

CHAPTER 3

COLD WAR CHALLENGES

Historically in any era of big power politics, military alliances have always been an important aspect of the foreign policy of a major power, whether or not these alliances are formal in character. There are some factors that catalyzed the formation of military alliances. Firstly, nations commit themselves to fight alongside each other because of the shared values and ideas. Secondly, an alliance can save costs and multiply benefits through sharing of responsibilities, common assets and risks. Military alliances include security guarantees in the event of aggression from a known or potential enemy.

The NATO was established as a military security organisation to safeguard the freedom, peace, common heritage and civilization of the European areas following the Second World War, professedly as an adjunct to the Charter of the United Nations in order to give it a façade of legitimacy. The aim of the NATO had been to form a common and unified Western defence network against the rising Soviet threat to the Western democracy and its expansionism. Secondly, after the fall of the Nazi Germany and with the Iron Curtain rising in Eastern Europe, there was an urgent need for restructuring the Western military security landscape because the old alliances had lost their rationale and hence became defunct. This was also necessary to foreclose any resurgence of a United Germany as a threat to international peace and security, even if the union of the two Germanies was a very distant possibility then.

Finally, it was important to lure a historically 'hesitant' United States into playing an active role in guaranteeing security in Europe on a permanent and substantial basis, this time codified and sanctified by a treaty. This, it was hoped, would ensure that the experience of the post-First World War was not repeated. That alone provided a guarantee against another war on account of Europe.

This chapter seeks to focus on the challenges of Cold War politics faced by NATO in two phases – (1). Before Warsaw Pact, (2). After Warsaw Pact and (3). The Second Cold War.

1. CHALLENGES BEFORE WARSAW (1949-55)

The major challenges that the NATO faced during the Cold War, before Warsaw Pact, were Berlin Crisis (1948), Coup in Czechoslovakia, and the Italian Elections (1948).

(a). Berlin Crisis (1948)

Although the Soviet Union and the Western countries were allies and fought shoulder to shoulder against Germany, Italy, and Japan, they could never really become friends. A sense of uneasy feeling of suspicion persisted throughout. The Soviet Union could never forget that the West had tried to undo the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and

intervened in the Civil War in White Russia. The United States and Britain also did not forget that in 1917, when the Bolshevik Government had made peace with Germany, the beneficiary was the enemy and the West had been let down by Vladimir Illiyich Lenin, leader of the Bolshevik Party. The West was also time and again reminded the declared objective of world revolution and overthrow of capitalism as the ultimate goal of Soviet leadership.

After the Second World War, Soviet Union was able to establish its domination over the East European countries, which she had hoped to, liberate from the Nazi Germany. The United States and its ally, Britain, were keen on holding free elections in the liberated countries and setting up democratic governments. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, US President Franklin D Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill insisted that free elections must be held in Eastern Europe, which the Soviet Union leader Joseph Stalin agreed – Self-determination was one of the promises of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations. But he failed to honour his pledge, for reasons not exactly unknown to his wartime ‘friends’. As the Soviets liberated East European countries, they installed Communist regimes without holding the promised elections.¹

After the unconditional surrender of Germany, she was occupied by the Allied armies. In accordance with an agreement among the allies, Germany was divided into four occupation zones - the American, the British, the French and the Soviet. Berlin, the German capital, fell into the Soviet occupation. But Berlin itself was divided into four occupation zones on the same pattern as the whole of Germany. Military occupation was to be a temporary arrangement. It was to end as soon as a peace treaty was to be concluded. But Germany became a major pawn and a battle theatre in the Cold War politics and military occupation turned into partition of Germany between East and West just as the entire Europe was divided between Communist East and Non-Communist West.

The Berlin Crisis marked the climax of the conflict between the East and the West. The origins of the conflict can be traced to the year 1945. The Yalta Conference and the Potsdam Conference had laid down the principles concerning the immediate post-war treatment of Germany. But as soon as these principles were accepted, the Western nations and the Soviet Union came into conflict because both sides had divergent interpretations of the principles.²

During the Potsdam Conference, the principal victors - United States, Soviet Union and Britain - agreed that Germany should be disarmed and denazified, divided into occupation-cum-administrative zones, but to be treated economically as one unit. Russia would obtain as reparations a proportion of the industrial products currently produced by German industry in the Western zones; and in return the Russian-

1 Halle, Louis J., *The Cold War As History*, Harper and Row Ltd, New York, 1967, pp. 6-10.

2 Schlesinger, Arthur, “*Origins of Cold War*”, *An American Reader*, Volume 1, edited by Wilcox, David, Dubuque, Kendall-Hunt Publishing Company, 1986, p.197.

controlled eastern zone would deliver food and raw materials to the Western zones. But Russia wanted to exploit the economic resources of the eastern zone as much as possible and did not supply the western zones with food. So in retaliation, the Americans did not deliver any industrial products to the eastern zone. Thereafter the western occupying powers and Russia handled economic affairs in their zones independently.

At Yalta, Soviet Union had insisted upon \$20,000 million as war reparation from Germany. US President Roosevelt was opposed to such massive reparation. However, that was to be the basis of negotiation at Potsdam. Stalin insisted on half of this amount as reparation for the USSR and Poland. Property was to be dismantled in Soviet occupation zones to recover the reparation. The Western Powers were to do the same in their zones. Hence, no single economic unit could be created. Germany remained into four occupation zones and no peace treaty was finalized at Potsdam. Also there were no free transportation lines amongst the four zones.³

There was no hope of a rapprochement and the two sides launched massive propaganda against each other. After British, American and French zones merged into one and occupation ended, a Federal Republic of Germany came into existence in West Germany. FRG adopted a constitution called the Basic Law, in anticipation of the eventual unification of Germany. Elections were held in the new state. A pro-Western government came to power under the visionary leadership of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. In due course, Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) became a member of the Western bloc. Soon after the creation of Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet Union established in its occupation zone German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) and Communist Government was set up.

The Iron Curtain fence stretched for thousands of kilometers to separate Eastern and Western countries, and it was especially strong in Germany, where the Berlin Wall became an unmistakable symbol of the Iron Curtain Division. In certain regions, Iron Curtain was nothing more than a plain chain link fence, when in other places it was a highly guarded area, which only people carrying special government permissions could approach.⁴

Concerned over the Soviet intrusion into Greece and Turkey, US President Truman was ready to provide economic assistance and willing to give the British weapons to tackle Greek guerillas. By 1948, losing control over the region, Britain withdrew from Greece and Turkey, which could easily be taken over by the Soviet Union. In view of the British withdrawal, the United States decided to step in to help Greece and Turkey and contain Communism.⁵

3 Ibid.

4 Churchill, Winston, *The Second World War, Triumph, And Tragedy*, Bantam, 1967, p. 480.

5 Kennan, George, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", *Foreign Affairs*, XXV, July 1947, pp.575-576.

US President Truman proposed the Truman Doctrine to extend military and economic assistance to anti-communist forces in Greece and Turkey. This assistance was linked to the US policy of support to “free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Truman Doctrine was a firm US declaration of commitment that the European countries could rely on the United States and a stern warning to the Soviet Union to mend its ways.

George F Kennan, American advisor, diplomat and best known as “Father of Containment” and now returned from Moscow became a key figure in the emergence of Cold War, propounded that Soviet behaviour on the international stage, depended chiefly on the internal necessities of Joseph Stalin’s regime. Kennan further stated that Stalin needed a hostile world in order to legitimize his own autocratic rule. Stalin thus needs Marxism-Leninism as:⁶

“Justification for (the Soviet Union’s) instinctive fear of the outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule.... for sacrifices they felt bound to demand... Today they cannot dispense it. It is the fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability.”

Even while he launched a scathing attack on the erstwhile US foreign policy mainly formulated and executed by lawyers and law minded politicians who gave away too much on ground of morality, and not on a realistic understanding of America’s interests, the US response to the Soviet challenges, Kennan suggested, was to strengthen Western institutions in order to render them invulnerable to the Soviet challenge while awaiting the eventual weakening of the Soviet regime. He argued that Stalin would not (and moreover could not) moderate on the supposed Soviet determination to overthrow Western governments. Thus, he stated:⁷

“The main element of any United States’ policy towards the Soviet Union must be a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.... Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western World is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence.”

Soon after the advent of the Truman Doctrine, US Secretary of State George Marshall presented a very depressing picture of European economy recently shattered and devastated by war. He stated that Europeans would have to make their own efforts to overcome the crisis and proposed economic assistance from the United States for a period of three to four years to prevent “economic, social and political deterioration of a very grave character.” He further stated that initiative had to come from Europe and “the

⁶ Kennan, George, *Memoirs 1925-50*, Hutchinson, London, 1968, p. 490.

⁷ Ibid.

programme should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, of European nations.”⁸

The United States launched the Marshall Plan to rebuild Western and Central Europe. The Marshall Plan was an offer to help all those countries that wanted it. He made no distinction between East and West. Marshall said, “Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty and chaos.” As an architect of the Marshall Plan, Kennan helped launch the pillar of economic and political containment of the Soviet Union. Although Kennan regarded the Soviet Union as too weak to risk an open war, he nevertheless considered it an enemy capable of expanding into Western Europe through subversion given the popular support for Moscow-controlled Communist Parties in Western Europe, which remained demoralized by the devastation of the Second World War. To counter this potential source of Soviet influence, Kennan’s solution was to direct economic aid and secret political help to Japan and Western Europe in order to revive Western governments and prop up international capitalism. By doing so, the United States would help rebuild the balance of power on a global scale to counter the Soviet threat wherever it raised its head.⁹

In addition in June 1948, Kennan proposed secret support of left wing parties not oriented towards Moscow and to labour unions in Western Europe in order to engineer a rift between Moscow and working class movements in Western Europe.

As the United States was launching the Marshall Plan, Kennan and the Truman administration hoped that the Soviet Union’s rejection of the Marshall Plan would place strains on its relations with its Communist allies on East Europe. Meanwhile, Kennan also proposed a series of efforts to exploit the differences between Moscow and Tito’s Yugoslavia. Kennan proposed conducting covert action in the Balkans aimed at further eroding Moscow’s influence.

Stalin responded by extending his control over East European countries through a number of trade treaties. On October 5, 1947, the Soviet Union created an organisation - Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) with its headquarters at Belgrade. It was an association of all the East European Communist Parties. This was to consolidate Eastern Europe into one powerful bloc. It was the Soviet answer to the Marshall Plan.

Britain along with France, Belgium and the Netherlands had been campaigning for greater US contribution to the European defence since early 1948. British Government felt that the defence of Europe could not be effective without active US participation, preferably in a formal organisation. At that time, the United States was not keen to involve herself too deeply.

⁸ Kennan, George, *The Soviet Union and the Atlantic Pact* Foreign Service Dispatch 116, of September 8, From the American Embassy to Department of State, Washington, 1952.

⁹ Ibid.

The Western sectors of Berlin became a thorn in the Soviet side, as the time passed and as Kissinger stated, “*a showcase of prosperity in the midst of the dismal grayness of the Communist bloc*”.¹⁰ West Berlin tempted those from East who look for economic prosperity and freedom to move to the West through the subway. All attempts to re-unify Germany having failed, the Soviet Union separated East Berlin from West Berlin completely and permanently.

The final act in the Berlin crisis in 1961 began when the East German regime created a barbed wire barricade between the Soviet-occupied sector and other sector in the city. A fence had been built around the entire city of Berlin. Kissinger wrote: “*The bankruptcy of a communist regime unable to induce its own citizens to remain within their country was revealed to all the world.*”¹¹

As the settlement of Berlin crisis became a chimera, tension kept on increasing in Europe. The flow of refugees from the East had been steadily growing. In 1959, as many as 1,40,000 persons from East Germany fled to West Germany. Commenting on the Berlin Wall and US response, Paul Johnson wrote: “It was illegal and Truman and Eisenhower would certainly have knocked it down. But under weak President John F. Kennedy, the fait accompli was accepted.”¹² The flow of refugees was checked and East German economy was saved. The Berlin Wall kept the people on either side ruthlessly separated until it was pulled down brick by brick in 1989, at the end of the Cold War.

(b). Coup in Czechoslovakia (1948)

Besides the Berlin Crisis, there were certain developments that changed the US attitude. Since the Second World War, Czechoslovakia had worked to achieve a non-aligned policy that best served its national interests. When it came to foreign affairs, the Czechs tended to ally themselves with the powerful (and geographically close) Soviet Union, but domestically the Czech government was restoring the democracy that existed there in the time between the two worlds was. To hasten their economic recovery after the Second World War, the Czech government was in favor of accepting aid offered in the Marshall Plan. But the Soviets did not intend to allow any state within their sphere of influence to become a democracy; this threatened the security offered by the buffer zone that the Soviets had created.

Stalin urged the Czech leaders not to accept the aid from the Marshall Plan, and then formed the Cominform to combat the Marshall Plan, and the “American Imperialism” that it represented. Czechoslovakia was an unwilling participant in this organisation and as a result did not receive aid for recovery. It suffered the same fate as the other nations

10 Kissinger, Henry, *Years of Upheaval*, Little Brown, Boston, 1982, p.1283.

11 Ibid.

12 Johnson, Paul, “America’s Isolationism”, *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 7, No. 3, May/June 1995, pp. 1-3.

in Eastern Europe that Stalin had denied the right to participate in the Marshall Plan, its economy deteriorated while those of the Western European states began to recover.

In 1947, the Communists with Soviet backing rapidly increased their political power in Czechoslovakia. Supported by the Soviet Army and Soviet influence, both of which were already strong in Czechoslovakia, the communists carried out in a coup in Prague in February 1948. Leading politicians who advocated democracy were arrested and imprisoned, and the communists infiltrated into the government. Shortly after the coup, the Czech President, Edvard Benes was ousted from power and replaced by the leader of the Czech Communist Party, Klement Gottwald. Gottwald and his partisans gained control of the ministries of education, interiors and communications. Major industries were nationalized. The prewar conservative political parties were banned and anti-communists were killed or exiled.

Western eyes saw Czech independence and democracy snuffed out by a totalitarian dictatorship, intent on dominating a small and decent country – at least the Soviets assisted, although it was Czech communists, who had done most of the “dirty work”. The USSR seemed to have completed the formation of a monolithic Soviet bloc and concluded the partition of Europe, which appeared to vindicate and certainly crystallized the pessimistic, and darkest appraisals of Soviet power in the West by people who felt certain that cooperation with that nation was clearly unrealistic. Because its impact was equally profound in Western Europe as in the United States, it helped unify Western countries against the communist bloc. It gave the air of prescience to the French and Italian governments for having driven out communists from their administration. Additionally, it finally discredited Soviet moves to prevent the formation of a West German state and accelerated the construction of a West European alliance, the Treaty of Brussels; mutual security was the new watchword.¹³

The coup's impact in the United States was immediate. Opposition towards the Marshall Plan had developed in the [United States Congress](#), but a shocked and aroused public opinion overwhelmed this, and Congress promptly approved over \$5 billion for the first year of the European Recovery Program. Until the Czech coup, the emphasis in [Washington](#) had been on economic containment of Communism, primarily through the [Truman Doctrine](#) and the Marshall Plan and a heavy reliance on atomic power as a shield to support it. President [Truman](#) understood that in 1946 and 1947 the American people were not prepared for a massive conventional arms buildup or a confrontation with the Soviet Union. He was reluctant to increase the military budget dramatically and instead chose a gradual and balanced buildup. Expecting to spend large amounts on the Marshall Plan, he sought to keep the annual defence budget below \$15 billion.¹⁴

13 Behrman, Greg, *The Most Notable Adventure: The Marshall Plan And The Time When America Helped Saved Europe*, The Free Press, New York, forthcoming, 2011.

14 Ibid.

The Czech coup changed the whole tone of the debate on the US military budget. It helped spark a new round of Pentagon lobbying for a substantial rise in the military budget. Truman responded to the crisis with a nationwide radio address calling for a renewal of selective service. He aimed to send a signal of determination to the Soviet Union that the US military posture was strong and that the country with this expansion of military preparedness was to be also prepared in the future to rearm massively if necessary. The US Congress rejected the programme of Universal Military Training but did vote to resume selective service and voted the money for a seventy-group air force, 25 percent larger than the official request.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the change in American foreign policy in response to the crisis-like atmosphere of early 1948 was more symbolic than real. American willingness to consult on new security arrangements for Europe was the product of neither a changed estimate of Soviet intentions nor a readiness to take on a larger share of burden of defending Western Europe. Rather, it was a tactical maneuver intended to mitigate the effect of the coup in Czechoslovakia and the brief but intense war scare that followed. As a result, a series of quick fixes followed to ensure that American forces would not be caught completely off guard in the event of war. More important was the sensitivity with which American officials now treated the nervousness of their European counterparts; the Americans now became more willing to take steps to boost morale in Europe and ease the widespread anxieties there.¹⁶ The coup and the Berlin Blockade that made clear that constant reassurance was needed to bind the Europeans to the US system¹⁷; hence, the remobilization of US armed forces began.

(c). Elections in Italy (1948)

In the mounting Cold War between the Western democracies and the Soviet bloc, Italians chose sides according to their ideology. During this period the extreme right, composed mainly of former adherents of Mussolini and monarchists, became increasingly bold. An armed band attacked a Communist-led parade at Greci, Sicily, killing eight people. The incident precipitated a cabinet crisis, when Alcide De Gasperi formed a ministry of Christian Democrats and nonparty specialists, excluding both Communists and Socialists. The new regime immediately began a purge of leftists from important public positions.

Coinciding with an intensification of the Cold War, the contest brought Italy to the verge of civil war. Displays of force became a central feature in the strategy of many parties. The Communist-led coalition, operating through the General Confederation of Labor, frequently used strikes as a political weapon. Elections were scheduled on April

15 Grogan, Robert, *Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, 1917-1991*, Lexington Books, 2001, p. 136.

16 Thies, Wallace, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden Shifting in NATO*, ME Sharpe, New York, 2002, pp.32-33.

17 Hunter, Allen, *Rethinking the Cold War*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1998, p.76.

18,1948 and the Communist-dominated Popular Democratic Front stood a realistic chance of victory.

Supplies and credits made available under the Marshall Plan had meanwhile begun to flow into Italy, creating favorable conditions for reconstruction of the national economy. Adhering to their policy of irreconcilable struggle against the plan, Communists promoted a widespread strike for higher wages. In the hysteria and foreboding that gripped Western circles following the Czech coup, it was concluded that similar tactics could be employed in Italy, whose citizens might not even have a chance to vote. British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin and the British Cabinet saw the cooperation between the two leading parties of the Italian left in almost apocalyptic terms, believing that once the Italian Communist Party won power, it would marginalize any modernize influence from the socialists. Bevin immediately concluded that “forces of democratic socialism” must be strengthened in Italy, and that Britain must support Christian Democracy, despite all its faults. Bevin was especially alarmed by the ability of the Communist Party, through the use of its dominant position in the trade union movement, to organize industrial disturbances not only to sabotage the success of the Marshall Plan, but also to subvert the Italian government through factory committees of action as in Czechoslovakia. The Italian Foreign Minister, despite his alarm over the coup’s timings, remained optimistic, assuring Bevin that the army and police were in excellent shape and that the coup would have an adverse effect, turning swing voters from the socialists.¹⁸

This was observed when Communist and Socialist leaders in Italy defended the Czech coup as a victory for democracy, rationalizing that the violation of civil rights was necessary and just response to a reactionary threat posed by Western Imperialist (i.e. American) interests; such discourse probably damaged the Front’s credibility and undercut its promises of modernisation.¹⁹ Kennan cabled to suggest the Communist Party should be outlawed and the U.S. intervene militarily in the likely event of a civil war, but he quickly softened his stand.²⁰

(d). Treaty Between Finland and the Soviet Union (1948)

In 1938, the Soviet Union began diplomatic negotiations with Finland, trying to improve their mutual defence against Germany. The Soviets were mainly concerned that Germany or France and Great Britain would use Finland as a bridgehead for an attack on Leningrad, and demanded a territorial swap to move the border farther away from Leningrad. Little progress was made as the political situation in Europe worsened.

The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed a mutual non-aggression pact, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, on August 23, 1939. The pact also included a secret clause

18 Pedaliu, Effie, G.H., *Britain, Italy and the Origin Of Cold War*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 69.

19 Ventrasca, Robert, *From Fascism To Democracy: Culture And Politics In The Italian Election Of 1948*, University of Toronto Press, 2004, p.6.

20 Hixson, Walter, *George Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast*, Columbia University Press, 1989, p.75.

allocating the countries of Eastern Europe between the two signatories. Finland was consigned to the Soviet 'sphere of influence'. In 1939, the Soviet Union demanded that Finland agree to move the border back from Leningrad. It also demanded that Finland lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for the creation of a naval base. In exchange, the Soviet Union offered Finland a large part of Karelia. This offer was referred to in Finland as "two pounds of dirt for one pound of gold". The Finnish government refused the Soviet demands, resulting in a conflict between them.

Nestled within the great conflict of the Second World War was another lesser known contest – the Winter War between Finland the Soviet Union. On November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union, an August entity with a population of more than 170 million, declared war on Finland, a country of four million.²¹

Moscow Peace Treaty was signed in 1940 with Finland having to cede parts of Karelia, part of Salla and islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Moscow armistice was signed by Finland and the Soviet Union in 1944 ending the Continuation War. Finland's relationship with the USSR necessitated the legalisation of the Communist party and a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance was signed in 1948.

After the Second World War, most Finns became convinced that only neutrality could provide real security since no balancing powers existed in Eastern Europe; the prospects for Scandinavian cooperation were at best remote; and the Western powers were neither willing nor able to guarantee Finnish Security. (Finland had been considered part of the Soviet sphere of influence at the Yalta Conference). A number of developments occurred in the first years after 1948 that further clarified Soviet-Finnish relations. Negotiations for a Scandinavian defense alliance (1948-49) were declared unacceptable to the Soviets. Finland was warned to abandon "Northernism" or the "idea of the North" which the Soviets labeled as an American attempt to increase the influence of the Atlantic Alliance. The negotiations failed.²²

In the mid-1960s, the Finnish President Kekkonen suggested that Norway should leave NATO and instead sign a defense agreement with Great Britain and the United States similar to the Finnish-Soviet agreement. This supposedly would have limited international military involvement (especially during a crisis) in Scandinavia. It was not seriously considered. Kekkonen also suggested that the border between Finland and Norway be neutralized to reduce the possibility of East-West conflict involving Finland. This suggestion was also rejected.²³

The Finnish policies of the other Scandinavian countries can be described by what is called the "Northern Balance Theory." In this theory, a balance between Western

21 Trotter, William R., *A Frozen Hell: the Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40*, Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1991, p. 19.

22 Jakobson, Max and Kennan, George, *Finland in the New Europe*, Greenwood Publishing Group, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 1998, p.88.

23 Ibid.

(Scandinavian) and Soviet interests is maintained by a Finland friendly to the USSR, a neutral Sweden and minimal NATO members Norway and Denmark to whom the threat of closer NATO ties is necessary in preventing further military integration between Finland and the USSR.²⁴

In order to protect the Western Hemisphere from Soviet influence, the United States signed Rio Treaty, an Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Treaty for mutual defence with 19 American republics in 1947. This treaty provided for the peaceful settlement of disputes arising among the signatory nations and to provide defence against aggression on the premise that an attack against an American State shall be an attack against all American States.” This treaty later took the shape of Organisation of American States, Regional Organisation for nations of Western Hemisphere, founded in 1948, in Bogota, Columbia. The organisation administers and extends to all nations in the Western Hemisphere the collective defence guarantee established through the Rio Treaty of 1947.

With the Berlin Blockade and growing might and influence of the Soviet Union, the United States decided to leave the policy of isolation and take active involvement in the defence of Europe. On April 4th, 1949, ten Western Europe-Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal and the United States and Canada signed the Washington Treaty, creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, an alliance aimed to bringing together free and sovereign countries in order to create a collective security system.²⁵

(d). NATO's Constitutional Responses

NATO became a regional organisation permissible under Article 51 of the UN charter. The treaty provided for mutual consultation in case political independence, territorial integrity or security of any of the signatories in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and they agreed to work for collective defence and to assist each other. This would include the use of armed forces to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

From the beginning of NATO, Western Europe's defence against a land invasion from the East demanded a major reliance on the U.S. leader in atomic power. Western military spokesmen agreed that in any immediate war Western land and air forces would be inadequate to protect the Western frontiers. The creation of adequate defences, moreover, would take and extensive U.S. assistance. Whereas the atomic strategy offered a formidable deterrent against a conventional attack, it could not prevent the Soviet occupation of Western Europe. For that reason, Western spokesmen had little choice but to assume that the Soviet danger indeed had been exaggerated or to build defences that would guarantee the treaty area against a land invasion.

24 Ibid.

25 Schlesinger, Arthur, “Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat”, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1995.

On August 8, 1949, Acheson appeared before a Joint Hearing of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees to argue the administration's case for military assistance to various North Atlantic Treaty countries. In the same year, Congress authorised a military assistance program, encouraged in part by the initial explosion of an atomic device by the USSR, which terminated the American monopoly. The Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 first authorised the president to furnish military assistance to the members of NATO, but only to countries that had requested such aid prior to the effective date of law. Secondly, the President could not distribute any of the \$900 million made available for Europe before the NATO allies had integrated their defences in the North Atlantic area. Third, the law provided that any recipient nation must have entered into an agreement with the United States that embodied certain defence obligations in exchange for military assistance.²⁶

In a meeting in Paris in December 1949, North Atlantic leaders accepted unanimously the recommendations of NATO's Military Committee for the integrated defence of the treaty area, and the North Atlantic Council approved the recommendations. Shortly thereafter Truman agreed that the recommendations satisfied the need of a common defence based on the cooperative use of military resources. The recommendations, said the president, "provide further convincing evidence of the determination of these nations to resist aggression against any of them and as a definite indication of the genuine spirit of cooperation among the Treaty members."²⁷ Early in 1950 Washington negotiated a series of bilateral military aid agreements with NATO members, whereby the latter agreed to supplement U.S. assistance with defence programs of their own.

Still, the process of building unity and strength into the Atlantic world had scarcely begun. The continuing search for security soon focused on West Germany, still potentially Western Europe's most powerful nation. As early as 1949, Acheson made the integration of West Germany into Europe's burgeoning security system the ultimate objective of United States defence policy. Henry A Byroade, Director of German and Austrian Affairs, informed the Southern Newspaper Publishers' Association that "We are determined to do all within our capacity to bring about the assimilation of West Germany into a free Europe and the assumption of cooperative responsibilities by the Germans in the European community."²⁸ With the establishment of the German Federal Republic in 1948, the occupation governments had continued to control Germany's military and foreign affairs as well as all of its foreign trade policies. What mattered thereafter was the extent to which Britain, France, and the United States chose to exercise their powers.

26 Acheson's statement before the Joint Hearing of the Foreign Relations And Armed Service Committee, August 8, 1949.

27 Mutual Defence Assistance Agreements, Department of State *Bulletin* 22 (February 6, 1950): 198.

28 Acheson's address to the American Society of Newspaper Publishers, New York, April 29, 1949, *ibid* 20 (May 8, 1949): 585; Byroade's address to the Southern Newspaper Publishers' Association, Mineral Wells, Texas, October 31, 1949, *ibid* 21 (November 7, 1949): 702.

Many Western writers and officials alike had argued against the German membership in NATO. To commit West Germany to the North Atlantic Alliance, warned American critic James P Warburg in 1949, would not only involve the United States in rearming of Germany but also would solidify the Eastern bloc. To arm Western Germany, declared Kennan, would create an unacceptable threat to the USSR and divide Germany permanently into Western and Soviet sphere. Never would the Kremlin tolerate a united Germany armed and free to pursue its own destiny. British writer Kingsley Martin argued that the desire to be on good terms with Germany reflected essentially a fear of the Soviet Union. An armed Germany would contribute nothing to European security, for the only effective deterrent against Soviet expansion was the US commitment to Europe's defence.²⁹

The US took the lead in establishing West Germany from three Western zones of occupation. To counter the Western reorganization of Germany, the Soviet Union proclaimed its zone of occupation in Germany as the 'German Democratic Republic'. After 1950, responsibility for the defence of Indochina against Communism turned increasingly to the United States, which funded more and more of France's ultimately vain effort to stem the insurgency.

What established the necessary level of Western concern to resolve the German question was the outbreak of the Korean War. The North Korean attack on June 25, 1950, seemed to prove two basic assumptions on which NATO rested: that the USSR would probe every weak spot in the long line that separated the Communist from the non-Communist worlds and the United States would come to the assistance of any victim of Communist-led aggression. Korea also turned containment from a matter of diplomacy into one of military reality, for it demonstrated that Western intent had fallen increasingly out of step with military strategy. No longer could the NATO countries limit their defence expenditures to what they believed they could afford; the emergency seemed clear. Still it was essential that the military requirements not be exaggerated. As the *Economist* warned, "over and over again, it must be repeated that the job is not to fight and win a war – when the sky is the limit – but to prevent one – in which time is of the essence."³⁰

Following their September 1950 meeting in New York, the foreign ministers of Great Britain, France and the United States announced their decision to rearm Germany. The standard that they followed Byroade had marked clearly over CBS: "everything we do in Germany must be measured in terms of its effect on...the great and rising menace from the East." In their communiqué the ministers spelled out their intention to strengthen Western Europe through the further integration of the Federal Republic into the Atlantic Community. The USSR had established large military units in its zone of occupation. Now the three allies would not only strengthen their forces in Germany but also invite German participation in an integrated Western European force. How Germany would

29 *New Statesman and Nation*, July 30, 1949, p.115.

30 "Strength with Speed," *Economist* 159 (July 8, 1950):58; "Priorities for Containment," *ibid* 159 (July 22, 1950): 154.

participate in this common defence was too divisive an issue to permit an immediate decision. France completely refused to accept the creation of an independent German army, insisting instead that German contingents, limited to battalion size, be incorporated into a European army. Meanwhile, the Federal Republic regained control of its foreign affairs, with the right to establish diplomatic relations with other countries as well as increased freedom over all internal and external economic matters.³¹

The American response to the challenge of Soviet power after 1949 had seemed impressive indeed. Former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter Bedell Smith had warned the nation in June 1949: "It is extremely important for the democracies, and especially the United States, never to lose sight of the fundamental fact that we are engaged in a constant, continuing, grueling struggle for freedom and the American way of life that may extend over a period of many years." In time Acheson shared this view that the Soviet Union endangered American civilization itself. What made the Soviet threat so serious was less the traditional struggle for power than the Communist ideology that determined Kremlin policy. "This fanatical doctrine", he had declared in 1950, "dominates one of the greatest states in the world, a state which, with its satellites, controls the lives of hundreds of millions of people and which today possessed the largest military establishment in existence." The threat was especially dangerous because the Kremlin had singled out the United States as the principal target of attack, convinced that it was the productive power and vitality of this country that stood between the Soviet Union and dominion over the entire world. "We are faced with a threat," Acheson continued, "in all sober truth I say this – we are faced with a threat not only to our country but to the civilization in which we live and to the whole physical environment in which that civilization can exist."³²

With the outbreak of Korean War, Acheson emphasised that the need for power as the foundation of a desired settlement. On September 1950, he said in a national television: "The goal for which we are struggling in to settle, so far as we can, the great issues between the East and the West. We cannot have one party very strong in terms of armament, and the other party very weak."³³ He warned Atlantic Pact members that their military plans were far too modest to convince Congress of their good faith. Unless Europe has convincing evidence of its intention to rearm, Congress would refuse to reinforce American troops in Europe or send additional supplies and equipment.³⁴

To overcome Europe's reluctance to create the fifty-division integrated defence force recommended by the NATO chiefs of staff, European leaders invited U.S. General Eisenhower to return to Europe as Supreme Commander of all NATO forces. It was hoped that his presence would serve as a pledge of the American commitment to

31 Byroade's television broadcast over CBS, August 20, 1950, Department of State *Bulletin* 23 (September 11, 1950): 427; report over the foreign ministers' meeting, September 19, 1950, *ibid* 23 (October 23, 1950): 530-31.

32 Department of State, *Strengthening the Forces of Freedom* (Washington, 1950), p.1.

33 Quoted in *New York Times*, September 10, 1950.

34 "Germans and Russians", *Economist* 150 (December 23, 1950): 1125-26.

Europe and give NATO the prestige and leadership required to overcome those vested interests, which undermined its unity and purpose.

Obviously any Western negotiation with the Kremlin held greater promise of success if conducted from a position of strength. Still the *New Statesman and Nation* detected early the central fallacy in the concept: "The difficulty is that while countries dare not negotiate when they are weak, they are apt not to think it worth while when they feel strong."³⁵ That the West lacked the will to build a predominant military structure mattered little. There would no negotiation from strength, not because power was elusive but because the aims of Western diplomacy were unattainable. No level of preparedness would dismantle the Iron Curtain without war for the reason that the West could never establish an interest in Eastern Europe substantial enough to lend credibility to any threat of force. Washington had managed to place the nation's goals beyond Western military capabilities. Consequently, the West faced the simple choice of indefinite coexistence with the Soviet world or resort to war.

Communism spread to Asia in 1949, when the Chinese communist forces under Mao Zedong overthrew the anti-communist government of Chiang Kai Shek. Mao forced Chiang to flee China for the island of Formosa, where Chiang set up the government of Taiwan. The communist takeover of China increased American fears of communist domination of most of the world. In addition, before 1949 ended, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb.

Of course, who would want to do that? This was probably the most dangerous period for nuclear war. The vast growth in the numbers and kinds of long range nuclear weapons meant neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could hope to escape the ravages of thermonuclear war. Of course, the massive numbers of nuclear warheads produced actually resulted in a stalemate – and this was good for everyone concerned. The world shuddered at the thought that the destiny of the globe was in the hands of two superpowers, yet the logic of the "balance of terror" worked right from the start. Total war was too dangerous. It would destroy everything. There are no victors in thermonuclear war – only victims.

The fear of communism and the threat of nuclear war affected American life throughout the Cold War. The trials of both Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs caused many Americans to fear that communist spies held important parties in the federal government. Hiss was accused of passing secret documents to the Soviets during the late 1930s. Although Hiss claimed his innocence, he was convicted of perjury (lying under oath), and many Americans believed he was guilty of treason.³⁶ In 1950, the United States learned that a spy ring had sent atomic secrets to the Soviets, which had allowed them to develop an atomic bomb so quickly. This information led to the arrest of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who had worked on the United States' atomic project. In

35 *New Statesman and Nation*, August 18, 1951, p. 170.

36 Navasky, Victor, "Hiss in History", *The Nation*, April 12, 2007.

1951, after a long and widely publicized trial, a jury found Rosenbergs guilty of espionage. The United States government executed the Rosenbergs in 1953.³⁷

American fears of communism in the early fifties advanced the political career of Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. Senator McCarthy played on American fears of communism by recklessly accusing many American governmental officials and citizens of being communists. He based these charges on very weak evidence or no evidence at all. He produced a piece of paper which he claimed contained a list of known Communists working for the [State Department](#). McCarthy is usually quoted as saying: "I have here in my hand a list of 205 — a list of names that were made known to the [Secretary of State](#) as being members of the [Communist Party](#) and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department."³⁸ In 1954, the Army-McCarthy hearings were televised. These Senate hearings investigated the alleged communist influence in the United States Army. When the army's attorney stood up to McCarthy at these hearings, McCarthy showed himself to be a liar and bully rather a heroic defender of American democracy. The Senate then censured Senator McCarthy and he quickly lost his influence. Nevertheless, McCarthy's rapid rise to power led to the coining of the term McCarthyism, or the making of his allegations based on rumour or guilt by association. One may also define McCarthyism as unfairly accusing others of disloyalty and subversion.

Soviet counter-measures, meanwhile were far from successful. Appeals for neutrality were unsuccessful in Japan though they gained sympathy from those states that would probably have chosen neutrality anyway. Similar appeals failed almost completely in Europe. The Soviets tightened their hold on Germany and Poland, creating the German Democratic Republic in 1950, and formally linking it with the Soviet pact system. But efforts to hold out the bait of reunification to attract West Germany away from the Western Alliance were in vain. Whatever - an equal voice for East and West Germans - was sufficient to make it wholly unacceptable.

However, other events dictated the expansion of Western alliance to West Asia, South and Southeast Asia. Soon after the communist victory in Indo-China and North Korea, the anti-communist forces – Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States formed the NATO-like security pact for Southeast Asia South East Asia Treaty Organisation (the Manila Pact) on September 8, 1954 to meet the growing cries from the Philippines. Like the NATO, the Southeast Asian alliance was intended to prevent the spread of communism.³⁹

SEATO was designed to be a Southeast Asian version of NATO, in which the military forces of each member would be coordinated to provide for the collective defence of the

37 Stanley, Alessandra, "Russia's K.G.B Plays Down Atomic Role of Rosenbergs", *New York Times*, March 16, 1997.

38 Griffith, Robert, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate*, University of Massachusetts Press, Baltimore, 1987, p. 49.

39 Bogle, Lori Lyn, *The Cold War*, Taylor and Francis, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2001, p. 172.

members. SEATO did use portions of the military forces of its members in annual joint training maneuvers. Unlike the NATO alliance, SEATO had no joint commands with standing forces. Also an attack on one member was not automatically considered an attack on all. Although a condition of the Geneva agreement had prohibited South Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos from participating in an Alliance, a SEATO protocol extended protection to Indo-China. SEATO, though, was not a multilateral defence treaty like NATO, it simply pledged resistance to communism with no automatic provisions for either collective action or intervention in regional or other disputes.⁴⁰ Despite being intended to provide a collective, anti-communist shield to Southeast Asia, SEATO was unable to intervene in the conflicts in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam because an intervention required a decision of unanimity, which was never reached; France and the Philippines objected. Intervention in the Vietnam conflict was sought again later, but France and Pakistan withheld support.⁴¹

Given the declining interests of France (after 1954) and the United Kingdom (after the end of the Indonesian-Malaysian conflict in 1966), in Southeast Asia, SEATO failed to be effective as a collective security organisation. SEATO was created as part of Truman Doctrine of creating anti-communist bilateral and collective defensive treaties. These treaties and agreements were intended to create alliances that would contain communist power. This policy was considered to have been largely developed by American diplomat George Kennan. President Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was the primary force behind the creation of SEATO, which expanded the concept of anti-communist collective defense to Southeast Asia.⁴²

It was three years since the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation was rather hastily established after the French military collapse in Indo-China. What was its present effectiveness, and what were its prospects, as a security organisation for Southeast Asia? There has never been any doubt or obscurity about SEATO's over-riding purpose - to resist the extension, by whatever means, of Communist rule in Southeast Asia. At the Manila Conference, there was some clash of opinion on how the purpose of the proposed body should be officially proclaimed. The United States wanted to limit it to resistance against Communist aggression, while the United Kingdom and some other countries thought it would be more politic to refer to aggression in general terms, since this might make SEATO less unpalatable to the Colombo powers. The United States then agreed to refer to aggression in general terms in the body of the Treaty, but announced its understanding that its own military obligations were limited to the resistance of Communist aggression. At the same time, Australia insisted on its own proviso that nothing in the Treaty must be construed as a

40 Brands, "Bound To Empire: The United States And The Philippines", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Volume 52, No. 3, August 1993, pp. 257-59 and Combs, Jerald, *History of American Foreign Policy: From 1895*, Volume 2, M.E. Sharpe, New York, June 2008, pp. 366-69.

41 Bogle, note 102.

42 Halle, note 13, pp. 40-42.

A major test for the containment policy came in 1950 when communist North Koreans invaded non-communist South Korea. American military forces led a counterattack that drove deep into North Korea itself. Communist Chinese forces then came into the war on the side of North Korea, and the war threatened to widen. In 1952, former World War II hero Dwight Eisenhower won the presidential election, after he had promised to go to Korea. In 1953, the Korean War ended in stalemate with South Korea free of communist occupation. Because the United States had prevented South Korea from falling under communist control, the nation's confidence in the containment policy increased. The first armed conflict of the Cold War, the Korean War led to a major increase in defence spending by the United States. Because American leaders saw Stalin's actions in Korea as a potential precursor to aggressive movements in Europe, the war helped prompt the United States to turn NATO into an ambitious and permanent military structure.⁴³

The United States and its Western allies carried out an agreement to rearm West Germany and integrate it into NATO. This development threatened a vital Soviet foreign policy objective: the Soviet Union was intent on preventing the resurgence of a powerful German nation and particularly one allied with the Western powers. In an effort to derail the admission of West Germany to NATO, Soviet representative at the 1954 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference in Berlin, Viacheslav Molotov went so far as to propose the possibility of holding simultaneous elections in both German States that might lead to a re-unified, though neutral and disarmed, Germany. At the same time, the Soviet Union proposed to the Western powers a general treaty on collective security in Europe and the dismantling the existing military blocs. When this tactic failed and West Germany joined NATO on May 5, 1955, the Soviet Union declared that West Germany's membership in the Western alliance created a special threat to Soviet interests. The Soviet Union also declared that this development made its existing network of bilateral treaties an inadequate security guarantee and forced the East European socialist countries to "combine efforts in a strong political and military alliance".⁴⁴

The Soviet Union, in response to the West's anti-Communist moves, concluded the Warsaw Pact with her satellites on May 24, 1955. It concluded all communist states in Europe-Soviet Russia, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and East Germany - except Yugoslavia, which under the leadership of Marshall Josef Tito stood united against the thrusts of both the West as well as the Soviet. The Warsaw Pact allowed Russia to station her troops in Eastern European countries.

The Soviet Union claimed that the May 1955 creation of the Warsaw Pact was done in reaction to the induction of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO in that same year. The pact formalized the Soviet Union's position as head of a socialist bloc of states, and replaced bilateral relations with a multilateral framework.⁴⁵

43 Calvocoressi, Peter, *World Politics, 1945-2000*, Longman Ltd, New York, 8th edition, 2000, pp.36-39.

44 Schumann, Arthur, *Berlin Blockade*, Random House, New York, 1989, p.20.

45 Ibid.

While the Soviets had avoided formalizing their alliance to keep the onus of dividing Europe into opposing blocs on the West, the admission into NATO of the European state with the greatest military power forced the Soviet Union to take NATO into account for the first time. The Soviet Union also used West Germany's membership in NATO for propaganda purposes. The Soviets evoked the threat of a re-armed West Germany seeking to reverse its defeat in the Second World War to remind the East European countries of their debt to the Soviet Union for their liberation, their need for Soviet protection against a recent enemy, and their corresponding duty to respect Soviet security interests and join the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet Union had important reasons for institutionalizing the informal alliance system established through its bilateral treaties with the East European countries, concluded before the 1949 formation of NATO. As a formal organisation, the Warsaw Pact provided the Soviet Union an official counterweight to NATO in East-West diplomacy. The Warsaw Pact gave the Soviet Union a status equal to the United States as the leader of an alliance of nations supporting its foreign policy initiatives in the international arena. The multilateral Warsaw Pact was an improvement over strictly bilateral ties as a mechanism for transmitting Soviet defence and foreign policy directives to the East European allies. The Warsaw Pact also helped to legitimize the presence of Soviet troop- and overwhelming Soviet influence- in Eastern Europe.

2. AFTER WARSAW (1955-78)

The challenges faced by the NATO after 1955 portrayed here are: the Hungarian Crisis, the Czechoslovakian Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis, the *Détente*, Disarmament/Arms Control Treaties.

After Truman-Stalin Era, the East-West Relations considerably eased, but there were no signs of the end of Cold War. With the outbreak of the Korean War, Acheson re-emphasised the need for power as the foundation of a desired settlement. On September 10, 1950, he declared over national television: "the goal for which we are struggling in to settle, so far as we can, the great issues between East and West. To settle these differences, we have got to talk on equal terms. We cannot have one party very strong in terms of armament, and the other very weak."

One of the NATO's first major crises was the handling of the Suez Canal crisis, in which France and the United Kingdom cooperated with Israel to launch military strikes on Egypt for its decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. The strikes were conducted without any consultation at NATO and with NATO Secretary General Lord Hastings Ismay out of the decision-making process. In responses to the strikes, the United States condemned the British-French-Israeli actions, and sided with the Soviet Union and Egypt in calling the removal of Israeli forces from the region. Others in the Alliance were upset with the British and French, given that the Soviet Union had just intervened in Hungary to suppress a democratic uprising, and that the alliance's credibility had been threatened due to the open disagreements between allies. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower felt that he had been personally betrayed by the British due to the secret

planning for the military strikes and the complete absence of consultation with the United States.⁴⁶ NATO historian Lawrence S. Kaplan noted, "The result was the near destruction of the Alliance as the United States sided with the Soviets to oppose the Suez Operation."⁴⁷

In December 1956, NATO accepted a report provided by the foreign ministers from Canada, Italy, and Norway (Lester Pearson, Halvard Lange and Gaetano Martino), who later came to be known as NATO's "Three Wise Men". Their report, which had been called for by then U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, allowed for greater leadership authority at NATO and oversee all North Atlantic Council (NAC) sessions; NATO's official decision making body. The report also allowed the NAC to broaden its scope of discussion by allowing any member of the alliance to raise any issue of concern. In addition, the report reaffirmed the allies' commitment to greater transatlantic consultation. Although the report had little immediate impact, it is clear that American, British, and French differences over military action in the Middle East were rather quickly overcome and that the Alliance found consensus to work toward an improved and stronger NATO.⁴⁸

With the decline of the British power, the United States was compelled to assume new responsibilities. In March 1957 at U.S. President Eisenhower's request, the Congress declared that the United States was prepared to use force to protect Middle Eastern peoples against armed aggression by international Communism and appropriated \$ 200 million for military and economic aid to all Middle Eastern states, which were willing to receive it. This extension of American leadership to a new region became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. But by what means the United States could curb the explosive nationalism of the Arab states prevent them from accepting Soviet offers, and persuade them to make peace with the Israelis remained to be seen.⁴⁹

(a). Soviet Interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968)

The Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 gave sleepless nights to the NATO generals. The year 1961 was momentous for the Alliance with the Berlin Wall, the shooting down of a U-2 aircraft and arrest of its pilot and the armament and installation of missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba right at the underbelly of the United States, with the United States responding to it with naval blockade.

46 Douglas, Stuart and Tow, William, *The Limits of the Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems Since 1949*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1990, pp.60-61.

47 Kaplan, Lawrence S., *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, Praeger Publishers, 2004, Westport, Connecticut, p.13.

48 Kaplan, Lawrence S., "Report of the 'Three Wise Men': 50 Years On", *NATO Review*, Spring 2006.

49 Parkes, Henry Bamford, *A History of the United States Of America*, Knopf, New York, 1957, pp.701-702.

Since the end of Second World War, Hungary was governed by an orthodox Communist leader, Matyas Rakosi, nominee of Stalin. His regime was severe even by Stalinist standards. In 1953, he was replaced by a reformist Communist, Imre Nagy. Two years later, he was removed and Rakosi returned to power. This time, many intellectuals were sent to prison and Nagy was expelled from the Communist Party. Nagy challenged the Soviet Union's right to intervene in the domestic affairs of fellow communist countries. On October 23, 1956, people in Hungary rose in revolt. Public demonstrations became violent and people demanded a multi-party system, complete withdrawal of Soviet troops and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet Union was not prepared to accept a liberalized economy Communist regime or a multi-party democracy in a country that she had brought under her control, and ignored the aspirations of the Hungarian people. Call for free elections under the UN supervision was not accepted by the Soviet Union and this clearly violated Hungarian sovereignty.

The western countries reacted with extreme caution to the Hungarian Revolution movement. The international environment gave limited room to maneuver within the existing European status quo. The reason was the possibility of a thermonuclear war with the USSR. The possibility of a new war was not a brand new idea. —In the US, by one report, features of a new war were being studied and concepts such as the — northern corner“(the Arctic region) would be the strategic center.” This idea emerged since the end of the Second World War.⁵⁰

[The Secretary-General of NATO](#) **Paul Henri Charles Spaak** called the Hungarian revolt "the collective suicide of a whole people".⁵¹ The actions from the western side, such as the establishment of NATO, rearmament of West Germany and adaptation into NATO clearly showed the intent of the western countries. Russian reactions, such as the explosion of the atomic and Hydrogen bombs and the formation of the Warsaw Pact kept up with them.

The U.S. paid closer attention to the developing Hungarian Crisis. The Chairman of the Joint chiefs and the CIA Director continued to be unusually watchful and alert for as long as the crisis continued. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles gave a speech at the Dallas Council on World Affairs on October 27th and articulated the U.S. policy which was “Washington sought no military alliances in Eastern Europe and Khurushchev should be told that too. The U.S. would not take advantage of any independence the Soviet might grant their satellites to recruit new partners for NATO. The viewpoint of U.S. leaders from this political confirmation was clear. On the other hand, the Eisenhower administration and the world's greatest military power had very limited options regarding any sort of intervention within the Soviet sphere of influence. To preserve the U.S. international prestige: —it was for this reason that on 24 October Dulles suggested to

50 Roman, Eric, *Hungary and the Victor Powers, 1945-1950*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996, p. 149.

51 “How To Help Hungary”, *Times Magazine*, 24/12/1956.

President Eisenhower that the issue of Soviet intervention should be broached in the Security Council.⁵²

The NATO had committed itself to a large build-up of ground and air forces to match what it saw as conventional superiority on the part of the Soviet Union and the East European states. Eisenhower decided that such a policy was not feasible in economic terms, and in 1953 he adopted a policy that placed a heavy reliance on nuclear retaliation to deter Soviet aggression wherever it might occur. In line with this policy, the NATO adopted MC 48 in December 1954; this was a new strategy that placed primary reliance on nuclear weapons and on combat forces in being. The aim of the strategy was to convince the Soviet Union that "in the event of aggression [it] will be subjected immediately to devastating counter-attack employing atomic weapons".⁵³

West Germany was admitted into the NATO in 1955 and was re-armed to offset Soviet conventional superiority. Nevertheless, U.S. and the NATO strategy continued to rely heavily on nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons, which the United States had begun to deploy in Europe. Any thought of military intervention by the United States or the NATO would have had to face the fact of Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, and more specifically the presence of Soviet forces in Hungary, Romania, and in the adjoining parts of the Soviet Union. Intervention would have involved direct clashes between Soviet and NATO forces, thereby risking escalation to general war. The crisis then turned out to be a "blessing in disguise" for the strengthening of NATO conventional forces.

In 1967, NATO had adopted a new strategic concept, known as "flexible response", to replace the outdated strategy of massive retaliation. NATO also had approved the Harmel Report, a landmark document on "The Future Tasks of the Alliance", which proposed to move away from the Cold War confrontation and towards peaceful co-existence with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Auspicious though these developments may have seemed, the Harmel Report's two-track approach of "defence and détente" was soon overshadowed by events in Eastern Europe, especially in Czechoslovakia.⁵⁴

At the beginning of 1968, a progressive faction in Czechoslovakia Communist Party decided that radical changes were necessary to forestall a major catastrophe. The new regime set about liberalizing and democratizing Czechoslovak life and loosening the country's association with the USSR. Its' Action Programme guaranteed freedom of press, speech, assembly and religion; gave a greater role to non-Communist parties and groups; adopted economic reforms, including decentralized decision making and profit incentives; and promised federal status for Slovakia. Dubcek even allowed anti-

52 Calhoun, Daniel F., *Hungary And Suez, 1956:An Exploration of Who Makes History*, Lanham, University Press of America, 1991, p.338.

53 Pedlow, Gregory W., *NATO's Strategy Documents, 1945-1969*, Brussels, 1967, p.232.

54 McGinn, John G., "The Politics of Collective Inaction: NATO's Response To The Prague Spring", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Volume 1, Number 3, Fall 1999, pp.111-138.

USSR opinions to appear in Prague newspapers. Beginning in February 1968, this new era of freedom had a startling effect on the people of Czechoslovakia, particularly those of its capital city of Prague. The new freedoms resulted in a more enlightened political, cultural, and social atmosphere. This time period from February to August 1968 became known as the “Prague Spring”. However, it evoked only hostility from the Soviet Union and other East European socialist countries.⁵⁵

Unconvinced, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact Allies decided to end the Czechoslovak experiment. The Soviet Union intervened in the Czechoslovakia on the pretext that the Czechoslovakia Communist Party granted substantial rights to minor parties and Dubcek and other Czechoslovak leaders were arrested and taken to Moscow. It was the job of the UN Security Council to resolve this issue and end this conflict as soon as possible. As the Security Council included both NATO powers who wanted to protect the reforms of the Dubcek government and ensure Czechoslovak sovereignty, and Warsaw Pact powers, which place the security of the “world revolution” above all, negotiations must be made as to how this issue can be resolved to please both sides.⁵⁶ Henry Kissinger, stated, “The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had weakened the ideological appeal of Communism in the rest of the world.”⁵⁷

The Prague Spring represented a more serious challenge to the Soviet Union because it occurred in an area more crucial to Soviet Security. The domestic liberalisation program of the Czechoslovakian Communist regime led by Alexander Dubcek threatened to generate popular demands for similar changes in the other East European countries and even parts of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union believed it necessary to forestall the spread of liberalisation and to assert its right to enforce the boundaries of ideological permissibility in Eastern Europe. However, domestic change in Czechoslovakia also began to affect defence and foreign policy, just as it had in Hungary in 1956, despite Dubcek’s declared intention to keep Czechoslovakia within the Warsaw Pact. This worrying development was an important factor in the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968.⁵⁸

This intervention was explained by the Brezhnev Doctrine, which stated, “When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries.” Implicit in this doctrine was that the leadership of the Soviet Union reserved to itself the right to define ‘socialism’ and ‘capitalism’. Thus ‘socialism’ was defined according to the Soviet model, and anything significantly different from this model was considered to be a step towards capitalism.⁵⁹

55 Rubinstein, Alvin Z., *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global*, Harper Collins Publishers Inc., New York, 4th edition, 1992, pp. 104-107.

56 Ibid.

57 Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy*, Pocket Books, Simon and Schuster, New York, December 3, 2003, pp. 112-114.

58 Rubinstein, note 118.

This doctrine was announced to justify the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to terminate the Prague Summit, along with earlier Soviet military interventions, such as the invasion of Hungary in 1956. These interventions were meant to put an end to liberalisation efforts and uprisings that had the potential to compromise Soviet hegemony inside the Eastern bloc, which was considered by the Soviets to be an essential defensive and strategic buffer in case hostilities with the West were to break out. It was therefore assumed that there was a world of socialist countries, whose economic and political goals stand wedded to each other and there was a world outside the system defining relations between socialist countries on the one hand and the non-socialist and capitalist countries on the other. The relationships between the former must be maintained and deviations, if any, in one socialist country should be rectified in the interests of socialist solidarity. In this, the use of force would be justifiable.⁶⁰

The Soviet invasion of the Czechoslovakia caught much of the Western world surprise and was significant in the sense that it delayed the splintering of Eastern European Communism and was concluded without provoking any direct intervention from the West. The invasion did temporarily derail progress towards détente between the Soviet Union and the United States. The NATO Allies valued the idea of a lessening of tensions, and as a result they were determined not to intervene. Still, the invasion forced U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson to cancel a summit with the Soviet leader Brezhnev. Although Brezhnev knew this was the most likely outcome of the invasion, he considered maintaining Soviet control in the East Bloc a higher priority in the short-term than pursuing détente with the West. As it turned out, the progress on arms control agreements were only delayed by a few years in the aftermath of the Prague Spring.⁶¹

The Western intelligence officials, especially the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States focused in on two critical factors. This first of these was the importance of the Czechoslovak armed forces to Warsaw Pact military planning. In a war with NATO, the Czechoslovak army would have formed the first echelon of a Warsaw Pact attack into southern Germany, intended to outflank any NATO effort to defend along the inner-German border and, ultimately, to drive across Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg to the Rhein.⁶² The Czechoslovak military leadership was given command of the Front and would have retained command of its armed forces in wartime--which put Czechoslovakia, alongside Poland, in a privileged position in the Warsaw Pact hierarchy.⁶³ The reduction of Soviet ground forces in the early 1960s had

59 Stavrianos, L.S., *The Epic of Man*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1971, pp.456-66 and Ouimet, Matthew, *The Rise And Fall Of The Brezhnev Doctrine In Soviet Foreign Policy*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2003, pp. 3-6.

60 Ibid.

61 'Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968', U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C.

62 DI Intelligence Memorandum (OSR), *Warsaw Pact War Plan for Central Region of Europe*, 18 June 1968, p. 5, p. 1.

63 Ibid, p.1.

only increased the importance of the Czechoslovak army to Soviet/Warsaw Pact war planning.⁶⁴

The second factor was the importance of the Czechoslovak economy within the Soviet bloc. Czechoslovakia was among the most industrially developed of the Warsaw Pact countries, yet it had suffered the most from 20 years of communist rule. In 1948, Czechoslovakia was better off than West Germany, but by 1968 per capita output had slipped to about two-thirds that of the Federal Republic, in addition to major differences in quality. Moscow was aware that popular opinion in Czechoslovakia blamed the old-line party hierarchy for its relative decline.⁶⁵ "Economic pressure is a major force for political change in Eastern Europe," noted a March 1968 intelligence report. Without meaningful reform, Czechoslovakia's problems "may become acute in the next two or three years..."⁶⁶

To CIA, the Czechoslovak economic crisis meant that the Soviet leadership was concerned over the stability and reliability of Prague's military contribution to the Warsaw Pact. They thus were likely to be receptive to anything that promised a solution to Czechoslovakia's internal problems. Moscow also realized that the first result of a premature attempt to decisively intervene in Czechoslovakia likely would be demoralization of the Czechoslovak military. At the same time, the Kremlin was concerned that the "contagion" of Czech democratization not spread nor that the Czechoslovaks themselves go too far in creating an open society. All these factors seemed to add up to a Soviet decision to watch, wait, and hope for the best, while preparing for the worst.⁶⁷

Although NATO members closely watched developments in Czechoslovakia throughout 1968, the alliance did not pursue a coherent policy. NATO members were extremely cautious in their actions toward Czechoslovakia primarily because they were eager to strengthen the budding process of detente with the Soviet bloc. Substantive arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union appeared to be a real possibility by the summer of 1968, and most of the allied governments feared that any public pronouncements or other actions by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) would jeopardize the chances for meaningful agreements. In addition, most Western leaders believed that any supportive rhetoric from NATO would merely undermine the position of the reformist government in Prague vis-a-vis its Warsaw Pact allies. As a result, NATO members worked individually rather than collectively to avert military action in Eastern Europe through the use of quiet diplomacy. Western diplomats secretly conveyed messages to the Soviet Union warning that aggressive actions against Czechoslovakia would have adverse effects on East-West relations. This quiet diplomacy signaled that the allies

64 Ibid.

65 DI Intelligence Memorandum (OER), *Economic Pressure for Change in Eastern Europe*, ER IM 68-33, 27 March 1968, p. 2, pp. 1,4.

66 Ibid.

67 Unsigned CIA Memorandum, *Need of Czechoslovakia for Western Economic Support*, 8 April 1968, pp. 1-2.

wanted to avoid increasing tensions with the East but, at the same time, were eager to take steps on their own that would help forestall Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia.⁶⁸

As these events unfolded in the East, NATO was busy trying to follow up on the decisions taken at its December 1967 meeting. Although the individual states were keeping track of developments in Czechoslovakia, their main concern was how to implement the recommendations of the Harmel Report, especially the recommendations pertaining to detente and a further relaxation of tensions. Numerous issues had to be resolved before the principles could be put into practice, but the general direction seemed to be positive.⁶⁹

Despite this air of optimism, the Western allies were not counting on any sudden breakthroughs. NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio acknowledged that follow-up studies to the Harmel Report did not require dramatic and immediate accomplishments. In a conversation with the U.S. ambassador to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, in February 1968, Brosio said that even the first steps toward implementation of the conclusions of the Harmel Report were important. The alliance had recently emerged from a two-year crisis of credibility in 1966-1967, sparked by French President Charles de Gaulle's decision to pull his country out of NATO's integrated military command. The debate over the flexible response strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in allied defense policy had laid bare some major fissures within NATO that were just beginning to be repaired. Slow but steady progress, therefore, was a desirable outcome for Western leaders in 1968.⁷⁰

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on November 15th and 16th, 1968 attended by Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers to discuss the serious situation following the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia and the occupation of that country by the Soviet Union. They noted that the principle (all nations are independent and that any intervention by one state in the affairs of another is unlawful) had been deliberately violated by the Soviet leaders with the backing of four of their Warsaw Pact Allies. The NATO members had denounced the use of force which jeopardised peace and international order and struck at the principle of the United Nations Charter. The NATO Allies had been obliged to re-assess the state of their defences. They considered that the Czechoslovak crisis called for a collective response. The conventional capability of NATO's tactical air forces would be increased. Certain additional national units would be committed to the Major NATO Commanders. Specific measures had been approved within these categories of action for improving the conventional capability of NATO forces. The NATO ministers also acknowledged that the solidarity of the Alliance could be strengthened by co-operation between members to alleviate the burdens arising

68 McGinn, note 117.

69 Ibid.

70 Haftendorn, Helga, *NATO and The Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966-1967*, Oxford University Press, New York, June 1996, pp. 320-322.

from balance of payments deficits resulting specifically from military expenditures for the collective defence.⁷¹

The Western government officials had assumed that the Soviet Union had never put its nuclear forces on full combat alert, even during the Cuban missile crisis. In late 1989, however, an excerpt was released from a secret U.S. intelligence report claiming that Brezhnev ordered a nuclear alert during the invasion of Czechoslovakia.⁷² That claim has since been endorsed by a leading American specialist on nuclear command-and-control, Bruce Blair, in a lengthy book on nuclear operational procedures. Blair argues that the incident in August 1968 was one of several times that the Soviet Union put its nuclear forces on combat alert.⁷³

Bearing in the mind the special responsibilities of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the NATO ministers reaffirm the determination of the Alliance to persevere in its efforts to contribute to a peaceful solution of the German question based on the free decision of the German people and on the interests of the European Security. They would safeguard Berlin's security and maintain freedom of access in the city.⁷⁴

Even if chances seemed infinitesimal that Soviet mobilization against Czechoslovakia could cover a thrust against the West, the state of NATO's defences in 1968, warranted prudence. Forces on the central front had declined to 22 percent under strength divisions, even though official estimates of the requirements for conventional defence were on the order of the thirty full strength divisions.⁷⁵

Thus, although NATO was keenly interested in the Prague Spring, the obstacles to Western action in the East caused the allies to adopt a wait-and-see approach. Western governments were unable to develop a concerted policy that would take full advantage of the situation. On the contrary, most of the NATO states seemed to assume and even hope that internal problems within the Warsaw Pact would go away over time. In the meantime, the West focused on further work in pursuit of the Harmel Report's call for detente, not least to divert Moscow's attention away from Prague. The setback for

71 Final Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 15th-16th November 1968. International situation following Warsaw Pact armed intervention in Czechoslovakia, NATO held a meeting in Brussels on 15th and 16th November 1968 to discuss the bearing of the situation on Germany and strengthen NATO's defence capabilities.

72 Smith, R. Jeffrey and Tyler, Patrick, 'To the Brink of War in the Prague Spring,' *Washington Post*, 29 August 1989, A-23.

73 Blair, Bruce G., *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1993, pp. 179-80.

74 Note 134.

75 McLin, John, "NATO and the Czechoslovakian Crisis", Part I, *Renewed Public Support For a Retooled Alliance*, West Europe Series, Volume 4, No. 3, American Universities Field Staff, Hanover, 1969, p.4. Nearly a decade later, the NATO division totals, depending on what was counted, ranged from 22 to 30. And Blaker, James and Hamilton, Andrew, *Assessing the NATO-Warsaw Pact Military Balance*, Congressional Budget Office, 1977, pp. 34-35.

nuclear arms control proved to be only temporary. Discussions on strategic arms limitations began in 1969 and led to two bilateral treaties in the 1970s.

NATO maintained a holding pattern with no actual military engagement as an organisation. On July 1, 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty opened for signature: NATO argued that its nuclear weapons sharing arrangements did not breach the treaty as U.S. forces controlled the weapons until a decision was made to go to war, at which point the treaty would no longer be controlling. Few states knew of the NATO nuclear sharing arrangements at that time, and they were not challenged.

In order to improve the East-West relations, steps were initiated by the United States and the USSR. The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was invited by the American President Dwight Eisenhower to visit Camp David, Washington D.C where formal talks began. In regard to Berlin, the US President made it clear that America had no intention of staying in Berlin forever. But there were hardly achievements either in regard to Berlin or the overall Cold War issues.

The main outcome of the Camp David on Berlin was further delay. Khrushchev agreed to convene a meeting of the four powers occupying Berlin. But Eisenhower needed the consent of the allies. French President Charles De Gaulle refused to attend the proposed summit unless Khrushchev first visited France. It was agreed that the Summit would be held in Paris in May 1960.

Before the starting of Paris Summit, the spirit of Camp David disappeared. On May 1, 1960, an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union. The U-2 plane was on reconnaissance flight flying over the Soviet territory. After U-2 plane was shot down, the American government denied that it was a spy flight. But Francis Gary Powers, the pilot, who had been captured alive with a spy kit, exposed the falsehood. This incident destroyed the chances of an early improvement in East-West relations. The Paris Summit did not happen. The Soviets again pointed to the designs of NATO against the Soviet Union, by nurturing a garland of military bases all around its territory.

(b). The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

The relations between the United States and the USSR further soured over the issue of Cuba. The island of Cuba had been 'liberated' by the Americans from Spain in 1898 and the right of US intervention was written in the Constitution of Cuba through the so-called Pratt Amendment. In 1934, President Franklin D Roosevelt scrapped the Pratt Amendment and initiated the policy of 'good neighbour'. After the abrogation of Pratt Amendment, Cuba had to undergo a period of political unrest and instability. A non-commissioned officer Batista made himself a permanent dictator and introduced a reign of terror. The US envoy Sumner Welles described his regime as 'frankly communistic'. Under Batista's regime, Fidel Castro had found several supporters in the United States.

The United States' arms embargo to Batista became a turning point in Castro's road to power.⁷⁶

With the rise of Fidel Castro as the leader of the Cuba, Castro brought Cuba closer to the Soviet Union. With Soviet Union as an ally, Cuba followed Marxism-Leninism in preference to the 'sugar imperialism' of the United States. In 1959, he signed a treaty to get Soviet arms, advisors and KGB assistance. For an island situated so near the United States and so far away from the USSR, to be a Soviet satellite was a momentous event. From the American point of view, Cuba committed a crime, a show of ingratitude to its 'liberators' from Spain in 1898!⁷⁷

One early result of Cuban dependence on the USSR was the nationalization of American property by Cuba, US refusal to purchase Cuban sugar and severance of diplomatic relations by the United States in January 1961. Throughout 1960, thousands of Soviet technicians and advisors had arrived at Cuba. At the same time, thousands of anti-Castro Cubans moved out of Cuba to the United States at such a pace that the US government began seriously thinking of creating a Cuban army in exile which could invade their land and overthrow Castro. The US President Eisenhower encouraged the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to develop a secret plan to overthrow Castro. The CIA decided to train and equip a group of anti-communist Cuban exiles, who were living in the United States. In Guatemala, the Cuban refugees were being trained in guerilla tactics. With the U.S. assistance this force would land at the Bay of Pigs on the Cuban coast and lead the Cuban people in an uprising against Castro. When President John Kennedy entered the office in 1961, he approved of the CIA's plans to go ahead with the Bay of Pigs invasion. The invasion was a complete failure, as the US government did not back them up. The expected popular uprising against Castro never happened. Castro's army had captured or killed most of the American-supported invaders. The United States was condemned by the Communist Bloc as a 'proven aggressor'.⁷⁸

In 1962, the Soviet Union decided, "to use Cuba to help the USSR." It was proposed to set up a Soviet base in Cuba threatening the United States with Soviet missiles – as a response to the NATO policy of erecting missile bases in Turkey. Having decided to challenge the United States, Khrushchev dispatched nuclear bombers and ground-to-ground missiles. The installation of missiles would place the United States in direct firing range from Cuba.

The US government under Kennedy soon became aware of the serious danger to their security. Highflying U-2 reconnaissance planes of the US discovered that the Soviets were installing missile sites capable of launching nuclear warheads, created in Western Cuba directly threatening the United States. Badly scarred by the Bay of Pigs fiasco,

76 Chayes, Abram, *The Cuban Missile Crisis, International Crisis And The Role Of Law*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1974, pp. 1-5.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

the Kennedy administration was both vulnerable and sensitive on the question of Cuba. Republicans, relying on public opinion polls showing growing public concern about the Soviet influence in Cuba, served notice that Cuba would be 'the dominant issue' of the November Congressional campaign.⁷⁹

In the late summer of 1962, the Kennedy administration was placed under increasingly severe domestic pressure to take stronger actions against Fidel Castro. The Republicans had announced that Cuba would be the dominant issue in the mid-term Congressional elections in November 1962.⁸⁰ The administration sought to reassure the public that the dangers of the [conventional] Soviet military build-up in Cuba were being exaggerated and that there was no reason to respond with war-like measures, such as a blockade. The administration disclosed considerable intelligence information concerning the character of the Soviet military supplies and personnel flowing into Cuba, hoping to assure the public that it was well informed as to what the Soviets were, and were not doing in Cuba.

Why did the Soviet Union emplace missiles in Cuba? The traditionalists of the Kennedy Administration submit six plausible hypotheses: 1) the Soviets sought to test American determination and will; 2) they sought to strengthen their bargaining position on Berlin; 3) Khrushchev and his associates sought to defend Cuba from an American attack while simultaneously extending the communist influence in the Western Hemisphere; 4) the Soviets sought to alter and equalize the strategic balance of power, that is, to compensate for the missile gap; 5) Khrushchev and/or the Russians sought to reassert their authority and prestige as the leader in international communism and 6) Khrushchev sought to divert attention away from a host of Soviet domestic problems.⁸¹

Kennedy Administration initially rejected an air strike on the missiles because it could not be surgical and the problem of advance warning was unsolvable. An attack without warning would not be understood by the world and, furthermore, the option of an air strike or an invasion would run counter to American tradition.⁸² Therefore, the President supported for quarantine, such action provided, according to Hilsman, "a step by step a progression up the ladder of coercion."⁸³ It also permitted more controlled escalation on the part of the United States and required Khrushchev to be the first to initiate any

79 Hilsman, *To Move A Nation*, pp. 170-173, Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 118-121, and Olsen, "G.O.P. Backs Use Of Troops In Cuba", *New York Times*, 8th September 1962, column 4, p.2.

80 Werder, Karl K., *The Continuing Lessons of Cuban Missile Crisis*, October 1962, Research report, Maxwell Air Force Base, Air War College, Air University, 1995, pp. 12-13.

81 Rostow, Walt W., *The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History*, Macmillan, New York, 1972, pp.252-253.

82 Sorensen, Theodore C., *Kennedy*, Harper and Row, New York, 1965; paperback, Bantam Books, New York, 1966, p. 771-773; Kennedy, Robert, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 1969, pp. 37-38.

83 Hilsman, Roger, *To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy*, Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1967, p. 205.

military action.⁸⁴ Furthermore, international law influenced the choice of quarantine; legal considerations restrained the United States because Article Two of the United Nations Charter ruled out the use of land aggression and surprise attack. The United States wanted the United Nations to endorse its response to the missiles in Cuba and, therefore, did not want to respond in a way that violated the U.N. Charter. Also, such considerations influenced the choice of the term “quarantine” because a “blockade” was considered an act of war under international law.⁸⁵

Kennedy was advised minimum use of force. He ordered the blockade of Cuba so that the Soviets could be forced to abandon the missile programme. He asked Khrushchev to recall ships loaded with nuclear missiles, which were approaching Cuban waters, lest they should be shot down. The Soviet leader agreed to pull out from Cuba but sought two demands from the United States, namely, an American promise that the United States would not invade Cuba and secondly, the removal of US-medium range missiles from Turkey. Kennedy ignored the second demand stating that the second letter had no relevance to the Russian threat from Cuba. But he promised that US would not invade Cuba and would not withdraw her missiles from Turkey. It was on this basis that Khrushchev agreed to dismantle and remove the missiles, thus ending the crisis. It must, however, be placed on record that both the UN Secretary-General and the leaders of the Non-Aligned countries played a role in cooling down the situation from one of brinkmanship.⁸⁶

On 13th September 1963, after a Soviet statement citing threats of a United States attack on Cuba, the President reiterated his conclusion ‘that these new shipments do not constitute a serious threat to any other part of this hemisphere’.⁸⁷ He went on to say:

“...unilateral military intervention on the part of the United States cannot currently be either required or justified, and it is regrettable that loose talks about such action in this country might serve to give a thin colour of legitimacy to the Communist pretenses that such a threat exists.”⁸⁸

The attack against Cuba had been justified on Cold War pretexts. Cuba is a tentacle of the evil empire, threatening to strangle the US. The formal decision to overthrow the government of Cuba was made secretly in March 1960, when there was no significant connection between Cuba and the Soviet Union. When the Kennedy administration took office, one of its first acts was to extend the attack against Cuba. President Kennedy had a Latin American mission, which surveyed the situation in the hemisphere. Arthur

84 Sorensen, Theodore, note 145, p.776; Rostow, Walt W., note 144, p. 258.

85 Chayes, Abraham, note 139, pp. 40, 49, 68.

86 Diez Acosta, Tomás, *October 1962: The 'Missile' Crisis As Seen From Cuba*, Pathfinder Press, New York, 2002, p. 20.

87 Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962, 674.

88 Ibid.

Schlesinger described the threat that Cuba posed to the United States stating, "the spread of the Castro idea of taking matters into one's own hands" – a serious problem in a region like Latin America, where wealth is very highly concentrated, "and the poor and underprivileged, stimulated by the example of the Cuban revolution, are demanding opportunities for a decent living."⁸⁹

Nevertheless, the Cuban Missile Crisis heightened the threat of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis convinced world leaders that it had the potential of a World War Three. Both the superpowers were convinced that nuclear war would be fatal for both of them. The Cuban Crisis had demonstrated the need of a swift contact between American and Soviet leaders to avoid recurrence of similar crisis. A hotline was then installed to link Washington D.C with Moscow, which would enable direct contact between the leaders of two powers when the time was of essence in preventing the eruption of a nuclear war. In 1967, the Allies agreed to replace massive retaliation between with the more nuance "flexible response" doctrine designed to give a NATO a variety of nuclear and conventional forces responses to a Soviet attack.

(c). *Détente*

After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the world experienced an extended period of relaxed tension, termed as 'détente'. During the détente, the Cold War had not ended, but the level of temperature had gone down and there were signs of understanding. According to Corall Bell, "Détente supposes a conscious and deliberate reduction of tension.... Cold War assumes a conscious maintenance of tension at relatively high level."⁹⁰

Corall Bell's analysis of détente underlines the relaxations not only between Soviet Union and the United States but also between the two powers and China. She stated, "If it takes two to male a quarrel, it takes two or three to maintain detente."⁹¹

Détente as such was not new. After the Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, policy makers in Washington and Moscow had increasingly accepted the territorial and nuclear status quo. Taking a step back from nuclear danger, neither side set much store in the principle of "victory through force." Gone were the times of John F. Dulles's rhetoric of "liberation," "roll back," and "driving wedges." This new environment allowed for the relaxation of tensions in 1963 between Washington and Moscow and the subsequent bilateral talks on the two main factors that contributed to a *modus vivendi*: the German question and the nuclear question. The spirit of limited bilateral cooperation was formalized with the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and a series of smaller steps, including the Hot Line and the Consular Agreement.⁹²

89 Schlesinger, Arthur Jr., *A Thousand Days: JFK In The White House*, Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1965, p.838.

90 Bell, Corall, *The Diplomacy of Détente: Kissinger Era*, St. Martin, New York, 1977, pp. 2-6.

91 Ibid.

Détente was an American diplomatic strategy deployed within triangular power balance, vis-à-vis both China and the Soviet Union. The efforts made by Nixon Administration and particularly the steps taken by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, eased the tension between the United States and China. On October 26, 1971, People's Republic of China was allowed representation in the United Nations and Taiwan was expelled. According to Bell, "Détente with China was a more notable achievement than the détente with the Soviet Union because that level of tension with China had been far lighter.... than with the Soviet Union."⁹³

Détente from the outset was part of the Alliance's aim that is somehow to reduce the harsh and dangerous militarized confrontation and to lower the levels of tension between the Soviet Union and the West. Attention was placed on the causes of tension, in particular, the Soviet combination of expansionist and adversarial policy with a massive military force that far exceeded any needs of defence on their part.⁹⁴

DK Simes stated that as defence was the primary need of the USSR, it used both cooperation and conflict as tools of security. This is the essence of détente practised during the reduced tension phase of the Cold War. Commenting on the international situation in 1976, Kennan said, "In this complicated world, there could be no international relationship which was one of the total antagonism or total identity of interest."⁹⁵

The central element in the policy of détente was normalization in Europe. The tension began to ease towards the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The most significant was the problem of two Germanies and of Berlin. The change of West German Government in 1969 helped in relaxation of tension. Under the Chancellorship of Willy Brandt, West German initiated Ostpolitik, indicating a 'policy for the East'. Brandt Government renewed normal relations with Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. Both the German states recognized each other and were recognized by the Superpowers.

The four-power agreement on Berlin was concluded in 1971. Neither East nor West abandoned its formal position on Berlin, yet many complicated questions were sought to be regulated. Access to West Berlin from West Germany was approved by providing easier rail, road and water communication, and West Berlin was recognized as a part of

92 For the constructed peace of the early 1960s, see Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–63* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Andreas Wenger, "Kennedy, Chruschtschow und das gemeinsame Interesse der Supermächte am Status quo in Europa," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1998), pp. 69–99; and Christof Münzer, *Die Berliner Mauer, Kennedy und die Kubakrise: Die westliche Allianz in der Zerreissprobe, 1961–63* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003).

93 Bell, Corall, note 153.

94 Goodpaster, Andrew J., "NATO: Between Challenges and Response" in *NATO at Fifty*, edited by Susan Eisenhower, *Center for Political and Strategic Studies*, Washington, D.C., pp. 13-26.

95 Simes, Dimitri.K., *Détente And Conflict: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1972-1977*, SAGE Publications, Beverly Hills, Californation, 1977, pp. 50-52.

Federal Republic. However, the Berlin Wall remained intact as dividing line between two parts of Berlin.

In 1975, during the Helsinki Agreement, the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada and major European powers accepted the European frontiers set up after World War Two. This recognized that Germany was divided and East European countries agreed to allow their people human rights such as freedom of speech. The Helsinki Conference was hailed as the end of Cold War, just as Churchill's Fulton Speech was the declaration of the Cold War. Geir Lundestad referred to achievements of the Helsinki Conference as a symbolic culmination of détente in Europe.⁹⁶

(d). Disarmament/Arms Control Treaties

The development of the atomic bomb by the United States toward the end of World War II brought with it the capability of devastating whole civilizations. While the United States still maintained a monopoly on nuclear weapons, it made overtures in the UN for the control and elimination of atomic energy for military purposes. In June 1946, American representative Bernard Baruch presented a plan to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons, international control over the processing of nuclear materials, full sharing of all scientific and technological information concerning atomic energy, and safeguards to ensure that atomic energy would be used only for civilian purposes. The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) vetoed the Baruch Plan in the Security Council, objecting to the UN's authority over disarmament and citing the domination of that body by the United States and Western Europe.⁹⁷

In 1949, the USSR exploded an atomic weapon of its own, ending the U.S. monopoly. The possibility of a nuclear war was now present, because relations between the USSR and the West were tense. Both the United States and the USSR were engaged in a race to develop thermonuclear (hydrogen) devices, which have many times the destructive power of atomic bombs. These weapons raised the possibility of ending all life on earth in all-out war. After 1954, when the USSR exploded its first hydrogen bomb, the primary concern of arms control was to reduce nuclear arsenals and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.

Although the Soviets gained nuclear capability before most analysts thought possible, the US still retained this dominance through a second stage until the late 1950s. During most of the 1960s the United States still held a first strike capability, but by the end of this decade the USSR had reached a rough balance with the US, which it maintained until the end of the Cold War.

⁹⁶ Lundestad, Geir, *No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe: Past, Present and Future*, St. Martin, New York, 1998, p.268.

⁹⁷ Schwartz, Jordan A., *The Speculator: Bernard M. Baruch in Washington, 1917–1965*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1981, pp. 1-3.

The stages of the nuclear arms race set the conditions and established the principal actors for the accompanying disarmament process. There were other players, of course,⁹⁸ but the circumstances set by the two superpowers dominated the substance of nuclear restraint negotiations for the duration of the Cold War. Moreover, while the nuclear build-up was accompanied by other areas of arms acquisitions such as conventional, biological and chemical weapons, strategic nuclear weapons posed the greatest single threat to international peace and security.

The end of the Korean War in 1953 and changing military technology, however, led to new defence priorities. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who succeeded Truman as the American President in January 1953, was convinced that Soviet leaders hoped their military challenge would force the United States into what he called "an unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster....Communist guns, in this sense, have been aiming at an economic target no less than a military target." He abandoned NSC 68's conception of a time of maximum danger and began planning a less costly strategy for the "long haul." Throughout his two terms (1953–1961), Eisenhower limited annual defense spending to about \$40 billion. He sought to deter communist aggression with an array of nuclear weapons rather than a large army. His strategic mainstay was SAC, supplemented by the navy's carrier based atomic bombers and its new fleet of submarines (SSBNs) armed with the Polaris ballistic missile.⁹⁹

To cope with a Red Army advance in Europe, or a communist military offensive anywhere else, the Eisenhower administration adopted an asymmetrical strategy. On 12 January 1954, in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that to meet communist aggression the United States would "depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing." This public pronouncement of the doctrine of "massive retaliation" capped an intensive high-level review of American strategy begun the previous May. As early as October 1953, Eisenhower had approved NSC 162/2, a paper attempting to reconcile deterrence with reduced defense spending. The solution, labeled the "New Look," was to equip U.S. troops in Europe with tactical nuclear weapons whose destructiveness would permit him to reduce "the big, expensive army he had inherited from Truman."¹⁰⁰

To preclude bankrupting the U.S. economy with military spending, Eisenhower planned to shrink the army from twenty to fourteen combat divisions by mid-1957. He would arm this leaner army with atomic artillery and short-range, air breathing missiles

98 Of the confirmed "Group of Five" nuclear powers, China has over 400 warheads, and Great Britain and France have 200 and 480, respectively. See Molander, Roger and Wilson, Peter, "On Dealing with the Prospect of Nuclear Chaos", *The Washington Quarterly*, 17, Summer 1993; Kay, David A., "Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond," *The Washington Quarterly*, 18, Winter 1995.

99 Kugler, Richard, "NATO Chronicle: The Cold War Years", *Joint Force Quarterly*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Washington D.C., Spring 1999 Issue No.21, p.3.

100 Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., "Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander: Airman, Strategist, Diplomat", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Volume 4, No.3, Summer 2002, pp.142-144.

carrying nuclear warheads. In February 1954, he induced Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act to permit divulging information about operational characteristics of American nuclear weapons to NATO allies. By December 1954 he had persuaded NATO strategists to assume that tactical nuclear weapons would be used in any future conflict with the Red Army. American General Lauris Norstad, NATO's supreme commander, succinctly summarized the new strategy in January 1956. The threat to use tactical nuclear weapons would "link the lowest and highest levels of violence and reinforce the credibility of the Western deterrent."¹⁰¹

Nuclear weapons became an integral part of NATO strategy in 1954 when the United States, facing superior Soviet conventional forces in Europe, threatened "massive retaliation" against the Soviet Union in the case of a Soviet attack against Western Europe. By so doing, the United States "extended deterrence" to its European allies against a Soviet attack and created what also was referred to as a "nuclear umbrella" sheltering Western Europe.¹⁰²

The shift from defensive to offensive thinking in the Warsaw Pact seems, ironically, to have taken place in the period that has traditionally been viewed as a time of improving East-West relations after Stalin's death. This transformation was closely connected with a reassessment of the role of nuclear arms. Although Stalin was eager to acquire nuclear weapons, he did not consider them a critical, strategic factor because of their small number. In the wake of Stalin's death, Soviet strategists began to discuss the implications of nuclear war, at a time when nuclear weapons already formed the cornerstone of NATO's doctrine of massive retaliation. In this way, nuclear weapons were belatedly included in the strategic plans of Eastern European armies.¹⁰³

By 1957, the Alliance adopted a strategy of massive retaliation. It threatened a nuclear blow to the Soviet Union for almost any transgression. Both Britain and France began nuclearising and non-nuclear Germany found comfort under the growing NATO nuclear umbrella. Flexible response did not abandon nuclear deterrence or the option to escalate. Although NATO had rejected the multilateral nuclear force, it created Nuclear Planning Group to ensure that the U.S. and British forces would fully meet nuclear requirements. Yet flexible response also called for an initial and affordable conventional defence strong enough to fight hard in the early stages and make aggression problematic. It made clear that defences would be fought on the borders of Germany.

By the early 1960s, the credibility of the massive retaliation threat was called into question by the reciprocal ability of the Soviet Union to hit the U.S. cities with its

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969* edited by Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow, Chief, Historical Office, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, in collaboration with NATO International Staff Central Archives, published May 1999. Available at www.nato.int.

¹⁰³ Dinerstein, Herbert, *War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking*, Praeger Publications New York and London, 1968, p.268.

nuclear weapons. Therefore, in 1967, the allies agreed to replace massive retaliation with the more nuance “flexible response” doctrine designed to give NATO a variety of nuclear and conventional force responses to a Soviet attack. Flexible Response required that the allies deploy conventional and nuclear forces sufficient to respond to a Warsaw Pact attack at any level and to escalate all the way to strategic nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union if necessary to terminate hostilities on acceptable terms. In terms, the Alliance never was in a position to respond to a Warsaw Pact attack with the full range of military options. But NATO did manage to sustain options that were considered sufficiently credible to deter aggression and to discourage Warsaw Pact escalatory steps once hostilities began.

Because the Warsaw Pact nations deployed substantially greater numbers of conventional forces than the NATO countries, NATO relied heavily on nuclear weapons to deter the Pact use of its conventional capabilities, as well as to deter potential Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons in a conflict. Flexible responses included NATO’s declared readiness to use nuclear weapons first if the Western conventional defences were failing to hold against a Warsaw Pact attack.

The vast majority of NATO’s nuclear weapons systems were U.S. owned and operated. A portion of the nuclear inventory was for years under “dual-key” arrangements with NATO allies who had delivery systems for one or more types of U.S. nuclear weapons, including nuclear artillery shells, depth charges, short-range missile warheads, and free-fall bombs. The warheads for such systems were kept under U.S. control in peacetime but could have been transferred to non-nuclear allies for use with their delivery systems in war. Britain-owned and operated nuclear forces were also committed to NATO. France maintained its own independent strategic and tactical nuclear forces.

U.S. nuclear weapons were deployed in forward locations in Europe, particularly in West Germany to ensure that in the early stages of a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe, the United States would face a “use them or lose them” decision. Thus, NATO’s nuclear strategy, combined with extensive forward deployments, gave very specific meaning to the U.S. nuclear commitment to the defence of Europe. The mutual defence commitment in the Treaty of Washington said nothing about what nuclear risks the United States would be required to take on the behalf of its European allies. That commitment was given specific meaning by NATO’s strategy and deployments, not by the language of Article 5.

Beyond creating a system of military deterrence, what was the Western buildup of power to achieve? Power is a means, not an end. If the immediate goal was security, the ultimate end could only be a negotiated settlement or war. Still official Washington was determined to avoid latter alternative. It was compelled, therefore, to rationalize its preoccupation with power as a temporary condition preparatory to an eventual resolution of the Cold War largely on Western terms. To give the nation’s defence policies the needed sense of direction, Acheson developed the promising concept of

negotiation from strength. Acheson first advanced this theme in a press conference in the following words:¹⁰⁴

“What we have...observed over the last few years is that the Soviet Government is highly realistic, and we have seen time after time that it can adjust itself to facts when facts exist. We have seen also that agreements reached with the Soviet Government are useful when those agreements register facts...So it has been our basic policy to build situations which will extend the area of possible agreement; that is, to create strength instead of weakness which exists in many quarters...Those are illustrations of the ways in which, in various parts of the world, we are trying to extend the area of possible agreement with the Soviet Union by creating situations so strong they can be recognised and out of them can grow agreements.”

Acheson's promise of negotiation from strength followed had on the heels of President Truman's announcement of January 31st, 1950 that the administration would push the development of the hydrogen bomb. This decision, for whatever reason, exposed much of the private concern, especially, among leading scientists, over the direction of American policy. A group of distinguished nuclear physicists led by Robert J. Oppenheimer had argued in private against the hydrogen project. Albert Einstein added to his disapproval warning that the effort to achieve security through the pursuit of military predominance was a “disastrous illusion”. For him, the arms race based on hysteria and conducted in secrecy, had already led to the “concentration of tremendous financial power in the hands of the military, militarization of the youth, close supervision of the loyalty of the citizens...intimidation of the people independent political thinking, indoctrination of the public...[and] growing restriction of the range of public information under the pressure of military secrecy.” The Hydrogen Bomb, if successful, would poison the atmosphere with radioactive fallout, making the annihilation of life on earth a technical possibility. Einstein saw hope only in renunciation of violence and the creation of embryo world government.¹⁰⁵

Such pressures on the administration continued through February 1950. Senator Brien McMahon, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee, suggested that the Senate offer a five-year worldwide Marshall Plan, with a U.S. commitment of \$50 billion, in exchange for a firm agreement on the control of atomic energy. Millard E. Tydings, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, recommended on February 6, 1950 that the United States call a world disarmament conference before it embarked on an expensive, long-term dangerous arms race.¹⁰⁶

In 1957 the International Atomic Energy Agency was established to oversee the development and spread of nuclear technology and materials. Two years later a treaty

104 Acheson's press conference, February 8, 1950, Department of State *Bulletin* 22, February 20, 1950, p. 273.

105 Quoted in “Agreement Through Strength”, *Economist* 158 (February 18, 1950): 353-54.

106 Bell, Corall, *Negotiations from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power*, Bantam, London, 1962, pp.15-62.

was negotiated to demilitarize the Antarctic and to prohibit the detonation or storage of nuclear weapons there. Both the United States and the USSR were among the signatories.

While the American striking forces were being dismantled, American superiority in nuclear know-how was also being eroded away at the nuclear test ban talks in Geneva. In the talks, under Kennedy and Eisenhower, there were massive concessions to the Communists, a continual erosion of the American position. In a series of concessions, the U.S. agreed to accept fewer and fewer “monitoring stations” to detect possible nuclear test cheating. Over a five-year period, demands for control stations were reduced from 180 to 8.¹⁰⁷

The negotiations and concessions continued even after the Communists showed their bad faith by breaking the three years “gentleman’s agreement” not to test while the talks were proceeding. On September 1, 1961, in the midst of negotiations, the Communists embarked on the most massive series of tests in history, climaxing on October 21, 1961, with the explosion of a 58-megaton bomb. On November 8, 1961, President Kennedy told American people:¹⁰⁸

The Soviet Union prepared to test (nuclear weapons) while we were at the table negotiating with them. If they fooled us once, it is their fault, if they fool us twice, then it is our fault.

The danger facing NATO was apparent as the 1960s dawned. Although its massive build-up was some years away, the Soviet Union was already acquiring Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and could thereby expect to deter U.S. nuclear retaliation for a conventional invasion of Western Europe. With deterrence in decline, the Cold War heated up and worry spread across the West.

Moscow began to brandish nuclear weapons and put pressure on Berlin. Western Europe was once vulnerable to political blackmail and invasion. While the United States faced down the Soviets in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Berlin Crisis exposed a lack of military options in Central Europe. This gap weakened the NATO diplomacy. If a war broke out, the Alliance could face the daunting choice of either surrendering or triggering a nuclear holocaust. It confronted a grave crisis in its military strategy that went to the heart of its political cohesion and will.¹⁰⁹

The Atlantic Alliance fell into a paralyzing debate. The Kennedy Administration proposed that its nuclear strategy be broadened by upgrading conventional defences. The U.S. Secretary of Defence McNamara announced this stance to the defence ministers at Athens in 1962. Washington argued that this would strengthen deterrence by making conventional aggression less attracting while lessening an unhealthy

107 Dodd, Senator Thomas, Congressional Record, February 21, 1963, p. 2662.

108 St. Louis Globe Democrat, August 7, 1963.

109 Kuglar, Richard, note 162.

dependence on nuclear escalation. An alarmed Germany viewed the matter differently. Bonn valued the nuclear strategy and feared that Washington would weaken deterrence, not enhance it. Chancellor Adenauer fretted that America was backing away from the defence of Western Europe and instead would expose the continent to a destructive conventional war to prevent nuclear attack on its own territory. He also feared a U.S. sell-out of Berlin or other steps to accommodate Moscow at Europe's expense.¹¹⁰

Britain and other allies were caught between two nations. Not wanting to weaken nuclear deterrence or undertake a conventional buildup, most sided up with Germany. The debate might have been less volatile had it focused solely on military strategy, but deeper political controversies arose. The Transatlantic Relationships was changing because economic recovery less reliant on Washington. The Europeans were now more willing to assert their identities.

On March 2, 1962, President Kennedy told a nationwide television audience: "We know enough about broken negotiations, secret preparations, secret preparations, and the (Soviet) advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium."¹¹¹ Despite the President's words, the talks and concessions continued. Even so, the Communists, strangely, wouldn't accept a treaty in which they, in effect, would determine whether or not they were cheating. They held out for a non-inspection at all. On March 8, 1963, Senator Barry Goldwater in a Senate speech asked "whether.... the Administration is engaged in an attempt to arrange a test ban without any inspections...when you look at the concessions we have already made in this area, you can see we are certainly headed in that direction."¹¹²

In July 1963, the United States agreed to no-inspection nuclear test ban treaty, which prohibited tests in outer space, underwater and in the atmosphere. The treaty was hailed as a "great break in the cold war." President Kennedy called it "the first step towards limiting the nuclear arms race."¹¹³ Actually, the treaty was nearly identical with one proposed by the Communists. On November 27, 1961, the Soviet Union offered the United States a treaty providing that "...all testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water should be banned indefinitely. No international detection system is required because enough countries have systems adequate to detect all nuclear explosions."¹¹⁴

After the Cuban Missile Crisis, a number of agreements were concluded and several contacts were established to ease the tension. One such agreement was the Partial

110 Ibid.

111 *St. Louis Globe Democrat*, July 6, 1963.

112 Ibid, March 8, 1963.

113 Kennedy, Message to Senate on Test Ban Treaty, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, August 8, 1963.

114 *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, November 28, 1961.

Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1963 by the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. Negotiations for test ban were carried out since 1955. The Cuban Crisis hastened the agreement. The nuclear tests were causing serious damage to the environment and threat to mankind. The treaty banned all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, on the ground and under water. In 1968, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed by the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. The nuclear powers were to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons to countries not having them. France and China did not sign either the treaties.

Arms control efforts must be evaluated and understood in the context of American defence strategy and policy. Since the early 1960s, the United States defence against a Soviet nuclear attack has been based on a policy of *Mutual Assured Destruction*. The theory is that if both the nations have the capability to absorb a major nuclear first strike and still launch a massive retaliation then neither side would risk striking first.

When the policy was first conceived in the days of President Kennedy's Defence Secretary Robert Strange McNamara, the United States had nuclear superiority over the Soviets. In implementing the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction, the Soviets were to be allowed to achieve either nuclear parity – or even a slight superiority – so they wouldn't feel threatened.

The theorists who devised the Mutual Assured Destruction concept soon became concerned. If one side or the other developed a defensive system, which could destroy incoming nuclear weapons before they hit their targets it would destabilize Mutual Assured Destruction. They feared that a nation with an operational defence against missiles could launch its own first strike confident that it could stop the enemy's retaliation.

After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, East-West détente was widely seen as the only option to ensure the world's long-term survival. Washington became increasingly interested in East-West détente and pushed NATO in the same direction. As early as May 1964, President Johnson had spoken of the need for "building bridges" and in October 1966, he advanced the idea of "peaceful engagement" with the countries of the Eastern bloc. The North Atlantic Council resolved to "undertake a broad analysis of international developments" under a proposal initiated by Belgium's Pierre Harmel. Significantly, this effort points to increasing desire by the European members of NATO for increased political stature and greater participation. Among the major points advanced in the reform proposals were recommendations to (1) improve NATO'S role in reducing tensions between East and West, (2) enlarge the policy-making role of the NATO Council, and (3) increase alliance responsibility as a political entity itself for coordinating specific areas of interest to the alliance community.

The Harmel Report, approved by the NATO member states in December 1967, spoke explicitly of the Western aim "to further a détente in East-West relations". However, it was made clear that any détente would have to be based on NATO's and the West's cherished policy of strength. During the NATO Council of Ministers meeting in Reykjavik in June 1968, all NATO members emphasised their willingness to embark

upon East-West negotiations regarding troop reductions in Europe. In fact, Washington hoped that NATO would become one of the instruments driving détente; in an era of lessening threat perception, it would help to give the Atlantic Alliance a new sense of purpose. It would also discourage the European Allies from pursuing bilateral policies of détente, as for example the French and especially the West Germans were doing.

In 1969, negotiations were initiated with the Soviet Union regarding prohibition of nuclear arms from seabeds and mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. A breakthrough was made in May 1971, when the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaty (SALT) was signed by the two powers based on a link between offensive and defensive limitations. Both parties agreed not to test, construct or operate an anti-missile defence system. The treaty was one of a series of “equal but not equal” agreements between the United States and the Soviets.

The proponents of the ABM treaty focused on the need to prevent either side from protecting itself from retaliation if it should launch a first strike against the other. They ignored the need of the United States to protect its cities and its people in the event the Soviets cheated (as they always do) and launched its own first strike. The danger was particularly great as evidence piled up that the Soviets were deploying super missiles with a first strike capability of destroying America’s retaliatory capacity. In 1972, as the Senate was considering ratification of the ABM Treaty, Senator Henry Jackson pointed out that the SALT I Treaty....

“ Confers on the Soviet Union the authority to retain or deploy a number of weapons based on land and sea that exceeds our own in every category, and by a 50 percent margin. Is this parity? ...The agreement gives the Soviets more of everything: more light ICBMs, more heavy ICBMs, more submarine launched missiles, more submarines, more payload, even more ABM radars. In no area of the SALT I agreements is the U.S. permitted to maintain parity with the Soviet Union.”¹¹⁵

The pressing need for a defence against a pre-emptive Soviet first strike was emphasised by the Blue Ribbon Department of Defence panel. Its report to the President Richard Nixon pointed up the dangers in the shifting balance of military power. The report warned that there was...

.... Convincing evidence that the Soviet Union seeks a pre-emptive first strike capability...there is no longer any certainty that our nuclear deterrent will remain credible...the weakness of the U.S. – of its military capability and will – could be the gravest threat to the peace of the world [and the survival of the United States].¹¹⁶

America's relative economic and financial decline, in combination with global détente and the accompanying perception that the military threat from the Warsaw Pact

115 Quoted by Sullivan, David, *The Bitter Fruit of SALT: Record of Soviet Duplicity*, Texas Policy Institute, Houston, 1981, p.22.

116 Ibid, p.1.

was receding, decisively contributed to undermining the Nixon administration's commitment to the European continent and, to some extent, to NATO. Congress had also grown increasingly skeptical about the benefits of America's involvement in Europe. Establishing a united and federal Europe, as the creators of NATO originally had envisaged, was now seen as counterproductive for Washington's hegemony in the Western world. In Kissinger's realist worldview, it was unlikely that "Europe would unite in order to share our burdens or that it would be content with a subordinate role once it had the means to implement its own views." Kissinger even recognized that once "Europe had grown economically strong and politically united, Atlantic cooperation could not be an American enterprise in which consultations elaborated primarily American designs."¹¹⁷

However, as far as public rhetoric was concerned, the Nixon administration continued speaking out in favor of a united federal Europe with a large single market, fully integrated into the Atlantic system. It was still assumed in Washington that a united Europe would share "the burdens and obligations of world leadership" with the United States. In particular, the Nixon White House favored the envisaged expansion of the European Community. It hoped that Britain's entry and the revival of the Anglo-American "special relationship" would lead to an improvement in transatlantic relations and within NATO. Yet on the whole Nixon and Kissinger were not prepared to accept the growing maturity of Europe and the realities of a more pluralistic and interdependent world. The Nixon administration still expected a largely docile Europe. As far as East-West relations and the NATO alliance were concerned, Washington certainly wished to be in full control. *Ostpolitik*, West Germany's fairly independent variant of détente, was therefore only grudgingly accepted by the U.S. administration. Nixon and Kissinger disliked the independence and confidence with which the West Germans proceeded with *Ostpolitik* and competed with Washington's own strategy of superpower détente.¹¹⁸

At the root of NATO's military problems is a complex of strategic issues centering on the question of deployment, use, and control of nuclear weapons. To solve this problem, a decision by the United States to genuinely share elements of control, deployment, strategy, and the decision to use nuclear weapons is required. This is the future means with which to come to a sharing of responsibilities within the alliance. In the 1970s the United States and the European allies would be well served by closer ties and further development of military integration within the alliance.¹¹⁹ Nuclear weapons can provide the needed catalyst. If the United States cannot bring itself to promote a European nuclear force, it should exercise more prudence in seeking to retard internal European initiatives and nuclear arrangements. One positive role for the U.S. is to exert its influence in shaping meaningful Atlantic nuclear relationships. Atlantic political cohesion

117 Thornton, Richard C., *The Nixon-Kissinger Years: Reshaping of America's Foreign Policy*, 1st edition, Paragon House Publishers, New York, 1st edition, 1989, pp. 20-22.

118 Ibid.

119 Osgood, Robert, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p.19.

will progress no further until a positive U.S. nuclear policy for NATO emerges. A number of alternatives can be used to build on the existing strategic nuclear forces, including the earmarked United States forces, in such a manner as to open the way for an Allied Nuclear Force.

Proposals for nuclear sharing within the alliance have been made by a number of European commentators. French General Pierre Gallois, a former member of the Planning Group at SHAPE, proposed that the United States make nuclear weapons available (individually or in groups) under dual control, with the proviso that the “key” to the warheads be turned over in critical situations specified in advance.¹²⁰ According to Gallois, the only meaningful way to assure the credibility of nuclear retaliation is for NATO to have power to retaliate. To allow selected NATO nations to rely on a unilateral force of nuclear weapons encourages proliferation and strains mutual defense obligations. One means to check proliferation of nuclear weapons is for the United States to share nuclear weapons, under proper safeguards, for combined dual and unilateral control. His plan relieves the alliance of dependence on United States control of nuclear weapons without requiring the several members to develop their own nuclear capability and without requiring the cumbersome procedures of a collective decision of all the allies. In brief, the Gallois plan is one means to solve problems of nuclear proliferation and alliance dependence by combining the military and political advantages of American and independent control. Critics suggest that Gallois may have combined the disadvantages of both systems. Europeans favor this approach. A similar plan, embracing cooperation of NATO and the Western European Union, with political control within a combined NATO-WEU Council, was proposed within the NATO Parliamentarians Conference in December 1964.

Attempts to devise common nuclear strategy are likely to prove futile in the absence of common political policy. Thus, creation of a political function at the highest level for concerting the policy of the alliance is needed. Henry Kissinger has proposed creation of a political body to be constituted as an Executive Committee of the present NATO Council.¹²¹ Membership would include five permanent members - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy - and one rotating member to represent the smaller NATO nations. These nations would select their representatives by vote within the NATO Council, the permanent members being excluded from participation, in order to protect the rights of smaller countries. The Executive Committee would formulate common Atlantic purposes and define limits of autonomous action when interests diverge and would provide opportunity to carry out closer association. Such an arrangement could afford the alliance members within Europe opportunity to form a closer association. The Western European Union could properly assume responsibility for the European component of the Allied Nuclear Force and provide joint European contribution to NATO plans.

120 Gallois, Pierre, “New Teeth For Teeth”, *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIX 1, October 1960, pp.67-80.

121 Kissinger, Henry, *The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance*, Doubleday Anchor, New York, 1966, p.194.

By 1973 Kissinger realized that transatlantic relations were in urgent need of revision and repair. To the anger of the European Community countries who had not been consulted, he grandly announced the "Year of Europe." The Nixon administration had been largely occupied with the Vietnam War and the development of détente with China and the Soviet Union during its first years in office, and the "Year of Europe" was Kissinger's attempt to improve U.S.–EC relations inside and outside NATO while safeguarding Washington's leadership role. Kissinger proposed a new Atlantic Charter and did not hesitate to emphasize that the United States had global responsibilities while the EC countries only had to deal with regional problems. Moreover, he insisted on a greater degree of military burden-sharing, arguing that only Europe's economic contribution would guarantee the continued functioning of America's security umbrella. The so-called Nixon Doctrine of 1970 had emphasized that America's allies ought to assume more of the burden of defending themselves.¹²²

With growing prospects of an American defence against the threat of a Soviet first strike, the arms control enthusiasts in both countries went to work again and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was negotiated, signed and ratified in 1972. The ABM treaty did not outlaw all anti-missile defence systems. Both the nations were permitted to select one area to protect. The Soviets chose to protect their capital and main population center, Moscow. Instead of defending Washington D.C. or New York, the United States chose to defend Grand Forks, North Dakota, site of a few missile silos.

The joint renunciation of anti-missiles defences by the United States and the USSR, in their ABM Treaty was based on the belief that mutual security could be guaranteed by the 'deterrent' character of each other's offensive missile forces. Neither side could be sure of eliminating by the offensive route, with an 'disarming first strike', or by the defensive one, with an effective anti-missile shield. Both sides would thus be 'deterred' from ever starting a war, the theory went, since the certainty of an annihilator 'second strike' response by the surviving nuclear forces of the opponent would make an attack tantamount to national suicide. This relationship between opposing nuclear forces became known as 'Mutual Assured Destruction' (M.A.D).¹²³

U.S. President Richard Nixon visited Moscow in 1972, where number of other agreements was signed. One of these agreements was 'The Basic Principles of Mutual relations between the United States and the Soviet Union'. In 1973, 'the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war' was also concluded.

Eventually, greater awareness began to take hold. In the mid-1970s, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger called for more spending and stronger NATO forces. The end of the Vietnam conflict allowed American planners to refocus on Europe. In 1978 the Carter administration persuaded the Alliance to adopt the Long-Term Defense Plan

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Spinardi, Graham and Bulkeley, Rip, *Space Weapons: Deterrence Or Delusion?*, Rowman and Littlefield Publications, Maryland, 1986, p.54.

(LTDP) to upgrade conventional forces and speed reinforcements to Europe. It sought to enhance interoperability, plug holes in the defence posture, and hasten modernization to match the Warsaw Pact.¹²⁴

3. THE SECOND COLD WAR

The process of détente was at its peak at the time of Helsinki Conference in 1975. But after that it lost its momentum. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union again became so sore that by 1980, it appeared that the Cold War had come back. The new tension came to be described as the 'New Cold War'. The United States and the Soviet Union were determined to pursue more active policies, 'even in adversary's backyard'.

At the time, when Ronald Reagan had begun his administration in 1981, American prestige was going down rapidly. The United States had failed in Vietnam. At that moment of US weakness, communism was all ready to hit hard and it appeared that communist momentum might sweep all before it. Reagan changed the tone, but not the course, of foreign policy. Détente, a peaceful if strained policy of coexistence with the USSR that was stressed in the 1970s, was de-emphasized. In 1983, addressing a conservative Christian audience, Reagan called the USSR "an evil empire." He launched a global crusade against governments and movements said to be under Soviet influence.

The United States and its NATO allies enhanced conventional defences. The Reagan administration implemented the decision by President Carter to rapidly reinforce Europe in crises, increasing U.S. presence from 5 divisions and 8 fighter wings to 10 divisions and 20 wings. Europe contributed funding for host nation programmes to provide logistical support. The size of NATO forces was further enhanced when Germany was transformed reserve brigades into well-armed combat formations. Other allies upgraded readiness and manpower. France also drew closer by making clear that its large army could be available for NATO missions in crises.¹²⁵

So far as the strategic arms race between the two superpowers – the United States and the USSR – was concerned, both were anxious to develop a capability to destroy a major portion of the others' nuclear arsenal by counter force strikes. Both the US and the Soviet Union having been both masters as well as captives of the arms race and fears decided to cut the strategies by half. During the early 1980s controversy surrounded the placement by the United States of ballistic missiles on the territory of some of its Western European allies. Opposition to this within West Germany (which became part of the united Federal Republic of Germany in 1990) played a part in unseating Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1982. Controversy also surrounded the Strategic Defence Initiative introduced by the US President Reagan in 1983. This

¹²⁴ Kugler, note 162, p.5.

¹²⁵ Ibid, p.6.

research program for developing a defense against ballistic missiles challenged the assumptions of nuclear strategy since the beginning of the arms race. President Reagan promised to make SDI technology available to the Soviet Union, as they too could be free from the fear of a surprise attack. They rejected his offer as a propaganda ploy and ridiculed the system as unworkable. However, the U.S. military build-up, particularly the Strategic Defense Initiative (called Star Wars) technology, threatened Soviet security. The Strategic Defense Initiative was supposed to permit the United States to intercept enemy missiles before they hit their targets. Since the late 1940s both deployment of nuclear arms by the superpowers and restrictions upon their use had been founded upon a theory of deterrence.¹²⁶

The first proper U.S. briefing for the NATO Allies on the Strategic Defence Initiative was given at the Brussels headquarters of the Alliance in February 1984. It was followed by a meeting at Cesme, Turkey of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) of Defence Ministers and senior aides. At both meetings, the Europeans were sharply critical: doubtful whether such defences could provide any worthwhile protection for their countries against intermediate and shorter range ballistic missiles; and against other nuclear capabilities of 'Warsaw Pact' forces; concerned about their possible negative effects on the arms control process; fearful that U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence would result in 'zones of differing security' (a German euphemism) within the Alliance; and anxious about the Strategic Defence Initiative's destabilizing effects, not merely on the arms race but also during any major East-West crisis, should one break out during or after the deployment of any future strategic defences.¹²⁷

Assuming the office in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of a nuclear Super Power, which was in a state of economic decay, projected the goal of a move towards minimal levels of nuclear and conventional arms. Strategic Arms Reduction Task (START) was proposed by the US President Reagan when the offer of the Zero Option was made in November 1981. So, the concept of 'reduction to replace limitation' had been made. Instructions were issued to the disarmament delegations of the US and the USSR to prepare for a treaty for the reduction of strategic nuclear forces by about fifty percent and to destroy all ballistic missiles.¹²⁸

In the winter of 1985/86 agreements began to seem slightly more likely on 'confidence-building measures', at the European Security Conference in Stockholm, and on 'mutual force reductions', at the long-stalled NATO-Warsaw Pact talks in Vienna. If such progress was made, it would be welcomed more for its possible political significance than as contributing much in itself to European security. The acid test for West European confidence in U.S. Alliance leadership would remain the ability of the latter to bring about significant nuclear reductions in Europe.

¹²⁶ Ibid, p.8.

¹²⁷ Spinardi, and Bulkeley, note 186, p.241.

¹²⁸ Kugler, note 162, pp.12-14.

Finally, in 1987, it was agreed to destroy Soviet and American intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles. At a summit meeting in Washington, D.C., in December 1987, President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev signed a treaty banning intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), including many of those the United States had placed in Western Europe several years earlier. The treaty called for the destruction of all U.S. and Soviet missiles with ranges of about 500 to 5500 km (about 300 to 3400 mi) and established a 13-year verification program. The INF treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate and the Soviet Presidium in May 1988.¹²⁹

During the close of the Cold War, in January 1989, NATO and the Warsaw Pact members produced the Mandate for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The mandate set out objectives for the CFE Treaty and established negotiating principles, and formal negotiations began on March 9, 1989. The Conventional Force Reduction negotiators strived to arrive at a codifiable balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe and subsequently to reduce each alliance's forces to a lower level of balance. The European members of NATO began to make unilateral cuts of their own. This paved the way for an understanding between the two Superpowers, which in turn contributed to the end of the Cold War.¹³⁰

In 1990, Gorbachev had established his sincerity in maintaining world peace and relations between the United States and the Soviet Union became cordial. Facing threat of separation from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and from other parts and grand economic crisis, Russia demanded monetary help and trade facilities from the US and Western countries. When he lost power in 1991, the Soviet army had thrown its support behind his rival Boris Yeltsin, the Communist Party had been declared illegal and the 'empire' which had been assembled after so much of bloodshed by every Russian ruler since Peter the Great, had disintegrated. Gorbachev destroyed the Communist Party, which had controlled every aspect of the Soviet life. The country disintegrated and Gorbachev was blamed for the debacle of his reforms 'Glasnost' and 'Perestroika'.¹³¹

One of the first developments of the end of the Cold War was the re-unification of Germany. The wall that was built to separate East Berlin from the West was constructed at the Soviet initiative, but was strongly resented by people living on either side. As soon as the US-Soviet relations normalized, strong desire of two Germanies was expressed in all quarters. The Berlin Wall was first to be pulled down (1989) with so much enthusiasm that the end of Cold War could easily be noticed. Negotiations were initiated between the two countries – one was a member of NATO and the other of Warsaw Pact (which has since been abolished). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the next step taken in 1990 was the introduction of West German currency in the East also. Finally, the two Germanies were reunited. Hence, while the division of Germany in 1940s marked the

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Kramer, Mark, 'The Collapse of the Soviet Union', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Volume 5, Number 4, Fall. 2003.

creation of bitterness of Cold War, the unification was the outcome and symbolic of the end of the Cold War.¹³²

Between 1985 and 1990, Gorbachev sought to reform Soviet society by introducing *perestroika* (Russian for “restructuring”) of the economy and *glasnost’* (“openness”) in political and cultural affairs. He augmented the authority of the Soviet presidency and transferred power from the Communist Party to popularly elected legislatures in the union republics. In 1991, as the Soviet economy deteriorated, Gorbachev faced competing pressures from hard-line Communists, from free-market reformers, and from nationalists and secessionists seeking independence for their republics. He immediately resigned as Communist Party general secretary, suspended party activities, and placed reformers in charge of the military and KGB (secret police). In December the Soviet parliament passed a resolution that acknowledged the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Gorbachev resigned his position as president of the USSR.¹³³

In the summer of 1989, the Berlin Wall became irrelevant when Hungary allowed East Germans to pass through Hungary on their way to Austria and West Germany. In the fall of that year, the East German regime was on the verge of collapse, and on November 9, 1989, enthusiastic private citizens began to demolish whole sections of the wall without interference from government officials. East Germany eventually participated in the removal of the Berlin Wall and reunited with West Germany in 1990 as one nation, the Federal Republic of Germany. The Berlin Wall is now commemorated by a few remaining sections and by a museum and shop near the site of the most famous crossing point, Checkpoint Charlie, thus ending the Cold War.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.