CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

NATO's first 50 years proved to be momentous in the history of the Alliance. When the Cold War ended in 1990, NATO Allies shared one fundamental conviction: Europe could not grow together as long as the main institutions remained closed to the Eastern half of the continent. Not to offer Eastern neighbours the prospects of joining NATO and the European Union (E.U.) would have amounted to the continuation of an implicit division of Europe - a division between a self-confident, secure West, and an uncertain, insecure East. The enlargement of NATO was thus both necessary and inevitable. Then there were new issues - international terrorism and the threat of proliferation of WMDs.

For 40 years, during the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were two military alliances confronting each other, often ignoring the U.N. in their respective fields of operation. In U.N. circles, where members were struggling to put a cap on arms expenditures and urging disarmament, the two military alliances were often seen as significant parts of the problem rather than contributors to the solution.

Wartime alliances rarely survive the enemy's defeat, and in that sense NATO is already something of an anomaly. Its members remain committed to mutual defense even though the threat that brought them together has vanished, and they are trying to sustain a high level of policy coordination even though their interests and goals are gradually diverging. NATO has redefined its mission and is in the process of taking on new members, a process that has been strongly endorsed by the U.S. Congress and the American people.

These events would seem to cast doubt on any gloomy prognosis for NATO. If the divisive forces described above are present and growing, then what explains the persistence of the transatlantic ideal, and especially America's willingness to maintain or expand its world-girdling array of security commitments? I believe four factors are responsible.

First, the end of the Cold War left the United States in an unprecedented position of pre-eminence. Victorious great powers typically try to mold post-war worlds to suit their own interests and ideals, and the United States is not the sort of country that would pass up such an opportunity. Not every foreign policy elite gets a chance to remake the world in its own image, and the energetic internationalists in the Clinton administration have been especially vulnerable to this temptation. The American government likes themselves that they are the "indispensable nation"--to use Madeleine Albright's self-flattering phrase--and it even seems appropriate when the U.S. economy is strong and when the enormous military establishment acquired during the Cold War is at the disposal of our leadership.

Second, the United States is able to extend these new commitments because other states are only too happy to keep free-riding on American protection. Why should the Europeans do the heavy lifting when Uncle Sam is still willing to do most of the work? Why wouldn't Poland or Hungary want the prospect of U.S. protection, even if it is a guarantee that the US don't really want to honor? The United States remains Europe's ideal ally, not least because they are an ocean away and do not threaten to dominate it. Although the US allies resent the high-handedness of the US and seek to rein in US impulsive excesses, for the most part they have been letting us have our way.

Third, keeping NATO together made good sense in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, if only because it was unclear how events in the former Soviet Union were going to evolve. We could not be certain that Russia would not get back on its feet and once again pose a direct threat to Europe, so keeping the alliance together was the prudent course until Russia's eclipse was unmistakable.

Finally, the Atlantic Alliance is heavily institutionalized, and no organization goes out of business quickly or willingly. Having been in business for more than four decades, NATO is now buttressed by a large formal bureaucracy and by an extensive transatlantic cadre of former NATO officials, defense intellectuals, military officers, and journalists, all of whose professional lives have been devoted to preserving the “Atlantic community”. Ending the alliance would remove their main professional preoccupation and call a halt to the endless series of conferences that these elites have long enjoyed. It is therefore not surprising that they resist any hint that NATO is beginning to dissolve, or that they have laboured hard to devise new ways of keeping it busy.

Given these four factors, one can envision an optimistic scenario in which the transatlantic partnership holds together and gradually expands, peace deepens, and prosperity grows. In this scenario, NATO may not have to actually do much of anything, so nobody in the United States minds and everything remains tranquil. This is precisely the vision that the Clinton administration has been counting on: expansion prevents conflict throughout Europe, and the United States never has to pay any real costs at all.

Unfortunately, this scenario is unlikely to weather the challenges that lie ahead. NATO’s eastward expansion will provide new opportunities for disputes within the alliance, and we can expect to see repeated quarrels over how far and how fast to expand, and over who will bear the costs and risks of these new responsibilities. If the U.S. economy slows or goes into recession—as it eventually will--support for overseas commitments is likely to shrink sharply. And when one of these commitments eventually costs U.S. lives--as one did in Somalia--skeptics will be quick to ask whether U.S. vital interests are really at stake.

Most importantly, the passage of time will bring European and American differences into sharper relief. Consider the implications of China's continued rise. If China does emerge as a true great power in the next century, the United States is likely to take steps to contain its influence. Such a policy will require allies in Asia and the Pacific; but the Europeans are both less interested in this problem and have less to contribute to

solving it. (Indeed, a revitalized Russia would be a more useful ally against a rising China, which is a good reason why the United States should not humiliate Moscow by expanding NATO ever eastward.)

The China example illustrates the fundamental problem once again: shorn of an overarching threat to compel Western unity, the United States and its European partners have less and less reason to agree. Although they retain certain common interests and will continue to cooperate on some issues, consensus will be neither as significant nor as automatic as it was in the past.

These were the heady ingredients of the changing international milieu NATO lived through. This raises the important questions: What energised NATO to grow, more than survive, and change? The hypotheses are tested through an examination of the factors that gave rise to NATO.

The first substantive chapter in this study, **Chapter 2**, examines the origin of NATO. The forcible installation of Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe, territorial demands by the Soviets, and their support of guerrilla war in Greece appeared to many as the first steps of World War III. The Berlin blockade that began in March 1948 led to negotiations between Western Europe, Canada, and the United States that resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty. Cold War challenges dealt in **Chapter 3** are studied in terms of three timelines: (1). Challenges before Warsaw (1949-1955), (2). Challenges After Warsaw (1955-1979) and the Second Cold War (1979-1989).

Until 1950 NATO consisted primarily of a pledge by the United States to aid its members under the terms of Article 5 of the treaty. There was no effective machinery, however, for implementation of this pledge. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 convinced the allies that the Soviets might act against a divided Germany. The result was not only the creation of a military command system, but also the expansion of the organization. In 1952 Greece and Turkey joined the alliance, and in 1955 West Germany was accepted under a complicated arrangement whereby Germany would not be allowed to manufacture nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. In its first decade NATO was mainly a military organization dependent on U.S. power for security and for the revival of Europe's economy and polity.

Post-Cold War NATO's search for identity is dealt with in **Chapter 4**. It is divided into three parts: (1). Disappearance of the Soviet Union, (2).New Challenges and (3). Evolution of New Framework. NATO was created for defensive purposes. It's collective enemy - the Soviet bloc - has vanished and therefore, NATO's 'life expectancy' has, by many, been expected to be limited as well. The impact of disappearance of the Soviet Union have rise to a choice between two options - to wind itself up because the Cold War disappeared or to find a new rationale to reorient itself into a new organism with new objective to changed international scenario. And NATO chose the second option because it is called upon by the United States to take over security aspects of 'New World Order' as proclaimed by the U.S. President George Bush Senior. However, the Atlantic partnership has proven to be more adaptable to the changing international

environment than anticipated. Its' anachronistic appeal put NATO on the spot in justifying its' continual existence. NATO experienced a transition towards a global security agency with worldwide reach and influence. When suddenly, it found in the early 1990s the Soviet threats ceased to exist, the Atlantic alliance went on a search to redefine itself. And its new role in the "New World Order" dominated by only one super power. And a search for a new enemy too? The security policy of the United States changed since 1990, and certainly since 9/11 terrorist attacks. Were the changes that the NATO underwent logically related to these changes in the US policy? Both had to identify new threats or potential threats in the international arena. Could they justifiably perceive powerful rivals in China and India, and indeed the new amorphous punching bag of "rogue states"? NATO also needed to ensure most immediately the dismantling of the 'abandoned' nuclear warheads in the former Soviet bloc countries – a present material threat.

Even before the avalanche of events in Eastern Europe culminated in the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, speculation began on how to replace the alliance arrangements with a new European architecture. The post-Cold War era would need a system to ensure security through mechanisms for crisis-management and conflict-prevention, bolstered by potential enforcement action and a procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Stability might be assured so long as the major powers accepted the system as a legitimate framework of international order. It would not be easy to adapt security institutions to a Europe no longer divided.

The operational roles of the Alliance in relation to peace-keeping and peace-support are the subject of **Chapter IV Part II 'New Challenges',** which examines the implementation of Alliance decisions with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, and the mission in Darfur, Sudan. The mid-1990s proved that in fact, there is an even greater need for the maintenance of highly trained troops capable of peacekeeping duty, whether through NATO or the United Nations. Of direct concern to NATO is the instability along the frontiers of Europe, particularly in the Balkans. NATO has had to repeatedly intervene in the area in order to promote its agenda for peace. By the time NATO could calmly sit down and reassess the world situation, wars flared up even by the middle of 1990. The Alliance defined a new strategic concept, embarked on intensive partnerships with other countries, including former adversaries and embraced new member countries, joined US in its war with Iraq, and then in Yugoslavia, which exploded at the death of Tito. In addition, and for the first time, NATO undertook peacekeeping tasks in areas of conflict outside the Alliance, opening the way for a lead role in multinational crisis-management operations and extensive cooperative arrangements with other organisations.

In **Chapter IV Part III 'Evolution of New Framework'**, NATO underwent a series of reforms and reorganisations during the first forty years (1949-89) of its existence, designed to adapt it to the occasional opportunities that presented themselves to move beyond Cold War constraints in order to place the security of member countries on a more positive and stable foundation. In a relatively short period of time since the end of the Cold War, the alliance has been in the midst of an identity crisis, and had to

undergo a process of much more fundamental transformation, adapting to changes in the security environment of a scope and intensity. Following the dissolution of the USSR, NATO sought to strengthen relations with the newly independent nations that had formerly made up the USSR and with other Central and Eastern European countries that belonged to the Warsaw Pact. NATO's structures would have to be adjusted to reflect the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe and German unification. This triggered a strategic re-evaluation of NATO's purpose, nature and tasks.

Chapter V deals with American leadership in establishing NATO as a military alliance to secure European security during the Cold War and on how the U.S. uses NATO with the changing security environment i.e. with the disappearance of the Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War. Clearly, NATO was viewed as a tool for ensuring the U.S. security guarantee against any interference in the Western Hemisphere. The 1941 Pearl Harbour attack and forcible installation of governments by the Soviets in Europe made the United States to take necessary steps to preserve democracy and freedom.

The Wilsonian ideal of an international order based on a common devotion to democratic institutions and settling its disputes by negotiations rather than war has triumphed among the nations bordering the North Atlantic. The governments are democratic and the label "democracy" denotes genuinely pluralistic states with regular and peaceful alternation of parties in office. This is in contrasts to much of the rest of the world where the word is often invoked to legitimise whoever is in power and where changes in government occur, if at all, by coups or coup-like procedures. In the Atlantic area, was is no longer accepted as an instrument of policy; in the past half-century, force has been used only at the fringes of Europe and between ethnic groups, not between traditional nation-states.

This is why, for half a century, the partnership of nations bordering the North Atlantic has served as the keystone of American foreign policy. Even after the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the Atlantic partnership has remained for the United States the crucial buttress of international order. Beyond the definition of mutual defence of a traditional alliance, the nations of the North Atlantic have evolved a web of consultations and relationships to affirm and achieve a common political destiny. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, American assistance staved off Europe's economic collapse. And when the Soviet Union became threatening, NATO was called into being. Its' military arm has been an integrated military command; its permanent Council of ambassadors has coordinated allied diplomacy. More recently, globalisation has deepened economic ties to a point where investments by the two sides in each other have linked the well-being of North America and Europe in a nearly inextricable manner.

The end of the Cold War redefined the relationship between NATO and Russia. On the one side, NATO has been able to transform its raison d'être by shifting from an organization solely providing collective defence to an organization proactive in the area of collective security. NATO, initially designed to protect the Euro-Atlantic area from a Soviet attack, evolved into an alliance promoting security in Europe, but also beyond. On the other hand, Russia has been seeking a new identity since 1991. The direct

aftermath of the Cold War was a clear period of domestic turmoil ending with the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000. Since 2000, Mr. Putin's primary mission has been to bring Russia back to its great power status by reasserting its influence over neighbouring states and beyond.[1]

The status of the relationship has remained one of the most pressing issues for both actors. Andres Fogh Rasmussen made his first speech as the new Secretary General (SG) in 2009 on this very topic: NATO and Russia. Secretary General Rasmussen believes that good relations between the two actors would not only contribute to better European security, but to improved global security.[2] In the late 1990s David Yost wrote, "no issue is more central to the Alliance's goal of building a peaceful political order in Europe than relations with Russia."[3] The core members of the Alliance see Russia as the missing piece of the puzzle in order to stabilize and "westernize" the European continent completely. On the other hand, Russia views the European continent as still an area where Russian influence can be increased and maintained.

The broader question regarding the relations between NATO and Russia concerns relations between Russia and the members of the Euro-Atlantic community. NATO and Russia have had a troubled relationship for historical, cultural, strategic, and political reasons. Is NATO the appropriate platform for strengthening cooperation and security on the European continent and beyond? Can NATO overcome the internal strategic divisions among its members on dealing with Russia? Is Russia willing to cooperate fully with the members of the Euro-Atlantic community through NATO?[4]

The Georgia invasion of 2008 was also a major wake-up call for the Euro-Atlantic community, since it was an obvious reaction to Western recognition of Kosovo and the commitment of the United States and others in NATO to grant membership to Ukraine and Georgia. The invasion was a clear statement by Moscow that Russia remains a powerful actor and "wants the West to accept that the post-Soviet space is part of a Russian sphere of influence."[5] This latter point was made most explicit in a speech by

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1 Among the most perceptive analyses of Russian foreign policy have been Andrei Tsygankov, Bobo Lo and Dimitri Trenin; See Tsygankov, Andrei, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, Lanham, MD, Rowan and Littlefield, 2nd edition, 2010; Lo, Bobo, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*, New York, Wiley, John & Sons, 2003; Trenin, Dimitri, Getting Russia Right, Washington, Carnegie Foundation, 2007.

2 Rasmussen, Andres Fogh, "A New Beginning for NATO and Russia", Project Syndicate, 20 October 2010.

3 Yost, David, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, p. 131.

4 Kanet, Roger E. and Larive, Maxime Henri Andre, NATO and Russia: A New Perpetual New Beginning, *Perceptions*, Spring 2012, Vol XVII, Number 1, pp.75-96.

5 Larrabee, Stephen, "Russia, Ukraine, Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2010), p. 34

President Medvedev soon after the war in Georgia, when he referred to post-Soviet space as an area of Russia's "privilege interests".[6]

During the Bush administration from 2000 to 2008, NATO had an "open door policy." The colour revolutions of 2003-3005 in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia led NATO to talk about including Ukraine and Georgia within the Alliance, despite Moscow's strongly voiced opposition. In Putin's words, the enlargement of NATO is a real threat to the security of Russia, since the expansion is going eastward. Candidates for NATO membership are geographically within the sphere of influence of Moscow, as is the case for Ukraine and Georgia and other possible candidates. In early 2011 the Russian Prime Minister declared, "The expansion of NATO infrastructure towards our borders is causing us concern."[7] The main reason is that Russia views NATO as a military rather than as a political structure. In the case of Georgia, there is no doubt that the Georgians are seeking membership for one simple reason, protection from the threat of Russia.

Russia pursued a dual strategy to contain the enlargement process: economic pressures on Ukraine and Georgia, largely through the shutting down of natural gas flows and the 2008 war in Georgia.[8] Georgia and Ukraine were and are still considered as the Russians' jewels of its lost imperial past they were the cornerstones of Russia's regional hegemony and great power status.[9] The Georgian issue started with the diplomatic crisis of 2006 and the 2008 invasion.[10]

The recent crisis in Ukraine has focused almost exclusively on two objectives: punishing Russia for its takeover of Crimea, and getting it to back down and return Crimea to Kiev's control.

Russia has strong fraternal ties with Ukraine dating back to the ninth century and the founding of Kievan Rus, the first eastern Slavic state, whose capital was Kiev. Ukraine was part of Russia for centuries, and the two continued to be closely aligned through the Soviet period, when Ukraine and Russia were separate republics. "The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country," wrote former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger in a *Washington Post* op ed.[11]

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6 Dimitri Medvedev, "Medvedev Sets Out Five Foreign Policy Principles in TV Interview", Vesti TV, 31 August 2008 BBC Monitoring, translated in Johnson's Russia List, at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/, [last visited 5 August 2011].

7 Elder, Miriam, "Putin: Still Suspicious of NATO", *Globalpost*, 27 April 2011.

8 Russia's "gas wars" with Ukraine had other objectives, in addition to demonstrating the latter's economic dependence on Russia.

9 Rachwald, Arthur R., "A 'Reset' of NATO-Russia Relations: Real or Imaginary?", European Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2011, p.118.

10 Pouliot, Vincent, "The Year NATO Lost Russia", in Frédéric Mérand, Martial Foucault and Bastien Irondelle (eds.), *European Security since the Fall of the Berlin Wall*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2011, p.252.

11 Kissinger, Henry, "How the Ukraine crisis ends", ***Washington Post***, 6th March, 2014.

Ukraine is also an economic partner that Russia would like to incorporate into its proposed Eurasian Union, a customs union due to be formed in January 2015 whose likely members include Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia. Ukraine's membership would increase the union's population "by a solid 27 percent", wrote Simon Saradzhyan, a research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center.[12]

Ukraine plays an important role in Russia's energy trade; its pipelines provide transit to 80 percent of the natural gas Russia sends to European markets, and Ukraine itself is a major market for Russian gas.[13] Militarily, Ukraine is also important to Russia as a buffer state, and it is home to Russia's Black Sea fleet, based in the Crimean port city of Sevastopol under a bilateral agreement between the two states. Russia considers EU efforts to expand eastward to Ukraine, even through a relatively limited association agreement, as an alarming step because it opens the doors toward strengthening an array of Western institutional ties at the expense of Russian ones.[14]

The EU's Eastern Partnership Program, established in 2009, is aimed at forging tighter bonds with six former Eastern bloc countries.[15] Russia sees it as a stepping stone to organizations such as NATO, whose eastward expansion is regarded by Russia's security establishment as a threat. Ukraine belongs to NATO's Partnership for Peace program but is seen as having little prospect of joining the alliance in the foreseeable future. Similar concerns about Georgia contributed to Moscow's deployment of forces at the Georgian border in 2008, which led to a brief war and Russian occupation of the breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[16]

Russian president Vladimir Putin has portrayed his country's role in Ukraine as safeguarding ethnic Russians worried by lawlessness spreading east from the capital, charges that leaders in Kiev dismiss as provocations.[17] In the case of Crimea, Putin has stressed Moscow is not imposing its will, but rather, supporting the free choice of the local population, drawing parallels with the support Western states gave to Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia.

The situation in Crimea is becoming increasingly dangerous. The Ukrainian prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, has declared the movements of Russian troops on the peninsula a "declaration of war to my country", and has appealed to NATO for help.[18] The Western defense alliance called a meeting in Brussels, with NATO General

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12 Saradzhyan, Simon, *Stand-off in Crimea: Cui Bono?*, Power and Policy, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. 12th March, 2014.

13 McMohan, Robert, Ukraine in Crisis, Council on Foreign Relations, 11th March, 2014.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen announcing on Twitter that the 28 member states wanted to consult about the situation in the Ukraine and "coordinate closely".[19] Following the meeting, NATO sharply condemned Russia's military escalation in Crimea. "Military action against Ukraine by forces of the Russian Federation is a breach of international law. We call on Russia to de-escalate tensions," said Rasmussen.[20] In a statement, NATO called Ukraine "a valued partner."[21]

From the point of view of military expert Klaus Mommsen, NATO could at least take on a role as mediator. "After all, NATO is not just a defense alliance," he says. "After the break-up of the Soviet Union it developed into a political platform on which Russia is also represented, through the NATO-Russia Council, for example."[22]

The case of Ukraine is unique, because it is central to Russian power. As underlined by Zbigniew Brzezinski, without Ukraine Russia cannot remain a Eurasian empire.[23] The discussions about NATO enlargement and Western support for the democratic movement in Ukraine have directly threatened Russia, which viewed the Orange Revolution and Ukraine's focus on relations with the West as a major blow to Russia's sphere of influence. In Moscow, Western involvement in Ukraine in support of democratic changes and even integration within the Euro- Atlantic community and architecture was seen as a threat to Russian objectives.[24]

U.S. officials say Russia's actions are in breach of international law, including the non-intervention provisions in the UN Charter; the 1997 Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine, which requires Russia to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity; and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.[25] That document states: "The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the

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18 Hoppner, Stephanie, "What should NATO do about Ukraine?", Deutsche Walle Institute, 3rd March, 2014.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Hoppner, Stephanie, "What should NATO do about Ukraine?", Deutsche Walle Institute, 3rd March, 2014.

23 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *The Grand Chessboard*, New York, Basic Books, 1997.

24 Kanet, Roger E. and Larive, Maxime Henri Andre, note 569.

25 McMohan, Robert, note 578. The "Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances" is a diplomatic memorandum that was signed in December 1994 by Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. It is not a formal treaty, but rather, a diplomatic document under which signatories made promises to each other as part of the denuclearization of former Soviet republics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

existing borders of Ukraine."[26] For its part, Russia has rejected charges that it is violating international law and has called for Ukraine to return to the terms of the February 21, 2014 agreement between opposition leaders and Victor Yanukovich that permitted him to stay in office as the head of a national unity government while elections were planned.

As Russian troops amass near Ukraine's eastern border, and additional forces enter Ukraine's autonomous region of Crimea, a referendum scheduled for Sunday that could bring the peninsula under Russian control has the potential to set off an armed confrontation.[27] A Second Crimean War, if it actually broke out, would pitpost-Soviet Russia against a Western-backed Ukraine.

The last time the peninsula was the center of a conflict was in the 1850s, when the Crimean War broke out. At the time, the peninsula in the Black Sea was controlled by the Russian Empire, and found itself in the middle of a tug-of-war between an expanding Russia, which styled itself as the protector of Christians in the Muslim Ottoman Empire, and the declining Ottomans. The latter were backed by European powers wary of the Czar's southward expansionism.[28]

The 1853-1856 conflict, which killed more than 500,000 soldiers, was in many ways the first modern war, employing then-new technologies such as railways and the telegraph, and one of the first recorded by photography. Hostilities ended with a victory by the coalition of the Ottomans plus France, Britain and the Kingdom of Sardinia, the strongest of the pre-Unification Italian states. (It also was the first war in which the British and French were allies, not enemies.)[29]

But unlike the war of the 1850s, this time a confrontation in Crimea might not turn out well for a Western coalition. If war between Russia and Ukraine breaks out and NATO comes to Kiev's defense, the strategic situation would not favor the 28-member alliance, Patrick Larkin, a military expert and co-author of a book on a hypothetical second Korean War, told IBTimes.[30]

"There are so few NATO troops that could, or would, make it to Ukraine and Crimea in time to matter that any NATO force would be significantly outnumbered," Larkin added.[31]

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26 Ibid.

27 Kashi, David, "A Crimean War Would Be Uphill Fight For US And NATO Against Russia, Experts Say", International Business Times, 16th March, 2014.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

The Russians would be playing on their home turf, essentially, against a Ukrainian military that's far weaker than theirs and a Western force that would find it very difficult to physically get to Crimea. NATO forces would have to travel hundreds of miles through Ukraine to get to an eastern Ukrainian front. In addition, most NATO countries have forces deployed on their borders for defensive purposes and are not necessarily equipped to take offensive action deep into enemy territory, Larkin said.[32]

"To get to Crimea, you either go overland through Ukraine, for several hundred miles, or you make an amphibious assault off the Black Sea," Tom Fedyszyn, a former NATO strategist and commander of two U.S. Navy warships, told IBTimes.[33]

Fedyszyn, who now teaches at the U.S. Naval War College, said that in his opinion Ukraine would put up a fight, but would not be able to defend successfully against an advanced Russian army, especially as its forces are relatively disorganized and in poor shape.[34]

However, if Turkey, a NATO ally sitting across the Black Sea, allowed the alliance to use its air bases, and if its navy joined the fight, the balance of power could significantly shift toward the West, as Russia would have trouble keeping its forces in fighting shape. "There are only three major routes into the peninsula, and air and missile strikes could make it difficult for the Russians to resupply or reinforce their existing forces," Larkin said.[35]

But a confrontation between NATO and Russia could expand to another part of Europe if Belarus, another ex-Soviet state and Russian ally, joined in the fight or allowed Russia to use its bases. That could threaten Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the three Baltic ex-Soviet republics that became NATO members in 2004 and are extremely wary of Russia. In this (admittedly unlikely) scenario, more NATO forces would be siphoned away from the Black Sea region to protect the three tiny Baltic states, taking some pressure off Russia.[36]

Moscow sparked anger after Ukraine sent its forces to occupy the majority Russian-speaking Black Sea peninsula of Crimea, where regional authorities declared independence and will hold a referendum on Sunday on whether to leave Ukraine and join Russia.[37] NATO and its members have spoken out strongly against the vote, which has escalated East-West tensions to their worst point since the Cold War.

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32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 "NATO websites targeted in attack claimed by Ukrainian hackers", AFP in ***Hindustan Times***, 16th March, 2014.

NATO said several of its websites were targeted in a "significant" cyber attack on Saturday that was claimed by Ukrainian hackers in what appeared to be the latest bout of virtual warfare linked to the country's crisis.[38] Spokeswoman for the military alliance Oana Lungescu said on Twitter that the websites had been hit by "a significant DDoS (denial of service) attack", but that it had had "no operational impact".[39] Under DDoS attacks, hackers hijack multiple computers to send a flood of data to the target, crippling its computer system.

Crimea voted to split away from Ukraine and return to the Russian fold. For a vast majority of Crimea's Russian-speaking population this is an act of redressing a monumental injustice that happened in 1991 when Crimea, which geographically, ethnically and historically is more Russian than many regions of Russia itself, became part of a foreign state as the Soviet Union broke up along arbitrarily drawn administrative borders.[40]

However, reuniting a divided people may not have been the prime motive that forced President Vladimir Putin's hand in Crimea.[41] The Ukraine crisis is viewed in Moscow as a continuation of the Western plan to encircle Russia militarily and torpedo its reintegration efforts in the former Soviet Union. The new leaders in Kiev installed with the West's support are the same people who staged the "orange revolution" in Ukraine in 2004 and set Ukraine on the path of NATO membership.[42]

Ukraine's induction into NATO would be a strategic catastrophe for Russia. NATO would come within 425 kilometres of Moscow, cut off Russia from the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and squeeze it out of the Caucasus.[43]

In Ukraine, Mr. Putin made the same point he has been driving home in Syria: regime change by force is illegal.[44] When Western nations hailed the overthrow of a democratically elected government in Ukraine as "a democratic free choice of the Ukrainian people," Mr. Putin's reply was: Crimea also has the right to make its own free choice.[45] The West pushed Mr. Putin too far in Ukraine, which is more than just a former Soviet state. It is where the Russian nation was born — in medieval "Kievan Rus" — and it is still part of the "Russian world." The West's efforts to bring Ukraine into its orbit were viewed in Moscow as an encroachment on Russia itself.

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38 "NATO websites targeted in attack claimed by Ukrainian hackers", AFP in ***Hindustan Times***, 16th March, 2014.

39 Ibid.

40 Radyuhin, Vladimir, "Why Russia Needs Crimea", *The Hindu*, 17th March, 2014.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

Ukraine, the second most powerful economy in the former Soviet Union, is a linchpin to Mr. Putin's plan to build the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), a Moscow-led version of the European Union. The U.S. denounced the plan as a disguised attempt to re-create the Soviet Union and vowed to disrupt it.[46] An "effective way" to wreck Mr. Putin's project was found when the European Union offered Ukraine an "either-or" choice between closer ties with Europe or membership in Mr. Putin's EEU.

Apart from geopolitical compulsions, Moscow's support for Crimea's breakaway bid was driven by important domestic considerations. The protests in Ukraine, manipulated as they were by the West, reflected the rise of grass-root civic activity against corruption and authoritarianism — the same problems that bedevil Russia and that brought thousands of anti-government protesters onto the streets of Moscow two years ago.[47] By intervening in Ukraine, Mr. Putin sought to stop the surging pro-democracy wave from spilling over to Russia.

Mr. Putin's intervention in Ukraine has brought Russia strategic gains but is fraught with serious risks. Crimea's reunification with Russia solves the problem of the Black Sea Fleet, which Ukraine's new leaders vowed to shut down and for which there is no other basing location that does not freeze in winter. Russia retains strategic grip on the region and ability to project its naval power to the Mediterranean and beyond.[48]

The Ukraine and Western powers said they would not recognise Crimea's split from Ukraine, but Russia argued that Kosovo's self-proclaimed independence from Serbia provided legitimate precedent.[49] Moscow recalled the 2010 ruling by the U.N. International Court of Justice, which said that unilateral declaration of independence by a part of a country did not violate international law.[50] The example of Crimea has inspired other Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine to demand greater powers from the centre. If Ukraine switches from a unitary state to a federation, the pro-Russia regions will get the right to block any sharp swing of the country towards the West.

NATO-Russia relations remain relevant, as each has historically been the mirror image of the other. Not only does Moscow see in NATO the failure of the Soviet story, but also an Alliance that has known how to adapt to the new challenges of the 21st century. What is certain is that Russia and NATO are different international actors with a similar agenda: existence through actions.[51]

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46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Radyuhin, Vladimir, "Why Russia Needs Crimea", note 606.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Kanet, Roger E. and Larive, Maxime Henri Andre, note 569.

NATO sees Russia as a core component to ensure a secure and stable regional and international space. NATO believes that cooperation between the two actors is not only desirable, but vital, as they both share common interests such as missile defence, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, counter-piracy and a stable international system. Ultimately, trying to find common ground for a better cooperation and coordination will remain a serious challenge. Until both actors are seeking the same thing, the perpetual new beginning of re-establish relations will be inevitable.[52]

The North Atlantic Alliance today faces a paradox perhaps best illustrated by the following two observations. First, a quick glance at NATO reveals an Alliance that today is engaged in more missions and activities than ever before. It is not an exaggeration to say that NATO today is busier than at any time since its founding over half a century ago and in many key areas on the verge of being over-stretched.

Second, there is no shortage of new problems where the US would like to see NATO become involved or enlarge its current missions – an expanded role in Afghanistan, more responsibility in Iraq, stepped-up outreach in the wider Black Sea region or playing a supporting role in establishing Middle Eastern peace. There is a queue of countries seeking closer strategic ties and eventual membership in the Alliance, including several Balkan countries, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine. One even sees the stirrings of a debate in Israel about exploring closer Euro-Atlantic ties. Obviously, there is still a demand for NATO, and it exerts a considerable magnetic attraction in Europe and beyond.

After the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union, NATO had to reinvent itself politically for the initial challenges of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the Alliance's post-Cold War reinvention is one of the main reasons why Europe as a whole is more peaceful and secure today than at any time in recent history. In the wake of 9/11, however, the Alliance faced the need to reinvent itself a second time to face the challenges of the post-post-Cold War era that are centred beyond Europe, especially in the broader Middle East. Whereas NATO successfully reinvented itself to meet the challenges of the first, it has not – at least not yet – made the leap required for success in the second.

What were those challenges of the 1990s that the Alliance successfully managed? They were primarily to stop the ethnic wars in the Balkans, anchor the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe to the West and establish a new and cooperative relationship with the Alliance’s former adversary, Russia. To be sure, the Alliance was initially slow in moving to halt ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. And the evolution of both NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia relations were not without their own trials and tribulations and an occasional near-death experience. Nevertheless, in the space of a decade NATO successfully transformed itself from a North American-Western European alliance focused exclusively on territorial defence into a pan-

52 Ibid.

European institution with new members stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and missions centred increasingly on what used to be called “out of area”. It was no small accomplishment.

What would have been unthinkable under the conditions caused by the east-west conflict has become common practice after it finished: NATO is used for peacekeeping operations in states and regions in and out of Europe. The world has seen two-dozen regional wars from Iraq and Chechnya to Bosnia and Kosovo and others, since 1990. All these wars took place ‘out of area’ from the perspective of the Alliance, meaning outside the territory of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, defined in the Article 6, which alone is protected by the Alliance. Parties to the Treaty have intervened in a few of these wars, though the Alliance as a whole has become involved only in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

It is a fact that peace-keeping and peace enforcement do not mix. Peace-keeping, as evolved by the U.N. over some 40 years of trial and error, requires impartiality and objectivity - no matter what provocation. As soon as peace-keeping troops take sides, they are seen by one of the conflicting parties as part of opposition. Even protective convoys escorting humanitarian aid to the besieged of one side may be perceived as biased if the denial of food is war aim of the other side.

There is doubt that the U.N. should ever be in the business of military peace enforcement. That is a task that should be carried out by fully effective military organisations, such as NATO or groups of states willing to do and capable of doing the job. Such organisations should be given the political license from the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII; the operations should be halted if that political license is subsequently withdrawn. But the U.N. itself has neither the military command systems nor the political cohesion to carry out military-enforcement tasks. Moreover, it is arguable that a U.N. that carried out military peace enforcement - except perhaps in the most unique circumstances - would find itself in much political trouble with its members. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, as the source of authority for U.N. peace enforcement, was written for a different era and under different assumptions. The world today has little semblance of that of 1945.

This argument raises a counter question: should NATO engage as an institution in the much-lighter-weight business of peace-keeping? The troops and wherewithal of its members are needed, but whether NATO as an institution should perform peace-keeping is perhaps still open to question. In circumstances that occur in or close to a NATO area, will NATO be able to remain impartial and objective? Or is NATO going to hijack the peace-keeping concept and give it a different definition and orientation palatable chiefly to the United States?

The United States has a permanent and vital national interest in preserving the security of European and Canadian Allies. Conversely, Allies in Europe recognise that their security is inextricably tied to that of North America. While there are many dimensions to the Transatlantic security relationship, the presence of significant and

highly capable U.S. military forces in Europe will remain, for the foreseeable future, a critical linchpin. Behind that presence stands the full array of U.S.-based conventional forces, America's unsurpassed nuclear deterrent, formidable economic power and demonstrated political will to defend democratic ideals and values.

The United States welcomed European efforts to increase their contribution to collective defence and crisis response operations within NATO and to build a capability to act militarily under the European Union where NATO as a whole is not engaged. These efforts are part of Europe's longstanding and natural trend towards greater cooperation and deeper union in economic, monetary, social and political matters, a trend supported by the United States since the early post-Second World War period. America's leadership role has adjusted before to changes in Europe and is prepared to adapt themselves in the future to work with stronger, more versatile and more united European partners.

The Gulf crisis reassured Americans that NATO under their leadership remained the best way to manage Western defence and security issues; but the problems it incurred for the Europeans reinforced Franco-German proposals for a common EC foreign and security policy. Some saw the WEU as the core of an eventual European defence identity. The Atlanticists retorted that the Gulf experience confirmed that a common EC foreign and security policy was only a rhetorical exercise. But they also regarded the Western European Union (WEU) as a less divisive approach to a European defence identity because the WEU was subordinate to NATO through its treaty clauses while the EC had little say over it.

The United States and its Transatlantic Allies enter the 21st century as the strongest force for peace and freedom the world has ever known. By supporting democracy and freedom in places known as the former Yugoslavia, the people of Europe and North America have demonstrated the power of their shared values.

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) was a great challenge to the world community and its capacity for crisis management and preventive actions in the new post-Cold War international security environment. For NATO as an European regional arrangement for safeguarding peace and defending its member states from outside aggression the unfolding crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina made it very clear that NATO had to change the way it did business, if it were to continue to make an effective contribution to international peace and security. The challenges for change within NATO and the European Community came at a time when the United States of America were also reconsidering their role in the world arena, being aware that as the lonely remaining superpower in the post-Cold War era they had certain (and becoming even greater with every passing day) obligations for safeguarding world peace and regional stability. Very soon, NATO led by the United States embarked on a pro-interventionist track, strongly convinced as a lesson from the early stages of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina that it could not remain disengaged from the rest of Europe.

The Bosnian Crisis highlighted the continued dependence of Western Europe upon the United States, at least in projecting NATO political and military power. While Europe is currently able to defend itself, it lacks sufficient clout to advance into areas such as the Balkans. It is likely that the European pillar of NATO is moving towards greater military autonomy from the North American pillar, but that this will take much more work. The Bosnian Crisis was too soon after the Cold War to expect Europe to act independently, after almost fifty years of U.S. leadership. Yet the desire for increased European autonomy is definitely there. Such actions as the Western European Union, the experiment with the Franco-German Corps, and the Eurofighter project all indicate a potential willingness to assume greater responsibility for their own affairs in the future. Yet for the foreseeable future, continued U.S. leadership is deemed critical in promoting NATO's agenda in the absence of any other obvious leader.

Analyzing NATO's escalating involvement in the international intervention into the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we render it as having quite significant implications for the evolving nature of the concept of peacekeeping within the framework of NATO. One should acknowledge the gradual, but logical and meaningful evolution in NATO's peacekeeping engagements. Seeking to redefine itself in the post-Cold War period, NATO as a regional security organization worked together with the UN at a time, when the world organization was too much optimistic about its ability to prevent conflicts and guarantee peace and international stability in greater co-operation with regional organizations.

NATO's involvement politically and militarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina had a great impact on NATO's defense posture in Europe and on the re-definition of the role of the Alliance in the international arena. When the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out in 1991, NATO had never before conducted an operation outside its own geographical region. The lesson NATO learned from its aftermath was that the conflicts outside-of-territory were also threaten Euro-Atlantic security interests and that it cannot adopt a lay-back attitude.

The blowing up of the World Trade Center towers in New York by terrorists on 11th September 2001 transformed not just the NATO's agenda, but also the entire agenda of international relations of the 21st century. On 12th September, NATO proclaimed that the terrorist attacks on the United States amounted to an attack against one of the Alliance members in terms of Article 5 of its Charter and therefore an attack on all the members and it offered all necessary assistance to the United States in its 'Crusade against International Terrorism'. For its 52 years, NATO never really had to define its central commitment the Article 5 defence guarantee. Article 5 clearly states that an attack on an ally shall be considered an attack against them all.

9/11 forced the Americans to recognise that the United States is exposed to an existential threat from terrorism and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. Meeting that threat became a premier security challenges for the United States as well as Europe. There was a clear and present danger that terrorists would

gain the capability to carry out catastrophic attacks on Europe and the United States using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

After the passing of UN Resolution 1973 in March 2011, the Intervention by NATO in Libya in 2011 as a template for future NATO missions and proof that the United Nations can outsource its muscle to the alliance. From American viewpoint, NATO is able to support the United Nations Security Council and help implement its decisions. That adds to the credibility of the U.N., and the United States is pleased to see NATO in that role. Throughout the conflict, NATO has insisted that its actions are limited to supporting the U.N. resolution that calls for protecting civilians and enforcing an arms embargo.

The intervention in Libya clearly represents a return to the 'peace-making through air bombardments' of the 1990s, only now with a new geographical focus. In addition to this comes the fact that the Libya intervention became more far-reaching than any earlier NATO intervention after it de facto turned into an attempt at promoting regime change. Judging by actual actions, everything suggests that NATO, or at least the participating NATO members, quickly extended the strategic focus from mere civilian protection and the enforcement of a no-fly zone to actively helping the toppling of Gaddafi and his regime. This happened by supporting the advance of the rebels towards Tripoli and other key strategic cities through air bombardments against Gaddafi's forces.

NATO's conduct has made Russia in particular criticise NATO for overstepping the mandate of the UN resolution in the attempt to oust the Libyan regime. The escalation to regime change is a drastic step that, in principle, could push other great powers to reconsider strategic partnerships with NATO in the future. NATO thus seems to face a dilemma between prioritising its role as either a military or as a political actor in the new world order. The military effort in Libya may, against this backdrop, risk shaking the Alliance's self-defined political role in the interplay with the new 'emerging' powers.

The paradoxical thing about the Libya intervention is that it is taking place at a time when most Western states are facing cuts in defence spending and when NATO is already pressured in Afghanistan with difficulties in ensuring backing from Allies and partners. Rationally, therefore, NATO should not be able to afford to open a new front in North Africa where most Alliance members can hardly be said to have any vital interests. National prestige and the ability to enforce a humanitarian order in the European neighbourhood through the elimination of a relatively easy target were decisive for NATO's decision to engage as a party in Libya's internal conflict. To put things a bit polemically, NATO did it because it could.

In the case of Syria, Kosovo-style humanitarian intervention could justify NATO military action against Assad regime after alleged chemical attacks. The US President Barack Obama is unlikely to have much trouble mustering a NATO coalition of the willing if Washington opts for military intervention in Syrian response to the alleged chemical weapons atrocities by the Assad regime. There was, however, no prospect of

a UN mandate for international military action over Syria – with the Kremlin, enraged at what it saw as abuse of a UN mandate to topple Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, certain to keep wielding its veto.

NATO has smartly steered clear from any involvement in Syria - at least until now. Turkey's flirtations with a possible NATO role in Syria (during the jet crisis) has been dodged by calling for political consultations based on the Alliance's Article 4, rather than framing the event an Article 5 (collective defense) situation. A NATO-led military intervention in Syria would be unwelcome for at least five reasons. First, as long as Assad is in power, a United Nations Security Council mandate will not be granted by either Russia or China. Both these global powers have learned their lesson from Libya, where a mandate for installing a no fly zone resulted in NATO-led regime change. Second, the absence of a legal mandate to intervene is not just a procedural inconvenience. Both Russia and China have geostrategic and economic reasons to keep NATO and the West out of Syria. Both the Russian and Chinese navy have upgraded their presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Officially, this has been part of a large-scale maritime war game, also including Syria and Iran. The message is however unmistakably clear: don't mess with Syria! Third, the current Syrian imbroglio is even more messy and ambiguous than Libya in 2011. Fourth, NATO's involvement in the discomfiture of the Assad regime will give it more responsibility for the future handling of the country than it can deal with. US Secretary of Defense Panetta recently argued that in any post-Assad scenario, Syria should "maintain as much of the military, the police, along with the security forces, and hope that they will transition to a democratic form of government. That's a key." The problem with this assessment is that the US and NATO have little to no influence on Syria's future. The worry is not just the tragedy and the bloodshed and the horror that's going on in the cities of Syria, but also the possibility of a widening Sunni-Shia conflict which could engulf the whole of the Middle East and would have global consequences. This is not a conflict NATO should get itself into. Fifth, NATO involvement in Syria would tie the Alliance down for years to come, sapping its political and military energy. A NATO presence in Syria would drag the Alliance intothe Sunni-Shia conflict. This would, however, make it unlikely for NATO to face its main strategic challenge: a nuclear Iran.

Although NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history in the wake of the September 11 attacks and allies came forward with offers of military support for the subsequent military operation in Afghanistan, the United States found that European allies had little useful to offer. U.S. rejection of most of the offers ruffled allied feathers and raised questions about the relevance of a military alliance, where only one member could project significant, high-end, expeditionary military power.

After the invocation of the Article 5 of Washington Treaty, NATO had taken variety of steps to engage more fully in the global war on terrorism, including a declaration that tackling terrorism was NATO's new mission. On a more concrete level, Alliance members adopted a package of measures during the Prague Summit in 2002 that were designed to strengthen NATO's preparedness and ability to take on the challenges associated with terrorism. But beyond the rhetoric and posturing, was the Alliance really

ready – in terms of having the appropriate command and force structure – to tackle this new threat? If the last major Alliance effort to address a change in the threat environment is any indicator, NATO may not be ready to decisively face down terrorism for quite some time.

The U.S. response to this dilemma was two-fold. The first was to persuade European allies to pool their limited resources to establish a single, multinational, European-centered NATO Response Force (NRF), trained and equipped to U.S. standards, that would be able to deploy quickly and fight effectively alongside U.S. forces. The second, closely related to the first, was to persuade allies that NATO need to extend its mandate beyond the traditional borders of Europe so that NATO forces could go out-of-area to where the threats actually were.

The fundamental need for change notwithstanding, NATO could take on re-examination of its internal relationships with considerable self-confidence. After all, 9/11 did not change everything. Despite some American claims that Europe was "fading slowly in the U.S. rearview mirror," there is an umbilical transatlantic connection that has become too firmly entrenched to be easily jettisoned. First, European stability remains a key U.S. strategic interest. The consolidation of Europe as an undivided, democratic, and market-oriented space remains a major objective of U.S. security policy. Only in NATO, the central legitimizing framework for U.S. power in Europe, can the United States play an undisputed leadership role in advancing this strategic objective. Thus, the United States is not likely to surrender this role. Indeed, many U.S. critics of Europe have yet to grasp the fact that both NATO enlargement and the war on terrorism have actually increased the United States' immersion in European security affairs. Consequently, there is no serious political force in the United States advocating a withdrawal from Europe.

Second, Europeans remain the key strategic allies for the United States. This statement does not exclude a stronger U.S. focus on other regions, nor is it contradicted by the emergence of much wider "coalitions of the willing" along the model provided by the Afghanistan campaign. Europe's military capabilities lag behind the United States, yet on a global scale, Europe ranks No. 2 militarily. Moreover, although the debate preceding the war against Iraq may have suggested otherwise, it is only in Europe where the United States finds a milieu of countries predisposed to working with the United States. In Asia, by contrast, the United States will have to continue to rely on bilateral relationships with politically and culturally very different countries. In short, if the United States wants to remain the world's predominant power, it will have to remain a "European power" as well.

In this era of globalisation, America and Europe have common interests in dealing with security challenges on the periphery of the European continent and beyond that can have important ramifications for democracy and prosperity within Transatlantic Community. Globalisation and the information revolution bring enormous benefits to the Transatlantic Community, including its security structures, but they also increase its vulnerabilities. They facilitate efforts by potential adversaries - both hostile states and

increasingly sophisticated terrorists - to develop or acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means to develop them. Humanitarian disasters beyond Europe can have an important impact on Transatlantic interest and require joint U.S.-European responses.

This study therefore verifies the assumptions underline in the three hypothesis identified in the introductory Chapter One by co-relating them to the changing international milieu dominated by the United States, in which NATO becomes an important means of implementation of the American security policy.

When NATO's Heads of State and Government met for their Lisbon Summit in November 2010, they had to answer a critically important question: Can NATO become a true 21st century Alliance? The answer they gave was an unequivocal "yes". By adopting a new Strategic Concept that embraces globalisation as the key characteristic of the strategic environment, they acknowledged that the Atlantic Alliance has to transform further – and that one important part of this transformation will be the development of closer relations with countries across the globe.

In the run-up to the Lisbon Summit, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen had already outlined what this would entail: closer relations with all major global players, including India and China.[53]

Only a few years ago, any mentioning of India and China as potential NATO partners would have led to raised eyebrows not only in Delhi and Beijing, but also in many NATO member countries. Not any more. The Secretary General's suggestion sparked little debate, let alone controversy. After all, reaching out to India is not a veiled attempt to draw this country and other rising powers into the Alliance's political and military orbit. And neither is it an attempt to outflank the United Nations as the ultimate arbiter of global security. The suggestion to use NATO as a forum for consultation and cooperation is much less grandiose, and much more pragmatic. In an age that is increasingly shaped by the forces of globalisation, managing common security challenges requires a much tighter network among key players.[54]

As NATO steps up its courtship of India, Delhi too will have to think about the kind of relationship it desires. Washington genuinely seeks a NATO-India partnership. As NATO retools for the 21st century for new missions in Africa and South Asia, and as it advances across the Middle East toward the Indian Ocean, looking for global partnerships, India inevitably figures in its agenda.[55]

There was something very poignant about the NATO naval force making its historic visit to the Indian Ocean. The NATO maritime mission involved ships from six member

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53 Ruhle, Michael, NATO and India:Size No Problem, ***NATO Review***, 20th April, 2011. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/Partnerships/India_NATO/EN/index.htm

54 Ibid.

55 Bhadrakumar, M.K., India holds key in NATO's world view, ***World Security Network***, 9th October, 2007.

countries, which set sail from Europe. The deployment in the Indian Ocean aimed to "demonstrate the Alliance's continuing ability to respond to emerging crisis situations on a global scale and foster close links with regional navies and other maritime organizations". NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoof Scheffer said, "Maritime security, ensuring the safe passage of shipping and supporting a coordinated international approach to protect energy supplies are high priorities for NATO".[56]

Afghanistan is a compelling case in point. NATO's leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has not only brought the Alliance to China's borders, it has also created much greater interdependence between NATO and India. As a major international donor with a considerable civilian presence in Afghanistan, India has a strategic interest not only in the security that ISAF forces provide, but also in the stabilising influence which NATO's engagement brings to the region. NATO's long-term success in Afghanistan, in turn, hinges on the success of the civilian reconstruction efforts that India and others provide. Afghanistan has thus become a prime example of how new challenges create new dependencies and relationships.[57]

There were doubts about the possible implications for India's international position should it develop closer ties with NATO. As India is simply too big to be just another partner country to the Atlantic Alliance. And while most members of the Indian strategic community readily admit that NATO's Afghanistan mission coincides with India's own strategic interest in stabilising that country, they do not necessarily conclude from this that India and NATO should develop closer cooperation.[58]

India has a critical role to play in Afghanistan as it is the most important partner of the war-torn country in the region, General Joseph Dunford, the commander of the US-NATO forces in Kabul said in response to a question during a Congressional hearing on Afghanistan.[59] He believes that India's role in Afghanistan is critical and that India is a very close partner to Afghanistan, and from an economic perspective and from a trade perspective, probably their most important partner in the region.

On the contrary, many seem to believe that NATO's eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan will mean the end of its interest in Asia.[60] And finally, since India enjoys close bilateral relations with all major NATO allies, and in particular its ever closer ties with the United States, some see little added value in building closer ties to the Alliance.

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56 Ibid.

57 Ruhle, Michael, NATO and India: Size No Problem, note 566.

58 Ibid.

59 "India's Role in Afghanistan very critical:US-NATO Chief", ***First Post***, 14th March, 2014.

60 Ruhle, Michael, NATO And India: Size No Problem, note 566.

But are these valid arguments? First, any concern that India could be relegated to the status of a junior NATO partner is misplaced.[61] China's staff level contacts with NATO have certainly not hindered that nation's rapid ascent. And neither has the international stature of countries like Japan, Egypt or Australia suffered from their cooperation with NATO.

Hence, India will not need to compromise the fundamental tenets of its foreign and security policy. As Switzerland's long-standing cooperation with NATO should demonstrate even to the most ardent sceptics, neither non-alignment nor neutrality need prevent a country from cooperating with NATO.[62]

Secondly and most importantly, the case for closer cooperation between India and NATO does not rest solely on Afghanistan.[63] There is a growing need for nations and organisations to cooperate more closely in many other areas, too. Much of the consultation will take place in the United Nations. But challenges such as cyber attacks, energy security, nuclear proliferation, failing states and piracy all compel nations to look for additional frameworks which allow them not only to talk together, but also to work together, including militarily. NATO is one such framework – and the only one with over six decades of experience in multinational military planning and cooperation.

For the Alliance, sharing this unique experience more widely is both natural and inevitable. That is why NATO's cooperation with the Indian navy in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia will likely be followed by closer cooperation in other areas as well. Another sign of a new dynamic is India's high-level participation in NATO's annual seminar on weapons of mass destruction proliferation. This seminar brings together over 50 nations from five continents, including India's neighbours China and Pakistan.

French President Francois Hollande's state visit to India in February 2013 can be seen as an attempt to bolster France's global standing and exports. After all, the visit focused exclusively on strengthening bilateral commercial and defense ties, and provided some extra encouragement on a deal to sell 126 Rafale fighter jets to New Delhi. But in the context of this deepening relationship, France has a historic opportunity to go further – to strengthen NATO's relationship with India, which would advance the interests of India, France, and the Alliance.[64]

Although there is no formal institutional connection between India and NATO, India and the NATO allies, most importantly the United States, informally share an interest in maintaining maritime security in the Indian Ocean and have spent significant resources

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61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Chan, Arthur, French Foreign Policy in South Asia: NATO's Bridge to India?, ***Streit Talks***, 28th June, 2013.

to combat piracy in this vast area. Particularly notable are India's bold efforts to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa.

In the U.S. experience, the potential for genuine, two-directional learning and new insights from military cooperation with India is substantial. Collaboration has proven beneficial to both sides and has contributed positively to security in the region, where India is a crucial and uniquely stabilizing force.

With the exception of the U.S.-India-Japan naval exercises of 2009 and 2011, however, India has more recently been reluctant to officially collaborate on a multilateral rather than bilateral basis on maritime security issues. But as demonstrated by India's prior joint cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia in post-2004 tsunami relief missions, multilateral action in the realm of maritime security can reap benefits for both India and the United States and its allies.[65]

While NATO and India have cooperated on combating piracy through efforts like Operation Ocean Shield, New Delhi's attention is drawn toward the Pacific in keeping with its Look East Policy. This is perhaps the reason why India has drawn closer to the U.S. and Japan while remaining aloof from NATO. The former two are Pacific powers, while the latter is not. More than that, Indian policymakers may believe that partnerships with the U.S. and Japan are more befitting of India's stature, given the size and influence of these two countries. This could explain why, in spite high profile calls to forge a partnership and even offers of missile defense cooperation, little has come about as a result.

In sum, the issue is not whether India and NATO should consult and cooperate, but how this can best be done. Should one continue on an "ad hoc" basis, with the limited effectiveness that is inherent to improvisation? Or should India and NATO opt for a more regular dialogue, in which they learn about each other's perceptions, policies, and procedures, and are able to quickly operationalise that knowledge in tackling common challenges? The choice should be clear: exploiting NATO's potential as a forum for consultation and cooperation is a "win-win" situation, both for India and for the Alliance.

The challenge for Indian diplomacy will be to convincingly interpret the implications of its "strategic partnership" with the US. The perception is growing, and is incrementally gaining credibility, that India is aligning with a US-led security system in Asia.

The Atlantic Alliance is beginning to resemble Oscar Wilde's Dorian Gray, appearing youthful and robust as it grows older--but becoming ever more infirm. The Washington Treaty may remain in force, the various ministerial meetings may continue to issue earnest and upbeat communiqué, and the Brussels bureaucracy may keep NATO's web page up and running—all these superficial routines will go on, provided the alliance isn't

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65 Blackwell, Robert, 'Should India collaborate with NATO, especially against piracy in the Indian Ocean?, Council on Foreign Relations, 26th June, 2013.

asked to actually do anything else. The danger is that NATO will be dead before anyone notices, and the United States will only discover the corpse the moment they want it to rise and respond.

That having said, NATO's future would require a stronger role for the European Allies and a re-balancing of the vital transatlantic relationship in order to protect the interests of the Continental Europe.