

CHAPTER VII
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In the preceding chapters some aspects of the influence of Nyāya philosophy have been analysed in general. In some cases we have tried to particularise the influence of particular Naiyāyikas or their works on the basis of the quotations or some similarity wherever the fact is very clear. When we are not clear we have discussed them as generally under the influence of Nyāyaśāstra. Here, in this chapter we particularly make an attempt to trace the influence of Buddhist logic on Sanskrit poetics.

While considering the influence of Buddhist logic on Poetics the first question arises : who among the poeticians are actually Buddhists. There are no concrete historical evidences on the basis of which poeticians can be determined as Buddhists. Therefore different scholars have come forward with differing claims and conjectures. If some say that the famous poeticians like Bhāmaha and Dinnāga etc. are Buddhists and belong to the tradition of Buddhist poeticians, there are other scholars who do not accept this view. However, one has to admit the fact that there is definitely some, at least partial influence of Buddhist philosophy and Buddhist logic on many of the Sanskrit poeticians.

In the development of Sanskrit poetics not only the Hindus but Buddhists have also made important contribution. So in Sanskrit poetics we find different traditi^ons or systems such as Buddhist tradition of Sanskrit poetics. The Brahminic tradition of Sanskrit poetics is well-known and makers of this system are mainly Brahmins, the follower^e of Hindu religion and philosophy. They are, to mention a few, Bharata, Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka and many others. Similarly, the poeticians like Bhāmaha, Śuddhodani, Dharmakīrti, Medhavin, Śilameghavarma, Saṅgharakṣita etc., are said to be the poeticians of Buddhist tradition.¹ But it is unfortunate that the works of most of these poeticians are not available; they are completely lost to the posterity. Except the first one they are known only from the references made to them by other poeticians. It is not possible to make proper study of these writers in the absence of their works. We shall have, therefore, to satisfy ourselves only with a broad survey - study of some important Buddhist poetic concepts woven in the fabrics of the general system of Sanskrit poetics.

VII.1 Bhāmaha

Bhāmaha, the author of KA is one of such authors. As the oldest extant poeticians after Bharata, he occupies a place of prominence in the history of Sanskrit poetics. He first laid down normative rules of Alaṅkāras and started

the Alaṅkāra school. He is not only a poetician but a great philosopher theorist also. He said to be influenced by the Buddhist logic as set out by Vasubandhu and Dinnāga. Of all the poeticians Bhāmaha seems to be the foremost to accept the viewpoints set forth in the Buddhist logic. Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy² makes some arguments in support of this supposition. We summarise them here as follows:

1. Bhāmaha begins KA with a salutation to one who is given exclusive epithet 'sārva' and 'sarvajña'.³ Later we see him deriving both the words, 'sārva' and 'sarvajña' from 'sārva' in the sense of doing good to others by adding the affix 'sa-' as mentioned by Kātyāyana in his Vārttika.⁴ Though according to Amarakośa 'sārva' can denote both Śiva and Buddha equally,⁵ the compassionate quality of working for the well of the entire world is Buddha's exclusive epithet. Prajñākaragupta's salutation to Buddha in his Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣya makes it clear as :

प्रमाणभूताय जगद्धिनेषिणे
प्रणम्य शास्त्रे सुगताय नायिने ।

It is further proved by the following verse of the Maṅgala in praise of Buddha cited by Śrīdharadāsa in his Sādūktikaraṇāmṛta.⁶

यदाख्यानासङ्गाद्युषसि पुनते वाचमृशयौ
यदीयः सङ्कल्पो हृदि सुकृतिनामैव रमते ।
स सार्वः सर्वज्ञः पथिनिरपवादो कृतपदो
जिज्ञो जन्तुर्धर्ममयतु भवावर्तपत्तिनान् ॥

Here both the epithets in question are exclusively applied to Buddha in close succession. Taking into consideration this view we can say that Bhāmaha pays homage to Buddha as he was a Buddhist poetician.

2. Bhāmaha devotes almost the whole of the fifth chapter of the KA to a detailed discussion of the rules of pramāṇas viz., pratyakṣa and anumāna. The whole account is modelled after the Buddhist logic of Dinnāga. It is generally admitted that the acceptance of only two pramāṇas is an innovation first introduced only by Dinnāga. There are only two pramāṇas accepted in Sauntrantic thought initiated by Dinnāga and extended further by the followers such as Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. Bhāmaha cites them from Dinnāga himself almost verbatim.

सत्त्वाद्यः प्रमाणाभ्यां प्रत्यक्षमनुमा च ते ।

असाधारणसामान्यविषयत्वं तयोः किरु ॥ KA. V. 5.

Dinnāga and his successors admit only two pramāṇas, because reality as apprehended is itself only two-fold viz, svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa. The former is the subject of only bare sensation or perception and the latter which involves names and forms having universal application is experienced only because of inference. This is also another point proving Bhāmaha's greater affinity for the views of Buddhist logic.

3. Diñnāga's definition of perception as kalpanāpodham is also cited verbatim by Bhāmaha in the same place of his work i.e. V. 6a. Immediately on the heels of it he follows the view of Vasubandhu indicated by the first two words of his definition viz., 'tato'rthāt' the other words left out being 'rūpādesta^{ta} eveti^{ta}hānyatah'. Vasubandhu was out and out a Vijñānavādin holding (reality only subjective in saṃjñā (sense). Pratyakṣa, according to this view, becomes the real subjective experience, arising from the internal sensation of external things. Again, Bhāmaha explains the idea of kalpanā in Diñnāga's own words viz., nāmajātyādi etc.

कल्पनां नामजात्यादियैजनां प्रतिजानते । (KA.V.6b)

4. Bhāmaha illustrates hetuvirōdhinipratijñā with two statements, one from Vedānta and other from Sāṃkhya.⁷ Ātman exists (asti ātmā) is the position of Vedānta and prakṛti exists (asti prakṛtiḥ) is the position of Sāṃkhya. Bhāmaha says that in both the above statements subject(dharmi) of the proposition is unestablished and as such what is predicated of an unestablished subject also becomes unestablished. This makes it likely that Bhāmaha is following possibly the anātmavādin Buddhist¹logical tradition.

5. Bhāmaha is seen rejecting the Buddhist doctrine of Apoha as constituting the essence of all word-meaning.⁸

It should be noted that apohavāda is a distinctive feature of Dinnāga's logic. In earlier Buddhist texts we do not find any reference to it. Bhāmaha ridicules this doctrine by stating that if the 'gauh' were to mean no positive cow but only exclusive of all others than cow (agotapratishedha) it would become incumbent on the listener to seek out another word to be aware positively of the cow as such. One and the same word cannot denote both positive and negative entities simultaneously. According to Bhāmaha it is natural to think that the positive meaning should precede the negative exclusion. This refutation indirectly proves Bhāmaha's deep knowledge of Buddhist logic and reveals independence of his mind.

6. Bhāmaha's incidental remarks as a literary theorist evoked a detailed notice and rebuttal at the hands of professional philosophers like Śāntarakṣita who were adherents of the Dinnāga's logic developed by Dharmakīrti. In the Tattvasaṅgraha Bhāmaha is expressly named and his criticisms of apohavāda are answered at considerable length by Śāntarakṣita.⁹ This shows that though Bhāmaha was a poetician his views were considered seriously in the Buddhist philosophical tradition. This could not have been the case, if Bhāmaha were considered as belonging to a non-Buddhist poetic tradition.

7. The Buddhist philosophers do not accept soul as an independent entity and therefore they are known as

anātmavādins. Bhāmaha, like Buddhists, does not accept any soul element in poetry also while analysing the poetic elements. Bhāmaha seems therefore to be revealing a strong influence of the Buddhist tradition of logic which advocated the theory of anātmavāda.

8. Bhāmaha himself admits in his work that his father's name was Rukrila Gomin.¹⁰ This name sounds much nearer to other Buddhistic names like Rahula, Somila, Potrila etc. Apart from this, Gomin is one of the prominent disciples of Lord Buddha. Therefore, this particular name also indicates the possibility of Bhāmaha being a Buddhist. Secondly, the name of Bhāmaha's son, according to M. Krishnamacarya, is probably Maskari.¹¹ This name also confirms his being a Buddhist.

As far as our study goes Prof. Krishnamoorthy is absolutely right in viewing Bhāmaha as a Buddhist Logician.

VII.2 Śaṅkuka

As far as the influence of Buddhist logic is concerned we cannot neglect Śaṅkuka, a figure of great prominence. There is no doubt that the Rasa-theory of Śaṅkuka has been developed upon the back-ground of the Nyāya theory of Anumāna. But the question arises : what is that logical system under the influence of which he has postulated his Rasānumitivāda. Since Śaṅkuka

does not leave for us any direct clue and since Śaṅkuka flourishes during a period of transition when prācīna Nyāya was at its peak, Buddhist logic was in full swing and the back-ground for Navya-Nyāya was beginning to be prepared, it is difficult to get a correct answer.

However, there are some indications in Abhinava's presentation of his views that points to a possibility of his leanings towards the Buddhist system of logic.

1. According to Śaṅkuka Rasa is the latent emotion (sthāyibhāva) imitated by the actor. Rasa originally does not reside in the actor. But the spectators consider him as Rāma. In fact there is no real presence of Rasa in the actor but the spectator thinks him as Rāma by means of citraturaganyāya. He, therefore, gets involved with it and thinks Naṭa's happiness, miseries etc. as those of the character (Rāma).¹² According to the spectators this knowledge is different from all the four types of knowledge viz., samyakjñāna, mithyājñāna, samsayajñāna and sādrśyajñāna. Śaṅkuka admits this fact and therefore the question occurs to him how is it that the spectators experience happiness on the basis of false knowledge. To put it into technical language how false knowledge leads to arthkriyā (practical behaviour). To serve this problem, Śaṅkuka follows Dharmakīrti and quotes the following kārikā from his PV.

मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोरमणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतोः ।

मिथ्याज्ञानविशेषेऽपि विशेषोऽर्थक्रियां प्रति ॥ (II.57)

2. The Citraturaganyāya employed by Śaṅkuka to explain his theory is the special feature of Buddhist logic. As rajjusarpanyāya has been used by the Vedāntins to illustrate their theory of superimposition so also Buddhist logicians apply Citraturaganyāya to elucidate their theory of illusion. Unlike Hindu Naiyāyikas Buddhists do not admit sāmānya as a special category. But they consider it as a non-existence (abhāvarūpa). According to Naiyāyikas, sāmānya is defined as nityatve sati anekasamavetatvam. The nature of sāmānya is ekākarapratīti, cognition of oneness of form in various individuals e.g. the realisation of potness in various pots. According to them, sāmānya is independent and internal category but Buddhists do not admit this sāmānya as a separate category. It is only of the nature of sāmānya. The non-difference which is experienced among the different ghaṭas is due to the function of the spectator's sight. The truth-seeker finds difference among them. The Buddhists give an example of citradarśana (picture scene) to show how a person finds identity between two different objects. The observer of a picture finds identity between two different objects viz., the original ghaṭa and the painted ghaṭa. Buddhist Vijñānavādins are of the view that anything either gauḥ or ghaṭaḥ or

turaga in a picture is an upādhi (adjunct) of viज्ञāna. Since the lines, colour etc., of a painted pot seem to be non-difference from a real pot, one is not able to differentiate it. But to a wise person the difference is clearly visible. Dharmakīrti has illustrated the nature of this nyāya in his PV.

नीलादिश्चित्रविज्ञाने ज्ञानोपाधिरनन्यभाक्
अशक्यदर्शनस्तं हि पतत्यर्थे विवेचनम् ॥ (II.220)

3. While Bhaṭṭa Tauta, the teacher of Abhinavagupta refutes the Rasa-theory of Śaṅkuka, he seems to consider him as a Buddhist. A number of evidences are available in the ABh. Bhaṭṭa Tatta gives four alternatives for the refutation of the theory of imitation (anukaravāda). Among them one is of vyākhyātrviśeṣa. By saying: व्याख्यातारः खल्वैवं विवेचयन्ति, He is quoting from Dharmakīrti.

The text of Dharmakīrti runs thus:

नन बाह्या विवेकिनः, न च तेषु विकल्पप्रवृत्तिः, कथं तेषु भवतीति ? व्याख्यातारः खल्वैवं विवेचयन्ति, न तु व्यवहृतीरः । ते तु स्वावरुम्बनमेव अर्थक्रियायोग्यं मन्यमानाः विकल्पार्थावैकीकृत्य प्रवर्तन्ते । तदभिप्रायवशादेवमुच्यते । तथा तत्कारितयाऽतत्कारिभ्यो भिन्नान् शब्देन प्रतिपादयन्तीत्युच्यते । तत्त्वचिन्तकास्तु प्रतिभासाभेदादिभ्यो नाभेदमनुसंधत्ते । Pramāṇavārttika-Vṛtti, p. 170-1

While discussing the sāmānya Dharmakīrti considers it from two points of view, one vyavahartā puruṣa and other vyākhyātā. In the same way Bhaṭṭa Tauta refutes from four points of view viz., sāmājika, naṭa, vyākhyātā

and Bharata. Tauta's statement implies that even if Śaṅkuka follows the śidhānta of Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti Rasa cannot be proved, as anukaraṇarūpa.

5. In the refutation of Śaṅkuka's view one line seems to be significant : नर्तकान्तरेऽपि च रामोऽयमिति प्रतिपत्तिरस्ति । ततश्च रामत्वं सामान्यरूपमित्यायातम् ।
(ABh. P. 269).

Bhaṭṭa Tauta argues here that if Śaṅkuka's argument is accepted then different actors on different stages will have to be considered as 'ramo'yam' and therefore the rāmatva in the form of a universal (sāmānya) will have to be unavoidably admitted. The implication of the words rāmatvam sāmānyarūpamityāyātam is that Śaṅkuka does not and cannot admit sāmānya which is the position of the Buddhist logician. Tauta thus indirectly indicates to Śaṅkuka being a Buddhist thinker.

6. Lollāṭa accepts rasa to be the upacitasthāyi existing in the poetic character. Thus he admits two conditions viz., the upacita (accumulated) and anupacita (unaccumulated) of sthāyi (permanent emotion). While refuting this Śaṅkuka holds that the anupacita condition cannot be apprehended because in that condition there is no conjunction of vibhāvādi with sthāyi. When the conjunction takes place, that condition turns into the state of upacita. Vibhāvādi happen to be the līngas indicating the state of bhāva. In the anupacita state when there are not any vibhāvādi, the knowledge of sthāyi cannot arise in the absence of the līngas.¹³

This argument of Śaṅkuka seems to be having relation with the Buddhist doctrine. Buddhist philosophers admit only two pramāṇas - pratyakṣa nad anumāna. The anupacita state which Lollaṭa admits as sthāyī cannot be perceived as it is internal bhāvātmaka and there cannot be any inference of it without vibhāvādi which act as lingas. There is no other pramāṇa to prove this state. Thus the argument of Śaṅkuka gives an indication of his Buddhist back-ground.

7. The Vijñānavādin Buddhist philosophers do not admit the existence of any other object except Buddhi or jñāna. Dharmakīrti says that there is no difference between blue colour and the knowledge of the blue colour. The external objects which appears to be different from knowledge is an illusion and just an appearance of jñāna itself. The nīlātmaka knowledge itself takes place as the external blue object which appear to be existing. According to Dharmakīrti arthasārūpya is the means of knowledge. The existence of nīla is inferred on the basis of nīlasārūpya or arthasārūpya.¹⁴ similarly the person who admits the existence of external objects admit bhāva or artha as the producer of jñāna.¹⁵ So according to them jñāna precedes bhāva and according to vijñānavādins, bhāva precedes jñāna.¹⁶ Thus there are two types of vijñāna, vyavahārabuddhi and tāttvikabuddhi. As per the vyavahārabuddhi, bhāva precedes jñāna and

according to the tāttvikabuddhi, jñāna precedes bhāva.

Now, while Bharata in the sixth chapter of NS raises a question whether bhāva arises from rasa or rasa arises from bhāva, he gives the following answer keeping its critics in view.

१कं रसेभ्यो भावानामभिवृत्तिरुताहो भावेभ्यो
रसनामिति । कैषाचिन्मतं परस्परसम्बन्धादेष्वा
मभिवृत्तिरिति । तन्न । कस्यात् । दृश्यते हि
भावेभ्यो रसानामभिवृत्तिर्न तु रसेभ्य भावाना-
मभिवृत्तिरिति । ABh. P. 286.

In this connection the criticism of Śaṅkuka seems to be based on the Buddhist ideas. He admits the production of bhāvas from rasa as is clear from the following:

श्रीशङ्कुकस्ताह - अनुकतरि रसानास्वादयन्तोऽ-
नुकार्ये भावप्रतीतिः प्रयोगे । कैके प्रकृतिः रसं
निष्पादयतीति । द्वितीयपक्षो नाट्याचार्यो - - - - -
ABh. P. 283.

Śaṅkuka admits that first of all the sāmājika experiences the anukriyamāna rasa in anukartā and after that the knowledge of bhāva in relation with anukārya. Therefore, from the point^{of} view of sāmājika, abhāva arises from rasa, while from the vyavahāra or laukika point of view it is said that rasa arises out of perception of bhāva (which is called prakṛti in the above statement).

Here, two points appear to be similar with the Buddhist thoughts. One is the discussion of the relation of rasa

and bhāva from the vyāvahārika and Laukika point of view as well as from that of vyākhyātā and ālocaṇa and other is the acceptance of rasa in the form of knowledge as the producer of bhāvas. Further, Śaṅkuka's thesis of janya-janaka is nothing but vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka nature as it known from the statement of Dharmottarācārya

न चात्र जन्यजन्यकभावनिवन्धनः, साध्यसाधन-
भावः, अपितु व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकभावेन ।

Com. Dharmottara on Hetubindu, P. 276

8. While Bhaṭṭa Tauta refutes the anukarāṇavāda of Śaṅkuka from the point of view of vastuvṛtta, vivecaka and vyākhyātā he has almost definitely kept in view the Buddhist thoughts. In the experience of sāmānya while vyavahartā observes identity vivecaka observes difference. Similar is the case with the perception of a picture sāmājika does not make any difference between naṭa and Rāma it is the vivecaka who finds a difference there. Keeping this in view Tauta says :

नापि वस्तुवृत्तानुसारेण तदनुकारत्वम्, अनुसंवैयमानस्य वृत्तत्वा-
नुपपत्तेः । Abh. 276
Sāmājika cannot concentrate on the vastutattva because

of his deep involvement with the realisation of rasa. Here Bhaṭṭa Tauta presents his view of vastutattva in the light of the ideas of Dharmakīrti.

9. The terms and language used by Śaṅkuka also give an indication of the influence of Buddhist logic. The terms like samyakjñāna which is used by the philosophers like Dharmakīrti with a specific meaning in the place of

yathārthajñāna in the age when Śāṅkuka flourished and Buddhist logic was in its full swing definitely bear some significance. All these arguments prove that Śāṅkuka's rasa theory has deep relation with the philosophy of Dharmakīrti.

VII.3 Ānandavardhana

1. Ānandavardhana in his DhA shows evidences of his close acquaintance with the works of Dharmakīrti, the great Buddhist logician. His following stanza :

मुख्यां वृत्तिं परित्यज्य गुणवृत्त्यर्थदर्शनम् ।
यदुद्दिश्यं फलं तत्र शब्दे नैव स्वकङ्कति ॥ I. 14

has close connection with the following stanza:

यत्र स्वदयासदर्थोऽपि जनैः शब्दे निवेशितः ।
स मुख्यस्तत्र तत्साम्याद् गौणोऽन्यत्र स्वकङ्कति ॥
(PV. II. 37)

2. Ānandavardhana refers to the kṛtrimasāmbandhavādinah

(scholars who accept a conventional relation) between words and their senses. Here, the Buddhist logicians must have been meant along with other Naiyāyikas.

Abhinava in his Locana¹⁸ also refers to PV.III.91, which may be taken as an evidence. He quotes the kārikā in full in a separate context.¹⁹ Abhinava in his Locana²⁰ refers to another verse attributed to Dharmakīrti by Ānandavardhana himself. They are as follows:

लावण्यद्रविणव्ययौ न गणितः क्लेशौ महान् स्वीकृतः
 स्वच्छन्दस्य सुखं जनस्य वसतः चिन्तानक्षौ दीपितः
 एषापि स्वयमेव तुल्यश्मणः भावाक्षराकीर्तता
 कोऽर्थश्चैतसि वैधसा विनिर्मुक्तस्तन्व्यास्तनुं तन्वता ॥
 (DHA. P. 240)

अनद्यवसितावहं मनल्यधीशक्तिना -

प्यदृष्टपरमार्थतत्त्वमधिकाभियोगैरपि ।

मत्तं समं जगत्पल्लवसदृशप्रतिग्राहकं

प्रयास्यति पयानिधेः पय इव स्वदेहे जराम् ॥
 (ibid. P. 242)

The former verse is said to belong to the concluding portion of Nyāyaviniścayaavṛtti of Dharmakīrti.²¹

3. Ānandavardhana employs the terms like 'nāntariyaka' which are familiar in the Buddhist parlance.²²

4. He is reported to have written a commentary on the Pramānaviniścaya of Dharmakīrti also.²³

VII.4 Mahimabhaṭṭa

Buddhist logic seems to have exercised a profound influence on Mahimabhaṭṭa. The following points make it clear:

1. Mahimabhaṭṭa has cited following four verses from the PV of Dharmakīrti:

तदुक्तम् —

तद्भावहेतुभावां हि दृष्टान्ते तद्वैदिनः ।

ख्याप्येते विदुषां वाच्यो हेतुरेव च कैवलः ॥

(VV. P. 69; PV. III. 26)

तदुक्तम् —

भ्रान्तिरपि सम्बन्धतः प्रमा' इति ।

मणिप्रदीपप्रभयैर्मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतः ।

मिथ्याज्ञानविशेषेऽपि विशेषोऽर्थक्रियां प्रति ॥

(VV. P. 76; PV. II. 57)

तदुक्तम् —

स्वज्ञानेनान्यथाहेतुः सिद्धर्थे व्यञ्जके । मतः

यथा दीपोऽन्यथाभावे को विशेषस्य कारकात् ।

(VV. P. 80; PV. III. 262)

यदाहुः — नासिद्धौ भावधर्मोऽस्ति व्यभिचार्युभयाश्रया ।

धर्मो विरुद्धो भावस्य सा सता साध्यते कथम्

(VV. P. 469; PV. III. 190)

2. Ruyyaka, the commentator identifies the following

quotation of Mahimabhaṭṭa

यदुक्तं 'तच्च न शब्दपुनरुक्तं पृथग्वाच्यमर्थपुन-
रुक्तेनैव गतार्थत्वाद् । न ह्यर्थभेदे शब्दसाम्येऽपि
कश्चिदोषः । यथा —

हसति हसति स्वामिन्युच्ये रुदन्यपि शैदिति ।
द्रविणकणिकाक्रीतं यन्त्रं प्रनृत्यति नृत्यति । } ✓

VV, P. 334

with a passage in the Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti by saying

'yaduktam vādanyāye.'²⁴

3. Bhaṭṭagopāla, the author of Sāhityacudāmaṇi, a commentary on KP describes Mahimabhaṭṭa as an Anumāna theorist following Buddhist tradition.²⁵

4. His concept of vyāpti as involving the relation of either tādātmya or tadutpatti between hetu and sādhya is evidently derived from Buddhist logic since it conceives of this dual relationship in vyāpti.

5. Ruyyaka in his commentary on VV often tries to clarify Mahimabhaṭṭa's position on the basis of Buddhist principles. Commenting on Mahimabhaṭṭa's inclusion of Lakṣanā as Anumāna, Ruyyaka points out that though Buddhists accept lakṣanā as arthavyāpāra it should actually be considered Anumāna.²⁵ He thereby suggests that Mahimabhaṭṭa subscribed to Buddhist standpoint in such matters. Similarly on Mahimabhaṭṭa's comment that pain is a specific form of experience, Ruyyaka observes that this has been stated by Mahimabhaṭṭa as per Buddhist principles.²⁶

6. When Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that from the line 'mohantu harervihāṅgamo hantu' we cognise a particular type of bird characterised by the class characteristic Garuḍatva. The commentary explains the point that Garuḍatva is reckoned as a class characteristic as per Buddhist principles according to which Garuḍas are many.²⁷

7. Mahimabhaṭṭa cites an anonymous passage²⁸ which accepts only two pramāṇas viz., pratyakṣa and anumāna. Apparently this is a quotation from some Buddhist work, since Buddhist logic accepts only two pramāṇas. It is true that Vaiśeṣika philosophers also accept only two pramāṇas but in view of the many other references to Buddhism in VV, the above passage is also probably from some Buddhist source.

VII.5 Trairūpyahetuvāda

(theory advocating the three characteristics of a valid reason)

In Indian logic trairūpyahetuvāda is an important theory. Logicians, from the very beginning, have tried to define the characteristic of a valid reason or a sadhetu and to show how many characteristics exactly a sadhetu should have. In this connection, trairūpyavāda and pañcarūpyavāda have been developed. According to Buddhists, a sadhetu is that which possesses all the three characteristics viz., pervasive presence of the hetu in the pakṣa(pakṣasattva), the necessary presence of the hetu in some similar instances (sapakṣasattva) and the pervasive absence of the hetu from dissimilar instances(vipakṣāsattva).

These are the basic tenets for the Buddhists²⁹ concerning the test of validity or invalidity of a hetu.

In the absence of the three characteristics outlined above the hetu will suffer from the fallacies like asiddha, anaikāntika and viruddha respectively.

A lot of controversy has been created with regard to the trairūpyavāda of hetu. In the history of Indian logic we find two interpretations of the concept of trairūpya, one in Prasastapāda and the other in Diñnāga. Prasastapāda points out that 1. what is conjoined with sādhya and 2. has been found in what possesses it, and 3. is always absent in the absence of sādhya, is liṅga which brings about inference. What differs from this is one or two aspects is lacking of the mark, being either contradictory, untrue or inconclusive. This view is very close to that of Diñnāga. In the Pramāṇasamuccaya he defines trairūpya as 'anumeye'tha tat-tulye sadbhāvo nāstita'sati'. This means the presence of hetu in the pakṣa, its presence again in sapakṣa like mahānasa and its absence in vipakṣa like jalahrda is later modified in the Nyāyabindu by Dharmakīrti as follows:

त्रैलोक्यम् पुनर्लिङ्गस्यानुमेये सत्त्वमेव, सपक्षे एव सत्त्वम्
असपक्षे चासत्त्वमेव निश्चितम्। (Nyāyabindu II.5)

Stcherbas'sky remarks:³⁰

The relation of the logical Reason to the substratum of the inference, on the one side, and to the similar and dissimilar cases, on the other side, is expressed in the three rules

of Vasubandhu, which have been endorsed by Dignāga(sic) and Dharmakīrti. They constitute the celebrated Three Aspects of the logical reason as taught by the Buddhists and rejected by all other schools of Indian logicians except the reformed Vaiśeṣikas.

It needs to be specially mentioned here that this trairūpyavāda of hetu is a special theory of Buddhist logic. On the other hand, Hindu Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers add two more characteristics for distinguishing a sadhetu from an asadhetu i.e. asatpratipakṣatva and abādhitatva. Thus they advocate pañcarūpyavāda of hetu. By enumerating the five-fold hetvābhāsas Gautama indicates that a real hetu must possess five characteristics (pañcarūpa) in default of any of which it becomes a hetvābhāsa.

With this background while studying Sanskrit poetics we observe that some of the poeticsians who have entered upon some kind of discussion relating to the theory of anumāna have almost always referred to trairūpya of hetu. They have also pointed out that the invalidity of a hetu arises from the absence of any of these three characteristics resulting in the hetvābhāsas like anaikāntika etc.

Obviously, the trairūpya hetu was sufficient for establishing the validity of a hetu. The remaining

two of the pañcarūpa tradition of prācīna Naiyāyikas were redundant. This was soon realised by the brahminical logician also who were flexible enough to modify their views on this point. As Udayanācārya shows doubt about the pañcarūpatva of a valid hetu, it was obvious that neo-logician would adopt trirūpatva only.

Bhāmaha was the earliest poetician and the first to accept the trirūpa hetu under the influence of Buddhist philosophers. Later poeticians had only to follow the appropriate example of their staunch ancestor, as it can be seen from the following verses:

1. त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गानो ज्ञानमनुमानं च केचन।
तद्विद्वा नान्तरीयार्थदर्शनं चापरं विदुः ॥ KA. V. 11.
2. त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गाख्यानं पथार्थानुमानमिति - - - - VV. P. 67.
3. यदुक्तं - - - - त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गाधनुमेयज्ञानं - - - - ibid. P. 81
4. पक्षधर्मान्वयव्यतिरेकित्वेन त्रिरूपो हेतुः साधनम्।
KP. 182.

5. तथार्ह - अनुमानं नाम पक्षसत्त्वसपक्षसत्त्व-
विपक्षव्यावृत्तत्वविशिष्टाल्लिङ्गाल्लिङ्गिनो
ज्ञानम्। SD., P. 165

Thus, ultimately it was the Buddhist principle of the trairūpya of hetu that proved more efficient and was accepted both in poeticians and logician tradition.

Thus Buddhist Logic, "a system of logic and epistemology created in India in VI-VII century A.D. by the two great lustrés of Buddhist science, the Master Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti"³¹ has left remarkable influence on Sanskrit poetics. In the broad field of Indian Logic Buddhist Logic constitutes an intermediate state and was developed in a spirit of a decisive opposition to the logic of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. It lasted for about three centuries and constituted an intermezzo after which Indian Logic continued its historical life in India in the absence of any Buddhist opposition. After the disappearance of Buddhist Logic new school of Nyāya concentrated all their attention on the problems of syllogism and was chiefly engaged in finding new and exceedingly subtle definitions of every detail of the syllogistic process.

Hence it is easy to infer that the poeticsians who mainly flourished during the period when the high tide of the Buddhist Logic was continuing in India, have come under the influence of Buddhist logic. Even if many of the rhetoricians were brahmins and followers of Hindu religion, still they, when the occasion arises, unhesitatingly quoted kārikas from the classics of Buddhist logic in support of their contention and used definitions and terminology adopted by the Buddhist

logicians. It is clear that the system of Buddhist logic was very influential, pre-dominant and the propounders of the system like Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti had made great contributions and the author of Alāṅkāraśāstra were much influenced by it. Prof. Anantalal

³²
Thakur remarks:

It (Sanskrit poetics) has many things in common with the Buddhist philosophers - the relation between the words and their import being one such important topic. Buddhist philosophers have written works like Śabdārthacintāmaṇi. The Buddhist definitions in almost all the cases were precise and their terminology very rich and all-embracing. Moreover, Kashmir was the land where Alāṅkāraśāstra thrived more than anywhere else. It was Kashmir where Buddhist Logic and philosophy also flourished a bit earlier and formed an important item in the curriculum. Hence it is but natural that the rhetoricians should take recourse to the Buddhist means and methods of thought and quote from Buddhist works whenever they were found useful. It may be added in this context that Brahminical logic for a time was overshadowed by its Buddhist counterpart to be revived subsequently by scholars like Vācaspati Miśra and others. But the Buddhistic elements

made a permanent impression on the Alāṅkāraśāstra in its hey days.

During the period of development of Navya-Nyāya the poeticians were attracted towards this new system of logic with its new style and methods. The influence of various kinds, which we have observed in previous chapters on Sanskrit poeticians and their works, are purely of Navya-Naiyāyikas. Buddhist logic was almost non-existent then and it had nothing to influence the poeticians of this later period. It was only in the initial stages of Sanskrit poetics that we observe the clear influence of Buddhist logic on authors from Bhāmaha to Śaṅkuka, Tauta, Mahimabhaṭṭa and their contemporaries. In the later stages only those concepts of Buddhist logic (like Trairūpya) which were already assimilated in the main stream of Indian logic remained.

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काव्यालङ्कार इत्येष यथाबुद्धि विधास्यते ॥ KA, I.1
4. हितप्रकरणे णञ्च सर्वशब्दान्प्रयुञ्जते ।
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ibid, VI. 53
5. सर्वज्ञः सुगतो बुद्धो ---- Amarakośa, I. 1.13.
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(KA. V. 15a)
8. Ibid, VI. 17, 18, 219.
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10. वृथितं रक्त्विगोमिसूनुनैदम् ॥ KA. VI. 64a
11. Krishnamacharya, M., History of Classical Sanskrit Literature, Para 815, P. 724.
12. यः सुखी रामः असावयमिति प्रतीतिरस्तीति ।
ABh. P. 267.

13. विभावाद्ययोगे स्थायिनौ लिङ्गाभावेनावगन्थनुपपत्तेः।

Ibid. P. 266.

14. अर्थसारूप्यमस्य प्रमाणम् । Nyāyabindu I.20

यस्माद्विषयाज्ञानमुदेति तद्विषयसदृशं तद् भवति।

यथा नीलादुत्पद्यमानं नीलसदृशम् तच्च
सारूप्यं सादृश्यमाकार इत्याभास इत्यपि व्यपदिश्यते।

Com. of Dharmottara on I.20

15. न चात्र जन्यजनकभावनिबन्धनः साध्यसाधनभावः

ibid.

16. ननु च ज्ञानादव्यतिरिक्तं सादृश्यम् । ibid.

18. Locana, p. 542.

19. शब्दाः संकेतितं प्राहुर्व्यवहाराय स स्मृतः।

तदा स्वलक्षणं नास्ति संकेतस्तेन तत्र न ॥

PV. III. 91.

20. Ibid. II. 263-4.

21. तथा चार्थं विनिश्चयवृत्त्यन्ते धर्मकीर्त्याचार्य-

स्य श्लोक इति प्रसिद्धिः। एतदर्थसंस्पर्शक-

श्चापरोऽपि हि स्फुट एव तस्य श्लोको

विवक्षितं परिपश्यन्ते। यथा - अनध्यवसित - - - -

Kāvyaṃyūśāsanaviveka, P. 363.

22. Thukuy Anantatalal, "Influence of Buddhist
Logic on Alamkāra Śāstra", P. 258.

23. Ibid. P. 218.
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यैतदुक्तम् । Ibid. P. 346.
27. गरुडजान्त्यवच्छिन्नसौगतदृशः। गरुडानां बहुत्वा-
दिति भावः । Ibid. 279.
28. यदाहुः - "न चान्यदृशेनै --- - - द्वे एव प्रमाणे ।
VV. P. 81
29. Nyāyabindu II. 3.; III. I
30. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I. P. 243-4.
31. Ibid P. 1.
32. Thakur Anantlal, op.cit. P. 261.
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