CHAPTER 5

NATO AND THE MOVING FRONTIERS OF AMERICAN SECURITY

The formation of NATO in 1949 represented a realisation that the United States must be permanently involved in European military security. However, it is worth noting that states have historically banded together in the face of a hostile hegemonic power, and circumstances after the Second World War suggest that the formation of NATO fits the traditional model, at least for the United States. That war left the European states self-consciously weak and fearful of an expansionist Soviet Union. Doubtful of their ability to provide security, Britain, France and the Benelux states persuaded the United States to enter the North Atlantic Treaty. The British viewed a U.S. security obligation necessary to allow the West European integration and held that the United States itself should be part of a "broader Western Union". Entering the treaty, certainly ran counter to traditional American isolationism and U.S. assumptions regarding its long-term interests in the Alliance were not quite ha tune with European expectations.

U.S. policymakers viewed European integration as contributing to Soviet containment and promising an eventual minimisation of transatlantic security commitments: "if the West Europeans could be made to feel "safe", economic prosperity, followed by political stability and eventual unity, would be assured. It would be only a matter of time before the United States could reduce its commitments; by then West Europeans would be able to stand on their own. Without this optimistic perception, it is doubtful whether the United States would ever have signed the North Atlantic Treaty…NATO was seen as a holding measure".

Thus, from the U.S. perspective, the collective NATO defence function was indirect. Permanent European security, would eventually be provided by a united Europe confident enough to withstand Soviet power and dogma; NATO was a security provider.

Lord Harding Ismay said during the Cold War that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was created to keep the Americans in, the Germans down and the Russians out. After the war against Serbia in 1999 to protect Kosovo, one wonders whether the previously defensive alliance has not now been re-engineered into keeping the Americans in, the Russians down and the United Nations out. With military and humanitarian engagement in Afghanistan since 2001, has NATO morphed into a tool for confronting local 'warlords,' rooting out poppy cultivation, undertaking provincial reconstruction and schooling girls?[1]

Forged in the crucible of the Cold War to contain Soviet expansionism, NATO sustained the environment of military security, political stability and economic cooperation among the enemies of yester years in Europe (Britain, France and

[1] Ismay, Lord Harding, "NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954", *El Paris Year Book*, 1956.

Germany). After the Cold War, it was both a force for stabilization in a period of turmoil and rapid change as well as a tool for sculpting the emerging 'new order' (including the re-unification of Germany).

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO in 1999. Now Croatia and Albania had been invited to join. But its members could not agree on the admission of Georgia and Ukraine, with the U.S. voting in favour, and France and Germany opposing. The Bucharest summit on April 2-3 proclaimed the importance of the alliance to the entire Western world and its continuing, indeed increased, relevance in the post-9/11 world. The underlying issues changed little over the decade (1990-2000): the core role of the alliance, repercussions on relations with Russia and implications for the Pacific.

(1). U.S. Security Policy through the Cold Wars

The experience of World War II (1939-1945) changed American attitudes toward isolationism. The United States recognized that to be safe it needed allies. As a result, the country's postwar policy was based on international cooperation and collective security. The United States was one of four countries to draft the charter for the United Nations (U.N.) and one of the U.N's founding members. The Soviet Union's push to increase its sphere of influence changed U.S. foreign policy even further. United States policymakers tried to curtail Soviet expansion and Communist influence by giving economic and military aid to other countries. The United States also formed formal military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), established in 1949.

In its early days, the United States adopted an isolationist policy for a variety of reasons. The fledgling nation wanted to develop without becoming entangled in the conflicts that had overtaken Europe and without being influenced by European values. Early leaders feared that too much involvement in the affairs of other nations would endanger the values of freedom and equality that had fuelled the founding of America. The United States wanted to serve as a model for other countries and recognized that it must first perfect its own development. Early leaders of the United States endorsed commercial treaties and expansion of trade with other nations, but discouraged political or military alliances. President George Washington delivered such a message in his Farewell Address of 1796, just before leaving office. Washington called upon the United States to foster good relations with all nations and encouraged the country to develop economic ties abroad. But he warned against becoming involved in the affairs of Europe. In his 1801 inaugural address, President Thomas Jefferson repeated Washington's warning, encouraging friendly relations with all nations but "entangling alliances with none." In 1823 President James Monroe also reiterated Washington's directive in a message sent to Congress. The message, which became known as the Monroe Doctrine, called on the United States to stay out of European affairs and also warned the Europeans not to meddle in the affairs of the western hemisphere. Monroe said any such action would impinge upon the "rights and interests" of the United States.

The United States, until just before the end of the Second World War, excluded itself to a form of isolationism. By doing this, the United States relied on and looked after itself when dealing with foreign policy. But soon after the Second World War things changed, isolationism could not work for the betterment of the United States any longer. The United States needed to change the way it operated on an international scale, and take on a more demanding role in its foreign policy making. To understand this shift from isolationism to collective foreign diplomacy, an evaluation of the three levels of analysis would present three different aspects on how and why the United States made this shift. When looking at the post-war era, the United States' change from isolationism was essential to its survival due to two key elements: the shift in great power, and the strengthening of the U.S. military and capitalist economy. By using the three levels of analysis, one will be able to understand in depth how their interaction lead to the United States straying from its traditional isolationism, to its current role of collective foreign diplomacy.

To be able to build its military to great power status, it needed to increase its revenue, in order to do that it needed the economic stability. In order to form allies, the United States had to start picking sides, which could not have been done under isolationism. No one person, or one group of people could make this happen, a course of events did. For many years to come after the United States left its roots of isolationism and began to form its international relations, the Soviets saw this as a struggle for relative power. All attempts were failed due to the lack of responsibility to follow through with their actions, and the lack of leadership. In order for the United States to stay on top as a great power, it needed to open its market internationally. Besides forming allies, the United States had to build up its military in order to protect its power and the nations it formed Alliances with. In the long run, the United States' strong capitalist economy helped them win the Cold War, they simply out spent the Soviets, with the decision to leave isolationism and form international markets, all this was possible. From the post-war, international system to the events that lead up the United States shift, all started at the third level of analysis.

After the end of the Second World War, the fall of Hitler and the devastation suffered during the wars by most of the great powers in Europe, caused the International System to have a shift in great powers. During the great powers, there was an attempt to form a semi-govern party in the international system. Where the United States saw its chance and the right time to leave isolationism, it did.

Between the end of the Second World War in August 1945 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the United States experienced generally increasing prosperity at home and unprecedented economic and military power abroad. But America's pre-eminent position in world affairs, together with the new danger of nuclear war and a bitter rivalry with the Soviet Union, was more a source of anxiety than of satisfaction for most Americans.

The strong feelings of anxiety in the United States beginning in the mid-1940s had diverse roots. Concern about a depression once war orders ceased, about jobs for

millions of veterans, about inflation as price controls were lifted, about strikes in industries in which the end of war-related overtime shrank pay-checks, and other issues growing out of dislocations of the Second World War and its aftermath contributed to the dissatisfaction which was reflected in the Republican campaign slogan of 1946, “Had Enough?” The victory over Germany and Japan and the founding of the United Nations were supposed to relegate international relations to relative obscurity. But the failure of the United Nations to resolve the most important international issues, the arrival of the frightening atomic era, and serious disagreements with Russia contributed to the feeling that victory over the Axis powers had brought problems instead of peace.

The events and public debate from 1937 through 1941 assured that the United States would become interventionist in foreign affairs, but the form that the American peacetime involvement would take remained nebulous throughout the war. What became clear soon after the war was the hold which the Munich analogy had on the thinking of U.S. President Truman and many other Americans. According to this analogy, Stalin had replaced Hitler as the dictator seeking world domination. If the United States in dealing with Russia avoided the appeasement which had abetted Hitler’s aggression in the late 1930s, then Communism could be contained and the Third World War could be averted.[2]

As the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union grew in the late 1940s, and into the 1950s, both countries began to rebuild their military forces. Following the Second World War, American leaders were intent on reforming the military forces. There were two main goals policy makers had in mind. First, in the aftermath of Pearl Harbour, the armed forces had to be unified into an integrated system. Such policy of unification was required by the Cold War itself. Second, there was also a need for entirely new institutions to coordinate all military strategy. In 1947, Congress solved both issues by enacting the National Security Act. The Act created first, a Department of Defence which would serve as an organising principle over the army, navy, and air force. Second, the Act created the National Security Council, a special advisory board to the executive office. And lastly, the Act created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was in charge of all intelligence.

The years from 1946 through 1952, the years in which the Cold War consensus on American foreign policy was established, were a time of constant and disturbing change in foreign affairs. These also were the years in which the major features of the world as it would be known a generation later took shape. Communist governments gradually were established in the areas in Eastern Europe and the Far East occupied by Russian armies during the Second World War. Capitalistic societies grew in strength in the areas of Western Europe and the Far East occupied by American armies. In 1949, the Soviet Union exploded an atomic bomb, thus ending and American monopoly, and the Communists finally won the civil war in China. In order to prevent the spread of Communism in Asia, the United States in 1950 intervened directly in a war in Korea and

[2] May, Ernest R., *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1973, pp.19-51.

sent the munitions to the French for use in Indochina. And the proliferation of spread public animosity toward Russia developed quickly after the war.

As Stalin in 1948 tightened his grip on Eastern Europe and threatened the Western position in Berlin, both belligerent attitudes toward Russia and the expectation of war increased. When Gallup Poll in March 1948 asked the open-ended question, "what policy do you think we should follow toward Russia?", a plurality responded "prepare to fight, build up armed forces". The other most frequent responses were "be firm, no appeasement" and "go to war". Fewer than 5 percent suggested conciliatory steps like "get together, work things out" or "let the U.N. work things out". Seventy-three percent of the same sample said that the United States was "too soft" in its policy toward Russia. In August 1948, 57 percent believed that there would be another major war within ten years, and 32 percent believed that the United States would be at war within a year.[3]

In the light of the hardening views towards Russia, it is not surprising that the Americans in the late 1940s supported increased military expenditures and a year of compulsory military service for all young men, a proposal commonly known as universal military training. More than two-thirds of those with opinions in February 1948 and in January 1949 supported an enlarged army, navy and air force, and substantial majorities also were willing to pay higher taxes to support the military. Although more than 70 percent of the public consistently supported Truman's proposal for universal military training, the measure was delayed and then defeated in Congress largely because of concern about substantially increased costs and persistent lobbying by church, labour and peace groups.[4]

But the intense bipartisan hostility towards Russia did make it possible for the passage of Truman's three most significant initiatives in foreign policy: aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947, the Marshall Plan for economic aid to Western Europe in 1948, and American leadership in establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as a formal military alliance in 1949. Mounting large public relations campaigns and supporting private groups such as the Citizens Committee for the Marshall Plan, the administration carefully built public and bipartisan Congressional support before brining these measures to a vote. In 1947, the public was much more favourable to economic than to military aid to Greece and Turkey; by 1949, the public, increasingly perceiving the Communist threat as primarily military, strongly supported both economic and military aid.[5]

During the Cold War, NATO had a clear enemy in the Soviet Union. This gave it a precise function: to defend Western Europe against conventional and nuclear attack. The clarity of the function against the defined enemy shaped the military structure and determined force deployment. The alliance and structure persist but are conceptually

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[3] Gallup, '*The Gallup Poll'*, I, p.721, 759.

[4] Gallup, '*The Gallup Poll*', I, p. 653, 719, 723; II, p.791-92, 294; Wilson, E. Raymond, *Uphill for Peace: Quaker Impact on Congress*, Friends United Press, Richmond, Virginia, 1975, p. 19; Wittner, Lawrence S., *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1969, pp.162-64.

[5] Wilson, Theodore A., *The Marshall Plan, 1947-51*, Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1977, p.36.

and operationally adrift in the war on terror that erroneously conflates a tactic – terrorism – into the enemy. Nor is NATO well suited to combat other major contemporary threats like Islamic fundamentalism and nuclear disarmament. The European Union, not NATO, is the more effective instrument for consolidating and securing the new democracies born out of the multicolored revolutions across Central and Eastern Europe.

Projecting western force into distant trouble spots by deploying NATO out of its European cradle carried a manifold risk. The vaguer, more nebulous functions in areas far removed from its traditional mooring ground would overshadow the its record of having helped to preserve the alliance through the Cold War; entangle NATO in protracted and messy historical enmities and conflicts elsewhere, turn it into a nation-building-like enterprise that would carry with it the same weakness that enfeebles the United Nations in the same field; raise suspicions and provoke retaliation from Russia; and revive memories of occupation by the former colonial powers in many developing countries.

The Alliance had the resources to succeed. It possessed not only great wealth and military strength, but also political assets. Its prospects were enhanced by the U.S. leadership, European cooperation, and its own institutions. Because NATO stood as the greatest peacetime Alliance in history, its troubled origins were easily forgotten. It began as a hollow shell and became a great defence Alliance through its patience and change on the part of its members. The Washington Treaty that created it was signed in 1949, two years after the Cold War erupted. Because initially, there was no consensus for a truly military pact, the organisation was formed as a political alliance although its mission was protection against the Soviet military threat.[6]

The idea behind the Alliance was sound: to commit the United States to European security while joining the nations of Western Europe together under American leadership. The Washington Treaty called on NATO to function as true collective defence alliance rather than a loose security pact like the failed League of Nations. Its members committed to each other's security. If one was attacked, the others were to come to its defence.

"We are at a point in time when important events occurring in rapid succession change the scene. It seems that this second post-war decade upon which we have entered will mark a new phase in the struggle between the forces of despotism and the forces of freedom", declared U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, as he proposed a major step in Western foreign policy: the transformation of the 15-nation NATO from a defence pact into a pregnant next phase that could conceivably make it an instrument for the integration of the Western World.

Clearly, NATO was viewed as a useful tool of policy, aimed with intrinsic value. The collective defence provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty did, of course, have military

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[6] Kugler, Richard L., "NATO Chronicle: The Cold War Year", *Joint Force Quarterly*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Washington D.C., Spring 1999, Issue No. 21, pp. 1-2.

implications. Nevertheless, with some U.S. policy makers holding that a military alliance could provoke the Soviet Union, the Alliance did not immediately form a credible military structure that would develop after Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons and the Korean War. The United States even stationed forces within the territory of NATO members to ensure U.S. involvement, should the Soviets attack.

Notably, the United States emerged as the de facto leader of the Alliance. First, the most obviously, the original NATO purpose, in the European view, was to ensure a U.S. security guarantee. Second, the United States possessed the greatest military capability and potential among NATO members. Third, since “command structures have reflected realities based on military capabilities”, the Supreme Commander Europe and Atlantic are always United States officers. Finally, the North Atlantic Treaty’s provisions for the United States to be custodian of key documents were not trivial or procedural, since they suggest that member states had confidence in the United States that they did not share among themselves.

As noted already, NATO was part of a larger grand strategy of containment. The Alliance’s initial posture was consistent with the U.S. aim of avoiding strategic over-extension while preventing Soviet expansion, building confident geo-political areas that could withstand Soviet influence, and encouraging internal Soviet change by consistent and firm denim of the Soviet foreign policy aims. The policy was intended for the long term, conserved scarce resources, and did not pursue active defeat of Soviet power.

Helped by a tinge of historical amnesia, westerners view NATO as the alliance that pooled the military strength of the trans-Atlantic democracies. Obsessed unhealthily by the burdens of history, non-westerners could not forget that every major 19th century colonial power now belongs to NATO (although not every NATO member had an empire). The differing perceptions provided the key to contrasting narratives of NATO involvement in theatres of operation far removed from Europe.

To President Dwight Eisenhower, a Republican, the national security of the United States could best be maintained by an interventionist international policy. Under the guidance of the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, his administration abandoned the Cold War policy of containment that had been adopted by President Harry S. Truman in favor of a two-pronged approach to the communist menace. The U.S. would respond militarily to overt communist aggression while advocating active measures to promote the liberation of countries that had converted to communism. This new policy required a strong military and Eisenhower accordingly increased the production of nuclear weapons as a cost-effective way to meet his administration's goals.

As President, he sought to maintain America's global presence as the main deterrence to communist expansion. To meet the needs of a steadily growing population, he sought to devote as few resources as possible to the military. This cost cutting led him to emphasize nuclear weapons because they offered more bang for the buck, in both literal and psychological terms. Popularly thought to have delegated foreign policy strategy to Dulles, Eisenhower in fact controlled its formulation through

the mechanism of the National Security Council (NSC). He created the NSC Planning Board to carry out the strategic planning function, while the Operations Coordinating Board coordinated plans for translating approved national strategy into agency operations. Dulles commanded day-to-day NSC operations and served as foreign policy spokesman for the administration. In time, Dulles became the sole intellectual wellspring of foreign policy conception at the expense of the policy planning staff. The creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was his effort at reducing communist dangers in the region.

In 1955, the NSC issued NSC-5412/2 to spell out the goals of covert operations. Such activities were to be designed to create and exploit troublesome problems for communism; discredit the prestige and ideology of communism; counter any communist threat to achieve dominant power in a free world country; reduce communist control over any areas of the world; create a positive image of the U.S.; and develop underground resistance to communism.

President John F. Kennedy, a Democrat, entered the White House in 1961 with confidence that instability in the developing world posed the greatest risk to the national security of the United States. Kennedy planned to resist Soviet expansionism in Latin America, Asia, and Africa by abandoning Eisenhower's policy of massive retaliation in favor of a flexible response, combining economic support with military assistance.[7]

To Ronald Reagan, a conservative Republican, national security meant battling the Soviet Union for world supremacy. Much more conservative than his predecessors, Reagan argued that international instability of the world could be traced to Moscow and he insisted that the United States needed to use military force to protect its global interests. As a result of these assumptions, the Reagan administration promoted a massive buildup of both conventional and nuclear weapons to close the gap that it presumed had developed between Soviet and American forces. To help achieve the glory days of international respect for the U.S., Reagan revamped the national security system. Secretary of State Alexander Haig served as the primary advisor on foreign affairs, while National Security Advisor (NSA) William Clark took the responsibility for developing, coordinating, and monitoring national security policy.

Reagan made another significant change by terminating the policy of détente with the Soviet Union that had been pursued by his predecessors and ushered in the ‘second Cold War’. He made this choice out of his expressed belief that the inherent evil of Soviet totalitarianism had created an "evil empire." He repeatedly stated the American resolve to fight communist aggression anywhere in the world. This determination would lead the U.S. to confront communism in Grenada, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.

During the Cold War, the United States provided security and leadership for Western Europe’s defence within NATO. The European Community prospered under the security shield provided by the United States. After the Cold War, the United States hoped to

[7] Vijayalakshmi, Prof KP, *American Foreign Policy during the Cold War*, The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 4, 11th March, 2011.

realize a “peace dividend” and began to reduce its forces in Europe. Europe was less of a security concern for America and they wanted the Europeans to shoulder a greater security and defence burden for the European continent. “At least in the first decade after the end of the Cold War, the United States… would look for a peace ‘dividend’ by reducing defense expenditures, taking the opportunity to shift resources to other priorities.”[8]

(2). U.S. Security Policy Through the 1990s

George Herbert Walker Bush, a Republican, was inaugurated as president of the United States in January 1989 at a watershed moment in twentieth-century history. The inauguration came at a time, when the old great-power order collapsed and the United States stood as preeminent in world affairs. Small wonder, he proclaimed the dawn of a “new world order”. In the first months of the Bush administration, the world was astounded as democracy sprouted everywhere in the communist bloc. Long oppressed by puppet regimes propped up by Soviet guns, Eastern Europe was revolutionized in just a few startling months in 1989. In rapid succession, communist regimes collapsed in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and even hyper-repressive Romania. In December 1989 jubilant Germans danced atop the hated Berlin Wall, symbol of the division of Germany and all of Europe into two armed and hostile camps. The two Germanys, divided since 1945, were at last reunited in October 1990, with the approval of the victorious allied powers of the Second World War.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union appearing more likely during the fall of 1991, the United States shifted its policy. Following Soviet President Gorbachev's resignation and the formal dissolution of the Soviet government on 25 December, the United States announced recognition of the twelve remaining Soviet republics as independent states. However, the United States proposed establishing full diplomatic relations with only six of the new states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine, states that the administration claimed had made specific commitments to responsible security policy and democratic principles. However, Secretary of State James A. Baker's articulation of principles guiding the pace of U.S. recognition seemed governed more by political expediency than principle. Each of the four successor states that possessed strategic nuclear weapons—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine—were among the first states to win U.S. recognition. This risked sending a dangerous message: that retaining nuclear weapons would offer the new states leverage with the West.

Furthermore, the recognition of Armenia but not Azerbaijan may have exacerbated tension in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh—populated by Armenians but located in and administered by Azerbaijan—by undermining the U.S. neutral position regarding the conflict. Concern, however inflated, that a policy of selective recognition could prompt the Islamic republics of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus to turn toward Iran prompted the United States to quickly accept perfunctory promises of support for democratic principles and

[8] Sloan, Stanley, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic community : The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2nd edition, 2005, p.86.

to establish diplomatic ties. By the end of February 1992 the United States had granted formal diplomatic recognition to eleven of the twelve non-Baltic republics. It granted recognition to the final republic, Georgia, in March 1992, after its civil wars subsided and Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister, offered appropriate commitments.

If commitments towards the United States are of lesser value for allied capitals, does the United States, for its part, still need permanent alliances? Permanent Alliances appear to be of increasingly limited value for the United States, as the ratio of costs to benefits has changed to such an extent that conservative commentators have called for a radical re-shuffling of U.S. commitments and bases abroad.[9]

Alliances have become costly for Washington, as permanent deployments have increasingly created friction with local populations, with each incident involving U.S. forces and the local populations prompting a public outcry, as in Japan and in South Korea in the 1990s. Given today's pace of U.S. technological advances, particularly in the field of communications, allied forces are not as easily interoperable. Washington complains that European forces are still ill-equipped for rapid power projection, which makes the planning and conduct of common military operations more difficult and time-consuming.

Operations under the NATO banner bear a heavy political cost, relying on procedures that require constant negotiation to reach consensus. NATO was created to defend against a major threat; nations were expected to delegate command to the Alliance's military authorities at the first signal of Soviet attack. Reaching consensus thus was not expected to be a problem. Despite the wishes of some in the U.S. Congress that the Alliance's decision making procedures should be reformed, with consensus giving way to majority ruling, this perspective remains a minority view both in Washington and in Brussels. At the same time, the increasing threats of terrorism and ballistic missiles make allied territories vulnerable, risking exposure of the United States to blackmail.

Meanwhile, the benefits of Alliances to the United States are decreasing. Washington is now capable of countering most potential military threats alone, in stark contrast with circumstances during the Cold War, when local allies were to provide the bulk of defence capabilities in case of Soviet aggression until U.S. reinforcements could arrive. In addition, the use of allied territory is no longer guaranteed in times of crisis. Rather, host countries reserve the right to say no to the United States, as Ankara and Riyadh did prior to the war in Iraq. At the same time, Washington is able to rely increasingly on long-range power projection for contingencies not involving a large deployment of ground forces and will be able to do so even more in the future as the new generation hypersonic weapons are developed.[10] Moreover, Alliances appear to be of limited political value if they do not help ensure that allies will refrain from actively opposing

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[9] Hanson, Victor D., "So Long To All That: Why the Old World Of Bases, Alliances, And NATO Is Now Coming To An End", *National Review Online*, January 31, 2003.

[10] Borger, Julian, 'U.S.-Based Missiles to Have Global Reach; Allies to Become Less Important As New Generation of Weapons Enables America to Strike Anywhere from its own territory", *Guardian*, July 1, 2003.

U.S. policy decisions, as some European countries did in early 2003 on issues regarding Iraq.

The marked drop in forces available for combat operations as well as the growing technological gap between European and American militaries was made obvious during the Gulf war. It also later surfaced in NATO air operations over Bosnia and Kosovo. Strategic analysts argue that unless this trend is halted, effective military capabilities will increasingly rest with US forces.[11] Americans resent being asked to shoulder more than their fair share of Europe's military burden, while Europeans resent being dictated to by the United States. Burden sharing and power sharing, always overarching issues for the alliance, are becoming a source of conflict. How NATO addresses these issues could very well determine its prospects for survival.[12]

This change in the costs-and benefits equation helps explain why Washington finds ad hoc coalitions under U.S. command increasingly attractive. Another reason is that the United States has grown increasingly weary of potential risks for U.S. forces operating under an umbrella organisation. Following the disaster in Mogadishu, in early May 1994, then-President Bill Clinton, a Democrat, signed Presidential Decision Directive 25, strictly limiting the possibility of foreign command of U.S. forces. Changes in the U.S. domestic scene and political culture, particularly since the Congressional elections of November 1994 that brought to power to a new generation of Republican politicians, have demonstrated growing U.S. defiance vis-à-vis multilateral institutions, especially when U.S. troops may be placed in harm's way. All of these factors likely help fuel the sentiment behind Bush Jr.'s statement in September 2001 that, "[a]t some point, we may be the only ones left. That's okay with me. We are America".[13]

Especially in the post-Iraq environment of distrust of the United States and overseas military adventures tied to the U.S. apron strings, western people would be divided on the new NATO agenda. Al-Qaeda could be every effective in using picture of President George W. Bush Jr's speech in Bucharest to identify NATO as the enemy in Afghanistan. Bush's attempt to focus NATO to the cause of the U.S. war on terror was to gift a propaganda tool to Al-Qaeda to describe NATO into a tool of American aggression.

Among U.S. Alliances, the Trans-Atlantic System is complex and unique. Forged by two world wars, NATO is the quintessential military alliance, to the point that experts and officials on both sides of the Atlantic frequently refer to it as simply "the Alliance". It is also the single remaining multilateral alliance of the network created by U.S. diplomacy in the 1950s. Is its fate the same as the others? Unlike the other now-defunct multilateral alliances, NATO gained new life after the disappearance of the Communist threat by intervening in the Balkan wars, starting with the monitoring of an embargo in

[11] Yost, David, 'NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles In International Security', United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., 1999.
[12] Goldstein, Walter, *Security in Europe: The Role of NATO After The Cold War*, Brassey's Inc. London, 1994, p. 10-11.
[13] Woodward, Bob, *Bush At War*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2002, p.81.

the Adriatic Sea in the summer of 1992, and culminating in 1999's 'Operation Allied Force' to enforce a settlement to the Kosovo problem. NATO's moment of triumph was also the beginning of its troubles, however, as this operation left a bitter taste in Washington. Critics stigmatized the "war by committee" that obliged the United States, by far the largest contributor to the war, to consult and reach consensus with 18 other capitals at each important stage of the war-waging effort. Several countries even repeatedly insisted on micro-managing the selection of targets.[14]

Almost a decade after the Kosovo War, whose beneficiaries were Muslims, it was clear that those who thought they understood that the Balkans were sadly wrong. A graveyard for statesmen throughout history, the Balkans threw up a difficulty for every solution. NATO now finds itself between the Scilla of policy failure and the Charybdis of disaster. It can cut and run, abandoning the dream of a multi-ethnic society living together peacefully. Or it can persevere, possibly for decades, and risk being drawn increasingly into a quagmire that turned NATO into an object of hatred and attacks by both sides.

Another challenge to the transatlantic relations is the impact of an emerging European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI). Moves towards a common European defense and security policy and European capabilities that are 'separable but not separate' from NATO, have sparked off a considerable debate. Concerns have been voiced that this could lead to a decoupling of Europe's security from that of its other NATO allies, a duplication of effort and capabilities, and discrimination against those allies who are non-European Union members.[15] In 1999, the member states of the European Union laid the foundations of their new European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI). At the December 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting, a 'headline goal' for a rapid–reaction force was set.

The United States supported the development of an European Security Defence Initiative within the Alliance - at least rhetorically, but at the same time, "President George Bush and his top officials…were ensuring continuity in U.S. international leadership, including the leadership of NATO" as a high priority.[16] The United States was very concerned that ESDI would eventually lead to a competing security structure that would undermine the Alliance. Secretary of State Madeline Albright's well known "three D's" illustrated these concerns. The United States did not want a *decoupling* of Europe's security from its own, a *duplication* of effort or capabilities, nor *discrimination* against those NATO allies outside the European Union.[17]

While America expressed its good will to make U.S. and NATO assets, capabilities, and Combined Joint Task Forces available for WEU-led military operations ("Berlin-

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[14] Daalder, Ivo H., and Hanlon, Michael, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War To Save Kosovo*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2000, p. 105.

[15] Heisbourg, Francois, "European defence takes a leap forward", *NATO Review*, Volume 48, No. 1, Spring-Summer 2001.

[16] Sloan, note 488, p.182.

[17] USIS Washington File, "Speech by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 15th December 1999, http://www.fas.org. /spp/starwars/program/news99/991215.-bmd-usia1.htm.

Plus" arrangements), it made clear that NATO was its number one forum for political dialogue and military involvement in EU security matters.[18] One classical U.S. argument against an autonomous European security and defence system was that it would present a back-door security assurance to present and future EU member states not covered by NATO's core Article 5. "Because EU Member States like Finland and Austria, who are not members of NATO, will participate fully in the EU's… [ESDI], they will indirectly affect the European input into NATO and may in crisis situations call upon the United States for military assistance."[19]

Do Westerners really want to put NATO in the middle of a potential Ukrainian civil war, knowing how deeply divided that country is between its pro-Russian and western factions? Or import Georgia's pre-Revolution troubles and conflicts? That is, far from securing these troublesome regions, NATO would risk long-term infection by their historical animosities.

The Cold War ended in a manner rare in history and unique in modern times. The defeated power, Russia, acquiesced to the terms of its defeat and thereby also to the legitimacy of the new order. The Kosovo War united Russians in deep and abiding anger against the West. While the ailing and erratic Boris Yeltsin played the Russian roulette with his prime ministers, wide swathes of people and politicians lost confidence in the "good faith" of liberal democracies in conducting foreign relations on the basis of justice, equality and non-use of force. Western criticisms of the Russian use of massive force against Chechnya drew angry reminders of NATO action in Kosovo: an international war of aggression against a country that had not attacked any NATO member, as opposed to actions within Russia's borders against a group whose terrorist acts had penetrated Moscow itself.

Cold War victory bred complacency and hubris in western capitals. Starting from the Kosovo War and including the most recent proposals on missile deployment, newest candidate states, Georgia and Ukraine as potential members, NATO had serially rubbed Russian noses wrongly in the dirt of Russia's historic modern day defeats. Confronted by the relentless eastward expansion of NATO, an angry and resentful Russia, emboldened by the U.S. entrapment in Iraq and the resulting U.S. isolation and defensiveness, enriched by the escalating price of oil to which the Iraq conflict was a major contributor, and empowered by Vladimir Putin, had found its voice and is in a state of regeneration.

The United States had vital interests in a Europe that is democratic, undivided, stable and prosperous, open to trade and investment opportunities and supportive of political, economic and military cooperation with the United States in Europe and other important parts of the world. Transatlantic cooperation was the key not only to advancing mutual interests of the United States and Europe, but also to solving the global problems. The

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[18] Quinlan, Michael, *European Defence Cooperation: Asset Or Threat To NATO?*, Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Washington D.C., 2001, p. 17.

[19] Van Ham, Peter, Europe's New Defence Ambitions: Implications For NATO, the U.S. and Russia, The Marshall Center Papers, No.1, April 2000, 4.

United States and its NATO allies play leading roles in the major institutions and in developing tools needed to shape the international community; constituting three of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

Because of their level of technological achievement, solid democratic systems, military competence, wealth and other enduring factors, European allies play important roles in addressing the risks to US Security and well-being. Moreover, the collapse of totalitarianism and the commitment to build democratic political institutions and free market economies by Europe's former communist states represent a historical opportunity to expand the circle of states that saw it in their interest to cooperate in the pursuit of common goals.

For these reasons, the United States would continue to have a great stake in maintaining influence in the decisions and policies of Europe's governments and multinational organisations. NATO, in particular, the institutional embodiment of the trans-Atlantic partnership, has been the key element in maintaining general peace in Europe from 1949 till the end of the Cold War in 1990. Critical to America's interests in the region is the maintenance of the viability and vitality of NATO as an institution, which is able to deter and defend against any attacks on its members. At the core of NATO's success is the integrated military command structure, through which the forces of the Alliance cooperate, train and plan together for the common defence.

An often-ignored facet of Europe's importance to US national security is the tremendous economic benefits Americans receive from cooperative relationship with the prosperous and dynamic region. Inside the 'zone of stability' defended by NATO, the United States and its allies had developed strong economic ties that had been of great mutual profit. These ties generated jobs for American workers, quality goods for American consumers and investments and profits for American business.

America's military presence in Europe and the defence contributions of Allies are the prerequisites for the stable security environment that nurtures the economic benefits for the region. By pursuing a policy that shares responsibility for defending mutual interests with Transatlantic Allies, America reduces its own defence costs and increases the security of its vital economic interests. Expanding the "zone of stability" would not only decrease the threat of instability damaging economic interests in Europe, but would also increase the value of those interests as the development of new markets provide new trade and investment opportunities for Americans. The result of such prudent security investments in Central and Eastern Europe is likely to parallel the economic benefits derived from their security relationship with NATO allies: increasing employment opportunities, expanded selection of products and profitable investments and exports.

With NATO celebrating its 50th Anniversary in Washington DC, hosted by Democratic President Clinton and with NATO's historic coercive campaign against Serbia in 1999, the time seemed right to pause and take stock of where the NATO Alliance stood and where it was heading, with particular attention to the American Role. The Washington Summit also highlighted the importance of the NATO-Russia relationship. Russia may

be a country of many contradictions; it may be uncertain of its role in this emerging new Europe, but one thing is clear: there can be no security in Europe without a stable Russia. Political and economic turmoil in Europe can have a wider effect. Indeed, in the Russian government's latest national security assessment, they identified economic difficulties as their number one security challenge.

NATO is needed to provide economic and political stability in Europe, which is vitally important to the United States economy. A US Commitment to the collective defence of Europe is necessary to preserve the economic prosperity of America. The system of international trade upon which American prosperity depends is predicated on free stable and orderly political conditions. The US trade with Europe, amounting to over $ 250 billion annually, produced over three million domestic jobs. US Companies employ three million people in Europe. One in 12 factory workers in the United States is employed by a European Union (EU) firm operating in this country, of which there are some 4000. One half of the world's goods is produced by the United States and the EU. Ninety percent of humanitarian aid dispensed throughout the world came from the United States and the EU. Fifty-six percent of US foreign investment occurs in Europe. In 1993, Europe was America's second largest customer, taking 31 percent of America's exports. It was also the US's second largest supplier, providing 29 percent of imports.[20] The large oil and gas reserves in the North Sea and particularly in the Caspian basin provide a strategic hedge against the disruption of supplies from the Middle East.

What these figures reveal is the enormous degree of economic interdependence between the United States and Europe. The unity of vision and purpose shared by Europe and the United States provided an enormous leverage as these partners act in concert to encourage peace and prosperity throughout the world. Thus, the maintenance of political and economic stability in Europe remains in the forefront of America's national interests. [21]

A great power threat to Europe would cause the wholesale disruption of the European economic order. The stability of world markets and international trade depends on a stable and thriving Europe. The United States cannot afford to cut itself off from the world market. Neither could the US long sustain its economic growth if Europe as a whole were to enter an economic crisis born of insecurity or protracted instability. The sustenance of America's very standard of living depends on stable international financial and commodity markets of which Europe is a critical element.

As a result of those interests, the United States continued to maintain a strong military presence in Europe. Unlike those who believed that the end of the Cold War marked the end of serious security challenges, NATO's statesmen realized immediately that there are other security problems, which were emerging, and that simple prudence demanded that they be prepared for.[22] NATO is as an important vehicle for consolidating and

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[20] Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment 1995*, National Defence University Press, Washington D.C., 1995, p. 42.
[21] Clark, Wesley K., "The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead", *Parameters*, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 2-14.
[22] Ibid.

spreading freedom and democracy in Europe, even while NATO ultimately is an alliance of collective defence. It is not only practically important from the standpoint of providing stability in Europe, but it has a moral component as well. NATO is an organisation of democratic states and a reflection of America's identity in the world, an anchor for American values both abroad and at home. This stability, born of political freedom and economic prosperity, should now be brought by NATO to Central Europe, a region historically characterized by political instability.

The immutable facts of geography ensure that Russia is a factor simultaneously in Europe and the Pacific. The U.S. is separated by oceans from both theatres; Russia is joined by land to both. Russia's death as a great power would have momentous consequences for the Pacific as well as Europe. The consequences would be equally momentous in both theatres if Russia were to recover and reinvigorate itself as a great power. Despite the disappearance of European powers from this theatre, the Pacific balance of power is no more settled in this century. Yet, between being defeated by Japan a hundred years ago and helplessness in the face of NATO expansion today. Moscow bestrode the world as one of the two superpower colossi.

During the Cold War, the clarity and proximity of the Soviet threat and the relatively stable balance of power held the rival bloc coalitions impact. If NATO was an old alliance looking for a new role and its expansion is the price paid for anchoring U.S. security commitment to Europe, what might this imply for U.S. allies and adversaries in the Pacific?

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the abatement of the Russian threat, the only common thread tying together the U.S. security alliances with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan seemed to be the dormant fear of a resurgent ad assertive China, with the risk of making this a self-fulfilling prophecy. Russia's humiliation reduced the West's bargaining leverage with China. It diluted Chinese fears of Russia, strengthened China's determination to avoid having to negotiate with the West from a position of weakness, removed a possible "Russian card" for the West in the strategic game with China, and increased pressure on Asian countries to come to terms with China's rising status and power.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, combined with the moderation of communist ideology, its commitment to economic and market reforms and a skilful pursuit of the diplomacy of regional reassurance, had weakened the bases of U.S. alliances in the Pacific. In future the security partnerships with the West would lack the emotional attachment of the generations that experienced and grew up in the shadow of the world wars and the Cold War. The instinctive commitment to military alliances would be attenuated, and they would no longer provide ballast to commercial and political disputes.

NATO was needed as insurance to maintain the freedom and security of Europe. The United States has been a major European power throughout the 20th century, intervening in three world wars to prevent a hostile power or bloc of superpowers from

dominating the continent. An American commitment to this basic security condition of Europe is an insurance policy that works to prevent another great power war in Europe. The premiums that America plays on this policy commensurate with the benefits. A focused and clearly defined policy would ensure this balance is retained. In fact, the costs of these premiums had dropped tremendously since the end of the Cold War. In 1989, the United States military had over 313,000 service members permanently stationed in Europe. That number is now down to 100,000.[23]

As with any insurance policy, the cost of being insured through NATO is far less than the cost of not being insured at all. A major power threat to the political freedom of the European continent was the condition that inevitably drew the United States into the enormously expensive campaigns of the World Wars I and II and the Cold War. It is far better to have 100,000 troops peaceably deployed in Europe now than have to commit a million later to fight a war that broke out in the absence of the one power that could guarantee the core security condition of Europe: less expensive to live as lodgers now than as liberators later.

The end of Cold War destabilized global peace and security. Until that time, bipolar deterrence required each side to control its allies and clients. It inhibited regional rogue regimes from resorting to aggression and kept many domestic ethnic tensions from turning into unmanageable violence. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the chaos that followed were less likely to happen before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.[24] With the collapse of mutual deterrence, the United States – alone or perhaps with the help of a 'coalition of the willing' – assumed the role of managing actual and potential crises situation around the globe.

Unipolarity necessarily raises concerns about unilateral decision-making. Many across the globe view the US policies with growing doubts about the impartiality and infallible of the US's judgment. Concerns about impartiality are invoked by the tendency of the US to promote its self-interests in other fields of international law including the environment (the Kyoto Protocol) and trade and sometimes disdain for global standards of human rights. Concerns about infallibility focus on the fundamental disagreement about the promise of the use of military muscle, as many outside the US emphasise the limits and the long-term dangers of military action. Some even fear for their very sovereignty, as reflected in a question posed by a report of Defence Committee of the Assembly of Western European Union: 'Is it Europe's destiny to be more than an allied province?'[25] To control partiality, erroneous judgment and loss of sovereignty, the opponents to unilateralism insist on maintaining the law, which provides for collective decision-making through the UN Security Council.

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[23] International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1989-90 and The Military Balance 1995-96*, Brassey's (UK) and Oxford University Press, pp. 25-30.

[24] Haass, R.N., *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force In the Post-Cold War World*, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., revised edition, 1999, pp. 3-5.

[25] 'The United States Security Strategy and its Consequences for European Defence', Document A/1824, June 4, 2003, accessed at http://assembly.weu.int.

In pursuing its self-appointed global management role, the United States finds it difficult to remain within the confines of the traditional doctrine one the *jus ad bellum*. It, therefore, seeks to stretch the limits, insisting that the new limits reflect compelling the United States and global interests and as such, they should be recognized as compatible with, or tolerated by the international law. The clearest example is the so-called the 'Bush Doctrine' that breaks new grounds in attempting to justify pre-emptive military action.

The main rationales for intervention – economy, security and justice – provide the key to understanding the logic of the post-Cold War security situation. The United States has a strong motivation, couple with reasonably sufficient military strength, to maintain global security. This serves both its own interests and the interests of many other communities, certainly in the developed world, but also of many developing societies. Security and stability are obviously public good because all of them can enjoy, without distracting from each other's enjoyment. The provision of such good raises a collective action problem, because not all who benefit from the good wish to contribute to its production. This is certainly case of global security. [26] As Olson's logic goes, when public goods can be provided by the relatively more powerful actors within a certain group, 'there is a systematic tendency for exploitation of the great by the small.[27] Therefore, as long as the United States has the military capacity to maintain global law and order, and as long as it has an interests in pursuing that goal, other states face the temptation to 'free ride', to reap the benefit of stability without incurring the costs of producing it.

Olson's observations explain the disproportionate reliance on the American contribution on the context of NATO during the Cold War. As long as the two superpowers followed a deterrence strategy of 'mutually assured destruction', the outcome – stability – was in public good that smaller NATO members were able to enjoy minimal contribution.[28] Interestingly, the two superpowers developed more discerning weapons that could distinguish between targets, deterrence lost much of its 'publicness', and the smaller NATO members became more willing to share the burden of providing defence.[29]

Global security in the post-Cold War era constitutes an even more complex collective action problem than in the Cold War days. This is due to three main factors. The first factor is the limited availability of deterrence. The Cold War duopoly offered stability that was enhanced by the public good of mutual deterrence. The two powers could and did coordinate the mutual level of deterrence and thus economized on the costs of

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[26] Olson, Mancur, "Collective Action in the Utilisation of Fresh Water: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law", 90 *American Journal of International Law,* 1996, p. 384 and pp.390-394.

[27] Olson, Mancur, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods And The Theory of Groups,* Harvard University Press, 1965, p. 29.

[28] Olson, Mancur and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances", *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 48, 1966, p.266.

[29] See Sandler, T. and Hartley, K., "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action", volume 39 *Journal of Economic Literature*, 2001, p. 869; Sandler, T. and Hartley, K., *The Economics of Defence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, Ch. 2, p. 34-36.

producing the public good. In contrasts, the current era does not have the stabilizing factor produced by mutuality and by the efficacy of deterrence. There is no counterpart to the US hegemon and deterrence does not work against those who try to stabilize the status quo and seek violence to achieve their goals. Thus, there is almost no limit to the amount of collective effort that must be invested in protecting against those challenges. In these settings, one encounters one other of Olson's observations regarding the provisions of public goods, namely, the tendency towards sub-optimal provisions of the collective good.[30] The largest actor, the United States, would contribute, as much as it can afford to. It may elicit relatively small contributions by some of its allies,[31] but this much would be less than the total potential contributions of all other actors, large or small, once they truly commit themselves to the collective effort. Hence, actual global stability is under threat of being under supplied.

The second factor that characterizes the post-Cold War to stabilize the status quo is the possible strategy of differentiation available to many states. States can add to the protection they obtained through the US efforts an added layer of protection by setting themselves apart from the United States and its allies, thus shielding themselves from being targeted by terrorists. The US cannot threaten them with removing them from its protective umbrella, although modest economic punishment may become possible.[32] These states can play the part of neutrals in the raging war. US President George Bush's call or plea, 'either you are with us or you are with the terrorists',[33] on the one hand and Al Qaeda attacks on the US, on the other hand, demonstrate the centrality of this factor.

The third factor exacerbating the provision of global security in the post-Cold War era is the disagreement between the United States and a number of other key actors, including members of the Permanent Five at the UN Security Council, about the ways to obtain the public good. Some even view the US measures s aggressive policies detrimental to public good, but threatening global security. This disagreement is real, and it cannot be resolved by abstract analysis, because it is a matter of judgment call. The US may be correct in deciding to use force, or it may be making grave errors. The difficulty is that the position of those who dispute the US can be presented as motivated by free-riding interests, and at the same time, the US position can be characterized by its critics as partisan. This breeds suspicion, which leaves little space for coordination of collective action.

The US attitude towards international cooperation in this effort to provide these public goods is complex. It recognizes the obvious benefits of international cooperation and seeks to achieve them. But at the same time, it insists on maintaining its independent and unrivalled right of action. Militarily, the United States resists having

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[30] Olson, note 506 at p.28.

[31] Sandler and Hartley, note 509, at p.875.

[32] For example, the US occupation authorities refused to allow French and German companies to take part in the rebuilding of Iraq.

[33] President Bush's September 20, 2001, *Address to Congress and the Nation*; accessed at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,62167,00,html.

peer competitors.[34] Legally, the United States insists on its unfettered power to make assessments as to the risks of its national security and the means to address them. Acting in cooperation with allies is the preferred route, but when these fail to offer the support it seeks, the US will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary.[35] The US expects others to join efforts – neutrality is betrayal! – Because the fight can only be gained through collective action.

Viewed from this American angle, the United States is the primary provider of global security. Some of this traditional allies share some of the collective efforts. Others share only a symbolic part. Those who ride free compromise the success of the campaign. Most annoying are other benefactors of the US efforts who not only free ride, but actually burdens the US-led efforts by invoking international law against it. Angry remarks about 'old Europe' betray frustration at what is viewed as European ungratefulness, if not hypocrisy. They also betray lack of attention in the U.S. administration to the crucial domestic dimension of global competition, to what Joseph Nye calls 'soft power', the power of shared values.[36] As a result, international law loses its soft power, for many Americans, who see it as a tool to hinder the provision of the public goods of global welfare and security, a tool invoked against the US by unthankful opportunists.

The United States needs alliances of all sorts in an interdependent world. Economic alliances allow the U.S. to remain the number one trading nation in the world and sustain American prosperity at home. Political alliances ensure that America is involved in decisions the world over that may influence the peace and prosperity of the United States. Military alliances give America partners in fighting her enemies and defending her interests, thereby lessening the costs to the U.S. in time of war and peace.

The U.S. has many national interests throughout the world, but not all are equally important. The principal task of American statecraft is to discriminate among these interests, set strategic priorities, and choose policy options commensurate with their importance. Such an approach distinguishes among vital national interests, important interests, and marginal interests.[37] Naturally, America has a vital national interest in defending the physical territory and airspace of the United States and ensuring the safety and well-being of Americans abroad. To protect these vital interests, the U.S. should be willing to wage war if necessary.

In addition, the U.S. has vital national interests that lie beyond American shores. For both political and economic reasons, it is in America's vital national interest that

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[34] Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition", *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2002, p.44, at 49-50.

[35] National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002) at 6, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc//nss.htm; see the Clinton Administration: 'We act in concert with the international community whenever possible, but do not hesitate to act unilaterally when necessary'. (*A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (December 1999), at 19-20, accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nssr-1229.pdf.

[36] Nye, Joseph and Myers, Joanne, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 1st edition, Public Affairs, New York, March 2nd, 1964, pp 1-5.

[37] Holmes, Kim R., *A Safe and Prosperous America: A US Foreign Policy and Defence Blueprint*, The Heritage Foundation, Washington DC, 2nd edition, 1994, pp.10-14.

Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf are not dominated by a hegemonic power or bloc of powers. It is also in America's vital national interest that the U.S. have unimpeded access to foreign trade and natural resources. American prosperity overwhelmingly depends on the stability of international markets and free trade regimes. Political scientist Benjamin Schwarz has written that:

> Economic interdependence dictates security commitments. As long as world politics remain what they have always been, Europe and East Asia will be potentially unstable. And as long as U.S. prosperity is understood to depend upon the stability of those regions, the United States must pacify them. America's worldwide security commitments are a truly permanent burden.[38]

However, Schwarz and many others also recognize that this permanent burden ultimately could turn into a "wasting proposition." America, without a coherent strategy, and in order to sustain its prosperity, will run itself ragged trying to preserve the stability of the entire world. Its engagement in world affairs therefore must be selective. The U.S. must set clear priorities that allow it to use its political capital and military forces for the tasks that most matter to America. If the U.S. tries to do everything, it will overextend itself and accomplish nothing.[39]

In order to avoid becoming the world's policeman, the U.S. must operate within security alliances. These alliances must preserve the conditions necessary for American prosperity, and must do so by "stretching" American resources through an intelligent definition of America's exact role and principles for sharing burdens with allies. These alliances must unequivocally lay out the roles that make the most sense for America and her goals abroad. NATO, in particular, needs to be refocused to avoid being drawn into an expensive "wasting proposition" that the American people will not support.

Despite these compelling reasons for American involvement in NATO, the American public will not support such a commitment if it is not supported by a clear and coherent military strategy. A commitment that does not discriminate between situations where the employment of American power is necessary and those where it is merely a substitute for that of reluctant Europeans will cause the American people to balk at an expensive transatlantic responsibility. A recent poll by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes shows that over 70 percent of Americans believe the United States should work principally through alliances or coalition structures to relieve America of some of its security burden. More conclusively, 71 percent of Americans said the U.S. is playing the role of world policeman "more than it should be."[40] Americans want multilateral security structures that make sense for America. This means working through military alliances, not the United Nations. Americans want the

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[38] Schwarz, Benjamin C., "The Arcana of Empire and the Dilemma of American National Security", *Salmagundi*, Winter-Spring 1994, p. 195.

[39] In doing so, it could become, in the words of Prof. Ronald Steel, "a strange kind of superpower with Chronic Deficits, weak currency, massive borrowing, and immense debt" Steel, Ronald, *Temptations of A Superpower*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1995, p.5.

[40] Kull, Steven, "The Public Rejects a Hand off Defence Budget", *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 22, 1996, p 19.

U.S. involved in alliances where the U.S. role is clearly understood, the burden is shared, and American participation is essential for success.

Americans need to understand clearly the criteria that determine the American role in NATO and NATO's role in Europe. In the identity crisis that has characterized NATO's search for a post-Cold War role, many new or revised missions have been entertained and questions raised. Should NATO operate only in its traditional area of operations, or should it consider out-of-area missions? Should NATO concentrate on traditional notions of military deterrence and war-fighting, or should it engage in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and military operations other than war? Should NATO extend its nuclear guarantee to new members or associate members?

These questions are based on the search for relevant and viable missions that would justify the existence of NATO in the absence of a threat to its core role as a defensive alliance. As guidelines for determining the future American role in NATO, they completely miss the point. The U.S. role in NATO, a fundamentally American alliance, should be determined by principles of engagement, not by geographic parameters or mission types. Stating that the U.S. will undertake NATO operations only in certain areas or will not participate in certain types of missions unnecessarily limits American flexibility. Instead, the American role should be considered through guidelines that point the way to a successful and sensible role in NATO.[41]

America's principal military role is to serve NATO's core mission of collective defense. NATO's mission is collective defense, not collective security. Collective defense seeks to tie many nations to a collaborative effort in defending their territory. It is inherently limited, focused, and reactive in its political nature. The missions of collective defense are straightforward and focused: defend members from outside attack. Collective defense seeks to deter through military strength and defeat an aggressor when deterrence fails. Collective defense organizations cannot afford to do anything except succeed spectacularly. Any other result amounts to failure.

Collective security arrangements are different from collective defense. They seek to provide a forum through which members can organize cooperative responses to security problems, especially those below the threshold of war. The United States already is involved in a collective security organization in Europe, and it is not NATO. It is the 54-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Established in 1973, the OSCE has become increasingly institutionalized since the end of the Cold War. It is an organization that can act as a forum in which the nations of Europe can coordinate and integrate their common efforts towards preserving peace and stability. Along these lines, it has undertaken very limited fact-finding, sanctions-monitoring, and observation missions in the former Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Albania, and even Chechnya.[42] However, the OSCE is viewed

[41] These principles serve mainly to inform the commitment of American combat troops to significant military operations. Combat support and combat service support to European missions or more limited operations are much less contentious and are not typically a policy dilemma.

[42] Organisation for Security and Cooperation in *Europe Press Release*, January 24, 1995.

largely as a toothless talking-shop. There is too much disparity among its members to institutionalize the military resources and structures needed for more significant military operations.

The failure of the OSCE and the United Nations (another collective security organization) to deal competently with problems like Bosnia has thrust NATO into the picture. In short, events are taking NATO down the road to becoming something it never was: a collective security organization. By default, not design, NATO has been consigned to fill the collective security gap in Europe. This means that NATO might become involved in even more ambiguous security missions like Bosnia. As it does so, it will find that the inevitable divergence of opinion over these operations will dilute its unique and formidable cohesion. NATO drew its strength from its core identity, which united all members. A lack of focus on its principal mission of collective defense will continue to weaken the alliance. As one U.N. scholar recently recognized, "NATO's biggest advantage over the UN, historically, has been agreement on some clearly defined defensive purposes, whereas the UN has an almost infinite range of responsibilities.'[43] Using NATO for contentious collective security missions will only serve to erode that unique advantage.

The U.S. public and Congress will not support an American-led alliance running hither and yon from one media-generated crisis to another and lacking criteria for distinguishing the roles of America and its European allies. The U.S. should refocus its role in NATO on the core mission: to prevent a major power threat to Europe by a hostile power or bloc of powers. While U.S. participation in NATO peacekeeping operations should not be ruled out, it should be undertaken only if participation affects NATO's core mission or some other vital U.S. national interest.

U.S. forces must make a unique contribution to the military operation. The United States is the only military superpower in the world today. It has an enormous edge in intelligence-gathering systems, military technology, and the size, lethality, and professionalism of its armed forces. No other nation alone, and few combined, can challenge the combined air, land, sea, and space-based military capability of the U.S. But while America's military capabilities are enormous, they also are thinly spread. The Soviet threat has collapsed, but global U.S. military commitments remain. The U.S. military has been reduced by over one-third since the end of the Cold War and has been greatly strained in trying to honour its commitments with such a reduced force. This situation is made worse by the defense cuts imposed by the Clinton Administration -- cuts that underfund President Clinton's own strategy by some $150 billion over five years.[44]

Since American military forces are stretched thin, the U.S. must deploy them only when their capabilities and effect are unique. As a rule, America should not duplicate

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[43] Roberts, Adam, "From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the use of force", *Survival*, Vol.37, No.4, Winter 1995-96, p.25.

[44] US General Accounting Office, 'Future Years Defence Program: Optimistic Estimates Lead To Billions in Overprogramming', July 29, 1994.

the efforts of the European powers. If an American infantry battalion is needed to balance a NATO force on paper, but does not make a unique contribution to the force, it should not be deployed in place of a similar European unit.[45] The United States is not just another European power; it is a world power with unique capabilities and a unique role in European security. The division of labor in NATO military operations should be based on this premise. The intention is not to help the U.S. shirk mundane tasks, but to ensure that the American public see clearly that, to paraphrase Lyndon Johnson, "American boys aren't dying where French boys should." The intention of an intelligent division of labor in NATO is to preserve, at all costs, the fundamental American security guarantee to Europe. To do that, Americans must be convinced that every NATO nation is pulling the wagon in the best way it can, and is not merely along for the ride.

Does this mean that America would lose its leadership role in NATO, consigning itself to a specialist's role in the alliance? Not at all. The U.S. need not match the Danish infantry battalion for infantry battalion to exert its leadership. At times the U.S. may need to deploy a large American combat formation in order to exercise its leadership in a NATO coalition of forces, even if the French, British, or Germans can match the size and type of contribution on paper. This is a unique contribution because it demonstrates the seriousness of the U.S. military commitment in a way that air, sea, or support forces cannot. A leader reserves his talents, time, and resources for important tasks that only he may be able to accomplish. It is good teamwork, but not always good leadership, for a leader to duplicate the efforts of others to the detriment of his unique responsibilities.

The last principle that should guide American military operations in NATO is that the American contribution should be decisive.[46] The American military effort must make the difference between winning and losing or stalemate. Ultimately, American support for a rich and prosperous NATO alliance cannot be sustained if the American public and Congress see that the basic security condition of Europe can be guaranteed without the United States. If that is the case, it is time for the United States to come home.

The United States military contribution should push the effort over the top. In some cases, this may mean the limited deployment of special capabilities that dramatically enhance and multiply the effectiveness of a European-dominated coalition.[47] For example, the U.S. may wish to deploy intelligence, logistics, air, sea, and specialized combat support units to assist a European effort in out-of-area peacekeeping. In the core missions of NATO, the U.S. may need to dominate the force structure, base its operations on American command and control structures, and take the lead in determining strategy and operations. This was the arrangement in the Persian Gulf War.

One might argue that this distinction robs the United States of a leadership role in day-to-day European events and reserves U.S. influence for some cataclysmic battle for Europe's future. Once again, this presents a narrow reading of the principle of a decisive role and discounts the role that competent American leadership can play in

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[45] Ibid.
[46] Holmes, Kim R., note 517, p 150-154.
[47] Ibid.

Europe. The United States can exercise American leadership in NATO and European security affairs in many ways. American diplomacy, political influence, and economic tools all can be decisive in conflicts outside of a great power threat to Europe.

However, randomly deploying American military forces on peripheral missions in order to "fill out" a European force structure and "preserve American leadership" will erode American support for NATO. It traps the U.S. into having always to "lead" in even the most marginal operations, because European security systems have no other viable alternative. In a recent address to Congress, President Jacques Chirac of France seemed to support this line of reasoning, stating that reform of NATO would "enable the European allies to assume full responsibilities, with the support of NATO facilities, whenever the United States does not wish to engage its ground forces."[48] America leads in NATO because of the conditions that leadership engenders, conditions that must be favourable to the United States. Leadership is not an end in itself.

(3). U.S. Security Policy After 9/11

With the September 11 attacks began with the Fifth War on Afghanistan, the U.S. President George Bush called it a “crusade”. The NATO promptly declared that the 11th September attacks amounted to an armed attack against a member of the Alliance within the ambit of the Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington, 1949, its basic constitution, and that therefore, all other members of the Alliance were entitled/obliged to response as the Alliance might deem fit.

The Bush Doctrine was asserted in the context of the war against global terrorism. It has its roots in the previous anti-terrorist strikes. In the aftermath of the bombing of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar-Es-Salaam in 1998, the United States attacked targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. The missile strikes were justified by the Democratic President Clinton as acts of self-defence, a ‘necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks’.[49] But the Bush Doctrine goes further than endorsing acts to prevent imminent threats. It stipulates that action is justified ‘even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attacks:[50]

> “The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive strikes to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attacks. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.”

Despite invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on September 12, 2001 (an action the United States had not requested), NATO was not involved in major military

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[48] Miller, Stanley, “France’s Chirac Urges Revamped NATO in Address to US Congress”, *The Los Angeles Times*, February, 1996, p. A2.

[49] Report to Congressional Leaders (21 August, 1998), in Murphy, “Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law”, *American Journal of International Law*, 93 (1999), pp. 161-162.

[50] National Security Strategy, Department of State, Washington D.C., 17th September 2002.

operations of Enduring Freedom. Allied Force also the left the same taste in some European capitals, however, because during the war, the United States operated partly under the U.S. flag, outside NATO structures and procedures, and thus completely out of the control of the 18 other nations.[51] It is also clear that European security is of decreasing importance for Washington because the continent is now mostly peaceful whereas nearly all current and projected security challenges are likely to be in the Middle East and Asia.

Much has changed as a result of the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11th September 2001. As an immediate effect, new U.S. priorities superseded peace-keeping operations in the Balkans, and the U.S. began to transfer military assets away from Europe to fight the global war on terror. In 2006, the fight against global terrorism remains the number one priority for America. In this context, the United States is going beyond its traditional alliances - like NATO.

In October 2001, the United States chose a "coalition of the willing" instead of acting within NATO to fight the battle against terrorism in Afghanistan. "The United States had made it clear that, even though it appreciated the alliance's declaration of an Article 5 response, it would conduct military operations itself, with ad hoc coalitions of willing countries… The United States decided not to ask that military operations be conducted through the NATO integrated command structure."[52] NATO's only contribution for this battle against terrorism was its joint-owned Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) fleet. These high value NATO assets were used to help patrol U.S. airspace while the U.S. deployed an equal number of their AWACS jets for use in the air campaign against Taliban forces in Afghanistan.[53] Furthermore, the U.S has called for enhanced European defence and other capabilities to enable the EU member states to better share the global security burden—especially through preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, collecting and sharing intelligence information, and preventing terrorist attacks.

While European Allies had been working to establish an autonomous European Security and Defence Policy within the European Union, the United States had been tugging in the opposite direction, seeking new roles and missions for the Alliance as the NATO enlargement process and NATO enlargement in the Balkans began to wind down. The attacks on September 11, 2001, were a seminal event in this regard, demonstrating that the most important security threats to NATO members, military or otherwise, emanated from outside of Europe and that NATO was poorly equipped to handle them. With offers of military support from NATO allies, the United States found that European allies had little useful to offer. The U.S. rejection of most of the offers ruffled allied feathers and raised questions about the relevance of a military alliance,

[51] Daalder and Honlon, note 494, p. 124.
[52] Sloan, note 488, p.219.
[53] Ibid, p.215. NATO did not send its AWACS jets to Afghanistan because the military operations there were a joint U.S.-British campaign and not a NATO-led operation. Today, EU NATO member states are contributing military forces to the UN-mandated and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) to maintain and support the security in Afghanistan. Several member states are commanding Provincial Reconstruction Teams to support the successful reconstruction of Afghanistan.

where only one member could project significant, high-end, expeditionary military power.[54]

NATO found itself deeply enmeshed in one of the most serious crises in its history, when France, Germany and Belgium vetoed having NATO undertake precautionary planning to provide military assistance to Turkey in the event of an invasion by Iraq.[55] The invasion of Iraq and the defeat of Saddam Hussein proved to be swift and decisive but the mission of Iraq and Middle East remained unaccomplished. Far from enhancing, the Iraq War had damaged collective capabilities of the United States to fashion a robust response to the challenge of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It curtailed civil liberties, hardened sectarian divides, eroded America's moral standing and made the world less safe.

Iraq risked re-legitimising wars of choice as an instrument of unilateral state policy. To argue that military victory bestows legitimacy is to say that might is right, that ends justify the means: two longstanding Western taboos. It also begs the question: Will others politely accept the new U.S. imperial order, or will they begin to arm and align themselves so as not to become tomorrow's Iraq? Few will accept the doctrine that the administration of the day in Washington can decide who is to be which country's leader and who is to be toppled. Nor is Washington noted for urging the abolition of the veto power of the P5 as an obstacle to effective U.N decision-making. Since the end of the Cold War, Washington has wielded the veto most frequently.

Not only were claims to justify the war false; the balance sheet also included the damage caused by the war. First, the casualties: 4000 US soldiers killed and counting. An even greater moral cost than the risks to the lives of one's own soldiers is asking them to kill large numbers of others on the basis of false claims. Is the total casualty one hundred thousand, one million, fewer, or more? What precautions should be taken to ensure that a coalition of the willing does not become the coalition of the killing?[56]

The United States desired to regain the mastery over Europe it had during the peak of the Cold War but it was also determined not to be bound by European desires – or indeed by the overwhelming European public opposition to the war with Iraq. Genuine dialogue or consultation with its NATO allies was out of the question. The Bush Administration, even more than its predecessors, simply did not believe it nor would it accept NATO's formal veto structure; NATO's division on Turkey had nothing to do with it. Washington could have it both ways. Its commitment to aggressive unilateralism was the antithesis of an Alliance system that involved real consultation. France and Germany were far too powerful to be treated as obsequious dependents, and the meeting between the two nations and Belgium was an important step in the direction of

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[54] Schmidt, John R., "Last Alliance Standing? NATO After 9/11", *The Washington Quarterly*, Volume 30, No. 1, Center for Strategic and International Studies, pp. 93-106.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Schwarz, Peter, "Iraq War Splits NATO", *Washington Post*, February 13, 2003.

NATO's break-up and the creation of an autonomous bloc that Washington could not control.[57]

NATO's original raison d'etre for imposing American hegemony – which was to prevent the major European nations from pursuing independent foreign policies – was now the core of the controversy that was raging. Washington could not sustain this grandiose objective because a re-united Germany was far too powerful to be treated as it was a half-century ago, and Germany had its own interests in the Middle East and Asia to protect. The American response to the refusal by Germany, France and Belgium to act under Article 4 of the NATO treaty, to protect Turkey from an Iraqi counter-attack was only a contrived reason for confronting fundamental issues that had simmered for years[58] because that would prejudge the Security Council's decision on war and peace.

The United Nations stood damaged. Many say it failed the test of standing up to a tyrant who had brutalised his own people, terrorised his neighbours and thumbed his nose at the UN for 12 years. Many more say it failed to stand up to the superpower in defence of a country that had been defeated in war, ravaged by sanctions, disarmed and posed no threat to anyone else.

The U.N.-U.S. relationship was badly frayed. Yet they need each other in Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Haiti and elsewhere. A completely plaint UN would indeed become irrelevant, even to the United States.

The post-Cold War activities of the UN reflect a normative agenda that has been especially conducive to the promotion of US values and understandings about world order. Specifically, I look at Security Council-authorized interventions based on an expanding definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security; extensive 'state-building' efforts undertaken in the context of consent-based peace operations; and the broader human rights/democratization/good governance activities of UN agencies. These activities shaped and were shaped by a normative climate that permits ever deeper intrusion in the domestic affairs of states, an agenda that is compatible with expanding US definitions of its own interests, and yet needs the imprint of multilateral legitimacy to escape charges of neo-imperialism.[59]

The US organizes and operates within institutions it can dominate, and resists or opts out of those it discovers it cannot.[60] A more complex set of calculations is involved. In entering into institutional arrangements, leading states seek to 'lock in' other states to

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[57] Kolko, Gabriel, "Iraq, the United States and the End of the European Coalition", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Volume 33, Issue 3, 2003, pp.291 – 298.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Johnston, Ian, "US-UN Relations after Iraq: The End of The World (Order) As We Know It?", *European Journal of International Law*, Vol 15, 2004, pp.813-838.

[60] Ikenberry, J., 'State Power and the Institutional Bargain: American's Ambivalent Economic and Security Multilateralism' in R. Foot, S. N. MacFarlane and M. Mastanduno (eds), US Hegemony and International Organizations (2003), 49 at 50. And Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001).

the rules and policy orientations of the institutions, while at the same time trying to minimize limitations on their own autonomy and discretion.

Ikenberry's model is helpful in explaining the pattern of 'ambivalent engagement' that has characterized US policy towards most post-Second World War international organizations.[61] Shifting power relations and calculations of interest, influenced by reluctance on the part of any participants in the institution to be tied down more than necessary, would explain the precarious nature of the institutional bargain. And it is bound to seem especially precarious in the post-Cold War era, when the bargain is largely between the US and every other state. Because the US dominates the world by almost every conceivable material measure, it is more likely to calculate that it can do better on its own, while other states are more likely to calculate that the institution is not going to provide much protection against US high-handedness.

Trans-Atlantic relations were damaged. When the major European nations objected that the case of war had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, instead of dialogue they got bad-tempered insults. Robin Cook, who resigned from Tony Blair's Cabinet over the war, argued in 2004 that neo-conservatives ideologues 'regard allies not as proof of diplomatic strength but as evidence of military weakness.'[62]

European unity was shaken. The characterisation of old and new Europe was, in fact, quite mistaken. Considering the past, few centuries of European history, France and Germany standing together in resisting war is the new Europe of secular democracies and welfare states, built on peaceful relations embedded in continental institutions. The former Soviet satellites that sided with the United States represented the continuity from the old Europe built on balance of power policies that had led to the world wars.

The U.S. reputation as a responsible global power suffered a serious setback. U.S. soft power was eroded. The problem of U.S. credibility with the Islamic world is acute. Muslims are embittered, sullen and resentful of a perceived assault on Islam. The U.S. credibility as a human rights champion suffered a calamitous collapse with the publication of photographs from Abu Gharib. The abuses were not isolated incidents but reflected a systemic malaise. Washington is yet to regain the moral high ground lost with the pornography of torture.

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[61] Four recent collections of essays discuss this pattern of ambivalent engagement. Patrick, Stewart and Forman, Shepard, *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, USA, 2002, p. 437; Malone, David and Khong, Yuen Foong, *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: International Perspectives*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, CO, USA, 2003; Foot, MacFarlane and Mastanduno, supra note 3; Byers, M. and Nolte, G., *United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. Earlier collections include Maynes, C. W. and Williamson, R., US Foreign Policy and the United Nations System, New York, London, 1996, pp. 108-139; and Karns, Margaret, and Mingst, Karen, *The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence*, Hyman, Unwin, Boston, 1990. The best recent single author study on the US policy towards international organizations is Edward Luck, *Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919–1999*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 1999.

[62] Cook, Robin, "Bush will now celebrate by putting Falluja to the torch: The world is fated to four more years of brutal confrontation", *The Guardian*, 05/11/2004.

The new Democratic President Barack Obama appointed Richard Holbrooke as a special representative to the two interlinked countries that he said constitute "the central front in enduring struggle against terrorism and extremism" - Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pak-Afghan belt turned into a festering threat to international peace and security. Obama emphasized on an integrated U.S. strategy towards those two countries. While pursuing a "surge" of U.S. forces in Afghanistan without clarity on the precise nature and length of the military mission, Obama was seeking to, albeit in more subtle ways, what U.S. policy has traditionally done - prop up the Pakistani state.[63]

Obama's priority was to prevent Pakistan's financial collapse while getting the Pakistani military to stop aiding Al Qaeda and the Talibans. Toward that end, Obama was all set to more than triple non-military aid to a near-bankrupt Pakistan, already one of the three largest recipients of U.S. assistance, but with the military aid currently being three times larger than the economic aid.

Though Afghanistan is the Obama Administration's stated top foreign policy priority, President Obama faces pressure from a number of fronts to redefine U.S. objectives and to retreat from U.S. commitments to Afghanistan's democratic aspirations. Representative John Murtha (D-PA) has likened the mission in Afghanistan to America's protracted engagement in Vietnam.[64] The political left of the Democratic Party, epitomized by groups such as the Progressive Democrats of America, oppose NATO's operations in Afghanistan, claiming the war will be a "quagmire" for the Obama Administration.[65]

Sending 30,000 more U.S. forces into Afghanistan was a losing strategy. In fact, Taliban attacks escalated in 2008, even as the number of NATO and U.S. troops in Afghanistan nearly doubled in the first half of 2008. The Soviet Union, with 100,000 troops couldn't pacify a country that historically has been "the graveyard of empires". Yet Obama embarked on a near-doubling of U.S. troops in Afghanistan to raise the combined U.S., NATO and Allied force level there to 100,000.[66]

The largest surge was intended for a non-military mission - to strike a political deal with the Talibans from a position of strength. U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates, scaling down America's "too broad" objectives, told the Congress that there was not enough "time, patience or money" to pursue ambitious goals in Afghanistan. Obama, ironically, has set out to do in Afghanistan what his predecessors did in Iraq, where a surge was used largely as a show of force to buy off Sunni leaders and local chieftains. Payoffs won't create a stable, more peaceful Afghanistan, a tribal society without the literacy level and middle class of Iraq.

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[63] "Success in Afghanistan lies through Pakistan: Barack Obama's strategy on Pakistan and Afghanistan signals subtle shifts but no fundamental break with failed U.S. policies, thus raising the spectre of Indian security coming under greater pressure", observed by Brahma Chellany in *The Hindu*, 31/01/2009, p.11.

[64] Bendery, Jennifer, "Obama Must Sell Liberals on Afghanistan," *Roll Call*, February 26, 2009.

[65] Deen, Thalif, "Afghanistan, the Next U.S. Quagmire?", Progressive Democrats of America, February 20, 2009, at *http://pdamerica.org/articles/news/2009-02-20-12-29-01-news.php* (March 19, 2009).

[66] Brahma Chellany, note 544.

Obama needs to face up to a stark truth: the war in Afghanistan can only be won in Pakistan, whose military establishment fathered the Taliban and still provides sanctuary, the intelligence and material support to that Islamic militia. In fact, the Pakistani military, through its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, has exploited Afghanistan's special status as the global poppy hub to fashion the instrument of narco-terrorism. The proceeds from the $300-million-a-year drug trade, routed through Pakistani territory, fund the Talibans and several Pakistani-based terror groups like the Laskar-e-Taiba, Jaish-I-Muhammad, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Maktab al-Khidamat and Hizb ul-Tahrir.

Pakistan was also Al Qaeda's world headquarters. But while Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other Al Qaeda leaders operated out of mountain caves along Pakistan's Afghan border, the presence of the Talibans and other Pakistani-nurtured militants is more open on Pakistani soils. As the then Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry puts it bluntly, "a single country has become ground zero for the terrorist threat we face. The consensus among our intelligence agencies is that top Al Qaeda leaders are plotting their next attack from Pakistan, where the prevalence of religious extremists and nuclear weapons makes that country the central, crucial front in our struggle to protect America from terrorism".[67]

Without its jihad culture being unravelled, there is a potent risk of Pakistan sliding from narco-terrorism to nuclear terrorism. Diminishing that risk demands that the Pakistani government be encouraged by the United States to assert the civilian control over the military, intelligence and nuclear establishments. A.Q. Khan, who masterminded an international nuclear-smuggling ring for 16 long years with military connivance, including the provision of military transport aircraft, has still not been allowed to be questioned by international investigators.

Obama identified Pakistan as a critical factor months ago when he advocated direct U.S. action there, including cross-border hot pursuit, if Pakistani security forces failed to play their role. But it will be difficult for him to reverse the long-standing U.S. policy of building up the Pakistani military as that's country's pivot. Since the time, Pakistan was co-opted into the U.S.-led Cold War military alliances, successive U.S. administrations have valued the Pakistani military for promotion of regional interests, to the extent that the CIA helped train and fatten the ISI. The CIA-ISI ties remain cosy.[68]

Some delicate shifts in the U.S. policy are under way. For one, the new Democratic administration, in keeping with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's pledge during her Senate confirmation hearing, has set out to "condition" further U.S. military aid to concrete Pakistani steps to evict foreign fighters and shut down Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries**.**

[67] Senator John Kerry's Confirmation Hearing Statement, Council on Foreign Relations, 24th January, 2013.
[68] Brahma Chellany, note 544.

In an operation 35 miles north of the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, U.S. Navy SEALs killed Saudi terrorist financier Osama bin Laden.[69] This victory is a testament to the tireless efforts of our brave men and women in uniform. Their momentous achievement shows why when it comes to capturing and killing terrorists, targeted counterterrorism measures often prove more effective than expansive counterinsurgency campaigns.

With bin Laden's death, the United States closes a long chapter of its "War on Terror." Yet given America's large-scale, long-term nation-building mission in Afghanistan, another chapter remains unfinished. The day after President Barack Obama announced bin Laden's death, NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in a statement congratulating the United States for the operation against bin Laden, reiterated NATO's intent to continue with its nearly decade-long mission, with its ostensible goal of denying terrorists a safe haven in Afghanistan ever again.[70]

NATO and the U.S. need to re-think the mission — for several reasons. First, while some policymakers claim the war in Afghanistan is worth waging because terrorists flourish in failed states, this theory cannot account for the terrorists who thrive in states with the military power to resist external interference. That bin Laden was found in Pakistan highlights this fact. After all, even in the unlikely event that America and its allies did forge a stable Afghanistan, the fewer than 100 al Qaeda fighters currently believed to be in that country could simply relocate to other regions of the world.[71] Moreover, as far as we know, the Al Qaeda movement has cells not only in Pakistan, but also in Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa, and, at one point, Germany, Spain, and even Florida.

Second, remaining in Afghanistan presents a bigger threat to American interests than al Qaeda itself can pose. Amassing troops there has fed the perception of a foreign occupation of Muslim land, and spawned terrorist recruits in that country and elsewhere. Following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, no one could have imagined that the United States would go from punishing al Qaeda and the Taliban to ten years later mandating the number of women who can serve in the Afghan parliament. Luckily, American security does not depend on us transforming what is a deeply divided and poverty-stricken society into a self-sufficient, non-corrupt, stable electoral democracy.[72]

Third, Afghanistan's landlocked position in Central Asia will forever render it vulnerable to meddling from surrounding states. The clash of strategic interests not just between the United States and Pakistan, but also among other competing regional powers, shows, to quote America's new CIA director, General David Petraeus, that "while the security progress achieved over the past year is significant, it is also fragile and

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[69] Innocent, Malou, "With bin Laden's Death, America Must Recalibrate Its Policies", *The Daily Caller*, 03/05/2011.
[70] Goldman, Julianna, "Bin Laden Killing by U.S. Forces Praised as Officials Ready for Reprisals", *Bloomberg*, 02/05/2011.
[71] Innocenty, Malou, note 550.
[72] Ibid.

reversible." Under such conditions, Washington's periodic troop surges, increased development aid, and Predator drone strikes will fail to translate into anything more than limited gains on the ground.[73]

For another, the U.S. was to unveil a huge jump in non-military aid to Pakistan. The administration was pushing for the early passage of the pending bill, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, which Obama, Vice President Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton had co-sponsored with eight other legislators in July 2008. The legislation was partnership-boosting measure to channel greater U.S. aid for Pakistan's humanitarian and development needs. It also sought to tie future U.S. military aid to a certification by the Secretary of State to Congress that the Pakistani military was making "concrete efforts" to undermine Al Qaeda and the Taliban. But given the troop surge, the new land-transit deals with Russia and Central Asian states would not significantly cut America's logistics dependence on Pakistan, which also provided intelligence to the U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

Also, the new administration seemed confused over whether Afghanistan or Pakistan ought to be priority no.1. Biden, an early supporter of the surge, contended that the United States must focus on securing Afghanistan because "if Afghanistan fails, Pakistan could follow". He was wrong. With the war now years old, the time when a surge could work already passed. The United States could never win in Afghanistan without dismantling Pakistani military's sanctuaries and sustenance infrastructure for Taliban. Indeed, the real problem is not at the Pakistani frontiers with Afghanistan (and India). Rather it is the sanctuaries deep inside Pakistan that continue to breed and export terrorism. The U.S. military cannot directly achieve in Afghanistan what high pressure American diplomacy can deliver on that front through Pakistan.

While insisting that the primary goal of the new Afghan strategy be narrow, President Obama has actually widened the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and the region. He runs the risk of getting into a political and military quagmire. He insists that the terror syndicate was "actively planning attacks on the homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan". He said: "We have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat the Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That's the goal that must be achieved".

The hyped-up new U.S. strategy - "stronger, smarter and comprehensive" - is essentially based on nine different postulates. One, there is a fundamental connection between the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Two, the Al Qaeda poses an existential threat to Pakistan. Three, Pakistan's ability to meet the Al Qaeda threat is tied to its own strength and security. Four, Pakistan needs U.S. help but must be made accountable while receiving it. Five, the Taliban's gains in Afghanistan must be reversed and a more capable and accountable Afghan government needs to be promoted. Six, the "surge" should have both military and civilian components and they need to be integrated. Seven, the requisite of enduring peace is that there should be reconciliation among former enemies. Eight, the Al Qaeda can be isolated and targeted on the pattern of the

[73] Ibid.

“Sunni Awakening” process successfully undertaken in Iraq. And finally, international participation is necessary, especially NATO’s.

How adequate is the present U.S. Afghan strategy in coping with these postulates? First, President Obama recognises the obvious truth that Pakistan is the key problem and, therefore, has to be an “AfPak” approach. But he outlined few new options for dealing with Pakistan. The strategy envisages massive U.S. economic (and military) assistance to Pakistan and the world community’s active engagement of it. That is as far as it goes. However, the Pakistani leadership is very fragmented and no single source of power is in charge or has a vision of how to bring FATA into the mainstream. The military too seems increasingly lacking the capacity or will (or both) to provide leadership. Within the military, the sympathy for the Taliban and the resentment towards the United States are substantial. Besides, the cauldron of “anti-Americanism” in the Pakistani opinion is overflowing.

Washington seems to expect that the leverage of aid and the incumbent Army chief and the President will balance out its loss of influence. But the critical question remains - the U.S. ability to reshape the attitude of the Pakistan government and the military. To be sure, that also involves a cultural change which is going to take time. Unsurprisingly, the reception to Obama’s proposals has been lukewarm in Pakistan. The pervasive opinion seems to be that it is the American presence in the region that is causing violence. Of course, this does not mean increased American aid is unwelcome but ultimately, Pakistan has to do its own thinking. The dilemma explains why Obama has probably not shown his hand yet on Pakistan.

Secondly, the “Afghanisation” of the war, as outline by Obama involves the creation of a large, disciplined, well-trained Afghan army of 1,34,000 men and police force of 82,000 by 2011. Building national security institutions papering over ethnic fault lines is not easy. Also, the challenge of sustaining such numbers is acute. Again, the new strategy involves the U.S. dispatching hundreds of additional diplomats and experts to Afghanistan. What they are expected to achieve in the present climate of violence and anarchy is debatable.

Thirdly, while stressing the need for “reconciliation among former enemies”, Obama outlined a process similar to what the United States pursued in Iraq, namely, to “isolate and target [the] Al Qaeda”, while reaching out to adversaries. The idea is to distinguish between “an uncompromising core” of the Taliban, which must be defeated through the use of force, and those who may have taken up arms for a variety of local reasons. The strategy aims at working with the latter elements and building around them a reconciliation process in every province.

The U.S. strategy emphasises a regional approach. But what does it entail? At its core lies NATO’s pivotal role. The United States expects its NATO partners to play a supporting role by deploying troops and offering financial and technical assistance. Washington hopes that the NATO partners will rally around the U.S. leadership role. Around this first circle of the United States and its Western Allies, Washington hopes to

gather under a United Nations umbrella - “Contact Group” - non-NATO allies and regional players like Russia, China, India, Iran and the Central Asian states and countries of the Persian Gulf.

In other words, Obama’s “regional policy” means the United States intends to pursue its new Afghan strategy, while other countries will be offered the historic opportunity to help Washington achieve its objective. Arguably, other countries, especially regional players, are bound to wonder of this does not smack of the U.S. unilateralism.

The United States and its allies have been infusing troops, weapons and authority into Afghanistan for more than 11 years to shackle Taliban extremists and uproot Al Qaeda’s bases for waging war against the West. Winding down the mission will be swifter but riddled with risk and complications.

Obama indicated that the withdrawal of 66,000 U.S. troops would be front-loaded, with more than half leaving within the year. Other major troop-contributing nations have already curtailed combat operations and begun their own departures.[74] But the strategic advances accomplished by the post-9/11 war have been limited and in few instances immune from reversal. As the Pentagon and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization draft plans for the pullout, there is concern that equipment convoys will be vulnerable to insurgent ambush, that Afghanistan’s police and soldiers won’t be ready to protect their own country and that the fragile government and institutions may be unable to withstand assault by extremists bent on once again dividing Afghans by rekindling ethnic, tribal and religious conflicts.

The impending withdrawal isn’t the result of the mission to defeat global terrorism having been accomplished. Rather, the U.S. decision to leave Afghanistan is driven by Americans’ fatigue with foreign wars and their staggering cost in blood and treasure. And while the incremental structure of the drawdown is intended to allow its architects to refine logistical details as they go, the political imperative to decamp is unlikely to be eroded by the predictable setbacks.

The Alliance remains vital to American security, and its effectiveness as an institution deserves our continued focus and attention. But, needless to say, that focus has changed. Europe has changed. The world has changed. And when the allies met in Chicago to discuss its future in Afghanistan and elsewhere in May 2012, a lot of that redefining was on the table. John Kerry believed that NATO is a fundamental element of American national security, and its organization demands critical analysis in order to meet the evolving threats of American national security.[75]

One thing is pretty clear about NATO – it has already confounded its skeptics. From Bosnia to Kosovo, from Afghanistan to Libya, the Alliance has demonstrated an ability

[74] Williams, Carol J., War's wind-down fraught with risk for troops, Afghans, *Los Angeles Times*, 15/02/2013.
[75] Kerry Statement Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on NATO: the Chicago Summit and Beyond, 10th May, 2012.

to adapt to the post-Cold War security environment. Obviously, the United States had their challenges in both Afghanistan and Libya, but they have learned from them.[76]

The signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement by President Obama in May 2012 signaled the gradual transition from a war-fighting posture to a supportive role.[77] And NATO's commitment to the people of Libya in the past year has shown that the Alliance – properly leveraged – is still a very highly responsive, capable, and legitimate tool when it really matters.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition – comprised of 90,000 U.S. troops serving alongside 36,000 troops from NATO Allies and 5,300 from partner countries – has made significant progress in preventing the country from serving as a safe haven for terrorists and ensuring that Afghans are able to provide for their own security, both of which are necessary conditions to fulfill the resident's goal to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda. At Chicago, the U.S. anticipates three deliverables: an agreement on an interim milestone in 2013 when ISAF's mission will shift from combat to support for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); an agreement on the size, cost and sustainment of the ANSF beyond 2014; and a roadmap for NATO's post-2014 role in Afghanistan.[78]

The Chicago Summit made it clear that NATO will not abandon Afghanistan after the ISAF mission concludes. The Alliance reaffirmed its enduring commitment beyond 2014 and defined a new phase of cooperation with Afghanistan. Last week, President Obama and President Karzai signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement, which demonstrates U.S. commitment to the long-term stability and security of Afghanistan.

Senator Jeane Shaheen, a Democrat from New Hampshire who is Chair of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, acknowledged the problems that NATO continues to face in Afghanistan with civilian casualties and public relations mistakes, and warned that the Alliance would need to define better the country's security transition by the time of the summit in May.

The threat that is driving U.S. (and NATO) missile defense efforts originates from the Middle East, primarily from Iran. In 2007, the Bush Administration proposed creating a "Third Site" in Europe consisting of 10 long range mid-course interceptors in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic. The Obama Administration replaced that plan with a more flexible and responsive plan called the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). EPAA is based on the SM-3 interceptor, deployed in four phases through 2020, on land and at sea. Throughout all four phases, increasingly-capable versions of the SM-3 will be introduced. The EPAA is designed to adapt in response to the evolution of the ballistic missile threat and BMD technology.

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[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.

The United States plans to make the EPAA its national contribution to the NATO missile defense plan. The United States is not alone fielding the capabilities or in bearing the costs for missile defense in Europe. There is a strong consensus in the Alliance in support of a NATO-wide territorial missile defense capability, in addition to its already agreed position of defending deployed troops against missile threats. Getting this expanded consensus has been a political and technical achievement.

The NATO Strategic Concept, agreed at the Lisbon summit, contains a carefully worked out compromise on the role of nuclear deterrence in Europe. On the one hand it stated that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance, and that NATO will retain the appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional weapons. On the other hand, it stated that NATO's broad goal is to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons and to create the conditions for a non-nuclear world. To square this circle, it agreed that nations would not take unilateral action to withdraw nuclear assets and that in negotiating future nuclear reductions the aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase nuclear transparency and to relocate their weapons away from NATO territory.

This puts the focus in the right place. The nuclear problem in Europe is Russia. They have ten times the non-strategic nuclear weapons that NATO has in Europe. The Russian doctrine is first use. And they have used nuclear weapons to intimidate their neighbours. But they have refused to talk about either non-strategic nuclear weapons transparency or reductions. An agreement on missile defense cooperation could change their attitude.

But several European countries, with Germany in the lead, have sought to modify that NATO consensus. They have concerns about the safety of US nuclear weapons on their soil. And so those nations initiated a Deterrence and Defense Posture review, which has recently been completed. That so-called DDPR assessed NATO's conventional, nuclear, and BMD capabilities. The main protagonists were the Germans and the French. The U.S. interest here is to retain the Strategic Concept consensus and to put the burden of nuclear reductions in Europe where it belongs, on Russia.

The U.S. sought to bring NATO's declaratory policy for nuclear use closer to that of the United States. U.S. declaratory policy has a so-called "negative security assurance" which says it will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states who are a party to the Non Proliferation Treaty, with a possible reconsideration of this policy if biological weapons are used against the U.S., France and the United Kingdom have their own declaratory policies. Several nations sought to exclude discussion of declaratory policies from the DDPR.

Although the news on NATO has become increasingly bleaker in the run-up to the Chicago summit, U.S. politicians and former policymakers were not calling for any sea changes for the Alliance during their remarks at an Atlantic Council event on March 20th, 2012 in Washington, DC.[79]

[79] 'NATO in a New Era: A Congressional Event on the NATO 2012 Chicago Summit', North Atlantic Council, March 20, 2012.

Senators Jeanne Shaheen and John McCain headlined the event titled: “NATO in a New Era: A Congressional Event on the NATO 2012 Chicago Summit”. Senator Shaheen, a Democrat from New Hampshire who is Chair of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, acknowledged the problems that NATO continues to face in Afghanistan with civilian casualties and public relations mistakes, and warned that the Alliance would need to define better the country’s security transition by the time of the summit in May. Senator McCain, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and former Republican presidential candidate from Arizona, called for sustaining a US presence in the long-term through reaching a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the Afghan government that would include keeping US special operations units in the country past 2014.[80]

Senator McCain lamented that the topics of further NATO expansion and Syria would not be on the summit’s agenda, and dramatically chided the United States and the rest of the Alliance for not intervening in the Syrian crisis.[81]

In the first panel session, which focused on NATO in a ‘globalized world’, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that she was pleased with how Secretary General Anders-Fogh Rasmussen used the Group of Experts’ recommendations for input into the last revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept in 2010. She said that the flexibility of the New Strategic Concept would help the Alliance to adapt to new global challenges. Former Navy secretary and Senator John Warner criticized the discussions over US defense plans as over-emphasizing the strategic shift toward the Pacific and Asia, and added that the United States should reinforce relationships with its old allies during times of rapid change.[82]

Dr. Albright expressed more caution than Sen. McCain over whether the Alliance should become involved in Syria, and warned that the crisis poses a different set of challenges when compared to Libya. Warner said that NATO should rely on Turkey for more help and direction in dealing with Syria, similar to the way he thought that the Alliance benefited from French and British leadership on the Libyan intervention.[83]

The Chicago Summit provided allied leaders an opportunity to demonstrate that the transatlantic relationship remains vibrant in the face of economic constraints and that the Alliance is implementing a sustainable strategy for transition in Afghanistan and addressing emerging threats. European governments could answer U.S. concerns about diminishing military capabilities by making a sustained commitment to Smart Defense and other initiatives needed to realize a credible and effective NATO military posture for 2020.

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[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid.

The U.S. Congress has played an important role in guiding U.S. policy toward NATO and in shaping NATO's post-Cold War evolution. Members of the 112th Congress have expressed interest in each of the key agenda items to be discussed in Chicago and, to varying degrees, have called on the Obama Administration to advance specific policy proposals at the Summit.

Proposed companion legislation in the House and the Senate—The NATO Enhancement Act of 2012 (S. 2177 and H.R. 4243)—endorses NATO enlargement to the Balkans and Georgia, reaffirms NATO's role as a nuclear alliance, and calls on the U.S. Administration to seek further allied contributions to a NATO territorial missile defense capability, and to urge NATO allies to develop critical military capabilities. Other Members of Congress have also called on the U.S. Administration and NATO to enhance efforts to bring Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and Montenegro into the alliance.[84]

Beyond the formal agenda in Chicago, leaders would repair a growing rift within the Atlantic Alliance. Over the last several years, the credibility of NATO has been threatened by the debt crisis and major cuts in defense spending. The crisis has weakened Europe's military capabilities, sapped its ambitions for global leadership, and called into question US leadership in Europe and within the Alliance. The decline in European defense capabilities has grown so severe that outgoing U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned of a 'dim if not dismal' future for NATO if allies fail to act.

An Alliance adrift would be an historic strategic setback for the United States and its Atlantic allies. For all its shortcomings, NATO remains home to the United States' most capable and willing allies. The Alliance is the glue that binds the United States, Canada, and Europe into the greatest community of shared values, democratic governance, and prosperity on the planet. A stronger, more ambitious, and more united transatlantic partnership will be essential in shaping a future in which the West accounts for a relatively smaller share of the world economy, population, and military might. For the United States to achieve its international aims in a competitive world, it needs a strong, capable, and ambitious Europe.

Fortunately for the United States and its Atlantic allies, a dismal future for the Alliance is not foreordained. For NATO to build a better future, the United States will have to demonstrate strong leadership of the Alliance, Europe will have to maintain its global ambitions, and the Alliance will have to strengthen its engagement with global powers.

Strong US leadership has been a crucial element of Europe's peace and prosperity since the Second World War. This formula will remain relevant to the revitalization of the Alliance. Unfortunately, many in the United States today view Europe as passé given the emergence of China and other Asian powers. This perspective blatantly ignores the fact that our European allies serve as a force multiplier for US foreign policy initiatives

[84] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, "NATO: The Chicago Summit and Beyond," April 26, 2012; Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing: "NATO: Chicago and Beyond," May 10, 2012.

worldwide. Afghanistan serves as a primary example, where Europe has 40,000 troops fighting alongside their US counterparts. If the United States withdraws from Europe and turns away from its primary allies, it will likely find Europe less willing and able to assist the United States in achieving its foreign policy priorities. As the United States draws down it forces stationed in Europe and begins to end over a decade of continuous NATO operations, the US military must redouble its effort to train and exercise with allied forces to preserve their ability to fight together.

But US leadership of the Alliance is no substitute for European political ambition. While all allies have a responsibility to strengthen NATO, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Turkey in particular will play key roles in determining whether Europe remains Washington's top global partner. France will need to continue the path initiated by the then President Nicolas Sarkozy that views cooperation with the United States and within NATO, rather than competition with the United States, as the best means to enhance France's influence. The United Kingdom – America's closest and most stalwart ally – will have to maintain the ambition and make the investments in defense necessary to preserve its 'special relationship' with Washington. Germany would show the same level of ambition to influence global events that it shows in its economic leadership of the Eurozone crisis.

Democrats and Republicans alike have an interest in a strong NATO and renew America's security and standing in the world through a new era of American leadership. One would hope both sides would work hard to maintain the bipartisan support that has backstopped this alliance throughout its history.