

CHAPTER. V.

EXPOSITION OF THE SUDDHĀDVAITA.

(I).

Introductory.

While the founders of various theories in Indian Philosophy have formulated and preached their own ideas, it was left for their illustrious followers to put their doctrines in a systematic form. Thus whereas Gaudapāda in his Kārikās first brought out the theory of Māyā and that of Ajāti, Śaṅkara surpassed his grand-teacher and people now know Śaṅkara more than they know Gaudapāda. Śaṅkara was followed by Vācaspati Miśra and others, who systematised Śaṅkara's theories and preached the avacchedavāda, or the pratibimbavāda or whatever Vāda, as they thought, has been accepted by Śaṅkara. This has happened in the case of all the great teachers like Rāmānuja, and Madhva, Śrīkenṭha and Nimbārka. But Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva are clear in their works. Rāmānuja with his dialectical style and Śaṅkara with his easy and graceful and yet scholarly diction stand in sharp contrast with Vallabha, whose laconic and terse expressions are fused with a very subtle analysis brought forth in his interpretative method. Vallabha is so brief in his

works, that it is difficult to understand them fully without the aid of commentaries. We are even confused at times and not in a position to understand what exactly he is driving at. Viṭṭhaleśa, though clearer in exposition than his father, is more concerned with the establishment of the Sampradāya and even in his independent works like the Vidvanmandana, he seems to be launching a violent tirade against Śaṅkara rather than attempting a systematic exposition of his own doctrines. Again one may feel that at times Viṭṭhaleśa is very sectarian. His special references to Gokula, Puṣṭi, Maryādā and Pravāha, his laying greater emphasis on the minor and decidedly later Upaniṣads- all this may not appear to a critical mind as a very creditable performance. Viṭṭhaleśa was followed by Gokulanātha and Harirāya- both of whom can be called the pillars of the Sampradāya, but their share in the systematic explanation of the philosophical part of the Suddhādvaita is not so very great as to be taken into account. Puruṣottama alone, the greatest scholar of the Sampradāya, was the first writer to note this defect and to try to make ~~up~~ for it.

Again though Puruṣottama is mainly a commentator, he is not merely a writer of commentaries. His Vādagranthas and his Prasthānaratnākara-which is unfortunately not

complete, ~~so~~ show something of a modern scholar in Puruṣottama. Here his aim is not to refute the theories of others but to propound his own and the refutation of others' thoughts is just a subordinate affair. Again, as we have seen above, Puruṣottama's method is comparative and analytical. So it is by reading Puruṣottama's works that we can find out where exactly the 'Suddhādvaita' stands in the whole range of Indian, especially the Vedāntic, philosophy.

Further, Puruṣottama, who has written so much on the 'Suddhādvaita', was rewarded with an enviable title of Vedapaśu by his contemporaries and some people in the Saṃpradāya even went to the extent of saying that Puruṣottama has taught ^{us} ~~strong~~ theories.¹ There may be various reasons for it and we shall deal with them later on. But it is necessary for us to see where Puruṣottama's analysis has led him and whether there is anything in his works, that warrants such a statement. For all these reasons, therefore, we have attempted in the following pages the exposition of the 'Suddhādvaita' as given by Puruṣottama.

1. Cf. Avatāravādēvalī. Hindi. Intro. p. 6.

(II).

Theory of knowledge.

Knowledge, says Puruṣottama, is endless, and infinite because it is the very nature of the Supreme Principle, Brahman. When the Lord desires to create and to be manifold, the sentiency which is His very nature, is revealed in many ways. Thus even though it is infinite, it can be understood as tenfold. As stated in the beginning of Prasthānaratnākara, these ten types are as follows:-

(1) Knowledge which is the essential nature of God, the essential spirit of all the beings, which is not liable to modification (vikāra) and which is to be meditated upon by all.²

(2) When this essential nature of God is manifested, like the light of the Sun, it is then called the quality of God. It inheres in the individual souls from Him.

(3) In the beginning of the creation, God accepts the Vedāśarīra and we have that knowledge, manifested in the form of the Vedas.

(4) The third kind of knowledge becomes the seed from which is manifested in the first creation, the verbal

2. Tatre sarvātmabhūtam sarvāpāśyam mukhyam avikṛtam
svasvarūpātmakam ekam- Pr.p.2.

knowledge.

These four types of knowledge are said to be eternal (nitya). The other six which are enumerated below, are said to be Kārya and are attributes of the internal organ (Antah-karana).

(5) When individual words convey the sense, we have the fifth kind of knowledge, depending upon and qualified by the association of particular words. Even for the dumb, who have no speech, gestures take the place of words.

(6) When one knows something by means of his organs of sensation, that is the sixth kind of knowledge, which may be called the sense-knowledge.

The remaining four kinds of knowledge are also related to the individual knower, but depend upon the internal organ.

(7) The Manas, which has the nature and function of conation and non-conation, (Sankalpa & Vikalpa) produces the doubt. (Saṁśaya)

(8) The body-consciousness, wrong knowledge, decision and memory—all these depend upon the buddhi.

(9) The dream consciousness depends upon the egoism (Ahaṁkāra) associated with the buddhi.

(10) Deep-sleep consciousness where the citta has the vision of the soul^y as One.

Puruṣottama does not accept the view that the knowledge which is thus produced, is just a transitory phenomenon, lasting for three moments only. Even if we admit its permanence, there can be no contingency of one particular knowledge lasting all the while. When another kind of knowledge is produced due to the presence of other objects and the set of circumstances required for its production, it supercedes the former, which is then relegated to the back-ground and which exists in the subtle form of impressions, (Samskāra) Whenever the attention of the manas is drawn towards it, it can be discovered in memory; it is not so found out when the manas is busy with other things and does not pay heed to it. It is not necessary therefore to say that the knowledge is destroyed. It is just concealed.

From another point of view, knowledge can be classified as sāttvika, rājasa, and tāmasa according as there is the presence and preponderance of one or another of the three qualities. Out of these three, the last is incapable of proving anything. It is just illusory, is condemned by the cultured people and is adhered to only by the heretics and

the low.

The sāt̥tvika knowledge is of the form of pramā or right knowledge; for, whenever there is an increase of sattva, right knowledge is produced owing to various causes like scriptures, action, meditation, mantras, purifications etc. When however the sattva quality is lacking, the same circumstances which produce knowledge, produce error in its lieu. Thus we can say from this positive and negative concomitance that the knowledge, which is produced by the sattva, is the pramāṇa which is not sublated or which is not liable to sublation.³

The sāt̥tvika knowledge does not accept any distinctions (vikalpas). It is the kaivalya, which is absolutely valid, the primary notion being the presence of the Universal Essence every where. It is sadātmaka. The syllogism⁴ given by Puruṣottama to prove that all the

3. Abād̥hite jñānatvam bād̥hayogyavyatiriktatvam vā tal-
lakṣaṇam. Pr.p.6.

4. Vimetā bhāvāḥ sadabhinnāḥ. Ādyantamedhyeṣu sadanugatatvāt.
Yad eva yad anugataṁ tat tad abhinnam. Sauverṇakundāla-
-katakādivat. Sadevaśeṣatvāc ca tathā. Pr.p.6.

objects are non-different from the Sat on the analogy of the non-difference of the gold and the golden ornaments, because of the inherence of Sat comes very near to the esoteric knowledge of Śaṅkara, in which all the distinctions are to be eschewed and there remains only pure being. The indeterminate knowledge according to the Puruṣottama, is the first apprehension of being alone, without any qualifications and distinctions. But while Śaṅkara's esoteric knowledge does not admit even the knower and the triplicate difference of the knower, known and knowledge, Puruṣottama does not go to that extent. The basic difference between the two is that, while Śaṅkara's nirvikalpaka is perfectly in consonance with his own theories of the nirvikalpaka Brahman, such is not the case with Puruṣottama, who is not in a position to accept the distinction in the qualityless and the qualified Brahman. Puruṣottama's explanation of the nirvikalpaka is in keeping with his theory of tādātmya.

The Rājasa knowledge, which is produced by the rājasa-sāmagri, is variously revealed and is full of distinctions. The rājasa knowledge is stated to be savikalpaka. Whenever an object is first known, it is known as pure being viz. we have the indeterminate knowledge on account of

the quality of Sattva. This is however immediately superseded by the rajas, which is moved by the internal organ in association with the senses and this leads to the distinction in the name and form of that particular object. The change-over from the indeterminate to the determinate is so rapid that the apprehension of the former is almost absent and we do not at all think that we have passed through one stage and come to another. The procedure however is the same., whether the sensory perception may be simple or complex, as illustrated in that of "a pot" or that of 'a pot on the ground'. Puruṣottama classifies the savikalpaka into two:

- (i) Viśiṣṭabuddhi-or associated knowledge e.g. 'a man with a stick.'
- (ii) Samūhālambanabuddhi-knowledge of a conglomeration of entities.e.g. 'a man and a stick,' 'a pot, a cloth and a pillar.'

Puruṣottama's explanation of the indeterminate and the determinate is as follows:-

We have at first the revelation of the pure being. This is nirvikalpaka. When the internal organ operates with the senses, that pure being is defined in its name and form; and this is savikalpaka. The distinction between the two

forms of knowledge may appear to be rather too minute and scholastic. It is an explanation of the process of perception and cognition from the simple to the complex. But the difference of opinion among various thinkers is due to the difference in their various concepts about the Supreme Principle and its relation with the diversity of the world. The nirvikalpaka-savikalpaka process thus has to be explained in keeping with the theorists' own doctrine of the creation of the world, with all its distinctions and diversities from the cause or causes, which he has postulated. It will be interesting here to compare the Buddhādvaiṣa theory with those of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. We have already stated before, how Śaṅkara and Puruṣottama come very near to each other in their concepts of the nirvikalpaka jñāna. Similar is the position with the concepts regarding the savikalpaka also. Puruṣottama points out that the Rājasa knowledge has no absolute validity but is useful only in the worldly dealings. He explains the vyavahāra as a bundle of the natural processes of the body and senses and produced by a similar bundle in the mind, which is replete with the egoistic thoughts of

'I' and 'Mine'.⁵ The exoteric reality of Śaṅkara has its reality in the empirical sphere only and has no absolute reality. But the distinction between the two is pointed out by Puruṣottama himself, when he defines the determinates as the interim qualities of the reality.⁶ Puruṣottama's explanation can be very easily distinguished from that of Rāmānuja, who thinks that everything, even Brahman is qualified. For him the psychological process in the indeterminate to the determinate is not that in the simple to the complex, but in the complex without the past associations to the complex, associated with the past experiences.⁷ Puruṣottama's explanation of the two types of knowledge is quite in keeping with his theory of ^Pure Monism, wherein the One becomes manifold and yet remains one and pure.

5. Ahamamābhīmānātmakamēhasasannipātajanyo dehendriyādi-
svābhāvikavyāpārātmakah sannipātah. Pr. p. 7.

6. Vikalpāḥ sataḥ avāntaraviśeṣāḥ. Pr. p. 10.

7. Nirvikalpakam api saviśeṣaviśayam eva. Śrībhāṣya. I. i. 1. p. 27.
Also, Ato nirvikalpakam ekajātīyeṣu prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇam.
And, Tatra prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇe gotvāder anuvṛttākāratā
na pratīyate. Dvitiyādipiṇḍagrahaṇeṣv evānuvṛttipratīteḥ.

Śrībhāṣya. I. i. 1. p. 28.

Puruṣottama classifies the determinate knowledge into doubt, error, decision, memory and dream.

Doubt or *samśaya* is explained by Puruṣottama as the understanding of various and contradictory characters in one substantive.⁸ It is further classified into *sama* and *utkāṭakotika*. *Sama* is that in which both the alternatives have equal force, e.g. 'This is a man or not a man' or 'This is a man or a pillar'. The *utkāṭakotika* on the other hand, is that in which one of the alternatives is stronger than the other, e.g. 'This is most probably a man'.

Viparyāsa is explained by Puruṣottama as the extraneous knowledge revealing an object different from the object, which is contacted by our senses.⁹ Here comes the theory of erroneous perception, which is called *khyāti*. Puruṣottama discusses and refutes various *khyātis* and propounds the *anyakhyāti* in his *Khyātivēda*.¹⁰ Puruṣottama's analysis of illusion is based upon the objective experience of a subjective impression. In the illusory perception of silver, the illusory silver is revealed to us on account of

8. Ekasmin dharmīni viruddhaśānākotyavagāhi jñānam samśayah.

Pr. p. 15.

9. Samprayuktabhinnārthanātrapratipēḍakam bāhyam jñānam viparyāsaḥ. Pr. p. 16.

10. Khyātivēda: Vādāvalī. p. 120. ff.

the objective and external projection of the knowledge through the instrumentality of Māyā. The knowledge of silver is existing as an impression because of our earlier experience of the same. This projected knowledge envelopes the object in view, partly or completely and thus we perceive something quite different (Anyā). It is therefore called Anyakhyāti.¹¹

Dr. P. D. Chandratre in his thesis on 'Methodology' of the major Bhāṣyas on the Brahmasūtras' says that Vallabha accepts the anyathākhyāti, so that one's mistake of something for some other thing is due to the similarity of some of the attributes between the two. 'After the attainment

11. Tat pūrvotpannasyānubhevasya samskāratmanā sthitasyo-
dbodhakaiḥ prābalye māyikārthākāravatī buddhivṛttir
māyayā bahiḥ kṣipyate. Tadā sē purovartīnam sarvato'
māsato vāvṛtya bahir avabhāṣata iti māyikasyānyasyaiva
khyānād anyakhyātir ity atra vyavahriyate. Pr. p. 17.
Also, Aṭaḥ śuktirajatādīsthale māyayā bahiḥkṣiptabuddhi-
vṛttirūpam jñānam evārthākāreṇa khyāyata iti mantavyam.

Khyātivāda. Vādāvalī. p. 121.

of true knowledge however the view-point in this respect is changed to Akhyāti.¹² The Anyathākhyāti is accepted by the Naiyāyikas while the Akhyāti is believed in by the Prābhākaras. Vallabha's doctrine of error has been ably explained by Prof. G. H. Bhatt in his article on the subject.¹³ Puruṣottama not only refuses to believe in the anyathākhyāti, but even refutes it. Puruṣottama says that if we believe in the appearance of an object otherwise, then that anyathātva would mean yathārthatva or reality.¹⁴ The chāmēra cannot be regarded as real and cannot therefore be said to exist. Hence we shall have to understand the instrumentality of Māyā and the external projection of our own buddhi, which reveals something other (anya) than the object with which our senses are in contact. This is known as anyakhyāti. In spite of the polemical passages against anyathākhyāti, we shall have to admit the first part of it viz. that of similarity. Thus when Puruṣottama says that the rajatābuddhi comes to the fore because of the latent impressions of the same already existing in our minds, we shall have to accept that rajata and śukāti must have some similarity for

12. Methodology. p. 97.

13. Prof. G. H. Bhatt: Vallabhācārya's view on error.

Siddha Bharati. Vol. II.

14. Anyathātve yathārthatāpatteh. Khyātivāda. Vādāvalī. p. 122.

otherwise we can not account for the rajatabuddhi alone and not the ghatabuddhi, being projected outside.

Purusottama accepts this by saying that the term *anya* means *sādrśa*.¹⁵ This however is from the point of view of those who have not attained to the true knowledge. As for those, who have correct knowledge, everything is perceived by them as the manifestation of Brahman; the theory of erroneous perception is that of *akhyāti*, which is just our inability to note the distinction between the object in view and the object which is perceived. But the question arises here, as to whether we can believe in the erroneous perception of those who have right knowledge. Purusottama himself says that their knowledge is right knowledge.¹⁶

Various theories of erroneous perception in the systems of Indian philosophy do not purport merely to explain the psychological development, involved in

15. Anyapadasya sādrśyevācakatvenānubhūtasādrśadharmānām eva khyānāt. Khyātivāda. Vādāvalī. p.130.

16. Atas teṣām jñānasya yathārthatvāt ...etc. Ibid. p.130.

wrong perception. These theories are in keeping with the doctrines about the reality or otherwise of the universe with its manifold appearances, as related to its Supreme Cause. Every one accepts that the snake perceived in place of rope or silver mistaken for conchshell is false and practically non-existent. But the question is, as to how, that which is not existing can replace something which exists and can appear as existing. Śaṅkara who thinks that the perception of everything requires its existence, says that it is inexplicable. If the snake does not exist, it can not be seen. So long as we are seeing it, it is real and we even tremble with fear at its sight. Only when we come to know that it is a rope, we feel that the snake is unreal. The snake thus cannot be said to be real, for otherwise it would not have been sublated; it can not be said to have been unreal, for then it would not have been perceived at all. For Śaṅkara all knowledge is real in its own sphere. This is not the position of Rāmānuja, who goes to the extent of taking even silver as real on the ground of the triplication of the primordial elements (Trivṛtkarṇa), as stated in the

scriptures. Puruṣottama, so to say, steers clear of the two, for he has to explain the theory in keeping with the difference between Jagat and Samsāra, maintained by Vallabha. Thus he can not accept the different levels of experience, nor the reality of everything, that is perceived. That is why he says that the silver, that appears in place of conchshell, is an erroneous objective experience of a subjective entity, while the conchshell remains there as true as ever. It is thus our fault that we see silver; it is not the conchshell, which becomes silver owing to our faulty eyes. He believes that Māyā is an instrument in false apperception. Here Puruṣottama may be said to come very near to the Ātmakhyāti of the Buddhists, who believe in the internal existence of silver as a mode of mind and who think that the error consists in regarding what is internal as external. But the two systems are wide apart in their basic theories; for the Vijñānavādins think of the internal existence alone of everything and deny the externality of all objects. This can not be admitted by Puruṣottama; who refutes the theory of Ātmakhyāti thoroughly. In the Buddhist doctrine the

externality even of a conchshell is an error.

Niścaya is defined as the correct apprehension of an object.¹⁷ It can be obtained by perception, inference, verbal knowledge or analogy.¹⁸ Decisive knowledge is said to be twofold, pratyakṣa and parokṣa. Immediate or direct knowledge arises out of a real existing contact between the object and our senses;¹⁹ while indirect knowledge is different from it. Śaṅkara also divides knowledge into pratyakṣa and parokṣa; but for Śaṅkara, immediate knowledge is not to be equated with sensory perception only, but it also includes the immediate intuition, which may not involve sensory perception. Thus the knowledge arising out of the teaching, 'That thou art' is also immediate because it is intuitive.²⁰ Thus according to him pratyakṣa is the communion of the subject-consciousness and the object-

17. Niścayo yathārthānubhavaḥ. Pr.p.18.

18. Analogy is explained as arising through the senses having the knowledge of similarity. Sēdṛśyādisahakṛte-ndriyārthasamsārgajanyā. Pr.p.19.

19. Pr.p.20.

20. Pratyakṣāvegāman cedam phalam. Tat tvam asīty asamsāryā-tmatvapratipattau satyēṁ samsāryātmatvavyāvṛtteh.

Śaṅkarabhāṣya. I. iv. 14.

consciousness; for this the body is not indispensable. ²¹

Vallabha refuses to admit that verbal knowledge can produce immediate apprehension because in the illustration like 'Thou art the tenth', the tenth person ~~sees~~ that he is the tenth and it is this perception, which is more powerful than verbal knowledge. ²² Puruṣottama, while explaining this, says that the sentence 'Thou art/ the tenth' gives us knowledge not of the Ātman but only of the body. According to Śaṅkara the passage 'That thou art' produces ātma - sāksātkāra. Thus there is disparity of illustration.

Vallabha further points out that if we agree to the intuitive knowledge based upon verbal authority, it would mean a mixture of pramāṇas, which is undesirable. ²³

Puruṣottama is more pointed when he says that Śaṅkara means something which goes off its set limits. Thus the passage 'Thou art the tenth' has not the capacity of giving

21. *Evam sati deha upalabdhir bhavaty esati ca na bhavātīti na dehadharmo bhovitum arhati. Śaṅkarabhāṣya. III. iii .54.*

22. *Daśamaś tvam asīty ādau pratyakṣasāmagryā balavattvād dehādeḥ pratyakṣatvāt. A.B. I.i.1.*

23. *Pramāṇasaṅkarāpattiś ca. A.B.I.i.1.*

knowledge of the subject leaving aside that of the object, which is the purport of the sentence. Thus the communion of the subject consciousness and the object consciousness is not admissible.²⁴ Immediate knowledge thus is only due to sensory perception in the Śuddhādvaita.

Memory is explained as knowledge arising from the impression only.²⁵ The impressions are our past experiences existing in subtle form.²⁶

The dream experiences have the dream world as their object. The dream world is purely illusory and has no element of reality.²⁷ The reality, which is at times experienced in the dreams, may be explained as on a par with the chimeræ that we may at times see in the waking state. But as the knowledge is of the essential nature of the self, even that

24. Daśamas tvam asīti vākyasthayuṣmatpadasmāritapadārtho-
-llāṅghanenāsmatpadārthaviṣayakajñānajanane tasya jñānasya
pramāṇatvam na syāt. A.B.P.I.i.1.p.31. Puruṣottama also
gives an alternative explanation for the mixture of
pramāṇas.

25. Samskāramātrajanyen jñānam. Pr.p.21.

26. Pr.p.21.

27. Svāpaikī sṛṣṭir māyāmātram na vastubhūteti niścayaḥ.

Pr.p.24.

which has the dream world as its object is true and not false.²⁸ Here Puruṣottama refuses to accept Madhva's theory that though the dream world is true and without any material cause, the dream experiences are false. Puruṣottama reduces this to absurdity by pointing out that if a man sees his head being cut off in a dream even though his vision may be untrue, he must have his head cut off and must meet with his death.

The distinction between the dream and the waking state is stated to be the continuation of the latter, while the former is seen and destroyed and there is no continuity between two dreams.²⁹ Śaṅkara distinguishes between the two from two points of view. He says that whatever is perceived in a dream is sublated in the waking state. Besides the criterion of *bādhā*, Śaṅkara also distinguishes the two by stating that the dream experiences are memory or *smṛti*,

28. Jñānam tu tadviśayakam satyam eva. Tasyātmarūpatvāt. Pr. p. 25.

29. Tathā ca svapnajāgaritadr̥ṣṭayos tātkalikānyathātva-tāt-kālikānyakālikānyathātva-bhāverūpavaidharmyān na svapna-jāgaritadr̥ṣṭayos, tulyatvam. A. B. P. II. ii. 29. p. 656.

Vallabha is far simpler when he says: Varsānantaram api dr̥śyamāṇaḥ stambhaḥ stambha eva. A. B. II. ii. 29. p. 656-57.

whereas the waking experiences are upalabdhi.³⁰ The orthodox Vedāntic view however is that ~~of~~ the *Anirvacanīyakhyāti*. Śaṅkara refers to this in his Bhāṣye on the Brahmasūtra III.ii.7.³¹ It may be said, the reason of Bādha-abādha, as given by Śaṅkara, is not so different from that of Vallabha, who says that a pillar remains a pillar even after years, which means that it is not contradicted or sublated; but while Śaṅkara's Bādha-abādha depend upon the change from the dream to the waking state, this is not the case with Vallabha, who intends to point out that there is no continuity between two dreams.

Deep sleep experience is stated to be a division of the dream. In deep sleep, Puruṣottama says, the self reveals itself.³² Cintā or reflection which may be of the nature of synthesis or analysis, which may be by the method of agreement

30. Kin punar vaidharṇyam? Bādhā-bādhāv iti brūmah....Api ca smṛtir eṣā yat svapnadarśanam. Upalabdhis tu jāgarita-darśanam. Śaṅkarabhāṣya. II.ii.29.

31. Cf. the quotations from Vedāntaparibhāṣā and Brahmavidyā-bhāṣana in Brahmasūtraś II.i. & ii. with Śaṅkara's comments Dr. Belvalkar. p. 164.

32. Susuptis tu svapnasyaivāvēntarabhedah. Tatrātmaphureṇam tu svata eva. Pr. p. 25.

or difference, or which may be of the nature of mental doubt or meditation is to be included in the memory and need not be separately considered. Shame, fear and the like are modes of egoism and are ^onot states of cognition. Recognition is not different from decision. Memory is auxiliary to recognition., which is produced 'in association with the present perception, directly through the operation of memory and indirectly through the operation of past impressions.'³³

The correctness or otherwise of an experience depends upon the predominance of right knowledge or false knowledge respectively. Thus paintings, idolations and stage-representations by actors have the predominance of *pramā* in as much as they have the capacity to produce the same feelings, as would have been produced in presence of the objects, which they have imitated.³⁴

Śaṅkara believes that the subject and the object are fundamentally opposed to each other like light and darkness. The essential nature of the subject is different from

33. Śa N. Dasgupta..History of Indian Philosophy.Vol.IV.p.339.

34. Bhramapremāsaṭūhālembanam tu ekadeśavikārtam ananyavad bhavatīti nyāyena bhramādhikye viparyāsa eva.Pramādhikye ca niścayaḥ. Pr. p.25-26.

that of the object. The subject is sentient while the object is nonsentient. In the opinion of Śaṅkara the subject-object relationship is purely relative. In the ultimate analysis, the subject is not even the knower viz. the substance of which knowledge is an attribute, but is knowledge itself. Thus there is complete identity between the Ātman and samvit. Our statements like 'I am thin,' or 'I am blind' are due to the superimposition of the subject upon the object and vice versa. Similarly when we say 'I know myself', we are trying to turn the subject into an object and thus think in the realm of Adhyāsa. Rāmānuja in his Bhāṣya on the very first Sūtra, gives a studied refutation of Śaṅkara's position and maintains that knowledge is different from the knower and the known. There can be no samvit without the subject and the object. Knowledge again is an attribute of the Ātman. Puruṣottama says that the vyāpti of viśayatva and jñatva cannot be maintained as has been done by Śaṅkara, because the sentient Ātman is an object of self realization like 'I know the Ātman'. If the Ātman is not an object of pratyagvitti, that pratyagvitti ceases to be a vitti at all. It is possible to say that everything that is jñāta is also

a viṣaya, but its converse is wrong.³⁵ Puruṣottama further says that Ātman and samvit are not synonymous. The relation of Ātman and samvit is^s that of a substance and its attribute or better, that of āśraya and āśrayin. In the statements like 'I know', or 'I possess knowledge', knowledge is understood as an attribute of 'I'.³⁶ Puruṣottama says that the object is also real and different from the subject. That the Ātman is revealed by knowledge (paratah-prakāśita) does not render it non-sentient, because Ātman is self-luminous. Puruṣottama says that Ātman is both, having the essential nature of knowledge and having knowledge as an attribute.³⁷ This is the real import of the ten divisions of knowledge, given by Puruṣottama. In the system of Rāmānuja, it is very difficult to find out how the attributes are organically related to the substance. For Śaṅkara the attributes and the substance are not related but are one, and the difficulty

35. Viṣayatvena jadatvena vyāpteh pratyakṣabādhitatvāt...

Jadatvena viṣayatvena vyāpter^{eva} pratyakṣasiddhatvāt.

A.B.P.I.i.1.p.15.

36. Aham jñānāmīti Jñānavān aham ity eva ātmadharmatvenaiva tasya bhānā ca. A.B.P.I.i.1. p.16.

37. Citsvarūpatve sati svayamprakāśasamvidāśrayatvasyaiva cetanatvāt. A.B.P.I.i.1.p.15.

arises when he tries to explain how Ātman, which is sentiency, becomes sentient. The theory of anirvacanīyata is infact a frank admission of the inability to explain the problem. But then a very important problem remains unexplained. Rāmānuja's refutation of Śaṅkara touches the same points. The samvit of Śaṅkara, which is regarded as one with Ātman, is the esoteric knowledge. What then is the use of refuting him with the arguments, which belong purely to the exoteric level? Puruṣottama blends the two positions and tries to avoid the difficulties by stating that knowledge is the Nature as also an attribute of the self. This involves the question of the exact relationship between a substance and its qualities, which we shall discuss later on. Again Puruṣottama does not maintain, atleast expressly, the distinction between the exoteric and the esoteric spheres of knowledge, and yet he tries to evolve the former from the latter. This can be and is done by him by falling back upon the incomprehensible powers of God.

(III).

Means of proof.

Pramāṇas have always occupied an important position in the systems of Indian thought. While beginning his Prasthāna-ratnākara, with a chapter on the Pramāṇas, Puruṣottama gives

the oft-quoted maxim, 'Mānādhīnā meyasiddih' i.e. 'the establishment of that, which is to be measured, depends upon that which measures.'³⁸ Vallabha describes pramāṇa as that by which one knows, what is unknown.³⁹ Puruṣottama says in the beginning of his Prasthānaratnākara, that the term pramāṇa has two meanings. Firstly it stands for the knowledge which is not sublated or which is different from that which is liable to contradiction; it also stands for that which brings about such knowledge.⁴⁰ It is interesting to note here that Puruṣottama distinguishes between Karāṇa and kāraṇa. Karāṇa is explained by him as 'Vyāpāravad asādhāraṇam'⁴¹ or 'A unique agent associated with a dynamic agent with reference to the effects that are to be produced.'⁴²

Vallabha has not said much about pratyakṣa, but Puruṣottama has dealt with it often and at length.

38. Pr.p.1. Cf. also Citsukhī.II.18, quoted by Dr.P.D. Chendratre, Methodology. p.44. Fn.1.

39. Anadhigatārthagant^trvāt pramāṇasya. A.B.I.i.2. p-80.

40. Tatra pramāṇaśabdo bhāvavyutpanno rūḍho vā abādhita-jñāne vartate bēdhayogyavyatirikte ca. Karāṇavyutpannas tu tādrśajñānakarane. Pr.p.1.

41. Pr.p.26.

42. S.N.Dasgupta. History of Indian Philosophy. Vol.IV.p.340.

P
 Perception or pratyakṣa is defined by Puruṣottama as the pramāṇa, corresponding to and depending upon various sense-faculties. ⁴³ The sense organs are six in number, eye, skin, nose, tongue, ear, and mind. Whereas most of the Indian systems do not admit the mind also as a sense-faculty, Puruṣottama is inclined to admit it as such. It is better, he says, to believe that the mind is and is not a sense-faculty, because of its nature of both knowledge and action. It has not been accepted as an indriya because it is superior to the other five. Thus he thinks that the mind has its function of a sense-faculty, but has also something more than that of an ordinary sense-faculty.

These indriyas are atomic, super-sensible and changing (Vikāri). Puruṣottama gives the objects of these faculties as follows:

The eye has as its objects the manifest form, that which has the manifest form, and the modes of the latter like number, extent, separation, conjunction, division, relation, non-relation to others, motion, action, genus and that in which it is inherent. The objects of the

43. Indriyātmakam pramāṇam .Pr.p.108.

skin are the manifest touch and whatever is connected with it. Similar are the cases of nose, tongue and ear, which have their objects as the manifest smell, the manifest taste and the manifest sound respectively, together with all their correlates. It is interesting to note that for Puruṣottama only the manifest form or sound or touch can be an object of its corresponding sense-faculty. Thus the atoms of ghosts, which have no manifest colour can not be an object of the corresponding visual sense-faculty. Thus the earth is the object of all the five sense-faculties; water of four (excluding the gustatory), fire of three (excluding the gustatory and the olfactory), air of the tactual and the auditory. Space is the object of the visual sense-faculty only on the ground of the prameyabala.⁴⁴ Directions and time are known only as attributes of the objects of knowledge and not as separate objects. The modes of the mind like desire and others are grasped by the mind. The soul and its attributes are not however objects of mundane sense-faculties.

Tamas or darkness is regarded as a separate positive entity and not mere absence of light. The followers of Śaṅkara also think in the same way. When

44.Pr.p.110.

we do not perceive objects in darkness, we actually see the darkness, which is an entity and which comes in the way of other objects and covers them. Similarly Puruṣottama is inclined to regard the pratibimba also as a separate category.⁴⁵

Puruṣottama refuses to accept Abhāva as a separate category and considers the various abhāvas as just different states of the cause. He thinks that they should be included in the āvirbhāva and tirobhāva. The abhāva came to be regarded as a padārtha by the later Vaiśeṣikas, when the Vaiśeṣika ontology gave way to and absorbed in it the consideration of the Nyāya epistemology. Kaṇāda, for instance, does not admit it. For him absolute non-existence has no meaning while other three abhāvas, the prāgabhāva, the pradhvansābhāva and the anyonyābhāva are related to the positive being. The Suddhādvaita believes in the manifestation of the Lord as the world. Hence for Puruṣottama, everything is God. When something is produced, the cause is manifested in that way; when it ceases to exist, that manifestation is withdrawn and there is

45. Vādāvalī. Andhakāravāda. p. 131ff. & Pratibimbavāda, p. 193ff.

non-manifestation. Thus there is no abhāva, nothing which is non-existent. Puruṣottama explains all the four abhāvas, as related to the Āvirbhāva and Tirobhāva of the inhering cause. The prāgabhāva or negation antecedent to production is the condition of the material cause, which is not manifested, the condition which is congenial to its manifestation as an effect.⁴⁶ Similarly the pradhvansābhāva or the non-existence posterior to destruction is the condition which is against the subsistence of the effect.⁴⁷ The anyonyābhāva or the negation of one thing in another and vice versa is just an āvirbhāvaviśeṣa because it is a manifestation of one thing, that excludes that ^{of} others.⁴⁸ The absolute non-existence, which is illustrated by the son of a barren woman or a sky-flower is nothing but non-manifestation or tirobhāva.

The function and operation of these sense-faculties are of the nature of proximity. (Pratyāsattirūpa) It can be divided into two, mundane and supramundane or laukika and alaukika. The supramundane is threefold, sāmānya, yogaja and

46. Tirobhāvesahakṛtā kāryāvirbhava-anukūlā avasthā. Pr. p. 111.

47. Kāryavasthātipretikūlā-avasthā. Pr. p. 111.

48. Tasyaiva itarevyāvartakatvād itarevyāvrttatvēc ca. Pr. p. 115.

māyā; while the former is fivefold, samyoga, tādātmya, samyuktatādātmya, samyuktaviśeṣanātā and tādātmyasvarūpa. The sāmānya is that which is useful in the knowledge of an individual owing to the general form, which is followed up in it.⁴⁹ The yogaja is the perceptual experience of the future or past events and those events, which are beyond the reach of our sense-organs.⁵⁰ The māyā is the perception of those entities, which in fact do not exist.⁵¹ When our eye sees an object, it is due to the contact of our eye with that particular object. This is samyoga, by which we know not only that particular object but also its qualities, action and species. Or it may be the identity of the two, which are in contact with each other. (Samyukta-tādātmya). Similar is the case of the skin, nose and tongue. When however we comprehend the sound by our ears, samyoga alone is the function. With regard to the knowledge of the external objects by the mind, those objects are experienced by the mind through the instrumentality of the sense-faculties, which are connected with the objects

49. Anugatākāreṇa tad vyaktijñāne upayujyate. Pr. p. 116.

50; Anagata-atīta-atīndriyādivastusākṣātkāre. Pr. p. 116.

51. Avidyamānānām padārthēnām buddhau upasthāpane. Pr. p. 116.

on the one hand and the mind on the other. The mind experiences its own attributes like knowledge and happiness because of the relation of identity or *tādātmya* between the attributes and the substantive. With regard to the comprehension of the modes of mind, the nature of those modes (*Vṛttisvarūpa*) is the means. Disappearance or *tirobhāva* is known through the *indriyasamyuktaviśeṣanātā*.

While dealing with the perceptual experience of external objects, an important point has been made out by the Sāṅkhya and the Vedāntic scholars with regard to the *vṛtti* or mode. We see a certain object with our eyes, but the same external object is seen even after the eyes are closed. This form cannot be an external object, which is not seen because it can not exist without its substance. Hence it must belong to something within, rather than to the object without. That is how the followers of Sāṅkhya admit the *vṛtti*. The followers of Śaṅkara accept the *vṛtti* as an effect or *pariṇāma* of the internal organ, produced by the contact of the senses with the objects. The Naiyāyikas do not think it necessary to accept the *vṛttipadārtha*. Puruṣottama says that the experience of an after-image is universal and cannot be rejected as

has been done by the Naiyāyikas. The vṛtti therefore has to be admitted, but it is not necessary to accept it as a separate category, different from the buddhi. It is just a specific state of the buddhi, aroused by time and produced by the qualities like sattva.⁵² Thus when an external object is produced in the waking state by means of our eyes, simultaneously with it is produced the buddhivṛtti of that particular form. When the eyes are closed we experience that very vṛtti. Thus the vṛtti is both ~~guna~~^{anyā} and indriyajanyā. It is interesting to note that Puruṣottama admits time as a category existing in the buddhi and not in the senses as done in the ~~Vedānta~~ Vedāntaparibhāṣā. For Puruṣottama time is the determinant of the buddhi and one of the accessories to mental illumination.⁵³

Buddhi, says Puruṣottama, is to be inferred from its effect i.e. the knowledge of something.⁵⁴ Its place is the heart. A man who is endowed with the buddhi, knows the external objects. So buddhi can be understood as the cause of knowledge, as can be seen in passages like 'a man who is

52. Budhicitattvasya kālakṣubdhasattvādiguṇakṛto'vasthā-
viśeṣa eva. Pr. p. 124.

53. Cf. T. Sn. Ab. pp. 107-110.; Pr. pp. 123-126.

54. Viśiṣṭajñānalakṣaṇakārya-anumeyā. T. Sn. Ab. p. 77.

intelligent knows the objects.' (Yo buddhimāns tasya padārtha-jñānam bhavati. Or Subuddhir ayam padārthān jānāti.) Buddhi and knowledge are used as synonyms on account of the identity of cause and effect. Thus Puruṣottama explains buddhi as 'Yogajedharmā' janyo viśiṣṭajñānasamānākāro jñānendriyā-nu-grāhakah padārtho buddhir iti.'⁵⁵ When the buddhi functions at the first movement of the operation of senses, there is indeterminate knowledge; when the buddhi is modified in the vṛtti, in association with the sense-faculty the indeterminate becomes determinate. The vṛttis appear in succession; with the rise of one vṛtti, the former disappears and remains as an impression (Samskāra). When these impressions are roused by certain causes and conditions, they take the form of memory.

Puruṣottama explains the process of our ordinary knowledge as similar to the process of any other action. According to the Bhagavad Gītā, actions of an individual are dependent upon five factors.⁵⁶ Body is the operating

55. P. Sp. Ab. p. 79.

56. Cf. Adhiṣṭhānam tathā kartā karanam ēa prthagvidham,
Vividhās ca prthak ceṣṭā daivam caivātra pañcamam.
'Serīravāhmanobhir yat karma prārabhate narah,
Nyāyayam vā viparītam vā pañcāsite tatra hetavaḥ.

Bhagavad Gītā. XVIII. 14-15.

basis, while the individual soul is the agent. Karana may be diverse, external or internal. Cestā or activity signifies the various functions of the prāṇas and body. Daiva is time, action, desire of God, the inner controller (Antaryāmin), and the superintending deities of the sense-organs, which are accessory to the chief breath. These are the factors responsible for that action which is the cause of the connection of the mind, which produces knowledge. The whole process can be explained thus. Because of the desire of God, the inner controller who is an anśa of God, inspires the internal organ with the help of time and action. The internal organ is fourfold. Rudra is the superintending deity of the ego (ahaṁkāra), which produces the consciousness of being embodied. Brahmā is the deity of Buddhi, which is responsible for the function of the sense-faculties. The citā is latent but grasps the soul in its unity in deep sleep. The manas, which is supervised by the Moon, heads the list of the organs of both actions and sensation and its function is to inspire the respective indriyas by means of its relation to the organs and their deities. Then these organs perform their respective functions. The sense-organs, when inspired by the manas,

are related with their objects and produce the indeterminate in the manas, which is also in contact with the objects ~~th~~ through the sense-organs. The manas thus has its mode in the sphere of these sense-organs. When these modes of the manas are qualified by the buddhi, through its own mode, the indeterminate becomes determinate. Because of the infinite number of external objects, the determinate knowledge is infinite; even then it can be classified into doubt, wrong knowledge, right knowledge and memory in the waking state. Similar classification is possible even in the dream state. Puruṣottama says that the buddhi can also be divided into three, the upādāna buddhi, when the mind is attracted by a certain object, the hāna buddhi, when the mind is repelled by a certain object and it wishes to avoid the same, and the upekṣā buddhi when the mind becomes indifferent to a certain object. The sense-organs enlighten an object by establishing contact with it. The eye approaches the objects with the help of its rays, or the power of the superintending Sun, or by the colour (Rūpa), which is its quality. The manas, which rules over the eyes, is also connected with the objects in the same way. Thus we perceive an object, limited by definite space, as for instance a pot on the earth or the stars in the sky.

Regarding the other organs of sensation, it is the manas, which goes to the objects together with the respective organs, because they have no rays. However unscientific this process may appear to a modern mind, it is interesting to note how carefully Puruṣottama has given an analysis of the psychology of perception.⁵⁷

This process of perception is not however applicable to the intuitive perception of the Lord. Puruṣottama says that the perceptual realization of God depends upon God himself. It is only by His grace, which is the seed of devotion, that one may see Him. He can also be seen in the state of incarnation because of His general desire that 'May all see me'.⁵⁸

As regards anumāna, Puruṣottama says that he has nothing new to say. He defines it as an instrument of inferential knowledge.⁵⁹ Vyāpti is the invariable concomitance or co-existence of the hetu and the sādhyā.⁶⁰ It thus requires

57. Cf. A.B.P. II. iv. 16. pp. 792-794; Pr. pp. 126-128.

58. Cf. A.B.P. II. iv. 16. pp. 803-804; Pr. pp. 137-138.

59. Anumitikarāṇam anumānam. Pr. p. 138. The same definition in Tarkasaṅgraha. P. 34.

60. Avyabhicaritam hetoh sādhyasāmānādhikaranyam. Pr. p. 139.

the presence of a particular sādhyā whenever there is a particular hetu, and the absence of the hetu in absence of the sādhyā. The hetu is that which is pressed into service with the object of proving something.⁶¹ The sādhyā is an object which is desired to be proved. (Sisādhayisāvisayātvaṃ). Puruṣottama is inclined to accept the division of vyāpti into sama and viśama, i.e. mutual or one-sided concomitance, following the Sāṅkhyapravacanasūtras. We have thus the sama vyāpti when the circle of the hetu and that of the sādhyā coincide; when the former falls within the latter, we have the viśama vyāpti.

Puruṣottama explains the process of inference as the decision of the presence of the sādhyā in a particular case, on the ground of the memory of the invariable co-existence of the hetu and the sādhyā, which we have seen often or once. Thus we have often seen the smoke and fire, both, in the kitchen and the like and we decide the invariable concomitance between the two. After that, when we see smoke on a hill, we remember^{mb} that concomitance and deduce the existence of fire also. We can say that the anumāna is the application to a particular case of a

61. Sādhyaṭvenopādīyamānatvaṃ hetutvaṃ. Pr. p. 139.

general rule, which again has been formed after looking into a particular case or cases.⁶²

While Gautama classifies inference into three; *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyato-drṣṭā*,⁶³ The new school of Logic gives another classification into *anvayavyatireki*, *kevalānvayi* and *kevalavyatireki*. The first is dependent upon only the positive concomitance as no instance on the negative side is available.⁶⁴ *Puruṣottama* is not, however, inclined to accept it, for even if an object may be said to be knowable in one form, it is not so knowable in another form and thus the negative instances are available.⁶⁵ *Puruṣottama* accepts

62. Tac ca sāmānādhikaranyam bhūyaḥ sakṛd vā darśanāt sanskārodbodhe smṛtipatham ārohati. Tatas tatsmeranottaram hetuḥ sādhyam niścāyayati. Yathā mahānesādaḥ niścite dhūmasya vahnnyavyabhicaritasāmānādhikaranye paścāt parvatādaḥ
 ṛṣte dhūme tatsmeranottaram dhūmo vahnim niścāyayati, dhūmadeśe vahnir iti. Sa niścayo' numitih. Pr. p. 142.

63. Nyāyasūtras I, i. 5.

64. Anvayamātravyāptikam. kevalānvayi yathā ghaṭo' bhidheyah prameyatvāt patavat. Tarkasaṅgraha p. 40.

65. Sarvatrāpi kenacidrūpeṇa jñeyatvādisattve' pi rūpāntareṇa tadabhāvasya sarvajenīnatvāc ca kevalānvayisādhyakānumānasyaivābhāvāt. Pr. p. 141.

the other two, i.e. Kevalavyatireki and Anvayavyatireki. The former is arrived at, when only negative instances can be found, as in 'the earth is different from other things because of its earthness'. (Prthivī itarebhyo bhidyate prthivītvāt.) In the anvayavyatireki form of anumāna, we have both the positive and negative concomitance as in 'the hill has fire on it, because of the smoke. (Parvato vahninān dhūmāt.)

Both these, anvayavyatireki and kevalavyatireki, can be classified into svārtha and parārtha.⁶⁶ Svārtha is for resolving the doubts of one's own mind while the other is for convincing others of one's own conclusions. The latter therefore is dependent upon a syllogism, which according to the orthodox Nyāya has five propositions, pratijñā, hetu, udāharana, upenaya and nigamana. Puruṣottama prefers the syllogism with only first three propositions.⁶⁷

Puruṣottama also discusses in his ^PPrasthānaratnākara, various fallacies of reason, which we have referred to in the preceding chapter and hence the discussion need not be repeated here.

The most important pramāṇa for the Vedānta, however, is the verbal testimony, which is defined in the Nyāya-

66. Idam dvividham api svārthaparārthabhedāt punar

dvividham. Pr.p. 143. See also Tarkasaṅgraha p. 37.

67. Pr.p. 144.

Sūtras as the instructive assertion of a reliable person.⁶⁸

According to Puruṣottama, āpta is one who speaks of things as they are.⁶⁹ It can be divided into two types, laukika and alaukika. The laukika refers to persons like us while the alaukika refers to all from sages to God. Among those who are alaukika, the higher a person, the more reliable he is. The most trust worthy and absolutely infallible is therefore God. So the Vedas which owe their origin to Him, constitute the independent pramāṇa.⁷⁰

Puruṣottama discusses whether or not the Vedas can be treated as an independent pramāṇa. Ordinarily, the words of a man depend upon what he has seen or inferred, but this does not mean, says Puruṣottama, that verbal testimony

68. Āptopadeśaḥ śabaddaḥ. Nyāyasūtras I.i.7. Cf. also Sa cāptopadeśarūpaḥ. Pr. p. 34.

69. Āptaś ca yathāsthitārthavādī. Pr. p. 34.

70. It is interesting to note that a similar classification has been given in the Tarkasaṅgraha: Vākyam dvividham. Vaidikam laukikam ca. Vaidikam īśvaroktatvāt sarvaṁ eva pramāṇam. Laukikam tv āptoktam pramāṇam. Anyad apramāṇam. Tarkasaṅgraha. p. 53. Cf. also similar classification in the Nyāyasūtras: Sa dvividho dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭārthatvāt. I.i.8.

owes its authoritativeness to perception or inference. Whenever a word is heard, it has the capacity of conveying to our mind a specific object, which may not have been perceived. The scriptures are not dependent upon perception as the dharma, which is nowhere found in the world, is taught in the Vedas. We may agree that the words, which establish something connected with the worldly dealings, require perception but this is not the case with the Vedas.⁷¹ The Vedas teach us of the objects, which are supraworldly. So their authoritativeness is self-established.⁷² Puruṣottama argues that if we believe in the paratah pramāṇya, i.e. its validity depending upon something else and not self-proved, then the right knowledge can be acquired only by the operational capacity of that particular pramāṇa, upon which it depends. The knowledge of that capacity again depends upon something else and so on. This would lead to the regressus ad infinitum. We shall have therefore to stop somewhere. So we may finally believe in the pramāṇatva of the internal organ, which is purified by the Yoga or in the instrumentality of the quality of

71. Ato Laukikavyavahārasādhakasyaiva śabdasya pratyakso-
pajīvakatvaṁ na Vedasya. Pr.p.38.

72. Śabda eva pramāṇam. Tatrāpy alaukikaññāpakam eva. Tat
svatahsiddhapramāṇabhāvam pramāṇam. T.S.P.V.7.p.35.

sattva, pure and simple. The purification of the internal organ or the quality of sattva can be brought about by the scriptural means alone. Great persons can have faith only in the Vedas. So the Vedas alone, which purify the sattva, which are the words of God himself and are of the nature of His outbreathing, stand as unrivalled *pramāṇa*.⁷³

The impersonal character of the Vedas, as made out and emphasised by the *Mīmāṃsā*, has raised one of the complicated problems regarding the character of words and their relation to the objects, which they convey. If we have to believe in the Vedas as the highest authority, we must understand that relation to the ^{be} eternal, but the individual objects denoted by the words are perishable. How to explain this? Jaimini says that the words exist for ever, in an unperceived form; they are only made manifest when they are uttered. The relation of words and their meaning is eternal.⁷⁴ In that case words can not denote individuals; they have their relation with the form or *ākṛti*, which is eternal. Śaṅkara generally accepts the opinions of the *Mīmāṃsakas* and says that the words have their connection

73. Cf. *W.S.Ab.V.7.p.35*.

74. *Autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ*.

with the form and not with individuals.⁷⁵ Though Śaṅkara accepts the conception of jāti, later Advaitins like Ġitsukha do not accept it, because it is difficult to explain the relation of jāti and vyakti, class and individuals. Rāmānuja gets over the difficulty by thinking that all the words ultimately denote God. The inner/self of all the words is God; as the external form of the objects, which are expressed, may be diverse, we should not think that the words, which ultimately denote God, are synonymous.⁷⁶

According to the Suddhādvaita, the highest Lord has many powers. God creates not only the rūpa-prapañca or the creation in form but also the nāma-prapañca or the name-creation. Thus pure monism may be said to give a theological explanation of the Vedas. As Puruṣottama puts it, the Śabdabrahman is first revealed as the Nāda of God. It is immutable at first. When it is manifested through the mouth of God, after acquiring a subtle form of the nature of

75. Ākṛtibhiś ca śabdānāṃ sambandho na vyaktibhiḥ.

Śāṅkerabhāṣya. I. iii. 28.

76. Sarve śabdāḥ paramātmāna eva vācakaḥ. Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha. p. 104.

See also: Iha tu sarvāvasthāvesthāyāṃ paramapuruṣaśarīra-
tvena cidacitos tatprekāratayaiva padārthatvāt
tatprekārāḥ paramapuruṣaḥ sarvadā sarvaśabda-
vācya iti viśeṣaḥ. Śrībhāṣya. I. i. 1.

the mental determination of different letters, it appears in the gross form of morae, vowels and letters. It then assumes the form of Śabdabrahmātmakaveda. As that Nāda is all-pervading, it is present in us also. God then enlightens the vṛtti of the auditory sense-faculty and it is heard: it can not be heard otherwise as the door of hearing is closed. It is the same Nāda, which is known as Sphota on the ground of its etymology as 'sphutati vāg anena.'⁷⁷ It is then revealed in the form of parā, paśyanti, madhyamā and vaikharī, as accepted by the grammarians. Puruṣottama says that just as sat, cit and ānanda are aspects of God, letters, words and sentences are aspects of Śabdabrahman.⁷⁸

Puruṣottama also discusses how a word is heard. Wind, he says, is instrumental in the production of sound in or out of the body. Sometimes we hear the sound of friction. The five prēmordial elements are its samavāyins. Sound is particularly related to the Ākāśa, while it may be said to be common to the other four. Whenever a sound is produced

77. Pr. P. 56.

78. Brahmanah saccidānanda iva śabdabrahmano varṇapada-
vākyaṇi nāmāni. Pr. p. 56.

it generally spreads in various directions, because of its very nature of spreading out. So those who happened to be near to the place, where the sound is produced, can very easily hear it. Thus spread out by the air, it is gradually absorbed in the ears of the hearers and ultimately becomes inaudible.⁷⁹ We can recognise the place of the origination of the sound, because of the wind, that brings it to our ears. Thus the directions which are not independently grasped by our ears, can be comprehended as qualifying attributes of the sound, which is heard by us.

Just as Brahman in the Śuddhādvaita has contradictory attributes, the Śabdabrahman also is possessed of contradictory qualities. Consequently, letters, words and sentences also, as aspects of the same, have the viruddha-dharmaśrayatva. That is why the śabda, which is not only eternal but also pervading or vyāpaka, is heard only in certain places and not everywhere and at all times.

Puruṣottama says that the relation of a word with its meaning is eternal. He accepts the existence of ākr̥ti or form and the eternal relation of the words with it.⁸⁰

79. Dāhyābhāve vahnir iva svebhāvatāḥ kālāḍina ca tasya nāśah. Pr.p.63.

80. Tasmād asty atiriktā ākr̥tir nityeṣi tayā śabdasya sambandho'pi nitya iti siddham. Pr.p.44.

But he does not agree with the contention of Śaṅkara and the Mīmāṃsakas that the words are connected with only the form and not with individual objects. On the other hand he says that words have their relation with the individual objects and not just with the form.⁸¹ If we believe in the relation of the words with an eternal form there would arise the contingency of admitting lakṣaṇā (indication), by which we know of an individual object. Vallabha however is staunchly opposed to lakṣaṇā in the explanation and interpretation of the Vedic passages. In emphatically advocating the strictly literal interpretation of the Vedic passages, Vallabha surpasses the Mīmāṃsakas also. While stating that, by once resorting to lakṣaṇā, we shall resort to it everywhere, which is surely not a happy way of explanations, Vallabha and after him Puruṣottama give a sound argument also. The words employed in the Vedas have not always their conventional meaning, but are at times used in their etymological sense. The word 'siktaretāḥ' is an instance. It can not have relation with any eternal form that can imply any individual, on the other hand it is an attribute and as the term can be used only after the seminal discharge, it is anitya also.⁸²

81. Tasnān nāḥṛtiṃātre sambandhaḥ, kintu vyaktāḥ eva sambandhaḥ. Pr. pp. 48-49.

82. A.B.P.I. iii. 28. p. 426.

To remove this anomaly, we shall have to accept a different Vedic world with the celestial^a objects, that are the avayavas of God. Thus all the words, letters and sentences, which are the vikṛti of the Omkāra, primarily express God. What is briefly stated by the Omkāra is stated in the Vedas in so many words. ⁸³ How can we know that there is a different Vedic creation? For this is given the example of the word Jāmadagnya. One may call oneself Jāmadagnya or the son of Jamadagni, but he knows himself to be Jāmadagnya only indirectly and there is no perceptible evidence for it. Similarly the Vedic world, which is different is known only indirectly. ⁸⁴ The conventional usage in the scriptures is to be understood, as it is understood in the world, from the expressions of the elders. Puruṣottama says that people make golden images after knowing the form from the earthen or wooden images. That is why mundane illustrations like that of a pot and the clay are found in the Vedas. So only human beings and not the Vedas are dependent. ⁸⁵

83. Tathā ca hījaśaktir eva sarvavṛkṣe prasaratīty Omkārasya yā paramātmavācakatā saiva sarvasmin vedatarau prasṛtā.

A.B.P.I.i.10.p.150.

84. Tathā ca parokṣeṇa svasya yathā jāmādeḥnyāvaḥpatir yathā parokṣeṇāpi tasya prapañcasyāvaḥpatih. A.B.P.I.iii.28.p.427.

85. A.B.P.I.i.4.pp.136-137.

The connection of words with individual objects is the question not only with the Vedas but even with ordinary words, which have their worldly usage. That the objects are infinite does not pose any problem for Puruṣottama, who says that all the objects in the world are non-different from God.

It will thus be seen that the Śuddhādvaitins not only differ from Śaṅkara, but even from Rāmānuja. They accept the form but are inclined to believe in the relation of words with individual objects. They agree with Rāmānuja in his view that words express God, but while for Rāmānuja, all the words ultimately express God, in the system of Vallabha, all the words primarily express God and there is no scope left for indication. They admit the sphoṭa but not as explained by grammarians. The sphoṭa is not revealed by the letters (Varnābhivyaṅgya) but is explained as "Sphutati vāg anena" by which the speech becomes manifest. And finally they believe in an entirely different world of the Vedas. This world is supramundane and hence the authority of the Vedas can never be questioned, even if they express what may appear to be absolutely wrong and absurd ideas like 'Fire is cold' (Vahnir anuṣṇah). That the Vedas are alaukika is enough to seal the lips of any sceptic, who would find out a bundle of

contradictions in the Vedic literature. It is a novel and yet very strong argument of Vallabha and his followers.

Puruṣottama accepts the expressive capacity of all the three, letters, words and sentences. He says that among themselves they bear the relation of principal and subordinate. Thus in a word, the letters are subordinate to the word, and in a sentence the words are subordinate to the sentence. Puruṣottama explains the expressiveness (Vācakatva) as the possession of the beginningless capacity favourable to the connotation of a certain meaning, which is understood from it. As this connotation by capacity is accepted as eternal, there is nothing to bar the eternal nature of expressiveness.⁸⁶ Grammarians believe that śakti is the very nature of the word and is the same as vācakatva. Puruṣottama however understands śakti as the capacity to reveal the meaning and not as vācakatva.⁸⁷ Śaṅketa is explain^{ed} by him as the divine regulation of śakti so as to

86. Vācakatvam cārphapratiṭījanamēnukūlānādiśaktinattvam
bodhyam. Evam ca śaktyā bodhakatvasya utpattikatvenābhi-
-pratitvān na tośya nityatve kim api bādhakam. Pr. p. 88.

87. Vestustas tu sādhu tvāpareparyāyā anādivācakatvarūpā
arthabodhāvīrbhāvakaśaktir atiriktaiva. Pr. p. 88.
At another place Puruṣottama explains śakti as:
Padapadārthayor nityasambandharūpā. T. Sn. Ab. V. 153. p. 130.

reveal only a particular meaning of a particular word uttered at a particular place, and time.⁸⁸ Śakti is three-fold i.e. it has three vṛttis: (1) Primary or mukhya, (2) Indication or gaunī and (3) implication or tātparya.

The first is the expressed sense. It is threefold;

conventional e.g. maṇḍapa, etymological e.g. pācaka and etymologico-conventional e.g. pañkaja. The second is that which indicates by a possible connection. It is classified into two: (1) Prayojana lakṣaṇā, when some sense is conveyed indirectly with a certain purpose, e.g. Gaṅgāyām Ghosaḥ.

(2) Gaunī lakṣaṇā, when the idea of resemblance is meant in a sentence, e.g. Gaur vāhikā.⁸⁹ Implication is the utterance of a sentence for conveying a certain purport.⁹⁰

Puruṣottama like some rhetoricians, does not accept suggestion or vyañjanā as a separate vṛtti, but includes it in the tātparya.⁹¹

88. Etad deśakālavibhedenāsmābhir uccāryamāno'yaṁ śabda
imam evārtham bodhayatu na tv anyam itīśvarakṛtaniyama-
-rūpaḥ śakti-saṅkoca eva saṅketapadenocyate. Pr. p. 88.

89. Pr. p. 93.

90. Tātparyam ca tatpratītiicchayā uccāritatvam. Pr. p. 94.

91. Pr. p. 95. ff.

Purusottama does not agree with the Mīmāṃsā doctrine that śabda is pravartaka. In the Suddhādvaita, it is God who urges people for action. Puruṣottama uses the method of reductio ad absurdum and argues that if we believe that the words are pravartaka, all would be engaged in the activity, as enjoined in the Vedas but this is not the case. So their pravṛtti or otherwise depends upon the desire of God and not the Vedas.⁹²

Vallabha explains the smṛtis as:

Rsīṇām pūrvacaritesmaranam smṛtir ucyate.⁹³

Puruṣottama accepts it as his definition of the smṛtis in his Prasthānaratnākara.⁹⁴ Experience, says Puruṣottama, is the root of memory. It may arise owing to the practices of ancient sages, or by worldly dealings, or from the śāstric works on policy or from the Vedas. Out of all these, only the last can serve as the means of valid knowledge. But the validity of the smṛtis as a pramāṇa is not on a par with the Vedas. Puruṣottama says that just as a mirror reflects an object, the smṛtis expound the

92.Pr.p.101.

93.T.Sn.V.33.

94.Pr.p.103.

teaching of the Vedas, but just as in the case of reflection there is a fundamental distinction between the object and its image, as seen in a mirror, similarly the prāmānya of the smrtis is dependent upon the knowledge of the Vedas. The smrtis thus have the purpose of enlarging and strengthening the Vedas and not of replacing them.⁹⁵

Purāṇas are understood by Vallabha as being Vedadharmatidesa, i.e. the extension of Vedic teaching.⁹⁶ It may be interesting to note that the purāṇas are considered in the Suddhādvaita as more important than the smrtis.⁹⁷ The Purāṇas are of the nature of explanation and expansion of the Vedas (Vedopabramhanarūpa). The Purāṇas describes the sport of the highest Lord and are thus equally authoritative like the Vedas, the only difference between the two being that the Purāṇas are dependent upon a particular kalpa to which they belong, while the Vedas are independent of such

95. T.Sn.Ab.V.46.p.38.Cf.also p.39.where Purusottama says:

Smrtirūpapramāṇasya svarūpam janyam na tū vedavat nityam.

96.T.Sn.P.V.48.p

97." Śrutismrtī ubhe netre purāṇam hrdayam smrtam"

quoted by Vallabha in T.Sn.P.V.49.

considerations.⁹⁸

Puruṣottama is not inclined to accept the other pramāṇas, which are accepted by other systems of thought. Upamāna need not be taken as a separate pramāṇa, for the knowledge of resemblance is obtained by our sense-organs like the eye with the help of the memory of the similarity that has been experienced before.⁹⁹ The *yogya-anupalabdhī* which is advanced by the *Maiyāyikas*, as an argument to prove the *abhāva* has not been admitted by Puruṣottama. We can not say that something is known by non-apprehension, just as we know it with our own eyes.¹⁰⁰ The *Mīmāṃsakas* accept the *arthāpatti* as a separate pramāṇa, as illustrated by the passage, '*Jīvan devadattaḥ grhe nāsti*', which means that he is out. It is classified by *Pārthasārathimīśra* into two, *śrutārthāpatti* and *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*. Puruṣottama says that the *Arthāpatti* of both these types is just auxiliary to the *śabda* and *pratyakṣa* respectively. Prin. S. N. Dasgupta says: 'Puruṣottama also

98. *Purāṇam Vedavad eva bhagavanniśvāsarūpaṃ tattatkalpīya-
-bhuvenadrumātmakasya bhagavato līlāṃ pratipādayac
chivādirūpasya mātmyam parabrahmaṇa eva vadati....tena
tattatkalpātmakakālādhīnam eva tadbalaṃ na tu tannira-
-pekṣam iti.* T. Sn. Ab. V. 55. p. 54.

99. Pr. p. 148.

100. *Cakṣuṣāvagataḥ itivānupalabdhyaṅavagata iti pratyayā-
-bhāvat.* Pr. p. 121.

admits arthāpatti or implication as separate pramāṇa, in the manner of Pārthasārathimīśra'.¹⁰¹ It is difficult for me to understand how he has arrived at such a conclusion, when actually Puruṣottama says : 'Evam dvividhāpīyam arthāpattir yathāyatham pratyakṣaśabdayor anugrahikā. Pratyakṣādipramitārthe jñānadārdhyahetutvāt. Natu pramāṇāntaram. Tadgemakasya balīyaso' bhāvād iti.' ¹⁰² Dasgupta has based the whole section on the pramāṇas in his chapter 'The philosophy of Vellebha' Ch. XXXI. upon the Pramāṇaprakaraṇa of the Prasthā-^{ha}-ratnākara. That is why I found it difficult to understand how the conclusion is arrived at by Dasgupta.

Aitiḥya or tradition is explained as a particular statement, the authorship of which is unknown.¹⁰³ It is illustrated by 'there is Yakṣa in this tree.' It is no pramāṇa because it is not decisive. It is included in the śabda. Sambhava, which is like understanding the number hundred in the number thousand, is included in the śabda. Lokaprasāda is included in pratyakṣa, cestā in anumāna, lipi in śabda and pratibhā, which is illustrated by 'my brother is to come to-morrow' is no pramāṇa.

101. S.N. Dasgupta. History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. IV. p. 345.

102. Pr. p. 152.

103. Aviditakartrkah śabdaviśeṣaḥ. Pr. p. 153.

It will thus be seen that only three pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa, anumāṇa and śabda are accepted in the Śuddhādvaita. Out of these three, the first two are useful in the ordinary worldly dealings, while in the spiritual matters only verbal testimony is to be taken as authoritative.¹⁰⁴ Puruṣottama says that the validity of the pramāṇas depends upon the quality of sattva present in them.¹⁰⁵ This quality of sattva can be acquired even by Yoga, but as the Yoga itself depends upon the Vedas, it is better to accept the Vedas as the highest pramāṇa. Perception and inference depend upon persons like us, who are affected by avidyā or ignorance and so they are definitely weaker than śabda.¹⁰⁶ Vallabha defines tarka as 'Tarko nāma svotpreksitē yuktih.'¹⁰⁷ Puruṣottama gives a very interesting argument, when he says that as the world is full of diversity, it is very easy to find out suitable

104. Purvoktāny eva vyavahāre pramāṇāni. Paramārthe tu śabda eveti siddham. Pr. p. 153.

105. Sarvāny eva pramāṇāni sattvam eva kathamāna, Upejīvanti..... Pr. p. 34.

106. Pr. p. 104.

107. A. B. II. ii. 21. p. 568.

examples for both the argumentators and so it is difficult to give a particular reasoning for a particular point.¹⁰⁸

Puruṣottama does not seem to have any definite view regarding the spontaneity and self-validity of knowledge. While the followers of Mīmāṃsā, Kevalādvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita believe in the self-validity of knowledge, Puruṣottama says that there are cases where knowledge should be regarded as depending upon accessory influences of memory and the like, hence it should not be regarded as self-valid always.¹⁰⁹ For the scriptures of course, he believes in their self-validity, as pointed ^{out} above.

(IV).

Brahman-attributes.

Our world with all its wide variety, has always been a big question mark for the thinkers. We wish to know what is at the root of this world, what makes human beings laugh and weep on this big stage of the world and what drives the Sun and the Moon and Stars from the East to the West. Speculations of philosophers have always been pointedly turned towards the investigation of the esse of the universe. Again it has not been mere curiosity of an arm-chair

108. Lokasya vaicidryenobhayaṃ vādinor drṣṭāntasaulabhye

ekatarayuktiniyāmakasya hetor abhāvāc ca-A.B.P.II.i.11.
p.569.

109. Pr.p.155.

thinker, but coupled with this urge of knowledge is an equally strong, nay even a stronger, urge to find out the way of happiness and bliss for the human beings, who are rotting here and there in the dust and din of the humdrum mortal world. Systems have been propounded after systems, thinkers have followed thinkers, philosophers and religious teachers have preached one after another; all with the sole aim of finding out the truth and weal behind the worldly woe. What is the Supreme Spirit? The Upaniṣads say that it is Brahman; the systems of the Vedānta, each claiming to be the rightful successor of those ancient works, have retained the same name, but each of them has its own conception of that Supreme; whether it has attributes, how it is related to the world and to us and how we can attain to it.

It has often been alleged that Indian Philosophers, who have accepted the śabdapramāṇa as the highest authority, have never cared to prove logically the existence of Brahman but have accepted it from the Upaniṣads. While for Śaṅkara it may not be true, but it is correct statement for Vallabha and his followers. Vallabha not only refuses to accept tarka, but even condemns those who follow it. The Naiyāyikas, especially Udayanācārya has given so many arguments to prove the existence of Brahman. Rāmānuja in his Śrībhāṣya has refuted such arguments as have been advanced before him. Puruṣottama with his strictly logical

mind, gives a studied refutation of all these arguments and tries to prove that Brahman is the Aupanishada Puruṣa, which can be known only from the Upaniṣads and not by any other means.¹¹⁰

Brahman thus can not be said to be an object of our worldly dealings. It is beyond all our senses, beyond all our thoughts. It is Sarvavyahārātīta. But if it is beyond the reach of our senses, how can we approach it? What again about the incarnations of God, which, as stated in the Purāṇas, are seen by the people? To this the 'Suddhādvaitin replies that even if it is beyond the vyahāra, and is thus not an object of any pramāṇa, it becomes an object of the Vedas, because of its own desire.¹¹¹ So far as the incarnations are concerned Puruṣottama says that Avatāra means the descent of God from the Vaikuṇṭha to the world.¹¹² These various incarnations of God are like the different parts played by an actor, who may be seen on the stage as a king or as a minister at his own desire.¹¹³

110. A.B.P.I.i.2.pp.70-81.

111. Tatas ca pramāṇabalenāviśayaḥ svecchayā viśayaś cetyuktaṁ.

A.B.I.i.4.p.134.

112. Avatāro nāma vaikuṇṭhasthānād ihāgananaṁ. T.S.Ab.V.73.p.121.

113. Yathā naṭe rājāyam aśvo'yam tathā sādharāṇo matsyo'yam
varāho'yam manusyo'yam iti teṣāṁ buddhijanakety arthaḥ.

T.S.Ab.V.71.p.120.

How is it that Brahman is beyond our ordinary means of proof? The reason is that Brahman has no form, that can be an object of our visual perception. It is like the empty space without clouds. Our eyes, which can comprehend only that which is endowed with form, goes far and wide in the sky but grasps^s nothing. It is only the fathomless blue, that is seen by us. Similar is the case with Brahman, which is too subtle for our senses and too far for our ordinary functions of mind and body.¹¹⁴ Thus Brahman, which is not in any way an object of our bodily and mental efforts, can be an object on account of its own sweet will, which can make itself seen or unseen, heard or unheard, known or unknown in whatever form it wishes and at whatever ~~stands~~ time it desires. When it thus wishes to be seen, it is the very profundity of Brahman that helps the mundane sense-faculties in its apprehension.¹¹⁵

Brahman, which is formless, is an abode of contradictory qualities, according to the 'Suddhādvaita. From the scriptures which are the only authority for knowing Brahman, we find that it is variously described as full of attributes and yet devoid of them. If an attempt is to be made to reconcile

114. Cf. T. S. Ab. V. 75.

115. *Evam sati nām sarve lokarṣṭyaiva paśyantv iti yadeccchā tadā brahmano gambhīrataiva lokarṣṭyanaugrāhikā bhavati.*

those conflicting passages, we shall have to believe that Brahman is possessed of contradictory attributes. Vallabha and his followers believe that Brahman is capable of becoming everything (sarvabhavanāsamārtha). Hence for one, who accepts the Brahman as stated in the scriptures, there is no conflict nor any shadow of conflict. It is, as Puruṣottama points out, the nature of the thing (vastuśvabhāva) and how can the essential nature of anything be called in to question?¹¹⁶ We can not counter what is, and the possession, of the contradictory attributes by Brahman, is. Even if we find something quite wrong and self contradictory in the śrutis like, 'the fire is cold', we should believe that it is correct, because Brahman can be both fire and cold. Similarly Brahman can be both formless and formed, without hands and feet it can run and catch, without ears it can hear, and without eyes it can see.¹¹⁷ The contradictory attributes of Brahman can be made out even on the logical grounds. The earth, as we see, is the resting place of the objects, which are by their

116. A.B.P. III. ii. 21. p. 923.

117. Tathā ca bhagavataḥ sarvarūpatvena vahnirūpatvād anuṣṇa-
tvarūpatvāc cānuṣṇatvavahnitvayor aikādhikaranyāc
chivatvādinām apy aikādhikaranyāt vahnir anuṣṇaḥ param
brahma brahma-viṣṇuśivākāraṁ anākāraṁ ity aviruddham.

very nature against each other. Thus for instance a snake and a rat, both of them live on earth. Again we may enter or exit or rest and all these are called actions. We may be awake or may be experiencing dreams, but the resort of both these is our buddhi. Similarly Brahman, which is the Almighty basis of everything, the principal substratum of all that works or is worked upon in the universe, is decidedly the abode of contradictory attributes.¹¹⁸ This possession of contradictory attributes, says Puruṣottama, is found in Brahman more; it is less and less in its effects just as a lotus leaf gets thinner and thinner and is pointed at the end.¹¹⁹ Thus even the effects have the viruddhadharmāśrayatva, what to talk of Brahman?

The teachers of the Suddhādvaita have to say something even for those, who do not accept the Viruddhadharmāśrayatva, just on the ground of the essential nature of Brahman.

118. Brahma Viruddhadharmāśrayam. Vivakṣitasarvādhāratvāt. Sahajaviruddhasarpa-mūṣakādyādhārabhūmivat. Peraspara-viruddhaniskramanātva praveśanātvaśrayakarmatvāt. Jāgrdādyādhārabuddhivac ca. T.S.Ab.V.71.p.119.

119. Yathā hi kamalam mūle bhūyaḥ sad agra bhāge anīyas tiṣṭhatī tathā viruddhadharmāśrayatvam api bhagavati. Bhūyaḥ sat kāryeṣu hrasad ativiprakṛste kārye'tyalpen bhavati. T.S.Ab.V.71.p.119.

Brahman is different from the world and so the negative descriptions of Brahman are for showing how our mundane attributes can not be applied to it. Thus Brahman is said to be described as endowed not with the ordinary attributes of our world but with the supramundane attributes, stated in the scriptures.¹²⁰ This is proved by the scriptures themselves because the negative descriptions are followed by the positive ones. This is just like a statement, 'he is not a sinner but is meritorious.'¹²¹ This kind of reasoning is however for only those, who do not agree to the viruddhadharmāśrayatva on the basis of the vastusvabhāva alone; otherwise the principal tenet of the Suddhādvaita is of Brahman possessed of contradictory attributes.¹²²

The question of the attributes of Brahman has assumed very much importance in Indian Philosophical Systems. The

120. Tathā ca jagadvailakṣaṇyabodhanena tatprakāraḥ dharmā
niśidhyante na tu tatsadrśāḥ svarūpadharmā api.

A.B.P.III.ii.22.p.924.

121. Asthūlādisrutir na yēvad dharmāniśedhikā. Kiñcin
niśidhye tadanyesattāyā bodhakatvāt. Yād evam tad evam.
Ma pāpāḥ puṇyavān ayam ityēdivākyavat. S.S.p.238.

122. Ato ye vastusvabhāvato viruddhadharmāśrayatvam na
manvate tān praty evam laukikāleukikavibhāgarūpayā
yuktyā nirṇayah. A.B.P.III.ii.22.p.925.

Upanisads, which are the expressions of various thinkers about the Supreme Principle of our life and of our world, show two different trends of thought, both of which are mutually conflicting. While the religious urge of a man would require a God, who is full of all virtues and devoid of all the evil, the reasoning of a man tends to admit of a God, nay not a God but a principle, which is beyond us and beyond all that belongs to us. How can Brahman be bound by the so-called virtues or vices of our fleeting life and changing world? If we accept Brahman as basically different from the world of limitations in which we live and die, we should also be prepared to concede that it can not be possessed of the ~~finite~~ qualities, which are of the limited world and which are thus limited themselves. Thus the bold declarations of Yājñavalkya in the Brhadāranyakopaniṣad¹²³ led to the extreme position of the Buddhists, who would call their principle nothing else but śūnya, which brought their theory dangerously near to nihilism if not nihilism itself. Śaṅkara, as a master of strictest logic cannot in any case refuse to accept this. If the reality is to exclude the *eternae* and if it is to be eternal, then the Real, rather than that which is not non-real,

123. Cf. Brhadāranyakopaniṣad: II.iii.6, III.ix, 26, IV.ii.4, IV.iv.22, IV.v.15.

cannot be understood as fettered by our own chains. Brahman can not flow in the limited channels; the only thing which we can say about it is that it is pure being, though as a category there may not be much difference between pure being and non-being. Śaṅkara certainly believes in a personal God, but that Īśvara is at a lower level. All the virtues and powers of that God are evaporated in the white heat of the pure being, when we rise from the lower to the higher realm of Truth. The teachers who followed Śaṅkara, could easily see that however logical this position might be, here religion is divorced from philosophy. However ardent a devotee may be, however sincere he may be, he would not like to worship a God, who does not exist in the highest sense. Mere flight of high soaring intellect would not be sufficient for religion, which requires some slice of imagination and emotion. Thus Rāmānuja and the Vaiṣṇava teachers who followed him violently attacked Śaṅkara as a buddhist in disguise. Rāmānuja says that Brahman is possessed of all the attributes, which are good and is devoid of all the qualities, which are bad. Vallabha cannot accept this for obvious reasons. If we believe that God is different from the world, he must not have the attributes

of the world. Vallabha can neither accept the position of Śaṅkara, whom he thinks to be the real villain of the Vedānta, because Vallabha believes in the path of devotion as the only and the easiest way of salvation. Hence we have the highest Lord of the 'Suddhādvaita, as possessed of supremundane attributes, leaving out the limited worldly qualities. Brahman can thus become even a bundle of contradictory attributes, because all the attributes are superworldly as the term contradictory, which is the word of our world, loses all its force. Really what Vallabha intends to say is that Brahman is endowed with all the attributes, though they may appear to be contradictory to us, because of its essential nature of being beyond our imagination and intellect. The foregoing analysis will show that the positions taken by Śaṅkara and Vallabha are not far removed from each other, though attempts have been made to show that they are poles apart. The only difference between the two is that while Śaṅkara refuses to adore his God with worldly clothes, Vallabha goes one step forward and adores Him with the clothes, which are not worldly. That Vallabha calls Brahman nirguṇa is an unmistakable proof for it, because nirguṇatva means prākṛtaguṇa-rāhitya.

It should be noted that according to Purusottama one who is possessed of the knowledge of the qualitless Brahman, is one ^{who} has been away from the worldly qualities owing to the grace of God. ¹²⁴

What again is the relation between Brahman and its attributes? The problem does not arise for Sankara, who does not believe in the qualified Brahman. On the other hand he thinks that absolute oneness or Advaita can not tolerate the difference even within itself, as would be the case if we accept Brahman as possessed of qualities. Brahman according to Rāmānuja, is Viśiṣṭa or qualified by the sentient and the non-sentient, both of which form the body of Brahman which is the soul. Here ofcourse Rāmānuja is not so very clear or exact. He says that Brahman is one even though it is qualified, just as the body and the soul together make one man. But this would make his Brahman a composite whole, because if we are to believe in the transformation of the cit and the acit in to the gross form from its subtle state, Brahman remaining the same,

124. Yaś tu bhagavadanugraheṇa prākṛtaguṇarahiṇo' bhūt
sa nirguṇabrahma vidyāvaṇ ity ucyate. A.B.P.IV.iii.14.

it would naturally imply that the cit and the acit are the ~~extraneous~~^{ex} qualities attached to Brahman and do not belong to its essential nature as Rāmānuja wants it to be. Puruṣottama rightly points out that if we are to believe in oneness, that One cannot include within itself the qualities, which do not form part and parcel of its essential nature.¹²⁵ The greatest difficulty with Rāmānuja is that, he leaves the relation of Brahman and cit-acit partially unexplained, skips over the problem by giving the body-soul analogy which is not quite satisfactory and clings to the term Advaita, even though at times the Dvaita is not removed.¹²⁶ Vallabha's position, as explained by Puruṣottama, is an attempt to solve this difficulty, while retaining Brahman as possessed of attributes. Vallabha can not agree to any distinction within Brahman; it cannot be a composite whole and so we must accept ekarūpatā in the essential nature of Brahman as the scriptures always pointedly teach of Brahman as 'one without a second'.¹²⁷ Puruṣottama says

125. Ātmapadasya kevalātmavācitvena viśeṣanāntarasāṅgrahā-kṣamatvāt. A.B.P.I.i.3.p.98.

126. Cf. 'An eternal relation between them whether essential or accidental will be an inexplicable mystery.'

Radhakrishnan. Indian Philosophy Vol.II.p.713-714.

127. Cf. A.B.P.III.ii.11.p. 902.

that a substance and its quality have the inseparable relation between them and it is because of this inseparable relation between the two that there is non-difference.¹²⁸ Again the attributes of Brahman are not accidental but essential and Brahman is thus both the knower and the knowledge, the existent and the existence, the blissful and the bliss. The relation between the two is thus of Tādātmya, which is explained as 'Bhedeśahisnur abhedah.' Just as sunlight is an attribute of the Sun and is also the essential nature of the Sun, so is the case with Brahman and its attributes.¹²⁹ It will thus be seen that Vallabha steers clear between the two positions of Sāṅkara and Rāmānuja. He accepts the attributes of Brahman and as attributes, they must be different from the substance. But then they are inseparable and essential, not accidental or extraneous. They thus belong to the very nature of Brahman. Hence the difficulties, which are found in the theory of Rāmānuja are avoided.

The question also arises whether Brahman should be

128. Dharmadherminos cāvinābhāvena sthitatvād abhedah.

A.B.P.I.iv.2.p.481. See also 'Sā ca sampad (i.e. abhedā as bhedaviruddhasampad) bhāvarūpatve sati svāśrayāvinābhū-tatvam tad vibhāvavartamānatvam iti yēvat. A.B.P.III.ii.28. p.935.

129. Yathā sūryaprakāśayos tādātmyarūpasya bhedaviruddha-sampado' bhedasya kalpanā evam brahmatoddharmayor api.

A.B.P.III.ii.28.pp.935-936.

endowed with a body. Puruṣottama after Vallabha rejects the idea outright because the alī, creator, Brahman cannot be said to have any limitation of its own that would require a body. So in the original form there can be no śarīra.¹³⁰

(V).

Brahman-the essential form.

For the sake of a clear understanding of the 'Sūdhādvaita, Brahman is to be understood as having three forms, the essential form, the causal form and the effect-form.¹³¹ The essential form of God is threefold viz. kriyātmaka, jñānātmaka, and ubhayātmaka. The first is described in the former part of the Vedic literature. (i.e. pūrvakāṇḍa) and the second, in the latter part i.e. the uttarakāṇḍa or the Upaniṣads. In the Gītā and the Bhāgavata, Brahman is qualified by both action and knowledge, and is showed to be the object of devotion. Here the Akṣara is to be included in the Uttarakāṇḍa and Karma in the Pūrvakāṇḍa. Time (Kāla) which is of the essential

130. Tatpānyānapēkṣatayā sarvakartur brahmanah kā vānupapa-
-tīh syād yena svasyāpi śarīram kalpayet. Ato mūlarūpe
nāsty eva śarīram. A.B.P.I.i.19.p. 227.

131. Cf. T. S. V. 85. also Pr. p. 164.

nature of the interior sat, cit and ānanda (existence, consciousness and bliss) and the svabhāva or nature, which is not described in the scriptures as an object of production, are to be included in the essential form of Brahman.

When God desires to be many, the aspect of bliss is slightly suppressed, because of the rise of the quality of sattva in the interior.¹³² He thus becomes gaṇitānanda. This is called Aksara, the form, which God assumes, when he becomes both prakṛti and puruṣa. In the Aksara are said to remain Billions of eggs of all sorts. That is what the Bhāgavate Purāṇa calls Aksara as the cause of all the causes.¹³³ This Aksara is said to be resting at the feet of the Lord and is thus called the ⁱtail of the Blissful.¹³⁴ It is again the resting place of God, his āśhāra, his place of resort. Thus it stands for the vyēpivaikunṭha. The difference between Aksara and Puruṣottama is that the Highest Lord only desires for sport and is not entangled in it; the Aksara on the other hand is entangled in it and with the slight suppression of the aspect of bliss by means of the quality of sattva,

132. T. Sn. V. 99.

133. Ted āhur akṣaram brahma sarvakāraṇakāraṇam. Bhāgavate-
-purāṇa. III. xi. 41.

134. Brahma pucchaṃ pratisthā. Teittirīya-upaniṣad. II. 5.

it can be called the chief jīva.¹³⁵ Puruṣottama, the Highest Lord is again said in the śrūtis and the smṛtis to be higher than both kṣara and Akṣara.¹³⁶ The Highest Lord is thus the controller of Akṣara. This Akṣara^{is} also ānandamaya. As pointed by our author the incarnations of the Puruṣa are blissful and so we must accept the Akṣara also as Ānandamaya, because it is the avatārin of the Puruṣa, which is its avatāra. The difference between the Highest Lord and Akṣara is that of conditions or states and not of entities.¹³⁷ Even if we believe that the Akṣara is Ādhāra and Brahman is Ādheya, there is no harm in believing both as one on the ground of

135. Tathā, ca Puruṣottamas tū līlayā icchām karoti na tu tayā vyāpriyate, ity atirohitānandah. Akṣaram tu tayā vyāpṛtam saṁ mūlabhūtena sattvena tirohitānandam mukhya-jīvapada-vācyatām dhatte. T. Sn. Ab. V. 98 p. 79.

136. Cf. Kṣaram pradhānam amṛtākṣaram haraḥ. Śvetāśvetara. U. I. 10 ... Akṣarat parato paraḥ. Muṇḍaka. Upaniṣad. II. i. 2. Dvāv imau puruṣau loke kṣaraś cākṣara eva ca.

.....
Uttamaḥ puruṣas tv anyeḥ paramātmety udāhṛtaḥ.

Bhagavad Gītā. XV. 16-17. etc.

137. Gītāyām dvadāśe 'evam satatayuktā ye bhaktās tvām paryupāsate, ye cāpy akṣaram avyaktam teṣāṁ ke yoga-vittamāḥ' īti prāśnena taduttareṇa cākṣarapuruṣottama-yor aikyam avasthābhede-na bhinnatvam ca bodhitam.

A. B. P. I. ii. 23. p. 341.

the Viruddhadharmāśrayatva of God. ¹³⁸

Aksara is obtained by the followers of the path of knowledge, while the Highest Lord can be realised only by the grace of God, combined with sincere devotion and ardent love. This Aksara can however be understood as paying way to the paraṇṛpti, because it produces the highest knowledge by destroying nescience. The destruction of nescience leads to the manifestation of the aspect of bliss, which may finally lead a devotee to the essential nature of the Highest Lord. It is thus antecedent to the paraṇṛpti. ¹³⁹

Thus the scriptural passages teaching knowledge are connected with the Aksara. Thus the Aksara is the form assumed by God for the emancipation of the souls following the path of knowledge. ¹⁴⁰

Aksara is a novel conception introduced by Vallabha in the systems of Vedāntic thought. Dr. P. M. Modi in his 'Aksara-a forgotten chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy' has shown how the conception of Aksara, besides that of the Supreme Principle has often been met

138. T. Sn. Ab. V. 99. p. 81.

139. ~~T. Sn. Ab. V. 99. p. 81.~~ A. B. P. III. iii. 33. pp. 1084-1085.

140. T. Sn. Ab. V. 99. p. 79.

with in the Upaniṣads and the Gītā. The concept of Aksara however lost its existence in the works of Gaṇḍapāda and Saṃkara and was not revived by the later Ācāryas until Vallabha, the last Ācārya in Indian Philosophy. He gave a peculiar position to it in the frame work of his theory of Pure Monism. The present writer does not think it proper to discuss the concept of Aksara, as explained in the Upaniṣads and Gītā, because it is not within the scope of this study. It is however difficult to assert dogmatically as to what exactly has been the meaning of the word, because the Upaniṣads contain speculations of various philosophers belonging to various places and ages while the Gītā appears to give more or less a synthetic exposition of the different theories, that were current in those days. It may be possible to understand the Aksara as the immutable principle thus showing the trend of abstraction and negation in the description of the Absolute. But so far as Vallabha is concerned, his idea of the Aksara is neither of abstraction nor of negation. It is the mukhya-jīva, or the first product, if the word can be used, and contains within itself crores of eggs for future creation. Vallabha however uses the term found in the Upaniṣads and

the Gita for a particular purpose. The Upaniṣads, especially the older ones, generally teach the path of knowledge, while the later~~are~~ and minor Upaniṣads and the Purāṇas teach of devotion. Vallabha who laid the greatest stress on devotion thought that the Highest Lord could be obtained not by knowledge alone, but by sincere devotion and ardent love of a devotee, favoured by the grace of God. What then about those who follow the path of knowledge or action, as taught in the Śāstras? The term Akṣara, found in the Gītā and the Upaniṣad⁵ was understood and explained by Vallabha as the fruit, obtained by those who follow the path of knowledge. Akṣara is again inferior to the Highest Lord, and thus the superiority of the path of devotion is established. It is possible that Vallabha might have been influenced by Śaṅkara, who also maintained a division of the personal God and the impersonal Brahman; though it should be admitted that there is no parity between the two cases except that there is a division, and that one of the two is higher than the other. The distinction between the personal God and the impersonal Brahman has no place in the theory of Vallabha. Thus whatever may have been the connotation of the term Akṣara in the older works, it has

a peculiar significance of its own in the philosophy of Vallabha.

Time (kāla), action(karma) and nature(svabhāva) are said to be the different forms of Akṣara. Kāla is manifested with the slight revelation of the aspect of existence (sat), having all the aspects of existence, sentiency and bliss inside.¹⁴¹ It is thus an essential form of the capacity of action, because action is the capacity of the aspect of sat. Hence the other two aspects of sentiency and bliss are suppressed.¹⁴² It can also be described as always moving, the cause of all, or the support of all.¹⁴³ As it is the cause of all, it is a cause of worldly dealings like 'soon' or 'late' and being the support, it causes the dealings of past and future.¹⁴⁴ Its first work is to disturb the equilibrium of the guṇas.¹⁴⁵ In the

141. Antahsaccidānando vyavahāre īśatsattvāmsena prakāṣaḥ kālaḥ. Pr. p. 166.

142. Kālaḥ puruṣottamasya kriyāśaktirūpaḥ. Cestārūpatvāt. ... Kriyā ca sadamśaśaktirīti yukteś cidānandatiro-
bhāvaḥ. T. Sn. Ab. V. 105-106. p. 84.

143. Nityagatve sati sakalāśrayaḥ sakalodbhavo vā kālaḥ. Pr. p. 166.

144. Tena sakalodbhavatvāc cirekṣiprādivyahārahetutvam sakalāśrayatvād atītānagatādivyavahārahetutvam ca darśitem. T. Sn. Ab. V. 105-106. p. 84.

145. Etasya prathamam kēryam guṇakṣobhaḥ. Pr. p. 166.

Tattvadīpanibandha, the dāvine form of time is stated to be Akṣara, the material form is the Sun and the spiritual form is the division into aeons, years and months.¹⁴⁶ In the Prasthānakāra however Puruṣottama says that the material form is the Sun and other luminaries, the spiritual form is the atoms and the Highest Lord is the divine form.¹⁴⁷ The time taken by the solar wheel in covering the atomic space is the time-atom which is too subtle.¹⁴⁸

Karma, like kāla, is not a distinct category but only a different form of the Akṣara. It is the universal action which is capable of being manifested by diverse individual actions, depending upon that which is enjoined or that which is proscribed.¹⁴⁹ Like kāla, it is also connected with the aspect of sat, while cit and ānanda are suppressed.¹⁵⁰ The difference however between kāla and karma is quite clear.

146. T.Sn.V.109.p.85.

147. Pr.p.166.

148. Tetra yēvatā kālēne sūryarathacakram paramānumātram deśam vyāpnoti sa kālāḥ paramānuh. Pr.p.166.

149. Vidhiniśedhaprakāreṇa laukikakriyābhāḥ pradeśato' bhi-vyāñjanayogyā kriyā. Pr.p.168. See also: Vihitanisiddhaprakāraḥ kriyābhigyañgyā kriyā karmeti tallakṣaṇam siddhyati. T.Sn.Ab.V.112.p.87.

150. T.Sn.V.112.p.86-87.

Kāla is manifested of itself, while karma is manifested in the form of injunctions and prohibitions by human beings.¹⁵¹ Again it is not eternally manifested like the kāla, but subsists only upto the rise of fruit.¹⁵² Karma is universal and is thus not different with different individuals. As it can be manifested in various ways, it can give happiness and miseries to different individuals simultaneously.¹⁵³ It is not necessary to accept the Adrṣṭa, apūrva and such terms as denoting separate categories. They denote only the aspects of karma.

Svabhāva or nature is explained as that which produces transformation.¹⁵⁵ It is inferred from the transformation, which is its effect.¹⁵⁶ Puruṣottama says that when we see a certain cause producing a particular effect only, we shall have to accept the desire of God as the hetu for it. It may be possible to say that the desire of God is the svabhāva

151. Kālaḥ svata eva prakāṣaḥ, ayam tu puruṣair vidhinisedha-prakāreṇa prakatīkriyate. T.Sn.P.V.110.p.85.

152. Phalabhogānantarām karmānāśasamaranāt tathā. T.Sn.Ab.V.110.p.85.

Also see: Etasya cābhivyaktyanantarām phalasaṁāpanāva-dhi prakāṣyam phalabhogajanakakriyāyāḥ kramena tirobhāvaḥ. Pr.p.169.

153. T.Sn.Ab.V.111.p.86.

154. T.Sn.Ab.V.111.p.86; Pr.p.169.

155. Parināmahetutvam tallakṣaṇam. Pr.p.169.

156. Parināmena anumeyah. Pr.p.169.

but it is better to accept it as a separate category, which is manifested in the form of the desire of God.¹⁵⁷ Thus it is not manifested in the form of sat, cit and ānanda. Puruṣottama also points out that so far as the worldly dealings are concerned, kāla has nothing to do with anything either sentient or otherwise. Karma is useful only as connected with the sentient, where as svabhāva is connected with both the sentient and the non-sentient.¹⁵⁸ It has thus everything as its basis. (Sarvavastuśv āśritah.) All these four, Aksara, kāla, karma, and svabhāva are one with Brahman and are therefore neither effects nor causes.¹⁵⁹ That is why they are included in the essential form of God.

157. Dugdhamṛtsūtrādīkam cādhighatāpatādīrūpeṇaiva parīṇamati netareṇa rūpeṇa. Tetra tādṛśī bhagavadicchaiva hetuḥ. ... Tathā ca saiva parīṇamahetubhūtā icchā svabhāva iti vaktum śakyam yady api, tathāpi † 'Kālam karma svabhāvaṃ ce māyeśo māyayā svayā, Ātman yadrecchayā prāptam vibubhūsur upādade' iti vākye upādānagocaratayā kālavād bhīmaḥ tayā ca nirdeśāt necchā svabhāvaḥ kintu icchākāreṇa prakato bhavati buddhir iva vijñānerūpeṇa. T. Sn. Ab. V. 113. p. 87.

158. Kālah... nirādhāra eva vyavahāropayogī karma... cetanādhāram eva vyavahāropayogi, tathāśvabhāvaḥ... cetanācetanavastvadhāram (Rūpaṃ). T. Sn. Ab. V. 113. p. 87.

159. T. Sn. V. 114. p. 88.

It will not be out of place here to note the conception of Antaryāmin, as taught by the exponents of Pure Monism. God is said to enter the heart of an individual, in the form of a swan, together with the individual soul. This form is called the Antaryāmin or the inner controller. Just as there are many individual souls, there are also many Antaryāmins.¹⁶⁰ One may point out the anomaly in believing in so many Antaryāmins. Vallabha says that the difference is not even in the individual souls and so there is no question regarding the Antaryāmins.¹⁶¹ Vallabha states the distinction among the Antaryāmin, Akṣara and Kṛṣṇa is just as between the charioteer the warrior and one who is in the warrior. Puruṣottama explains that the Antaryāmin rules over the individual souls like a charioteer, who controls the horses. Akṣara again controls the Antaryāmin, just as a warrior directs a charioteer; and Kṛṣṇa rules over Akṣara even as the Antaryāmin of a warrior rules over him.¹⁶² Thus though the Antaryāmin belongs to the essential form of Brahman, because of its entrance in the effects with the individual souls, it is to be included in

160. Yathā jīvanām nānātvam tathāntaryāminām api. Ekasmin

hrdaye hamsarūpenābhaya-preveśāt. T.S.P.V.28.p.70.

161. Bhedas tu jīve'pi nāstīti na kāpī anupapattiḥ.

T.S.P.V.28.p.70.

162. T.Sa.Ab.V.121.p.95.

the causal form and not the essential form.¹⁶³

The concept of Antaryāmin is not new to the Vedānta. Rāmānuja for instance accepts it as one of the modes of God. According to Rāmānuja, Īśvara appears in five different modes, one of which is the Antaryāmin, in which mode he dwells in the heart and is to be seen by Yogins and accompanies the individual soul even when they go to heaven or hell.¹⁶⁴ The Antaryāmin is, for all practical purposes, a connecting link between the individual soul on the one hand and God on the other. If we believe in the devotion as the only means of liberation, it is necessary also to admit God, who can be worshipped and hence who is different from us. In that case the Antaryāmin would, so to say, serve as something like a bridge between the two.

(VI).

Brahman-the causal form.

The causal form of God is manifested in 28 categories. They are as follows:-

- (1- 3) Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas,
- (4) Puruṣa, //
- (5) Prakṛti,

163. Antaryāminēm svarūpabhūtatve' pi jīvena saha kārye praveśāt... kāraṇakotāḥ eva niveśaḥ. Pr. pp. 164-165.

164. Cf. Bhandarkar. Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism etc. p. 75.

- (6) Mahat,
- (7) Ahaṅkāra,
- (8-12) Tanmātras,
- (13-17) Bhūtas,
- (18-22) Karmendriyas,
- (23-27) Jñāhendriyas, and
- (28) Manas.

Puruṣottama says that all these 28 categories are not separate entities as such, but have God as their essence. We shall presently see how and where the advocates of Pure Monism differ from the Sāṅkhya theorists, but the basic distinction between the two is that while the followers of Sāṅkhya believe all these as separate entities, this is not the case with the Suddhādvaitins, for whom the term tattva is to be understood as tat-tva or bhagavat-tva.¹⁶⁵ What is meant by these 28 categories is that the causality of God is manifest in 28 ways.¹⁶⁶ The Suddhādvaitins explain all these tattvas on the strength of the Gītā and the Bhāgavata-III, as expressly

165. Bhagavato bhāvo bhagavattvam. Bhagavataḥ sarvān prati yā sāmānyakāraṇatā sā... yatas teṣāṃ tathātven tasmāt tēni tattvāni na tu sāṅkhyāntaravat prthakpadārthatvena tattvāni. T.Su.Ab.V.87, p. 71.

166. Bhagavato yā kāraṇatā sā loke' stāvimsatidhā prakāṣyati yāvat. Pr. p. 169.

stated by Puruṣottama.¹⁶⁷

Sattva is of the nature of pleasure and illumination, is non-obstructive to pleasure and causes attachment to pleasure and knowledge in human beings.¹⁶⁸ Rajas is of the nature of passions, produces desires and associations, and causes attachment to actions.¹⁶⁹ Tamas stupefies all the embodied beings and is created by the concealing power, it produces tendency to carelessness, laziness and sleep.¹⁷⁰

Puruṣottama says that we can not accept the theory of the Sāṅkhya that these qualities are moving by themselves, because we shall then be confronted with the contingency of rejecting God. Again the Sāṅkhyatheory is that these qualities produce each other and coalesce with each other. This, says Puruṣottama, would be tantamount to an incoherent admixture of their respective natures. Nor again should the

167. Atah param gītām tṛtīyaskandham cāśritya teṣāṃ lakṣaṇā-
-ny ucyante. Pr. pp. 169-170.

168. Sukhānāvarakatve prakāśakatve sukhātmatve ca sati
sukhāśaktyā jñānāśaktyā ca dehino dehādyāśaktijanakam
sattvam. Pr. p. 170.

169. Rāgātmakam vā trṣṇāśangādījanakam vā karmāśaktyā dehino
nitarām dehādyāśaktijanakam vā rajah. Pr. p. 170.

170. Āvaranāśaktijanyam sarvadehinohekam pramādālasyañidrā-
bhir dehino dehādyāśaktijanakam tamah. Pr. p. 170.

rajas be admitted as is done by the followers of Kapila, to be of the nature of miseries, for that would run counter to its explanation as being of the nature of passion. Barring these points of difference, Puruṣottama is prepared to accept other points, made out by the Sāṅkhya.¹⁷¹

God, says Puruṣottama, is without guṇas but he produces these three guṇas. This can be understood on the analogy of cotton and a thread. There is no thread in the cotton, but the cotton assumes the state of a thread. Similarly the Highest Lord, who is himself nirguṇa, creates them at his will. 172

Puruṣa, says Puruṣottama, is the Ātman. The term Ātman is explained as derived from the root 'at' to pervade, to envelope. So Ātman is that which envelopes everything, the body, the senses and everything for the sake of others.¹⁷³

171. Cf. Pr. p. 170. For the Sāṅkhya view see:

Prītyeprītiviśādātmakāḥ prakāśapravṛttinīyamārthāḥ,
Anyonyābhībhavāśrayajenānamithunavṛttayaś ca guṇāḥ.
Sattvam leghu prakāśakam iṣṭam upaśtambhakam calem ca
Guru varanākam eva tumah^{rajaḥ} pradiṇavaś cārthatō vṛttiḥ.
Iśvarekṛsna's Sāṅkhyekārikās, 12-13.

172. Pr. p. 172.

173. Dehendriyāśāṅkam sarvam parārtham atati vyāpnoty
adhitasthethi ātmā. Pr.p.173.

Purusottama explains puruṣa in three ways. (a) He is beginning-less and devoid of qualities; is the controller of prakṛti and is known as an object of the notion 'I'. (b) He is self-luminous. (c) Even though he is not affected by the qualities^{ies} and faults of the world, he is associated with it.¹⁷⁴ The self-luminosity of the Puruṣa or the Ātman can be proved by our experience of happiness or absence of miseries, when we are enjoying deep dreamless sleep. He is thus kevala and the qualifications such as kartṛtva are due to its non-discrimination from the Prakṛti and the like, on account of the desire of the Lord, favourable to creation. This can be explained on the analogy of the redness of the Sun, which is seen in a red mirror. That is why it is capable of liberation (Muktiyogyatva), because if the bondage is understood as natural, the scriptures teaching of salvation would be useless.

According to the Sūdhādvaita, Puruṣa is one and not many, and there is no difference between Puruṣa and Īśvara,

174. Teṣu anāditve sati nirguṇatve sati prakṛtiniyāmakatve saty ahamvittivedyatvam ity ekam laukikam. Svayam-

-prakāśatvan ity aparaṃ svarūpalakṣaṇam. Viśvagataguna-dosaśambandhābhāve' pi saṃyog sansargavattvam iti tṛtīyam muktyupayogi. Pr. p. 173.

on the ground of the sentiency in the essential nature of both.¹⁷⁵ The individual soul or jīva is different from the Puruṣa. Having sentiency as its essence, the jīva may be regarded as of the same type as the Puruṣa or as a part of Puruṣa.¹⁷⁶ So the Mūla Puruṣa can be established on the strength of the jīvātman, which is the sākṣin or the witness in the deep sleep.

Prakṛti is called Pradhāna or the main form, which God has produced as the material of the world.¹⁷⁷ It can be described in six ways, so as to show the six qualities which God has bestowed upon it. It is triguṇā or having the three qualities in a state of equidispotion. Just as Brahman has sat, cit and ānanda as its attributes and also has its essence, similarly the three qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas are not only the attributes but the very essence of the Pradhāna. This, says Puruṣottama, is the difference of Pure Monism from the theories of Képils. The Pradhāna is

175. Cidrūpatvena puruṣeśvarayor availakṣanyāt ... Puruṣas tv ēka eva. Puruṣeśvarayor na vailakṣanyam anvapi tadā-nyakalpānāpārthā. Pr.p.176.

176. Jīvas tu puruṣatattvād bhinna eva.... Cidrūpatvena tatsajātīyah puruṣasyaivāṃśo vā. Pr.180.

177. Bhagavatā jagadupādānatvena nirmitam mukhyam bhagavad-rūpam. Pr.p.185.

again avyakta and becomes abhivyakta or manifest by means of time and the like. It is eternal(nitya) and has the nature of existence and non-existence.(sadasadātmaka) It is described as 'aviśeṣa' because the worldly beings are not able to discriminate it and is also called 'viśeṣavat', as it shows all the specifications. Puruṣottama says that in other systems the relation between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is that of the master and his servant, but in the 'Suddhādvaita' it is of contact also because the productive contact of the two is admitted.¹⁷⁸ There is no harm in regarding both Prakṛti and Puruṣa as possessed of form, because even the Highest Lord may be said to have a form on the strength of the theory of Viruddha-dharmāśrayatva.

Mahat is produced from the qualities, which are disturbed. It is not different from the sūtra, but one with it. Sūtra is connected with the power of action and mahat with that of knowledge. So one and the same entity is called both mahat and Sūtra, in as much as it can be viewed from the point of

178. Prakṛtipuruṣayoś ca svasvāmibhāve eva sambandho'

nyatra. Prakṛte tu vīryādhānasya vivakṣitatvāt samyogo'

pi. Pr.p.136.

view of either knowledge or action.¹⁷⁹ Mahat can be explained in three ways ,from the spiritual, the divine and the material points of view. The first refers to its essential nature, the second to its meditation in the form in which it is well-known among Gods, and the last is for explaining it to the people. The first explanation can again be given as threefold, as sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa. From the sāttvika point of view it can be explained as immutable and capable of manifesting the world, which is its substratum.¹⁸⁰ From the rājasa point of view it can be described as the shoot of the world.¹⁸¹ From the tāmasa point of view it is described as capable of destroying very powerful tamas.¹⁸² From the ādhidaivika or the celestial point of view it can be stated to be of the nature of pure sattva, which is the place of the manifestation of

179. Sūtreṃ sūcanāt kriyāśaktimāṃ prathamā vikārah. Tato mahān jñānaśaktimān. Sa ca sūtreṇa samyuktaḥ samyahnmiśritaḥ. Tataḥ prthaṇ na kintv ekaṃ eva vācyaṃ. Jñānakriyāśaktibhyāṃ dvēdhocyate. Pr. p. 187.

180. Tatra kūṭasthatve sati svādhāra viśvavyāñjaka tvam iti sāttvikam svarūpalakṣaṇam. Pr. p. 187.

181. Jagadaṅkuratvam. Pr. p. 187.

182. Atisamarthatamaṇāśakatvam. Pr. p. 187.

Vāsudeva, so that it can be meditated upon in that form. From the material or the ādhibhautika point of view, it explained as the citṣa, having the unchanging objectless knowledge as its mode.¹⁸³ That ~~is~~ ^{it} without an object, differentiates it from the buddhi, which is always related to an object. The followers of the Sāṅkhya on the other hand take the buddhi and the citṣa as synonymous.

Ahaṅkāra or the ego is produced from the mahat. It is described as endowed with the qualities of tamas, rajas and sattva, which respectively produce the tanmātras, the indriyas and the manas.¹⁸⁴ From the celestial point of view it is said to be an abode of Saṅkarsaṇa. On the material side it can be stated to be the agent, the means and the effect corresponding to the qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas respectively.¹⁸⁵ One, who is the substantive of the ego which is then an attribute, is endowed with quiet and terrible stupefaction.¹⁸⁶

183. Ādhibhautikam cittatvam iti lakṣaṇam. Cittatvam ca nirviṣayasarvavikārarāhitajñānavṛttikatyaṁ. Pr. p. 188.

184. Pr. p. 188.

185. Bhautikalakṣaṇaṁ tu kartrkaraṇakāryatvam. Pr. p. 189.

186. Dharmipurahsaram tu śāntaghoravimūḍhatvam iti bhautikam svarūpalakṣaṇam. Pr. p. 189.

One, who has no ego, is not stupefied and so the devotee, whose mind is fixed upon God, is different from one who has 'sāntaghoravimūḍhatva.

Prāṇa and Buddhi are just different forms of ahaṅkāra. They should not be regarded as separate categories. Prāṇa gives power to all the senses.¹⁸⁷ This is why its attributes are ojas, which is the power of the senses, sahas, which is the power of the Manas, and bala, which means physical strength. Prāṇa is atomic, but on account of its capacity, it can be fivefold. Thus it can pervade the whole body. The five forms are, Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna.¹⁸⁸

Buddhi is to be inferred from its effect, which is the knowledge of a particular object.¹⁸⁹ Puruṣottama's explanation of buddhi is given above.

Tanmātras are defined by Puruṣottama as subtle states of the elements.¹⁹⁰ The elements are possessed of the qualities

187. Prāṇalakṣaṇam tu sarvendriyabaladātrtvam. T. Sn. Ab. V. 97. p. 78. Also see Pr. p. 189.

188. Cf. T. Sn. Ab. V. 97. p. 78.

189. Viśiṣṭajñānalakṣaṇakāryānumeyā. T. Sn. Ab. V. 97. p. 78.

190. Sā ca bhūtasūkṣmāvasthā. Pr. p. 189.

like the sound, which is non-manifest.¹⁹¹ They are five, sound, touch, form, taste and smell. They can be grasped only by the yogins, while people like us can comprehend them only when they are specific. Here the Sāṅkhya theory is accepted by the 'Suddhādvaita.

'Śabda is explained as having the attribute of being comprehended by our ears. It is the tanmātra of space and can be said to be the sign of inference of something having been seen by a seer.¹⁹² The last is explained rather ingeniously. If a man standing outside the house says that the elephant has gone, then householder, who is in the house, infers that the man out of the house has seen the elephant. The sound, which is in the effects and which is consequently qualified, is an attribute of all the five elements and not just of the space, as made out by the followers of the Nyāya system. Puruṣottama gives a very good argument for this. When a gun is fired, the sound has its effect upon the skin and the heart also of the hearer.¹⁹³ Puruṣottama also refuses to admit with the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā that śabda is a

191. Nirviśeṣaśabdādigunavād bhūtatvam. Pr. p-189.

192. Pr. p. 189.

193. Pr. p. 191.

substance having its measure, and which is liable to contraction and expansion. According to him Śabda is a *guṇa* and not a *dravya*. Similarly touch or *sparsa* is the *tanmātra* of *vāyu* and is comprehended by the skin.¹⁹⁴ When in the effects, it is the quality of four elements. So it can also be described as an attribute of what is pervaded by the sound or what pervades the form.¹⁹⁵ *Rūpa* or form is the *tanmātra* of light and can be grasped by our eyes. It can also be described as having the form, similar to the form of a substance or always found as affixed to the substance or occupying the same space as that of a substance.¹⁹⁶ *Puruṣottama*, it is interesting to note, accepts *citra* as a separate colour.¹⁹⁷ *Rasa* or taste in the *tanmātra* of water and is grasped by our tongue; and *gandha* or smell is the *tanmātra* of the earth and is grasped by our nose. *Puruṣottama* also discusses the various divisions of all these.

Bhutas or the primordial elements are generally characterised as being endowed by manifested sound and the

194.Pr.p.192.

195.Pr.p.192.

196.Pr.p.196.

197.Citram apy atiriktam rūpam.Pr.p.196.

like. They are five.¹⁹⁸ Ākāśa is defined in three ways. It gives the worldly space, is an object of the dealings of within and without, and is the substratum of the prāṇa, sense-faculties and the internal organ.¹⁹⁹ Puruṣottama does not accept that ākāśa has any form, nor that the blue colour seen above, is an attribute of the sky.²⁰⁰ Its manifest quality is sound. Vāyu is formless, it moves and pervades, carries objects, sound and smell and gives strength to all the sense-faculties.²⁰¹ Its manifest quality is touch; and the sound follows from its cause (Ākāśa). Tejas is explained as capable of enlightening, cooking and digesting, heating that which is cold, eating up and drying.²⁰² Its special quality is form, while the qualities of sound and touch follow in it from their causes. Water is capable of

198. Tatrākāśādipañcakēnyatamatvam saviśoṣaśabdādimattvam
vā sāmānyalakṣaṇam. Pr. p. 202.

199. Pr. pp. 202-203.

200. Nākāśe rūpam. Upari nīlam paśyate ākāśam paśyāmīty eva
pratyāt. Nīlam nabhaḥ paśyāmīty atrāpi na guṇitvena
nabhaso bhānam. Guṇatvena nīlasattve mānābhāvāt. Pr. p. 207.

201. Pr. p. 209.

202. Pr. p. 209.

wetting, sticking, satisfying, living, expanding, flowing, removing the heat, and remaining in a mass.²⁰³ Its specific quality is taste; sound, touch and form follow in it from their causes. The earth is that which has form and which holds the whole world.²⁰⁴ Its specific quality is smell, while other qualities follow.

Indriyas are described as being produced of the taijasa ahankāre and as means of action or knowledge.²⁰⁵ They can be said to be capable of enlightening about the self through their fruit, while they are connected with the body.²⁰⁶ They are twofold, faculties of action and those of sensation. Puruṣottama does not admit that they are transitory or that they are themselves objects of our senses. The indriyas are different from their places in our body and are thus suprasensuous. They are atomic in measure and are always superintended by their respective deities, without which they are capable of doing nothing. The five organs of action are speech, hands, panis, feet and anus; while those of knowledge are ears, skin, nose, eyes, and

203. Pr. p. 210.

204. Pr. p. 211.

205. Taijasaḥ ankāropādeyatve sati jñānakriyāyatarakarāṇam indriyam. Pr. p. 214.

206. Dehasamyuktatve sati svaphelanātmajñāpakatvam vā.

Pr. p. 214.

tongue. Puruṣottama explains them completely, enumerating the Superintending deities and describing their scope and action.²⁰⁷

Manas is capable of both action and knowledge. It is of the nature of conation and non-conation.²⁰⁸ Its explanation from the celestial point of view is given as the place of the manifestation of Aniruddha. From the material point of view it is stated to be slowly meditated upon by the yogins. While dealing with perception, ^PPuruṣottama says that it can be regarded as both an indriya and not an indriya. In the ^Pprameya-^Pprakaraṇe of the Prasthānaratnākara he says that it is not an indriya.²⁰⁹ Its place is the heart.

Puruṣottama is not prepared to accept the Prāgebhāva (Negation antecedent to production) or dhvansa (destruction) as separate categories. It is not different from the state of the cause, the kāraṇāvasthā, and an avasthā can not be experienced as an entity different from the entity, of which it is a condition.²¹⁰ Puruṣottama further points out that when a man does not see the special state of the cause ,

207. Pr. pp. 215-217.

208. Tasya ca saṃkalpavikalpātmakatvaṃ svarūpalakṣaṇam.
Pr. p. 217.

209. Idam ca nendriyam. Pr. p. 217.

210. Avasthā ca svarūpātirekeṇa nānubhūyate. T. Sn. Ab. V. 117.
p. 89.

favourable to production, he does not think that he is seeing the *prāgabhāva* of a particular effect.²¹¹ Again the *prāgabhāva* does nothing in the production of an effect.²¹² Similar is the case with the *dhvanśa* also, which is not distinct from the essential nature of the instrumental or the material cause.²¹³

Puruṣottama says that other categories, accepted by other systems, need not be separately enumerated. Thus for instance, number, measure, distinction, non-difference, desire, efforts, happiness, miseries, all these can be stated to be existing or otherwise only in so far as they are related to the *tattvas*, which have been dealt with. *Sāmānya* or generality is co-eval with the *tattvas*, while *samyoga* is included in the *sparsa*. In fact the *sāmānya* etc. do not exist at all, so far as the causal form of God is concerned. They can be

211. Na hi ghaṭajananābhukūlām kāraṇāvasthām apaśyateḥ.

kaśyāpi iha ghaṭo bhaviṣyati, idāṁ atra ghaṭapṛāgabhāva
iti buddhir udeṭi. T. Sn. Ab. V. 117. p. 90.

212. Tathā cāśādhāraṇakāraṇatvenābhyaupagamyamānasya tasya
vyāpārābhāvāt kāraṇatā nāṅgīkartum śakyā. T. Sn. Ab. V. 117.
p. 90.

213. Ubhayathāpi nimittopēdānānyotarasvarūpātirikto
dhvemsō na nirūpayitum śakyah. Tadatiriktasyādarśanāt.

T. Sn. Ab. V. 117. p. 91.

admitted only in the effect-form.²¹⁴

The foregoing explanation of the causal form of God, as accepted by the Śuddhādvaita, bears an interesting comparison with the position accepted by the followers of Sāṅkhya. In the very beginning of this section, we have pointed ^{out} that the fundamental difference between the Sāṅkhya on the one hand and the Śuddhādvaita on the other is that while the former upholds the dualistic doctrine by considering all these as separate entities, the latter believes all these categories to be just forms of one Supreme God. All these 25 categories of the Sāṅkhya have been admitted with the ~~addition~~ ⁱⁿ of the sattva, rajas and tamas, which though given a prominent place by the Sāṅkhya, are according to it not tattvas but qualities or guṇas. It may thus appear that in the Śuddhādvaita we have a Vedāntic superstructure raised upon the principal entities of the Sāṅkhya. The primary source of this lies in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, where there is clearly noticeable a deliberate attempt to put the Sāṅkhya wine in a monistic bottle. Attempts to harmonise the dualistic theories with those of monism are found in the Gītā also. The Sāṅkhya philosophy with all

214. Vestutas tu sāmānyāder abhāva eva... Tasmān naiyāyikādyupagatatapadārthanām śrutipurāṇavirodhe laukikayuktivyuktatve ca kāryakotāv eva niveśe iti bhāvah.

that is admitted in it, has no place in the absolutism of Śaṅkara, but it has crept into the theories advocated by Rāmānuja and the succeeding Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas in one or another form. The Sāṅkhya theories were slowly and slowly almost reshaped so as to suit even a monist like Vallabha. The share of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa in this process seems to be very much, but as we are not definite about its date, it can not be properly appreciated.

Another important point is that while explaining these categories, there are given the ādhidaivika explanations referring to Śaṅkaraṇa and Aniruddha. The root of this lies in the Caturvyūha theory, as promulgated by the earlier Pāñcarātra. This theory has however been criticised by the author of the Vedānta-sūtras. Rāmānuja not only accepts the theory but even interprets the Brahmasūtras so ingeniously as to get the theory sanctioned by the author of the Brahmasūtras. Vallabha while commenting upon the Sūtras rejects the theory and agrees with Śaṅkara in his interpretation. Here however we find that if the theory of the vyūhas is also brought in harmony with monism, the Buddhādvaita has no objection against it, though it is not expressly stated or referred to. Here also the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa seems to have played a very important part, in so shaping it so as to suit Monism.

(VII).

Creation.

Puruṣottama in his Prasthānaratnākara and Anubhāsyaprakāśa²¹⁵ gives the process of creation, following the Bhāgavata. II. Brahman first assumes the forms of knowledge, joy, time, desire, action, Māyā, and Prakṛti. Kāla or time is of the nature of the power of action, while desire is the thought of the Lord expressed in "May I be many and produce".²¹⁶ This is twofold. The first has the nature of differentiation, while the second is of the nature of raising and degrading.²¹⁷

Considering the first Puruṣottama says that the attributes of sat, cit and ānanda, which are of the nature of action, knowledge and bliss, not connected with kāla, are mutually differentiated and while in that process they differentiate their substantive also; thus making Brahman endowed with action, knowledge and bliss. Thus the Highest Lord, who is trirūpa, becomes possessed of form (sākāra). Even though thus differentiated, owing to his desire to remain non-differentiated, God remains one whole.

215. Cf. Pr. pp. 159ff. Also A.B.P. II. iv. 22. pp. 810-813.

216. Bahu syām prajāyeya. Chāndogya. VI. ii. 3, Taittirīya II. 6.

217. Dvitiyaś tūtkarṣāpakarṣarūpaḥ. Pr. p. 161.

That is who the effect form is inferior and God with all these three forms is called complete or Pūrṇa. The power of the aspect of existence (Sat) is the Māyā, which is of the nature of action, and that of the aspect of sentiency is the Māyā, which deludes.²¹⁸ The Māyā, which is instrumental in the production of the world, belongs to the aspect of bliss. Māyā is thus related to all the forms of God and is therefore comprehensive of everything.²¹⁹ It thus gives the form to everything, that comes out of the original nature.²²⁰ It can thus be accepted as of the nature of place, time and objects (Deśakālavasturūpā). At times it may be said to produce even the desire of the Lord. It does not however mean that the original creatorship is devolved upon it.²²¹

Coming to the second, Puruṣottama says that all these aspects have that of bliss as the Highest, while the other two viz. that of sat and cit are inferior to it and are

218. Śaktis tu sadamśasya kriyārūpā cidamśasye vyāmohikā māyā.

Pr.p.160.

219. Sañcāyakarūpā .Pr.p.160.

220. Tato mūlarūpe nirgate akṣaramśabhūtasya tatra praveśas

tadā tasmins tāni ākṛtim sampādayati. Pr.p.160.

221. Na tu tāvatā mūlakartṛtvam. Pr.p.161.

produced as serving it. Then are created knowledge and action, which are the attributes of cit and sat, as powers of the Highest Lord. Then the aspect of bliss is endowed with knowledge and action. When the attribute of the aspect of cit viz. knowledge goes away from the cit, the power of the cit, viz. the deluding Māyā, deludes it. The cit aspect, even though of the nature of understanding, is deluded by it, because of the absence of knowledge, which is its attribute, and because of the separation of the aspect of bliss from it. The cit is related to māyā, ~~which is of the nature of the~~ with the understanding that it will be joined with the ānanda through this relation. Being thus not at ease, it ^{remains} ~~remains~~ dependent upon the sūtrātman, which is of the nature of the tenfold prāṇas. It is thus called jīva, because of its efforts to hold the prāṇas.²²² Similar is the position of the aspect of existence, which becomes inert, because of the absence of the power of action. Later on by virtue of activities, which are the parts of the original action, it is manifested in the form of the body and the like. When that activity or the attributes of that activity are concealed, it is also concealed; when however it is manifested, the terminology like ghata and the like

222. Teda prāṇadhāranaprayatnavattvāj jīva ity ucyate. Pr. p. 161.

comes to the Jīva, the Lord and the Buddhi, and so when the manifestation is concealed, that terminology produces the understanding of destruction. Similar is the case with the cit, which is manifested and concealed by the knowledge, which is a part of the power of knowledge. The aspect of bliss is to be understood in much the same way. Thus by twofold desire, the inert objects which are manifestations of the sat aspect and which are binding upon the individual souls; the individual souls, which are manifestations of the cit and which are bound; and the antaryāmins, which rule over them and which are the manifestations of the Ānanda, - all these are produced on the analogy of sparks from fire.

The whole analysis of creation as given by Puruṣottama, has been taken down by us ~~type~~ here completely, except some minor omissions. It is interesting to note that the concept of Māyā is accepted by the 'Suddhādvaita, though its seems to be different from that of 'Sāṃkara. Māyā is the miraculous power of God, but it is delusive also with regards to its connection with the aspect of cit and in 'the making of' the jīvas. This vyāmoḥikā Māyā has a very

important part to play. This vyāmohikā Māyā, it is important to note, is the same as avidyā in the Śuddhādvaita.²²³

(VIII).

Brahman-the effect-form.

The effect form of God, is endless. Even then it can be classified into two, the samastī and the vyastī in so far as we view it either collectively or individually.²²⁴ The collective form is of the nature of the Brahmāṇḍa, while the individual one is made up of the individual souls and the inanimate objects. The Antaryāmin is not included in the effect form, because it has no ego of the body (Dehābhī-māna), while the individual soul is so included because it is possessed of that ego.

The individual soul, even though belonging to the effect form and endowed with the bodily consciousness is eternal and is not therefore produced, like an ordinary transitory objects. That the individual soul is eternal

223. Teda cidamśasya śaktir vyāmohikā māyā avidyēti yāvat.
Pr. p. 161. See also: Prof. G. H. Bhatt's article 'The concept of Māyā in the Śuddhādvaita Vedānta'. Indika, The Indian Historical Research Institute, Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume, Bombay. 1953.

224. Cf. T. Sn. Ab. V. 118, p. 92.

and does not vanish with the destruction of the body, is proved on the strength of a very curious but interesting argument of Puruṣottama, who points out that even a newly born child will be hungry and will try to suck its mother. This can be explained, says Puruṣottama, only on the ground of that child, remembering its experiences in the previous life. This shows that the jīva that was in the previous body has now come over to that of the newly born child.²²⁵ As it is eternal, it can not be said to be produced, for that which has a beginning must have an end and if we believe in the production of the Jīvas, we should admit its destruction also and that would run counter to the eternal nature of the jīvas, that has been scrupulously maintained in all the scriptures. The analogy, that is used, is that of the emanation of sparks from fire and this emanation can not be called production.²²⁶ In his

225. Jātemātrasya bālasya kṣudhātāḥ stanapānādaḥ pravṛtti-
-derśanāt. Tasyāś ca pūrvānubhūtakṣunnivṛttikāraṇabhūtā-
-nubhavejanyasmṛtimentarenānnapapattyā tasyātmanah
pūrvāpārejanmīyaśarīrāvacchinnaśyaikyā siddhe tena
cānāditve'nādibhāvatvena ca dhvamsāpratīyogitve
nityatvasya siddhatvat. T.S.Ab.V.53, p.92.

226. Yato visphuliṅgavad uccaraṇam notpattih. Nāmarūpasamban-
-dhābhāvat. A.B.P.II.iii.17.p.704.

famous kārīkā on creation Vallabha says that those which are transcendent are produced, with regard to those that are eternal but limited there is contact, while for the eternal and the unlimited there is manifestation.²²⁷ While explaining this kārīkā, Puruṣottama says that production is the association of the objects due to the externalization; contact is due to the action of coming in; while manifestation is caused by desire. This being the case, when there is manifestation or contact, the essential nature and the qualities of the cause do not undergo any fundamental change or modification and hence the samāgama is not utpatti.²²⁸ The writers on the 'Suddhādevita, especially Puruṣottama, have made deliberate attempts to show that the spark-fire analogy can not and should not mean production.

What is the relation of this individual soul to Brahman? On the strength of the scriptures, the Gītā,

227. Anitya janamaṇ nitye paricchinne samāgamaḥ,
Nityāparicchinnaṇaṇ prākāṭyaṇ ceti sā tridhā.

A.B.II.iii.31. p. 679.

228. Janamaṇ bahirbhāvaḥetukaḥ viśayasamsargaḥ, samāgamaḥ
āgamaṇakriyāḥetukaḥ saḥ, prākāṭyaṇ icchāḥetukaḥ sa.....
Tathā cātra vibhāgāḥ jāte bahirbhāve tadānīm sva-rūpa-
-dharmayoḥ anyathābhāvaḥetukāḥ tasya notpattirūpātā.

S.S. pp. 170-171.

and the Sūtras, the individual soul is said to be an anśa of Brahman. What exactly is the connotation of this term in connection with the individual soul, as related to Brahman? The word Anśa is used for a part (Avayava), a son, a piece (Khaṇḍa), a part of something which is specific (Viśiṣṭavastvekaśa), a portion from the whole mass (Kṣeyekaśa) or even a wife.²²⁹ Similarly the term pāda which is found in the śrutis, stands for a part or a portion. So we may accept any of these senses and there will be nothing wrong. Even then however we should accept that meaning, which is properly suitable to the illustrations of sparks and fire and a spider and its web. Thinking in this way, we should understand the term anśa to mean a piece or a part, but having the essential nature of the whole unchanged.²³⁰ That is why the individual soul is called an ābhāsa or an appearance of Brahman; just as a Brahmin who is devoid of good conduct, but who bears the

229. Puruṣottama quotes the passage: Ardho vā eṣa ātmano yat patiḥ. Here he says that ardha means aṁśa.²²⁹

A.B.P.II.iii.53.p.767.

230. Tathā sati khaṇḍāvayavādirūpās tannityatvādibodhaka-
-śrutyānurodhāt evikṛtasvarūpā evaṁśāśiddhyati.

A.B.P.II.iii.53.¶.767.

sacred thread, is a Brahmin only in appearance. ²³¹

The question naturally arises as to how can non-dualism be explained, when we believe in the amśatva of individual souls. The individual souls, which are the manifestation of the cit aspects and which are amśas of Brahman, can be called one with Brahman, as a part can not be different from the whole. A spark, which is an amśa of fire, can not be non-fire. But then is not a part different from the whole? Can we say that a part as such is absolutely one with the whole?

The question does not arise for Śaṅkara, nor even for Rāmānuja. Śaṅkara with his staunch belief in absolute identity has said that the individual souls are also appearances, imagined by our ignorance. If we have to believe that 'I am Brahman', that 'I' must be wrong and must be Brahman. But then this would lead to the destruction of the individual souls as such and surely nobody would attempt to realize that Supreme, by the realization of which he will destroy himself. ²³² Rāmānuja accepts qualified Monism and so the differences between the individual souls on the one hand and Brahman on the other does not worry him much.

231. Yathā'nēcārī brāhmaṇo brāhmaṇābhāṣaḥ, sūtradhāra katve'
pi brāhmaṇyākhyāḥ evatāyās tatas tirohitatvāt, tathā,
jīvo'pi. A.B.P. II. iii. 50. p. 760.

232. Na hy ātmanāśaḥ puruṣārthaḥ. A.B.I. iii. 15. p. 399.

Madhva would in fact want difference and try to disprove identity. Bhāskara and Nimbārka admit both oneness and difference, but while the latter leans heavily towards the fundamental nature of difference, the former tries to explain it on the strength of upādhis.

Puruṣottama makes a thorough analysis of the problem, that faces him. The Ācārya, whose theories he is expounding, says just that an anśa is not different from the anśin, but this is not enough. If we want to promulgate the path of devotion, we must maintain the individuality of the individual souls and the anśa, if its anśatva is not imagined, can in no case be called absolutely identical with the anśin. Puruṣottama therefore says that they must accept the theory of Bheda-bheda, while leaning towards abheda and explaining the Bheda as owing to desire. That is why, while referring to Bhāskara, Puruṣottama says that he admits both anśatva and bhinnābhinnatva.²³³ This he says is the relationship of tādātmya and herein the difference owes its existence to the desire of the Highest Lord and is thus adventitious.

233. Tatra anśatvam tu yuktam bhinnābhinnatvam ca. Śrautavāt.

A.B.P.II.iii.53. p.763. See also: Tathā caivam tādātmye
eva vyāsasya tātpariam na nityabhede nāpy abhede iti.

S.S.p.175.

It is interesting to note that Puruṣottama calls Rāmānuja a believer in difference.²³⁴ There is no tāttvibheda in the Śuddhādvaita, where the jīvatva is adventitious.²³⁵

This however raises another problem. That which is adventitious and not natural, can not be called eternal. In his efforts to bring the theory of amśatva as near to abheda as possible, Puruṣottama calls jīvabhāva as adventitious, but then how can the individuality of the jīvas be eternally maintained if it is not natural? We should here bear in mind that in the Śuddhādvaita, the highest emancipation is the Sāyujya, where a devotee enjoys with God. It may be said that the individual soul might have attained the Brahmabhāva, but even then the distinction does and should persist. Again Vallabha argues actually that the destruction of the soul can not be desired by anyone; So there is a deliberate effort on the part of the propounders of the Śuddhādvaita to retain that individuality. Again, it is maintained that the jīvatva is only because of the embodied ego (Dehābhimāna) and we may say that when that

234. Atrā tādātmyam anāṅgīkurvatām tāttvikabhedaavādinām
Rāmānujamedhvanaiyēyikādīnām nānāmatāni. S.S.p.150.

235. Jīvabhāvasya āgantukatvakathanena tāttviko bhedo
vāritah. S.S.p.155.

is destroyed, the jīvabhāva, which is adventitious, is also destroyed. What then about eternity and individuality? This contingency appears to arise for all those, who try to retain the individuality of the souls, call them nitya and yet try to adhere to Monism. It does not arise for two philosophers only, Śaṅkara and Maḍh^hya, both of whom take uncompromising attitudes^s, the former cutting the Gordian Knot by saying that all the distinctions are false, and the latter flatly rejecting all thought of Monism.

Further, what about the souls in the world? Are they one or many? If we believe in only one soul, i.e. Ekātma^vāda, then the eternal individual souls would pose a problem. If on the other hand we agree to the existence of different individual souls, we must believe in the multiplicity of the souls i.e. Nānātma^vāda. If a jīva is believed to be an an^s of Brahman, there is bound to be the conclusion of the an^sin, being a composite whole, rather than one complete whole. Puruṣottama here takes a compromising attitude^d and says that from the point of view of the individual souls, we should admit multiplicity, while from the stand point of Brahman there is oneness.²³⁶

236. Evaṃ jīvānām an^satve jīvasvarūpavicāreṇa nānātma^vādo
bhagavatsvarūpavicāreṇa ca ekātma^vādaḥ. A.B.P. II. iii. 53.
p. 767.

There is no agreement among Indian Philosophers regarding the measure of the Individual soul. The followers of the Nyāya believe in the jīvas to be omnipresent, but they accept the multiplicity of the souls. The Jains accept the jīvas as having the measure of the bodies, which is the residence of those jīvas. Śaṅkara thinks that the jīva is actually not existing on the highest level, and so it may be called vibhu in reality. All the other exponents of the Vedānta accept the jīva to be atomic. Puruṣottama ridicules the theory of vyāpakātmavēda by pointing out that if all the jīvas are omnipresent, all would be joined with all the bodies and if one body eats a mango all would enjoy it, because there is no limitation or regulation. So many times one feels that there is nothing at one's feet but the head is aching, similarly there will be an experience of happiness in the body of Devadatta, while simultaneously there may be a feeling of pain in the body of Yaṅṇadatta.²³⁷ So many other arguments are also advanced by Puruṣottama. The jīva again can not be said to have the dehāparimāṇa, because that would lead to the transiency of the jīvas and run counter to their eternity.²³⁸ The materialists believing in the

237. T.S.Ab.V.53.p.92.

238. Madhyamāparimāṇatve anityatāpatteḥ. T.S.Ab.V.53.p.92.

luminosity of sentiency as being a result of the
conglomeration of the atoms of the primordial elements.

This is also not acceptable, since in that case consciousness
would remain in a dead body also.²³⁹ The jīvas then should
be admitted as atomic in measure. How then to explain the
pervasion of the whole body by the consciousness, which is
atomic? This can be explained on the ground of the capacity
of the caitanya to pervade the whole body just like a piece
of sandal-wood or it may be called its quality of spread-
-ing just like that of smell, which spreads here and there
leaving its original source.²⁴⁰

One would naturally ask~~d~~ as to how to explain the
scriptural passages, that often teach of the pervasion of
the soul, if we are to accept it as atomic. Here the
followers of the Śuddhādvaita state that this can be
explained on the ground of the Bhagavattva of the souls.

239. Jñānam yasya dharmah sa puñjo bāhyaś cen mrtāśarīre
pi jñānam upalabhyeta. T.S.Ab.V.55-56, p.97.

240. Sarvaśarīragatacaitanyopalambhas tu sāmartyaḥ vā
guṇāḍ veti sādhitam. A.B.P.II.iii.28, p.721.

When the aspect of bliss, which is concealed from the individual souls, is manifested, then the soul attains those attributes, which are connected with the aspects of bliss and there is viruddhadharmāśrayatva, as of the Highest Lord. Thus even though the souls may be atomic, they may be great and pervading on account of the possession of the contradictory attributes. Thus the vyāpakatva of the soul who has obtained the realization of Brahman, can be explained. The vyāpakatva is thus of the nature of Brahmatva and not jīvatva.²⁴¹ The jīva, as a jīva, is atomic and as Brahman it is pervasive.

Being a part of Brahman, the jīva is sentient, and the sentiency is not only an attribute but also the essential nature of the individual soul; just as the attributes of Brahman also constitute its very nature. Puruṣottama gives a very good argument when he says that which is produced by one is one's quality; that which is

241. Tasya brahmabhāvam prāptasya jīvasya bhagavattvena
vyāpakatvaśrutir yujyate. Na tu jīvatvena rūpeṇa....

Ānandāśābhiyakteu brahmabhāve sati tasya tadviruddha-
dharmādhāratvam bhavaty aśeṣe tatra brahmakotayeh
paricchedo vyāpakatvam ca pratīyerann iti. A.B.P. II. III

one's quality is inseparable from the one, of which it is a quality; finally that which is inseparable from one is one's essential nature.²⁴² As the sentiency is an attribute of the individual soul, it follows as a corollary that it is also its essential nature. Similarly the activity of an individual soul also comes from Brahman. The individual soul is an agent on account of the relationship of *tādātmya*, which it bears with Brahman. Thus the activity is of Brahman and it appears to be in the *jīva*.²⁴³

Here comes perhaps the most crucial problem of all the systems of the world. If the individual souls are agents themselves and if the activity of these *jīvas* is to come from Brahman, and also if everything is in and through God, what about the unhappiness experienced by the *jīvas*? The contingency, that arises for Brahman, is that the Highest Lord, who is said to be so merciful and kind, so good and benign, is partial to some who are made happy and cruel to

242. *Yo yajjanakah sa tadgunako yo yadgunakah sa tadavānābhūtaḥ, yo yadavānābhūtaḥ sa tadātmakeḥ*. A.B.P.II.iii.18/.

p. 706.

243. *Brahmagataṃ eva kartṛtvam brahmetādātmyād eva jīve bhāsate*. A.B.P.II.iii.41.p.748.

those who are miserable. The human beings in this wide world are daily falling and bleeding upon the thorns of life. Who is responsible for this? The theory of the enjoyment of the fruits of one's own actions and that of the transmigration of souls are formulated as a reply to this, but we shall have to admit in that case that the Highest Lord is dependent upon the actions of an individual. Why should the omnipotent God depend upon the actions and create human beings according to the same? The doctrine of the freedom of will may be and has been admitted in the Śuddhādvaita. God is like a father, who puts all the necessary material before a child and informs him about the good or bad points connected with them, but it is the child who acts and not the father, who is consequently not responsible for the defaults of the young one.²⁴⁴ This however is no solution of the problem, because even if we admit the freedom of will, what about the creator who has created people, some happy, healthy, wealthy and wise, others equally miserable, weak, poor and foolish. The contention of God being dependent upon the actions can not be agreed to by the Śuddhādvaita, which believes in the omnipotence of

244. Ato guṇadoṣa-kathanapūrvakam bālecchānusārisāmagrisampā-
-dake pitari yathā na doṣaḥ kintu bālasvabhāve tathā
brahmaṇy api na doṣaḥ kintu jīva eva. A.B.P. II. iii. 42.

God, who is and must be independent. The karma again being jada or inert must be regulated by someone.²⁴⁵ Why then not believe in God as the giver of fruits, as He is the source of activity? And if that is accepted, as it is actually accepted, what about the contingency of partiality and cruelty? Vallabha tries to solve the difficulty by pointing out that the creation is of and in the self. God does not create anything new or different from Him; He just manifests himself as the jīvas and so even though the makers of miseries, he ^{is} neither partial nor cruel.²⁴⁶ Everything is one with him. The Brahmasūtra II.i.34. says that God creates in accordance with the actions of an individual. This sūtra is only for explaining the opponent.²⁴⁷ Viṭṭhaleśa has another explanation to offer. He says that God desires to sport and sports naturally require some differences and distinctions. There is nothing wrong therefore if we believe

245. Atah karmaniyāmaka īśvaro'ṅgikārya eva. T.S. Ab.V.76.p.128

246. T.S.V.76.p.128.

247. Pūrvam tadananyatvādi sūtraiḥ sarvasya brahmātmakatvam.

jīvasyāpi brahmātmakatvam ca pratipādayan yadatra

sāpekṣatvam hetūkaroti tena jñāyate vādibodhanāyedaṁ

iti. A.B.P. II.i.34.p.602.

the miseries also to be the līlā of God.²⁴⁸ Puruṣottama combines the two views in to one and says that even though God may give fruit with regard to the karma of individuals, He does not become dependent, because He desires to do in that way. While thus following his desire, he can not be said to be cruel or partial, because He is everything. The karma also is an attribute ~~also~~ of Brahman and that is how it is accepted as devoid of beginning. Sometimes God may not care for karma, because He is independent.²⁴⁹

The explanations of Vallabha and his son and the interpretation of the two views as given by Puruṣottama should be given a due place among all those explanations

248. The view of Viṭṭhaleśa is suggested by his explanation of Brahmasūtra II.ii.742 in which he explains the word prayatna as 'Bhagavatkr̥tāḥ kr̥tārthaṁ udyamāḥ.' For further explanation see A.B.P.II.iii.743p.750.

249. Tenatredam siddham. Phaladāne bhagavān jīvakṛtapraya-
-tnasāpekṣo'pi na svātantryādūhīyate. Tathaivālocita-
-tvāt. Ālocanēnusāreṇa viśiddham phalam jīvebhyo
dadād api na vaiṣamyādidoṣabhāg bhavati. Sarvarūpatvāt.
karmaṇām apy anāditvam bhagaveddharmatvāt. Kvachin
maryādām bhīṣaty api. Svatantratvāt. A.B.P.II.iii.42.

which have so far been given. The contention of Viṭṭhaleśa may appear even strange on the face of it. Why should the jīvas suffer for the sport of God? Such a God will not be different from the boys, who throw stones in ponds for joy and kill the frogs. Hence the arguments based on the līlā of God must have the solid backing of the argument based on the oneness or Ātmasrṣti, if we are to use the terminology of the Śuddhādvaita. But the explanation on the ground of Ātmasrṣti requires one's vision cultivated for this, and is in fact a negation of the miseries rather than an explanation of them.

The world is regarded in the Śuddhādvaita as a manifestation of the aspect of sat of God. The Vedānta can not accept the theory of Kaṇāda that the world is produced from the conglomeration of atoms, or from the prakṛti as advocated by the Sāṃkhya. Puruṣottama repudiates both these views thoroughly in his Srṣtibhedavāda.²⁵⁰ However the problem for the Śuddhādvaita is, whether the world should be accepted as unreal. The whole world with its wide variety of things, both great and small has been a very great problem for the philosophers. It is always fleeting and changing. Can it be called real at all? Again if we are to accept that everything is Brahman, can we

250. Cf. Srṣtibhedavāda. Vādāvalī. pp. 82-95.

equate Brahman with the floating, changing, mass of things, which are not satisfactory, not eternal, and not even joyful? Can we believe that this world, which we see around us, is a real transformation of real Brahman?

Śaṅkara says that the world is mithyā or unreal. The reality of the empirical world can not be maintained in the ultimate analysis and so Śaṅkara distinguishes between the Vyāvahārika satya or the exoteric truth and the ^Pāramārthika satya or the esoteric truth. Here however it is necessary for us to understand what exactly is meant by Śaṅkara, when he says that the world is mithyā. The world, as it is, is in any case more real than the chimeræ and can not thus be rejected outright as sheer illusion. It can not thus be compared with mirage, or dreams or phantoms of experience. The Prātibhāsika is different from the Vyāvahārika; but just as the Prātibhāsika is negated in the Vyāvahārika, in which we know that all that we have dreamt or seen or thought is wrong, even so we can go one step further and say that the Vyāvahārika is just an appearance, when we go to a still higher level of the Pāramārthika ^{satya} ~~satya~~. While we are dreaming, we do not think that what we experience is false; we know that only when we arise from our dream and find ourselves

in the waking state. By the parity of reasoning we can say that the waking worldly state can also be falsified, when we rise still higher due to the dawning light of true knowledge. The reality and otherwise of the world are thus relative. When Śaṅkara says that the world is mithyā, it is so only from the point of view of the highest reality, which the world is surely not.

The unreality of the world, with everything that it includes, matter, souls, personal God, and all—even if ~~it~~ may be maintained on the highest level, is a big blow to the religious mind and how so ever great may be the conclusions of this devastating reasoning, a man, especially a man of religion, does not like it. What would be the position then if the whole world is regarded as a phantom of imagination, even if such an understanding may be a misunderstanding or misinterpretation? The Vaiṣṇava teachers who followed Śaṅkara launched a violent tirade against him, and Śaṅkara was called 'Buddhist in disguise' (Pracchanna-bauddha) and a 'False-speaker' (Mithyāvādin).²⁵¹ Rāmānuja

251. Nāgārjuna distinguishes between two satyas. Cf.

Dve satye samupāśritya buddhānām / dharmadeśanā,
 Lokasamgr̥tisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ.
 Mūlamādhyamika^{ka}śāstra. XXIV.8. quoted in 'Gaudapāda' by
 T. M. P. Mahadevan. p. 206. fn. 70. Even Śūnya of Buddhism is
 void only in the ultimate analysis.

and Madhva, Bhāskara and Nimbārka—all who followed Śaṅkara said that the world is real and explained the relation of the world and Brahman in their own ways. The world, according to Rāmānuja, is the gross/acit which is the effect of the subtle acit. This subtle acit, together with the subtle cit, forms the body of Brahman and thus there is qualified monism. Even if we may not enter into a discussion of the relation of the subtle acit and Brahman, we should at least admit that the rudiments of the world are in Brahman. If then the empirical world is ugly, bad and dull, the rudiments should be subtly ugly and subtly bad. Can they then be connected with Brahman? If we think that the subtle acit does not contain all this, what can be the source of everything despicable and dissatisfactory in the world, which is the gross form of that very subtle acit? Any way the reality of the world, when looked upon in the context of the Advaita, even though that Advaita may be qualified, remains an unsolved problem.

Vallabha and his followers say that the world is not false. It can not be equated with the illusory appearances, because it is the manifestation of the aspect of sat of

Brahman; and is thus its effect. As the cause is real, the effect, which is the revelation of its aspects of being, can not be called unreal. The *prapañca* is thus *satya* and not *mithyā*. The question now is as to how can the world be called real. What Vallabha and his followers mean by the reality of the world is the reality of the essential form of the world (*Brahmarūpeṇa satyatva*). We may agree that the world, which is just the manifestation of Brahman, is real in its essence, which is Brahman; but as Dr. P. T. Raju puts it, 'the relation between the essence of the world and the Brahman is not the problem. The problem is about the relation between the world as we experience it and the Brahman.'²⁵² Thus if Brahman is the norm of reality, can we say that the world, in which we live, is also real?

The answer to this is found in the distinction that has been made out by the followers of Pure Monism, between *Jagat* or *Prapañca* on the one hand and the *Samsāra* on the other. This distinction has not been maintained by the predecessors of Vallabha and therefore it is a novel theory for the Vedānta. The world has Brahman as its material cause and *māyā* as an instrument; the *samsāra* on the other

252. Dr. P. T. Raju. *Idealistic thought of India*. p. 169.

hand has no material cause and avidyā or nescience is instrumental for its appearance.²⁵³ The samsāra is not produced. It is 'ucyate' and not 'jāyate'.²⁵⁴ The Samsāra is of the nature of pride and consciousness of possession (ahantāmatātmake) and is thus destroyed by knowledge. It is the Samsāra which ends, when one is liberated, and not the world, which may be merged at the will of God. In the 'Suddhādvaita the terms māyā and avidyā are not synonymous, as is the case with the system of Śaṅkara. On the strength of the Bhāgavata passage,²⁵⁵ Puruṣottama says that the avidyā is an effect of the māyā. Avidyā is thus not without a beginning and being one of the twelve śaktis of the Lord, it has no power over God.²⁵⁶ Knowledge puts an end to the avidyā and consequently samsāra, but not the prapañca.²⁵⁷

253. Tathā hi prapañcasya brahmopādānakatvam māyākaraṇakatvam, samsārasya nirupādānakatvam avidyākaraṇakatvam iti kāraṇabhedād bhedah. T.S.Ab.V.23.p.60.

254. T.S.P.V.23.

255. Vidyāvidye mama tanū viddhy uddhava śarīrinām,
Mokṣabandhakarī ādye māyayā me vinirmite. Bhāgavata.
XI.xi.3.

256. T.S.Ab.V.25.p.65.

257. Jñānasya sakāryāvidyānāśakatvam mocanam ca, anyathaiva avidyāyā ahantāmatātmake samsārabījatvāt samsārasyāvidyākatvakathanena sakāraṇasya tasyaiva jñānanāśyātvakathanena ca samyag siddham. T.S.Ab.V.81.p.139.

It should also be borne in mind that avidyā is just removed by vidyā, it is not destroyed. An effect is completely destroyed only when the inhering cause is destroyed. Knowledge can not destroy the māyā which causes avidyā. Avidyā therefore exists in the māyā in a subtle form.²⁵⁸ Puruṣottama gives an illustration by pointing out that the state of sleep, which is removed by wakefulness, remains in the buddhi, as its mode and pervades the internal organ.

Avidyā and vidyā have five divisions, each, and they are called parvans. The five parvans of the avidyā are the ignorance of the essential nature and the superimposition of the body, the senses, the prāṇa and the internal organ.²⁵⁹ Avidyā, says Puruṣottama, can be understood either collectively or individually. It is thus samastirūpā or vyastirūpā, just as we can understand the forest as one, while the trees are many. The samastirūpā is one of the powers of the Highest Lord, The vyastirūpā is connected with the individual souls.²⁶⁰

There is no question of superimposition with reference to

258. Kāryasya sarvathā nēśo hi samayāyināśāt. Prakṛte ca vidyāyāḥ sāttvikītena svajanakamāyānāśakatvābhāvāt māyāsattvāt tatra sūkṣmarūpeṇāvidyāyāḥ sattu tasya upamardo eva na tu nāśah. T. S. Ab. V. 33-34. p. 74.

259. T. S. V. 32.

260. Evam sati samastirūpeṇa vauṇam itived aikyam. Vyastirūpeṇa vṛkṣā itivenā nānātvam. Tatra samastirūpā bhagavacchaktir vyastirūpā jīvanām iti siddhyati. T. S. Ab. V. 32. p. 73.

the avidyā, which is produced from the māyā before creation, because the adhyāśas come afterwards. Māyā produces mahat, which again creates the ego. Both these are of the nature of the internal organ and so the first is the antahkaranādhyāśa. Prāṇa is just another form of the ego and there is the prāṇādhyāśa. This^{is} followed by the superimposition of the body and the senses. The dehādhyāśa leads to a complete forgetting of the essential nature (svarūpe-vismaraṇa). This is the ignorance of the nature, which is the same as wrong knowledge. Thus the original nescience leads to the bondage of the dehādhyāśa and the superimposition of the attributes of the body, which in its turn produces the cycle of births and deaths. This is saṃsāra.²⁶¹

It will thus be seen that the distinction between the jagat and the saṃsāra depends upon the distinction between the points of view from which we look at the cosmos. If we take it to be just of the essential nature of Brahman, it is the prepañca which exists; if it is understood as a heterogeneous mass of things separated from one another and also from Brahman, there is ignorance and saṃsāra. Thus it is the difference which is sublated and not the essential nature. When we are in need

261. *Evam ca mūlāvidyākṛto dehādhyāśādibandhas tena kṛto yo janmamaranādīpareṃparājanako dehādīdharmādhyāśaḥ sa saṃsāra iti phalaṭi .T.S.Ab.V.32.p.74.*

of much of gold we use all the ornaments of gold in our possession and we take them to be gold and not bracelets and rings different from the gold. The distinctions^s are removed and we have gold alone. Even so here also we have the prapañca, which is not false.²⁶² The distinctions are thus due only to the egoism and the things, as they are viewed by the ordinary people in the world, are brought about only by speech.²⁶³ The saṃsāra is thus a delusion of the individual soul, due to which he sees things, which do not exist and does not see what exists in the prapañca, which is of the nature of Brahman. Puruṣottama gives even a syllogism to prove the reality of the prapañca. Just as the dream world requires the world, which is more real to precede it, even so our vyāvahārika prapañca follows the prapañca, which is relatively more real. The reason given for the premise is the māyikatva or the 'māyikatveṇa abhimatatva'.²⁶⁴

262. Yathā bahusuvāṇāpekṣāyāṃ tatkāryāṇi kṛtākakūṇḍalaghata-
śarāvādīny ānīyaitāveḍ idam suvarṇam iti suvarṇatvenaiva-
tāni grhyante na tu kṛtākādīrūpeṇa iti vikalpabuddher
eva bādho na tu svarūpasyāpīti tādṛśabhānānurodhena api
na mithyātvaṃ prapañcasya siddhyati. T.S.Ab.V.91.p.158.

263. Tena lokapratīyamānarūpeṇa padārthānām vācārāmbhāna-
-mātratvaṃ eva. T.S.Ab.V.92.p.159.

264. Vyāvahārikāḥ prapañcāḥ svāpekṣayotkṛtāḥ sattākeprapañce-
pūrvakāḥ. Māyikatvenābhimatatvān māyikatvād vā. Svapnādi-
prapañcavet. S.S.p.351. See also Śrītibhedavāda, vādāvalī,
p.104.

That is why it is said that a Brahmvādin never sees anything bad in the world, because for him everything is of the nature of Brahman.²⁶⁵

The foregoing discussion regarding the distinction between the jagat and the saṁsāra, eloquently speaks of the exact position that the Śuddhādvaita has taken regarding the world. The world can not be accepted as real, as has been done by Rāmānuja; nor can it be regarded as unreal as taught by Śaṅkara. Vallabha therefore tries to make a compromise by stating the reality of the world in its essential nature and distinguishing it from the saṁsāra, which is illusory and unreal. When Puruṣottama postulates another prapañca, which is relatively more real, it may appear that the difference between the Śuddhādvaita and the Kevalādvaita is more of emphasis than of substance. It is interesting to note here that the five pārvans of the avidyā are, ignorance of the real nature and the adhyāsas, both of which are maintained by Śaṅkara. Puruṣottama's opponent appears to be correct in pointing out that in the Śuddhādvaita, the ultimate reality of the world is accepted as of the nature of Brahman, after rejecting the same from the point of view of the world, while in Śaṅkara's system there is the rejection of just the

265. T.S.Ab. V.79.p.133.

ultimate reality of the world as such.²⁶⁶ Can it be said that Vallabha admits the theories of Śaṅkara for all practical purposes and raises a theistic structure upon them, instead of the absolutistic one constructed by Śaṅkara?

(IX).

Theory of causation-Abheda.

After dealing with important points regarding Brahman and the world, together with the individual souls, we shall now turn to the theory of causation as promulgated in the 'Suddhādvaita. The theory of causation assumes primary importance in Indian systems of philosophy because here the thinkers try to show how the world as an effect can be explained from the principle, that they have accepted. While the followers of the Sāṅkhya believe the Prakṛti to be the cause of the universe together with the Puruṣa, who just 'looks' at it, the Vaiśeṣikas are of the opinion that the gross forms of the world are all derived from the

266. Brahmavāde hy advaitārtham jagato jagadrūpeṇa pāramārthika
-satyatām nānāyuktisrutisūtrādibhir nirākṛtya tasya
tasya brahmarūpeṇa pāramārthikasatyatā pratipādyā...

Māyāvāde tu jagataḥ pāramārthikasatyatvanirākarāṇa -
mātreṇa... T.S.Ab.V.82.p.140.

conglomeration of the atoms, which constitute the original cause. All the branches of the Vedānta agree that the ultimate cause, the uncaused cause of the world is Brahman, and all except Madhva admit that Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the world.

The followers of the Sāṅkhya are refuted by saying that the Prakṛti is inert and thus cannot produce the world.²⁶⁷ Puruṣottama says against the Vaiśeṣikas that in the Vedic as well as Purāṇic literature we find that the gross cause gives rise to the subtle effects and not vice versa. This is found in the world also, for the mass of threads, which is gross gives rise to the piece of cloth, cotton which is a mass causes the thin threads.²⁶⁸ We can not therefore admit that the cause is subtle and is thus the atoms. The Buddhistic theory of creation, of that which exists from that which does not exist, is also vehemently rejected. The Buddhists contend that it is from the seed, which is destroyed, that a sprout is caused. Here also

267. A.B.II.ii.1-10.

268. Śraute paurāṇe ca darśane sthūlād eva kāraṇāt sūkṣma -
sya kāryasya vibhāgenādāv utpatteḥ. A.B.P.II.ii.12.

Puruṣottama points out that it is only the gross form of the seed, which is destroyed and not its subtle form which definitely exists.²⁶⁹ The world thus is not *asataḥ sattā-rūpa*, and must have Brahman as its cause.

While the other systems of the Vedānta say that Brahman is the material cause or the *upādāna* of the world, the Śuddhādvaita prefers the term *samavāyikāraṇa* or the inhering cause. Brahman has three aspects, being, sentiency and bliss; and these aspects are found inherent in the inert worldly objects, the individual souls and the Antaryāmins. Thus there is inherence of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*. That which is inhered in the other is seen as the latter's essential characteristic, just as a pot shows the essential characteristics of the clay. The whole world, whatever may be the internal differences and distinctions, reveals one common characteristic of being or existence; and we can say that there is inherence or *anvaya* of *sat* in the world.²⁷⁰ As *sat* is of the essential nature of

269. *Evāñ ca āṅkurādāv api bījasthūlānśasyaivopamardo na tu sūkṣmānśasya. Tadantasta eva sūkṣmānśānām āṅkurībhāvāt.* A.B.P.II.iii.26.p.651.

270. *Yo hi yadanvitaḥ sa svasmins tadviṣayām pratītim ādhatte yathā ghaṭādīḥ pṛthivyādipratītim. Tathātra sarvaṁ astītyādipratītijanakatvāt sadādyanvitam.*

A.B.P.I.i.3.p.83.

Brahman, as is the case with cit and ānanda, Brahman is the samavāyikāraṇa or the inhering cause of everything. The Anvaya or samanvaya is the inherence of that, which is neither adventitious nor super-imposed, and that is why the name and form or the illusory experiences are not to be understood as inhered.²⁷¹ That is why the samavāya of the Śuddhādvaita is different from the inseparable conjunction which is called samavāya by the Vaiśeṣikas.

The word Prakṛti stands for the essential nature of the thing and Brahman can just be called Prakṛti in this way; which therefore means the samavāyikāraṇa.²⁷² When we see an earthen pot, we know that it is made of clay and thus all the earthen pots can be known as having the clay as their essential inhering cause, similarly when we decide the aspect of being in one substance, it is known as inhering in all the existing substances and so Brahman, which has sat as its

271. Anāropitānāgantukarūpenānuvṛttir eva samavāyah.

A.B.P.I.i.3.p.90.

272. Prakṛtiśabdaś ca svarūpe rūḍhaḥ mṛtprakṛtir ghataḥ, kārpāsaprakṛtiḥ paṭaḥ ityādiprayogadarśanāt samavāyīkāraṇam abhidhatte. A.B.P.I.iv.23.p.530. Puruṣottama further says that the term Prakṛti also stands for the efficient cause, on etymological grounds: Prakṛtā kṛtir yena. A.B.P.I.iv.23.p.530.

aspect, is established as the inhering cause.²⁷³ The term prakṛti thus should not necessarily mean the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhya because the Pradhāna is not a samavāyin.

It is quite natural that a question will arise as to why the word upādāna, which is used by other systems of the Vedānta, is not found here, while the term samavāya is used instead of it. Puruṣottama says that the word upādāna, which means the material cause, expresses, that which is enveloped by the actions of the agents and which is consequently limited by the same.²⁷⁴ The upādāna is only a specific state of the samavāyin. It is that aspect of the earth alone, which in the form of a lump of clay or threads, limited and worked upon in the process of production, that can be called the material cause or the upādāna for the production of a jar or a piece of cloth. So only the

273. Yathā hyeksmīn mṛtpinḍe mṛdvikāratvanīścayottaram
 sarvasmīn tatsajātīye tathā jñānāṃ mṛttikāyām tat-
 -samavāyitvajñānam tādṛśaikadeśapratyakṣād eva bhavati...
 tathā prakṛte'py ekatra sammayatve nīscite sarveṣu
 tatsajātīyeṣu sadvikāratvajñānāt sati sarvasamavāyi-
 tvajñānam tādṛśapratyakṣād eva bhavatīti seti samavāyi-
 tvasiddhiḥ. A.B.P.I. iv. 23. p. 531.

274. Loke upādānapadena kartrīkriyayā vyāptasya pericchinna-
 -syaivābhidhānadarśanāt. A.B.P.I. i. 3. p. 118.

Highest Lord who is not changed or worked upon is the samavāyin of the world by just one of his aspects.²⁷⁵ The reason thus for the preference of the term samavāyin to the term upādāna lies in the adherence of the thinkers of Pure Monism in the avikṛtapariṇāmavāda, as different from the generally accepted parināmavāda or vivartavāda.

Upādāna, says Puruṣottama, is twofold, parināmin and vivarta. The first is defined as the transformation of the Upādāna, the transformation having an equal degree of existence.²⁷⁶ The vivarta on the other hand is the transformation, which has not an equal degree of existence with the upādāna.²⁷⁷ The parināma can further be understood as either vikṛta or involving change or modification, or avikṛta, i.e. that which does ^{not} involve any such change. The former is illustrated in the manufacture of a pot from the clay, while the shaping of different ornaments of Gold is an example of the latter. In our ordinary affairs of the world,

275. Upādānam tu samavāyina evāvasthāviśeṣaḥ. Paricchānnasya
karṭṛkriyayā vyāptasyaiva mrtpiṇḍasūtrādirūpasya
prṛthivyamāsasyaiva ghaṭapatādyupādānatvaḥ saṁśanāt...
Ata eva bhagavān avikṛta eva jagata ekāmśena samavāyī.

Pr.p.31.

276. Parināmaś ca upādānasamasattako'nyathābhāvaḥ. Pr.p.31.

277. Upādānasya viśamasattako'nyathābhāvo vivartaḥ.

Pr.p.32.

the efficient and the instrumental causes are different from the material cause. Pūruṣottama does not think it necessary to believe in the asamavāyikāraṇa, which is explained by the vaiśeṣikas to be the conjunction of the different constituents like the threads in the production of a piece of cloth. It may be included in the kāraṇasāmagri.

The followers of the Śuddhādvaita admit the avikṛta-pariṇāma-vāda in which the cause, even though transformed into the effects, retains its essential nature and does not undergo any basic or substantial modification. When milk is transformed into curds, it can not be used as milk and becomes curds only. We can not prepare tea with it. When however ornaments are made of gold, we can use all of them as gold and the gold remains gold even though the distinction between the golden ornaments and gold is of the different shape and different names. They are not different substances. ²⁷⁸

The avikṛtapariṇāma-vāda of Vallabha cannot be understood properly without the āvirbhāva-tirobhāva-vāda, which is one of the most important theories of the Śuddhādvaita.

278. tathā bahusuvāṇāṅkāśāyāṁ kṛtākakundalākalaśabhrāṅgāre-
divyaktyanādaṇas tathā... Etenākārādibhedakṛts eva tat-
-tallaukikavaidikavyavahārabhedo na vastubhedakṛtaḥ.

A.B.P.I.iv.23.p.535.

In fact Puruṣottama explains causality itself as the basis of the power of manifestation.²⁷⁹ The āvirbhava and tirobhāva can be explained as manifestation and concealment respectively. The āvirbhāva can be understood as the power of the cause, which reveals outside the latent effect, which already exists in the cause; the tirobhāva is that capacity which conceals the effect which exists outside.²⁸⁰ The terms may be understood simply also as āvirbhavana and tirobhavana thus meaning just manifestation and concealment.²⁸¹ Viṭṭhaleśa in his Vidvan-
-maṇḍana explains āvirbhāva as being fit to be an object of experience²⁸² and tirobhāva as being not fit to be an object of experience.²⁸³ Both āvirbhāva and tirobhāva are powers of the lord. Puruṣottama also discusses as to whether any such powers or powers are necessary in the cause. When a certain effect is produced from a certain cause or a particular set

279. Kāraṇatvam cāvirbhāvakaśaktyādhāratvam. Pr. p. 26,

280. Āviḥ prakāṣaṁ bhāvayati upādānantahstham kāryam bahiḥ prakāṣaṁ karoti yā nimittagatā upādānagatā ca śaktiḥ sā āvirbhāvaśabdavācya. Evam tīraḥ aprakāṣaṁ bhāvayati bahiḥstham kāryam upādānantah sthāpayati yā śaktir nāśaka-gatā sā tirobhāvaśabdavācya. Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda.

Vādāvalī. p. 191.

281. Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 191.

282. Anubhava viśaya tvayogyatā. V. M. p. 86.

283. Tada viśaya tvayogyatā. V. M. p. 85. See also the explanation in S. S. and Pr. p. 26. ff.

of causes, we should accept the power of that cause or causes to produce that particular effect. This power can not be understood as the nature or the essence of the cause, for neither the nature (svabhāva) nor the essence (svarūpa) can be avoided and so if we were to understand the productive capacity as either of them, we must admit the production of a piece of cloth from the threads, which are torn to tatters or that of a sprout from a seed which is burnt. We should thus accept the power of production as different from the essential nature of the cause and also as liable to obstruction or destruction by an external element.²⁸⁴ Those powers of production and its opposite can be respectively called āvirbhāva and tirobhāva. The whole process of causation has to be explained in terms of these two powers with which the Highest Lord is endowed. Even the six modifications of becoming (Bhāv^avikāras) as stated by Vāṛṣyāyaṇi in Nirukta²⁸⁵ can be understood in connection with these two. 'Is being produced' (jāyate) is related to revelation alone, so also 'is' (asti) is so related because of the ~~the~~ inherence of the aspect of being. 'Is being transformed', 'grows' and 'waned' (Vipariṇamate, vardhate and apakṣīyate) are connected with both

284. T. Sn. Ab. V. 140. p. 113. Also Cf. Āvirbhāvati-robhāvavāda.

Vādāvalī. p. 185. ff.

285. Nirukta. I. 2.

manifestation and concealment, while 'is being destroyed'²⁸⁶
(naśyati) is connected with concealment alone.

The effect thus is only a manifestation of the cause, or in other words, the effect is just a manifested state of the cause. This being the case, there is essentially non-difference between the cause and the effect.²⁸⁷ As everything is caused by Brahman, everything is Brahman. Brahman is revealed in the world by its aspect of sat, in the individual souls by its aspect of cit and in the Antaryāmins by its aspect of ānanda. That is why Brahman is described as devoid of any dualism, either with those who are of the same type or with those who are not of the same type or with those who are in it.²⁸⁸ The individual souls, which are sentient and eternal, have a similarity ~~via nature nature~~ with Brahman and are thus sa-jātiya. The sa-jātiyadvaita is illustrated by Puruṣottama as existing in the two different bulls. The inanimate objects are vi-jātiya because of inertia and transiency; and the difference would be just like that between a pot and a piece of cloth. The Antaryāmins are svagata, because all the aspects of sat, cit and ānanda are manifested in them but they are

286. S.S. pp. 350-351.

287. A.B.P.I. iv. 23. p. 534.

288. Sa-jātiyavi-jātiyasvagatadvaitavērjitaṁ. T.S.v. 60. p. 113.

limited and are capable only of limited and defined action; the illustration given here is that of the flowers and the tree.²⁸⁹ Brahman has none of these distinctions, as it is inherent in all the three by its various aspects.

Causation, says Puruṣottama, can be understood on two grounds, anvaya and vyatireka. They may be explained as meaning the invariable existence of the cause when the effect exists, and the invariable absence of the effect in the absence of the cause, thus implying a relation of invariable concomitance between the cause and the effect. Anvaya may also be taken to mean the inherence of the aspects of the cause in the effect and vyatireka may be understood as the existence of the cause over and above the effect.²⁹⁰ While the first explanation of the terms and the second explanation of anvaya leads to the theory of identity, the second explanation of vyatireka is important from another point of view. It shows that in the system of Vallabha God is not wholly transformed into the world and even though it is revealed variously by its aspects

289. T. S. Ab. V. 60. p. 113.

290. Kāraṇatāgrāhakau cānvaya-vyatirekau. Tau ca dvividhau. Svasvavyāpyetarayāvatkāraṇasattve yatsattve' vaśyam yatsattvam anvayaḥ. Yādabhāve' vaśyam yādabhāvo vyatirekaḥ... Anvayanam anvayaḥ.... Kāryeṇa saha tadavayavādirūpeṇā-vasthānam. Viśeṣeṇātirecanam vyatirekaḥ. Kāryātirekenā-vasthānam. Pr. p. 52.

it remains over and above the world. God is thus in the world and yet transcends the same. This is meant by *vystireka, iḥe. viśeṣeṇa atirecena.*

How can non-difference or identity be explained in the 'Suddhādvaita? We have seen that in the 'Suddhādvaita, Brahman inheres in the effects, or is revealed in the effects and the effects are only condition of the cause. Essentially therefore the effect is one with the cause, just as the golden ornaments are one with gold. Brahman is transformed in the effects without undergoing any change or modification. All this can be accepted. But even then there are two important points, which requires explanation. As we have seen above the problem before a philosopher is not merely to show the essential identity of the world with Brahman, but to explain the world as it is seen and experienced by us in its relation to Brahman. Secondly, even in accepting the essential identity and in accepting the difference only of name and form, that name and form which is surely a change or modification, if admitted as real and not *mithyā*, should be explained in the light of the monistic doctrine, that has been propounded.

As we have discussed in the previous section about the jagat vis-a-vis the *samsāra*, jagat is real only as a manifestation

of Brahman and not as the world, which is separated and different from Brahman. In that case the reality, of the jagat as jagat, can not be admitted. Puruṣottama says the same thing when he points out that the various forms, as seen in the world, are only for the worldly dealings. So the reality of the world can not be maintained in the limited and defined form, in which it exists, but from the point of view of reality the world is non-existent.²⁹¹ The illustrations which are given by Puruṣottama to prove the abheda, are still more pointed. The form of a pot may be different from that of clay, but it does not mean that the pot as a substance is distinct from the clay. A man who is sleeping or standing or sitting or walking may have different postures, but the man remains the same.²⁹² We may thus consider the distinctions as immaterial, but are they real? While refuting the dualistic theories, Puruṣottama says that they are

291. Teṣāṃ rūpāṇāṃ vyavahāramātrārthatvād ity artāhaḥ. Etena
 siddhānte pratiniyatarūpeṇa jagataḥ satyatvābhāvo, na
 tu satyatvena rūpeṇa jagadabhāva iti bodhitam. A.B.P.I.iv.23.
 p.536.

292. Yo vikāraḥ prthubudhnodarādīḥ sa vācārambheṇa vācika-
 kriyātmako na tu kāraṇād vyaktibhedāpādakaḥ. Yathā supte
 utthite upaviṣṭe ca puruṣe' vyavavinyāsabhedo' to nāma-
 -dheyam ūmīttikakriyāyāḥ padārthasvarūpabhedānāpādaka-
 -tvāt nāmaiva. Tathā cētra kāraṇāvasthātmānēvaika rūpya-
 -sya vivakṣitatvād vyaktibhedānādāra eva.

only due to the ego and are unreal.²⁹³ The distinctions even between things like a pot and a piece of cloth are only mundane and hence unreal.²⁹⁴ Rāmānuja attacks the theory of Ātmasvarūpa-parināmanavāda on the same ground of distinctions. If we believe in both the enjoyer and the objects of enjoyment as the transformations of the essential nature of God, how can there be distinction between them? Puruṣottama replies by restating his theory of Pure Monism on the scriptural grounds and says that the svabhāva-vibhāga is seen even in the world on account of the disintegration of powers. (Śaktiviśleṣa) This is like a tree, in which the leaves, flowers, fruits and roots-everything is mutually different, but all of them have the unity with the seed so far as their nature (svabhāva) is concerned.²⁹⁵ We have however seen that the distinctions are only due to the ego and are therefore unreal. Is this the same as Vivartavāda? When Śaṅkara says that the world is unreal, he rejects the reality of the world, as we see it. If that is vivartavāda, it may appear that it is accepted by the propounders of the Buddhādvaita also. Puruṣottama in fact admits this and says that from the point of

293. Abhimānamātram eva bhedo na tu vāstavaḥ. T.S.Ab.V.92.p.159.

294. Chetapatesthale tu vyāvahārikopādānakṛto bheda ity

evāstavaḥ. T.S.Ab.V.92.p.158.

295. A.B.P.II.i.13.p.573.

view of the world he accepts vivartavāda, while from the point of view of Brahman he believes in Parināmavāda.²⁹⁶

Admitting that there is Parināmavāda from the point of view of Brahman, what about the vikāras? We may say that the vikāras or modifications are unreal, but if we want to maintain the reality of the world, even in its essential form, we must admit at least one kind of change. The jagat is the effect form of Brahman, in which only one of the three aspects is revealed and the other two are concealed. Similarly the individual souls are an effect, with two aspects revealed and only one concealed. Thus there remains a subtle distinction between the cause and the effect, that is between the cause with all the aspects fully manifested and the cause with the manifestation of one or two aspects. Thus a change in the state of the cause can not be refused on any ground. The opponent of Puruṣottama correctly points out that even in the Avikṛtaparināmavāda, the change of the avasthā (pūrvāvasthā-anyathābhāvarūpa-vikāra) remains.

Puruṣottama says that the change in the state of the cause is not equal to the change in the substance and therefore there

296. *Evam ca antarāsṛṣṭim prati vivartopādēnatvam ātmasṛṣṭim prati parināmyupādēnatvam brahmaṇa iti niścayaḥ.*

is no harm in admitting it.²⁹⁷ At another place when the theory of Bhāskara is severely criticised by Vācaspati Miśra, Purusottama defends Bhāskara by pointing out that the difference between the two ornaments of gold, is due to the difference between their respective conditions. Thus that, which is conditioned, is different as well as non-different from that which conditions, according as we look to them from the point of view of the different conditions or of the oneness of the substance. Thus non-difference does not necessarily mean oneness, and the bheda can be admitted together with the abheda.²⁹⁸ Thus the unity of the cause and the effect is tolerant of the difference and this is Tādātmya.²⁹⁹ The bheda which is thus accepted is due to the desire of God.³⁰⁰ The powers of āvirbhāva and tirobhāva should also be understood on the basis of the

297. Tathā ca dadhidugdhanyāyena svarūpasya gandhādiguṇānām cānyathābhāva evātrāgrāhyavikāratvenābhipreyaṭe, na tu saṅkhyānyathābhāvo'pi tathātveneti kāryaśrutyanurodhādāṅgīkriyate. A.B.P.I.iv.23.p.539.

298. A.B.P.I.i.3.pp.92-95. See also Bhedaābheda svarūpanirṇaya. Vādāvalī.

299. Bhedaśhiṣṇur abhedaś tādātmyam. S.S.p.149.

300. Bhedaśhiṣṇutā ca bahu syām prajāyeya itīcchāyām tad-vyāpāre bhūtaśaktivibhāgena. Pr.p.29.

desire of God.³⁰¹ That is why Puruṣottama says that in the Śuddhādvaita the samavāya is not different from tādātmya and the samavāyikāraṇa is that cause, the effect of which is produced depending upon the cause in the relationship of tādātmya.³⁰² Thus we may say that the Śuddha-advaita is the same as Aicchika-bheda-abheda.

(X).

Sādhanaś and Phala.

At the very outset it is necessary to make one point clear, so far as this section is concerned. In the beginning of this chapter we have shown that Puruṣottama's contribution to the Śuddhādvaita is mainly on the philosophical side of the system. Though Puruṣottama has commented upon and independently written certain tracts dealing with the practical side of the system, such as the belief in devotion as the highest means of liberation, or the divisions of puṣṭi, pravāha and maryādā,

301. Evam saty asmin kale'smin deśe idam kāryam evam bhavaty itīcchāviśeṣyatvam āvirbhāvah, tadā tetra tathā tan mā bhavaty itīcchāviśeṣyatvam tirobhāvah. S.S. pp. 115-116.

302. Tetra tādātmyasambandhena yadāśrayam kāryam bhavati tat samavāyikāraṇam. Pr.p. 27. also: Ato na samavāyas tādātmya-tiriktah. Pr.p. 29. also: Yedyapi siddhānte samavāyo nātirike-tes tathāpi tādātmyasyaiva nāmāntaram tad. T.S. Ab. V. 27. pp. 68-69.

or the desirability of renunciation, etc., If however one wants to get a complete picture of these teachings, one should read the works of Gokulanātha and Harirāya rather than those of Puruṣottama. In this section therefore, we have not treated the topics of sādhanas and phala fully, but we have tried to give only those points which deserve special notice in our study of Puruṣottama.

Mokṣa according to the abstract speculations of the idealists of some of the Upaniṣads and according to Śaṅkara is the liberation from all the evils and miseries of the world. That the world is a venue of woe has been accepted by almost all the religious teachers and philosophers. Hence emancipation is definitely devoid of miseries. But is it full of joy also? Happiness and misery are relative terms and so, as argued by the absolutists like Śaṅkara, if we accept happiness or joy in the liberated state, the unhappiness will also be admitted from the backdoor. Hence mokṣa should be understood as total absence of miseries (Atyanta-duḥkha-abhāva). Naturally this could not appeal to the people at large. It is not enough that liberation is just an absence of unhappiness. This is only a negative aspect. There must be something positive also, so as to give

solace to the suffering mortals. Puruṣottama rejects the idea of relativity and says that there is full bliss and bliss alone in the state of mokṣa. Brahman is ānandamaya because of the ānandaprācurya. When we say that the sun is full of light or that the summer days are full of heat or that the monsoon nights are completely dark, the opposites of light, heat and darkness are respectively sublated by perceptual experience and cannot be understood as existing even in a minimum degree.³⁰³ Brahman is thus full of bliss and there is not an iota of its opposite in it. Even so liberation is also full of joy and not mere negation of miseries.

Can God be obtained? If ^{we} just argue that the attainment of anything can be accomplished only when that thing is different from one who obtains it, and that the relationship between the limited jīva and unlimited God is that of oneness, who is to be obtained by whom? That is why Śaṅkara says that mokṣa cannot be obtained, it is.³⁰⁴

303. Loke'pi pracuraṣṭa prakāśaḥ savitā prabhūtesantāpo nidā-
-gha-divaso'nāhakarāmayī varṣāvibhavarī bahudhano
vaiśravaṇa ityēdivēkyāśravaṇa pratiyoginām tamaḥśaitya-
prakāśedāridryāṇāṃ pratyakṣato bādhena tatra tadālpa-
-tvaśaṅkāyāṃ anudayāt. A.B.P.I.i.12.p.198.

304. Cf. Śaṅkara-bhāṣya.I.i.4,II.i.14.

This however is not the position, that can be accepted by the followers of the Śuddhādvaita. If God is not to be obtained, nothing is to be done for it, then what is the use of all the talk of devotion and discipline? Puruṣottama says that the attainment is possible owing to the āvirbhāva-tirobhāva, depending upon the will of God. As regards the oneness or non-difference between the two, it is the individual soul, who is one with Brahman and not vice versa; and so the non-difference does not come in the way of prāpti.³⁰⁵

The attainment of the Highest Lord means the Sarvātma-bhāva or the Brahmabhāva with the realization of the presence of Brahman everywhere. It is explained by Puruṣottama as the flashing of Brahman preceeded by the revelation of the attributes of Brahman.³⁰⁶ The highest kind of liberation however is the sāyujya, which is the result of the Puṣṭi-bhakti. Puruṣottama gives an etymological explanation of sāyujya as conjunction.³⁰⁷ It is

305. Ananyatvam tu suvarṇaśakalanyāyena brahmaṇaḥ sakāśāṅ jīvasya na tu jīvasya sakāśād brahmaṇaḥ iti tasyāpi prāptipratibandhakatvābhāvāt. A.B.P.I.i.11.pp.178-179.

306. Brahmabhāvaś ca svesmin brahmadharmāvirbhāvapūrvaka-brahmasphurtirūpa eva. A.B.P.I.i.29.p.263.

307. Saha yunaktīti sayuk, tadbhāvaḥ sāyujyam iti yogah.

T.S.Ab.V.13.p.48.

the eternal enjoyment in the company of Kṛṣṇa.

God, according to the Śuddhādvaita, is not only Sādhya-rūpa but even Sādhana-rūpa; even the means for his realization are of the essential nature of God. They are also the aspects of God. Puruṣottama says this on the strength of the Puruṣasūkta and the explanation of it in the second book of the Bhāgavata.³⁰⁸

The Upāśanās, given in the latter part of the Vedic literature, are not for the purification of the mind, as has been made out by Śaṅkara and his followers. These meditations on the other hand, inform us of the greatness of God and thus pave the way for devotion.³⁰⁹ Once the Brahmaneness (Brahmatva) is established there is not much of distinction between knowledge and meditation, because either of them is brought about by experience and both require a common mental faculty. The difference may however be found out by pointing out that meditations

308. T. Sr. Ab. V. 3. p. 5.

309. Udgīthēdisūryādyupāśanāyā tattatprekṛaṇoktam
phalam tena tenopāśyena dīyate. Teṣāṃ ca pratīkatve-
na tatkr̥taphaladānān mūlarūpamāhātmyam eva prati-
pāditam bhavati. Jñāte ca māhātmye tatra bhaktiḥ.

T. S. Ab. V. 12. p. 45.

require the superimposition of the attributes of one upon something else. Even if we accept it, the superimposition is always of the attributes of the superior upon the inferior and not vice versa. The attributes of the cause are superimposed upon the effect. Once this is conceded, even though knowledge and meditation may be distinguished with regard to their forms, it should be accepted that both lead to the same result. There is thus no difference between the two in their capacity to produce the result. ³¹⁰

As regards the three paths of action, knowledge and devotion, the Śuddhādvaita position is that of maintaining the superiority of devotion to the other two. Vallabha and his followers have given many arguments in their support. The path of knowledge leads to the *saṁyama* mukti, while that of devotion to the *nirguṇa* mokṣa. Knowledge, says Puruṣottama, presupposes the existence of the quality of *saṁyama* in the seeker of salvation and so the liberation that results cannot be without it; the *nirguṇa* mukti can result only by means of *bhakti*. ³¹¹

After Vallabha, Puruṣottama enters into the discussion of the term *Bhakti*. The base (*prakṛti*) and the affix (*Pratyaya*)

310. A. B. P. I. i. 20. p. 232.

311. T. S. Ab. V. 14. p. 51.

express the sense when combined; out of these two, the affix is principal. Here the affix, which is capable of connoting the general meaning of the root, mainly expresses the devotional action (bhajanekriyā), when joined with the root bhaj. That action is of the nature of service or sevā. The term sevā, as found in usages like strīsevā, auśadhasevā, etc. has a conventional meaning of a specific bodily activity preceded by either constancy or continuity. As this would imply some unhappiness due to the strain, that the body undergoes, it can not be called a puruṣārtha, for which one should try. Service should therefore be preceded by love. Thus the principal connotation of the affix is 'love' and the bodily efforts which are subordinate, are meant by the base. So the combination of the base and the affix means premasevā.³¹²

Love or sneha is explained as a specific attribute of the self or the mind, and is not a desire, or knowledge or efforts.³¹³ Bhakti is a rasa and this love to the object of devotion should not be understood as ordinary erotic sentiment, which is just an appearance of the love to God and is thus far inferior to it. That is why Puruṣottama after

312. T. Sn. Ab. V. 92. p. 75.

313. Snehaḥ cātmano manaso vā yogyo dharmaviśeṣaḥ. S. S. p. 7.

Vallabha takes pains to teach sense-control as an essential prerequisite of a seeker of God.³¹⁴

A very important contribution, that the Śuddhādvaita has made to Indian religious thought, is the Puṣṭimārga. The distinction between the Puṣṭi and the Maryādā has been given in detail by almost all the scholars of the Śuddhādvaita including Puruṣottama.³¹⁵ The Puṣṭimārga depends solely upon the Grace of the Lord.³¹⁶ The Grace of the Lord (Anugraha) is a separate attribute. It is not just the desire to give fruit, nor the desire or effort to ward off the miseries of others. It does not mean knowledge either. It paves the way to the desire of the Lord to give fruit or His acceptance, and is the cause of devotion.³¹⁷

(XI).

Conclusion.

We have in the foregoing pages discussed the important tenets of the Śuddhādvaita, as expounded by Puruṣottama following Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa. While the system, as

314. T. Sn. Ab. V. 238. pp. 184-186.

315. See Puṣṭi-pravāha-maryādā, with various commentaries.

316. Poṣaṇam tadenugrahaḥ. Bhāgavata. II. x. 4.

317. Tasmāt svīkāraphale dītsāprayojakam kṛpāparaparyāyam dharmāntaram eva... Sā ca bhaktyupadeśasyeva bhakter api kēraṇam. Puruṣottama's commentary on the Puṣṭi-pravāha-maryādā. V. 2.

explained by Puruṣottama is not and cannot be different from that taught by Vallabha, there is a clear difference in the approach of the two. As we have already stated, Vallabha's laconic style and interpretative method left very much to be understood and assumed. A clear exposition of the *Suddhādvaita* was badly needed and it was supplied by Puruṣottama. Puruṣottama however gives not just an exposition, but an analysis and a comparative study, thus arriving at some very important conclusions, which we have attempted to present in this chapter.

For understanding these conclusions better, we should see the whole course that Indian Philosophy has taken in the course of centuries. While the Upaniṣads gave various thoughts in various ways, the trend of abstraction and negation was taken up by the Buddhist idealists, who taught the *Vijñānavāda* and the *Sūnyavāda*. Śaṅkarācārya gave a positive shape to that trend by postulating the pure being and advocating the unreality of the world in its ultimate sense. Śaṅkara was the master of strictest logic and so attributed all the relationship to *Māyā*; he frankly admits that it is all inexplicable. Even though Śaṅkara has vehemently denounced the Buddhist theories,

he has equally vehemently repudiated the dualism of the Sāṅkhya or the atomic pluralism of the Vaiśeṣika. For him Monism can not be compromised in any way with dualism or pluralism. This however gave a severe blow to all that was emotional and religious, for religion wants heart more than head. Again the political enslavement of the Hindus required something, upon which they could fall back and from which they could get solace. This led to the reinforcement of the cult of devotion, which was already popularised by a host of Ālvārs. Attempts were made to bring in this popular element into the Vedānta. This however wanted a clear recognition of the reality, the ultimate reality of the dual, the devotee and God. People were unable to stand the devastating doctrine of the falsity of the world. Monism had to be compromised with dualism. Rāmānuja qualified it, Medhva accepted dualism alone, Bhāskara and Nimbārka ~~then~~ tried to combine the two. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka lean more towards dualism. Vallabha was convinced that the teaching of the Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtras is definitely of Monism; but he was an equally ardent devotee and Vaiṣṇava. He thereupon promulgated the theory of Pure Monism and retained the individuality of the

jīvas and the reality of the world. How can this be possible? Puruṣottama's analysis leads him to the theory of Tādātmya. He finds that if the reality of the world, even as a revelation of one of the aspects of God, is to be retained, the bheda will have to be tolerated. Abheda is here not the outright rejection of the bheda; it allows the aicchika bheda. The Tādātmya ^are~~l~~ation subsists between Brahman and its dharma, Brahman and the jīvas, Brahman and the world. This is where Puruṣottama ²ar~~i~~ves. Puruṣottama is credited with this exposition by no less an authority than Giridhara. 318

Viewed in the light of the above remarks, it will be clear that the Śuddhādvaita has tried to teach Monism without sacrificing the interest of the cult of bhakti. It is more advaitic than the systems of Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, or Nimbārka, and is more positive, if not dualistic, than that of Śaṅkara. The Śuddhādvaita should therefore be called 'Positive Idealism'.

318. Bhedābheda pratītiḥ tu madhyamānām prakīrtitā,
 Ato ^{hi} madhyamaḥ pakṣaḥ Śuddhādvaitānurodhetā.
 Bodhāya bahusandarbhe Gosvāmipuruṣottamāiḥ,
 Śrīmadēcāryacaraṇair yatre kuṭrāpi darśitā.
 Śuddhādvaitamārtanda. V. 34-36. Appendix. ~~to~~ 'Śuddhādvaita-
 siddhānta pradīpa. p. 226.