CHAPTER III

INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA ON POETIC BLEMISHES

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III.1 Concept of Poetic Blemishes

In the Alankāraśāstra an important place is given to the treatment of poetic blemishes (kavyadosas). Almost all the prominent Alankarikas beginning from Bharata have dealt with the nature and types of bkemishes which are definitely to be avoided in the literary compositions because they mar the aesthetic beauty of poetry. Dosas, are, therefore, very rightly defined as the causes of diminution(apakarsa) of kavya.¹ The absence of dosa is counted by Bhoja as the first condition which makes an utterance fit to be called kavya.2 Among the four poetical relations of sabda and artha the first is the avoidance of dosas (dosahana). Only after taking due care to avoid all flaws a poet can think of emblishing his speech with excellences. Emphasising on the avoidance of dosas in kavya, Bhamaha states that nobody is enjoyed by scriptures to write poetry under compassion or coersion or punishment, but to be a bad poet is declared by the wise to be death itself. Similarly, Dandin observes that one should not make even an insignificant blemish in a poem as a handsome body may cause disgust on account of a single leprous spot." Even the poeticians like Mammata explicitly

and others like Viśvanātha and Jagannātha implicitly advocate the rejection of blemishes in the definitions of kāvya.

Generally the poetic blemishes are classified under d different headings such as padadosas, vakyadosas, rasadosas etc. But all these <u>dos</u>as can be classified as shown by V.Raghavan under the following heads⁵:

1. Grammatical

2. Literary

3. Logical

A thorough examination of the concept of poetic blemishes reveals the fact that poeticians have emphasised upon the logical aspect of <u>śabda</u>, <u>artha</u> and their relations. As a result it is found that some of the faults are based on breach of logical doctrines and concepts of Nyāyašāstra. All those <u>dos</u>as which seem to have been influenced by Nyāyašāstra are discussed in the following pages.

III.2 <u>Bharata's Treatment, Poetic Blemishes</u>

In the literature of Sanskrit poetics, Bharata's NS is known to be the oldest extant work dealing with the concepts of poetics. Therefore, an examination of the concept of <u>dosa</u> should begin with Bharata's treatment of it. Bharata's chief concern being dramaturgy and the techniques to be employed in the composition of drama for stage performance he deals with various ways and modes of expressions, which add beauty, force and dignity to the speech.⁶ As defective expressions detracts from the beauty of verbal and formal aspects of poetry, he, therefore, has taken note of blemishes which are to be avoided by the dramatists. The list of blemishes propounded by Bharata appears to be the oldest formulation of the concept and later writers have made it their starting point. Bharata enumerates ten blemishes in poetic composition.⁷ They are as follows:

 <u>Gudhārtha</u> (circumlocution)2. <u>Arthāntara</u> (superfluous expression) 3. <u>Arthahīna</u> (devoid of meaning) 4. <u>Bhinnārtha</u> (defective significance) 5. <u>Ekārtha(tautology) 6. Abhiplutā-</u> <u>rtha</u> (elliptical expression) 7. <u>Nyāyādapeta</u> (logical lapse)
<u>Visama</u> (unevenness of metre) 9. <u>Visandhi(hiatus)</u>
<u>Sabdacyuta</u> (grammatical impurity).

Of these, the five <u>dosas</u>, viz., <u>Gudhārtha</u>, <u>Arhtāntara</u>, <u>Arthahīna</u>, <u>Ekārtha</u> and <u>Nyāyādapeta</u> are more important from our point of view. The following analysis will show how all these dosas are formulated on the basis of the logical defects enumerated in the NyS.

1, Gudhartha

<u>Gudhartha</u> is defined by Bharata as 'paryāyaśabdābhihita'. It occurs when the meaning becomes hidden wwing to the use of synonymous words. Bhāmaha does not difine this <u>dosa</u>. But he says :

गुढशब्हाभिधानं च न प्रयोज्यं मधञ्चन । सुधियामपि नैवेद्रमुपकाराय कल्पने ॥ (KA. I. 45)

The use of difficult words with a hidden meaning is a defect. <u>Kavya</u> with such an expression fails to appeal to a connoiseur who finds difficulty in appreciating its beauty. For examples

असितर्तिनुगरि, च्छिन्स्वः भितां पतिरद्विह्क ।

अमिट्नि: शुभ्रह्म्हट्टेंद्विंग जेध्नीयिपीद्ध न: ॥ (ка. I. 46) (May the son of fire destroy your foes entirely by his white and terrible glances , he, who is the piercer of mountain and lord of the inhabitants of <u>svarga</u> and is possessed of more than two eyes.)

The unusual, and therefore, difficult usages are to be explained as follows.

(a) <u>asitarati</u>, he who has a black (<u>asita</u>)path(<u>rti</u>)-Fire, his son (<u>tuc</u>) is lord Skanda.

(b) <u>adricchit-piercer</u> (<u>chit</u>)of a mountain (<u>adri</u>) (c)<u>svahksitam patih-the lord (pati)of the dwellers (ksitam</u>) of heaven (<u>svah</u>). He is the commander of the army of gods. (d)<u>advidrk-not having two (dvi</u>)eyes (<u>drk</u>); hence, many eyed may destroy again and again (jeghiyāt) your enimies (<u>vah</u> <u>dvisah</u>)with his fearful (<u>Amidbhih</u>) and white (<u>subhra</u>) glances (<u>drsta</u>).

Here the meaning is understood with the great labour. Bhāmaha's <u>Gudhaśabdābhidhāna</u> may be compared with Gautama's <u>Avijnātārtha</u> (Uninteligible statement), one of the <u>nigraha</u> - <u>stānas</u> propounded by the Naiyāyikas of the Akṣapāda school. It is defined by Gautama⁹ as the argument which is not understood by the audience or by the opponent toough it is repeated ()

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three times. Disputant being opposed by a stronger opponent tries to hide his inability to defend himself by using words with double meaning, or of uncommen use, or which are too quickly uttered to be intelligible. For example <u>sveto dhavati</u>, It means a white animal runs. But if a persion uses it in the sense of a dog runs away from here(<u>sva ito dhavati</u>), he commits this defect. In this blemish meaningful but uninteligible words are uttered.

From the above point of view Bhāmahás example() of <u>Gudhaśabdābhidhāna</u> may be taken as a case because it contaans uninteligible words which are not in commen use. Raghavan rightly remarks:

The second of these, apratitaśabda (one of the causes of avijnātārta as given by Vātsyāyana in Mana Nyāyabhāsya is met with in Alankāraśāstra.

It is akin to Bhāmahas Gudhasabdābhidhāna.

2.Arthantara

<u>Arthantara</u> is defined by Bharata as:<u>avar@yam varnyate</u> <u>12</u> <u>yatra tadarthantaramisyate</u> i.e. when anything not to the point is described it constitutes the fault called <u>Arthantara</u>. This is regarded so because it is uncalled for description. It expressly states what is implicitly contained in the essential nature of the subject. Bharata does not give an example of it. Abhinavagupta gives the following example:

चिन्तामाहमनङ्गमङ्ग तनुते विप्रेक्षितं सुभुव: । (P.331)

(The beautiful() lady's look spreads indded love as well as anxiety and stupor)

Here the mention of anxiety and stupor is not to the point. Love includes these states of mind and therefore they are understood. There is no need of its special <u>mention</u> in the verse. Though the above statement is not non-sensical it is certainly illogical.

The influence of the Nyāyaśāstra can be observed here. Arthāntara is one of the nigrahasthānas of the Naiyāyikas.

प्रकृताद्घीद अप्रतिसंबद्धार्थमधीहतरम् । (\underline{v} . 2.7) Vātsyāyana says that one gets defeated in an intellectual debate if he falls a pry to this flaw of irrelevant digression. He gives a humorous illustration of this flaw. If one has to prove <u>dntyatva</u> of <u>sabda</u> he should give a valid <u>hetu</u> which can prove it. But instead of giving a <u>hetu</u> in support of his proposition if he derives the word <u>hetu</u>' from its root, points out the <u>pratyaya</u> and shows how it is a <u>krdantapada</u> and then proceeds to give various kinds of <u>padas</u>, he commits the flaw of <u>Arthāntara</u>.¹³ Bharata's concept of <u>Arthāntara</u> seems to be identical with the concept of Gautama's nigrahasthāna.

3. Arthahina

Arthahina is defined by Bharata as :

अर्धहीन त्वसंबद्धं सावद्येषार्धमेव-य ।

Bhāmaha calls it Apārthaka and defines as :

समुरायार्थश्रन्यं यत्तरपार्थकमिल्यते ।

दोडिमानि देशपुपा: पडित्याट्रि त्रथाट्निम् ॥ (KA. IV. 8) It occurs when the combination as a whole is devoid of meaning. There is not a single harmonious meaning inherent in all padas of a verse. The incoherence is of two types Viz., incoherent words and incoherent sentences. Ten pomegranates, six cakes, goat's skin, lump of meat are examples of inherent words (<u>pada-apārthaka</u>) 'A person rice in a tank eating goes and bathing', is an example of incoherent sentence (vākya-apārthaka).

Apăr<u>mhaka</u> also is a <u>nigrahasthāna</u> in Gautama's philosophy. According to Gautama, <u>Apārthaka</u> is an argument of which words or sentences are combinded without any syntactical order and do not convey any connected meaning.¹⁵ The example of <u>padaapārthaka</u> is straightway taken from Vātsyāyana's NBh; in fact Bhāmaha clearly referring to Vātsyāyana since the example is verbatim from Vātsyāyana, and again as is clear from his words '<u>ityādi yathoditam</u>'. We should also note, however, that the two types of <u>Arthahīna</u> that of <u>pada</u> and of <u>vākya</u> are not mentioned in the <u>Bhāsya</u>; they are introduced by Bhāmaha himself. Dandin follows Bhāmaha in this manner.

4. Ekartha (Tautology)

It is defined by Bharata as 'avisesabhidhanam yat'." This fault occurs when indiscriminative use of many words for a single p(rpose is made. Abhinavagupta cites an example

of this defect as : कुन्द्रेयु हारहरहाससित (यशस्त)।¹⁷ (your fame is white like the kunda flower, the moon, the garland of pearls and the laughter of Siva).

In this example, all words have practically one and the same purport. Any one simile would have been enough. Each simile here serves the same purpose and hence tatulogy has occured. Since 'yasah' is regarded a to be white in poetic convention and <u>hasa</u> is also regarded white, it consits of re-duplication of the same idea without adding anything new or special to the sense.

It is significant to note that Gautama in his NyS speakes of <u>Punarukta</u> as a <u>nigrahasthāna</u>.¹⁸ Bharata's <u>Ekārtha</u> may be similar with Gautama's Punarukta. Raghavan rightly remarks:

Punarmikta is very well-known and is seen as Ekartha in Bharata.

Bhāmaha also borrows from Bharata the concept of the <u>doşa</u> called Ekārtha. He defines it as:

यदभिन्नार्धमन्ये। न्यँ तदेकार्धं प्रचक्षते । पुनरत्कमिट्टं प्राहुरन्ये शब्दार्धभेट्रत: ॥ ($kA \cdot V \cdot 12$) (when statements convey the same meaining as stated before, it is a fault called <u>Ekartha</u>.

Bharata does not give any divisions of it while Bhamaha divides it into those of <u>sabda</u> and <u>artha</u>. He does not exemplify

<u>śabda-ekārtha</u> and calls it <u>sthula</u> (obvious). He further notes that repetition is not a defect if the same word is repeated under the influence of fear, sorrow, jealously etc., e.g. '<u>gaccha gaccha</u>'. He gives the example of the second type as follows:

तामुत्कमनर्सं नूनं करोति ध्वनिरम्भसाम् । साधेषु धनमुक्तानां प्रणालीमुरवपातिनाम् ॥ (ка. 🗹 16)

(The sound reproduced by the rain falling from the clouds on the foof of the house and discharging through the mouth of spouts renders her anxious)

Here the word '<u>utka</u>' includes the meaning of '<u>manas</u>' in its own meaning and so the use of the word '<u>manas</u>' is futile.

It is important to mote that Bhāmaha identifies <u>Ekārtha</u> with <u>Purarukta</u>. He says : <u>punaruktam idam prahur'anye</u>'. To whome does he refer by 'anye' is not clear. At least, Bharata does not call if '<u>punarukta</u>'. It could be some other poetician prior to him whose work is now lost or it could also possibly be the NBh of Vātsyāyana since in his treatment of <u>Apārtha</u> and <u>Vyartha</u> he has alluded to it, and the two faults of <u>Vyāghāta</u> and <u>Punarukta</u> eccur in the NBh together in the same sutra.

Dandin and Vāmana also follow in the foot steps of Bhāmaha. But, Mammața calls it <u>Punarukta</u>. He, however, before treating this coșa, treats another doșa mamed <u>Anavikrta</u> which

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has a close similarity with that of <u>Punerukta</u>. It is a repetition of the same set of words or phrases without giving some variation through turns of expression. For example:

प्राप्ता: स्रिय: सकरूकामरुधास्तत: किं दत्तं पद्दं शिरसि विद्विषतां तत: किम् । संतर्षिता: प्रणयिनां विभर्वेस्तत: किं कर्ल्यं स्थितं तनुभृतां तनुभिस्तत: किम् ॥ (KP. VII. P:393)

(All-affording wealth has been attained-so what? The foot has been placed on the head of teh enemy-so what? Friends have been fully supplied with riches-so what? The bodies of men have lasted for a whole cycle-so what?)

Here the frequent use, the repetition of 'tatah kim' is monotonous and it adds nothing new to the meaning,

This <u>doşa</u> corresponds to the <u>Artha-paunaruktya</u> as illustrated by Gautama and Vātsyāyana. V.Raghavan remarks:

Both Gautama and Vātsyāyana speak of <u>Sabda-puanaruktya</u> and <u>Artha-paunariktya</u>. The latter, illustrated by Vātsyāyana corresponds to what Mammata has given among his <u>Artha-dosas</u> as <u>Anavikrta</u>.

The Agnipurana(AP) in its 11th chapter of <u>Alankara</u>-section deals with <u>Punarukta</u>. In transferring the logical defect of punaruktata to the sphere of poetics the AP certainly follows

Bharata, Bhamaha, Dandin and even perhaps Vamana who all mention and define this fault under the name of Ekartha. The AP defines it as : ābhiksnyādabhidhānam. It means continued repetition (abhiksnasya bhavah). It is of two kinds : 1. Arthavrtti (the repetition of meaning) and 2. Padavrtti (repetition of words). Again, Arthavrtti is of two kinds: 1. Prayuktavarasabdena (use of a better word different from the used one) and 2. Sabdantarena (use of an altogether different word). In giving the above division of <u>Punarukta</u> AP differs from earlier poeticians and in this respect it seems to follow Gautama's division of Punarukta as given in the NyS. But it should be noted that the two disisions of Arthavrtti are found neither in the NyS nor in any other poetic work. And prayuktavarasabdena also does not appear to be different from padavrtti. Therefore C_{μ} in our present state of knowledge, nothing van be said either about the source of the AP's classification of Arthavrtti or about the classification itself.

Ruyyaka, the author of <u>Alańkārasarvasva</u>(ASS) defines and illustrates <u>Punarukta</u> in the context of <u>Punaruktavadābhāsa</u>. According to him <u>Punarukta</u> is of three types viz., <u>śabdapunarukta</u>, <u>arthapunarukta</u> and <u>śabdārthapunarukta</u>.²² But in the context of <u>lātānuprāsa</u> alańkāra he quotes the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama which is thedefinition of <u>Punarukta</u> Nigrahasthāna i.e. śabdārthyoh punarvacanam punaruktaman-

yatranuvadat. (NyS, V. 2.14)

Jayaratha, the commentator in his <u>Vimarșini</u> also identifies that <u>sutra</u> by giving the name of Aksapāda ahurityākṣapādāh.²³

5. <u>Nyāyādapeta</u>

The fault Nyāyādapeta occurs in a poetic expression or a sentence when it deviates from or is devoid of logical propriety. It is defined by Bharata as: pramānavarivarjitam²⁴ 'an expression) devoid of meaning'. Abhinavagupta divides it into two kinds: 1. <u>deśakālaviruddha(defying the limitation</u> of place and time) 2. <u>kalāśāstraviruddha(contradicting the</u> established notions of arts and sciences etc.). The example of the first type is :

सुवीरेल्वस्ति नगरी मथुरा नाम विश्रुता | अक्षीटनालिकेराव्या यस्या: पर्यन्तभूमय: ||(ABh.P.333) (There is a city called Mathura in Suvira (panjab) whose vicinities abound with oilnuts and coconuts).

Hereone observes lapse of logical propriety with reference to place. The city of Mathura is not situated in Panjab but in the Uttarapradeśa. This hows the writer's ignorance of Geography. Oilnuts grow in Kashmir and coconuts in the South India. Coconuts flourish in the regions adjacent to the sea and oilnuts in cold mountainous regions. Hence the above given statement is in conflict with Geographical and topographical data and suffers from the fault of Nyāyādapeta.

Abhinavagupta does not give any instance of the second type of this defect. But an example of it can be furnished if a Buddhist is represented as an upholder of the sould theory (<u>atmavada</u>) which is flagrantly inconsistent with his creed because the Buddhis ts never believe in the metaphisical reality of a person; or if a Naiyayika declares the objective woeld as an illusion like the Vijnanavadins.

This fault has been treated by the later poeticians by making a little modification. Bhāmaha treats it by the name <u>Nyāyavirodhi</u> but the word Nyāya according to him stands for Sāstra in general. While treating this fault Daṇḍin briefly deals with its dub-divisions an <u>deśa</u>, <u>kālā</u>, <u>kalā</u> and <u>lokaviruddha</u> and pays more attention to <u>hetuvidyā</u> (<u>nyāya</u>). According to him the term <u>Nyāya</u> means <u>hetuvidyā</u>. Later on the poeticians like Mammața and Viśvanātha treated this fault by using the term <u>Śāstraviruddha</u> or <u>Vidyāviruddha</u>. While treating this, Puñjarāja, the author of the <u>Śiśuprabodhakāvyālahkāra</u>, particularly gives an example of <u>Tarkaviruddha</u>-<u>doṣa</u> as follows:

यधार्धानुभवाइन्या प्रमा सेयँ ममोरिता । (p. 14) This sentence is incorrect from the Tatkasastra point of view for, according to Tarkasastra, <u>anubhava</u> is of two types:

yathārtha (valid) and ayathārtha(invalid). Yathārthaanubhava is called pramā. But here in this verse pramā is said to be different to be different from Yathārthānubhava and therefore is not reasonable. This shows Puñjārāja's knowledge of the Tarkaśāstra.

Above analysis of this fault makes it clear that from NS onwards, this <u>dosa</u> contineously recognised under the Nyāya influence. Bharata does not use the term <u>Nyāya</u> in a general sense of propriety etc., but in s seecial sense of <u>pramāna</u>. We, may, therefore, conclude that he and all the poeticians after him propound this <u>dosa</u> with the Nyāya principles in their mind. PV.Kane rightly remarks:

the discussions about logical matter in the province of poetry were started by Bharata. His <u>Nyāyādapeta</u> which is defined as '<u>pramānapari</u>-<u>varjitam</u>' is an example of this defect. The pramānas are the special province of logic.

III.3 Bhamaha's Treatment of Poetic Blemishes

Bhāmaha in his treatment of <u>kāvyadosas</u>, not only follows Bharata but also adds many more new faults to the list. He enumerates more <u>dos</u>as based on the Nyāyaśāstra than his successors. He not only just gives importance to the grammatical accuracy and aesthetic value of the word and

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sense in poetry but also endeavours to focus the light on the requirement of logical accuracy.

Of the seven <u>doşas</u> treated by him under the Nyāya influence viz., <u>GudhaśabdābhidhānaAyuktimat</u>, <u>Apārthaka</u>, <u>Vyartha</u>, <u>Ekārtha</u>, <u>Apakrama</u> and <u>Nyāyavirodhi</u>, <u>Gudhaśabdābhidhāna</u> <u>Apārthaka8Ekārtha</u> and <u>Nyāyavirodhi</u> are already discussed above. The meaning three are taken up here.

1. Ayuktimat

Ayuktimat occurs if a poet makes the cloud, theomoon, the wind, the beed, the bird etc., a messenger in poetry.

अयुक्तिमदाया दूता जित्तभून्मार्त्तेन्द्रव: । तथा भ्रमरहारीत चक्रवाकशुकाट्रय: ॥ (KA · I · 42) Such delineations do not fit in eith Reason, argues Bhāmaha, and suffer from the sense of impropriety. But if these are addressed by persons suffering from an excess of longing, it is not considered as a blemish. This device is adopted by the poets of outstanding genius. For example, Kālidāsa in his <u>Meghadūtam</u>, describes the cloud as messenger. But he, perhaps aware of this fault, supplies a rationale for it.

कामार्ना हि प्रकृतिकृपणाश्चितनाचेतनेषु | <u>Ayuktimat</u> may be translated as 'illogical'. The example given by Bhāmaha suggests that he emphasises extreme and empirical reality provable by pramānas only. He does bot approve of superficial imaginations which are contradictory to the pramānas. Similarly, Nyāyaśāstra also accepts the validity of the things wiich are cognised only by the pramānas, and asserts the falsity of others. From this point of view, then, Bhāmaha's <u>Ayuktimat</u> agrees with this concept of Nyāyaśāstra. It takes place only where the things presented in a poem cannot be proved by any valid means of knowledge.

2. Vyartha

This fault arises when the subsequent statements contradicts the previous one. He gives the following example:

सरिव मान प्रिये धीह तस्तुनामस्य मा गमः। अर्नुश्चन्द्रानुवनिन्य: प्रेम दनन्ति न हि स्त्रिय:॥_(кн.IU.10) (O friend! do show your anger towards your lover, do not become mild to him; women who follow the wishes of their husbands do not hamper their lover)

Here, the first statement 'manam dhehi' (show anger) and the second statement chandanuvartinyah (follower of husband's wishes) are opposed to each other.

It is significant ot note that this <u>Vyartha</u> of <u>Bhāmaha</u> may be compared with <u>Vyāghāta</u> of Gautama. The discussion of <u>Vyāghāta</u> takes place in the section of <u>Śabdapramāna</u> of NyS of Gautama where the <u>pūrvapakṣa</u> argues against the validity of the verbal knowledge because of its flaws as <u>anrta</u> (untruth), <u>vyāghāta</u>(discrepancy) and <u>punarukta</u>(tautology).²⁷ Vyāghāta is explained by Vātsyāyana as that between the enjoinments of two <u>mantras</u>. For instance, there are some <u>mantras</u> directing a person to offer oblation before or after sunrise or when the stars are shining and the sun is not visible. Regarding these three times for the oblations, there are corresponding deprecatory texts: oblations offered at three different times are eaten by different kinds of dogs. The simple answer to this accusation is that once a person has agreed to offer an oblation at a certain time, the time that he has accepted ahould not be altered. The texts in question are meant to carry disapproval of alteration in the procedure already adopted. From this point of view Bhāmaha's <u>Vyartha</u> seems to be identical with the <u>Vyāghāta</u> of Daņdin. Dandin follows Bhāmaha in treating this <u>doṣa</u> by naming it Pūrvāpara-viruddha.

3. Apakrama

This fault occurs due to the reversal of the order of the statement (krama). Since syntactical regularity demands that the things attributed should follow the order of the first statements, violation of this regularity results in the defect called Apakrama.

For example:

विरधानौ किरीटेन्ट्र श्यामाभूडिनसच्छवी। स्थाडुःशू बिभाणा पाना वः शम्भुशार्डुःणा ॥ (ка. 11.21)

(May Siva and Vișnu who carry the crown and the moon, who have splendour of a black cloud and a snow like lustre, who

carry the disc and a triedent, protect you)

Here the <u>dharmas</u> should have been mentioned in the same order as their <u>dharmis</u> i.e. Siva and Visnu. But this order is violated and therefore it is a case of <u>Apakrama</u>. This fault may be compared with the <u>aparāptakālanigrhasthāna</u> of Gautama.²⁹ <u>Aprāptakāla</u> consists in stating the members of an inference in al illogical order. There is a definite order among the members of an ingerence: 1. <u>pratijnā</u> (preposition) 2. <u>hetu</u> (reason) 3. <u>udāharaņa</u>(example) 4. <u>upanaya</u>(application) and 5. <u>nigamana</u> (conclusion). The logical order among them conveys a connected meaning of the argument. If it is reversed it cannot convey any connected meaning. Bhāmaha has taken up the words of Vātsyāyana such as <u>viprayāsa</u> and <u>krama</u> to explain his concept of <u>Apakrama</u>.³⁰ For this <u>doşa</u> there is an agreement in the concept as well as expression of Bhāmaha and Dandin.

Apart from the treatment of faults as shown above Bhāmaha also expalins the <u>pratijnāhinādidosas</u> which are purely logical faults. He has definitely borrowed the concepts from Nyāya treatises. The <u>pratijnā</u> (proposition) is the most important feature of <u>anumānavākya</u>. Bhāmaha first of all explains the defects of the <u>pratijnā</u> (an <u>avayava</u> of syllogistic statement). It consists of a statement in which a subject (<u>paksa</u>) is already known specifically to both the parties in a discussion and a predicate in a specific form

is proposed to be established in the subject.³¹ In other words it is in the form of a definite proposition. Its chiof purpose is to bring about a definite knowledge of the paksa as such or what is proposed to be proved as having a <u>sādhya</u>. Gautama in his NyS defines <u>pratijnā</u> as <u>sādhyanirdeśa</u>.³² But Bhāmaha defines <u>pratijañā</u> as a statement of <u>pakṣa</u> in which <u>dharmi</u> and its dharma are present.

Bhāmaha explains all the six varieties of pratijnanosas with the examples as follows:

(1) <u>Tadarthavirodhini</u>: It is the proposition which contradicts its own meaning. In other words it is a self-contradictory statement. Example: 고디다 데다리다귀리고한가?귀: | (My father is a celibate monk from his chilhood and I am his legitimate (aurasa) son).

(2) <u>Hetuvirodhini</u>: The proposition contradicted by its reason (<u>hetu</u>). It is illustrated by a case which is a subject of dispute.

Example:

अरुन्यात्मा प्रकृतिर्वति ज्ञैया हेन्वपवार्दिनी। धर्मिणोडस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्तद्धर्मीडपि न सेन्स्यनि॥ शाइवतीडशाश्वीती वैति प्रसिद्धे धर्मिणि धर्नौ । जायते भेदविषया विवादे वादिनार्मिथ:॥ (KA V.14816)

Here the proposition wether the soul is existent or the <u>Prakrti</u> is a <u>hetuvirodhini-pratijñā</u>. Since in the above proposition <u>dharmi</u> (<u>atmā</u> or <u>prakrti</u>) is not established, its <u>dharma</u> cannot also be established. Here in the given proposition both <u>dharmi</u> and <u>dharma</u> are unestablished in the absence of proof.

3. <u>Svasiddhäntavirodhini</u> - the proposition which contradicts one's own siddhänta.

Example: काणभूआ यथा श्राब्स्मानावन्द्रवरम । According to the Vaiśesika school of Kaṇāda, <u>śabda</u> is <u>anitya</u>. But if a proposition like <u>śabdah</u> nityah (sound is eternal) is made by a Vaiśesika, that will be <u>svasiddhāntavirodhini</u>pratijnā because the later contradicts the former.

4. <u>Sarvāgamavirodhini</u> - the proposiion which is contradicted by all the Sastras.

Example: यथा द्याचिस्तनुस्त्रीण प्रमाणानि न सन्ति ना $(KA \cdot \underline{V} \cdot B)$ This is illustrated by the contradiction of a position which is universally accepted. The proposition like the body is pure' is in contradiction with the assertion with all the schools of philosophy. Similarly the assertion that there are no pramānas is a case in point.

5. <u>Prasiddhadharmavirodhini</u> - the proposition which is contradicted by its excessive popularity. Example: \widehat{AITJIE} ETERIE (KA. \overline{V} . 19) What it accepted by all and not subject of doubt does not require an express statementt.

6. <u>Pratyaksabadhini</u> - the proposition which is contradicted by direct perception.

Example: 고액 회귀리도 귀 귀두지 주먹거든이: 움믹마구: ! (KA·꼬·2) The statements like fire is cool, moon is hot are contradicted by direct perception.

According to Bhāmaha there should not be an absence of any member like <u>hetu</u> etc., in the <u>Pratijnāvākya</u> because it leads to the defective <u>anumāna</u>.

<u>Duşanābhāsa</u> (illusion of fault), according to Bhāmaha, are called <u>jāti</u> and they are numerable and therefore not explained by him_{-1}^{34}

The foregoing discussion of <u>pratinjā</u> etc., says Bhāmaha, is useful in the poems which are Śāstra-like in nature.³⁵ But in other <u>kāvyas</u>, <u>Pratijñā</u> etc., of different types occur. Because poetry depends on worldly experience and Śāstras () depend on truth. A poet cannot be bound when he composes a general <u>kāvya</u> but he has to follow the rules of the Śāstras when he specially compses <u>śāstrakāvyas</u>. Bhāmaha gives definition of other types of <u>pratijňā</u> etc., i.e. the undertaking of desired task which are likely to occur in <u>kāvyas</u> based on wordly experience (<u>lokāśritakāvyas</u>). It is of four types as the desired task pertains to <u>dharma</u>, <u>artha</u>, <u>kāma</u> and <u>lopa</u>.

About the nature of hetu Bhāmaha says that in poetry

too <u>hetu</u> has three aspects as in Śāstra. <u>Anumāna</u> is based on <u>anvaya</u>(agreement) and <u>vyatireka</u>(difference). Bhāmaha also gives the example of it the analysis of which can be made in the form of sādhya and <u>sādhana</u>.

यथाऽभिता वनाभागमेतरस्ति महत्सरः।

कूजनात्कुररीणाञ्च कमतानाञ्च सौरभान् ॥(KA. T. 48) Here the existence of pond is known by the kujana of <u>kurari</u> and fragrance of lotuses. The <u>anumāna</u> may be put in the following form: वना भोनी महत्सरः अस्ति कुररीणां कूजनात्, कमतानां सौरभात न्य ।

Here, vanabhoge is paksa, mahatsarah asti is sādhya and kujana and <u>saurabha</u> are <u>sādhanas</u> or <u>hetus</u> by which the existence of saras in the forest is inferred.

Even in the stock example 'parvato vahniman dhumat' this depends on the inevitable relation between <u>sadhya</u> and <u>sadhana</u>. The smoke seen in the sky is instrumental in effecting the inference of the fire only in athe mountain. In poetry sometimes reason is not distinctly stated from <u>sadhya</u> and the latter is established even without positive and negative concomitance.

The <u>hetu</u> in poetry is also liable to be vitiated by the three defects which violates the triple character of probans (<u>hetu</u>) in the Nyāya logic. Bhāmaha gives several examples of these defects which arise due to ignorance of doubt or false knowledge or the person concerned. Thus the statement : angn Ezerri Ezerri argrar argrar Arr $\operatorname{Ar$

This is a wrong statement because the <u>kasa</u> has no fragrance. It is an evidence of the ignorance of the speaker. The poetic reason as stated above i.e. fragrance of flower, is absent in the <u>paksa</u>. All these are to be understood as harmful or injurious on account of their vicinity to water. Thas gives rise to doubt as it is not an established fact that all things which grow in the neighbourhood of water are harmful. Another statement, certainly this is <u>cakora</u> because it has white corners in the eyes, is based on false knowledge, for the <u>cakora</u> bird is known for red corners in its eyes. So this statement, gives false information as the <u>hetu</u>, "white corners" is falsely attributed to the bird.³⁶

The <u>drstanta</u> or <u>Udaharana</u> consists in stating a parallel to the subject. Bhāmaha does not illustrate it. The kitchen in which smoke and fire are found together is cited as an example for inferring fire in the hill on the basis of smoke observed in it.

Bhāmaha than refutes the contention that sim[le] is a case of inference. There is no statement of <u>hetu</u> in simile. The statements of probans (<u>sādhana</u>) and probandum(<u>sādhya</u>) is only appropriate in the cases already noticed. The face is like a lotus is the case of simile without reference to <u>sādhana</u> and <u>sādhya</u>. The simile above stated is entirely different from the following statement.

इति प्रयोगंरूय यथा कलावपि भवानिह ।

श्रैयान्तृ द्वानु शिष्ट्रानान्पूर्व कार्त्तयुजी यथा ॥ (KA. V. 57) (You are pre-eminent even in this fallen sage. Just as you have been taught by man of superior intellect and wisdom; just as people were in the older age(krtayuga)).

Here one comes across a <u>hetu</u> and <u>sādhya</u> along with an example. But all the examples are not illustrative of concomitance of <u>hetu</u> and sādhya.

भरतरूवं दिकीपरूवं त्वमेवेंक: पुरुरवाः । त्वमेव वीर प्रयुग्नरूवमेव नरवाहन: ॥(KA. I. 59)

The conclusion that particular king possesses certain qualities is not possible somply on account of the example as the relation of <u>sadhya</u> and <u>sadhana</u> is not present. The use of the example(drstanta) alone results in neyartha dosa.

Thus Bhāmaha almost devotes his entire fifth chapter on the discussion of the logical defects with the regard to <u>anumāna</u> and its related matter. The discussess various kinds of doşas pertaining to <u>anumāna</u>. This shows his deep knowledge of Nyāya philosophy especially logical and epistemology as well as his great gemius in relating the topics of logic with poetics. He seems to be profoundly influenced by the Nyāya system of logic in postulating the doctrine of poetic blemishes. To which Nyāya system he adheres to will be discussed in the chapter on Buddhist Logic.

Dandin closely follows Bhāmaha in treating the poetic blemishes. So his treatment is not specially discussed here. As far as the <u>pratijňāhīnādidoşas</u> (logical faults) are concerned he does not follow Bhāmaha and shows his independence of mind in rejecting them.. He makes a cursory reference to it for its outright condemnation and says " the deliberation whether the defect of <u>pratijňā</u>, <u>hetu</u> and <u>drstānta</u> is a flaw or not (in poetry) is almost tough" what is the good of pursuing it?³⁸ Vāmana also follows Dandin in leaving the blemishes of <u>Pratijňā</u>hetu-drstānta-hīnadosas out.

Similarly, we do not find something concrete in the treatement of Bhoja so we have left him. But he in his Śr.P deals with <u>virodha</u>, one of the <u>vākyadoşas</u>. He classifies it into <u>pratyakṣavirodha</u>, <u>anumānavirodha</u> and <u>āgamavirodha</u>. Under <u>anumānavirodha</u> he includes Bhāmha's <u>pratijnāhīnādisoda</u>s³⁹

III.4 Treatment of Poetic Blemishes in the Kalpalataviveka


Chronologicllly, AP's treatment of <u>doşas</u> should follow that of Bhāmaha but since the treatment of the anonymous

author of <u>Kalpalatāviveka</u> is very close and complimentary to the one of Bhāmaha we here put aside the cronology cal order as an exception and deal with Kalpalatāviveka first.

Bhamaha's treatment of <u>Anumāna</u> and poetic blemishes like <u>Pratijňāhinādi</u> hasee exerted profound influence on <u>Kalpalatāviveka</u>, a valuable work on Sanskrit Poetics. The <u>Viveka</u> is a subcommentary on the <u>Pallava</u>, a commentary on the <u>Kalpalatā</u>. The author of the <u>Kalpalatā</u> and <u>Pallava</u> is Ambaprasada, the chief minister of Siddharāja Jaisimha (1094-1143A.D.) of Patana (Gujarat). The author of the <u>Viveka</u> is not known.

Kalpalatā is divāded into four chapters viz., Dosadaršana, Guņavivecana, Šabdālańkāradaršana and Arthālańkāradaršana. Since the treatment of dosa is the most important topic of the work it devotes a compl£te chapter constituting nearly half of the entire work and gives it a prime place. Viveka largely follows Mammata in his treatment of dosas and classifies them into four varities viz.padadosa, vākyadosa, arthadosa and rasadosa. Accordingly the first paricceda is divided into four sub- sections of the same names. Since padadosas,, vākyadosas ænd rasadosas don't reveal any influence of Nyāya only other dosas would be of direct intrest to our purpose.

Under the arthadosas the <u>Viveka</u> comprehensively discusses some logical faults and closely follows Bhāmaha regarding () pratijnāhinādidosas and explainspresent them as follows:



After pratijnadosas, the Vivekakara deals with <u>hetudosas</u>. Bhamaha also has dealt with them, but he did not give illustrations whereas <u>Vivekakara</u> does. The divisions of hetudosas as given by the Vivekakara are as follows:

A <u>hetu</u> must have three aspects viz., <u>pakṣasattva</u>, <u>sapakṣasattva</u> and <u>vipakṣasattva</u>. If a <u>hetu</u> is deficient in any one or more or all of them it becomes defective. When a <u>hetu</u> is deficient in one of the aspects three <u>hetvābhāsas</u> viz. <u>sādharaņa-anaikāntika</u>, <u>asādhāraņa-anaikantika</u> and <u>asidha</u> arise. When it is deficient in two aspects three other <u>hetvābhāsas</u> viz. <u>viruddha</u>, <u>asiddha-sādharaņa-anaikāntika</u> and <u>asiddhasādhāraņa</u> arise. When the <u>hetu</u> is deficient in all the three aspects another <u>hetvābhāsa</u> viz. <u>asiddha-viruddha</u> arises. Thus there are seven <u>hetvābhāsa</u>s which are illustrated and explained in the <u>Viveka</u> (pp.60-61)as follows: 1.विरुद्ध :निन्य: शब्द: कुनकत्वान् | Here the <u>hetu</u>, 'being a product' is not present in the similar case (<u>ākāša</u>) and also in the

dissimilar case (ghata).

2. असिद्धासाधारणानैकाल्तिक: निन्य: शब्द: मृत्तिवात् | Here the <u>hetu</u>, 'having limitedly extended body', is absent in the <u>paksa</u> (<u>sábda</u>) as well as present in <u>vipaksa(ghatādi</u>) and also in sapaksa(paranvādi).

3. असिद्धासाधारण: - निन्य: शब्द: अप्रमेथन्वान् | Here the <u>hetu</u>, 'not being cognisable' is absent both in the <u>paksa</u> (<u>sabda</u>) and the <u>sapaksa</u> (<u>paramānvādi</u>) amd also from the <u>vipaksa(ghatādi</u>) 4. साधारणानैकान्तिक :- अनित्य: शब्द : अमूतेत्वात् | Here, the <u>hetu</u> 'not having limitedly extended body' is present in <u>paksa</u> (<u>sabda</u>), sapaksa(buddhi) and in the vipaksa(<u>ākāśa</u>).

5. असाधारणानेकाल्तिक: - अनित्य: शब्द्र: आवणन्तान्|Here the hetu, 'being apprehended by the sense of qudition', is present in (<u>śabda</u>) and absent in both the <u>vipakṣa(ākāśa</u>) and the <u>sapakṣa</u> (<u>ghaṭa</u>) For <u>śravaṇatva</u> belongs to sound alone, according to Bauddhas, though according to Kaṇāda it belongs to genus (sāmānya) also.

6. असिद्ध: - अनित्य: शब्द: न्याभुषत्वात् । Here, the <u>hetu</u> being perceived by vision is present in <u>sapaksa(ghata)</u> and absent in vipaksa(paramānvādi) and the paksa(<u>śabda</u>).

7. असिद्ध विरुद्ध: - अनित्य: शब्द्ध: अकृतकात्वीत् । Here, the <u>hetu</u> not being a product is present neither in the <u>paksa</u> (<u>sábda</u>) nor in the <u>sapaksa(ghațādi</u>) but on the contrary present in the <u>vipaksa(ākāsa</u>). Hence it is deficient in all the three aspects whereas the first three of the above are deficient in two aspects and the next three in one.

Thereafter, the <u>Viveka</u> explains and classifies the drstantadosas which are presented in a tabular form as follows:

1. <u>Sādhyavikala</u>: <u>Drstānta</u> becomes defective when it is devoid of <u>sādhya</u> e.g. शब्दोडनित्य: अमूतत्वात् आकाशवन् । Here the sādhya is absent in the <u>Drstānta</u> which is <u>nitya</u>. 2. Sādhanavikala : If dṛṣṭānta is devoid of sādhana it becomes defective. e.g. शब्देाइनित्य: अमूनत्वान् घटवत् । Here the <u>sādhana</u> is absent in the dṛṣṭānta which is <u>murta</u>. 3. Ubhayavikala: If the dṛṣṭānta is devoid of both <u>sādhaya</u> and <u>sādhana</u> it becomes defective. e.g. शब्दाइनित्य: अमूनत्वान् परमाण्चन । Here neither the <u>sādhya</u> nor the <u>sādhana</u> is present in dṛṣṭānta which is nitya and <u>murta</u>.

From the above exposition of <u>Kalpalatāviveka</u>'s treatment of <u>arthadoşas</u> it is vlear that the <u>Vivekakāra</u> is closely following Bhāmaha and where Bhāmaha could enter into details or exemplification ot it, <u>Vivekakāra</u> fulfils that lacuna in a very able way. Bhāmaha tried to show by examples from wordly life like <u>bharatastvam</u> <u>dilipastvam</u> etc., or <u>yatirmamam</u> <u>pitā</u> etc., but did not give theoratical expalanations of it, <u>Vivekakāra</u> supplies the theoratic explanation of Bhāmaha's practical exposition and thas compliments his efforss.

III,5 Treatment of the Poetic Blemishes in the Agnipurana

The important feature in the treatment of poetic blemishes of the AP is that it touches upon <u>Hetvābhāsas</u> (logical fallacies) as <u>kāvyadosas</u>. The AP does not give any definition of <u>Hetvābhāsas</u> or <u>hetudosas</u> which are treated under the term '<u>hetvasamarthatā</u>'. I`t is defined as <u>istasādhanavyāghātānukāri</u> (an impediment to the accomplishment of the desired object, the ista being <u>anumiti</u> in the

case of <u>anumana</u>.⁴⁰ Though the AP does not explain a <u>hetu</u> becone <u>asamartha</u> in achieving its desired object because of the impediment standing on its way it may be explained as follows.

Example: parvatah dhumavan vahnimatvat

Here the <u>hetu vahnimattva</u> ia defective and therefore <u>asamartha</u> in producing <u>anumuti</u> i.e. the knowledge of smoke on the mountain it is because the <u>vyāpti yatra yatra vahni-</u> <u>mattvam tatra tatra dhūmavattvam</u> is not correct. As in the burning iron-ball (<u>tapta ayah golaka</u>) though <u>vahni</u> is present <u>dhūma</u> is not present. This <u>hetu</u> is <u>sopādhika</u> (endowed with an adjunct). Hence it is fallacious.

The AP gives eight varieties which are in fact the causes leading to hetvasamarthat \bar{a} as follows:

- 1. <u>Asiddha</u>(non-existent)
- 2. Viruddha (contradictory)
- 3. Anaikantika (inconclusive)
- 4. Satpartipaksa(antimonic)
- 8. <u>Vipaksasattva(presence in</u> vipaksa)

7. Sapaksasattva(absence in

6.Paksasattva(presence in

5. Kalatiaa(

paksa)

sapaksa)

As regards the first five varieties of <u>hetvasamarthatā</u> enumerated in the AP, Gautama(I.2.45) seems to be the source of the AP, though it differes from it in its order, and nomenclature. The Ap's Asiddha, Anaikāntika and Satpratipakṣa are synonyous with Gautama's Sādhysama, Savyavhicāra and Prakaraṇasama respectively. Gautama himself (1.2.46)explains Savyabhicāra as a`naikāntika. Gangeśopādhya (*2th century A.D.) inserts Satpratipakṣa and Asiddha for Gautama's Prakaraṇasama and Sādhyasama. Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana (16th centur yA.D.) in his NSM employs the terms similar to that of the AP viz. Anaikāntika, Viruddha, Asiddha, Pratipakṣa and Kālātyayāpadiṣta.⁴²

As regards the last three varieties, the AP obviously follows Bhāmaha who speaks about the three essential attributes of a <u>hetu viz.</u>, <u>pakṣasattva</u>, <u>sapakṣasattva</u> and <u>vipakṣāsattva</u> in the absence of which the reason becomes defective. The AP puts them forth in the reverse order, mamely, pakṣasattva, sapakṣasattva and vipakṣāsattva.

Thus on the basis of the above discussion it may be concluded that the author of AP reveals some influence of the Nyāya system and incorporates their logical doctrines in the form of <u>kāvyadoşa</u>. It is possible that they might have recieved this influence via Bhāmaha.

III.6 Mammata's Treatment of Poetic Blemishes

It is intpesting to deal with Mammata's method of presentation of poetic blemishes which reveals the Nyāya influence. He deals with them in the following order:

- 1. Padadoşas (blemishes of the word)
- 2. Padāmsadoşas (blemishes of the part of the word)
- 3. Vākyadosas (blemishes of the sentence)
- 4. Arthadosas(blemishes of the meaning)
- 5. Rasadosas (blemishes of the sentiment)

The important point here to note is that Mammata treats the padadosas first and then the padamsadosas. Generally the reverse order is expected. But in doing so he perhaps follows the technique called sangati (relevancy of sequence), which occupies a significant position in the Nyaya school as Mathurānātha in his commentary on the Vyaptipañcaka says nasangatam prayunjeta. The author of a work must first state his prayojana and discuss issues followed by tpical statement in a logical order. All scientific works should always be governed by logical consideration. The issues which logically arise from the previous statement should be discussed. The author must write in response to an actual or hypothetical question likely to be put to the student or the enquirer of truth for whose edification the book is written. All logically considered assertions are of the nature of answers to questions posed imliicitly or explicitly. The next assertion must ne such as could naturally satisfy that question. This is in nutshell the meaning of sangati.43

The logic treating the <u>padadoşas</u> first instead of <u>padāmsadisas</u> says Govinda Thakkura in his commentary, <u>Kāvyapradīpa</u> on NKP is the consideration of <u>sangati</u> and logical economy. The <u>padāmsadoşas</u> are p fewer in number and are identical with those of <u>padadoşas</u>. So after treating the <u>padadoşas</u> Mammata speaks of <u>padāmsadoşas</u> by way of extention (<u>atideśa</u>). This constitutes economy. Had the process been reversed he would have to give fresh definitions of all those <u>padsdoşas</u> which are not included on the list of <u>padāmsadoşas</u>. Govinda Thakkura's observation gives us a clue to understand that Mammata was following the principle of Nyāyaśāstra to make his presentation logically sound.

Most of the <u>padadosas</u> of Mammata have already been treated before along with those of Bharata and Bhāmaha. Only <u>Nirarthaka</u> is left out which we deal here with.

<u>Nirarthaka</u>

Mammata defines <u>Nirarthaka</u> as follows: निरर्थक पारपूरणमात्रप्रयोजन नाड़िपटम् ।(KP. VII. P. 273) Its example is: उत्फूर्क्लमक्रकेसरपरागगौरयुते मम द्वि गौरि! अभिवात्रियत प्रसिद्धयनु भगवति युल्मन्प्रसादेन ॥(KP. VII. P47) (O blessed Gauri, whose complexion is bright like the poolen of the full-blown lotus, may my desired object be accomplished by your kindness)

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In this verse the particle hi is nirarthaka.

Gautama in his Nys treats <u>Nirarthaka</u> as a <u>Nigrahastāna</u>, which is defined as-varņakramanirdeśavat nirarthakam(2.2.8).

Vātsyāyana gives the following example: nityah śabdah kacatatapānām jabagadadasatvāt jhabhaghadhadhasavat.

The letters <u>kacatatapa</u> etc., in the above are just arranged in the sequential order but they do not convey any significant meaning. It is clear that Mammata is employing the term in a sense different from one in Nyāyaśāstra.

Mammata also reveals a rave command over the loops and corners of Nyāyaśāstra in the method of presentation, in his arguments in the course of his exposition, in the tricks with which he traps the opponents and takes advantage of their inaccuracies and in such other aspects of his exposition. In this chapter, however, we are limiting our concern with Mmmata only to the limit of his treatment of dosa.

In the preceding pages of this chapter we have tried to show how the treatment of <u>kāvyadoşa</u>s of some poeticians reveal an influence of Nyāyaśāstra on them. They are Bharata, Bhāmaha, Dandin, Mammata, Bhoja, Agnipurānakāra and Kalpalatāvivekakāra. Other poeticians have more or less repeated the topics discussed by their predecessors with a little change in language or in terms without adding something substantial to the doctrine of <u>kavyadosas</u>. They, therefore, do not need any special mention in this chapter.

We have seen that Bharata's treatment of poetic blemishes is mainly concerned with the dramatic performance. Keeping in view the perfection of oratorial expressions or dialogues (vācikābhinaya) he has conceived and formulated the dosas which are supposed to occur at the time of stage performance. Gautha also has formulated some vadadosas (faults which occur during the process of vada) keeping in view the process of debate which takes place between a proponent and an opponent or two groups, for either to reject or to established one's own position. There after Gautama in his exposition enumerates also some of dosas which are supposed to occur at the time of argumentation leading to the defeat. Both Gautama and Bharata intend the same thing. Since, a statmment devoid of any kind of flaw is necessary both in case of a nata and a debator all the flaws have been formulated both in Gautama's Nyāyasūtra and Bharata's NS keeping that purpose in view. That is why we find some somilarity in the treatment of some logical and poetical defects.

The <u>Nyāyasūtra</u>s of Gautama deal with <u>doṣas</u> twice. The first is the section on śbbdapramā<u>na</u>, where the

purvapaksa states that the verbal souce of knowledge is not valid since it is liable to such flaws as <u>Anrta(untruth)</u>, Vyāghāta(contradiction) and <u>punarukta(tautology)</u>.

Secondly, a large number of <u>dosas</u> are met with towards the end of the <u>Nyāyasūtra</u> where the <u>Nighahasthānas</u> are enumerated. Here the flaws in the methodology of debate which would result in defeat, are given,

However, the direct reference to the Nyayasastra with regard to poetic blemsshes are not found in the works of poeticians who seem to be influenced to certain extent by the logicaog of Nyāyaśāstra. From a critical examination we find similarities both conceptual and linguistic in their treatment of dosas. The logical fausts like Vyaghata and Punarukta propounded by the Naiyayaikas are also found in the works of Alankarasastra. We have shown in this chapter that Vyaghata of Naiyayika is the Vyartha of Bhamaha and Dandin; their Punarukta is Ekartha in Bharata, Bha mha and Dandin. Mammata and AP and others directly deal with this fault without ever changing the name. Further, the Argha-punarukta corresponds with Mammata's Anavikrta. And Ruyyaka while dealing with Punarukta even quotes a Nyāyasútra which is also identified as that of Aksapāda by Jayaratha.

The <u>Nigrahasthānas</u> of Gautama are also accepted by the poeticians as they develope their concept of poetic blemishes under their influence. <u>Arthāntara</u> is found in Bharata's NS, <u>Nirarthaka</u> in Mammata; <u>Avijñātārtha</u> is akin to Bhāmaha's <u>Ghudhaśabdābhidhāna</u>. <u>Apārthaka</u> is exactly identical with the <u>Apārthaka</u> of Bhāmaha and Dandin. The <u>Nyūna</u> and <u>Adhika</u> <u>nigrahasthānas</u> of Nyāyaśāstra which refer to <u>nyunatā</u> and <u>ādhikya</u> of the syllogistic statemtnt like <u>Pratijan</u> etc., are met with in the <u>Nyunapada</u> and <u>Adhikapada</u> of Rudrata, Bhija Bhāmaha, Vāmana, Ma mata and Viśvanātha. Thus we may conclude in the light of the above discussion that Nyāya philosophy has definitely influenced some major poeticians in their treatment of poetic blemishes.

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- 13. NBh. on Nys. <u>V</u>. 2.7.
- 14. NS., ch. XVI, P. 332

109 15. पौर्वापयीयोगादृप्रतिसंबद्धार्थमपार्थकम् । Nys. ⊽. 2.10; यत्राऽनेकस्य पदस्य नाक्यस्य वा पैर्वापर्यणान्वय-यीगा नाहित इत्यसंबद्धार्थन्व गृहाते तन्मम्याय-र्धस्याऽपायां इपार्धक यथा 'दश दाडिमानि, वडपूपाः, कुण्डमजाजिनम्, पत्रकपिण्ड ----इति। NBh. on Nys V.2.10. 16. cf. 14. 14. ABh. P. 332. Abhinava quotes only upto 和田川 The line is completed by The Bechen by adding the words ZIRFAT, though he does not quote the source. 18. शब्दार्थयोः पुनर्वेचन पुनरुक मन्यत्रानुवादात् । NyS, ፶.2.14. 19. BSP., P.295. 20. Ibid अधीवृत्तिः पदावृत्तिर्श्वावृत्तिरपि द्विधा । Ap. XI. 15. 21. 22. ASS, P.70. 23. Vimarsini on Ass., P.70. 24. NS., ch. XVI, P. 333. 25. HSP., P.110. 26. विरुद्धार्थं मनँ व्यर्थं विरुद्धं नूपरिश्यने। पूर्वापरार्धव्याद्यातादिपर्ययकरैं यथा ॥ кत. <u>ा</u>. 9. 27. तरप्रामाण्यम् – अनूनव्याचातपुनभक्तेरीषेभ्यः । NYS. I. 1: 57

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