

Appendix-01

Current Peace-keeping Operations

There are currently 16 peace-keeping operations led by the Department of Peace-keeping Operations¹.

1. MINURSO

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by Security Council resolution 690 of 29 April 1991. It was in accordance with settlement proposals accepted on 30 August 1988 by Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO) (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro .The settlement plan, as approved by the Security Council, provided for a transitional period for the preparation of a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was to have sole and exclusive responsibility over matters relating to the referendum and was to be assisted in his tasks by an integrated group

¹United Nations Peacekeeping Mission homepage;
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/mission/index.shtml>(visited 1 April 2015)

of civilian, military and civilian police personnel, to be known as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.

2. **MINUSCA**

Concerned with the security, humanitarian, human rights and political crisis in the Central African Republic and its regional implications, the Security Council authorised on 10 April 2014 deployment of a multidimensional United Nations peace-keeping operation – The United Nations Mission for the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), with the protection of civilians as its utmost priority. Its other initial tasks included support for the transition process; facilitating humanitarian assistance; promotion and protection of human rights; support for justice and the rule of law; and disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation processes.

MINUSCA subsumed the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) on the date of the establishment. On 15 September 2014, the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) transferred its authority over to MINUSCA, in accordance with resolution 2149 (2014).

3. MINUSMA

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 to support political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-related tasks. The Mission was asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilisation of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap. By unanimously adopting resolution 2164 of 25 June 2014, the Council further decided that the Mission should focus on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilisation and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in that country².

4. MINUSTAH: Restoring a secure and stable environment

The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established on 1 June 2004 by Security Council resolution 1542. The UN mission succeeded a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) authorised

²United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in East Timor homepage, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/> (visited 1 April 2015)

by the Security Council in February 2004 after President Bertrand Aristide departed Haiti for exile in the aftermath of an armed conflict which spread to several cities across the country.

The devastating earthquake of 12 January 2010, which resulted in more than 220,000 deaths (according to Haitian Government figures), including 96 UN peacekeepers, delivered a severe blow to country's already shaky economy and infrastructure. The Security Council, by resolution 1908 of 19 January 2010, endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation to increase the overall force levels of MINUSTAH to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts in the country.

Following the completion of Presidential elections in 2011, MINUSTAH has been working to fulfil its original mandate to restore a secure and stable environment, to promote the political process, to strengthen Haiti's Government institutions and rule-of-law-structures, as well as to promote and to protect human rights.

The Mission has continued to mobilise its logistical resources to assist in the effort to contain and treat the cholera outbreak of October 2010.

5. MONUSCO: Protecting civilians and consolidating peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Operating in democratic Republic of Congo and subregion MONUSCO took over from an earlier UN peacekeeping operation – the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) – on 1 July 2010. It was done in accordance with Security Council resolution 1925 of 28 May, 2010 to reflect the new phase reached in the country.

The new mission has been authorised to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilisation and peace consolidation efforts.

6. UNAMID: Protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian aid and helping political process in Darfur

The African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur, referred to by its acronym UNAMID, was established on 31 July 2007 with the adoption of Security Council resolution 1769. UNAMID has the protection of

civilians as its core mandate, but is also tasked with contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).

7. UNDOF: Supervising ceasefire and disengagement agreement

From early March 1974, the situation in the Israel-Syria sector became increasingly unstable, and firing intensified. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established on 31 May 1974 by Security Council resolution 350 (1974), following the agreed disengagement of the Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan.

Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between the Israeli and Syrian forces and to supervise the implementation of the disengagement agreement.

8. UNFICYP: Contributing to a political settlement in Cyprus

The UNFICYP was originally set up by the Security Council in 1964 to prevent further fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish

Cypriot communities. After the hostilities of 1974, the Council has mandated the Force to perform certain additional functions.

In the absence of a political settlement to the Cyprus problem, UNFICYP has remained on the island to supervise ceasefire lines, maintain a buffer zone, undertake humanitarian activities and support the good offices mission of the Secretary-General.

9. UNIFIL: Monitoring cessation of hostilities and helping ensure humanitarian access to civilian population

Originally, UNIFIL was created by the Security Council in March, 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area. The mandate had to be adjusted twice, due to the developments in 1982 and 2000.

Following the July/August 2006 crisis, the Council enhanced the Force and decided that in addition to the original mandate, it would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities; accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon; and extend its assistance to help ensure

humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.

10. UNISFA: Demilitarizing and monitoring peace in the disputed Abyei Area

The Security Council, by its resolution 1990 of 27 June, 2011, responded to the urgent situation in Sudan's Abyei region by establishing the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). The Security Council was deeply concerned by the violence, escalating tensions and population displacement.

The operation has been tasked with monitoring the flashpoint border between north and south and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, and is authorised to use force in protecting civilians and humanitarian workers in Abyei.

UNISFA's establishment came after the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) reached an agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to demilitarise Abyei and let Ethiopian troops to monitor the area³.

³United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea homepage,

11. UNMIK: Promoting security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo

Originally, the Security Council, by its resolution 1244 of 10 June, 1999, authorised the Secretary-General to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo – the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) – in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo could enjoy substantial autonomy. Its task was unprecedented in complexity and scope; the Council vested UNMIK with authority over the territory and people of Kosovo, including all legislative and executive powers and administration of the judiciary.

Subsequently, following the declaration of independence by the Kosovo authorities and the entry into force of a new constitution on 15 June 2008, the tasks of the Mission have significantly been modified to focus primarily on the promotion of security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo.

12. UNMIL: Support for the implementation of the Peace Process

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by Security Council resolution 1509 (2003) of 19 September, 2003 to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; protect United Nations staff, facilities and civilians; support humanitarian and human rights activities; as well as assist in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military.

13. UNMISS: Protecting civilians, monitoring human rights and supporting implementation of cessation of hostilities agreement

In adopting resolution 1996 on 8 July 2011, the Security Council determined that the situation faced by South Sudan⁴ continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and established the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

⁴ On 9 July 2011 South Sudan became the newest country in the world. The birth of the Republic of South Sudan is the culmination of a six-year peace process which began with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.

(UNMISS) to consolidate peace and security and to help establish conditions for development.

Following the crisis which broke out in South Sudan in December 2013, the Security Council, by its resolution 2155 (2014) of 27 May 2014, reinforced UNMISS and reprioritized its mandate towards the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring, and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement.

14. **UNMOGIP: Observing the ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir**

The first group of United Nations military observers arrived in the mission area on 24th January, 1949 to supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. These observers, under the command of the Military Adviser appointed by the UN Secretary-General, formed the nucleus of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

Following renewed hostilities of 1971, UNMOGIP has remained in the area to observe developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971 and report thereon to the Secretary-General.

15. UNOCI: Protecting civilians and supporting the Government in DDR and security sector reform

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1528 (2004) of 27 February 2004, established the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) as from 4th April, 2004 with a mandate to facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the peace agreement signed by them in January 2003.

Following the 2010 Presidential election and the ensuing political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, UNOCI has remained on the ground to protect civilians, provide good offices, support the Ivorian Government in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants as well as on security sector reform, and monitor and promote human rights

16. UNTSO: Helping to bring stability in the Middle East

Set up in May 1948, UNTSO was the first ever peace-keeping operation established by the United Nations. Since then, UNTSO military observers have remained in the Middle East to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating and assist other UN peace-keeping operations in the region to fulfill their respective mandates.

UNTSO personnel have also been available at short notice to form the nucleus of some other peace-keeping operations worldwide. The availability of UNTSO's military observers for almost immediate deployment after the Security Council had acted to create a new mission has been an enormous contributory factor to the early deployment and the success of those operations.

Facts and Figures

- Peace-keeping operations since 1948: 69
- Current peace-keeping operations: 16

Personnel

- Uniformed personnel: 106,595 (as of 31 March 2015)
 - Troops: 91,962
 - Police: 13,122
 - Military observers: 1,781
- Civilian personnel: 17,092 (as of 31 December 2014)
 - International: 5,277
 - Local: 11,678
- UN Volunteers: 1,846 (as of 31 March 2015)
- Total number of personnel serving in 16 peacekeeping operations:
125,396
- Countries contributing uniformed personnel: 120
- Total fatalities in current operations: 1,564
- Total fatalities in all peace operations since 1948: 3,348

Financial aspects

- Approved resources for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015: about \$8.47 billion
- Outstanding contributions to peacekeeping (31 January 2015):
about \$ 2.17 billion

Current operations

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

(MINURSO) In Western Sahara since April 1991

Strength: 470 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 216
 - Troops: 27
 - Military observers: 183
 - Police: 6
- Civilian personnel: 242
 - International civilians: 80
 - Local civilians: 162
- UN Volunteers: 12

Fatalities: 15

Approved budget (07/2014– 06/2015): \$55,990,080

**United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)**

In the Central African Republic since April 2014

Strength: 10,339 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 9,902
 - Troops: 8,305
 - Military observers: 131
 - Police: 1,466
- Civilian personnel: 392
 - International civilians: 256
 - Local civilians: 136
- UN Volunteers: 45

Fatalities: 2

Approved budget (07/2014– 06/2015): \$628,724,400 [A/C.5/69/17]

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

In Mali since April 2013

Strength: 11,510 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 10,320
 - Troops: 9,142
 - Military observers: 0
 - Police: 1,178
- Civilian personnel: 1,065
 - International civilians: 523
 - Local civilians: 542
- UN Volunteers: 125

Fatalities: 49

Approved budget: (07/2014– 06/2015): \$830,701,700 [A/C.5/69/17



United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

In Haiti since June 2004

Strength: 8,394 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 6,806
 - Troops: 4,604
 - Police: 2,202
- Civilian personnel: 1,459
 - International civilians: 319
 - Local civilians: 1,140
- UN Volunteers: 129

Fatalities: 179

Approved budget (07/2014 – 06/2015): \$500,080,500 [A/C.5/69/17]

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo since July 2010

Strength: 24,842 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 20,878

- Troops: 19,292
- Military observers: 473
- Police: 1,113
- Civilian personnel: 3,501
 - International civilians: 889
 - Local civilians: 2,612
- UN Volunteers: 463

Fatalities: 86

Approved budget (07/2014 – 06/2015): \$1,398,475,300

[A/C.5/69/17]

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

In Darfur since July 2007

Strength: 20,921 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 16,815
 - Troops: 13,460
 - Military observers: 190
 - Police: 3,165
- Civilian personnel: 3,831

- International civilians: 967
- Local civilians: 2,864
- UN Volunteers: 275

Fatalities: 216

Approved budget (07/2014 – 06/2015): \$1,153,611,300

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

In Syria since June 1974

Strength: 941 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 785
 - Troops: 785
- Civilian personnel: 156
 - International civilians: 50
 - Local civilians: 106

Fatalities: 46

Approved budget (07/2014 – 06/2015): \$64,110,900

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

In Cyprus since March 1964

Strength: 1,072 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 923
 - Troops: 860
 - Police: 63
- Civilian personnel: 149
 - International civilians: 37
 - Local civilians: 112

Fatalities: 183

Approved budget **(07/2014 – 06/2015):** \$59,072,800

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

In Lebanon since March 1978

Strength: 11,430 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 10,546
 - Troops: 10,546
- Civilian personnel: 884

- International civilians: 282
- Local civilians: 602

Fatalities: 308

Approved budget **(07/2014 – 06/2015):** \$509,554,400

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)

In Abyei, Sudan since June 2011

Strength: 4,303 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 4,066
 - Troops: 3,947
 - Military observers: 119
 - Police: 24
- Civilian personnel: 191
 - International civilians: 126
 - Local civilians: 65
- UN Volunteers: 22

Fatalities: 18

Approved budget **(07/2014 – 06/2015):** \$318,925,200

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

In South Sudan since July 2011

Strength: 14,342 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 11,734
 - Troops: 10,539
 - Military observers: 187
 - Police: 1,008
- Civilian personnel: 2,202
 - International civilians: 818
 - Local civilians: 1,384
- UN Volunteers: 406

Fatalities: 35

Approved budget **(07/2014 – 06/2015):** \$1,097,315,100

United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)

In Côte d'Ivoire since April 2004

Strength: 8,678 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 7,511

- Troops: 5,883
- Military observers: 179
- Police: 1,449
- Civilian personnel: 1,013
 - International civilians: 328
 - Local civilians: 685
- UN Volunteers: 154

Fatalities: 132

Approved budget (07/2014 - 06/2015): \$493,570,300

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

In Kosovo since June 1999

Strength: 366 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 15
 - Military observers: 8
 - Police: 7
- Civilian personnel: 326
 - International civilians: 110
 - Local civilians: 216

- UN Volunteers: 25

Fatalities: 55

Approved budget (07/2014 – 06/2015): \$42,971,600

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

In Liberia since September 2003

Strength: 7,309 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 5,869
 - Troops: 4,302
 - Military observers: 126
 - Police: 1,441
- Civilian personnel: 1,250
 - International civilians: 383
 - Local civilians: 867
- UN Volunteers: 190

Fatalities: 190

Approved budget (07/2014 – 06/2015): \$427,319,800

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

In India and Pakistan since January 1949

Strength: 111 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 42
 - Military observers: 42
- Civilian personnel: 69
 - International civilians: 23
 - Local civilians: 46

Fatalities: 11

Appropriation (biennium 2014-2015): \$19,647,100

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

In Middle East since May 1948

Strength: 368 total, including:

- Uniformed personnel: 143
 - Military observers: 143
- Civilian personnel: 225

- International civilians: 88
- Local civilians: 137

Fatalities: 50

Workforce of the UN Peace-keeping

(As of 31 July, 2016)

The workforce of the United Nations peace-keeping operations in the field, as of 31 July, 2016 is as follows⁵:

United Nations Peacekeeping helps countries torn by conflict create the conditions for lasting peace. We are comprised of civilian, police and military personnel.

As of 31 July 2016, our workforce in the field consisted of:

- 87,546 serving troops and military observers
- 13,200 police personnel;

⁵ www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/mission/index.shtml (visited 31 July 2016)

- 5,256 international civilian personnel (31 July 2015);
- 11,215 local civilian staff (31 July 2015);
- 1,575 UN Volunteers.

123 countries contributed military and police personnel.

The UN does not have its own military force; it depends on contributions from Member States.

In addition to maintaining peace and security, peacekeepers are increasingly charged with assisting in political processes; reforming judicial systems; training law enforcement and police forces; disarming and reintegrating former combatants; supporting the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

Peacekeeping by the United Nations is a role held by the **Department of Peacekeeping Operations** as "a unique and dynamic instrument developed by the Organization as a way to help countries torn by conflict to create the conditions for lasting peace." It is distinguished from both peace-building, peacemaking, and peace enforcement.

Peacekeepers monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas and assist ex-combatants in implementing the peace agreements they may have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development. Accordingly, UN peacekeepers (often referred to as **Blue Berets** or **Blue Helmets** because of their light blue berets or helmets) can include soldiers, police officers, and civilian personnel.

The United Nations Charter gives the United Nations Security Council the power and responsibility to take collective action to maintain international peace and security. For this reason, the international community usually looks to the Security Council to authorize peacekeeping operations through Chapter VI authorizations.

Most of these operations are established and implemented by the United Nations itself, with troops serving under UN operational control. In these cases, peacekeepers remain members of their respective armed forces, and do not constitute an independent "UN army," as the UN does not have such a force. In cases where direct UN involvement is not considered appropriate or feasible, the Council authorizes regional

organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Economic Community of West African States, or coalitions of willing countries to undertake peacekeeping or peace-enforcement tasks.

Hervé Ladsous has served as the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) since 2 September 2011. DPKO's highest level doctrine document, entitled "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines" was issued in 2008.

United Nations peacekeeping mission in East Timor

The United Nations peace-keeping mission in East Timor is outlined below⁶.

⁶ united nations peacekeeping mission in east timor homepage+<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/>

The United Nations General Assembly placed East Timor on the international agenda in 1960, when it added the territory to its list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. At that time, East Timor was administered by Portugal. Fourteen years later, in 1974, Portugal sought to establish a provisional government and a popular assembly that would determine the status of East Timor. Civil war broke out between those who favoured independence and those who advocated integration with Indonesia. Unable to control the situation, Portugal withdrew. Indonesia intervened militarily and integrated East Timor as its 27th province in 1976. The United Nations never recognized this integration, and both the Security Council and the General Assembly called for Indonesia's withdrawal.

Beginning in 1982, at the request of the General Assembly, successive Secretaries-General held regular talks with Indonesia and Portugal aimed at resolving the status of the territory. In June 1998, Indonesia proposed a limited autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia. In light of this proposal, the talks made rapid progress and resulted in a set of agreements between Indonesia and Portugal, signed in New York on 5 May 1999. The two Governments entrusted the Secretary-General with

organizing and conducting a "popular consultation" in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accepted or rejected a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia.

UNAMET and the Popular Consultation

To carry out the consultation, the Security Council, by resolution 1246 (1999), authorized the establishment of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) on 11 June 1999. The 5 May agreements stipulated that, after the vote, UNAMET would oversee a transition period pending implementation of the decision of the East Timorese people. On 30 August 1999, some 98 per cent of registered East Timorese voters went to the polls deciding by a margin of 21.5 per cent to 78.5 per cent to reject the proposed autonomy and begin a process of transition towards independence.

Following the announcement of the result, pro-integration militias, at times with the support of elements of the Indonesian security forces, launched a campaign of violence, looting and arson throughout the

entire territory. The Secretary-General and the Security Council undertook strenuous diplomatic efforts to halt the violence, pressing Indonesia to meet its responsibility to maintain security and order in the territory. On 12 September 1999, the Government of Indonesia agreed to accept the offer of assistance from the international community. The Security Council then authorized ([S/RES/1264](#)) the multinational force (INTERFET) under a unified command structure headed by a Member State (Australia) to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.

Following the outbreak of violence, the Indonesian Armed Forces and police began a drawdown from the territory, eventually leaving completely. Indonesian administrative officials also left. On 28 September, Indonesia and Portugal, at a meeting with the United Nations, reiterated their agreement for the transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations. They also agreed that ad hoc measures were required to fill the gap created by the early departure of the Indonesian civil authorities.

UNTAET and Transition to Independence

On 19 October 1999, the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly formally recognized the result of the consultation. Shortly thereafter, on 25 October, the United Nations Security Council, by resolution 1272 (1999), established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) as an integrated, multidimensional peacekeeping operation fully responsible for the administration of East Timor during its transition to independence. Resolution 1272 mandated UNTAET to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; to establish an effective administration; to assist in the development of civil and social services; to ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; to support capacity-building for self-government; and to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.

In February 2000, marking the complete deployment of UNTAET, command of military operations was transferred from INTERFET to the

United Nations Peace-keeping Force. UNTAET also began a process of reorganizing itself to resemble more closely the future government of East Timor and to increase the direct participation of the East Timorese.

On 30 August 2001, two years after the Popular Consultation, more than 91 per cent of East Timor's eligible voters went to the polls again; this time to elect an 88-member Constituent Assembly tasked with writing and adopting a new Constitution and establishing the framework for future elections and a transition to full independence. Shortly thereafter, 24 members of the new all-East Timorese Council of Ministers of the Second Transitional Government were sworn into office. The new Council replaced the Transitional Cabinet created in 2000. The Constituent Assembly and a new East Timorese Government were to govern East Timor during the remaining transitional period before its independence as a democratic and sovereign State.

East Timor's Constituent Assembly signed into force the Territory's first Constitution on 22 March 2002 and following presidential elections on 14 April, Mr. Xanana Gusmão was appointed president-elect of East

Timor (Mr. Gusmão received 82.69 per cent of the vote and Mr. Fanscisco Xavier do Amaral 17.31 per cent). With both these preconditions for a hand-over of power met the Constituent Assembly was to transform itself into the country's parliament on 20 May 2002.

Newly independent East Timor swore in its first government and held an inaugural session of Parliament on the morning of 20 May just hours after more than 120,000 people celebrated the birth of the nation at a massive ceremony on the outskirts of Dili. The government, composed primarily of the same cabinet members that comprised the pre-independence Council of Ministers, was officially inaugurated by President Xanana Gusmão. The ceremony was attended by some 300 dignitaries including United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who handed over authority from the United Nations to the Speaker of East Timor's National Parliament. East Timor's Parliament then held its first session at which President Gusmão presented Secretary-General Annan with a request from East Timor to join the United Nations.

Role of the UN Peace-keeping forces in Darfur region of Sudan⁷

The **United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)** is a joint African Union and United Nations peacekeeping mission formally approved by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 on July 31, 2007, to bring stability to the war-torn Darfur region of Sudan while peace talks on a final settlement continue.

Its initial 12-month mandate has been extended to July 31, 2010. Its budget is approximately \$106 million per month. Its force of about 26,000 personnel began to deploy to the region in October 2007. The 9,000-strong African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was previously responsible for peacekeeping, had completely merged into this new force by December 31, 2007.

The mandate is for a force of up to 19,555 military personnel and 3,772 police, along with a further "19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each." The peacekeepers will be allowed to use force to protect civilians and humanitarian operations. UNAMID will be the first joint UN/AU force and the largest peacekeeping mission. As of

⁷ Source: Wikipedia (Darfur region of Sudan)

December 2008, it has deployed 15,136 total uniformed personnel, including 12,194 troops, 175 military observers, 2,767 police officers, supported by 786 international civilian personnel, 1,405 local civilian staff and 266 United Nations Volunteers.

Appendix No: 2

Country	Police	Troops	Observers
Argentina	23	854	2
Bangladesh	40	1,235	43
Belgium		1,038	34
Brazil		6	
Canada	45	2,091	15
Colombia	12		
Czech Republic		971	37
Denmark	45	1,230	14
Egypt		427	27

Finland	10	463	12
France	41	4,493	11
Ghana			32
Indonesia	15	220	29
Ireland	20		9
Jordan	71	3,367	48
Kenya	50	967	47
Lithuania		32	
Malaysia	26	1,550	27
Nepal	49	899	5
Netherlands	10	1,803	48

New Zealand		249	9
Nigeria	48		10
Norway	31	826	39
Pakistan	19	3,017	34
Poland	29	1,109	30
Portugal	39		12
Russian federation	36	1,464	22
Slovak Republic		582	
Spain	1	267	19
Sweden	35	1,212	19
Switzerland		6	6
Tunisia	12	1,464	

Turkey			
Ukraine	9	1,147	10
United kingdom		3,405	19
United States		748	
Venezuela			2

Appendix NO 3

<i>UNAMID Facts and Figures</i>
Current authorization until 30 June 2015: Security Council resolution 2173 of 27 August 2014
Strength
Initial authorization as per Security Council resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 19,555 military personnel
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6,432 police
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 3,772 police personnel
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A significant civilian component
Current strength as on 31 March 2015
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 16,815 total uniformed personnel
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 13,460 troops
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 190 military observers
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 3,165 police (including formed units)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 967 international civilian personnel*
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2,864 local civilian staff*
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 275 United Nations Volunteers
* Statistics for international and local civilians are as of <i>31 December 2014</i>
Country contributors
Military personnel
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Thailand, Togo, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Police personnel
Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia,

Germany, Ghana, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Fatalities

- 145 troops
- 44 police
- 1 military observer
- 3 international civilian
- 21 local civilian
- 2 other

- **216 total**

Financial aspects

- **Method of financing:** Assessment in respect of a Special Account
- **Approved budget (07/2014 – 06/2015):** \$1,153,611,300

Appendix NO: 4

UNMISS Facts and Figures: Current authorization until 30 May 2015

Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) of 25 November 2014

Strength

Initially authorized

- Up to 7,000 military personnel
- Up to 900 civilian police personnel
- An appropriate civilian component

Currently authorized [in accordance with S/RES/2155 (2014)]

- Up to 12,500 military personnel
- Up to 1,323 civilian police personnel (including Formed Police Units)
- An appropriate civilian component

Current strength (31 March 2015)

- 11,734 total uniformed personnel:
 - 10,539 troops
 - 187 military liaison officers

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ 1,008 police (including Formed Police Units)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 818 international civilian personnel*
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1,384 local civilian staff*
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 406 United Nations Volunteers
<p>*NB: Statistics for international and local civilians are as of <i>31 December 2014</i></p>
<p>Country contributors</p>
<p>Military personnel</p>
<p>Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Police personnel</p>
<p>Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, Ethiopia, Fiji, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway,</p>

Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Fatalities

16 troops

1 police

5 international civilian

6 local civilians

7 other

- **35 total**

Financial aspects

- **Method of financing:** Assessment in respect of a Special Account
- **Approved budget (07/2014 – 06/2015):** \$1,097,315,100

APPENDIX NO. 5

THE THEORY OF PEACE-KEEPING FROM A UN PERSPECTIVE

The key reports that concern the development of a vision and plan for peace-keeping are:

1. AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, PREPARED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN 1992

Peacekeeping was one of the techniques for achieving peace developed in *An Agenda for Peace*. The report made a significant contribution to the practice of peacekeeping by articulating the underlying concepts, legitimizing its operation and outlining future possibilities. The report defined peacekeeping As the United Nations presence in the field, hitherto deployed with the consent of all concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

Further the report addressed the related concepts of preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and post-conflict peace building. These concepts were presented as tools to be used individually or in combination by the UN to respond proactively to a situation that threatens peace and security in a geographical region. It is this proactive vision for the role of the UN that is at the core of *An Agenda for Peace*.

2. COLLECTIVE HUMAN SECURITY

In *An Agenda for Peace* Boutros-Ghali sets out his view that each element of the UN, including each Member, has an indispensable role to play in the maintenance of human security. This has led commentators to argue that Boutros-Ghali was identifying a new basis for intervention by the UN. Peou for example, argues that *An Agenda for Peace* gave rise to a new concept of collective human security.

For Peou this concept is a considerable step from the way peacekeeping had evolved up to that point. He argues that although *An Agenda for Peace* emphasised the importance of

sovereignty in the UN process, it also noted that absolute and exclusive sovereignty was no longer, if it ever had been, a viable concept.

Peou suggests that Boutros-Ghali put forward an alternative approach to the sovereign State as the key to international action on the basis of a system of collective human security. This sees the individual, not the state as the point of reference. The concept challenges the basic premise that intervention by the international community is for the purpose of preserving the state and instead puts forward collective intervention action as a means of achieving human security.

As understood by a particular theoretical perspective, internal sovereignty of state is absolute. But the concept of collective human security challenges this argument and asserts that a humanitarian crisis suggests collective effort by all countries of the world from platform of the United Nations. Thus, State is not the only entity responsible for providing security to the people. The adoption of the concept of collective human security effectively eliminates arguments over the ability to

intervene in circumstances where human security is endangered. As a result, intervention on this basis must override state sovereignty.

Alternatively, the Report's reference to human security is that it is a restatement of the underpinning Charter commitment to human rights. Rather than forming a basis for intervention by the UN, human security is used in the report to remind each member-state that it contributes to the maintenance of peace in the UN. If understood in this sense then the reference to human security is reinforcing the human rights basis of the Charter rather than foreshadowing humanitarian intervention to the extent suggested by Peou and evident in later reports, particularly the Responsibility to Protect. It may be that the concept of collective human security found its inspiration in the Report's reference to human security, but it was not the intended effect of An Agenda for Peace to provide a basis for humanitarian intervention beyond that which had already been recognised.

3. PREVENTATIVE DEPLOYMENT

An Agenda for Peace noted that the UN has been reactive to situations of conflict and called for action in future to precede and prevent conflict. Boutros-Ghali suggests that preventative deployments should be on the basis of consent from a State fearing invasion from another. Consent of the State should be obtained to place a peacekeeping force on that State's side of the border to act as a preventative or deterrent to invasion. Preventative deployment may be further expanded into a demilitarized zone where there is consent from both parties to the dispute. Again the emphasis is placed on consent of the State. Although difficulties with preventative deployments exist, not the least of which is determining the amount of weaponry that is required to create a deterrent, there have been situations in which the interposition of such a force could have averted a humanitarian disaster. Bellamy argues that disaster could have been averted in Rwanda and Bosnia by the insertion of a preventative deployment. Had this aspect of *An Agenda for Peace* been implemented many lives may have been saved.

4. UN STANDING FORCE

An Agenda for Peace calls upon the Member States to provide forces to the UN on a permanent basis for enforcement action under Chapter VII. Article 43 of the Charter provides for the provision of military personnel and equipment by Member States in the form of a standing force for use where required for the purposes of Chapter VII. Member States had effectively rendered Article 43, useless by failing to detach troops to form the UN force. ***An Agenda for Peace*** saw the post Cold War climate as finally providing the environment for this concept to be put in action. It was acknowledged that the size of such a force may be difficult to accurately assess but that such a force would be useful in meeting a threat from States, other than those equipped with sophisticated weapons.

An Agenda for Peace also introduced the concept of peace enforcement units that would perform a more robust, interventionist form of peacekeeping that would hold a place between the traditional consensual operations and all out armed conflict as used in Korea. By necessity- such operations would

fall under Chapter VII of the Charter. The concept of peace enforcement supporting a more interventionist role for UN peacekeeping would be one of the key themes further developed by the reports discussed in the remainder of this chapter. As it turned out Chapter VII operations would form the basis of the majority of peacekeeping operations post *An Agenda for Peace*.

5. Co-operating for Peace, The Australian response to *An Agenda for Peace* submitted to the UN in September 1993,

Co-operative Security

A concept introduced for the first time by Cooperating for Peace was the concept of "co-operative security". Cooperative security is closely aligned to "comprehensive security" and "collective security". Comprehensive security is defined as a: "notion that security is multi-dimensional in character, demanding attention not only to the political and diplomatic disputes that have so often produced conflict in the past, but to such factors as economic underdevelopment, trade disputes,

unregulated population flows, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, terrorism and human rights abuse."

Collective security is a term that has a mainly military response focus. Cooperative security embraces both collective security and comprehensive security and develops and integrates them.

6. Supplement to *An Agenda for Peace*, prepared by the Secretary-General in 1997 after it became clear that the end of the Cold War was not the panacea that had been hoped for

The Supplement noted the change in the nature of conflicts in distinct eras. During the Cold War conflict was seen as an issue between states, while post-cold war conflict was more likely to be intra-state. The incidence of peace-keeping and the complexity of the operations had increased concomitantly. The incidence of operations within collapsed states had also increased substantially. The result of this change in the predominant form of peacekeeping operation had led to the overburdening of the UN peacekeeping headquarters. Finally peacekeeping operations

were no longer to be viewed as amenable to rapid insertion and withdrawal. The UN had accepted that a peacekeeping operation was unlikely to succeed unless a long-term commitment could be given to sustain the operation until reliable institutions could be built up to replace the UN.

7. **Brahimi Report**, prepared at the direction of the Secretary-General to get peacekeeping operations back on track after perceived failures in peacekeeping operations in 2000,

The Brahimi Report made it clear that the tendencies of the past to deploy to situations of military stalemate and where at least one party to the conflict was not committed to the intervention, was not sustainable without a commitment to achieve specified outcomes. Peacekeepers were seen as the means to create the space and security for peace builders to achieve self-sustainment of the peace process. The report emphasised the partnership between peacekeepers and peace builders, which must be seen as an inseparable one: For future success the role of peace builders in complex operations must be acknowledged as a key role.

ROBUST DOCTRINE AND THE USE OF FORCE

The Brahimi Report supported the previous core principles of impartiality, consent of the parties and the use of force only in self- defense. However, referring to the purposes set out in the UN Charter, the Report also identified the need, and in some cases the requirement, to preserve the distinction between the victim and aggressor. The report identified as a fundamental premise the ability of the UN to respond effectively to violations of the Charter. As a result the UN must be prepared to pass more robust mandates including specific authority to use force.

8. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

The Report made a number of recommendations in the area of information management and strategic analysis. It recommended that a new information gathering and analysis entity should be created to support the Secretary-General and members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS). It was proposed that an ECPS Information and Strategic

Analysis Secretariat (ISAS) would be created. ISAS would maintain an integrated database on peace and security issues, distribute knowledge within the UN system, be responsible for policy analysis, formulate long-term strategies and bring incipient crises to the attention of the ECPS leadership.

INTEGRATED MISSION TASK FORCE

The Brahimi Report proposed the establishment of an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) to plan operations and support field headquarters. The staffing for the IMTF was to be drawn from across the LINT staff to improve the efficiency of operational planning. This proposal received support at the IPA meetings although it did not appear to stimulate significant debate.

9. **Responsibility to Protect**, the report prepared by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in response to a request from the UN issued in December 2001

The ***Responsibility to protect*** report was produced by a

commission established by the Canadian government, which was responding to calls from Secretary-General Kofi Annan to reach international consensus on the issue of humanitarian intervention. Opposing views had developed within the international community regarding intervention, with international actors divided between intervention on humanitarian or human rights grounds and the supremacy of state sovereignty.

The report is divided into eight chapters dealing with; the policy challenge; new approach; the responsibility to prevent; the responsibility to react; the responsibility to rebuild; the question of authority; the operational dimension, the responsibility to protect and the way forward.

CORE PRINCIPLES

Underpinning the ***Responsibility to protect***, four core principles and eleven sub principles for intervention were developed. These were:

(1) BASIC PRINCIPLES

a) State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.

b) Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of international war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.

(2) FOUNDATIONS

The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the International community of States, lie in:

a. obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty;

b. the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security;

c. specific legal obligations under human rights and human

protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law;

d. the developing practice of States, regional organizations and the Security Council itself;

(3) ELEMENTS

The ***Responsibility to protect*** embraces three specific responsibilities:

- a) **The responsibility to prevent:** to address the root causes and the direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.
- b) **The responsibility to react:** to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.
- c) **The responsibility to rebuild:** to provide particularly after a

military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation addressing the causes of harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

(4) PRIORITIES

- a) Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it.
- b) The exercise of the responsibility to both prevent and react should always involve less intrusive and coercive measures being considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.

The core principles in the '***Responsibility to Protect***' document are in many respects a synthesis of the reports and commentaries that had preceded it. In general terms the ***Responsibility to Protect*** developed the concepts of human security and peace building while basing the primary responsibility for these functions not on the international

community but on the individual state. The Charter position of the state as the primary functionary in international relations is unambiguous, as is the ultimate responsibility of the Security Council to ensure international peace and security.

THE WAY FORWARD

The report concluded by identifying that the concept of the responsibility to protect resolves the past conflict between intervention and state sovereignty. A consensus was identified that the responsibility of a state to protect its people from killing and other grave harm underpinned the very concept of sovereignty, and where that obligation could not be fulfilled then intervention by the community of states may be warranted. The key issues for intervention were the mobilisation of domestic and international political will to take action. For the future, the report recommended the acceptance by the General Assembly of the concept of the responsibility to protect as a sovereign responsibility of states. This responsibility was based on: sovereign responsibility; responsibility of the community of states to prevent, react and rebuild; definition of a threshold justifying

military intervention; and the precautionary principles that must be met to justify military intervention. It recommended that the Security Council embraces and adopts the guidelines for military action and that the permanent members abstain from use of the veto in matters of intervention for human protection purposes. Finally the report recommended that the Secretary-General works towards the adoption and implementation of the report and its recommendations.

10. **In Larger Freedom**, prepared by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to encourage a return to the principles of the United Nations following the invasion of Iraq

In Larger Freedom makes proposals for the UN to combat the causes of threats to international peace and security. In particular it proposes action be taken to reduce poverty, criminal activity and for the members-states to work together to eliminate terrorism by denying terrorists access to resources and support.

Of particular significance to this work; the report specifically identified human rights as the foundation and framework of the

UN Charter and therefore UN activities. The Secretary-General made it clear that it is under this framework that the conditions can be created to establish and maintain justice and the rule of law.

It could be argued that as human rights is the framework for the Charter, international human rights law must be the legal framework for activities conducted under it such as peace-keeping and peace-building.

As the report covers a number of issues that are concerned with the far-reaching challenges to world peace, it is intended to examine here only those parts of the report that are directly relevant to peace-keeping.

In Larger Freedom drew attention to the importance in peacekeeping of the rule of law and the UN commitment to the implementation of human rights and international law as well as basic standards of due process. The Secretary-General made a commitment to deal with individual members of contingents behaving improperly and called on member-states to do the same

within the contingents.

The report does not develop the theme of the implementation of law by peacekeepers but the conclusion could be drawn that the report intended that where necessary, peacekeepers would be involved directly in setting up and administering a justice system. If this were not the case then it would not have been necessary for the report to expressly direct peacekeepers to adhere to "the basic standards of due process". This part of the report may support the assertion made in later chapters of this work that peacekeepers have a duty to administer justice where the domestic system has failed and is also consistent with idea behind the formulation of the 'Responsibility to Protect'.

In Larger Freedom Report builds on the previous reports in the area of peacekeeping while recognising the realities of the existing world situation. Unlike the Boutros-Ghali reports, there is no implied hierarchy of deployments as between regional Chapter VIII operations and UN_operations. ***In Larger Freedom*** prefers an approach in which regional and UN operations can

operate together to achieve the desired result.

The recommendation for the abolition of the Military Staff Committee is a tacit acknowledgement that the Article 43 provisions would never be set in place. In the event that the report's call for strategic national forces was implemented, this would effectively replace the force of Article 43. In this way, the report can be seen to support the original concept of the Charter and achieve the intent by other means.

The position of sovereignty has seen a change in fortunes over the entire period of the evolution and development of peacekeeping. Boutros-Ghali saw sovereignty as receding under the tide of Security Council initiated intervention, despite his emphasis on the need for consent in peacekeeping operations. The ***Responsibility to Protect*** had a less passive notion of sovereignty, with an emphasis on the independence of states and an obligation to maintain the protections encompassed by the concept of human security, rather than have the state competing with the Security Council for the right to deal with citizens of sovereign states. The ***Responsibility to Protect*** preserved

respect for the state and only sought intervention where specific state obligations were breached. This theme is again reinforced by ***In Larger Freedom*** where state responsibilities were emphasised in the context of working within the collective security model set out in the Charter.

The Brahimi Report was less concerned with the theoretical position of peacekeeping and was concerned primarily with the practical conduct of peacekeeping operations. Although the Rapid Reaction Force was declared operational, it is yet to be genuinely tested. It also runs the risk of competing for military resources with the European Union and the NATO. Progress in other areas stimulated by the report has slowed; for example, no further progress has been made with regard to the Stand-by Arrangements. Many of the practical arrangements for peacekeeping have also been slow to materialise; in particular the UN mandates authorising force under Chapter VII remain very general in character, although they do now tend to be clear that Chapter VII is the basis of the mandate.

In Larger Freedom was built on the Brahimi Report in that

it provided the most coherent strategy to date for peacekeeping by proposing the formation of a mechanism to integrate the different stages and responses required to rebuild a state from collapse to independent action. If adopted, the peace-building office will be responsible for identifying from the outset, how a state could be rebuilt and for coordinating the elements involved in achieving this goal. The planning and implementation will, for the first time, run from troop insertion through rebuilding bureaucracy to handover of a functioning independent domestic sovereign state.

In brief, peacekeeping from a UN perspective has changed significantly over the years. Although the first of the reports considered in this chapter was presented fairly late in the development of peacekeeping, there has clearly been a shift over the past decades in the UN approach to the use of peacekeeping as a tool. Peacekeeping has moved from a discreet activity used to monitor ceasefires or elections and on occasion to act as a force capable of intervening between parties in order to prevent armed conflict to an element of an integrated plan to rebuild a failed sovereign state, where necessary, by temporarily

undertaking activities such as the administration of justice normally associated with sovereignty undertaken by a sovereign state.

As demonstrated by this analysis in this section of this appendix and the previous chapter, peace-keeping has grown over time to become a key tool of the UN. Its development has been watched, documented and debated within the UN and in the wider community.