

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) has been the predominant international organization influencing the nature and dynamics of inter-state relations since the end of the Second World War in 1945. The UN was entrusted with the role of keeping peace and security in the post-war world order, mainly by the victorious Allied powers in the Second World War. After the war, UN found itself in the Cold War environment, which was shaped by two super-powers - the United States of America and the former Soviet Union.

The role and dynamics of the UN peace-keeping operations during the Cold War were shaped by the rivalry of the two super-powers. However, with the end of the Cold War in 1989, the international strategic environment was transformed, in the sense that there was convergence of strategic objectives of the major powers in terms of promoting international security and peace in the post-cold war world order. After the Cold War, the role and dynamics of the United Nations Peace-keeping and Peace-making operations were qualitatively and substantively different from the Cold War era. This thesis aims to address this wider question in depth.

This study is significant, in the sense that the status and working of the UN peace-keeping operations are analysed and assessed in the post-cold war order by analysing the factors and forces that are responsible for their effectiveness. This would enable us to determine the virtues and shortcomings of such operations, especially in terms of the peace-building efforts in intra-state conflicts in various geographical regions within the sovereign state-system. The broad purpose of undertaking such study is to review such operations, by citing specific cases—the Bosnian conflict in the 1990s and the crises in Sudan (where the UN peace-keeping operation is still on) and determine their wider legitimacy and effectiveness.

In this introductory chapter, an attempt is made to provide historical background to the evolution of the United Nations as an international organization. The idea is to trace the idea of ‘peace’ among sovereign states philosophically, by referring to Kant’s conception of peace. Prior to the birth of the United Nations, the establishment of the League of Nations is traced in a historical manner. Thereafter, the birth of the United Nations is systematically traced. The principle and provisions of ‘collective security’ are outlined.

By way of introduction, formation of the UN peace-keeping is posited. The nature of the First-Generation peace-keeping is discussed, with reference to the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt. The character of international peace-keeping is highlighted within the cold war era. On the other hand, the character of the Second-Generation peace-keeping in the post-cold war era is discussed as well.

In this introductory chapter, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s is discussed and lessons learned there are posited by way of introductory remarks. Similarly, the crisis in Somalia is briefly introduced to highlight its salient characteristics. The crisis in Sudan is briefly introduced as well. By referring these cases, an attempt is made to outline the changing nature of the UN peace-keeping in the post-cold war era. The crisis in Rwanda is alluded to as well.

Lastly, three broad rubrics are posited to distinguish three different kinds of the UN activities ---- conflict prevention and peace-making; peace-keeping and peace-building. The introductory chapter ends with the larger argument posited, with regard to the utility of peace-keeping in the post-cold war era.

In 1795, Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*¹ outlined the idea of a league of nations to control conflict and promote peace between states. Kant argued for the establishment of a peaceful world community, not in a sense of a world government, but in the hope that each state would declare itself a free state that respects its citizens and welcomes foreign visitors as fellow rational beings, thus promoting peaceful society worldwide.

International co-operation to promote collective security originated in the Concert of Europe that developed after the Napoleonic Wars in the 19th century in an attempt to maintain the status quo between European states and so avoid war.² This period also saw the development of international law, with the first Geneva Conventions establishing laws dealing with humanitarian relief during wartime, and the international Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 governing rules of war and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Most of these attempts at international organization were half-hearted and inadequate. Besides,

¹ Kant, Immanuel. "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch". Mount Holyoke College. Retrieved 16 May 2008.

² Northedge, F. S. (1986). *The League of Nations: Its life and times, 1920–1946*. Leicester University Press.

there was no permanent organization of a political character to bring the nations together to enable them to understand one another's point of view, settle disputes and avert war.

The League of Nations

The Paris Peace Conference ended the First World War. After the First World War the economic and financial crisis afflicted the world with a general political unrest and an increase of mistrust and uncertainty in international relations. Subsequently, the League of Nations (abbreviated as **LN** in English, "Société des Nations" abbreviated as **SDN** in French), an intergovernmental organization was founded on 10 January 1920 as a result of the Paris Peace Conference. The League of Nations was established to remove earlier defects, promote international cooperation and achieve international peace and security. It was the first international organization whose principal mission was to maintain world peace. Its primary goals, as stated in its Covenant, included preventing wars through collective security and disarmament and settling international disputes through negotiation and arbitration.

The League of Nations had four specific functions: international disarmament, arbitration of international disputes, economic sanctions against aggression, and treaty revision. The Covenant contained no provision for the use of military force against recalcitrant aggressor nations, and three major powers were not members: Russia was not invited to join; Germany was excluded; and the United States chose not to join.

The League was first convened in Geneva on November 5, 1920. The first matter on the agenda was international disarmament. In naval disarmament conferences held in 1921 and 1936, the British, Americans, and Japanese agreed to a ratio of 5:5:3 in capital ships³. The naval conferences also agreed on a moratorium on building new ships until 1931, but they did not address submarines or aircraft. The 1932 conference on military disarmament could not identify a reasonable formula for determining a country's land force needs.

The second matter on the agenda was arbitration of international disputes. This was accomplished with some success when the countries

³ Brian Urquhart, The United Nations, Collective Security, and International Peacekeeping, in Negotiating World Order: the Artisanry and Architecture of Global Diplomacy, PP. 59-66

were small and relatively powerless, but larger and more powerful countries tended to simply ignore the international community. The only recourse for the League was economic sanctions, which were applied unevenly and failed to solve international disagreements. Finally, the League of Nations offered the possibility of treaty revision, which was used to ease the German situation somewhat in the 1920s and 1930s.

However, the successes of the League deserve to be better known; because such knowledge will prevent the wholesale condemnation of it, implied by description such as the “Geneva Council of Fools”. It helped to settle the frontier dispute between Turkey and Iraq (1924-26) and the dispute between Columbia and Peru regarding the Laticia Trapezium (1931-35). It helped, through the mandate system, improve the system of colonial administration. It also helped to settle interstate disputes when both parties to a dispute were genuinely attached to peace. Its organs like the Permanent Court of International Justice, International Labour Office, the Health Organization and other bodies made good contribution towards betterment of conditions in international society.

Of the League's 42 founding members, 23 (24 counting Free France) remained members until it was dissolved in 1946. In the founding year,

six other states joined, only two of which remained members throughout the League's existence. An additional 15 countries joined later. The largest number of member states was 58, between 28 September 1934 (when Ecuador joined) and 23 February 1935 (when Paraguay withdrew).⁴

Both the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, however, would be overwhelmed by the economic, social, and political tensions of the 1920s and 1930s. “Wilson sought to base the League of Nations on the lofty principle of collective security- a principle denounced by realists as an example of idealism under which the invasion of any country would automatically bring forward the combined might of all countries”(Richard W. Mansbach)⁵

The success of the League of Nations can be judged on the basis of its handling of disputes and incidents of international conflicts. The authenticity of any organization can be checked by its utility of solving political and social issues. Although, League of Nations had devoted

⁴ Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the world: international organizations in global politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004

⁵ Richard W. Mansbach, Introduction to Global Politics pp.89

serious attention to the question of international co-operation since its creation, but it failed due to the onset of the Second World War. The World War II demonstrated that the League had failed in its primary purpose, the prevention of another world war. There were a variety of reasons for this failure, many connected to general weaknesses within the organization. Additionally, the power of the League was limited by the United States' refusal to join. "Institutionalized mechanisms for the settlement and resolution of disputes, are, of course, important, but only if they are legitimised by the actors in the system."⁶

The dysfunctional structure of the League and muddled political conditions surrounding its activities coupled with the rise of dictatorships in Italy, Japan and Germany with contemporary colonial aspirations of major powers made the task of the League difficult, resulting in virtual paralysis. The philosophy of collective security propagated by the League did not find requisite support from its members.

⁶ Swords and Plowshares, Inis Claude, p. 5

However, it may be summed up, in words of Inis Claude: “ The point is that International organizations are neither sacred nor diabolical ideological inventions, but a part of the political and administrative apparatus of human society made necessary by the complexity and interdependence of that society. “⁷

Birth of United Nations

The final meeting of the League of Nations took place on 12 April 1946 in Geneva. On 19 April 1946, the President of the Assembly, Carl J. Hambro of Norway, declared "the twenty-first and last session of the General Assembly of the League of Nations closed". The League of Nations ceased to exist the following day.

At the 1943 Tehran Conference, the Allied powers agreed to create a new body to replace the League, the United Nations. Many League bodies, such as the International Labour Organization, continued to function and eventually became affiliated with the UN.

⁷ Paul Taylor and A. J. Groom , International organisation, New York, Nicolas, p. 25

The designers of the structures of the United Nations intended to make it more effective than the League.

The central purpose of the United Nations as set forth in Article 1 of the Charter is: “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression...”

Article 43 states: “All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including the right of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”

In order to carry out this commitment the Charter provides for a Military Staff Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff, or their representatives, from the five permanent members for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

International organizations are not ends in themselves but they are means chosen by governments for achieving common ends. In establishing the United Nations and its related agencies, the contracting parties committed themselves to a range of common purposes – the maintenance of international peace and security; cooperation in achieving conditions of economic and social progress and development; the political, economic, and social development of non-self governing territories; and the furtherance of respect for human rights. Of these, maintenance of international peace and security was regarded as the primary commitment and responsibility of the new organization, since the achievement of this objective was considered to be the necessary precondition of reaching the other goals.

It soon became clear after the United Nations began to function that it was not going to be able to achieve this purpose by the methods specified in the Charter. More particularly, failure of the permanent members to agree on the principles governing the agreements to be concluded under Article 43 meant that the Security Council would not

have at its disposal the full range of enforcement measures enumerated in Articles 41 and 42.

Furthermore, the deepening confrontation between the East and the West substantially reduced the likelihood that those means of peaceful settlement and persuasion available to the Council would in fact be used.

In the 1950s, the state of international relations restricted the capacity of the UN to deal with armed conflicts in an effective and credible manner. Given the state of political relations among the major powers, there was interest in alternative means of achieving security through self-defense arrangements under Article 51. After the decade of limited achievement in the field of peace and security, the United Nations in the mid-1950s entered a period of revised hopes and substantial accomplishments.

This change in United Nations fortunes was due in part to the lessening of the East-West tensions following the death of Stalin, but to a greater extent it was accounted for by the imaginative initiative and skillful diplomacy of the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, who,

by gaining the confidence of the major powers, was able to develop and make effective a peace-keeping role for the United Nations in situations where the United States and the Soviet Union had a common interest in limiting their involvement.

Peace-keeping operations were, at the time of their major successes, viewed by many, not only as opening up an important new area of constructive activity on the part of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, but also as indicative of an important institutional development taking the form of the assumption by, or the conferring upon, the Secretary-General of important responsibilities for initiating and directing these operations.

The capacity of international organization to adapt to new and unforeseen demands has nowhere better demonstrated than in the way in which the United Nations and its related agencies have responded to demands created by different situations.

Provision of Collective Security and its Fate

The UN Charter provides by article 39 to 47 for the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN could not raise its own force. However, the UN continued to pursue its goal of maintaining peace and security in the world through the mechanism of international peace-keeping missions and deployment of forces under those missions. It also established regional alliances and their resources to meet with the challenges of peace-keeping.

There is no mention of peace-keeping in the UN Charter. As such, the technique originated and evolved purely in response to emerging crises as they happened. Peace-keeping is a technique used by the United Nations to interpose military and civilian personnel between the warring countries or communities to stop the fighting among them. The presence of peace-keepers helps create an atmosphere in which fruitful negotiations for lasting peace can be held. As peace-keepers maintain peace on the ground, mediators from the United Nations meet with leaders from the disputing parties or countries and try to reach a peaceful solution to the problems.

Despite its focus on safeguarding international peace and security, the United Nations was not construed to confront the type of intra-state conflicts (between groups and peoples within a single sovereign state) that almost exclusively dominate its peace-keeping agenda today. Very soon after the United Nations' founding, the Cold War tensions complicated the decision-making under Article 43. Since any one of the Security Council's Permanent Five (P-5) can exercise veto rights in defense of broader geopolitical agenda, the ability of the UN to speak in a unified voice when authorising military action has often proved difficult; especially as the Cold War animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union crystallised.

Despite these challenges, the United Nations confronted threats to peace and security with military action far more effectively than its predecessor, the League of Nations. However, in doing so it was forced to develop "peace-keeping" within the parameters laid out in Chapter VII's passages on military operations⁸.

⁸ Stephen Hill and Shahin P. Malik: *Peacekeeping and the United Nations*. UK, 1996.

By definition, peacekeeping operations are essentially a practical mechanism used by United Nations to contain international conflicts and facilitate their settlement by peaceful means. Under Article 25 of the Charter, member-states of the UN have agreed to “accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council” (SC). Therefore, under the Charter, the SC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As a result of the increasing disagreement between the two superpowers, the original collective security system, which was based on peace enforcement by the SC and consensus by major powers, became unworkable. This led to the conception of peace-keeping operations (PKOs). Early peacekeeping was a response to inter-state conflict, and ideally it was conceived as a non-violent use of military force in an effort to preserve peace between warring state actors. The place of peace-keeping is between Chapter VI and VII of the UN charter, and in the future it would be euphemistically referred to as “Chapter VI ½ operations”⁹.

⁹ United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A review of United Nations Peace-keeping (3d ed.). New York 1996.

As the Cold War began shortly after the establishment of the United Nations, these conditions could not be met due to the fact that the relations among the major powers, and especially between the two superpowers, became marred by mistrust and disagreement. This resulted in the SC having to resort to other means in which to preserve peace and stability. Thus, the mediation, conciliation, good offices of the Secretary-General, and ultimately peace-keeping became other means during the Cold War. U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt had envisioned the SC's Permanent Members as a team of "world policeman".¹⁰ However, this never came to be a reality. Instead, as peace-keeping evolved, peace-keeping troops were drawn on a voluntary basis from the member-states of the United Nations.

Peace-keeping began with unarmed observers and then evolved into missions that had both armed peacekeepers and unarmed military observers. The classical model of old peace-keeping evolved over the 1950s, when consent from the warring parties was required for peace-keeping intervention, impartiality was required from the deployed UN

¹⁰ Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin: Understanding Peacekeeping. Malden, MA: Blackwell 2004.

forces, and the UN forces were only to resort to the use of arms in self-defense. There was only one instance during the Cold War in which the collective use of force was initiated under the Charter. This was the Korean Crisis in 1950.

Formation of United Nations Peace-keeping

While not consciously chosen, “peace-keeping” operations arose from the UN’s driving commitment to avoid the “scourge of war”¹¹. The all-important Justification for this peacekeeping function resides in Chapter VII of the charter, which stipulates that Security Council can authorize military action to safeguard international peace and security and respond to regional instability resulting from aggressive attacks on the sovereignty of member states. Under Article 43 of this chapter, member states are obligated “to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement, armed forces,

¹¹ Judith G. Gardam. Proportionality and Force in International Law, United Kingdom 2004.

assistance, and facilities... necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security”.

First Generation Peace-keeping

From 1948 until the end of the Cold War in 1989, the UN developed the pattern of the first-generation peace-keeping. The UN peace-keepers had to be invited by the host state and would not deploy until a ceasefire had been established. The invitation protected the sovereignty of member-states (a paramount concern for the United Nations) and the ceasefire provided some sign that the belligerents were committed to resolving the conflict.

Yet, the first-generation peacekeeping was more passive than that of today. Peace-keepers were deployed to keep the peace or stop ongoing fighting. The UN peacekeeping forces consisted of lightly armed troops deployed to serve in neutral capacity, physically interposed or inserted between opponents. Since the UN peacekeepers were primarily a visible deterrent and a reminder of the international community's reciprocal

commitment for resolving the conflict, they did not need heavy weaponry and intentionally did not project an offensive military capability.

Armed only lightly and with their iconic light blue helmets, the UN peacekeepers monitored ceasefires and remained in the field only so long as the invitation remained in force. Once an invitation was rescinded, the United Nations was obligated by its own rules of engagement, to withdraw its forces and work to fulfill its mandate by other means.

This approach to peacekeeping was easy to reconcile with the language of the UN Charter, thus obviating any need to get fixated on the absence of the term “peace-keeping” in the Charter. Nevertheless, this model was not without serious limitations. Perhaps the best illustration of the challenges associated with the first-generation peace-keeping is the initial UN Emergency Force (UNEF-1) mission that was deployed in the Sinai region of Egypt from 1956 to 1967¹².

¹² Brian D. Tittmore: “*Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace Operations*”, *Stanford Journal of International Law*. vol. 33, No. 61, 1997

Trial in the Sinai – The First-Generation Peace-keeping

On October 29, 1956, Israel invaded the Sinai peninsula of Egypt and quickly advanced westward towards the Suez Canal, which Egypt had nationalised in July, to the consternation of Britain and France. Both Britain and France intervened under the pretense of protecting the Suez shipping lane from Israeli invasion.

With three foreign forces deployed on its soil, Egypt petitioned the UN Security Council for assistance. When it met on October 31, it was stymied by the veto power of both Britain and France, so the issue was kicked to the General Assembly for resolution. Following a ten-day emergency session, General Assembly Resolution 998 (1956) authorised the Security Council to deploy a peacekeeping force to Egypt and called for the immediate withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from the Egyptian territory.

The UN peace-keepers were charged with the task of overseeing these withdrawals and serving as a force physically stationed between

Egyptian and Israeli troops in support of the ceasefire agreement. The limited rules of engagement set forth in the mission's mandate authorised the 6,000 peace-keepers to return fire only in self-defense. For the next decade, UNEF I, deployed on the Egyptian side of the armistice line, patrolled the Sinai frontier and shouldered the burden of preventing a resumption of hostilities with a diminishing number of troops.

Then, in May 1967, the Egyptian government withdrew the invitation to the UN peace-keepers. Less than three weeks later, the 1967 Six Day War broke out between Egypt and Israel leaving UNEF I with a problematic legacy. The Sinai example highlights the limitations of the first-generation model of the UN peace-keeping. Like many of the organization's military operations, the UN Security Council was susceptible to the intransigence of its five permanent members. Even when stalemates could be avoided, the limited nature of the first-generation peacekeeping meant there was often a split verdict on its utility¹³. On one hand, UNEF I maintained peace between two hostile

¹³ *Forces May be Endangered*, 56-II ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INT'L 540 (1975), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 903 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman, eds. 1988).

neighbouring states for ten years. On the other hand, it did very little to resolve the underlying cause of the conflict as demonstrated by outbreak of war once the UN peace-keepers were out of the picture.

Cold War Era and Traditional Peace-keeping

Peace-keeping was created as a way to overcome the stalemate that was plaguing the Security Council at the hands of the two superpowers the USA and the USSR who could simply veto any operation they deemed to be unfavorable to them. The aim of this peace-keeping initiative was to maintain fragile ceasefires and stabilise conflict areas, so that tension could then be resolved diplomatically. By keeping small regional conflicts (proxy wars) contained, the US and the former Soviet Union would not become involved in escalating conflicts leading to a possible nuclear third world war. As such, no state supplied troops to the UN peacekeeping forces in an effort to maintain their non-involvement in actual conflicts.

It should be noted that forces only entered a conflict region

once limited peace or a ceasefire had been reached, and they also required the support of all members of the conflict to ensure the force's impartiality and to honor the principle of consent. O'Neill and Rees (2005) explain that the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force appeared morally supportive of peace-keeping operations, yet in practical application these often hindered the UN forces. Forces were to be employed in situations where all parties to the conflict were interested in restoring peace but for some reason or another, were unable to do so without an impartial third party. This would ensure that keeping the already established peace was the object of the mission rather than a military intervention to end the conflict, sometimes referred to as peace-making. This was also important because it ensured that forces were not seen as invading forces, but were meant for protection for innocent civilians and help for the parties to the conflict to pursue a resolution of the conflict.

The UN documents the first peacekeeping mission as that of 1948 in the Middle East when the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) was established to

supervise a truce already in place, in an effort to end the Arab-Israeli war. Mere observer missions like UNTSO, were much less demanding than more complex conflicts such as the Suez Crisis in 1956 which required far more activity on the part of peace-keepers, including overseeing the withdrawal of invading forces.

Yilmaz (2005) argues that although there were a few missions in which the UN peace-keeping forces were ineffective in completing their mission including Cyprus in 1974 and Lebanon in 1982. The UN peace-keeping operations during 1948-88 were largely successful in that they reduced conflict and protected lives. UNEF I was a pre-condition for securing both the ceasefire and the withdrawal of the invading forces in Suez, making it an invaluable asset to the resolution of that crisis. Most importantly, peace-keeping operations were effective in keeping the US and the Soviet Union out of smaller conflicts, thus also maintaining international security.

Second-Generation Peace-keeping during Post Cold War World Order

Second-generation peace-keeping operations were developed out of a necessity to address the far more complex nature of ethnic and communal violence that increasingly confronted the United Nations at the end of the Cold War. It moved peace-keeping beyond the passive interposition role into something far more involved and multidimensional. The early 1990s ushered in a short-lived optimism about the UN peace-keeping. Tensions among the permanent five members of the UNSC seemed to dissipate and many looked forward to a new era of peace-keeping operations, purged of the partisanship generated by the Cold War adversaries¹⁴.

The grim flip side was that many of the smaller conflicts that the superpowers had held at bay during the Cold War were now free to explode unchecked. In the absence of Soviet or American patronage, many developing states around the globe began to fracture and spiral into chaos fueled by resurgent nationalism, political instability, and contested natural resources. The United Nations confronted an alarming

¹⁴ Garth J. Cartledge, *International Humanitarian Law*, in *International law and Australian Security*, p. 147 (Shirley V. Scott & Anthony Bergin ed.). Canberra 1997

proliferation mode of bloody and primal intrastate conflicts throughout much of the Global South. Its first-generation model of peace-keeping now appeared inadequate and ill-designed for these new types of conflicts.

The United Nations was forced to expand its understanding of what peace-keeping entailed to include long-term conflict resolution. Peace-keeping quickly evolved from a limited role of symbolic deterrence primarily charged with monitoring an existing ceasefire to an active one that involved in-depth conflict resolution and peace enforcement and implementation. Peace-keeping remained predicated on preventing the resumption of hostilities between warring parties, but beginning in the 1990s, its approach to resolving the underlying conflict also became more robust¹⁵. United Nations peacekeeping missions were increasingly charged with laying the foundation for a self-sustaining peace: implementing political solutions to the conflict, shoring up transitional governments, providing economic assistance for post-conflict stage, and

¹⁵ Judith G. Gardam: *Proportionality and Force in International Law*, United Kingdom 2004.

shouldering the responsibility for humanitarian assistance during the transition period¹⁶.

One of the lessons drawn from the UNEF I reflected the need for the peace-keepers to be more involved in resolving the underlying conflict. Adhering strictly to an interposition role was insufficient because it did little to create conditions for lasting peace in the absence of major powers as international actors.

If these lessons were important when the combatants were state actors with clearly defined borders and agendas, they became vital with the types of conflicts increasingly confronting the United Nations beginning in the 1990s, which involved both state and non-state actors with sometimes tenuous or nonexistent political structures as well as shifting or incoherent agendas. The security provided by the UN peace-keepers was illusory without an accompanying political solution. The United Nations began to acknowledge a responsibility to protect not only

¹⁶ J.M. Sanderson: *"Dabbling in War: The dilemma of Use of Force In United Nations interventions"*, in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in the New Century (Olara A. Otunno et al eds.). Maryland 1998.

the state, but also the citizens who were victimized by the conflict¹⁷. The UN peacekeepers came to realise that providing adequate relief for refugees and displaced persons is an indispensable component of the peace process. Without a sense of personal security, citizens cannot help create and sustain the conditions for permanent conflict resolution.

The United Nations began to emphasise humanitarian functions such as election monitoring, civil society building, police and judicial reforms, civil reconstruction, protection of heritage sites, and financial reform. Peace-keeping missions became more multidimensional and the skills of peace-keepers became ever more specialised. For instance, caring for victims in conflicts has evolved beyond simply providing access to basic necessities-- food, shelter, and medical assistance- to providing counseling and psychological aid to those traumatised by rape, child soldiering, and other atrocities.

Unlike the first-generation peace-keeping, disarming and demobilising the combatants now necessitates more than establishing

¹⁷ Patricia S. Rambach ed.: Report of the Conference on Contemporary Problems of the Law of armed conflicts. New York 1971.

weapons collection points and observing demobilisation. Peace-keepers must determine a “normal” level of weaponry acceptable within a given population based on socio-cultural factors (and the need for personal security in lawless situations), and demobilised combatants must be re-integrated into society. This often involves skills re-training, basic education, literacy programs, and public outreach initiatives to allay any fears that the public may be having about the presence of former combatants. Election monitoring involves more than securing polling stations and safeguarding the ballot boxes. It has become a process of engagement with or creation of civil society organizations to determine the size of the electorate and incentivise public participation. It might also involve literacy programs to enable voter participation. More often than not, the expanded role of the peace-keepers also includes close coordination with humanitarian and refugee agencies and communicating the benefits of cooperating with the UN operations.

The United Nations quickly realised that it required an infrastructure geared towards these more expensive and expansive missions. In 1992, it formed the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

(DPKO) as a centralized command for all missions. It is responsible for all the UN peacekeeping operations and serves as the conduit between mission in the field and the Security Council, which continues to authorise all activities¹⁸. In the last 21 years since its creation, the DPKO has been expanded and enhanced to include a greater degree of interoperability with other UN agencies and outside partners. The DPKO quickly discovered that its new approach to peace-keeping required the coordination of a broad spectrum of operators, each bringing their own particular competency to the peace-keeping brand of conflict resolution. Initially created to oversee one or two peace-keeping operations per year, the DPKO currently manages 15 peace-keeping operations, with the possibility of additional mission mandates always on the horizon.

The Balkan Test

This is one of the first full-blown peacekeeping missions of the 1990s, which demonstrated how the playing field for peacekeeping had changed and foreshadowed the challenges ahead. When Yugoslavia

¹⁸ Christine Gray: *International law and the use of force*. New York 2008.

disintegrated into an orgy of ethnic and communal conflict, the United Nations seemed unprepared for the new realities of the post-cold War peace-keeping. The peacekeeping mission to the breakaway regions of Yugoslavia quickly began to redefine the structures and goals of second-generation peacekeeping. As the Yugoslav federation was torn apart, the rhetoric of all parties to the expanding conflict became increasingly laced with both nationalist and ethnically charged language. By the time Bosnia declared its independence from Yugoslavia in 1992, many outside observers were unwilling to distinguish between the political objectives of the various nationalist leaders and the charges of ethnic division associated with them¹⁹.

In an attempt to oversee and referee the nature of violence, the Security Council formed the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which aimed to safeguard civilian populations caught up in the increasingly bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia. Beginning in 1993, this mandate was expanded to include the monitoring of six safe havens established in southeastern Bosnia for Muslims seeking sanctuary from

¹⁹ Bruno Simma: *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press 2002.

the ethnic-cleansing campaign being perpetrated by the Bosnian Serb forces. The early attempts by the United Nations to keep peace in Bosnia illustrate the steep learning curve experienced by the organization.

The UNPROFOR initially relied on the traditional model of deploying lightly armed interposition forces into a conflict zone. The problem with following this model in Bosnia was that the ceasefire was as fluid as the front lines and theaters of operation. The rules of engagement were poorly conceived and the international community's commitment to resolution of the conflict appeared weak. This was never more apparent than in July 1995 when approximately 600 Dutch peace-keepers surrendered the Srebrenica safe haven to a vastly larger Bosnian Serb force, following a prolonged assault²⁰.

In November 1995, Dayton Peace Accords, created the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). This embodied a

²⁰ Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White: *The Blue Helmets: Legal regulations of United Nations military operations*. England 1996

new model of peace-keeping as a response to communal and ethnic conflicts occurred within the states comprising the former Yugoslavia.

Lessons Learnt

The Yugoslav experience taught the United Nations that peace-keeping requires a vigorous commitment and a composite force capable of legitimising the institutions critical to the security of the population and the long-term viability of the state. This entails a broad range of functions that now include election monitoring, political and judicial reforms, resettlement of refugees, investigations and prosecution of war crimes, civil reconstruction projects, literacy programs, skills retraining, and economic rehabilitation. Simply put, second-generation peacekeeping demands a broader range of actors with more developed competencies and a longer-term, more forcefully articulated commitment to conflict resolution.

Another lesson from the Balkan experience was the need to coordinate a variety of agencies, organizations and actors. No fewer than

three entities, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Court of Human Rights (ECHIR), and the Council of Europe, had interesting responsibilities for human rights provisions as they pertained to election monitoring, regional security issues, constitutional reforms, and political, social and economic improvements throughout Bosnia.

Similarly, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Red Cross, the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) shared overlapping responsibilities as they pertained to investigating war crimes, protecting internally displaced persons, addressing human rights issues, and building confidence among the local population.

Thus, peace-keeping in Bosnia introduced the DPKO to the bureaucratic challenge of coordinating multiple agencies tasked with various elements of a second-generation peace-keeping mission. It also introduced the DPKO to the paramount importance of instilling

confidence in the local population and demonstrating an unwavering international commitment to conflict resolution.

On the Horn of Africa – The Crisis in Somalia

Following the downfall of President Siad Barre in 1991, a civil war broke out in Somalia between the faction supporting Interim President, Ali Mahdi Mohamed and that supporting General Mohamed Farah Aidid. The United Nations, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other organizations, sought to resolve the conflict. The Secretary-General in 1991 dispatched an envoy to which all faction leaders expressed support for the United Nations peace role. The United Nations also became engaged in providing humanitarian aid, in cooperation with relief organizations. The war had resulted in nearly one million refugees and almost five million people threatened by hunger and disease.

The Security Council in January 1992 imposed an arms embargo against Somalia. The Secretary-General organized talks between the parties, who agreed on a ceasefire, to be monitored by the United Nations

observers, and on the protection of humanitarian convoys by the United Nations security personnel. In April, the Council established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).

The relief effort was hampered by continued fighting and insecurity. The Security Council in August decided to deploy some 3,000 additional troops to protect humanitarian aid. But the situation continued to worsen, with aid workers under attack as famine threatened 1.5 million people²¹.

The United States in November 1992 offered to organize and lead an operation to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Security Council accepted the offer and authorised the use of "all necessary means" to establish a secure environment for the relief effort.

The Unified Task Force (UNITAF), made up of contingents from 24 countries led by the United States, quickly secured all major relief centres, and by year's end humanitarian aid was again flowing. UNOSOM

²¹ Report of the commission of inquiry established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them, appended to United Nations, transmitted by Note by Secretary-General, U.N. Doc S/1994/653, (1994)

remained responsible for protecting the delivery of assistance and for political efforts to end the war.

At a meeting convened by the Secretary-General in early 1993, fourteen Somali political movements agreed on a ceasefire and pledged to hand over all weapons to the UNITAF and the UNOSOM. In March, the United Nations organized an aid conference at which donors pledged over \$130 million. At a reconciliation conference organized by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Somalia, the leaders of fifteen political movements endorsed an accord on disarmament, reconstruction and the formation of a transitional Government.

The Security Council in March decided on a transition from the UNITAF to a new United Nations peacekeeping operation -- UNOSOM II, authorising it to use force if necessary to ensure its mandate -- securing a stable environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Even before Bosnia imploded into ethnic cleansing, on another continent, Somalia had descended into a civil war. Attempts to keep the peace there, also highlights the challenges of and the need for a more robust approach to second-generation peacekeeping. Responding to both

the civil war and a mounting humanitarian crisis, in 1992 the United Nations created the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) charged with enforcing a UN arms embargo, monitoring a UN-brokered ceasefire, and delivering aid to nearly one million refugees and five million sick and starving people.

Warring Somali forces ignored the ceasefire and increasingly attacked humanitarian aid convoys. These wanton attacks and the unwillingness to abide by the ceasefire strained the will of the international community and convinced the United Nations that its humanitarian mission required much more muscle than a lightly armed interposition force. In 1992, the United States was authorised by the United Nations to deploy the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to Somalia and to use "all necessary means" to provide a safe operating environment for international relief workers. The UNITAF was given an enforcement mandate that was not typical of peace-keeping missions at that time. Despite deploying more than 37,000 highly trained and well-equipped troops²², the UNITAF faced an operating environment openly hostile to

²² The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996. New York 1996.

international intervention of any kind and a famine that was accelerating the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

By 1993, UNOSOM and UNITAF were rolled into UNOSOM II, a UN peace-keeping mission with much the same mission as its predecessors, but more directly under the UN control and with a larger operating environment. With approximately 22,000 troops²³, the UN peace-keeping mission was doing more with less and beginning to suffer the consequences of diminishing political will among its member states. By 1994, it was followed by mounting high profile casualties—mostly for the Americans. The events of the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993, depicted in the book and film ‘Black Hawk Down’—the United States and several European powers began withdrawing their troops, signaling the collapse of international commitment to peace-keeping in Somalia.

The UNOSOM II was decommissioned in March 1995, citing "troop withdrawals, budget restrictions, and military actions by

²³ United Nations Department of Public Information: United Nations Peacekeeping Information Notes, Update. New York 1994.

Somali factions" as the reason for the mission's failure²⁴. In three years, the various UN peace-keeping missions in Somalia had been unable to restore peace or provide the necessary humanitarian aid to a devastated population.

In 2011, sixteen years later to the decommissioned UNISOM II²⁵, the Horn of Africa region (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia) underwent a severe drought; the international community was once again confronting a humanitarian crisis exacerbated by civil war in Somalia. Tens of thousands of refugees continued to flee across the border to neighbouring Kenya as famine and disease claimed untold lives. Now, as then, armed factions within Somalia are openly hostile toward international humanitarian relief and peace-keeping operations.

²⁴ Report of the commission of inquiry established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them, appended to United Nations, transmitted by Note by Secretary-General, U.N. Doc S/1994/653, (1994) Report of the Secretary.

²⁵ UNOSOM II was decommissioned in 1995.

The Crisis in Sudan

Another classic problem of intra-state nature evolved in Sudan, aggravated by the killing of lots of people of the same country by its own rulers and their supporters. The UN had to start an operation in the Darfur region of Sudan, to obviate one of the biggest humanitarian crises in the history of the world.

The operation in Sudan was named as the United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Dafur (UNAMID). This resulted from the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May of 2006. The government of Sudan accepted the presence of the UN peace-keepers in June of 2007, which involved the implementation of a three-phased approach for a joint mission of the UN with the African Union which was already deployed in the area. The mandate was extended to July 2009, with the protection of civilians, contributions to humanitarian assistance and security, and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law as just a few of the many tasks and responsibilities entrusted to the force.

The complexities of the mission, as well as the hindrance due to the principle of consent, are evident in this scenario. The UN force waited until it had consent from the Government of Sudan before deploying a mission to the conflict zone (years after the conflict began), and even though since they have begun their mission, they have encountered lack of cooperation at the hand of the same government causing a number of setbacks.

A New and Complex Peace-keeping in post-cold war era

With the end of the Cold War, there was no longer a need for the UN peace-keeping operations to keep the great powers out of conflicts. Peace-keeping operations, however, remained in demand because they were then considered as generally helpful mechanisms to the resolution of conflicts.

The number of UN peace-keeping missions soared dramatically as a result of the changing global political landscape at the end of the Cold War. Ethnic conflicts became more prevalent and internal wars

within countries, rather than between them which was common during the Cold War, emerged as a result of the failed states, which increased the demand for the UN operations. A number of such conflicts emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, when particular nations or regions were vying for independence. A significant portion of new the UN missions that began after the Cold War were dispersed throughout these formerly US or Russian-controlled areas, or to newly independent regions that had been previously part of the Soviet Union.

Since there was no tension within the Security Council that had existed between Eastern and Western rivals during the Cold War, the situation seemed promising for the UN to be able to more effectively undertake even more peace-keeping missions in the post-cold war world. This optimism was sparked by the hope that both the US and Russia would now be able to supply the UN forces, making those forces stronger than they had been. Since each state was no longer as interested in protecting its own sphere of influence in the same way it had, throughout the Cold War period, both states were also no longer as committed to managing security within those same regions by

themselves, opening the door to the possibility of collaboration within the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Mingst (2008) differentiates between traditional peacekeeping, and the now complex peacekeeping where both military and numerous civilian personnel partake. This complex peace-keeping is often more dangerous than traditional missions because not all parties in the conflict have necessarily consented to the UN presence, and force is sometimes utilised by those carrying out the operation. Both of these new characteristics of peacekeeping operations are new to the post-cold war era, and are problematic if the original idea behind the UN peace-keeping operations concerning impartiality, consent and non-use of force is to be sustain as it was throughout the Cold War era.

The complex post-cold war operations are also much more multi-dimensional than traditional ones were; since they consisted of political, economic, humanitarian and social components in addition to the military component. They can include confidence-building measures, power- sharing agreements, and electoral support, and are no longer seen as a strictly military endeavor, but rather a coordinated, multi-

dimensional intervention in a conflict situation.

As a result of this, the distinction between keeping and enforcing peace can become blurred. Matheson (2006) explains that although the UN operations maintain the mandate of impartiality, many of the conflicts in which they are now engaged are such that the UN force becomes a direct party in the conflict which in effect negates impartiality. This in itself is cause for a few dilemmas.

Firstly, if a UN force intervenes in a conflict without consent of all parties, it is in effect choosing a side, or inserting itself as a third adversary. For any government fighting against an insurgency or a rebel group, the peace-keepers are effectively choosing to side with the government's adversary when they intervene without governmental consent and vice versa.

Secondly, by using force and becoming engaged in active fighting, the line between keeping peace and making peace by enforcing a resolution decided upon from outside state actors becomes quite blurred.

With these new conditions and dilemmas, the UN peace-keeping has to choose between maintaining the traditional conception of peacekeeping operations, or moving in a new direction to ensure the utility of these operations. The problem is that when force is used to establish order in a situation where no ceasefire or peace agreement has been reached, the UN and/or its member states taking part in the operation risk being accused of intruding on the sovereignty of the state.

Yilmaz (2005) argues that another problem faced by the UN peace-keeping is that it is not able to keep pace with developments in international security that demands action. Although the US military is, at present, the most powerful in the world, its contributions to UN forces are not readily available since the US currently has its military personnel deployed in its own unilateral and coalition missions, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as part of its 'War on Terror' campaign. As of September 30, 2008, the US was actively supplying 0.3% of the UN Peace-keeping forces. Since the main contributors to the UN peacekeeping operations are the developing countries with limited resources and less qualified

personnel, the second-rate nature of this organization calls in to question its utility, especially since the UN remains dependent on the participation of its member-states for any mission to field enough personnel and material resources.

The Crisis in Rwanda

This was evident in Rwanda in 1994, where too few troops and supplies were not able to accomplish their main goal to oversee a lasting peace agreement between the Rwandan government and the rebel force, the Rwandese Patriotic Front. The failure of the force in Rwanda goes back to the bureaucracy of the UN and lack of support from the main states contributing to the mission. Much of this lack of support was due to the fact that Rwanda was not a country of high value to the world's major powers, nor was the conflict there much of a threat to international security.

In Rwanda, genocide took place in the context of the Rwandan Civil War, a conflict beginning in 1990 between the Hutu-led government and

the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was largely composed of Tutsi refugees whose families had fled to Uganda following earlier waves of Hutu violence against the Tutsi. International pressure on the Hutu-led government of Juvénal Habyarimana resulted in a cease-fire in 1993 with a roadmap to implement the Arusha Accords that would create a power-sharing government with the RPF. This agreement displeased many conservative Hutu, including members of the Akazu, who viewed it as conceding to enemy demands. Within the broader Hutu population, the RPF military campaign had also intensified support for the so-called "Hutu Power" ideology, which portrayed the RPF as an alien force intent on reinstating the Tutsi monarchy and enslaving the Hutus, a prospect met with extreme opposition.

By October 1994, estimates suggested that out of a population of 7.9 million, at least half a million people had been killed. Some two million had fled to other countries and as many as two million people were internally displaced. The UNAMIR was originally established to help implement the Arusha Peace Agreement signed by the Rwandese parties on 4 August, 1993. The UNAMIR's mandate and strength were adjusted

on a number of occasions in the face of the tragic events of the genocide and the changing situation in the country. The UNAMIR's mandate came to an end on 8 March 1996.

Rwanda was proof once again that the success or failure of the UN peacekeeping operations rests significantly with the cooperation and support of the world's greatest powers; whoever those may be at the time, and not merely a moral principle. A National Security Archive report points out the ways in which decisions made by the US government contributed to the slow US and worldwide response to the genocide. Secretary of state, Warren Christopher did not authorise officials to use the term “genocide” until May 21

Success Stories

While considering these dilemmas for post-cold war peace-

keeping, it needs to be acknowledged that there have been many successes to the credit of the UN. The UN proclaims that since its first mission in 1948, sixty three missions have been undertaken which have worked to disarm hundreds of thousands of former combatants and have allowed citizens in over forty five countries to participate in free and fair elections. Yilmaz (2005) argues that in fact peace-keeping is often a "necessary element of conflict management" and continues to play an important role in the process of peace-making. If peace-keepers are successful in protecting lives and preventing conflict escalation, then they have been successful in their mission. One can assert that the reality is that peace-keeping is now a component of a conflict intervention, rather than the solution in itself.

A Decisive Change in the UN Peace-keeping Dynamics

A high-level Panel was constituted to undertake a thorough review of the United Nations peace and security activities, and to present

a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future.

The former Foreign Minister of Algeria, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, was asked to chair the Panel in 2000, which included eminent personalities from around the world, with a wide range of experience in the fields of peacekeeping, peace-building, development and humanitarian assistance²⁶.

Defining the Elements of Peace Operations (UN Documents S12000/809121 August/2000, 3, Para 15) United Nations peace operations entail three principal activities:

- (a) Conflict prevention and peace-making;
- (b) Peace-keeping; and
- (c) peace-building.

²⁶ The Brahimi Report, General Assembly Fifty-fifth session, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, U.N. Doc. A/55/305, S/2000/809 (2000), at: <http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/594/70/PDF/N0059470.pdf?OpenElement> (visited 07.04.2015)

Long-term conflict prevention addresses the structural sources of conflict in order to build a solid foundation for peace. Where those foundations are crumbling, conflict prevention attempts to reinforce them, usually in the form of a diplomatic initiative. Such preventive action is, by definition, a low-profile activity; when successful, it may even go unnoticed altogether.

(A) Conflict Prevention and Peace-making

Peace-making addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy and mediation. Peacemakers may be envoys of governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations, or they may be unofficial and non-governmental groups, as was the case, for example, in the negotiations leading up to a peace accord for Mozambique.

(B) Peace-keeping

Peace-keeping is an enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the

past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars.

(C) Peace-Building

Peace-building is a term of more recent origin that, as used in the Brahimi report, defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peace-building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation

techniques²⁷. Essential complements to effective peace-building include support for the fight against corruption, the implementation of humanitarian demining programmes, emphasis on human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (I-IIV/AIDS) education and control, and action against other infectious diseases.

Experience shows that peace-keeping and peace-building are not possible without the deployment of the IPKF, which may comprise of military, police, military observers and civilian contingent. All other agencies of humanitarian nature need the support of the IPKF. The roll of the IPKF is now not only of keeping peace but also to facilitate an environment for the other agencies to work in the areas plagued by armed conflicts.

²⁷ William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, Moira K. Shanahan, The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003

The Utility of Peace-keeping in the Post-Cold War Era

With sixty seven operations around the world, the United Nations (UN) peace-keeping is an institution which embodies those principles of the UN that are championed world-wide---- i.e impartiality and the pursuit of peace. Although the details of each operation are conflict-specific, the wider principle of peacekeeping has remained intact for six decades, suggesting that there is some utility in such operations.

This research work is to evaluate the effectiveness of peacekeeping in a post-Cold War world by understanding changes in peacekeeping from its inception to the present day. This evaluation will show that there is utility in continuing peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War world although a new understanding of what peacekeeping should entail and achieve needs to be developed and accepted. It will be established that peacekeeping operations, traditionally conceived, are no longer effective at maintaining impartiality and protecting an already established, though fragile, peace within a given sovereign state.

Peace-keeping operations are now merely a facet of larger UN-sponsored intervention operations and can only effectively promote peace in conflict zones as part of a larger operation. Peace-keeping as it was classically conceived no longer exists since there is no original justification for it, and yet the concept has remained for decades even amidst the changing global political landscape. This is because as a part of a larger, more complex operation, peacekeepers can continue to offer support to the UN principles over decades, particularly the purpose of the UN as an impartial institution promoting peace in the conflict-ridden state.

There have been many inherent changes to peace-keeping operations since the Cold War, and many problems that hinder the ability of these forces to achieve their objectives. Peace-keeping operations continue to be effective at saving lives and advancing the peace process within very specific conflict regions.

To maintain consistency in this discussion, references made to "peacekeeping" refer to the United Nations peacekeeping missions so that this discussion can consider the effectiveness of the principle of

peacekeeping put into action. It is also important because the term "peace-keeping" has become somewhat ambiguous and, this way only one peace-keeping context (UN forces) must be established. Missions by a single country or coalitions of states set their own standards and are therefore different from UN peacekeeping forces, and will not be considered here, even if they consider a component of their operation to be keeping the peace in the conflict-ridden region.

Borrowing from O'Neill and Rees (2005) this discussion will consider UN Peacekeeping to be operations conducted by the UN involving international military, police and civilian personnel, have their general objective, the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security. Despite this definition, there continues to be ambiguity between the UN operations where peacekeeping includes both missions that do not allow for the use of force (Chapter VI), as well as some that are sanctioned under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows for engagement and the use of force in times other than in self-defense.

This thesis aims to determine the effectiveness of peace-keeping

during, and after the Cold War to determine if there is utility in continuity to engage peacekeepers in today's conflicts.