through a path, sometimes broad and sometimes narrow, for a mile, before the great dome was reached; this was seventy feet long and forty feet wide; here were the idol and the altar; the former was merely a rude column of stalactite, and the other a rock of the same mineral. The ways of the

cave were so intricate, that many who had unwarily bewildered themselves in it, perished, and were said to have been eaten by the serpent.

"It was not without some dangers that the first named spirits arrived at the mansion of the Sun, where their celestial happiness was to begin. In their hands, when dead, the priests of Mexitli placed six aloe leaves, marked with mystic characters. On one of these was to be the passport through the six perils that awaited them.

"The first was that of the falling mountains, between which those who passed would be, if not supernaturally protected, crushed to pieces; through these the road lay, and also through the path of the great serpent. This was the second trial. Darting lightning from his eyes, and vibrating a tongue of fire, he seized on and devoured all who were not provided with mystic aloe leaves. The next danger was from crossing the river of the crocodile, where that monstrous animal was as dangerous as the great serpent. The fourth was the passage of the eight deserts; the fifth that of the eight hills; and the sixth, the windy plain, in which the mountains were blown up by the roots. After this, the way was plain, and the Temple of the Sun opened to receive the happy conqueror."—

H. Chester's Universal Mythology.

The idea of immortality is thoroughly dwelt upon by them. It is not spoken of as a supposition or a mere belief not fixed. It is regarded as an actuality, as something known and approved by the judgment of the nation. During the long period of my residence

and travels in the Indian country, I never knew or heard of an individual who did not believe in it, and the appearance of the body in a future state. No small part of their entire mythology, and the belief that sustains man in his vicissitudes, here arises from the anticipation of enjoyment in a future life after the soul has left the body.—*H. M. Schoolcraft.*

OPINIONS OF PHILOSOPHERS AND DIVINES.

Had I no other proof of the immortality of the soul than the oppression of the just, and the triumph of the wicked in this world, this alone would prevent my having the least doubt of it. So shocking a discord amidst the general harmony of things would make me naturally look out for the cause. I should say to myself, We do not cease to exist with this life: every thing re-assumes its order after death. I should, indeed, be embarrassed to tell where man was to be found when all his perceptible properties were destroyed. At present, however, there appears to me no difficulty in this point, as I acknowledge the existence of two different substances. It is very plain that, during my corporeal life, as I perceive nothing but by means of my senses, whatever is not submitted to their cognizance must escape me. When the union of the body and soul is broken, I conceive that the one may be dissolved, and the other preserved entire. Why should the dissolution of the one necessarily bring on that of the other? On the contrary, being so different in their natures, their state of union is a state of violence, and when it is

broken they both return to their natural situation; the active and living substance regains all the force it had employed in giving motion to the passive and dead substance to which it had been united. Alas! my failings make me but too sensible that man is but half alive in this life, and that the life of the soul commences at the death of the body.—*J. J. Rousseau.*

The human soul, then, having no parts, must be indissoluble in its nature by anything that hath not power to destroy or annihilate it. And since it hath not a natural tendency to annihilation, nor a power to annihilate itself, nor can be annihilated by any *being* finitely powerful, without an immediate act of the omnipotent Creator to annihilate it, *it must endlessly abide an active, perceptive substance, without either fear or hopes of dying, through all eternity.*—*A. Baxter.*

That all thinking substances are distinct from matter, from whence it necessarily follows that the soul of man is a spirit, or a simple, indivisible being, and consequently immortal.—*Des Cartes.*

All changes in matter, which we either observe or can conceive, are merely changes of form; the parts still remain the same, not to be annihilated by any power of nature, and retaining still their specific solidity, magnitude, &c. Now, if no material substance can perish, and if all its real qualities are inseparable from it, much less can the soul, whose substance is an absolute stranger to composition, and whose qualities are much more one with the substance itself, be imagined capable of destruction.—*Dr. Blacklock.*

The general expectation which men have of continuing to live in another state beyond the grave, has commonly been admitted as one proof that they shall live. That they generally had such an expectation, can scarce be denied. The historians of mankind, their deifications, rites, stories of apparitions, the frequent mention of the Hades, with rewards and punishments hereafter, &c., all testify that even the heathen world believed that the souls of men survived their bodies. Their ignorance, indeed, of the seat and circumstances of the departed, has begot many errors and superstitions, and these have been multiplied by licentious poets and idle visionaries; but this, being no more than what is usual in like cases, ought to be no prejudice against the fundamental opinion.—*W. Wollaston.*

The natural course of things cannot be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavours of man: the current is too rapid and strong for him to stop it; and though the rules which direct it appear to have been established for the wisest and best purposes, they sometimes produce effects which shock all his natural sentiments. That a great combination of men should prevail over a small one; that those who engage in an enterprise with forethought, and all necessary preparation, should prevail over such as oppose them without any, and that every end should be acquired by those means only which nature has established for acquiring it, seems to be a rule, not only necessary and unavoidable in itself, but even useful and proper for rousing the industry

and attention of mankind. Yet when, in consequence of this rule, violence and artifice prevail over sincerity and justice, what indignation does it not excite in the breast of every human spectator! What sorrow and compassion for the sufferings of the innocent, and what furious resentment against the success of the oppressor! We are equally grieved and enraged at the wrong that is done, but often find it altogether out of our power to redress it. When we thus despair of finding any force upon earth which can check the triumph of injustice, we naturally appeal to Heaven, and hope that the great Father of our nature will himself execute, hereafter, what all the principles which he has given us for the direction of our conduct prompt us to attempt even here; that he will complete the plan which he himself has thus taught us to begin; and will, in a life to come, render to every one according to the works which he has performed in this world. And thus we are led to the belief of a future state, not only by the weaknesses, by the hopes and fears of human nature, but by the noblest and best principles which belong to it, by the love of virtue, and by the abhorrence of vice and injustice.—*Adam Smith.*

When the renowned American philosopher had approached to the very close of his life, he reasoned thus coolly with a friend: "Death is as necessary to the constitution as sleep; we shall rise refreshed in the morning. The course of nature must soon put a period to my present mode of existence. This I

shall submit to with the less regret, as, having seen, during a long life, a good deal of this world, I feel a growing curiosity to become acquainted with some other, and can cheerfully, with filial confidence, resign my spirit to the conduct of that great and good Parent of mankind who created it, and who has so graciously protected and preserved me from my birth to the present hour."—*Dr. B. Franklin.*

The soul is that vital, immaterial, active substance or principle whereby man perceives, remembers, reasons, and wills. It is rather to be described as to its operations, than to be defined as to its essence. Various, indeed, have been the opinions of philosophers concerning its substance. The Epicureans thought it a subtile air, composed of atoms, or primitive corpuscles. The Stoics maintained it was a flame, or portion of heavenly light. The Cartesians make thinking the essence of the soul.

Equally various have been their opinions concerning its situation. Hippocrates and Hierophilus place the seat of the soul in the ventricle of the brain; Democritus and Aristotle, through the whole body; Epicurus, in the stomach; the Stoics, about and within the heart; Erasistratus, adjoining the membrane of the epieranium; Empedocles, in the blood; and Moses, also Strabo, between the eyebrows.

It is wonderful to observe how the soul is elevated one moment to a star, and the next falls to a grain of sand; how it expands over the immensity of the heavens, and how it shrinks back upon itself; how it analyzes the light, and anatomizes an insect; how

incessant are its wishes, yet how limited its faculties!

Our inquiries about the nature of the soul must be bound over at last to religion, for otherwise they still lie open to many errors. For, since the substance of the soul was not deduced from the mass of heaven and earth, but immediately from God, how can the knowledge of the reasonable soul be derived from philosophy? It must be drawn from the same inspiration from whence its substance first flowed.—*Lord Bacon.*

Various, indeed, have been the opinions of philosophers and writers in all ages of the world, as to the substance or essence of the soul, its situation or lodgment in the body, &c. But whether it is lodged in the brain, or whether it looks out at every pore, I know not; but this I am willing to believe, that it does exist in the body, and will exist when the body is returned to earth.

The stars shall fade away, the sun himself
Grow dim with age, and nature sink in years;
But thou shalt flourish in immortal youth,
Unhurt amid the war of elements,
The wreck of matter, and the crash of worlds.

Joseph Addison.

Is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul and body, by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empowered, by a secret wish, to remove moun-

tains, or control the planets in their orbits, this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our comprehension.—*David Hume.*

Death is the great divider, but it is of things that are divisible. The more simple, pure, and refined any material thing is, by so much the more permanent and durable it is found to be. The nearer it approaches to the nature of spirit, the farther it is removed from the power of death; but that which is not material, or mixed at all, is wholly exempt from the stroke and power of death. It is from the contrariant qualities and jarring humours in mixed bodies, that they come under the law and power of dissolution. Matter and mixture are the doors at which death enters naturally upon the creatures.—*John Flavel.*

Another presumption in favour of a future state, is the perpetual progress of the soul towards perfection, and its endless capacity for further improvements and larger acquisitions. This argument has been set in so strong and beautiful a light by one of our finest writers (Creech), that it is hardly possible to do it justice in any other words than his own. "A brute," says he, "arrives at a point of perfection which he can never pass. In a few years he has all the endowments he is capable of, and were he to live ten thousand more, he would be the same thing he is at present. Were a human soul thus at a stand in her accomplishments; were her faculties full blown, and incapable of further enlargement; I could imagine she might fall away, insensibly, and then drop at

once into a state of annihilation. But who can believe that a thinking being, which is in a perpetual progress of improvements, and travelling on from perfection to perfection, must perish at her first setting out, and be stopped short in the beginning of her inquiries? Death overtakes her, while there is yet an unbounded prospect of knowledge open to her view, whilst the conquest over her passions is still incomplete, and much is still wanted of that perfect standard of virtue which she is always aiming at, but can never reach. Would an infinitely wise Being create such glorious creatures for so mean a purpose? or can he delight in the production of such abortive intelligences? Would he give talents which are never fully to be exerted, and capacities which are never to be filled? Is it not far more reasonable to suppose that man is not sent into the world merely to propagate his kind; to provide himself with a successor, and then to quit his post; but that those short-lived generations of rational creatures, which rise up and disappear in such quick succession, are only to receive their first rudiments of existence here, and then be transplanted to some more friendly climate, where they may spread and flourish; where they go on from strength to strength; where they may shine for ever with new accessions of glory, and brighten to all eternity?"—*Bishop Porteus.*

Man appears to be the only being on earth to whose nature and faculties his present state is commensurate. Every other creature completes its destiny, attains the utmost end of its faculties. Man

alone is always progressive, interminably advancing in his conceptions and achievements: yet he is always cut off in the midst of his work; he is never permitted to complete a single science. The powers of man tend towards an expansion which they can never here attain. The longer he remains here, the more a just contempt of the present world grows in every noble mind. Brutes are not haunted and disquieted by the desire of an ideal felicity which they cannot find; man only sighs after an image of infinite perfection, that can be realized only in God; aspires to his native skies, with as natural a tendency as that by which the flame ascends. There are traces of his grandeur even in ruins; indications that humanity was once a temple inhabited by Deity; and they infer the destiny of man to a future state of being.

The spirit of man is something uncompounded; therefore not destructible; not to be scattered by winds, or consumed by flames. No outward force can touch thought, can affect the inward consciousness of guilt or innocence. Spirit naturally ascends to God, the infinite Spirit, the Father of all spirits; as dust naturally returns to dust. If God does not destroy the spirit of his creature, it cannot be destroyed: but what reason can be assigned, why he should destroy that which is the chief work of his creative power? What atom of matter did he ever yet annihilate? Is it conceivable, then, that he should annihilate that, alone, which partakes most of his own nature, and renders the creature capable of an immortal union with himself? Can mind,

which is an eternal thing, an emanation of the Father of spirits, be supposed to perish? No, be assured you are born to immortality as your natural inheritance; your being, once commenced, must go on for ever.—*Robert Hall.*

But, even if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty as to the immateriality of the soul; yet, still all the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured, even without such philosophical proofs; since it is *evident* that he who made us at the beginning to subsist here, sensible, intelligent beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another world, and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has designed to men according to their doings in this life.—*John Locke.*

The thought "that our existence terminates with this life," doth naturally check the soul in any generous pursuit, contracts her views, and fixes them on temporary and selfish ends. It dethrones the reason, extinguishes all noble and heroic sentiments, and subjects the mind to the slavery of every present passion.—*Bishop Berkley.*

Butterflies and moths lay eggs which produce caterpillars, and these caterpillars, after feeding upon vegetable food, spin themselves frame-houses or beds—cocoon—in which they are transformed into aurelias, and from which they burst forth as perfect winged insects. The three states of the caterpillar, larva, and butterfly, have been applied to typify the human being; its terrestrial form, apparent death,

and ultimate celestial destination. And it seems much more extraordinary that a sordid and crawling worm should become a beautiful and active fly—that an inhabitant of the dark and fetid dunghill should, in an instant, entirely change its form, rise into the blue air, and enjoy the sunbeams—than that a being whose pursuits here have been after truth and an undying name, and whose purest happiness has been derived from the acquisition of intellectual power and finite knowledge, should rise hereafter into a state of being where immortality is no longer a name, and ascend to the source of unbounded power and infinite wisdom.—*Sir Robert Boyle.*

Besides the principles of which we consist, and the actions which flow from us, the consideration of the things without us, and the natural variation in the creature, will render a resurrection highly probable. Every space of twenty-four hours teacheth thus much, in which there is always a revolution amounting to a resurrection. The day dies into a night, and is buried in silence and in darkness; in the next morning it appeareth again and reviveth, opening the grave of darkness, rising from the dead of night: this a diurnal resurrection. As the day dies into night, so doth the summer into winter: the sap is said to descend into the roots, and there it lies buried in the ground; the earth is covered with snow, or crusted with frost, and becomes a general sepulchre; when the spring appeareth, all begin to rise; the plants and flowers peep out of their graves, revive, and grow, and flourish: this is the annual resurrection. The corn by which

we live, and for want of which we perish with famine, is, notwithstanding, cast upon the earth and buried in the ground with a design that it may corrupt, and being corrupted, may revive and multiply; our bodies are fed by this constant experiment, and we continue the present life by a succession of resurrections. Thus all things are prepared by corrupting, are preserved by perishing, and revive by dying; and can we think that man, the lord of all these things which thus die and revive for him, should be detained in death as never to live again? Is it imaginable that God should thus restore all things to man and not restore man to himself? If there were no other consideration but of the principles of human nature, of the liberty and remunerability of human actions, and of the natural revolutions and resurrections of other creatures, it were abundantly sufficient to render the resurrection of our bodies highly probable.—*Bishop Pearson.*

OPINIONS CONCERNING THE INTERMEDIATE STATE.

All the generations from Adam to this day, are past and gone; but they that have finished their course in Christ, according to the grace of Christ, possess the region of the godly, who shall be manifested in the visitation of the kingdom of Christ.—*St. Clement.*

That the souls of the godly (after death till the resurrection) remain in a certain *better region*, and unrighteous and wicked souls in an *evil one*: and the opinion that the souls are received up into heaven

immediately after death, he condemns as a Gnostic error.—*Justin Martyr.*

Our Saviour observed in himself the law of dead persons, and did not presently after death go to heaven, but staid three days in the PLACE of the dead. Again, whereas then our Lord went into the midst of the shadow of death, where the souls of deceased persons abode; and then afterwards rose again in the body, and was after his resurrection taken up into heaven; it is plain that the souls of his disciples, for whose sake the Lord did those things, shall go likewise to that invisible PLACE appointed to them by God, and there abide till the resurrection, waiting for the time thereof; and afterward receiving their bodies, and rising again perfectly, *i. e.* in their bodies, as our Lord did, shall so come to the sight of God.—*Irenæus.*

Heaven is not yet open to any, the earth, or hell, being yet shut; but that at the end of the world, the kingdom of heaven shall be unlocked. Again, all such are in hell [hades]; that there are both punishments and rewards; that both Dives and Lazarus are there; that the soul is both punished and comforted in hell, in expectation of the future judgment.—*Tertullian.*

Those places which lie under the earth, are not empty of distinguished and ordered powers; for that is the PLACE whither the souls both of the godly and the ungodly are led, receiving the forejudgment of their future doom.—*Novatian.*

None should think that the souls were imme-

diately judged after death; for they are all detained in one common *custody*, till the time shall come when the greatest judge shall examine their respective merits.—*Lactantius*.

It is the necessary law of nature that bodies should be buried, and that souls should descend into hell, where they are reserved for an entrance into the heavenly kingdom by the custody of the Lord, to wit, in the bosom of Abraham, unto which a great gulf hinders the wicked from approaching.—*Hilary*.

Puts this difference between death and hell, that death is the separation of body and soul, but hell the PLACE in which souls are reserved, either in happiness or misery, according to the quality of their merits.—*St. Jerome*.

The time which is interposed between a man's death and the last resurrection, containeth souls in hidden *receptacles*, according as every one is worthy of rest or labour.—*St. Austin*.

From what we have seen to be the unanimous consent of the early Christian Fathers respecting the souls of the departed faithful, we may learn, with almost unerring certainty, the doctrine of the primitive Church on this subject. As, however, the primitive liturgies may be more satisfactory evidence of the catholic doctrine of an intermediate place than individual opinions, we will transcribe the language of these devotions in relation to the pious dead, as given by that able and learned writer, Dr. Brett, in his collection of Primitive Liturgies.

Speaking of the "Prayer for the whole Catholic

Church, from one end of the world unto the other," or "that for the whole state of Christ's Church," as used in the Communion Office, he says, "As it stands in the Clementine Liturgy, and in all other Liturgies here published, that is, in the Liturgies of the Universal Church, not excepting any one Church before the Reformation, there is a petition for the faithful departed.

"In the Clementine Liturgy it runs thus: 'We also offer to thee for all saints that have done what is pleasing to thee from the beginning of the world, patriarchs, prophets, righteous men, apostles, martyrs, confessors, bishops, priests, deacons, sub-deacons, readers, singers, virgins, widows, laymen, and for all whose names thou knowest.'

"In St. James' Liturgy, the priest having prayed, that 'we may find mercy and favour with all thy saints, who from the beginning of the world have pleased thee in their generation, even with our fathers and forefathers, patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, confessors, teachers, and saints, and every just spirit departed in the faith of Christ;' then adds, 'Remember, O Lord, thou God of all spirits and of all flesh, the faithful whom we have now commemorated, or whom we have not mentioned, from righteous Abel unto this day. Make them to rest in the region of thy kingdom, in the delights of Paradise, in the bosom of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, our holy fathers; where there is no sorrow, grief and lamentation, and where the light of thy countenance continually shines upon them.'

"St. Mark's Liturgy: 'Give rest, O Lord God, to the souls of our fathers and brethren who are before laid to sleep, remembering from the beginning of the world our forefathers, fathers, patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, confessors, bishops, saints, just men, and every spirit departed in the faith of Christ, and those whose memory we this day celebrate, and our holy Father Mark, the Apostle and Evangelist, who showed unto us the way of salvation.'

"St. Chrysostom's Liturgy: 'We offer unto thee this reasonable service, for those who sleep in Christ, forefathers, fathers, patriarchs, prophets, apostles, preachers, evangelists, martyrs, confessors, continent persons, and every spirit departed in the faith of Christ.'

"St. Basil's Liturgy, as used in the Constantinopolitan Church: 'Remember all who are before gone to sleep, in hope of the resurrection to eternal life, and give them rest, O Lord, where the light of thy countenance shines upon them.'

"The Liturgy of St. Basil, used in the Alexandrian Church: 'Vouchsafe to remember, O Lord, those who have pleased thee from the beginning of the world, the holy fathers, patriarchs, apostles, prophets, preachers, evangelists, martyrs, confessors, and every just spirit departed in the faith of Christ. Give rest to all their souls in the bosoms of our holy fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Lead them, and put them into a green place upon the waters of rest, in the paradise of pleasure, where there is no grief, or sadness, or groaning, in the light of thy holy saints.

Give rest, O Lord, in that place, to the souls of them whom thou hast taken to thyself, and vouchsafe to translate them to thy heavenly kingdom.'

"The Ethiopic Liturgy: 'Be merciful, O Lord, to the souls of thy servants, and of thine handmaids, who have eaten thy body, and drank thy blood, and received rest in thy faith.' And again, 'Give rest also to our fathers and brethren that are asleep and departed in the orthodox faith.' Yet again, 'Be merciful to us, and to all those that are at rest, thou who hast sent thy Son born of a Virgin.' Once more, 'Remember, O Lord, all those that are asleep and at rest in the faith of Christ, and gather their souls into the bosoms of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.'

"The Liturgy of Nestorius: 'We also pray and beseech thee, O Lord, that thou wouldst at this oblation remember the fathers, patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, confessors, teachers, bishops, priests, deacons, and all who have been partakers of our ministry that are departed this life, and all our brethren in Christ who are gone out of this world in the true faith, whose names thou knowest; loosing and remitting to them all their sins and iniquities, through the prayer and intercession of those who have done what is pleasing in thy sight.'

"The Liturgy of Severus: 'Remember also, O Lord, those who have been famous before thee from the beginning, the fathers, prophets, apostles, martyrs, confessors, John the Baptist, Stephen the Deacon, the holy mother of God, and all pious and just men. Remember O Lord, all bishops and doctors, who

have stood in thy church, and fed thy spiritual sheep with their doctrine, and have converted unto thee those that were gone astray; but especially St. James, the chief of bishops, and other the holy fathers. . . . To the souls, and bodies, and spirits of all those, who out of flesh and blood are come to thee, O Lord of all flesh, give rest in the bosoms of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in the paradise of pleasure, in the place of rest, and in the tabernacles of the saints,' &c.

"The Roman Canon: 'Remember also, O Lord, thy servants and thy handmaids who are gone before us with the sign of faith, and sleep in the sleep of peace. Grant unto them, we beseech thee, O Lord, and to all that are at rest in Christ, a place of refreshment, light and peace, through the same Christ our Lord. *Amen.*'"

"That this entire region"—the region of departed souls—"was called by the Jews Sheol, by the Greeks Hades, and by the Latins Inferi. That these were the notions that commonly prevailed among the Jews, he conceives to be fully established by various parts of Scripture. From the Hebrews, he conceives that this opinion passed to other people, and became disfigured by various fictions of their respective inventions. Thus, the doctrine of the Egyptians respecting Hades, is given in the second book of Herodotus. The notion, he says, was variously embellished by the Greek poets; and afterwards, being stripped by Plato of much of its poetic ornament, was embodied by him in his philosophical system. Hence, again,

the Latins, and nations at large derived their phraseology in speaking of the state of the dead."

Hades is a *place* in the world not regularly finished; a *subterraneous* region, wherein the light of this world does not shine. This region is allotted as a place of custody for souls, in which angels are appointed as guardians to them, who distribute to them *temporary punishment*, agreeable to every one's behaviour and manners. In this region there is a certain place set apart, as a lake of unquenchable fire, whereinto, we suppose, no one hath hitherto been cast, but it is prepared for a day afore determined by God, in which one righteous sentence shall deservedly be passed upon all men; when the unjust, and disobedient to God, shall be adjudged to this everlasting punishment; while the just shall obtain an incorruptible and never-fading kingdom. These are now indeed confined in Hades, but not in the same place wherein the unjust are confined. For there is one descent into this region, at whose gate we believe there stands an archangel with an host; which gate, when those pass through that are conducted down by the angels appointed over souls, they do not go the same way, but the just are guided to the *right hand*, and are led, with hymns sung by the angels appointed over that place, unto a region of light, in which the just have dwelt from the beginning of the world. This place we call the *bosom of Abraham*.

But as to the unjust, they are dragged by force to the *left hand* by the angels allotted for punishment, no longer going with a good will, but as prisoners

driven by violence. Between them is fixed a chaos deep and large; in so much, that a just man that hath compassion upon them cannot be admitted, nor can one that is unjust, if he were bold enough to attempt it, pass over it. In this Hades, the souls of all men are confined until a proper season, which God hath determined, when he will make a resurrection of all men from the dead; not procuring a transmigration of souls from one body to another, but raising again those very bodies, which you Greeks, seeing to be dissolved, do not believe. But learn not to disbelieve it; for while you believe that the soul is created, and yet is made immortal by God, according to the doctrine of Plato; and this in time, be not incredulous, but believe that God is able, when he hath raised to life that body which was made as a compound of the same element, to make it immortal; for it must never be said of God, that he is able to do some things, and unable to do others.—*Josephus*.

Many passages in Plato's *Phædo* favour the opinion of an intermediate state, although widely differing from the Christian notions, and it seems to have been the unanimous current sentiment among the early Christians, that the soul was detained somewhere for a time between death and a final reckoning.

SCRIPTURE PROOFS.

The places of Scripture which he mentions to prove the separate existence and immortality of the soul, are partly taken out of the Old, but chiefly out of the New Testament. The texts of the Old Testa-

ment on which he insists are these two: *Gen. ii. 7*,

And the Lord formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and so man became a living soul:" and *Eccles. xii. 7*, where it is said, "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." This last text he thinks evidently alludes to the former, and gives a light to the words of Moses, attesting that they also were intended to declare the soul of a man a distinct substance from his body. The proofs which Mr. Turner brings on the same side out of the New Testament, are the words of our Saviour, *Matt. x. 28*: "And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." Here, as he observes, is a plain mention of body and soul as distinct substances, and the one liable to torment after the other is destroyed. *Luke xx. 37, 38*, where our Saviour argues thus: "Now that the dead are raised, even Moses showed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not the God of the dead, but of the living; for all live unto him." Another passage mentioned, and which seems strongly to conclude for the soul's distinct existence and immortality, is Christ's expression to the penitent thief on the cross: "This day shalt thou be with me in Paradise," *Luke xxiii. 43*. The prayer of St. Paul, *1 Thess. v. 23*: "I pray God that your whole spirit, soul and body, may be preserved blameless unto the coming of our

Lord Jesus Christ," is another testimony from the New Testament of the soul's separate existence and immortality. And lastly, another text which our author thinks to be a more undeniable proof than any of the former, is St. Paul's saying, (*Philip. i. 23.*) where speaking of the conflict he had within himself as to his desires, on one hand, of living to preach and propagate the Gospel, and on the other hand, of dying to receive the recompense of his labour; as to the latter, he expresses himself thus: "For I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart and to be with Christ, which is far better." "Better than what?" cries our author. "Why," adds he, "than living to preach the Gospel in persecution." This was happier for St. Paul, though the other might be more profitable to the people. "Nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more profitable for you." *Ver. 24.—John Turner's Lectures.*

But the Hebrew Sacred Scriptures are full of declarations that there is a reward to the righteous, and punishment to the wicked—and there is manifestly no fulfilment of these declarations upon earth; therefore there must be a fulfilment of them in a future world. Hence the tendency of the Hebrew Scriptures is to lead our thoughts to another world.

A very early event in the history of men would suggest these reflections to them—namely, the death of Abel, who was approved by God, and presently murdered, while the murderer survived and built a city.

The translation of Enoch.—Why was Enoch taken,

without dying, to dwell with God, if it was not intended that others of his species should exist in another world? Enoch was by no means the most eminent servant of God.

The frequent appearance of angels to good men.—

Every such visit would remind them of another world. But to be reminded of a world where some of God's creatures enjoy his presence, but into which they were never to enter, would be an occasion of extreme pain to those good men who loved God and his service; and would God needlessly put his servants to pain?

The patriarchs spoke of themselves as being strangers and pilgrims—that is, that they were not in their native land, but were travelling. Now, as the Apostle argues in the Epistle to the Hebrews, if they had meant the earthly land from which they had come, they had full opportunity to return thither, which they never seemed to think of doing. Evidently, therefore, the country they sought was a heavenly one.—*Gen. xlvii. 9.*

"And the soul of the child came into him again, and he revived." From this they might learn, that the soul can and does exist in a state separate from the body.—*2 Kings xiii. 21.*

I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth; and though, after my skin, worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God.—*Job.*

"Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, (in the grave,) thou wilt show me the path of life; in thy

presence is fulness of joy, and at thy right hand are pleasures for evermore."—*Psalms* xvi. 10.

"From men of the world, who have their portion in *this life*—as for me, I shall be satisfied when I awake with thy likeness."—*Psalms* xxvii. 14.

"Though I walk *through* the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for thou art with me." *Psalms* xxiii. 4.

"Thou shalt quicken me again, and shalt bring me up again from the depths of the earth."—*Psalms* lxxi. 20.

"The wicked is driven away in his wickedness, but the righteous hath hope in his death."—*Prov.* xiv. 32.

"Who knoweth the spirit of man, that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast, that goeth downward to the earth?"—*Eccles.* iii. 21.

"Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth, and walk in the ways of thine heart and in the sight of thine eyes; but know thou, that for all these things God will bring thee unto judgment."—*Eccles.* xi. 9.

"Thy dead men shall live; together with my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in dust; for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead."—*Isaiah* xxvi. 19.

"And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake; some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt."—*Daniel* xii. 2.

"I will ransom them from the power of the grave; I will redeem them from death. O death I will be

thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction."—*Hosea* xiii. 14.

"There is hope of a tree if it be cut down, that it will sprout again," &c. "But man dieth and wasteth away; yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he? As the waters fail from the sea, and the flood decayeth and drieth up, so man lieth down and riseth not: till the heavens be no more, they shall not awake, nor be raised out of their sleep."—*Job* xiv. 7, 10, 11, 12.

"The dust shall return to dust as it was, and the spirit shall return to God who gave it."—*Eccles.* xii. 7.

"For we know, that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened; not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life."—*2 Cor.* v. 1.

"Jesus saith unto Martha, Thy brother shall rise again. Martha saith unto him, I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day. Jesus saith unto her, I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die."—*John* xi. 23-26.

"For I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand; I have fought a good fight, I have finished *my* course, I have kept the faith; henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness which the Lord, the righteous Judge,

shall give me at that day; and not to me only, but unto all them also that love his appearing."—2 *Timothy* iv. 6, 7, 8.

St. Paul saith, "I would not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning them who are asleep, that ye sorrow not—even as others which have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, so also we are to believe that them who sleep in Jesus God will bring—from the dead—with him."—1 *Thess.* iv. 13.

"But this is now manifested by the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light by the Gospel."

"A particle may be a vehicle to consciousness," &c.—"may connect the natural, the corruptible, with the glorified body."

This idea is finely touched by St. Paul, in his first Epistle to the Corinthians, ch. xv. ver. 35, &c.

"Some man will say, How are the dead raised up, and with what body do they come?

"Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die.

"And that which thou sowest, thou sowest, not that body that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain.

"But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body.

"There are *celestial* bodies, and bodies *terrestrial*. But the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another.

"So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption.

"It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body. There is a *natural* body, and there is a *spiritual* body.

"As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy; and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly.

"Behold, I show you a mystery. We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump; for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed.

"For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality."

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

ECHECRATES (page 1) was a native of Phlius, a city of Peloponnesus, in the territory of Sicyon, situated not far from the isthmus of Corinth. It is recorded by Cicero that Plato was one of his pupils, and in consequence retained a great affection for him: hence he honoured his memory by making him one of the principal speakers in his celebrated dialogue on the Immortality of the Soul. He was a great admirer of Socrates, and a strict follower of his precepts.

PHÆDO (page 1), a Greek philosopher of some celebrity. He was a native of Elis, and of high birth. He was taken prisoner in his youth, and passed into the hands of an Athenian slave dealer; and, being of considerable personal beauty, was compelled to prostitute himself. The occasion on which he was taken prisoner was no doubt the war between Sparta and Elis, in which the Lacedæmonians were joined by the Athenians, which was carried on in the years B. C. 401, 400.

So that it would be in the summer of B. C. 400 that Phædo was brought to Athens. A year would thus remain for his acquaintance with Socrates, to whom he attached himself. According to Diogenes Laërtius, he ran away from his master to Socrates, and was ransomed by one of the friends of the latter. Suidas says, that he was accidentally present at a conversation with Socrates, and besought him to effect his liberation. Various accounts mentioned Alcibiades, Criton, or Cebes, as the person who ransomed him. Alcibiades, however, was not at Athens at the time. Cebes is stated to have been on terms of intimate friendship with Phædo, and to have instructed him in philosophy. Phædo was present at the death of Socrates, while he was still quite a youth. From

the mention of his long hair it would seem that he was not eighteen years of age at the time, as at that age it was customary to cease wearing the hair long.

That Phædo was on terms of friendship with Plato appears likely from the mode in which he is introduced in the dialogue which takes its name from him. Other stories, that were current in the schools, spoke of their relation as being that of enmity rather than friendship. Athenæus says that neither Georgias nor Phædo would acknowledge the least of what Plato attributed to them in the dialogues that bore their names. Several philosophers were ungenerous enough to reproach Phædo with his previous conduct.

Phædo appears to have lived in Athens some time after the death of Socrates. He then returned to Elis, where he became the founder of a school of philosophy. Anchipylus and Moschus are mentioned among his disciples. He was succeeded by Pleistanus, after whom the Elean school was merged in the Eretrian—*Menedemus*. Of the doctrines of Phædo nothing is known except as they made their appearance in the philosophy of Menedemus. Nothing can safely be inferred respecting them from the Phædo of Plato. None of Phædo's writings have come down to us. They were in the form of dialogues. There was some doubt in antiquity as to which were genuine and which were not. Panætius attempted a critical separation of the two classes, and the were acknowledged to be genuine. Besides these dialogues Laertius mentions as of doubtful authenticity, Nicias, M. dius, Antimachus or the Old Men, and Seythian Discourses.

Besides these Scudas mentions the Simmias, Alcibiades, and Critolaus.

It was probably from the Zopyrus that the incident alluded to by Cicero (*de Fato* v., *Tusc. Disp.* iv. 37-80), Maximus Tyr. (xxx. 3), and others, was derived. Seneca (*Epist.* xciv. 41) has a translation of a short passage from one of his pieces. (Fabrec, *Bibl. Gr.*, vol. xi. p. 717; Scholl, *Gesch. der Griech. Lit.*, vol. i., p. 475; Prellero, in *Erch. and Gruber's Encycl. C. P. M.*)

SOCRATES (page 1), the most celebrated philosopher of all antiquity was a native of Athens. His father, Sophroniscus, was a statuary

and his mother, Phænarete, was by profession a midwife. For some time he followed the occupation of his father, and some have mentioned the statues of the Graces, admired for their simplicity and elegance, as the work of his own hands. He was called away from this meaner employment, of which, however, he never blushed, by Crito, who admired his genius and courted his friendship. Philosophy soon became the study of Socrates, and under Achelus and Anaxagoras he laid the foundation of that exemplary virtue which succeeding ages have ever loved and venerated. He appeared like the rest of his countrymen in the field of battle; he fought with boldness and intrepidity, and to his courage two of his friends and disciples, Xenophon and Alcibiades, owed the preservation of their lives. But the character of Socrates appears more conspicuous and dignified as a philosopher and moralist than as a warrior. He was fond of labour, he inured himself to suffer hardships, and he acquired that serenity of mind and firmness of countenance which the most alarming dangers could never destroy or the most sudden calamities alter. If he was poor, it was from choice, and not the effect of vanity, or the wish of appearing singular. He bore injuries with patience, and the insult of malice or resentment he not only treated with contempt, but even received with a mind that expressed some concern and felt compassion for the depravity of human nature. So singular and so venerable a character was admired by the most enlightened of the Athenians. Socrates was attended by a number of illustrious pupils, whom he instructed by his exemplary life, as well as by his doctrines. He had no particular place where to deliver his lectures; but as the good of his countrymen, and the reformation of their corrupted morals, and not the aggregation of riches, was the object of his study, he was present every where, and drew the attention of his auditors either in the groves of Academus, the Lyceum, or on the banks of the Illyssus. He spoke with freedom on every subject, religious as well as civil; and had the courage to condemn the violence of his countrymen, and to withstand the torrent of resentment, by which the Athenian generals were capitally punished for not burying the dead at the battle of Arginusæ. This independence of spirit, and that visible superiority of mind and genius over the rest of his countrymen, created many enemies to Socrates; but as his character

was irreproachable, and his doctrines pure, and void of all obscurity, the voice of malevolence was silent.

Yet Aristophanes soon undertook, at the instigation of Melitus, in his comedy of the Clouds, to ridicule the venerable character of Socrates on the stage; and when once the way was open to calumny and defamation, the fickle and licentious populace paid no reverence to the philosopher whom they had before regarded as a being of a superior order. When this had succeeded, Melitus stood forth to criminate him, together with Anytus and Lycon, and the philosopher was summoned before the tribunal of the Five Hundred. He was accused of corrupting the Athenian youth, of making innovations in the religion of the Greeks, and of ridiculing the many gods whom the Athenians worshipped; yet false as this might appear, the accusers relied for the success of their cause upon the perjury of false witnesses, and the envy of the judges, whose ignorance would readily yield to misrepresentations, and be influenced and guided by eloquence and artifice. In this their expectations were not frustrated, and while the judges expected submission from Socrates, and that meanness of behaviour and servility of defence which distinguished criminals, the philosopher, perhaps, accelerated his own fall by the firmness of his mind and his uncompromising integrity. Lysias, one of the most celebrated orators of the age, composed an oration in a laboured and pathetic style, which he offered to his friend to be pronounced as his defence in the presence of his judges.

Socrates read it, but after he had praised the eloquence and the animation of the whole, he rejected it as neither manly nor expressive of fortitude; and comparing it to Sicynian shoes, which, though fitting, were proofs of effeminacy, he observed, that a philosopher ought to be conspicuous for magnanimity and for firmness of soul. In his apology, he spoke with great animation, and confessed that while others boasted that they were acquainted with everything, he himself knew nothing.* The whole discourse was full of simplicity and noble grandeur, the energetic language of offended innocence. He modestly said, that what he possessed was applied for the service of the Athenians; it was his wish to make

* A similar remark is reported to have fallen from the lips of Sir Isaac Newton when complimented on possessing superior knowledge.

his fellow citizens happy, and it was a duty which he performed by the special command of the gods, whose authority, said he, emphatically, to his judges, I regard more than yours.

Such language from a man who was accused of a capital crime, astonished and irritated the judges. Socrates was condemned, but only by a majority of three voices; and when he was commanded, according to the spirit of the Athenian laws, to pass sentence on himself, and to mention the death he preferred, the philosopher said, *For my attempts to teach the Athenian youth justice and moderation, and render the rest of my countrymen more happy, let me be maintained at the public expense the remaining years of my life in the Prytaneum; an honour, O Athenians, which I deserve more than the victors at the Olympic games. They make their countrymen more happy in appearance, but I have made you so in reality.* This exasperated the judges in the highest degree, and he was condemned to drink hemlock. Upon this he addressed the court, and more particularly the judges who had decided in his favour, in a pathetic speech. He told them that to die was a pleasure, since he was going to hold converse with the greatest heroes of antiquity; he recommended to their paternal care his defenceless children; and as he returned to the prison, he exclaimed, *I go to die, you to live but which is the best the divinity alone can know.* The solemn celebration of the Delian festivals prevented his execution for thirty days, and during that time he was confined in the prison, and loaded with irons. His friends, and particularly his disciples, were his constant attendants; he discoursed with them upon different subjects with all his usual cheerfulness and serenity. He reproved them for their sorrow. With this composure he spent his last days; he continued to be a preceptor till the moment of his death, and instructed his pupils on questions of the greatest importance. He told them his opinions in support of the immortality of the soul, and reprobated with acrimony the prevalent custom of suicide; he disregarded the intercessions of his friends, and when it was in his power to make his escape out of prison, he refused it, and asked with his usual pleasantry, where he could escape death; *Where, says he to Crito, who had bribed the gaoler and made his escape certain, where shall I fly to avoid this irrevocable doom passed on all mankind? When the hour to drink the poison was come, the ex-*

ecutioner presented him the cup with tears in his eyes. Socrates received it with composure, and after he had made a libation to the gods, he drank it with an unaltered countenance, and a few moments afterwards he expired. Such was the end of a man whom the uninfluenced answer of the oracle of Delphi had pronounced the wisest of mankind. Socrates died 400 years before Christ, in the seventieth year of his age. He was no sooner buried than the Athenians repented of their cruelty; his accusers were universally despised and shunned; one suffered death, some were banished, and others, with their own hands, put an end to their life, which their severity to the best of the Athenians had rendered insupportable. The actions, sayings, and opinions of Socrates have been faithfully recorded by two of his pupils, Xenophon and Plato; and every thing which relates to the life and circumstances of this great philosopher is now minutely known. To his poverty, his innocence, and his example, the Greeks were particularly indebted for their greatness and splendour; and the learning which was universally disseminated by his pupils, gave the whole nation a consciousness of their superiority over the rest of the world, not only in the polite arts, but in the more laborious exercises which their writings celebrated. The philosophy of Socrates forms an interesting epoch in the history of the human mind. The son of Sophroniscus derided the more abstruse inquiries and metaphysical researches of his predecessors, and by first introducing moral philosophy, he induced mankind to consider themselves, their passions, their opinions, their duties, actions, and faculties. From this it was said that the foundation of the Socratic school drew philosophy down from heaven upon the earth. In his attendance upon religious worship Socrates was himself an example; he believed the divine origin of dreams and omens, and publicly declared that he was accompanied by a demon or invisible conductor, whose frequent interposition stopped him from the commission of evil and the guilt of misconduct. This familiar spirit, however, according to some, was nothing more than a sound judgment, assisted by prudence and long experience, which warned him at the approach of danger, and from a general speculation of mankind could foresee what success would attend an enterprise, or what calamities would follow an ill-managed administration. As a supporter of the immortality of the soul, he allowed

the perfection of a supreme being, from which he deduced the government of the universe. From the resources of experience, as well as nature and observation, he perceived the indiscriminate dispensation of good and evil to mankind by the hand of heaven; and he was convinced that none but the most inconsiderate would incur the displeasure of their Creator to avoid poverty or sickness, or to gratify a sensual appetite, which at the end harass their soul with remorse and the consciousness of guilt. From this natural view of things, he perceived the relation of one nation with another, and how much the tranquillity of civil society depended upon the proper discharge of these respective duties. The actions of men furnished materials also for his discourse; to instruct them was his aim, and to render them happy was the ultimate object of his daily lessons. From principles like these, which were enforced by the unparalleled example of an affectionate husband, a tender parent, a warlike soldier, and a patriotic citizen in Socrates, soon after the celebrated sects of the Platonists, the Peripatetics, the Academics, Cyrenaics, Stoics, &c., arose. Socrates made a poetical version of some of Æsop's Fables, of whom he was a great admirer, and it is asserted by some that the tragedies of his pupil, Euripides, were partly composed by him. He was naturally of a licentious disposition, and a physiognomist observed, in looking in the face of the philosopher, that his heart was the most depraved, immodest, and corrupted that ever was in the human breast. This nearly cost the satirist his life; but Socrates upbraided his disciples, who wished to punish the physiognomist, and declared that his assertions were true, but that all his vicious propensities had been duly corrected and curbed by means of reason.

PHILIUS (page 1), a small independent republic of the Peloponnesus, adjoining Corinth and Sicyon on the north, of Arcadia on the west, and the Nemeian and Cleonean district of Argolis on the south and south-east. It is sometimes, however, referred to Argolis, since Homer represents it, under the early name of Arathyrea, as dependent on the kingdom of Mycena. The remains of the city of Philius are to be seen not far from *Agios Georgios*, on the road to the Lake of Stymphalus in Arcadia. The wine manufactured at Philius was famed all over Greece, and hence the Athenian maritime intercourse with this place.

ATHENS (page 1), a celebrated city of Attica, founded about 1556 years before the Christian era, by Cecrops and an Egyptian colony. It was called Cecropia from its founder, and afterwards Athenæ, in honour of Minerva, who had obtained the right of giving it a name in preference to Neptune. Every thing memorable, connected with either ancient or modern Grecian history, has more or less connection with this wonderful city, and a history of these renowned states of antiquity must necessarily be incomplete which does not include the history of Athens.

DELOS (page 2), one of the Cyclades at the north of Naxos, was severally called Lagin, Ortygia, Asterea, Clamidia, Pelesgia, Pyrpyle, Cynthas, and Sailles. It was called Delos because it suddenly made its appearance on the surface of the sea by the power of Neptune. This island is celebrated for the nativity of Apollo and Diana. One of the altars of Apollo, in the island, was reckoned among the seven wonders of the world. The island was held in such veneration that the Persians, who had pillaged and profaned all the temples of Greece, never offered violence to the temple of Apollo, but respected it with the most awful reverence.

THESEUS (page 2), King of Athens, was one of the most celebrated heroes of antiquity, he performed many great and wonderful feats of valour. Codrus wrote an account of the life and actions of Theseus, in poetry, which is now lost.

CRETE (page 2), one of the largest islands in the Mediterranean Sea, at the south of all the Cyclades. Its name is derived from the Curetes, who are said to have been the first inhabitants. According to Pliny, the extent of Crete, from east to west, is about 270 miles, and it is nearly 559 in circuit. In breadth it nowhere exceeds 50 miles. The interior is very mountainous and woody, and intersected with fertile valleys. Mount Ida, which surpasses all the other mountains in elevation, rises in the centre of the island. The Cretan code was supposed by many of the best informed writers of antiquity to have furnished Lycurgus with the model of his most salutary regulations. It was founded, according to Ephorus, as

cited by Strabo (480), on the just basis of liberty and equality of rights; and its great aim was to promote social harmony and peace, by enforcing temperance and frugality. The modern name of Crete is Candia. The greater portion of this fertile island is uncultivated; its exports are salt, grain, oil, honey, silk, and wool, it abounds in wild fowl and different kinds of game.

APOLLO (page 2), one of the great divinities of the Greeks, the son of Jupiter and Latona, called also Phœbus, or the Sun. But the opinion most universally received, was that Apollo was the son of Zeus and Leto, and was born in the island of Delos, together with his sister Artemis; and the circumstances of his birth are detailed in the Homeric hymn to Apollo, and in that of Callimachus on Delos. He was the deity, according to the ancients, who inflicted plagues on mankind, and at that time always appeared surrounded with clouds. His most famous oracles were at Delphi, Delos, Claros, Tenedos, Cyrrha, and Patara.

SHADES (page 3), ghosts or spirits of the dead. See, for more on this subject, Homer and Virgil.

APOLLODORUS (page 4), of Phaleron in Attica, a very ardent and zealous friend and follower of Socrates, but unable, with all his attachment, to understand the real worth of his master. He was naturally inclined to dwell upon the dark side of things, and thus became discontented and morose, though he had not the courage to struggle manfully for what was good. This brought upon him the nickname of the eccentric man. When Socrates was going to die, Apollodorus lost all control over himself, and gave himself up to tears and loud lamentations. When Socrates was going to prison, he cried out, "That which afflicts me most, Socrates, is to see you die innocent." Socrates smiled, and said, "My friend, would you rather see me die guilty?"

Ælian relates a droll anecdote, according to which Apollodorus offered to Socrates, before his death, a suit of fine clothes, that he might die respectably. Apollodorus occurs in several of Plato's dialogues, but the passage which gives the most lively picture of the man is in the *Symposium*. Compare T. A. Wolfe, *Prefat. ad Symposia*. [L. a.]

CRITOULUS (page 4), son of Criton, and disciple of Socrates. He did not, however, profit much by his master's instructions, if we may trust the testimony of Æschines, the Socratic, by whom he is represented as destitute of refinement and sordid in his mode of living (Comp. Plat. *Phæd.* p. 57; Xen. *Mem.* i. 3 § 8, ii. 6; Athen. v. p. 188, d.; Diog. Laert. ii. 121.) [E. E.]

CRITON (page 4), of Athens, the friend and disciple of Socrates, is more celebrated in antiquity for his love and affection for his master, whom he generously supported with his fortune, than as a philosopher himself. Accordingly, whenever he is introduced in Plato's dialogues, his attachment to Socrates is extolled, and not his philosophical talents. It was Criton who had made every arrangement for the escape of Socrates from prison, and who tried, in vain, to persuade him to fly, as we see from Plato's dialogue named after him; and it was Criton, also, who closed the eyes of the dying philosopher. Criton applied his great riches, which are mentioned by Socrates in a jocose way in the *Euthydemus* of Plato, to the noblest purposes. His sons, of whom he possessed four, according to Diogenes Laertius, and two, according to Plato, were likewise disciples of Socrates. The eldest of them was Critobulus.

Criton wrote seventeen dialogues on philosophical subjects, the titles of which are given by Diogenes Laertius. Among these there was one "On Poetics," which is the only work on this subject mentioned in the history of Greek literature before the work of Aristotle.

HERMOGENES (page 4), an architect of Alabanda, in Caria, employed in building the temple of Diana at Magnesia. He wrote a book upon his profession.

EPIGENES (page 4), a disciple of Socrates, who was with him in his last moments. Xenophon represents Socrates as remonstrating with him on his neglect of the bodily exercises required for health and strength.

ÆSCHINES (page 4), an Athenian orator, born B. C. 389; he distinguished himself by his rivalry with Demosthenes. He was a

disciple of Socrates, Plato, and Isocrates, and subsequently became a teacher himself, and afterwards a scribe to Aristophon. He tried his fortune as an actor, for which he was provided by nature with a strong and sonorous voice—in this he was unsuccessful. On leaving the stage he engaged in military services. He gained great distinction in this calling. He was one of the five Athenian ambassadors sent by Athens to treat with Philip, king of Macedonia. In B. C. 346 he was sent delegate to the assembly of the Amphictyons at the Pylæ, which was convoked by Philip, and at which he received greater honours than he could ever have expected.

At this time Æschines and Demosthenes were at the head of the two parties into which not only Athens but all Greece was divided, and their political enmity created and nourished personal hatred. Demosthenes charged Æschines with having been bribed and having betrayed the interests of his country during the second embassy to Philip, and the effeminate luxuriance of the so-called Asiatic school of oratory. On one occasion he read to his audience in Rhodes his speech against Ctesiphon, and when some of his hearers expressed their astonishment at his having been defeated, notwithstanding his brilliant oration, he replied, "You would cease to be astonished if you had heard Demosthenes."

Æschines spoke on various occasions, but he published only three of his orations, namely, against Timarchus, on the embassy, and against Ctesiphon. As an orator he was inferior to none but Demosthenes. He was endowed by nature with extraordinary oratorical powers, of which his orations afford abundant proofs. The facility and felicity of his diction, the boldness and vigour of his descriptions, carry away the reader now, as they must have carried away his audience. The ancients, as Photius remarks, designated these three orations as the *Græces*, and the nine letters which were extant in the time of Photius, as the *Muses*. Besides the three orations, we now possess twelve letters, which are ascribed to Æschines, which, however, are in all probability not more genuine than the so-called epistles of Phalaris, and are undoubtedly the work of late sophists.

This charge of Demosthenes was not spoken, but published as a memorial, and Æschines answered it in a similar memorial on the embassy, which was likewise published, and in the composition of

which he is said to have been assisted by his friend Eubulus. The result of these mutual attacks is unknown, but there is no doubt that it gave a severe shock to the popularity of *Æschines*. At the time he wrote his memorial we gain a glimpse into his private life. Some years before that occurrence he had married a daughter of *Philodemus*, a man of high respectability in his tribe of *Peania*, and in 348 he was father of three little children.

Æschines went to Asia Minor. He spent several years in *Ionia* and *Caria*, occupying himself with teaching rhetoric, and anxiously waiting for the return of *Alexander* to Europe. When, in a. c. 324, the report of the death of *Alexander* reached him, he left Asia and went to *Rhodes*, where he established a school of eloquence, which subsequently became very celebrated, and occupies a middle position between the grave manliness of the Attic orators.

ANTISTHENESES (page 4), a Cynic philosopher, the son of *Antisthenes*, an Athenian, was the founder of the sect of the Cynics, which, of all the Greek schools of philosophy, was perhaps the most devoid of any scientific purpose. He flourished b. c. 366. In his youth he fought at *Tanagra* (b. c. 426), and was a disciple first of *Gorgias*, and then of *Socrates*, whom he never quitted, and at whose death he was present. He never forgave his master's persecutors, and is even said to have been instrumental in procuring their punishment. He died at Athens at the age of seventy. He taught in the *Cynosarges*, a gymnasium for the use of Athenians born of foreign mothers, near the temple of *Hercules*. Hence, probably, his followers were called Cynics, though the Scholiast on Aristotle (p. 23, Brandis) deduces the name from the habits of the school: either their dog-like neglect of all forms and usages of society, sleeping in tubs and in the streets, and eating whatever they could find, or from their shameless insolence, or else their pertinacious adherence to their own opinions, or lastly, from their habit of driving from them all whom they thought unfit for a philosophical life.

His writings were very numerous, and chiefly dialogues, some of them being vehement attacks on his contemporaries, as on *Aleibiades* in the second of his two works entitled *Cyrrus*, on *Gorgias* in his *Archelaus*, and a most furious one on *Plato* in his *Satha*. His style was pure and elegant, and *Theopompus* even said

that *Plato* stole from him many of his thoughts. *Cicero*, however, calls him "*homo acutus magis quam eruditus*" (a person of more acuteness than learning), and it is impossible that his writings could have deserved any higher praise. He possessed considerable power of wit and sarcasm, and was fond of playing upon words. Two declamations of his are preserved, named *Ajax* and *Ulysses*, which are purely rhetorical; and an epistle to *Aristippus* is attributed to him. His philosophical system was almost confined to ethics. In all that the wise man does, he said, he conforms to perfect virtue, and pleasure is not only unnecessary to man but a positive evil. He is reported to have held pain and even infamy to be blessings, and that madness is preferable to pleasure, though *Ritter* thinks that some of these extravagances must have been advanced not as his own opinions, but those of the interlocutors in his dialogues.

The "*summum bonum*" he placed in a life according to virtue—virtue consisting in action, and being such, that when once obtained it is never lost, and exempts the wise man from the chance of error. That is, it is closely connected with reason, but to enable it to develop itself in action, and to be sufficient for happiness, it requires the aid of energy.

The *Physics* of *Antisthenes* contained a theory of the nature of the gods, in which he contended for the Unity of the Deity, and that man is unable to know him by any sensible representation, since he is unlike any being on earth. He probably held just views of Providence, showing the sufficiency of virtue for happiness by the fact that outward events are regulated by God so as to benefit the wise. Such, at least, was the view of his pupil *Diogenes* of *Sinope*, and seems involved in his own statement, that all which belongs to others is truly the property of the wise man. Of his logic we hear that he held definitions to be impossible, since we can only say that every individual is what it is, and can give no more than a description of its qualities, e. g., that silver is like tin in colour. He never had many disciples, which annoyed him so much that he drove away those who did attend his teaching, except *Diogenes*, who remained with him till his death. His staff and wallet, and mean clothing, were only proofs of his vanity, which *Socrates* told him he saw through the holes of his coat. His philosophy was evidently thought worthless by *Plato* and *Aristotle*.

to the former of whom he was personally hostile. His school is classed, by Ritter, among the imperfect Socraticists. After his death his disciples wandered further and further from all scientific objects, and plunged more deeply into fanatical extravaganzas. Perhaps some of their exaggerated statements have been attributed to their master.

The fragments which remain of his writings have been collected by Winckelmann (*Antisthenes Fragmenta*, Turici, 1842), and this small work, with the account of him by Ritter, will supply all the information which can be desired. [G. E. L. C.]

OTESIPTOS (page 4), the author of a history of Scythia, of which the second book is quoted by Plutarch, but whether the same as mentioned by Plato in *Phædo* is not known. [L. A.]

MENEXENUS (page 4), an Athenian son of Demophon, was a disciple of Socrates and was introduced by Plato as one of the interlocutors in his dialogues, *Lysis* and *Menexenus*; he is also mentioned in his dialogue on the Immortality of the Soul.

SIMMIAS (page 4), of Thebes, first the disciple of the Pythagorean philosopher Philolaus, and afterwards the friend and disciple of Socrates, at whose death he was present, having come from Thebes, with his brother Cebes, bringing with him a large sum of money, to assist in Criton's plan for the liberation of Socrates. At this time he and Cebes were both young men. The two brothers are the principal speakers, besides Socrates himself, in the *Phædo*; and the skill with which they argue, and the respect and affection with which Socrates treats them, prove the high place they held among his disciples, not only in the judgment of Plato, but in the general opinion. In the *Phædrus*, also, Socrates is made to refer to Simmias as one of the most powerful reasoners of his day.

According to Plutarch, who introduces Simmias as a speaker in his dialogue *De Genio Socratis*, he studied much in Egypt, and became conversant with the mystical religious philosophy of that country.

There is a very brief account of him in *Diogenes Laertius*, who

states that there was a collection of twenty-three dialogues by him, in one volume. The titles of these dialogues are also given, with a slight variation, by Suidas; they embrace a large range of philosophical subjects, but are chiefly ethical.

Two epitaphs on Sophocles, in the Greek Anthology, are ascribed to Simmias of Thebes, in the Palatine Codex. There is also an epitaph on Aristocles, among the epigrams of Simmias of Rhodes, which, says Jacobs, Prunck would refer to Simmias of Thebes. [P. A.]

THEBES (page 4), a celebrated city, the capital of Boeotia, situated on the banks of the river Ismenus. The Thebans were looked upon as an indolent and sluggish nation. When Alexander invaded Greece he ordered Thebes to be totally demolished, because it had revolted against him, except the house where the poet Pindar had been born and educated. In this dreadful period six thousand of its inhabitants were slain, and thirty thousand sold for slaves. It was afterwards repaired by Cassander, the son of Antipater, but it never rose to its original consequence, and Strabo, in his age, mentions it merely as an inconsiderable village.

CEBES (page 4), of Thebes, was a disciple of Philolaus, the Pythagorean, and of Socrates, with whom he was connected by intimate friendship. He attended his learned preceptor in his last moments, and distinguished himself by three dialogues that he wrote; but more particularly by his tables, which contain a beautiful and affecting picture of human life, delineated with accuracy of judgment and great splendour of sentiment. The whole of human life, with its dangers and temptations, was symbolically represented. These are said to have been dedicated by some one in the temple of Chronos at Athens or Thebes. The author introduces some youths contemplating the table, and an old man who steps among them undertakes to explain its meaning. The whole drift of the little book is to show that only the proper development of our mind and the possession of real virtues can make us truly happy. Owing to its ethical character, it was formerly extremely popular, and the editions and translations of it are very numerous. It has been translated into all the languages of Europe, and even into Russian,

modern Greek, and Arabic. The first edition of it was in a Latin translation by L. Odaxius, Bologna, 1497. In this edition, as in nearly all the subsequent ones, it is printed, together with the *Enchiridion* of Epictetus. The first edition of the Greek text with a Latin translation is that of Aldus (Venice, 4to, without date), who printed it, together with the "*Institutiones et Alia Opuscula*" of C. Lascaris. This was followed by a great number of other editions. The best modern editions are those of Schweighauser in his edition of Epictetus, and also separately printed (Strasburg, 1806, 12mo), and of A. Coraes, in his edition of Epictetus (Paris, 1826, 8vo). Little is known of the character of Cebes from history: Plato mentions him once, and Xenophon the same, but both in a manner which conveys most fully the goodness of his heart and the purity of his morals.

MEGARA (page 4), a city of Achaia and capital of Megares. It is situated at a nearly equal distance from Corinth and Athens, on the Sinus Saronicus. It was built upon two rocks, and is still in being, and preserving its ancient name. There was here a sect of philosophers called the Megara. They held the world to be eternal.

EUCLIDES (page 4), a native of Megara, and a disciple of Socrates. When the Athenians had forbidden all the people of Megara, on pain of death, to enter their city, Euclides disguised himself in woman's clothing to introduce himself into the presence of Socrates.

TERPSION (page 4), a Marian, mentioned by Suidas as one of the disciples of Socrates. Plutarch also refers to him. It is doubtless this Terpsion who is introduced by Plato as one of the interlocutors in the *Theaetetus*, and mentioned in the *Phædo*.

ARISTIPPUS (page 4), son of Aritades, born at Cyrene, and founder of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy, came over to Greece to be present at the Olympic games, where he fell in with Iscomachus, the agriculturist (whose praises are the subject of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*), and by his description was filled with so ardent a desire to see Socrates that he went to Athens for the purpose, and remained with him almost up to the time of his execution.

Though a disciple of Socrates, he wandered both in principle and practice very far from the teachings and example of his great master. He was luxurious in his mode of living; he indulged in sensual gratifications and the society of the notorious Lais; he took money for his teaching (being the first of the disciples of Socrates who did so), and avowed to his instructor that he resided in a foreign land in order to escape the trouble of mixing in the politics of his native city. He passed part of his life at the court of Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, and is also said to have been taken prisoner by Artaphernes, the satrap who drove the Spartans from Rhodes, B. C. 396. He appears, however, at last to have returned to Cyrene, and there he spent his old age. The anecdotes which are told of him, and of which we find a most tedious number in Diogenes Laertius, by no means give us the notion of a person who was the mere slave of his passions, but rather of one who took a pride in extracting enjoyment from all circumstances of every kind, and in controlling adversity and prosperity alike. . . . Thus, when reproached for his love of bodily indulgences, he answered, that there was no shame in enjoying them, but that it would be disgraceful if he could not at any time give them up. When Dionysius, provoked at some of his remarks, ordered him to take the lowest place at table, he said, "You wish to dignify the seat."

Whether he was prisoner to a satrap, or grossly insulted and even spit upon by a tyrant, or enjoying the pleasures of a banquet, or reviled for faithlessness to Socrates by his fellow pupils, he maintained the same calm temper. To Xenophon and Plato he was very obnoxious, as we see from the *Memorabilia*, where he maintains an odious discussion against Socrates, in defence of voluptuous enjoyment, and from the *Phædo*, where his absence at the death of Socrates, though he was only at Ægina, 200 stadia from Athens, is doubtless mentioned as a reproach. Aristotle, too, calls him a sophist, and notices a story of Plato speaking to him with rather undue vehemence, and of his replying with calmness. He imparted his doctrine to his daughter Arete, by whom it was communicated to her son, the younger Aristippus, and by him it is said to have been reduced to a system. Laertius, on the authority of Sotion and Panætius, gives a long list of books, whose authorship

is ascribed to Aristippus, though he also says that Sosierates of Rhodes states that he wrote nothing.

Among these are treatises on Education, on Virtue, on Fortune, and many others. Some epistles attributed to him are deservedly rejected as forgeries by Bentley. One of these is to Arete, and its spuriousness is proved.

The Cyrenaics despised physics, and limited their inquiries to ethics, though they included under that term a much wider range of science than can fairly be reckoned as belonging to it. So, too, Aristotle accuses Aristippus of neglecting mathematics, as a study not concerned with good and evil, which, he said, are the objects even of the carpenter and tanner. They divided Philosophy into five parts, viz., the study of objects of desire and aversion, feelings and affections, actions, causes, proofs. Of these mathematics is clearly connected with physics and with logic.

In many of his opinions we recognize the happy, careless, selfish disposition which characterized their author, and the system resembles in most points those of Heraclitus and Protagoras, as given in Plato's *Theætetus*. The doctrines that a subject only knows objects through the prism of the impression which he receives, and that man is the measure of all things, are stated or implied in the Cyrenaic system, and lead at once to the consequence that what we call reality is appearance, so that the whole fabric of human knowledge becomes a fantastic picture. The principle on which all this rests, viz., that knowledge is sensation, is the foundation of Locke's modern ideology, though he did not perceive its connection with the consequences to which it led the Cyrenaics. To revive these was reserved for Hume. The ancient authorities on this subject are Diogenes Laertius, ii. 65, &c.; Sextus Empiricus, *adv. Math.*, vii. 11; the places in Xenophon and Aristotle already referred to; Cic. *Tusc.* iii. 13, 22.

CLEOMBROTUS (page 4), an Academic philosopher of Ambracia, who is said to have thrown himself down from a high wall after reading the *Phædo* of Plato, not that he had any suffering to escape from, but that he might exchange this life for a better. He must have been the same who was a disciple of Socrates, whom Plato mentions as being in *Ægina* when Socrates died.

ÆGINA (page 4), a part of the *Ægean Sea*, called Saronicus Sinus, about twenty-two miles in circumference. The inhabitants were once destroyed by a pestilence, and the country was repopled by ants, changed into men by Jupiter, at the prayer of King *Æacus*. They were once a very powerful nation by sea, but they cowardly gave themselves up to Darius when he demanded submission from all the Greeks.

XANTIPPE (page 5), the wife of Socrates, remarkable for her ill humour and peevish disposition, which are become proverbial. Some suppose that the philosopher was acquainted with her moroseness and insolence before he married her, and that he took her for his wife to try his patience, and inure himself to the malevolent reflections of mankind. She continually tormented him with her impertinence, and one day, not satisfied with using the most bitter invectives, she emptied a vessel of dirty water on his head, upon which the philosopher coolly observed, *After thunder there generally falls rain.*

THE ELEVEN (page 5). These magistrates were the overseers of the prison and prisoners, and examined the sentences of the judges.

ÆSOP (page 6), a Phrygian philosopher, who, though originally a slave, procured his liberty by the sallies of his genius. He travelled over the greatest part of Greece and Egypt, but chiefly resided at the court of Croesus, king of Lydia, by whom he was sent to consult the Oracle of Delphi. Maximus Plandus has written his life in Greek, but no credit is to be given to the biographer, who falsely asserts that the mythologist was short and deformed. *Æsop* dedicated his fables to his patron Croesus; but what appears now under his name is no doubt a compilation of all the fables and apologues of wits before and after the age of *Æsop*, conjointly with his own.

EVENUS (page 6), an elegiac poet of Paros, the first that said habit was a second nature.

PHILOLAUS (page 8), a Pythagorean philosopher, the preceptor of Simmias and Cebes at Thebes. He could not fail to assert his

master's doctrine of the unlawfulness of self-murder. He wrote one book, wherein is contained the whole of the Pythagorean system. It is recorded that Plato purchased this volume for the enormous sum of four hundred crowns.

ENDYMION (page 30), a shepherd, son of Æthlius and Calyce. It is said that he required of Jupiter to grant to him to be always young, and to sleep as much as he would; whence came the proverb of *Endymionis somnum dormire*, to express a long sleep. Diana saw him naked as he slept on Mount Patmos, and was so struck with his beauty that she came down from heaven every night to enjoy his company.

ANAXAGORAS (page 30), a Clazomenian philosopher, son of Hegesibulus, disciple to Anaximenes, and preceptor to Socrates and Euripides. He disregarded wealth and honours to indulge his fondness for meditation and philosophy. He applied himself to astronomy, was acquainted with eclipses, and predicted that one day a stone would fall from the sun, which it is said really fell into the river Ægæus. Anaxagoras travelled into Egypt for improvement, and used to say that he preferred a grain of wisdom to heaps of gold. Pericles was in the number of his pupils, and often consulted him in matters of state, and once dissuaded him from starving himself to death. The ideas of Anaxagoras, concerning the heavens, were wild and extravagant. He supposed that the sun was inflammable matter, about the size of the Peloponnesus; and that the moon was inhabited. The heavens he believed to be of stone, and the earth of similar material. He was accused of impiety and condemned to die, but he ridiculed the sentence, and said it had long been pronounced upon him by nature. Being asked whether his body should be carried into his own country, he answered no, as the road that led to the other side of the grave was as long from one place as the other. His scholar Pericles pleaded eloquently and successfully for him, and the sentence of death was exchanged for banishment. In prison the philosopher is said to have attempted to square the circle, or determine exactly the proportion of its diameter to the circumference. When the people of Lampsacus asked him, before his death, whether he

wished anything to be done in commemoration of him, "Yes," says he, "let the boys be allowed to play on the anniversary of my death." This was carefully observed, and that time dedicated to relaxation was called *Anaxagoreia*. He died at Lampsacus, in his seventy-second year, 428 B. C.

HAIRES (page 48). The residence of departed souls was so termed by the Greeks. It is important to bear in mind this fact in reading the passages in the New Testament, where this word occurs. The term, although sometimes rendered grave, and sometimes hell, properly signifies the world of departed spirits, and includes both the place of happiness and the place of misery. On the meaning and use of this term see M. Stuart's *Exegetical Essays*, and Gibbons' *Miscellaneous Works*.

TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS (page 51). For a full account of this antiquated but remarkable doctrine, see William Ward's *View of the History, Literature and Mythology of the Hindoos*, including translations from their principal works, 4 vols. 8vo, London, 1820.

PENELOPE (page 54), a celebrated Princess of Greece, daughter of Icarus, and wife of Ulysses, king of Ithaca. She soon after became mother of Telemachus, and was obliged to part, with great reluctance, from her husband, whom the Greeks obliged to go to the Trojan war. The continuation of hostilities for ten years made her sad and melancholy, but when Ulysses did not return, like the other princes of Greece, at the conclusion of the war, her fears and anxieties were increased. As she received no intelligence of his situation she was soon beset by a number of importuning suitors, who wished her to believe that her husband was shipwrecked, and that therefore she ought no longer to expect his return, but forget his loss and fix her choice and affections on one of her numerous admirers. She received their addresses with coldness and disdain, but as she was destitute of power, and a prisoner as it were in their hands, she yet flattered them with hopes and promises, and declared that she would make choice of one of them as soon as she had finished a piece of tapestry on which she was employed. The work was done in a dilatory manner, and she baffled their eager

expectations by undoing in the night what she had done in the daytime. The artifice of Penelope has given rise to the proverb of Penelope's web, which is applied to whatever labour can never be ended.

ARGIVES (page 63). The Argives being routed by the Spartans, with whom they waged war for seizing the city of Thyre, cut their hair and swore solemnly never to suffer it to grow till they had retaken the town that belonged to them; which happened in the 57th Olympiad, when Croesus was besieged at Sardis. It was likewise a custom among the Greeks generally to cut off their hair at the death of their friends, and throw it into their tombs.

HERCULES, (page 64), a celebrated hero who, after death, was ranked among the gods, and received divine honours. According to the ancients there were many persons of the same name. Diodorus mentions three, Cicero six, and some authors extend the number to no less than forty-three. Of all these the son of Jupiter and Alcmena, generally called the Theban, is the most celebrated, and to him, as may easily be imagined, the actions of the others have been attributed. Wonderful strength was ascribed to him even in his infantile years. Eurystheus, king of Mycenæ, imposed upon him many difficult enterprises, which he carried through with success, particularly those which are called the twelve labours of Hercules. These were—to kill the Nemean lion; to destroy the Lernaean hydra; to catch alive the Stag with golden horns; to catch the Erymanthean boar; to cleanse the stables of Augias; to exterminate the birds of Lake Stymphalis; to bring alive the wild bull of Crete; to seize the horses of Diomedes; to obtain the girdle of Hippolyta, queen of the Amazons; to destroy the monster Geryon, to plunder the garden of Hesperides, guarded by a sleepless dragon; and bring from the infernal world the three-headed dog Cerberus.

EURIPIDES (page 66), a celebrated tragic poet, born at Salamis the day on which the army of Xerxes was defeated by the Greeks. He studied eloquence under Prodicus, ethics under Socrates, and philosophy under Anaxagoras. He applied himself to dramatical composition, and his writings became so much the admiration of his countrymen that the unfortunate Greeks who had accompanied

Nicias in his expedition against Syracuse were freed from slavery only by repeating some verses from the pieces of Euripides. The poet often retired from the society of mankind and confined himself in a solitary cave near Salamis, where he wrote and finished his most excellent tragedies. The talents of Sophocles were looked upon by Euripides with jealousy, and the great enmity which always reigned between the two poets gave an opportunity to the comic muse of Aristophanes to ridicule them both on the stage with success and humour. During the representation of one of the tragedies of Euripides the audience, displeased with some lines in the composition, desired the writer to strike them off. Euripides heard the reproof with indignation, he advanced forward on the stage and told the spectators that he came there to instruct them and not to receive instruction. He retired to the court of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, where he received the most conspicuous marks of royal munificence and friendship. His end was as deplorable as it was uncommon. It is said that the dogs of Archelaus met him in his solitary walks and tore his body to pieces, 407 years before the Christian era, in the 78th year of his age. Euripides wrote seventy-five tragedies, of which only nineteen are extant. He is peculiarly happy in expressing the passions of love, especially the more tender and animated. To the pathos he added sublimity, and the most common expressions have received a perfect polish from his pen. In his person, as it is reported, he was noble and majestic, and his deportment was always grave and serious. He was slow in composing, and laboured with difficulty, from which circumstance a foolish and malevolent poet once observed, that he had written one hundred verses in three days, while Euripides had written only three. True, says Euripides, but there is this difference between your poetry and mine—yours will expire in three days, but mine shall live for ages to come. Euripides was such an enemy to the fair sex that some have called him woman-hater, and perhaps from the aversion arise the impure and diabolical machinations which appear in his female characters, an observation, however, which he refuted by saying he had faithfully copied nature. In spite of all his antipathy he was married twice, but his connections were so injudicious, that he was compelled to divorce both his wives.

HOMER (page 75), the greatest of all poets, none in any age or nation have even nearly approached him, and in all likelihood never will; among the Greeks his books were quoted upon every subject as the very highest authority. Not less than seven cities claimed the honour of having given him birth, viz., Smyrna, Chios, Colophon, Salamis, Rhodes, Argos, and Athens. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are monuments much more durable than brass or marble, or military glory; time only can destroy them. The time of his birth is not accurately ascertained, but, according to Herodotus, he was born 884 years before Christ.

CADMUS (page 75), according to the ambiguous signification of a Phœnician word, Cadmus was the first who introduced the use of letters into Greece; but some maintain that the alphabet which he brought from Phœnicia was only different from that which is used by the ancient inhabitants of Greece. This alphabet consisted of only sixteen letters, to which Palamedes afterwards added four, and Simonides of Melos, the same number. The worship of many of the Egyptian and Phœnician deities was also introduced by Cadmus, who is supposed to have come into Greece 1493 years before the christian era, and to have died 61 years after.

BEOTIA (page 82), a country of Greece, bounded on the north by Phœcia, south by Attica, east by Eubœa, and west by the Bay of Corinth. It has been successively called Aonia, Mesapia, Hyantia, Ogygia, and Cadmeia, and now forms a part of Lividia. The inhabitants were reckoned rude and illiterate, fonder of bodily strength than of mental excellence, yet their country produced many illustrious men, such as Pindar, Hesiod, Plutarch, &c.

ÆSCHYLUS (page 100), an excellent soldier and poet of Athens. He was in the Athenian army at the battle of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea; but the most solid fame he has obtained is the offspring less of his valour in the field of battle than of his writings. Of ninety tragedies, however, the fruit of his ingenious labours, forty of which were rewarded with the public prize, only seven have come down to this time. In his old age he retired to the court of Hiero in Sicily. Being informed that he was to die by the

fall of a house, he became dissatisfied with the fickleness of his countrymen and withdrew from the city into the fields, where he sat down. An eagle, with a tortoise in his bill, flew over his bald head, and supposing it to be a stone, dropped his prey upon it to break the shell. This accident instantly caused his death, in the sixty-ninth year of his age, 456 B. C. It is said that he wrote an account of the battle of Marathon in elegiac verse.

GLAUCUS (page 101). He assisted Priam in the Trojan war, and had the simplicity to exchange his golden suit of armour with Diomedes for an iron one, whence came the proverb of the exchange of Glaucus and Diomedes to express a foolish purchase. He behaved with much courage and was killed by Ajax.

PHASIS (page 102), a river of Colchis, rising in the mountains of Armenia, now called *Faoz*, and falling into the east of the Euxine. It is famous for the expedition of the Argonauts, who entered it after a long and perilous voyage, from which reason all dangerous voyages have been proverbially intimated by the words of *sailing to the Phasis*.

PILLARS OF HERCULES (page 102), what is now known as the Straits of Gibraltar. For much interesting information on this subject see W. Smith's *Dictionaries of Greek and Roman Biography, Mythology, and Antiquities*. London, 1849.

TARTARUS (page 107), the abode of the wicked. Homer threatens the disobedient to the laws of the gods in severe terms. After mentioning some minor punishments he then proceeds—

"Oh far, oh far from steep Olympus thrown,
Low in the dark Tartarean gulf shall groan,
With burning chains fix'd to the brazen floors,
And lock'd by hell's inexorable doors;
As deep beneath th' infernal centre hurl'd
As from the centre to th' ethereal world,
Let him who tempts me, dread those dire abodes
And know th' Almighty is the God of Gods."

ACHERON (page 108), a river of Thesprotia, in Epirus, falling into the Bay of Ambracia. Homer called it, from the dead appearance

of its waters, one of the rivers of hell, and the fable has been adopted by all succeeding poets, who make the god of the stream to be the son of Ceres without a father, and say that he concealed himself in hell for fear of the Titans, and was changed into a bitter stream, over which the souls of the dead are at first conveyed. It receives, say they, the souls of the dead, because a deadly langour seizes them at the hour of dissolution.

ACHERUSIA (page 108), a lake of Egypt, near Memphis, over which, as Diodorus mentions, the bodies of the dead were conveyed and received sentence according to the actions of their life. The boat was called *Baris*, and the ferryman *Charon*. Hence arose the fable of *Charon* and the *Styx*, &c., afterwards imported into Greece by *Orpheus*, and adopted in the religion of the country. There was a river of the same name in Epirus, and another in Italy and Calabria.

STYGIAN-LAKE (page 109), one of the infernal lakes whose waters are said to possess a deadly influence. The river *Styx* was supplied from the waters of this Lake. Those who drank of these waters died instantly. It also corroded and wasted iron and copper, and broke all manner of vessels that were put into it. Some think that *Antipator* poisoned *Alexander the Great* with this water.

PYRIPHLEGETHON (page 109), flaming with fire. It is the name of one of the rivers in the lower world. See *Homer's Odyssey*.

COCYTUS (page 109), a river of Epirus. The word is derived from to weep and to lament. Its etymology, the unwholesomeness of its waters, and, above all, its vicinity to the *Acheron*, have made the poets call it one of the rivers of hell, hence *Cocytia virgo*, applied to *Alecto*, one of the *furies*.

ÆSCULAPIUS (page 118), son of *Apollo*, by *Coronis* or, as some say, by *Lariassa*, daughter of *Phlegias*, was god of medicine. After his union with *Coronis* *Apollo* set a crow to watch her, and was soon informed that she admitted the caresses of *Ischys* of *Æmonia*. The god, in a fit of anger, destroyed *Coronis* with lightning, but saved

the infant from her womb, and gave him, to be educated, to *Chiron*, who taught him the art of medicine. Some authors say that *Coronis* left her father to avoid the discovery of her pregnancy, and that she exposed her child near *Epidaurus*. *Æsculapius* was physician to the *Argonauts*, and considered so skillful in the medicinal power of plants, that he was called the inventor as well as the god of medicine. He restored many to life, of which *Pluto* complained to *Jupiter*, who struck *Æsculapius* with thunder, but *Apollo*, angry at the death of his son, killed the *Cyclops* who made the thunderbolts. *Æsculapius* received divine honours after death, chiefly at *Epidaurus*, *Pergamus*, *Athens*, *Smyrna*, &c. Goats, bulls, lambs, and pigs, were sacrificed on his altars, and the cock and the serpent were sacred to him.

Æsculapius was represented with a large beard, holding in his hand a staff, around which was wreathed a serpent; his other hand was supported on the head of a serpent. Serpents are more particularly sacred to him, not only as the ancient physicians used them in prescriptions; but because they were the symbols of prudence and foresight, so necessary in the medical profession. He married *Epione*, by whom he had two sons, famous for their skill in medicine, *Machaon* and *Podalirius*, and four daughters, of whom *Hygeia*, goddess of health, is the most celebrated. Some have supposed that he lived a short time after the Trojan war.

DELPHI (page 119), a town of Phocia, situated in a valley at the south-west side of Mount *Parnassus*. It was also called *Pytho*, because the serpent *Python* was killed there, and it received the name of *Delphi* from *Delphus*, the son of *Apollo*. Some have also called it *Parnassia Napa*, the Valley of *Parnassus*. It was famous for a temple of *Apollo*, and for an oracle celebrated in every age and country. The place was revered, and the temple was erected in honour of *Apollo*, and a city built. According to some accounts *Apollo* was not the first who gave oracles there, but *Terra*, *Neptune*, *Themis*, and *Phoebe*, were in possession of the place before the son of *Latona*. The oracles were generally given in verse, but when it has been sarcastically observed that the god and patron of poetry was the most imperfect poet in the world, the priests delivered her answers in prose. The oracles were always delivered by a

priestess called Pythia. The temple was built and destroyed several times. It was customary for those who consulted the oracle to make rich presents to the god Delphi, and no monarch distinguished himself more by his donations than Cressus.

This sacred repository of opulence was often the object of plunder, and the people of Phocis seized ten thousand talents from it, and Nero carried away no less than five hundred statues of brass, partly of the gods and partly of the most illustrious heroes. In another age Constantine the Great removed its most splendid ornaments to his new capital. It was universally believed and supported by the ancients that Delphi was in the middle of the earth, and on that account it was called *Terræ umbilicus*.

CHÆREPHON (page 119), a disciple and friend of Socrates, is said by Xenophon to have attended his instructions for the sake of the moral advantage to be derived from them, and to have exemplified in his practice his master's precepts. From the several notices of him in Xenophon and Plato he appears to have been a man of very warm and excitable feelings, with a spirit of high and generous emulation, and of great energy in everything that he undertook. He it was that inquired of the Delphic oracle who was the wisest of men, and received the famous and well-known answer. The frequent mention of him in Aristophanes shows that he was highly distinguished in the school of Socrates. It appears that he injured his health by intense application to study. He attached himself to the popular party in politics, and hence was driven into banishment by the thirty tyrants; but returned to Athens on the restoration of democracy. He died before Socrates.

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
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
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
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