CHAPTER - III

PATTERN OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CANADA.

The industrialization is an effort in which the lagging provinces place a major hope of finding a solution to their problems of unemployment, of poor purchasing power and of ending their newly realized backwardness in the modern world. This is mainly because investment in industry is the most dynamic element fuelling employment and income growth. The industrially underdeveloped regions have observed that there is a strong and positive connection between wealth and purchasing power of a region and the extent of its industrialization. Industrial development of underdeveloped provinces is necessary even to sustain the expansion and development of the agriculture sector in view of the complementarity between agriculture and industry and between industry and transport and communication. Though the resource and agriculture sector is predominant in the economic development of Canada, it lacks vigour and dynamism. Therefore, correction of regional disparity in industrial development cannot be left solely to the market forces.

According to American economist Charles L. Schultze there are many important tasks that only governments can perform and with constant efforts and watchfulness,they can be performed in the best possible manner. The government is able to device policies and programms with objectives to remove impediments to industrial development and growth. The objective of the government should be not to run the economy but to influence the system that runs the economy by either altering structural features of the economy or imposing rules to alter the behaviour of its citizens (1). The weakness of Canadian manufacturing sector occasionally encouraged the federal government to assume a role of a more vigorous industrial-policy. That role, for eg, was bolstered by the impact of the two world wars and the reconstruction periods that followed (2). Thus the federal efforts to formulate development policies and to implement programmes which aimed at reducing regional disparities led to the creation of the DREE (1969) and the DRIE (1984). As these programmes have

had provincial consequences, it is imparative to access their implications in relation to industrially lagging regions. To accomplish this goal, changes in the pattern of industrial development in the provinces over a period of time has to be examined carefully.Our aim in studying such patterns has been to discover the basic rules, if any, which governs the process of industrialization, irrespective of the existance of federal incentives and grant programmes, differences in endowment of various resources, socio-economic conditions, political systems and institutional framework.

The analysis proceeds in stages. It begins with the pattern of Industrial development during PREE-DREE period, followed by the DREE and the DRIE era of the Federal policy actions to reduce regional disparity in industrial development The pattern of industrial development can be examined with the help of important manufacturing characteristics - by province, labour productivity and capital investment in the provinces.

INDUSTRIAL PATTERN AND IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL POLICY

[A] PRE-DREE PERIOD :

The Tables IV.1 (A) to (H) need to be considered to examine the impact of the federal policy, and the measures introduced till 1968 to foster the economic development and to influence the industrial pattern in order to increase employment opportunities specifically in comparatively lower employment and lower manufacturing value added areas of the country. This table provides us with province-wise data for 1961 and 1969, comparable on significant characteristics of manufacturing sector. The year 1961 has been considered as the starting point and the year 1969 as the ending point because till 1960 there existed hardly any concrete and exclusive policy for the industrial development in lagging provinces. On the other hand, the year 1969 marked the end of the abrupt policy measures as more organized efforts were initiated by the federal government leading to the creation of the DREE in 1969.

The data of the table reflects that during 1961 and 1969 manufacturing activities was overwhelmingly concentrated in Central Canada (i.e. in Ontario and Quebec). Both Ontario and Quebec maintained the first and the second positions in terms of manufacturing establishment, manufacturing employment, manufacturing value added and shipments of goods of own manufacturs. Similarly British Columbia and Alberta maintained the third and the fourth respectively. During 1961, Alberta traded its fourth position in terms of manufacturing employment, while Manitoba remained at the fifth. New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, New Foundland and Prince Edward Island remained at the bottom of the list indicating static poor pattern of industrial development. Manitoba and Nova Scotia remained neither better off nor worse off.

Similar trend is revealed by the Table IV-3. The capital expenditure was also very high in Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta while it was very low in New Brunswick, New Foundland and Prince Edward Island.

Nevertheless, the results of the Tables IV.2 (A) to (C) qualify Saskatchewan and disqualifies Quebec for the list of the top four industrialised provinces. Saskatchewan remained above the National Average, along with Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta, in terms of wages per production and related workers, labour productivity (value added (MFG) / workers (production and related)) and total employee productivity (i.e value added (Total Activity) / Total employee).New Foundland, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick remained at the bottom of the list in terms of all the three ratios for the period from 1961 to 1969.

The gamut of data analysis exhorts us to conclude that the approbrium policy measures introduced by the federal government failed to influence the industrial pattern of the lagging provinces. During this period, Canadian manufacturing sector continued to be centered in the leading industrially developed provinces including Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta which generated higher manufacturing employment and value added. Using the 1961 data, Ray (1967) shows that manufacturing employment under foreign control was more concentrated in Ontario. Employment

under US control, in particularly, was highly located in the South of Ontario due to proximity of American headquarters. A particular stimulant of growth in the provincial economy was provided by the establishment of the Canada-US Automative Agreement in 1965, which resulted in a wave of expansion in the vehicle-assembly and parts industry. Hence it was believed that foreign control might have exacerbated, not alleviated, regional disparities in industrial development in Canada. Thus, while the international political and economical circumstances of the 1940's and 1950's encouraged a prominent federal role in industrial development, the approach that emerged not only weakend the economy, but also disrupted it reasonably. The Wonnacott study shows that in 1958 Central Canadian industry had a 36% advantage over North-East United State in labour costs and this locational advantage has hunted the anti-protectionists ever since (3).

The structure of economic incentives and the political and legislative atmosphere present in Central Canada were favourable to early and widespread distribution of centrally generated electric power. They were also favourable to industrial switchovers from a reliance on own-generated power to that on purchased power. Such development allowed Ontario and Quebec to develop highly productive industry exploiting technologies of new industrialism.

While the structure of economic incentives and political and legislative atmosphere present in Maritime provinces dictated limited development of centrally generated power and continued reliance on own generated power in industry. Without the development, promotion and utilization of centrally generated power, Maritime industry was unable to transform the requirement of the old industrialism to those of the new industrials. As a result the Maritim lost ground in the 1920's.

Industries were lured to the region having low labour costs, and other attractions but the reliability of purchased electricity and especially the development of regional electricity systems built around hydroelectricity and thurmal power badly affected the cost factor. However, except in Ontario and Quebec, the extension of regional systems was slow. In the Maritimes, the provincial governments were not as decisive

in providing for power development. Therefore, since 1926, the earliest year for which detailed regional material is available, significant proportion of output and employment in secondary manufacturing has been concentrated in Ontario & Quebec. New investment in the Maritime provinces over much of the period i.e. 1949-56 apart from social capital expenditures, tended to be directed toward the consolidation and improvement of plant and equipment rather than toward expansion.

In the 1950's attempts were made to establish provincially owned small-scale enterprises to shore up a declining manufacturing sector in New Foundland. The experiment failed and so in the 1960's efforts were directed towards large-scale development projects such as oil refineries, liner board mills shipyards and hydroelectric power projects. Many of these projects also ran into difficulties and suffered from unfavourable international market conditions.

The intensification of war brought to the Maritimes some industrial expansions, including plant renovation. In the post war time, these investments, however, tended to be limited in scope and featured types of industry which had very little chance of continuation. Until 1960 there was a lack of planning framework in federal regional development programmes. Roy George's comparative study of manufacturing production cost in the two region namely Nova Scotia and Ontario and Quebec concludes that an inadequate supply of competent entrepreneurship is at the root of the comparative problems of Nova Scotia's secondary Industry. George is critical of the poor coordination of efforts federal regional development through 1969 and observes that industrial incentives of the Area Development Administration failed to attract much of new manufacturing to Nova Scotia.

[B] DREE AND DRIE ERA (i.e. 1969 TO 1988)

The previous section has enlightened the pattern of industrial development during PREE-DREE period. This pattern was highly influenced by the historical factors pertaining to the economic, financial and tax policies of the federal government,

which helped earlier in concentrating the nation's business and industrial activities in Central Canada.

The present section begins with an examination of the influence of the federal regional policy, introduced in 1969 in the form of creation of the DREE and latter on that of the DRIE. Both these were founded on the pattern of industrial development and growth during 1969 to 1988 respectively. The reason is that the Regional Policy in Canada has tended to chase fluctuations in regional economic performance, as mirrored in industrial output, manufacturing employment and capital investment and net migration flows. The Regional Policy has also tended to focus on subsidies and privileges, direct or indirect, for physical infrastructure and services, extended to industrially lagging provinces in order to encourage private enterprises to establish their firms to industrially lagging provinces. Therefore it is imperative to assess the influence of the same on the provincial industrial pattern over a period of time.

Tables IV.1 (A) to (H), IV.2 (A) to (C) and IV.3 reflect the similar results reflected during 1961, 1965 and 1969, that is, Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta dominated in terms of manufacturing establishments, workers, wages, manufacturing value added, and employees, total wages and salaries and total activity value added. And four Atlantic provinces and Saskatchewan remained at the bottom of the list, capturing hardly 10% of the total share in terms of all the indicators used

Over a period of 28 years the position of the four Atlantic Provinces and Saskatchewan have not improved at all in terms of manufacturing establishments, workers, wages, value of shipments of goods of own manufacturers and value added (Mfg.). This clearly indicates that the federal efforts in the form of the DREE and the DRIE have remained passive, incapable to influence the pattern of industrial development and growth in these provinces. On the contrary, it seems that it has helped industrially developed provinces like Ontario, Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia to maintain their top ranks.

Similarly Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, Quebec & Manitoba have had

greater share in terms of capital expenditure. However, after 1975, specifically from 1977 onwards Manitoba traded its fifth position with Saskatchewan and has remained sixth, where as among four Atlantic Provinces both Prince Edward Island and New Foundland remained as "poor boyes" of confederation as they were sharing together between 4% to 7% of the total capital expenditure between 1969 to 1988. On the other hand Ontario, Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia had been commanding almost 80% to 85% of the total capital expenditure through out the period. From this, it can be asserted that the federal government failed to decentralise industries away from the Central Canada to the industrially lagging regions. This analysis also suggests that the private entrepreneurs still seem reluctant to locate their firms in the industrially poor provinces, inspite of incentives, grants and other policy measures of federal departments

As shown in Tables IV.2 (A) to (C) wages per worker has been remained higher in Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario and Saskatchewan for the period considered for analysis, where as four Atlantic provinces, Manitoba and Quebec remained below the national average in terms of wages per worker for that period except in 1983. Similarly this table also indicates that Alberta, Ontario, British Columbia and Saskatchewan (except for 1977, 1981 and 1983) remained above the national average in terms of per worker Value Added (Mfg.) (i.e. labour productivity). The striking fact reflected by this table is that higher wages per worker resulted in higher labour productivity and lower wages per labour resulted in lower labour productivity. This also implies that the quality of labour in Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario also played vital role in grabbing more wages for higher labour productivity. This also means that high productivity, core and high technology manufacturing establishments were not only located but continued to be concentrated in industrially affluent provinces like Ontario and British Columbia and oil rich province of Alberta. This analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that there is a strong and positive relationship between the wages to the workers and per worker value added (Mfg.). The crucial fact is that the policy actions taken by the DREE and the DRIE

which proved ineffective. After about two decades of regional policy, the federal government failed to arrive at the solutions to eradicate regional disparity in industrial development. The last part of the table strongly supports this conclusion. This part of the tables IV.2 (A) to (C) reveals that industrially affluent provinces with their huge natural resource endowments have remained well above the national average interms of total employee productivity (i.e. Value Added (Total activity)/ total employees).

The crucial fact emerging from the above analysis is that despite the status of traditionally industrially developed province, Quebec witnessed poor performance and therefore remained below the national average. This is because of the labour intensive nature of the industries and either because of a poor capital plant and dwindling resource base. Moreover, Quebec suffered from a poor integration of some industrial sectors with the rest of the provincial economy.

In brief, from the analysis of data based on the tables IV.1 (A) to (H), IV.2 (A) to (C) and IV.3 we conclude that Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Quebec exhibit higher level of industrialization than other regions. It has been possible because of their early developed base, and the privilege of opportunities to use capital equipment and advanced technology they enjoyed over other regions. As William Coffey demonstrates, high-technology linked service and industries, as well as fast-growing financial and business services, continue to be highly concentrated in Canada's large urban centres, located outside the Atlantic Canada. The relatively small size of Canada's peripheral regional markets means that they shall, in all probability, continue to be at a disadvantage relatively to Central Canada. Market-pull is an important factor in industrial or official location. The maritimes are truely "peripheral", not only with respect to distance but also with respect to the small size of their internal market. Adoption of new technologies is sensitive to distance. They are systematically adopted at a lower rate in Atlantic Canada, in turn, affecting productivity of labour.

In Canada, the last 10 to 15 years have seen a marked regional concentration

of footloose type i.e. whole range of electronic, information and computer related industries, evolved in the Ottawa are, because of the proximity of government and of research facilities.

The growth centre literature and locational research on technology intensive industry (Oakey 1984, Thwaites and Oakey 1985), both show that technology-based development is highly sensitive to agglomeration factors, and policies to improve Canada's technological performance. It should, therefore, logically be focussed on those location that have demonstrated some structural advantages in generating and nurturing, innovative firms (Britton and Gertler 1986). Therefore, despite of the DREE and the DRIE efforts through the funded and non-funded programmes to influence the locational pattern of industrial activities, most of the development has taken place in industrially affluent counties of Ontario and Quebec instead of Atlantic provinces. Further Ontario, with the greatest concentration of metropolitan areas has remained in the forefront as far as the phase of technology diffusion and adoption is concerned while the Atlantic was usually at the back stage.

The difficulty faced by peripheral regions in spreading the information economies rates to their less developed economic base, smaller local markets, and limited labour skills. These factors impede the rate of adoption of new technology. In each Atlantic province, for eg, information related jobs employ a smaller proportion of the workforce than required. The patterns of activity location of a wide variety of major corporations favour a strong metropolitan location of high level management and technical personnel.

The Atlantic region has a lower level of educational attainment than the rest of the country. It has a higher than the national average of rural population which has also been growing faster than urban population. Therefore, Atlantic region has continued to remain a least preferred location for the hi-technology and information related activities. Further being a staple region, Atlantic Canada lacks high-order tertiary and quarternary functions, such as R & D and top management. This prevents the region to participate in the new high-growth industries. The

employment that expands in such regions is of low-order processing or of mature manufacturing industries serving local markets. These industries are fragmented, inefficient and static local entrepreneurship fails to develop because of various barriers to the entry, such as lack of access to capital, predatory competition from larger externally-owned firms and inability to secure contracts from multinational firms prefering external supplies. Local entrepreneurship, then, remains weak because it never gets the opportunity of "learning by doing".

From the above discussion, it is clear that over and above the energy base of each province, the nature of entrepreneurship, foreign direct investment, the role of government policy and corporate mergers play vital role to influence the pattern of industrial development in the country.

The agricultural base of Ontario and Quebec can also be cited as a reason for industrial divergence. Commercial farming in Quebec was not as prosperous and widespread as in Ontario. An important side effect of the limited agricultural base of Quebec was the generation of large amount of surplus labour, which migrated to the South to men the factories of New England, and also moved into Montreal and other cities and towns of Southwestern Quebec. This provided labour force to the growing labour intensive industries. The easy availability of abundant and relatively labour was an important reason for development of labour intensive industries and also for poor labour productivity.

Ontario had an advantage of cultural similarity - Anglo - Saxon culture and language as well. Its proximity to nearby highly industrialized parts of the USA which were the home of corporation interested in setting up operation in Canada. In addition, the market centrality of Ontario was one of the reasons that led many foreign manufacturers not to consider seriously any other province of Canada as a site for their plants. In one of the Ontario discussion papers on R & D and technical diffusion, Miller (1983) correctly notes that more than half of Canada's R & D is already located in Ontario (4).

The motor-vehicle production has a tremendous impact in stimulating jobs

throughout the Canadian economy. This industry is a classic example of an activity dominated by American branch plants which showed an overwhelming tendency to locate in Ontario, helping to make that province the core area of secondary manufacturing in Canada. Consequently, Canadian firms assembling automobile were established in several cities and town across Southern Ontario by local entrepreneurs. The structure of economic incentives and the political and legislative atmosphere present in Central Canada were favourable to the early and widespread distribution of centrally generated electric power and also to the industrial switchover from a reliance on own generated power to a reliance on purchased power. These developments allowed Ontario and Quebec to develop industries with high productivity exploiting the technologies of the new industrialization. Therefore, the Southern part of these two provinces is the "heartland" of Canada's manufacturing division where the "key" industries and "centre" or core firms are concentrated. In contrast, the rest of Canada including Manitoba is the hinterland where the non-key industries and peripheral firms tend to locate.

The location of investment by multinational firms within host countries are much more concentrated than those of domestic firms. Semple and Smith (1981) on Canada, Taylor and Thrift (1981) on Australia and Little (1980) and McConnell (1980) on the USA all have found that more of foreign firms than domestic firms prefer to be concentrated in core regions. Therefore Ontario and Quebec were the most preferred location for US based companies, while companies other than US located their plants in British Columbia and Alberta. Therefore, in Alberta and British Columbia, clear gain for manufacturing employment have been made under foreign control other than the US one.

Unlike the Central Canada, the Maritimes did not have institutions ready to finance large-scale industrialization, and, as a result, the responsibility of undertaking, industrial investment was thrown largely on the shoulders of individual entrepreneurs. Industrialization, therefore, was made possible in the smaller towns of the regions with limited involvement by Halifax and Saint John businessmen

and banks, Naylor argues tht the big banks retained a "commercial orientation". While the financing of industrialization was undertaken by smaller local banks, the major banks promoted the flow of capital out of the Maritimes and into the Canadian West and the Caribbean, thereby starving local industry of needed capital (5). Thus one may conclude that the creation of a national financial market was one key feature of the concentration and centralization of capital and industry in the Central Canada.

Some explanation for the observed pattern of industrial location in Canada may be provided by distance and transportation costs. Low-cost labour available to these firms in the Atlantic provinces may be more than offset by the cost of shipping output to distant markets.

Atlantic region has been performing utterly poor on the industrial development front and has also failed to take maximum advantage of the federal programmes introduced by the DREE and the DRIE. This is mainly because of its high export dependency of the poor natural resource sector. Its great fishery has been ravaged by foreign travellers. The vast forests of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, which once provided the masts and spars to the British Navy, have been reduced to scrubby second growth infested by the Spruce and bud warm and butt rot. On the energy side also, the Atlantic provinces fare no better.

Larger industrial centres provide greater scope for coping with risk and uncertainty. Therefore, decentralization of manufacturing has not taken place to the greatest possible extent. Therefore hinterland regions do not became industrial centres in a market economy. Further, the staff of ministeries located in the decentralization regional offices are just messengers and not initiators of the policy.

To a large extent present pattern of industrial development in Canada, are a reflection of historical factors and sizes of markets. A major historical reasons determining the above analysis include: (1) the advent of the steamship caused a drop in ocean freight rates, cheap railway transportation and increased population of prairie provinces coupled with the tariffs of the "National Policy" - the economic

strategy that was introduced by the Tory government of Sir John A Macdonald in 1879 gave entrepreneurs of Montreal and Southern Ontario the opportunities they had been waiting for, (2) The iron and steel industry has been identified as a key industry or a leading sector in the economic takeoff of Canada, which began in 1896. Within Canada, Southern Ontario was by and large the most important metal producing and metal-working industrial region. In addition, Ontario plants and firms have dominated the Canadian automobile industry. Similarly in a wide range of fabricated metal and machinery products firms of Ontario developed considerable in the 19th Century and were lateron joined by large numbers of American firms in the 20th century. The growth of these activities helped development of the economies of agglomeration that made Southern Ontario such an attractive location for industry in the 20th Century.

The location of US subsidiaries in Canada is not dictated solely by domestic economic factors. Convenience of access to the US Head Office has been an important determinant of location of US subsidiaries in Canada. This has resulted in a concentration of subsidiary location in Ontario which has tended to exacerbate regional disparities in Canada, and (3) when private firms proved themselves unable to meet particular needs resulted during wars, the government created new Crown Corporations for the purposes required during II World War. During the war out of 28 newly created Crown Corporations, none of them was located in Maritime region (6). Therefore, for Canadian manufacturing, early decades of the 20th century were the years of unprecedented growth but with significant geographical concentration of production.

The above analysis may, strongly support the conclusion that virtually, every industries i.e. steel, meat, textile, automobile, heavy engineering, finance, railways etc. has been concentrated in the tiny triangle of South Ontario and Montreal. While oil and gas are responsible for much of the industrial job growth in Alberta, forest products and non-metalic minerals are the main agents of industrial development in British Columbia. This reflects poor performance of federal efforts in the direction

of regional development. Through the industrial incentives and other specific related programmes of the DREE and the DRIE federal government failed to create climate to bring forth the huge amount of private investment and attract much of the new manufacturing to Atlantic Canada and other industrially lagging regions.

In brief, continued reliance of Canada on staple exports, weaker manufacturing sector, relatively underdeveloped capacity to innovate successfully along with the weak federal leadership created the vaccum which paralysed "national efforts" to restructure industry at the crucial time in the country's economic development. The federal government is not taking the lead in industrial policy, specifically designed to reduce regional disparity in industrial development. This is not because of jurisdictional issues or limited resources. The author of "The Challange of Diversity" rightly argues that this reflects two significant barriers : (1) The lack of federal political commitment and (2) institutional weaknesses that hinder the ability to develop and implement an industrial strategy.

The Canadian political differences are expressed in regional terms which apply to industrial policy. However raises questions of not simply what the industry has to promote, but where its benefits are to be located. Despite highly developed nature of the multilateral relations in Canada, federal provincial relations in industry, science and technology are poorly developed. Finally, we conclude that , the Regional policies to iradicate regional disparities of three decades, with their burgeoning suburbias, pushed the poor regions further back into hills.

FOOTNOTES

1. Manitoba Advisory Board (Sept 1976) Report on Manufacturing Rationalization Trends in Manitoba.

2. Michael Jenkin (1983) The Challange of Diversity : Industrial Policy in the Canadian Federation, Background Study 30, Science Council of Canada.

3. Britton J N H "Locational Perspectives on Free Trade for Canada," Canadian Public Policy, IV : 1 WINTER (1978).

4. Richard Bird (1985) Industrial Policy in Ontario, Policy Study Services, Ontario Economic Council.

5. Frost J D "The Nationalization of the Bank of Nova Scotia," ACADIENSIS Vol. XII No. 1 AUTUMN (1982).

6. Forbes R Ernest "Consolidating Disparity: The Maritimes and the Industrialization of Canada during the Second World War," ACADIENSIS Vol XV No.2, SPRING (1986).

TABLE : II.1 (A)
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INCENTIVES OFFERS
ACCEPTED (RDIP) BY PROVINCE TO MARCH 31, 1971

Sr. No	PROVINCE	Number of (Net) Acceptance	Estimated Capital Costs	Estimated Employment	Estimated Incentives Grants.
1	NFL	3.46	0.60	2.96	1.04
2	NS	10.39	18.13	7.26	15.94
3	PEI	3.05	0.53	1.50	0.87
4	NB	9.98	4.18	8.90	8.78
5	QUEBEC	38.70	38.41	48.92	40.58
6	ONTARIO	6.92	13.07	8.23	10.28
7	MANITOBA	14.66	4.37	10.27	5.57
8	SASKATCHEWAN	5.09	2.93	4.97	3.71
9	ALBERTA	5.50	17.48	6.27	12.82
10	BC	2.24	0.32	0.72	0.41
11	NWT	-	-	-	-
12	YUKON	-	-	-	-
	TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

SOURCE : ANNUAL REPORTS - DREE

TABLE : II.2 (A)
ESTIMATED CAPITAL COST PER ACCEPTED OFFER BY PROVINCE FOR THE YEAR 1971

Sr.No.	PROVINCE	($000) 1971
1	NFL	222.00
2	NS	2226.78
3	PEI	219.47
4	NB	533.90
5	QUEBEC	1266.57
6	ONTARIO	2407.65
7	MANITOBA	380.47
8	SASKATCHEWAN	733.36
9	ALBERTA	4057.11
10	BC	179.91
11	NWT	-
12	YUKON	-
	NATIONAL AVERAGE	1276.07

SOURCE : ANNUAL REPORT - DREE.

TABLE : II.2 (A) (Concld.)
EXPECTED ELIGIBLE INVESTMENT PER ACCEPTED OFFER - BY PROVINCE - DURING 1976-77, 1979-80, 1981-82 AND 1982-83.

($000)

Sr.No.	PROVINCE	1976-77	1979-80	1981-82	1982-83
1	NFL	86.02	400.72	2441.15	486.5
2	NS	987.92	461.15	706.42	395.63
3	PEI	172.14	135.04	356.42	231.63
4	NB	74.53	629.98	8619	167.83
5	QUEBEC	345.30	758.02	1341.21	521.77
6	ONTARIO	506.09	1081.88	980.71	424.71
7	MANITOBA	371.39	672.06	667.92	619.6
8	SASKATCHEWAN	303.56	460.52	525.04	753.93
9	ALBERTA	-	267.86	-	-
10	BC	-	542.71	876.5	3198.5
11	NWT	-	185	506	-
12	YUKON	-	65	1540	6423
	NATIONAL AVERAGE	432.34	688.54	1463.05	618.51

SOURCE : ANNUAL REPORTS - DREE.

TABLE : II.2 (B)
ESTIMATED INCENTIVES GRANTS PER NUMBER OF ACCEPTANCE -
BY PROVINCE - DURING 1971,1976-77,1979-80,1981-82,AND 1982-83

Sr.No.	PROVINCE	1971	1976-77	1979-80	1981-82	($000) 1982-83
1	NFL	82.94	295.27	102.76	326.46	112.25
2	NS	423.16	2177.06	170.76	209.70	143.25
3	PEI	78.93	656.42	42.71	104.92	58.63
4	NB	242.47	1923.18	179.79	1100.32	444.22
5	QUEBEC	289.17	853.25	157.56	254.16	118.04
6	ONTARIO	409.18	1280.75	269.15	215.64	98.61
7	MANITOBA	104.83	866.93	146.38	163.35	153.19
8	SASKATCHEWAN	200.80	760.72	128.66	167.21	191.27
9	ALBERTA	642.93	-	91.00	-	-
10	BC	50.55	-	147.64	259.40	519.00
11	NWT	-	-	37.00	90.00	-
12	YUKON	-	-	23.00	540.00	1285.00
	NATIONAL AVERAGE	275.75	1054.76	157.98	269.72	152.02

SOURCE : ANNUAL REPORTS - DREE.

TABLE : II.2 (C)
ESTIMATED EMPLOYMENT PER ACCEPTED OFFER - BY PROVINCE - DURING 1971, 1976-77, 1979 - 80, 1981-82 AND 1982-83

($000)

Sr.No.	PROVINCE	1971	1976-77	1979-80	1981-82	1982-83
1	NFL	41.47	18.50	18.66	17.31	7.50
2	NS	33.90	7.54	18.91	19.02	14.90
3	PEI	23.80	16.26	6.21	17.08	2.74
4	NB	43.22	21.13	16.50	68.45	29.98
5	QUEBEC	61.29	19.08	18.53	20.63	8.39
6	ONTARIO	57.65	15.98	19.04	27.56	9.93
7	MANITOBA	33.94	14.03	17.72	21.97	12.51
8	SASKATCHEWAN	47.32	5.54	16.90	17.96	16.40
9	ALBERTA	55.30	-	16.14	-	-
10	BC	15.64	-	11.14	29.70	18.00
11	NWT	-	-	8.00	3.00	-
12	YUKON	-	-	3.00	33.00	30.00
	NATIONAL AVERAGE	48.49	16.31	17.87	22.96	10.66

SOURCE : ANNUAL REPORTS - DREE.

TABLE : II.2 (D)
EXPECTED ELIGIBLE INVESTMENT PER EXPECTED DIRECT JOB
BY PROVINCE - DURINNG 1971,1976,1979-80,1981-82 AND 1982-1983.

Sr.No.	Province	1971	1976-77	1979-80	1981-82	($000) 1982-83
1	NFL	5.35	4.65	21.48	141.04	64.87
2	NS	65.68	131.05	24.39	37.15	25.56
3	PEI	9.22	10.59	21.75	20.86	84.63
4	NB	12.35	35.23	38.18	125.93	56.31
5	QUEBEC	20.66	18.1	40.91	65	81.69
6	ONTARIO	41.77	31.68	56.82	35.58	42.78
7	MANITOBA	11.21	26.48	37.92	30.4	49.53
8	SASKATCHEWAN	15.5	54.81	27.26	29.24	45.97
9	ALBERTA	73.37	-	16.59	-	-
10	BC	11.51	-	48.71	29.51	177.69
11	NWT	-	-	23.13	168.67	-
12	YUKON	-	-	216.67	46.67	214.1
	NATIONAL AVERAGE	26.32	26.53	38.52	63.73	58.02

SOURCE : ANNUAL REPORTS - DREE.

TABLE : II.2 (E)
ESTIMATED INCENTIVES GRANTS
PER NEW JOB EXPECTED - BY
PROVINCE - FOR THE YEAR 1971

Sr.No.	PROVINCE	($000) 1971
1	NFL	2.00
2	NS	12.48
3	PEI	3.32
4	NB	5.61
5	QUEBEC	4.72
6	ONTARIO	7.10
7	MANITOBA	3.09
8	SASKATCHEWAN	4.24
9	ALBERTA	11.63
10	BC	3.23
11	NWT	-
12	YUKON	-
	NATIONAL AVERAGE	5.69

SOURCE : ANNUAL REPORT - DREE.

TABLE : II.2 (E) (Concld.)
ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF INCENTIVES PER EXPECTED DIRCET JOB -
BY PROVINCE - DURING 1976-77, 1979-80, 1981-82, AND 1982-83

Sr.No.	PROVINCE	1976-77	1979-80	1981-82	($000) 1982-83
1	NFL	1.60	5.51	18.86	14.97
2	NS	28.88	9.03	11.03	9.62
3	PEI	4.04	6.88	6.14	21.42
4	NB	9.10	10.9	16.07	14.92
5	QUEBEC	4.47	8.5	12.32	18.48
6	ONTARIO	8.02	14.13	7.82	9.93
7	MANITOBA	6.18	8.26	7.43	12.24
8	SASKATCHEWAN	13.74	7.61	9.31	11.66
9	ALBERTA	-	5.64	-	-
10	BC	-	13.25	8.73	28.83
11	NWT	-	4.63	30	-
12	YUKON	-	7.67	16.36	42.83
	NATIONAL AVERAGE	6.47	8.84	11.75	14.26

SOURCE : ANNUAL REPORTS - DREE.