

CHAPTER III  
INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA  
ON  
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### CHAPTER III

#### INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA ON POETIC BLEMISHES

##### III.1 Concept of Poetic Blemishes

In the Alaṅkāraśāstra an important place is given to the treatment of poetic blemishes (kāvya-doṣas). Almost all the prominent Ālaṅkārikas beginning from Bharata have dealt with the nature and types of blemishes which are definitely to be avoided in the literary compositions because they mar the aesthetic beauty of poetry. Doṣas, are, therefore, very rightly defined as the causes of diminution (apakarṣa) of kāvya.<sup>1</sup> The absence of doṣa is counted by Bhoja as the first condition which makes an utterance fit to be called kāvya.<sup>2</sup> Among the four poetical relations of śabda and artha the first is the avoidance of doṣas (doṣahāna). Only after taking due care to avoid all flaws a poet can think of embellishing his speech with excellences. Emphasising on the avoidance of doṣas in kāvya, Bhāmaha states that nobody is enjoyed by scriptures to write poetry under compassion or coercion or punishment, but to be a bad poet is declared by the wise to be death itself.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, Daṇḍin observes that one should not make even an insignificant blemish in a poem as a handsome body may cause disgust on account of a single leprous spot.<sup>4</sup> Even the poeticians like Mammaṭa explicitly

and others like Viśvanātha and Jagannātha implicitly advocate the rejection of blemishes in the definitions of kāvya.

Generally the poetic blemishes are classified under different headings such as padadoṣas, vākyadoṣas, rasadoṣas etc. But all these doṣas can be classified as shown by V.Raghavan under the following heads<sup>5</sup>:

1. Grammatical
2. Literary
3. Logical

A thorough examination of the concept of poetic blemishes reveals the fact that poeticians have emphasised upon the logical aspect of śabda, artha and their relations. As a result it is found that some of the faults are based on breach of logical doctrines and concepts of Nyāyaśāstra. All those doṣas which seem to have been influenced by Nyāyaśāstra are discussed in the following pages.

### III.2 Bharata's Treatment<sup>of</sup> Poetic Blemishes

In the literature of Sanskrit poetics, Bharata's NS is known to be the oldest extant work dealing with the concepts of poetics. Therefore, an examination of the concept of doṣa should begin with Bharata's treatment of it. Bharata's chief concern being dramaturgy and the techniques to be employed in the composition of drama for stage

performance he deals with various ways and modes of expressions, which add beauty, force and dignity to the speech.<sup>6</sup> As defective expressions detracts from the beauty of verbal and formal aspects of poetry, he, therefore, has taken note of blemishes which are to be avoided by the dramatists. The list of blemishes propounded by Bharata appears to be the oldest formulation of the concept and later writers have made it their starting point. Bharata enumerates ten blemishes in poetic composition.<sup>7</sup> They are as follows:

1. Gūḍhārtha (circumlocution) 2. Arthāntara (superfluous expression) 3. Arthahīna (devoid of meaning) 4. Bhinnārtha (defective significance) 5. Ekārtha (tautology) 6. Abhiplūtārtha (elliptical expression) 7. Nyāyādapeta (logical lapse) 8. Visama (unevenness of metre) 9. Visandhi (hiatus) 10. Śabdacyuta (grammatical impurity).

Of these, the five doṣas, viz., Gūḍhārtha, Arthāntara, Arthahīna, Ekārtha and Nyāyādapeta are more important from our point of view. The following analysis will show how all these doṣas are formulated on the basis of the logical defects enumerated in the NyS.

#### 1. Gūḍhārtha

Gūḍhārtha is defined by Bharata as 'paryāyaśabdābhihita'.<sup>8</sup>

It occurs when the meaning becomes hidden owing to the use of synonymous words. Bhāmaha does not define this doṣa.

But he says :

गुढशब्दाभिधानं च न प्रयोज्यं कथञ्चन ।  
सुधियामपि नैवेदमुपकाराय कल्पते ॥ (KA. I. 45)

The use of difficult words with a hidden meaning is a defect. Kāvya with such an expression fails to appeal to a connoisseur who finds difficulty in appreciating its beauty. For example:

असितर्तिगुग्निच्छिद्वत्स्वः क्षितां पतिरद्विद्वक् ।

अमिद्विः शुभ्रदृष्टद्विषौ जेघ्नीयिषीष्ट वः ॥ (KA. I. 46)

(May the son of fire destroy your foes entirely by his white and terrible glances, he, who is the piercer of mountain and lord of the inhabitants of svarga and is possessed of more than two eyes.)

The unusual, and therefore, difficult usages are to be explained as follows.

(a) asitarati, he who has a black (asita) path (rti)-Fire, his son (tuc) is lord Skanda.

(b) adricchit-piercer (chit) of a mountain (adri)

(c) svahkṣitam patiḥ-the lord (pati) of the dwellers (kṣitam) of heaven (svah). He is the commander of the army of gods.

(d) advidrk-not having two (dvi) eyes (drk); hence, many eyed may destroy again and again (jeghiyāt) your enemies (vaḥ dviṣaḥ) with his fearful (Amidbhiḥ) and white (subhra) glances (drṣṭa).

Here the meaning is understood with the great labour.

Bhāmaha's Gudhaśabdābhidhāna may be compared with Gautama's

Avijñātārtha (Unintelligible statement), one of the nigraha - ✓  
stānas propounded by the Naiyāyikas of the Akṣapāda school.

It is defined by Gautama<sup>9</sup> as the argument which is not understood by the audience or by the opponent though it is repeated (1)

three times. Disputant being opposed by a stronger opponent tries to hide his inability to defend himself by using words with double meaning, or of uncommon use, or which are too quickly uttered to be intelligible.<sup>10</sup> For example śveto dhāvati, It means a white animal runs. But if a person uses it in the sense of a dog runs away from here (śvā ito dhāvati), he commits this defect. In this blemish meaningful but unintelligible words are uttered.

From the above point of view Bhāmaha's example<sup>10</sup> of Gūḍhaśabdābhīdhāna may be taken as a case because it contains unintelligible words which are not in common use. Raghavan<sup>11</sup> rightly remarks:

The second of these, apratitaśabda (one of the causes of aviññātārta as given by Vātsyāyana in this Nyāyabhāṣya is met with in Alaṅkāraśāstra. It is akin to Bhāmaha's Gūḍhaśabdābhīdhāna.

## 2. Arthāntara

Arthāntara is defined by Bharata as: avarṇyam varṇyate yatra tadarthāntaramiśyate<sup>12</sup> i.e. when anything not to the point is described it constitutes the fault called Arthāntara. This is regarded so because it is uncalled for description. It expressly states what is implicitly contained in the essential nature of the subject. Bharata does not give an example of it. Abhinavagupta gives the following example:

चिन्तामोहमनङ्गमङ्ग तनुते विप्रेक्षितं सुभ्रुवः ।

(P. 331)

(The beautiful lady's look spreads indged love as well as anxiety and stupor)

Here the mention of anxiety and stupor is not to the point. Love includes these states of mind and therefore they are understood. There is no need of its special mention in the verse. Though the above statement is not non-sensical it is certainly illogical.

The influence of the Nyāyaśāstra can be observed here. Arthāntara is one of the nigrahasthānas of the Naiyāyikas. Gautama defines it as :

प्रकृतादर्थोद् अप्रतिसंबद्धार्थमर्थान्तरम् । (V. 2. 7)

Vātsyāyana says that one gets defeated in an intellectual debate if he falls a pry to this flaw of irrelevant digression. He gives a humorous illustration of this flaw. If one has to prove antyatva of śabda he should give a valid hetu which can prove it. But instead of giving a hetu in support of his proposition if he derives the word 'hetu' from its root, points out the pratyaya and shows how it is a krdantapada and then proceeds to give various kinds of padas, he commits the flaw of Arthāntara.<sup>13</sup> Bharata's concept of Arthāntara seems to be identical with the concept of Gautama's nigrahasthāna.

### 3. Arthahina

Arthahina is defined by Bharata<sup>14</sup> as :

अर्थहीनं त्वसंबद्धं सावशेषार्थमेव च ।

Bhāmaha calls it Apārthaka and defines as :

समुदायार्थशून्यं यत्तदपार्थकमिव्यते ।

दाडिमानि दैशपूपाः षडित्यादि यथैदितम् ॥ (KA. IV. 8)

It occurs when the combination as a whole is devoid of meaning.

There is not a single harmonious meaning inherent in all padas

of a verse. The incoherence is of two types Viz., incoherent

words and incoherent sentences. Ten pomegranates, six cakes,

goat's skin, lump of meat are examples of inherent words

(pada-apārthaka) 'A person rice in a tank eating goes and

bathing', is an example of incoherent sentence (vākya-apārthaka).

Apārthaka also is a nigrahaṣṭhāna in Gautama's philosophy. ✓

According to Gautama, Apārthaka is an argument of which words

or sentences are combined without any syntactical order and

do not convey any connected meaning.<sup>15</sup> The example of pada-

apārthaka is straightway taken from Vātsyāyana's NBh; in fact

Bhāmaha clearly referring to Vātsyāyana since the example is

verbatim from Vātsyāyana, and again as is clear from his words

'ityādi yathoditam'. We should also note, however, that the

two types of Arthahīna that of pada and of vākya are not

mentioned in the Bhāṣya; they are introduced by Bhāmaha

himself. Daṇḍin follows Bhāmaha in this manner.

#### 4. Ekārtha (Tautology)

It is defined by Bharata as 'aviśeṣābhidhānam yat'.<sup>16</sup>

This fault occurs when indiscriminative use of many words

for a single purpose is made. Abhinavagupta cites an example



of this defect as : कुन्दैरुहारहरहाससित (यशस्ते) । <sup>17</sup>

( your fame is white like the kunda flower, the moon, the garland of pearls and the laughter of Śiva).

In this example, all words have practically one and the same purport. Any one simile would have been enough. Each simile here serves the same purpose and hence tatulogy has occurred. Since 'yaśaḥ' is regarded a to be white in poetic convention and hāsa is also regarded white, it consits of re-duplication of the same idea without adding anything new or special to the sense.

It is significant to note that Gautama in his NyS speaks of Punarukta as a nigrahasthāna.<sup>18</sup> Bharata's Ekārtha may be similar with Gautama's Punarukta. Raghavan rightly remarks:<sup>19</sup>

Punarukta is very well-known and is seen as Ekārtha in Bharata.

Bhāmaha also borrows from Bharata the concept of the doṣa called Ekārtha. He defines it as:

यदभिन्नार्थमन्योन्यं तदेकार्थं प्रचक्षते ।  
पुनस्तुतमिदं प्राहुरन्ये शब्दार्थभेदतः ॥ (KA. IV. 12)

(when statements convey the same meaning as stated before, it is a fault called Ekārtha).

Bharata does not give any divisions of it while Bhāmaha divides it into those of śabda and artha. He does not exemplify

śabda-ekārtha and calls it sthūla (obvious). He further notes that repetition is not a defect if the same word is repeated under the influence of fear, sorrow, jealousy etc., e.g. 'gaccha gaccha'. He gives the example of the second type as follows:

तामुत्कमनसं नूनं कशेति ध्वनिरम्भसाम् ।  
सौधेषु घनमुक्तानां प्रणालीमुखपातिनाम् ॥ (KA. IV. 16)

( The sound reproduced by the rain falling from the clouds on the roof of the house and discharging through the mouth of spouts renders her anxious )

Here the word 'utka' includes the meaning of 'manas' in its own meaning and so the use of the word 'manas' is futile.

It is important to note that Bhāmaha identifies Ekārtha with Punarukta. He says : punaruktam idam prahur'anye'. To whom does he refer by 'anye' is not clear. At least, Bharata does not call it 'punarukta'. It could be some other poetician prior to him whose work is now lost or it could also possibly be the NBh of Vātsyāyana since in his treatment of Apārtha and Vyārtha he has alluded to it, and the two faults of Vyāghāta and Punarukta occur in the NBh together in the same sutra.

Daṇḍin and Vāmana also follow in the foot steps of Bhāmaha. But, Mammāṭa calls it Punarukta. He, however, before treating this doṣa, treats another doṣa named Anavikṛta which

has a close similarity with that of Punarukta. It is a repetition of the same set of words or phrases without giving some variation through turns of expression. For example:

प्राप्ताः श्रियः सकलकामदुधास्तनः किं  
 दत्तं पदं शिरसि विद्विषतां ततः किम् ।  
 संतर्पिताः प्रणयिनौ विभवेस्तनः किं  
 कल्पं स्थितं तनुभृतां तनुभिस्तनः किम् ॥ (K.P. VII. P. 393)

(All-affording wealth has been attained-so what? The foot has been placed on the head of the enemy-so what? Friends have been fully supplied with riches-so what? The bodies of men have lasted for a whole cycle-so what?)

Here the frequent use, the repetition of 'tataḥ kiṁ' is monotonous and it adds nothing new to the meaning,

This doṣa corresponds to the Artha-paunaruktya as illustrated by Gautama and Vātsyāyana. V. Raghavan remarks:<sup>20</sup>

Both Gautama and Vātsyāyana speak of Śabda-paunaruktya and Artha-paunariktya. The latter, illustrated by Vātsyāyana corresponds to what Mammata has given among his Artha-doṣas as Anavikṛta.

The Agnipurāṇa (AP) in its 11th chapter of Alaṅkāra-section deals with Punarukta. In transferring the logical defect of punaruktatā to the sphere of poetics the AP certainly follows

Bharata, Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and even perhaps Vāmana who all mention and define this fault under the name of Ekārtha. The AP defines it as : ābhikṣṇyādabhidhānam. It means continued repetition (ābhikṣṇasya bhāvaḥ). It is of two kinds :

1. Arthāvṛtti (the repetition of meaning) and 2. Padāvṛtti (repetition of words). Again, Arthāvṛtti is of two kinds:

1. Prayuktavarasābdena (use of a better word different from the used one) and 2. Śabdāntareṇa (use of an altogether different word).<sup>21</sup>

In giving the above division of Punarukta AP differs from earlier poeticians and in this respect it seems to follow Gautama's division of Punarukta as given in the NyS. But it should be noted that the two divisions of Arthāvṛtti are found neither in the NyS nor in any other poetic work. And prayuktavarasābdena also does not appear to be different from padāvṛtti. Therefore, in our present state of knowledge, nothing can be said either about the source of the AP's classification of Arthāvṛtti or about the classification itself.

Ruyyaka, the author of Alaṅkārasarvasva(ASS) defines and illustrates Punarukta in the context of Punaruktavadābhāsa. According to him Punarukta is of three types viz., śabdapunarukta, arthapunarukta and śabdārthapunarukta.<sup>22</sup> But in the context of lāṭānuprāsa alaṅkāra he quotes the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama which is the definition of Punarukta Nigrahesthāna i.e. śabdārthyoh punarvacanam punaruktaman-

yatrānuvādāt. (NyS, V. 2.14)

Jayaratha, the commentator in his Vimarṣini also identifies that sūtra by giving the name of Akṣapāda - āhurityākṣapādāh.<sup>23</sup>

### 5. Nyāyādapeta

The fault Nyāyādapeta occurs in a poetic expression or a sentence when it deviates from or is devoid of logical propriety. It is defined by Bharata as: pramāṇavarivarjita<sup>24</sup> 'an expression devoid of meaning'. Abhinavagupta divides it into two kinds: 1. deśakālaviruddha (defying the limitation of place and time) 2. kalāsāstraviruddha (contradicting the established notions of arts and sciences etc.). The example of the first type is :

सुवीरेष्वस्ति नगरी मथुरा नाम विश्रुता ।  
अक्षौटनालिकैराद्या यस्याः पर्यन्तभूमयः ॥ (ABh. P. 333)

(There is a city called Mathurā in Suvīra (panjab) whose vicinities abound with oilnuts and coconuts).

Here one observes lapse of logical propriety with reference to place. The city of Mathurā is not situated in Panjab but in the Uttarapradeśa. This shows the writer's ignorance of Geography. Oilnuts grow in Kashmir and coconuts in the South India. Coconuts flourish in the regions adjacent to the sea and oilnuts in cold mountainous

regions. Hence the above given statement is in conflict with Geographical and topographical data and suffers from the fault of Nyāyādapeta.

Abhinavagupta does not give any instance of the second type of this defect. But an example of it can be furnished if a Buddhist is represented as an upholder of the soul theory (ātmavāda) which is flagrantly inconsistent with his creed because the Buddhists never believe in the metaphysical reality of a person; or if a Naiyāyika declares the objective world as an illusion like the Vijñānavādins.

This fault has been treated by the later poeticians by making a little modification. Bhāmaha treats it by the name Nyāyavirodhi but the word Nyāya according to him stands for Śāstra in general. While treating this fault Daṇḍin briefly deals with its sub-divisions as deśa, kālā, kalā and lokaviruddha and pays more attention to hetuvidyā (nyāya). According to him the term Nyāya means hetuvidyā. Later on the poeticians like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha treated this fault by using the term Śāstraviruddha or Vidyāviruddha. While treating this, Puñjarāja, the author of the Śiṣuprabodha-kāvya-lāṅkāra, particularly gives an example of Tarkaviruddha-doṣa as follows:

यथार्थानुभवादन्या प्रमा सैयं समोदिता । (P. 14)

This sentence is incorrect from the Tarkaśāstra point of view for, according to Tarkaśāstra, anubhava is of two types:

yathārtha (valid) and ayathārtha(invalid). Yathārtha-anubhava is called pramā. But here in this verse pramā is said to be different to be different from Yathārthānubhava and therefore is not reasonable. This shows Puñjārāja's knowledge of the Tarkaśāstra.

Above analysis of this fault makes it clear that from NS onwards, this doṣa contineously recognised under the Nyāya influence. Bharata does not use the term Nyāya in a general sense of propriety etc., but in s seecial sense of pramāṇa. We, may ,therefore, conclude that he and all the poeticians after him propound this doṣa with the Nyāya principles in their mind. PV.Kane rightly remarks:<sup>25</sup>

the discussions about logical matter in the province of poetry were started by Bharata. His Nyāyādapeta which is defined as 'pramāṇapari-varjitam' is an example of this defect. The pramāṇas are the special province of logic.

### III.3 Bhāmaha's Treatment of Poetic Blemishes

Bhāmaha in his treatment of kāvya-doṣas, not only follows Bharata but also adds many more new faults to the list. He enumerates more doṣas based on the Nyāyaśāstra than his successors. He not only just gives importance to the grammatical accuracy and aesthetic valus of the word and

sense in poetry but also endeavours to focus the light on the requirement of logical accuracy.

Of the seven doṣas treated by him under the Nyāya influence viz., Gudhaśabdābhidhāna, Ayuktimat, Apārthaka, Vyārtha, Ekārtha, Apakrama and Nyāyavirodhi, Gudhaśabdābhidhāna, Apārthaka, Ekārtha and Nyāyavirodhi are already discussed above. The meaning three are taken up here.

### 1. Ayuktimat

Ayuktimat occurs if a poet makes the cloud, the moon, the wind, the bee, the bird etc., a messenger in poetry.

अयुक्तिमद्यथा दूता जलभृन्मारुतेन्द्रवः ।

नथा भ्रमरहारीतचक्रवाकशुकादयः ॥ (KA.I.42)

Such delineations do not fit in either Reason, argues Bhāmaha, and suffer from the sense of impropriety. But if these are addressed by persons suffering from an excess of longing, it is not considered as a blemish. This device is adopted by the poets of outstanding genius. For example, Kālidāsa in his Meghadūtam, describes the cloud as messenger. But he, perhaps aware of this fault, supplies a rationale for it.

कामार्ता हि प्रकृतिकृपणाश्चैतनान्यैतनेषु ।

Ayuktimat may be translated as 'illogical'. The example given by Bhāmaha suggests that he emphasises extreme and empirical reality provable by pramāṇas only. He does not approve of superficial imaginations which are contradictory



to the pramāṇas. Similarly, Nyāyaśāstra also accepts the validity of the things which are cognised only by the pramāṇas, and asserts the falsity of others. From this point of view, then, Bhāmaha's Ayuktimat agrees with this concept of Nyāyaśāstra. It takes place only where the things presented in a poem cannot be proved by any valid means of knowledge.

## 2. Vyārtha

This fault arises when the subsequent statements contradicts the previous one.<sup>26</sup> He gives the following example:

सरिव मानं प्रिये धीहि लघुनामस्य मा गमः ।  
भर्तुश्चन्दानुवर्तिन्यः प्रेम दन्ति न हि स्त्रियः ॥ (KA.IV.10)

( O friend! do show your anger towards your lover, do not become mild to him; women who follow the wishes of their husbands do not hamper their lover)

Here, the first statement 'mānam dhehi' (show anger) and the second statement chandanuvartinyah (follower of husband's wishes) are opposed to each other.

It is significant to note that this Vyārtha of Bhāmaha may be compared with Vyāghāta of Gautama. The discussion of Vyāghāta takes place in the section of Śabdapramāṇa of NyS of Gautama where the pūrvapakṣa argues against the validity of the verbal knowledge because of its flaws as anṛta (untruth), vyāghāta (discrepancy) and punarukta (tautology).<sup>27</sup> Vyāghāta is explained by Vātsyāyana as that between the

enjoinments of two nantras. For instance, there are some mantras directing a person to offer oblation before or after sunrise or when the stars are shining and the sun is not visible. Regarding these three times for the oblations, there are corresponding deprecatory texts: oblations offered at three different times are eaten by different kinds of dogs. The simple answer to this accusation is that once a person has agreed to offer an oblation at a certain time, the time that he has accepted should not be altered. The texts in question are meant to carry disapproval of alteration in the procedure already adopted. From this point of view Bhāmaha's Vyārtha seems to be identical with the Vyāghāta of Dandin. Dandin follows Bhāmaha in treating this doṣa by naming it Pūrvāpara-viruddha.

### 3. Apakrama

This fault occurs due to the reversal of the order of the statement (krama). Since syntactical regularity demands that the things attributed should follow the order of the first statements, violation of this regularity results in the defect called Apakrama.<sup>28</sup>

For example:

विद्युधानो<sup>१</sup> किरीटेन्दु<sup>२</sup> श्यामाभ्रहिसच्छवी ।  
 स्याङ्गशूल<sup>३</sup> बिभ्राणो<sup>४</sup> पातां वः शम्भुशार्ङ्गिणो ॥  
 (KA. IV. 21)

(May Śiva and Viṣṇu who carry the crown and the moon, who have splendour of a black cloud and a snow like lustre, who

carry the disc and a trident, protect you)

Here the dharmas should have been mentioned in the same order as their dharmis i.e. Śiva and Viṣṇu. But this order is violated and therefore it is a case of Apakrama. This fault may be compared with the apārāptakālanigrhasthāna of Gautama.<sup>29</sup> Aprāptakāla consists in stating the members of an inference in an illogical order. There is a definite order among the members of an inference: 1. pratijñā (proposition) 2. hetu (reason) 3. udāharana (example) 4. upanaya (application) and 5. nigamana (conclusion). The logical order among them conveys a connected meaning of the argument. If it is reversed it cannot convey any connected meaning. Bhāmaha has taken up the words of Vātsyāyana such as viprayāsa and krama to explain his concept of Apakrama.<sup>30</sup> For this doṣa there is an agreement in the concept as well as expression of Bhāmaha and Dandin.

Apart from the treatment of faults as shown above Bhāmaha also explains the pratijñāhīnādidoṣas which are purely logical faults. He has definitely borrowed the concepts from Nyāya treatises. The pratijñā (proposition) is the most important feature of anumānavākya. Bhāmaha first of all explains the defects of the pratijñā (an avayava of syllogistic statement). It consists of a statement in which a subject (pakṣa) is already known specifically to both the parties in a discussion and a predicate in a specific form

is proposed to be established in the subject.<sup>31</sup> In other words it is in the form of a definite proposition. Its chief purpose is to bring about a definite knowledge of the pakṣa as such or what is proposed to be proved as having a sādhya. Gautama in his NyS defines pratijñā as sādhyanirdeśa.<sup>32</sup> But Bhāmaha defines pratijñā as a statement of pakṣa in which dharmi and its dharma are present.

Bhāmaha explains all the six varieties of pratijñādoṣas<sup>33</sup> with the examples as follows:

(1) Tadarthavirodhini: It is the proposition which contradicts its own meaning. In other words it is a self-contradictory statement.

Example: यतिर्मम पिता बाल्यात्सुनुर्यस्याहमौरसः ।  
(KA.V.14)

(My father is a celibate monk from his childhood and I am his legitimate (aurasa) son).

(2) Hetuvirodhini: The proposition contradicted by its reason (hetu). It is illustrated by a case which is a subject of dispute.

Example: अस्त्यात्मा प्रकृतिर्वेति ज्ञेया हेत्वपवादिनी ।  
धर्मिणोऽस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्तद्धर्मोऽपि न सैत्स्यति ॥  
शाश्वतोऽशाश्वतो वेति प्रसिद्धे धर्मिणि धर्मो ।  
जायते भेदविषयो विवादो वादिनोर्मिथः ॥

(KA.V.14-16)

Here the proposition whether the soul is existent or the Prakṛti is a hetuvirodhini-pratijñā. Since in the above proposition dharmi (atmā or prakṛti) is not established, its dharma cannot also be established. Here in the given proposition both dharmi and dharma are unestablished in the absence of proof.

3. Svasiddhāntavirodhini - the proposition which contradicts one's own siddhānta.

Example: कणभक्षो यथा शब्दमाचक्षीताविनश्वरम् । (KA. V. 17)

According to the Vaiśeṣika school of Kanāda, śabda is anitya.

But if a proposition like śabdaḥ nityaḥ (sound is eternal) is made by a Vaiśeṣika, that will be svasiddhāntavirodhini-pratijñā because the later contradicts the former.

4. Sarvāgamavirodhini - the proposition which is contradicted by all the Śāstras.

Example: यथा शुचिस्तनुस्त्रीणि प्रमाणानि न सन्ति वा । (KA. V. 18)

This is illustrated by the contradiction of a position which is universally accepted. The proposition like 'the body is pure' is in contradiction with the assertion with all the schools of philosophy. Similarly the assertion that there are no pramāṇas is a case in point.

5. Prasiddhadharmavirodhini - the proposition which is contradicted by its excessive popularity.

Example: श्रोत्रग्राह्यो ध्वनिर्यथा । (KA. V. 19)

What is accepted by all and not subject of doubt does not

require an express statementt.

6. Pratyakṣabādhini - the proposition which is contradicted by direct perception.

Example: यथा शीतोऽनक्तौ नास्ति रूपमुष्णः क्षयाकरः ।  
(KA.V.20)

The statements like 'fire is cool', 'moon is hot' are contradicted by direct perception.

According to Bhāmaha there should not be an absence of any member like hetu etc., in the Pratijñāvākya because it leads to the defective anumāna.

Duṣaṇābhāsa (illusion of fault), according to Bhāmaha, are called jāti and they are numerable and therefore not explained by him.<sup>34</sup>

The foregoing discussion of pratiñjā etc., says Bhāmaha, is useful in the poems which are Śāstra-like in nature.<sup>35</sup> But in other kāvyas, Pratijñā etc., of different types occur. Because poetry depends on worldly experience and Śāstras depend on truth. A poet cannot be bound when he composes a general kāvyā but he has to follow the rules of the Śāstras when he specially composes śāstrakāvyas. Bhāmaha gives definition of other types of pratiñjā etc., i.e. the undertaking of desired task which are likely to occur in kāvyas based on worldly experience (lokāśritakāvyas). It is of four types as the desired task pertains to dharma, artha, kāma and lopa.

About the nature of hetu Bhāmaha says that in poetry

too hetu has three aspects as in Sāstra. Anumāna is based on anvaya(agreement) and vyatireka(difference). Bhāmaha also gives the example of it the analysis of which can be made in the form of sādhya and sādhana.

यथाऽभितौ वनाभोगमेतदस्ति महत्सरः ।

कूजनात्कुररीणाञ्च कमलानाञ्च सौरभात् ॥(KA.V.48)

Here the existence of pond is known by the kujana of kurari and fragrance of lotuses. The anumāna may be put in the following form: वनाभोगे महत्सरः अस्ति कुररीणां कूजनात्,

कमलानां सौरभात् च ।

Here, vanabhoge is pakṣa, mahatsarah asti is sādhya and kujana and saubha are sādhanas or hetus by which the existence of saras in the forest is inferred.

Even in the stock example 'parvato vahnimān dhūmāt' this depends on the inevitable relation between sādhya and sādhana. The smoke seen in the sky is instrumental in effecting the inference of the fire only in the mountain. In poetry sometimes reason is not distinctly stated from sādhya and the latter is established even without positive and negative concomitance.

The example: दीपदीपा निशा यत्रै व्यपवृत्तदिवाकरा ।  
(KA.V.51)

Here, night is the substratum which is the object of inference sādhya and disappearance of the sun is sādhya and dharmā. Long disappearance of the sun can be logically proved only by the reason dipra dipatvam possessing brilliantly shining lamps.

The hetu in poetry is also liable to be vitiated by the three defects which violates the triple character of probans (hetu) in the Nyāya logic. Bhāmaha gives several examples of these defects which arise due to ignorance of doubt or false knowledge or the person concerned. Thus the statement : काशा हरन्ति हृदयममी कुसुमसौरभात् । (KA.V.539) ( the kāsas captivate the hearts of people by fragrance of their flowers),

This is a wrong statement because the kāsa has no fragrance. It is an evidence of the ignorance of the speaker. The poetic reason as stated above i.e. fragrance of flower, is absent in the pakṣa. All these are to be understood as harmful or injurious on account of their vicinity to water. This gives rise to doubt as it is not an established fact that all things which grow in the neighbourhood of water are harmful. Another statement, certainly this is cakora because it has white corners in the eyes, is based on false knowledge, for the cakora bird is known for red corners in its eyes. So this statement gives false information as the hetu, "white corners" is falsely attributed to the bird.<sup>36</sup>

The drṣṭānta or Udāharana consists in stating a parallel to the subject. Bhāmaha does not illustrate it. The kitchen in which smoke and fire are found together is cited as an example for inferring fire in the hill on the basis of smoke observed in it.



Bhāmaha than refutes<sup>37</sup> the contention that simile is a case of inference. There is no statement of hetu in simile. The statements of probans (sādhana) and probandum(sādhya) is only appropriate in the cases already noticed. The face is like a lotus is the case of simile without reference to sādhana and sādhya. The simile above stated is entirely different from the following statement.

इति प्रथोर्वस्य यथा कलावपि भवानिह ।

श्रेयान्वृद्धानुशिष्टत्वान्पूर्व कार्त्तयुगे यथा ॥ (KA.V.57)

(You are pre-eminent even in this fallen sage. Just as you have been taught by man of superior intellect and wisdom; just as people were in the older age(krtayuga) ).

Here one comes across a hetu and sādhya along with an example. But all the examples are not illustrative of concomitance of hetu and sādhya.

भरतस्त्वं दिक्पिपस्त्वं त्वमेवैकः पुरुषवाः ।

त्वमेव वीर प्रद्युम्नस्त्वमेव नरवाहनः ॥ (KA.V.59)

The conclusion that particular king possesses certain qualities is not possible simply on account of the example as the relation of sādhya and sādhana is not present. The use of the example(drṣṭānta) alone results in neyārtha doṣa.

Thus Bhāmaha almost devotes his entire fifth chapter on the discussion of the logical defects with the regard to anumāna and its related matter. He discusses various kinds of doṣas pertaining to anumāna. This shows his deep

knowledge of Nyāya philosophy especially logical and epistemology as well as his great genius in relating the topics of logic with poetics. He seems to be profoundly influenced by the Nyāya system of logic in postulating the doctrine of poetic blemishes. To which Nyāya system he adheres to will be discussed in the chapter on Buddhist Logic.

Daṇḍin closely follows Bhāmaha in treating the poetic blemishes. So his treatment is not specially discussed here. As far as the pratijñāhīnādisodas (logical faults) are concerned he does not follow Bhāmaha and shows his independence of mind in rejecting them.. He makes a cursory reference to it for its outright condemnation and says " the deliberation whether the defect of pratijñā, hetu and drṣṭānta is a flaw or not (in poetry) is almost tough" what is the good of pursuing it?<sup>38</sup> Vāmana also follows Daṇḍin in leaving the blemishes of Pratijñā-hetu-drṣṭānta-hīnadosas out.

Similarly, we do not find something concrete in the treatment of Bhoja so we have left him. But he in his Śr.P deals with virodha, one of the vākyadosas. He classifies it into pratyakṣavirodha, anumānavirodha and āgamavirodha. Under anumānavirodha he includes Bhāmaha's pratijñāhīnādisodas<sup>39</sup>

#### III.4 Treatment of Poetic Blemishes in the Kalpalatāviveka

Chronologically, AP's treatment of doṣas should follow that of Bhāmaha but since the treatment of the anonymous

author of Kalpalatāviveka is very close and complimentary to the one of Bhāmaha we here put aside the chronological order as an exception and deal with Kalpalatāviveka first.


Bhāmaha's treatment of Anumāna and poetic blemishes like Pratijñāhīnādi has exerted profound influence on Kalpalatāviveka, a valuable work on Sanskrit Poetics. The Viveka is a sub-commentary on the Pallava, a commentary on the Kalpalatā. The author of the Kalpalatā and Pallava is Ambaprasada, the chief minister of Siddharāja Jaisimha (1094-1143A.D.) of Patana (Gujarat). The author of the Viveka is not known.

Kalpalatā is divided into four chapters viz., Doṣadarśana, Guṇavivecana, Śabdālaṅkāradarśana and Arthālaṅkāradarśana. Since the treatment of doṣa is the most important topic of the work it devotes a complete chapter constituting nearly half of the entire work and gives it a prime place. <sup>The</sup> Viveka largely follows Mammata in his treatment of doṣas and classifies them into four varieties viz. padadoṣa, vākyadoṣa, arthadoṣa and rasadoṣa. Accordingly the first paricceda is divided into four sub-sections of the same names. Since padadoṣas, vākyadoṣas and rasadoṣas don't reveal any influence of Nyāya only other doṣas would be of direct interest to our purpose.

Under the arthadoṣas the Viveka comprehensively discusses some logical faults and closely follows Bhāmaha regarding pratijñāhīnādidōṣas and explains present them as follows:

TABLE I

प्रतिज्ञादोषाः (Intro. p. 68)



After pratijñādoṣas, the Vivekakāra deals with hetudoṣas. Bhāmaha also has dealt with them, but he did not give illustrations whereas Vivekakāra does. The divisions of hetudoṣas as given by the Vivekakāra are as follows:

A hetu must have three aspects viz., pakṣasattva, sapakṣasattva and vipakṣasattva. If a hetu is deficient in any one or more or all of them it becomes defective. When a hetu is deficient in one of the aspects three hetvābhāsas viz. sādharaṇa-anaikāntika, asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika and asiddha arise. When it is deficient in two aspects three other hetvābhāsas viz. viruddha, asiddha-sādharaṇa-anaikāntika and asiddha-sādhāraṇa arise. When the hetu is deficient in all the three aspects another hetvābhāsa viz. asiddha-viruddha arises. Thus there are seven hetvābhāsas which are illustrated and explained in the Viveka (pp.60-61) as follows:

1. विरुद्धः नित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वात् । Here the hetu, 'being a product' is not present in the similar case (ākāśa) and also in the dissimilar case (ghaṭa).

2. असिद्धसाधारणानैकान्तिकः नित्यः शब्दः मूर्तत्वात् । Here the hetu, 'having limitedly extended body', is absent in the pakṣa (śabda) as well as present in vipakṣa (ghaṭādi) and also in sapakṣa (paramānvādi).

3. असिद्धसाधारणः नित्यः शब्दः अप्रमेयत्वात् । Here the hetu, 'not being cognisable' is absent both in the pakṣa (śabda) and the sapakṣa (paramānvādi) and also from the vipakṣa (ghaṭādi)

4. साधारणानैकान्तिक :- अनित्यः शब्दः अमूर्तत्वात् । Here, the hetu 'not having limitedly extended body' is present in pakṣa (śabda), sapakṣa(buddhi) and in the vipakṣa(ākāśa).

5. असाधारणानैकान्तिक :- अनित्यः शब्दः श्रावणत्वात् । Here the hetu, 'being apprehended by the sense of audition', is present in (śabda) and absent in both the vipakṣa(ākāśa) and the sapakṣa (ghaṭa) For śravaṇatva belongs to sound alone, according to Bauddhas, though according to Kaṇāda it belongs to genus (sāmānya) also.

6. असिद्धः - अनित्यः शब्दः चाश्रुषत्वात् । Here, the hetu being perceived by vision is present in sapakṣa(ghaṭa) and absent in vipakṣa(paramāṇvādi) and the pakṣa(śabda).

7. असिद्धविरुद्धः - अनित्यः शब्दः अकृतकत्वात् । Here, the hetu not being a product is present neither in the pakṣa (śabda) nor in the sapakṣa(ghaṭādi) but on the contrary present in the vipakṣa(ākāśa). Hence it is deficient in all the three aspects whereas the first three of the above are deficient in two aspects and the next three in one.

Thereafter, the Viveka explains and classifies the drṣṭāntadoṣas which are presented in a tabular form as follows:

1. Sādhyavikala: Drṣṭānta becomes defective when it is devoid of sādhya e.g. शब्देऽनित्यः अमूर्तत्वात् आकाशवत् । Here the sādhya is absent in the Drṣṭānta which is nitya.

2. Sādhanavikala : If dr̥ṣṭānta is devoid of sādhana it becomes defective. e.g. शब्दैऽनित्यः अमूर्तत्वात् चरवत् ।  
Here the sādhana is absent in the dr̥ṣṭānta which is mūrta.
3. Ubhayavikala: If the dr̥ṣṭānta is devoid of both sādhaya and sādhana it becomes defective. e.g. शब्दैऽनित्यः अमूर्तत्वात् परमाणुवत् । Here neither the sādhya nor the sādhana is present in dr̥ṣṭānta which is nitya and mūrta.

From the above exposition of Kalpalatāviveka's treatment of arthadoṣas it is vlear that the Vivekakāra is closely following Bhāmaha and where Bhāmaha could enter into details or exemplification ot it, Vivekakāra fulfils that lacuna in a very able way. Bhāmaha tried to show by examples from wordly life like bharatastvam dilipastvam etc., or yatirmamam pitā etc., but did not give theoratical expalanations of it, Vivekakāra supplies the theoratic explanation of Bhāmaha's practical exposition and thus compliments his efforts.

### III.5 Treatment of the Poetic Blemishes in the Agnipurāṇa

The important feature in the treatment of poetic blemishes of the AP is that it touches upon Hetvābhāṣas (logical fallacies) as kāvyadoṣas. The AP does not give any definition of Hetvābhāṣas or hetudoṣas which are treated under the term 'hetvasamarthatā'. It is defined as iṣṭasādhanavyāghātānukāri (an impediment to the accomplishment of the desired object, the iṣṭa being anumiti in the

case of anumāna.<sup>40</sup> Though the AP does not explain a hetu become asamartha in achieving its desired object because of the impediment standing on its way it may be explained as follows.

Example: parvataḥ dhūmavān vahnimatvāt

Here the hetu vahnimatvā is defective and therefore asamartha in producing anumati i.e. the knowledge of smoke on the mountain it is because the vyāpti yatra yatra vahnimattvam tatra tatra dhūmavattvam is not correct. As in the burning iron-ball (tapta ayaḥ golaka) though vahni is present dhūma is not present. This hetu is sopādhika (endowed with an adjunct). Hence it is fallacious.

The AP gives eight varieties which are in fact the causes leading to hetvasamarthatā<sup>41</sup> as follows:

- |                                      |                                                       |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. <u>Asiddha</u> (non-existent)     | 5. <u>Kālātīa</u> (                                   |
| 2. <u>Viruddha</u> (contradictory)   | 6. <u>Pakṣasattva</u> (presence in <u>pakṣa</u> )     |
| 3. <u>Anaikāntika</u> (inconclusive) | 7. <u>Sapakṣasattva</u> (absence in <u>sapakṣa</u> )  |
| 4. <u>Satpartipakṣa</u> (antimonic)  | 8. <u>Vipakṣasattva</u> (presence in <u>vipakṣa</u> ) |

As regards the first five varieties of hetvasamarthatā enumerated in the AP, Gautama(I.2.45) seems to be the source of the AP, though it differs from it in its order, and nomenclature.



The Ap's Asiddha, Anaikāntika and Satpratipakṣa are synonymous with Gautama's Sādhysama, Savyavhicāra and Prakaranasama respectively. Gautama himself (1.2.46) explains Savyavhicāra as a naikāntika. Gaṅgeśopādhyā (12th century A.D.) inserts Satpratipakṣa and Asiddha for Gautama's Prakaranasama and Sādhysama. Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana (16th century A.D.) in his NSM employs the terms similar to that of the AP viz. Anaikāntika, Viruddha, Asiddha, Pratipakṣa and Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa.<sup>42</sup>

As regards the last three varieties, the AP obviously follows Bhāmaha who speaks about the three essential attributes of a hetu viz., pakṣasattva, sapakṣasattva and vipakṣāsattva in the absence of which the reason becomes defective. The AP puts them forth in the reverse order, namely, pakṣasattva, sapakṣasattva and vipakṣāsattva.

Thus on the basis of the above discussion it may be concluded that the author of AP reveals some influence of the Nyāya system and incorporates their logical doctrines in the form of kāvyadoṣa. It is possible that they might have received this influence via Bhāmaha.

### III.6 Mammata's Treatment of Poetic Blemishes

It is interesting to deal with Mammata's method of presentation of poetic blemishes which reveals the Nyāya influence. He deals with them in the following order:

1. Padadoṣas (blemishes of the word)
2. Padāmsadoṣas (blemishes of the part of the word)
3. Vākyadoṣas (blemishes of the sentence)
4. Arthadoṣas (blemishes of the meaning)
5. Rasadoṣas (blemishes of the sentiment)

The important point here to note is that Mammāṭa treats the padadoṣas first and then the padāmsadoṣas. Generally the reverse order is expected. But in doing so he perhaps follows the technique called saṅgati (relevancy of sequence), which occupies a significant position in the Nyāya school as Mathurānātha in his commentary on the Vyāptipañcaka says nāsaṅgatam prayuñjeta. The author of a work must first state his prayojana and discuss issues followed by typical statement in a logical order. All scientific works should always be governed by logical consideration. The issues which logically arise from the previous statement should be discussed. The author must write in response to an actual or hypothetical question likely to be put to the student or the enquirer of truth for whose edification the book is written. All logically considered assertions are of the nature of answers to questions posed implicitly or explicitly. The next assertion must be such as could naturally satisfy that question. This is in nutshell the meaning of saṅgati.<sup>43</sup>

The logic treating the padadoṣas first instead of padāmsadoṣas says Govinda Thakkura in his commentary, Kāvya-pradīpa on NKP is the consideration of saṅgati and logical economy. The padāmsadoṣas are a few in number and are identical with those of padadoṣas. So after treating the padadoṣas Mammata speaks of padāmsadoṣas by way of extension (atideśa). This constitutes economy. Had the process been reversed he would have to give fresh definitions of all those padadoṣas which are not included on the list of padāmsadoṣas. Govinda Thakkura's observation gives us a clue to understand that Mammata was following the principle of Nyāyaśāstra to make his presentation logically sound.

Most of the padadoṣas of Mammata have already been treated before along with those of Bharata and Bhāmaha. Only Nirarthaka is left out which we deal here with.

### Nirarthaka

Mammata defines Nirarthaka as follows:

निरर्थकं पादपूरणमात्रप्रयोजनं चाद्विपदम् । (K.P. VII. P. 273)

Its example is:

उत्फुल्लकमलकैसरपरागगौरद्युते मम हि गौरि!  
अभिवाञ्छितं प्रसिद्ध्यनु भवन्ति युष्मत्प्रसादेन ॥ (K.P. VII. P. 47)

(O blessed Gauri, whose complexion is bright like the poolen of the full-blown lotus, may my desired object be accomplished by your kindness.)

In this verse the particle 'hi' is nirarthaka.

Gautama in his Nys treats Nirarthaka as a Nigrahastāna, which is defined as-varṇakramanirdeśavat nirarthakam(V.2.8).

Vātsyāyana gives the following example:

nityaḥ śabdaḥ kacatātapānām jabagaḍadasatvāt jhabhaghadha-  
dhasavat.

The letters kacatātapa etc., in the above are just arranged in the sequential order but they do not convey any significant meaning. It is clear that Mammata is employing the term in a sense different from one in Nyāyaśāstra.

Mammata also reveals a rare command over the loops and corners of Nyāyaśāstra in the method of presentation, in his arguments in the course of his exposition, in the tricks with which he traps the opponents and takes advantage of their inaccuracies and in such other aspects of his exposition. In this chapter, however, we are limiting our concern with <sup>a</sup>Mammata only to the limit of his treatment of doṣa.

In the preceding pages of this chapter we have tried to show how the treatment of kāvya-doṣas of some poets reveal an influence of Nyāyaśāstra on them. They are Bharata, Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Mammata, Bhoja, Agnipurāṇakāra and Kalpalatāvivekakāra. Other poets have more or less

repeated the topics discussed by their predecessors with a little change in language or in terms without adding something substantial to the doctrine of kāvya-doṣas. They, therefore, do not need any special mention in this chapter.

We have seen that Bharata's treatment of poetic blemishes is mainly concerned with the dramatic performance. Keeping in view the perfection of oratorical expressions or dialogues (vācikābhinaya) he has conceived and formulated the doṣas which are supposed to occur at the time of stage performance. Gautama also has formulated some vāda-doṣas (faults which occur during the process of vāda) keeping in view the process of debate which takes place between a proponent and an opponent or two groups, for either to reject or to establish one's own position. There after Gautama in his exposition enumerates also some of doṣas which are supposed to occur at the time of argumentation leading to the defeat. Both Gautama and Bharata intend the same thing. Since, a statement devoid of any kind of flaw is necessary both in case of a nāṭa and a debator all the flaws have been formulated both in Gautama's Nyāyasūtra and Bharata's NS keeping that purpose in view. That is why we find some similarity in the treatment of some logical and poetical defects.

The Nyāyasūtras of Gautama deal with doṣas twice. The first is the section on śabdapramāṇa, where the

pūrvapakṣa states that the verbal source of knowledge is not valid since it is liable to such flaws as Anṛta(untruth), Vyāghāta(contradiction) and punarukta(tautology).

Secondly, a large number of doṣas are met with towards the end of the Nyāyasūtra where the Nigrahasthānas are enumerated. Here the flaws in the methodology of debate which would result in defeat, are given,

However, the direct reference to the Nyāyāśāstra with regard to poetic blemishes are not found in the works of poeticians who seem to be influenced to certain extent by the logic of Nyāyāśāstra. From a critical examination we find similarities both conceptual and linguistic in their treatment of doṣas. The logical faults like Vyāghāta and Punarukta propounded by the Naiyāyikas are also found in the works of Alaṅkāraśāstra. We have shown in this chapter that Vyāghāta of Naiyāyika is the Vyārtha of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin; their Punarukta is Ekārtha in Bharata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. Mammāṭa and AP and others directly deal with this fault without ever changing the name. Further, the Argha-punarukta corresponds with Mammāṭa's Anavikṛta. And Ruyyaka while dealing with Punarukta even quotes a Nyāyasūtra which is also identified as that of Akṣapāda by Jayaratha.

The Nigrahasthānas of Gautama are also accepted by the poeticsians as they develop their concept of poetic blemishes under their influence. Arthāntara is found in Bharata's NS, Nirarthaka in Mammata; Avijñātārtha is akin to Bhāmaha's Ghṛhaśabdābhidhāna. Apārthaka is exactly identical with the Apārthaka of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. The Nyūna and Adhika nigrahasthānas of Nyāyaśāstra which refer to nyunatā and ādhikya of the syllogistic statement like Pratijan etc., are met with in the Nyunapada and Adhikapada of Rudraṭa, Bhoja Bhāmaha, Vāmana, Maṃmata and Viśvanātha. Thus we may conclude in the light of the above discussion that Nyāya philosophy has definitely influenced some major poeticsians in their treatment of poetic blemishes.

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र्थस्याऽपार्थक्यं यथा 'दश दाडिमानि,  
षड्पूपाः, कुण्डमजाजिनम्, पल्लुपिण्ड - - - इति ।

NBh. on NYS V. 2. 10.

16. Cf. 14.

17. ABh. P. 332. Abhinava quotes only upto सितम् ।

The line is completed by Jha Bechen by  
adding the words यशस्ते, though he does not  
quote the source.

18. शब्दार्थयोः पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तमन्यत्रानुवादात् । NYS, V. 2. 14.

19. B&P., P. 295.

20. Ibid.

21. अर्थावृत्तिः पदावृत्तिरर्थावृत्तिरपि द्विधा । AP. XI. 15.

22. ASS, P. 70.

23. Vimarśini on ASS, P. 70.

24. NS., ch. XVI, P. 333.

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26. विरुद्धार्थं मतं व्यर्थं विरुद्धं नूपदिश्यते ।

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31. KA. V. 12.

32. Nys. I. 33.

33. KA. V. 13.

34. Ibid. V. 29.

35. Ibid. V. 30.

36. Ibid. V. 53 & 54.

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विचारः कर्कशः प्रायस्तेनालीढेन किं फलम् ॥

KD. III. 127.

39. Up. P. 216.

40. इष्टव्याद्यातकारित्वं हेतौ स्यादसमर्थता । AP. XI. 20.

41. Ibid. 21.

42. अनैकान्तौ विरुद्धाश्चाप्यसिद्धः प्रतिपक्षितः ।

कारुण्ययापदिष्टश्च हेत्वाभासश्च पञ्चधा ॥

NSM. P. 216

43. अनन्तशब्धिधानप्रयोजकजिज्ञासाजनकज्ञानविषयीभूता संज्ञातिः ।

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