

## Chapter 3

### The Logic of Cosmopolitanism and the Idea of International Justice

*“So act, that your principle of action might safely be made a law for the whole world.”*

Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*

Cosmopolitanism remains one of the most dominant theoretical perspectives in political studies. Understood to have been worked out first in ancient Greek philosophy, this concept continues to influence mainstream politics, both in terms of its thinking as well as practice. In fact, over the last decade, cosmopolitanism has been regarded by many political thinkers as the most valid and viable conceptual framework for working out a credible alternative to the politics of exclusion, violence and segregation. Cosmopolitanism is not only seen as a framework for organizing the relation among members in the state, it is also regarded as containing a potent understanding of the relationship among states. To this extent, cosmopolitanism has developed as a forceful perspective in the theory of international relations.

Cosmopolitanism is an idea which is derived from the word ‘cosmopolite’, which may be understood to refer to ‘a citizen of the world’. The concept of citizenship has for long been understood in a territorially defined and restricted sense. A citizen is commonly referred to a person, an agent, who is recognized through a guarantee of inalienable rights. In the absence of rights, one is not a citizen; rather she is a subject. In both its active understanding as well as passive conceptualization, citizenship is regarded as an identity which recognizes a person as an agent, someone who is rational, and is capable of self-determination.<sup>1</sup> However, underlying this guarantee of rights and the identity of the citizen is the concept of

territoriality. A citizen is one who is regarded as a member of a state, and among the features of a state is the concept of territory. A citizen is therefore intrinsically linked to the notion of territoriality. A citizen of one territorial state cannot and perhaps should not be a citizen of another territorial state. Even where the concept of dual or multiple citizenship is in place, the location of the idea of citizenship is restricted within territorial confines: so even if a person is a citizen of two states, his identity of citizenship of either state is limited by the territory of either of the particular states. Citizenship, put differently, is inherently and essentially territorially marked and defined, so that a citizen does not only refer to a person empowered with the guarantee of rights, but also and more importantly, one who is located spatially in a definite territory and holds membership of such territory.

For all democratic societies, the citizen is the unit of politics – the political starting point, the conception of the self. Somewhat like citizenship, democracy is also territorially or spatially defined and limited. Democracy functions and is operated on the basis of constituencies which are territorially restricted. Since democracy is territorially restricted, it is inevitable that the identity of the self, contained in the democratic experiment would also have to be territorially marked. . The identity of the citizen is then a political identity which constitutes the conception of the self for democratic politics.

However, the idea and identity of the citizen is required for another and perhaps equally important reason. It would not be entirely incorrect to suggest that the idea of the citizen as the self in a democratic setup is meant to transcend or at least stand above all other particular identities of the person, so as to facilitate a more meaningful and partisan-free discourse of politics. If the person were to be locked in his/her particular identities when acting or thinking in the political democratic realm, it would certainly lead to a dilution if not distortion of the

values and ethos of such a space. The concern is therefore that the political self transcends and goes beyond all such particularities to an identification of himself as a political agent – a citizen. This is perhaps the reason why the identity of the citizen has been more often identified in terms of the individual – the conception of the self as distanced and detached from all other particular identities and attachments. In recent times, however, there has been a strong criticism of such individualized conceptualization of the citizen-self. According to some thinkers, to rid the democratic space of all our particular identities is to depoliticize this space, leaving no reason or purpose of politics per se. Put differently, a democratic space which does not carry, contain and respond to a citizen's social, cultural and economic identities, is a space devoid of the idea of the political – an apolitical space.<sup>2</sup> While discussing the communitarian perspective in Chapter 4 of this study, I would explain this critique somewhat in detail.

Although cosmopolitanism may be understood to coincide and follow from the liberal tradition of political thought, it has come to develop as a distinct conceptual perspective, and one that has influenced and gained relevance in contemporary politics. And then, particularly in the theory and practice of international politics, the conceptual perspective of cosmopolitanism has been emphasized whenever there are attempts to resolve moral issues of justice and entitlement. In fact, in contemporary theorizing about international and/or global justice, the cosmopolitan perspective has emerged as dominant and perhaps that which offers a somewhat credible understanding.

The question that this study however seeks to respond to is: can we employ the idea of citizenship when working out or understanding politics in the international realm? Can the idea of a citizen serve as a valid starting place in international politics? Can we regard the

citizen as an effective conception of the self for the international realm? And more importantly, can the citizen be understood as a valid conception of the self for arriving at and agreeing upon principles of justice for states?

Needless to say, the realist paradigm which has dominated the study of international relations for several decades now, does regard the sovereign state in the international sphere on lines similar to that of a citizen in the domestic space. The state, according to the realist paradigm, is a citizen-like entity, the behaviour of which is considered rational and free, and based on the principle of self-determination. In fact, much of international politics assumes the sovereign state to be acting on the principles of rational politics, freedom and self-determination. And these values are also what informs and contributes to the sovereignty of the state. A state which is not considered to be rational or capable of self-determination is often a colonized state, and therefore unfree. In fact, the process of legitimization of the colonial project was carried out in a way which characterized and marked out the colonized state as being incapable of rational behaviour (for instance, in India, where the society was labelled as barbaric and in need of a civilizing mission, or in many parts of Africa which were defined as backward and animal-like mainly because of their non-institutionalized and pagan forms of worship). Also, similar to the concept of citizen, the state is a territorially defined entity. The state therefore, from a realist perspective is understood as a rational free and self-determining citizen.

The issue with identifying the state as the citizen and then working out an idea of international justice from this starting place, is somewhat self-defeating. Even though I have discussed the reasons for such self-defeat in the literature review contained in the first chapter of this study, it would be helpful to remind ourselves once more. The state is an essentially

and inherently political apparatus, with little space for moral considerations. The state, particularly according to the realist paradigm, is regarded as a player in the game of politics which is only a game of power. As already mentioned, for working out principles of justice, a moral understanding of the self is imperative. It is imperative that the space of politics includes 'the other' when thinking about justice. The realist paradigm offers no space to the other, and it would therefore be self-defeating to work with the realist paradigm for arriving at principles of justice for states.

The idea of cosmopolitanism however, does not regard the state as a citizen of the world. Cosmopolitanism considers the citizens of states as citizens of the world. In this way, cosmopolitanism transcends the idea of the state. The question then is, can cosmopolitanism offer a conceptual grid from where to begin to theorize the possibility of principles of international justice? Does cosmopolitanism carry a credible understanding of the relationship between the self and the other which could inform a viable and valid conception of justice for states? Does the cosmopolitan perspective contain the basis for international justice? Any response to this question would require, to begin with, an introduction to the idea of cosmopolitanism. Therefore, before understanding the idea of international justice and the relationship between the self and the other in the idea of cosmopolitanism, it would be helpful to begin by introducing the logic of cosmopolitanism. I must admit that cosmopolitanism is a deeply diverse and substantial discourse, with contributions from a wide gamut of thinkers and philosophers. Below, I only attempt to introduce cosmopolitanism by underscoring some of its dominant features and categories. I do not in any way claim, that this is an exhaustive and/or extensive account of cosmopolitanism.

### 3.1 Introducing the Logic of Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism has its philosophical origins in Greek philosophy. In fact, etymologically the word cosmopolite follows from the ancient Greek word *kosmopolitès*, which in turn is an amalgamation of two ancient Greek words, namely *cosmos* (world) and *polites* (citizen): a cosmopolitan thereby may be understood as ‘a citizen of the world’. Introducing the concept of cosmopolitanism, Chris Brown states:

In classical Greece the *polis* was at the centre of the lives of its citizens. The word is only weakly translated by terms such as ‘city’ or ‘city-state’; the *polis* was at the centre of the religious life of its members as well as their social and political lives. Indeed, even this wide formulation is in a way misleading in so far as it separates the *polis* from its inhabitants: this was not the Greek way – when writing of the action of a city, Greek authors generally employed the collective term for its citizens: thus it was almost always ‘the Athenians’ who act rather than ‘Athens’. When Aristotle refers to man as a ‘political animal’, the frame of reference is not that of politics in the modern sense of the term; Aristotle means that man is designed to live in society, in the city, and those who live outside the city are either beasts or gods.<sup>3</sup>

These ancient conceptual roots continue to influence, reflect in and guide the agreed upon modern meaning of the word. According to this agreed upon modern meaning, a cosmopolitan is one who has equipped herself with the cognitive tools to transcend her local and relative cultural and social identities to associate herself with an identity which is sufficiently global and transcendental. A cosmopolitan is, in other words, someone who is accommodative of other cultures, is willing to interact with such cultures, and recognizes himself as just one

among the several cultural categories that go on to make the world. As suggested by Thomas Pogge, “persons are called cosmopolitans, or cosmopolitan, when they are understanding and respectful of foreign cultures, travel widely, and can interact well with people from many societies. And cities or gatherings are called cosmopolitan when they bring together persons and groups with diverse ethnicities, languages, cultures, religions or lifestyles.”<sup>4</sup>

At the outset, this meaning of cosmopolitanism may appear purely empirical or explanatory. Cosmopolitanism, according to many, reflects the way people *do* live their lives, when being in relation or contact with other peoples and cultures. Cosmopolitanism, however, is more than an empirical explanatory framework; cosmopolitanism is a framework for detailing how people *ought* to live when being in contact and in relationships with other peoples and cultures. In the words of Thomas Pogge, “cosmopolitanism involves not merely views about how things are, but primarily views about how things ought to be. Cosmopolitan positions centrally include evaluative and normative views; they assess and prescribe.”<sup>5</sup> Put differently, what is particularly compelling about cosmopolitanism is its commitment and conformity to the normative. Unlike most other conceptual perspectives, which often only focus on an analysis or conceptual reading of the empirical or how things are, cosmopolitanism primarily involves normative views or questions about how things ought to be. Cosmopolitan positions centrally include evaluative and normative views; they assess and prescribe. Underlying these normative and evaluative assessments and prescriptions is the fundamental and defining value – that of recognizing and respecting all human beings as equals, mainly in terms of their moral worth. Cosmopolitanism, with its emphasis on a common universal identity of man as human being, is more akin to an ethical or moral conception. In fact, for few political thinkers, such is the moral emphasis of cosmopolitanism that it fails to be regarded as a political argument – it is, instead, an ethical cum religious inclined conception.

For understanding the logic of cosmopolitanism, it would be helpful to begin with a historical trajectory of the development of cosmopolitanism. As mentioned above, the core of cosmopolitanism is the idea that all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, are/can/should be citizens in a single community. A common place assumption is that ancient Greek philosophy was consistently anti-cosmopolitan. According to Plato and Aristotle, for instance, a man identifies himself primarily and principally as a citizen of a particular polis or city, and in doing so, he marks out his unquestioned allegiance to a specific institution and community of people. Such an allegiance would infer that he could be counted upon for cooperation and assistance in such cases as when his city is attacked, or in sustaining practices and institutions of justice as well as in defining and contributing to the common good. Put differently, the good life of a citizen, according to one interpretation of philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, is essentially linked to the fate of the city. A citizen would not be expected to share with or assist a person living outside the city. Any cosmopolitan expectation of a good citizen extended only to assisting foreigners who resided in the city. This is then a territorially loaded understanding of citizenship.

However, there are other classical Greek philosophers who did advocate cosmopolitanism, and then in profound ways. It is often argued that the first philosopher to give an explicit argument of cosmopolitanism is the 4<sup>th</sup> Century BCE Cynic Diogenes, who was inspired by Socrates. This attribution to Diogenes develops from the belief that when “he was asked where he came from, he replied, ‘I am a citizen of the world (*kosmopolitès*)’”.<sup>6</sup> This idea has been wonderfully explained in the following way: “by identifying himself not as a citizen of Sinope but as a citizen of the world. Diogenes apparently refused to agree that he owed special service to Sinope and the Sinopeans. So understood, ‘I am a citizen of the cosmos’ is



a negative claim, and we might wonder if there is any positive content to the Cynic's world citizenship. The most natural suggestion would be that a world citizen should serve the world-state, helping to bring it about in order to enable the later work of sustaining its institutions and contributing to its common good."<sup>7</sup> From the cosmopolitan perspective, therefore, a person's humanness is prior and holds more political value than her citizenship.

Cosmopolitanism perhaps finds a fuller expression in the arguments of the Stoics in Rome, who extended citizenship to all human beings by virtue of their rationality. Research suggests that this extension of citizenship to the all human beings was mainly due to the conquests which were part of the political during this time. With the conquests of the Greco-Roman world, the subsequent division of Alexander's empire into successor kingdoms and the unification of the Roman Empire under one political power, the idea of citizenship beyond the walls and borders of the city was perhaps politically expedient and inevitable.

This extension of citizenship to all human beings was also reflected in early Christianity, which upheld that while the worldly city may have a citizen's unquestioned authority, the most important work for all human beings, in accordance with the word of God, was human goodness and well-beings, which is far removed from traditional politics, and set aside in a sphere in which people of all cities and nations can become "fellow-citizens with the saints". This argument is found most clearly in the writings of Augustine, who argued that citizenship of the city of God is limited to those who love God, while all others are relegated to the inferior earthly city of man.

The political basis of cosmopolitanism resurfaces during the Enlightenment, and this resurgence can be attributed to many factors, some of which include: the increase in world

trade; the reality of the spread of colonialism and the extension of empires; the travel of men across the globe and the related 'discoveries' that followed from such travel; and the emphasis on the idea of human reason and the subsequent conceptualization of a notion of human rights. In fact, the idea of human rights, which has its philosophical basis in the theory of natural rights, was a major fillip to the idea of cosmopolitanism. According to the natural law theorists, nature implanted in humans, at the same time, the imperative for self-preservation as well as feeling of fellowship, a form of sociability that unites all humans at a fundamental level into kind of world community. This understanding meant that many philosophers and intellectuals of that time regarded their membership in the cosmopolitan 'republic of letters' as more significant than their membership in the particular political states they found themselves in. This understanding was particularly evident during the American Revolution and the first years of the French Revolution.

With the age of Romance opening up in the eighteenth century, the terms 'cosmopolitanism' and 'world citizenship' were reworked: while these terms earlier were regarded as essentially political in terms of the idea of self-perseverance and sociability, they were now seen to indicate an attitude of open-mindedness and impartiality. A cosmopolitan, now, was someone who was not subservient to a particular religious or political authority, someone who was not biased by particular loyalties or cultural prejudices. In fact, the word cosmopolitan was so loosened up that it was also understood in a lighter vein to refer to one who led an urbane life-style, was fond of travelling and cherished a network of international contacts, and felt at home everywhere. Following from this understanding, philosophers like Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot and Hume identified themselves as cosmopolitans.

Perhaps the most dominant Enlightenment thinker on cosmopolitanism was Immanuel Kant. According to Kant, all rational beings are members in a single moral community. Such

rational beings ought to be seen as analogous to citizens in the political–republican sense in that they share the characteristics of freedom, equality and independence, and that they give themselves the law, by authoring and agreeing to obey it. In his seminal work titled *Towards Perpetual Peace*, Kant advocated a transformation of the international legal order, which he called a ‘league of nations’. It would be helpful to briefly examine Kant’s arguments in *Perpetual Peace*.

In *Perpetual Peace*, Kant offers a sets of Preliminary Articles and Definitive Articles, which together contribute to his idea of cosmopolitanism. The difference between these two however, is explicitly made clear by Kant when he argues that while Preliminary Articles offer a projection of peace, the Definitive Articles contain the prerequisites of peace. According to Kant, any attempt at peace must be based on institutionalization, mainly because in the absence of a system of guarantees, neighbours can treat each other as enemies. It would be helpful to read these articles separately though. The Preliminary Articles, or Kant’s idea of a perpetual peace between states include:

1. No conclusion of peace shall be considered valid as such if it was made with a secret reservation of the material for a future war.
2. No independently existing state, whether it be large or small, may be acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift.
3. Standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) will gradually be abolished altogether.
4. No national debt shall be contracted in connection with the external affairs of the state.
5. No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state.

6. No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace. Such acts would include the employment of assassins or poisoners, breach of agreement, the instigation of treason within the enemy state, etc.<sup>8</sup>

From a reading of the above mentioned articles, it is clear that although Kant advocated perpetual peace, he was conscious and convinced of the perpetuity of war. Article 6, for instance, recognizes the possibility and practicability of war among states. In fact, for Kant, “peace is not the same as the absence of war”.<sup>9</sup> These articles then, according to Kant, ought to be understood as a set of rules that may be applicable in the absence of a perpetual peace. Interestingly, the principles that these six articles are based upon are exceptionally modern and hold valid in a contemporary normative reading of international politics. Such principles include open diplomacy, non-aggression, self-determination, non-intervention, the delineation of lawful means of making war (*jus in bello*), and disarmament. These principles, according to Mervyn Frost, “constitute the settled norms of the modern international system”, whereby a norm is regarded as settled “where it is generally recognized that any argument denying the norm (or which appears to override the norm) requires special justification”.<sup>10</sup>

According to Kant, a true and world-wide peace is possible only when states organize themselves internally according to ‘republican’ principles, when they organize themselves externally in a voluntary league for the sake of keeping peace, and when they respect the human rights not only of their citizens but also of foreigners. Although Kant emphasized and focused on the cosmopolitan nature of the international realm, he nevertheless remained firm on the sovereignty of the state. According to him, the league of states should not have coercive military powers because that would violate the internal sovereignty of states.<sup>11</sup> This

position that Kant held, allowed many scholars to criticize him for being inconsistent. According to Fichte, for instance, Kant seemed to have diluted his cosmopolitan footing, since the only way to fully overcome the state of nature among states and to underscore a universal humanity and humanness was for the states to enter into a federative union with coercive powers. Fichte's arguments then were for the transformation of the concept of sovereignty, whereby states transferred part of their sovereignty to the federal-international level, but only that part that concerns their external relations to other states, while retaining the sovereignty of the states concerning their internal affairs.

Kant's idea of cosmopolitanism is contained in the second section of *Perpetual Peace* in the form of three Definitive Articles. Kant refers to these Definitive Articles as a kind of 'civil constitution' which all men must adhere to. These Definitive Articles include:

1. A constitution based on the *civil right* of individuals within a nation (*iuscivatis*).
2. A constitution based on the *international right* of states in their relationship with one another (*iusgentium*).
3. A constitution based on *cosmopolitan right* in so far as individuals and states, coexisting in an external relationship of mutual influences may be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind (*iuscosmopoliticum*).<sup>12</sup>

In this way Kant seems to be relating the people with the state. As noted by Brown, "what Kant is doing... is bringing together two states of nature – one composed of people, the other of states. The requirement to establish a legal order, a constitution, applies to both people and states; people are enjoined to create a civil constitution, states a lawful international order; and people and states together a system of cosmopolitan *Recht*." <sup>13</sup>

For the purpose of this study, the third Article is most important, which I focus on below. While explaining this Article, Kant states that “cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality”.<sup>14</sup> In this way, Kant makes the point that hospitality is a matter of right and not philanthropy – which is to say that it might be good that foreigners be granted the opportunity to settle within a state, or conduct other activities, the only thing they have a *right* to is hospitality: “the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory”. This is understood to be the guiding force behind the hospitality offered to refugees. As long as the refugee behaves, he should not be treated with hostility. At the centre of Kant’s argument however, is an attempt to provide the basis for a cosmopolitan international order.

A political reading of Kant’s position on the stranger or refugee would reveal that perhaps the inclusion of these categories by Kant is only and mainly to work out a conception of the self by identifying a viable other. In this case, the state/citizen is the self while the stranger or refugee is the other. As such, in a world defined and closed by state borders, there ought to be some conceptualization and understanding for persons who have been set aside and outside the boundaries of statehood. This, I believe, is perhaps one of the most important contributions of Kant to international relations theory. It is thus that Martin Wight describes Kant as a “revolutionary” international theorist, mainly because Kant wishes to see the transformation of the international system into something else – as opposed to Machiavellians and Grotians, who are respectively satisfied with the status quo or seek only limited reform.<sup>15</sup>

It would be important to mention that in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, Kant’s idea of cosmopolitanism and his advocacy for a ‘league of nations’ is implemented with the

establishment of the League of Nations, which then is transformed as the United Nations. However, it would also be incorrect to suggest that these international organizations fully satisfy the Kantian objective as most of the proposals put forward by Kant were not implemented, for instance, the abolition of standing armies. The International Criminal Court may be regarded as an innovative form of cosmopolitanism, which goes much beyond Kant's conception of cosmopolitan law. The International Criminal Court represents the attempt to strengthen the status and moral force of individuals by transcending the principle of the absolute subjection of individuals to the state. Individuals, according to the international law institutionalized by the International Criminal Court, are the bearers of certain rights under international law, and this recognition is double-edged: on one hand, individuals are recognized as the bearers of rights and freedom which inform and strengthen the applicability and enforceability of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, thereby guaranteeing a space to individuals 'above' the state; on the other hand, they can be held responsible for crimes under international law in ways that cut through the shield of state sovereignty.

Cosmopolitanism, as is evident, from the brief historical trajectory outlined above, not a coherent homogenous or singular perspective. Rather cosmopolitanism carries a diversity of perspectives and positions within it. This diversity of perspectives have developed from a variety of philosophical influences ranging from the Socratically inspired Cynic Diogenes and the Stoics in ancient Greece and Rome, to Immanuel Kant, Johann Fichte, Hugo Grotius and David Hume during the early phase of the Enlightenment and David Held, Thomas Pogge, James Bohman and to some extent Jurgen Habermas more recently. However, there is a common basis to cosmopolitanism, and this common basis, according to Thomas Pogge, may be understood to be constituted by four commitments. Below I offer a brief explanation of these four commitments. In doing so, I draw from the arguments of Thomas Pogge.

The first commitment that constitutes the common basis of cosmopolitanism is normative individualism. Normative individualism holds that the ultimate units of moral concern are essentially human beings or persons, and not social and cultural groupings and communities such as family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural or religious communities, nations, or states. For the cosmopolitan perspective, identifying persons in terms of their social, religious, ethnic or cultural communities, brings in a differentiation which requires that such persons are placed or situated in different groupings, each adhering to a different conception of the good. This, in turn, locks people in communities, restricting and inhibiting the possibility of their holding a common understanding or conception of the good. A cosmopolitan moral criterion thus shuns aside these difference conceptions of the good, by recognizing persons as individuals. For cosmopolitanism, assessments and prescriptions of the political realm ought to be based solely on information about how individual human beings fare or are and ought to be treated.

The second commitment constitutive of the cosmopolitan basis is impartiality. According to the notion of impartiality, each individual ought to be considered symmetrically and impartially. This commitment confirms the cosmopolitan regard for the values of equality. Since cosmopolitanism involves an attempt to bind persons across cultural and social contexts, it necessarily must adopt and hold a promise of impartiality and symmetry, in the absence of which, such binding would be rendered deeply political and power-centric.<sup>16</sup>

The third commitment which remains common to the different strands of cosmopolitanism is all-inclusiveness. All-inclusiveness holds that every human being counts as an ultimate unit of moral concern and ought therefore to be included in any consideration or condition on which a cosmopolitan moral criterion bases its assessments and prescriptions. Any exclusion



according to this commitment is almost certainly arbitrary and an act of unjustified violence. As I will discuss later in this chapter, this may be the criterion or commitment which renders cosmopolitanism apolitical. By including every person, cosmopolitanism does not carry a conception of the other, which as I have mentioned earlier in this study, remains imperative for working out a theory of justice.

The fourth commitment is that of generality, which suggests that every human being has a special status and this ideal is not restricted by boundaries of nation-states, but rather has a global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern and consideration in politics, and perhaps everywhere else. With this commitment, cosmopolitanism deterritorializes the conception of the citizen, which is imperative for considering him/her as a citizen of the world. What cosmopolitanism fails to offer is a credible restriction (even a non-territorial restriction) on the idea of the citizen underlying its arguments.

The four commitments of cosmopolitanism, discussed above, affirm the guarantee at the heart of this perspective, according to which, all human beings are equal and therefore ought to be included in any consideration, assessment or engagement of the political realm. All persons are equal and therefore ought to be included, and included on equal and impartial considerations. This is the universalizing as well as normative zeal of cosmopolitanism, which is often celebrated and employed when addressing concerns of exclusion, violence and hate. It is also mainly because of this inclusive and equalizing imperative, that cosmopolitanism has received the most attention by scholars who are concerned with issue of global or international justice.

In spite of the common basis of cosmopolitanism, which is made up of these four commitments, there are a variety of cosmopolitanisms which are different from one another

in some crucial ways. For the sake of understanding cosmopolitanism it may be helpful to briefly explain this variety. In doing so, I once again take from Thomas Pogge. As argued by Pogge, “this variety can be reconstructed in two steps. In a first step, one distinguishes topically the various subject matters to which the central cosmopolitan idea can be applied. In a second step, one can then distinguish, within each subject matter, different ways of understanding and applying the central cosmopolitan idea.”<sup>17</sup> Focusing on the first step, Pogge draws a distinction among four main kinds of cosmopolitanism, and this distinction is made on the basis of the types of entities for which they provide assessments and prescriptions. The four entities he marks out are: “individual and collective *agents*, the *conduct* of such agents, social *institutions* (rules, practices) and *states* of the world”.<sup>18</sup>

The four different types of cosmopolitanism which Pogge marks out are: ethical cosmopolitanism; legal cosmopolitanism; social justice cosmopolitanism; and monistic cosmopolitanism. Below I offer a brief explanation of each of these types of cosmopolitanism. Doing so would facilitate an introduction to the logic of cosmopolitanism as well as the varieties it conveys.

Ethical cosmopolitanism holds that any assessment and prescription of politics must be based on taking equal account of the interest of all human beings. This type of cosmopolitan argument regards the means and procedure of assessing agents and their conduct to be closely interrelated. It therefore treats both the procedure of assessing as well the conduct of agents together in what may be called a conception of ethics, therefore ethical cosmopolitanism.

The second type of cosmopolitanism, namely legal cosmopolitanism, may be understood as a moral conception which prescribes a unified legal organization of the whole human world. In

other words, legal cosmopolitanism would suggest that social institutions ought to be designed, structured and legalized so that they include all human beings as equals. A moral conception centring on this demand envisions one universal political society that includes, or at least is open to, all human beings. Invoking the ancient Greek word *polis* (city-state), such a universal polity is often called a *cosmopolis*. Endorsed by various Cynic and Stoic thinkers, legal cosmopolitanism has remained on the margins of the discourse on cosmopolitanism, and is today dismissed nearly universally. This dismissal mainly follows from arguments which suggest that a world state today would be dangerous if not impossible. Interestingly, the advocates of this position make mention of Kant, who, they argue, also thought it a bad idea. Rawls, for instance, writes: “I follow Kant’s lead in *Perpetual Peace* (1795) in thinking that a world government... would either be a global despotism or else would rule over a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife as various regions and peoples tried to gain their political freedom and autonomy.”<sup>19</sup>

Some thinkers have however questioned this interpretation of Kant. Such an interpretation is drawn from the Kantian argument according to which, a plurality of independent states “is still to be preferred to their amalgamation under a single power which has overruled the rest and created a universal monarchy. For the laws progressively lose their impact as the government increases its range, and a soulless despotism, after crushing the germs of goodness, will finally lapse into anarchy”.<sup>20</sup> However, as explained by Pogge, this passage expresses strong reservations about a universal monarchy achieved by conquest, but it does not express any reservations about a liberal world republic achieved through a peaceful merger of republics. To the contrary, Kant may be understood to approve of a world republic over a league of sovereign states. In the words of Kant:

For states in their relation to one another, there cannot be any reasonable way out of their lawless condition which entails only war except that they, like individual human beings, should give up their savage (lawless) freedom, adjust themselves to public coercive laws, and thus establish a continuously growing international state (*civitas gentium*), which will ultimately include all the nations of the world. But under their idea of the law of nations they absolutely do not wish to do this, and so reject in practice what is correct in theory. If all is not to be lost, there can be, then, in place of the positive idea of a world republic, only the negative surrogate of an alliance which averts war, endures, spreads, and checks the force of that hostile inclination away from law, though such an alliance is in constant peril of its breaking loose again.<sup>21</sup>

While the common dismissals of legal cosmopolitanism are extraordinarily flimsy, they contain an important element of truth: endorsement or rejection of any specific world state model should depend in large part on an evaluation of how this model would actually work in the real world. A well-grounded expectation that such a model is associated with a substantial risk of despotism or civil strife is a solid moral reason for opposing its implementation. An unqualified commitment to any variant of legal cosmopolitanism should therefore be rejected. Cosmopolitanism, in any variant, must be attached to a commitment, and it is this understanding that takes us to the third variant of cosmopolitanism.

While legal cosmopolitanism is a more direct way of organizing a cosmopolis, the third type of cosmopolitanism, which is social justice cosmopolitanism, works the indirect way. According to social justice cosmopolitanism, rather than directly demand some particular institutional design, it would be more appropriate to endorse a moral criterion by reference to

which alternative institutional designs ought to be assessed and ranked. This understanding of cosmopolitanism is influenced if not shaped by the arguments of John Rawls. A conception of social justice is then cosmopolitan if and only if its assessments and prescriptions are based on taking equal account of the interests of all human beings.

The fourth type of cosmopolitanism, that is monistic cosmopolitanism, seeks to achieve unity instrumentally: by directing social institutions as well as the conduct and character of human agents to one common goal. Any conception that unifies morality's subject matters by postulating one common goal for all of them is monistic. It applies to all moral questions – including the questions of how social institutions ought to be designed and of how human agents ought to conduct themselves within a given social and institutional context – and it answers them all in a unified, broadly consequentialist way by reference to a single evaluative standard. Such a monistic moral conception is cosmopolitan if and only if the standard in terms of which it assesses the world takes equal account of the interests of all human beings. According to Pogge, “it is within this last approach that the fourth entity, states of the world, comes to the fore.” In fact, Pogge suggests that the use of the term ‘social’ in the idea of cosmopolitanism brings in a nuance understanding of the idea of justice which is conveyed. In the words of Pogge:

Moral conceptions focused on states of the world postulate a common goal or system of goals: that the world should go well by the lights of some evaluative standard. Such a common goal – which may involve a complex combination of interrelated desiderata – is often formulated in terms of justice: as the goal of a just world or of justice on earth. In such formulations, justice is understood as a property of states of affairs, not of social institutions. Though often conflated,

these two understandings of justice are importantly different. A common-goal conception might diagnose as an injustice the sheer fact that some are born into affluence and others into poverty, while a corresponding social-justice conception would diagnose as unjust any institutional order that avoidably gives rise to such unequal starting positions. While the former is focused on the assessment and improvement of states of the world, the latter is focused on the assessment and reform of social institutions. I underscore this important conceptual difference between two ways of understanding justice through selective use of the word 'social'. The claim that the world ought to be such that people have equal opportunities is a claim about justice; the claim that social institutions ought to be designed so that people have equal opportunities is a claim about social justice.<sup>22</sup>

In the pages above, I have offered a somewhat brief introduction to the logic of cosmopolitanism. This introduction, I admit, is clearly not exhaustive or comprehensive; rather all it offers is a working understanding to the logic of cosmopolitanism and an description of the varieties of cosmopolitanism. Having done so, I now move on in the next section, to discuss the idea of international justice in the logic of cosmopolitanism.

### **3.2 Exploring the Idea of International Justice in the Logic of Cosmopolitanism**

In the section above, I have introduced the logic of cosmopolitanism by detailing its historical trajectory as well as its points of conceptual agreement and divergence. I now move on in this section to explore the idea of international justice in the logic of cosmopolitanism. In doing

so, the questions I ask and seek to address include: what is the understanding of justice in the idea of cosmopolitanism? What is the idea of international cosmopolitan justice and how is it conceptualized for the international political realm? In what way does a cosmopolitan perspective contribute to the process and possibility of arriving at principles of justice for states? When considering what we owe to one another, are compatriots special? Do we have the same duties to non-compatriots as we have to compatriots or is there some principled way in which these two sets of duties ought to differ?

This section, in other words, is concerned with the question: Do we as citizens have an equally binding obligation towards citizens of other territorially defined states: if yes, what is the moral and political source of such an obligation; and if no, then what can we make of our common humanity and humanness? After attempting to address these questions, I would move on in the next section to discuss the relationship between the self and the other in the cosmopolitan account of international justice.

Do we as citizens of a territorially defined and closed state, have an obligation towards citizens of other equally defined and closed territorial states? In response to this question, there has been a wide variety of arguments, which for practical purposes can be classified into two simple categories. According to the first category, justice is a territorially defined value, which is permissible, legitimate and applicable only within the boundaries of the state. As such, citizens of one state do not have any obligation towards citizens of other states. This is obviously an anti-cosmopolitan position, but which would need to be explained in order to make clearer and more convincing the cosmopolitan argument. The other category follows from the cosmopolitan perspective and argues that we as citizens share a common humanity and humanness with citizens of other states, and therefore this common basis offers a

justifiable and legitimate source for our obligations to them. Below I discuss in some details both these categories.

There is an important debate among egalitarian theorists about whether our concern with equality and justice should be confined to members of the same state or whether it should extend to all globally. Some theorists argue that careful consideration of notions such as reciprocity, coercion, or fair terms of co-operation mandate that we give special weighting to the interests of compatriots. Others, by contrast, argue that these concerns, when properly understood, point in the direction of equally strong duties to non-compatriots.

Justice, according to the first category, is inherently and essentially limited by state/national boundaries. As mentioned above, I find it necessary to discuss the positions contained in this category and also to criticize them in order to put forward a case for a cosmopolitan account of social justice. This category holds the arguments of such scholars who argue that we, as citizens, belong to national setups and communities and any account of our global responsibilities that ignores this omits an important aspect of how we relate to one another.<sup>23</sup> One of the major proponents of this position, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this study, may be John Rawls. In two of his seminal works, Rawls holds and argues in favour of two opposing positions: while in *A Theory of Justice* he validates and justifies the discernment and acceptance of principles of justice for the internal structures of well-ordered societies, in his second work titled *The Law of Peoples*, Rawls rejects the basis for arriving at and legitimizing principles of justice for states.

As discussed in Chapter 2 above, Rawls in his classic work *A Theory of Justice*, focuses on the institutional order – ‘basic structure’ – of a self-contained and self-sufficient society of



human beings and argues for assessing alternative feasible designs of this institutional order on the basis of the distribution of social primary goods each such design would generate among the society's individual members. The criterion he formulates for the comparative assessment of such distributions – his famous two principles of justice, namely the principle of greatest equal liberty and the principle of difference and fair equality of opportunity – contains both absolute and relative components: as far as possible, the basic structure is to be designed so that each person has a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, so that fair equality of opportunity obtains, and so that the difference principle is satisfied.

According to some scholars it is possible to read Rawls's theory of justice as cosmopolitan, and this possibility follows from applying universally the argument that the global basic structure should, as far as possible, be designed so that each human being has a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, so that fair equality of opportunity obtains worldwide, and so that the difference principle is satisfied globally. According to such a cosmopolitan interpretation of Rawls's theory of justice as fairness then socio-economic inequalities among human beings are generated exactly insofar as this optimizes the globally worst socio-economic position.

However as seen above, Rawls rejects this cosmopolitan interpretation, Rawls wants his theory to be applied only to certain national societies, paradigmatically advanced liberal capitalist societies like the United States. In fact, he rejects at the global level any substantive conception of social justice, cosmopolitan or other-wise. Transnational institutional arrangements are to be designed through agreements negotiated among liberal and decent societies.<sup>24</sup> As argued by Pogge, "left unconstrained by any substantive conception of social justice, such negotiations reflect the unequal expertise and bargaining power among

negotiating governments and tend to sideline the interests of individuals, especially of those living in non-liberal or poorer societies. Rawls does provide a moral conception that reaches beyond national borders. This conception applies not to transnational institutional arrangements, but to the foreign policy of liberal and decent societies. Beyond that, it differs from a cosmopolitan conception of social justice in three further respects. First, Rawls's international conception takes peoples rather than individual persons as the sole units of moral concern, stipulating each people's sole interest to be that it maintain itself as a well-ordered – liberal or decent – society. Second, Rawls takes this interest to support a moral concern only for the absolute deprivation of other societies. Well-ordered societies ought to help other willing societies reach a threshold level at which they, too, could be well ordered. They can do this by giving economic assistance to burdened societies and by promoting respect for human rights. Such help is humanitarian – not something a burdened society or its citizens could claim as their due. Third, inequality across national borders – relative deprivation – is a matter of moral indifference. No matter how large such inequality may be or become, well-ordered societies have no moral reason to rein it in.”<sup>25</sup>

Rawls understanding of international justice then differs substantially from a cosmopolitan perspective. Rather than individuals it regards peoples as the basic unit; rather than conceptualize justice among states as the rights of disadvantaged and denied states to a principle of correction, it looks at justice in terms of humanitarian assistance and aid which depends on the well-off societies will and generosity; and finally rather than understanding inequality as historical, political and therefore constructed, it understands inequality as incidental and supplementary. Rawls's law of peoples is then certainly and clearly anti-cosmopolitan.

The argument that we have special duties to compatriots that are not shared with non-compatriots is also held by some other dominant thinkers. Thinkers like Richard Miller and Michael Blake argue that the difference between justice within states and among states is that while the former draws and depends on the coercive legal structure that applies within states, the latter is devoid of the presence, applicability and enforceability of such coercive structures.<sup>26</sup> For Blake, the morally relevant difference between national and transnational institutional arrangements is that the former are coercive and the latter are not. He uses a fable to illustrate his point. The fable is of two homogeneous societies consensually establishing trading relations. According to Blake, while the laws within each society are backed by coercion, the terms of trade are not coercive because either society is free to decline or discontinue this relationship. Blake concludes that it would not be morally objectionable for such trade to benefit those in the richer society much more than those in the poorer one.

This argument of Blake, however, does not hold when tested against the principles and policies made effective in the international realm. Consider, for instance, the enforcement of patents and intellectual property rights by World Trade Organization and several bilateral treaties signed by developed and developing states. Such treaties do regulate the politics of patents and intellectual property rights so that, while such patents and rights are typically held by corporations in rich societies, they are coercively enforced worldwide. Citizens of all member states of the World Trade Organization are coerced into obeying this legal structure. Needless to say that this has serious effects and a somewhat unjust impact on individual citizens of the developing world, particularly when it deprives many poor patients of access to existing life-saving medicines, on the grounds that generic medicines should not be manufactured. There is no morally relevant difference between one government coercively

imposing certain rules on the people within its jurisdiction and a group of willing governments coercively imposing such rules on the people within the union of their jurisdictions.

Advocating from a similar standpoint, yet from a different position is Thomas Nagel who argues that there is a difference in the authority to enforce justice within and outside the state.<sup>27</sup> According to Nagel, unlike transnational social institutions, a national institutional order is imposed with coercion claimed to be legitimate, in the name of its participants, who are also the joint authors of these rules or at least intended beneficiaries. In the international realm, rules are not legislated 'in the name' of a collective we, neither are they authored by such a collective.

Nagel's argument however, can be questioned on the grounds that a similar condition can prevail for national governments as well, and in such cases, would it be appropriate to absolve such governments on the duty of social justice. A despotic ruler or ruling group may coercively impose its rules without claiming to be entitled to do so, without any pretension of ruling in the name of its subjects, and without any expectation that these subjects ought to accept the authority of the rules imposed upon them. Would the concept of social justice be inapplicable to a national society in this condition? It is also important to note that the international treaties on patents and intellectual property rights are also based on such coercive aspects, and as discussed above, are not equally beneficial to all. Would this entail that they are absolved of the issue of social justice? Nagel seems to be giving certain social and economic arrangements and institutions the legitimate basis for avoiding a concern with justice.

From the above discussion, it does seem that the objections against a cosmopolitan account of international justice offered by Rawls, Blake and Nagel do not hold ground. I do believe that the problem that all three accounts of ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ convey is their failure to attend to a valid conception of the self and the relationship between the self and the other. Although Rawls, Nagel and Blake object to the cosmopolitan standing on justice, for different reasons, none of them object to the cosmopolitan understanding of the conception of the self and its relationship with the other. In other words, all three positions ignore the starting place. I must admit that Rawls does pay some attention to this when he replaces the idea of the individual and the state with the category of peoples. However, Rawls, as discussed in Chapter 2 above, does not carry a valid conception of the self and the other in his understanding of the law of peoples.

I now turn to the second category which regards a citizen’s obligations across the borders of the nation state to be valid and enforceable. This category, although held together by a common concern and conviction of global obligations and justice, is constituted by several different reasons put forward by several scholars. While justifying the idea of global obligations, Robert Goodin argues, “there is nothing inherently special about our co-national relationships but state boundaries are useful in assigning important duties to particular agents.”<sup>28</sup> Similarly, Martha Nussbaum argues that in a world of great unmet need, paying special attention to one’s co-nationals can be justified. For Nussbaum, “as human beings, we belong to a global community of human persons.”<sup>29</sup> Nussbaum argues that while love for one’s country might have a legitimate place in people’s conceptions of a good life, we should not overlook the many other relationships we are in which connect us to others in the world. We need to draw the global community in closer to the local one, and, more generally, aim to

see ourselves as members of overlapping communities which also have important claims on us.

In a similar vein, Thomas Pogge offers an enormously influential account that focuses on the implications of cosmopolitanism for the global institutional order. In his words: “Insofar as human agents are involved in the design or administration of global rules, practices, or organizations, they ought to disregard their private and local, including national, commitments and loyalties to give equal consideration to the needs and interests of every human being on this planet”.<sup>30</sup> According to Pogge, any account of justice that does not take into consideration the justice for all people, including those across national borders, is both insufficient and inadequate. In fact, Pogge seems to argue in favour of extending John Rawls's difference principle to the global context, so that a just global distributive scheme is one that would most benefit the worst-off representative individual of the world's population taken as a whole.<sup>31</sup>

Among the many theorists who advocate a cosmopolitan account of justice across borders, is Kok-Chor Tan. Tan begins from a liberal individualist perspective and goes on to justify the possibility and desirability of “justice without borders”. According to Tan, any commitment to liberalism and liberal political philosophy necessarily involves and depends on an *a priori* commitment to a cosmopolitan conception of justice. In his words, “a sincere commitment to the liberal ideals of individuality and equality commits one also to a cosmopolitan conception of global distributive justice.”<sup>32</sup> In fact, many liberal theorists have held this position, some of which include Martha Nussbaum, Charles Beitz, Henry Shue and David Moellendorf.<sup>33</sup> Perhaps the most well-developed and comprehensive recent account of cosmopolitan justice offering support for a global difference principle is Darrel

Moellendorf's *Cosmopolitan Justice*. Moellendorf takes as his point of departure Rawls's early views on justice and using these considerations, argues that Rawls's views on international justice must largely be rejected.

Since cosmopolitanism takes the individual to be the ultimate unit of moral worth, it necessarily holds that the individual ought to be entitled to equal consideration regardless of her culture, nationality or citizenship, besides other morally arbitrary facts about her. As Nussbaum puts it, the cosmopolitan view holds that, wherever she is, "each human being is human and counts as the moral equal of every other".<sup>34</sup> A cosmopolitan conception of distributive justice would thus hold that distributive principles ought to apply among individuals across national boundaries, and not be limited within or constrained by these boundaries. In fact, the cosmopolitan idea was thought to follow logically from the avowed universalism of liberalism, and it was for some time widely-believed that a proposed liberal theory of justice is a *reductio ad absurdum* if it cannot be universalised to support a theory of cosmopolitan justice.<sup>35</sup>

But this cosmopolitan complacency in liberal thought has recently been shaken by another idea from within liberalism itself, namely that of the idea of liberal nationalism. The resurgence of nationalist movements in different parts of the world in recent years, and the renewed challenges of multiculturalism and migration within liberal democracies have prompted a burgeoning interest among liberal theorists in the idea of nationalism.<sup>36</sup> As liberal nationalists argue, it is within the context of a national culture that "the core liberal values" of individual autonomy, social justice and democracy are best realised.<sup>37</sup>

An important question that emerges from such a cosmopolitan reading of justice across borders, is the relationship between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. What are the limits of cosmopolitan justice in a world divided and characterized by national borders and sentiments? If justice, as understood from a cosmopolitan perspective, sees justice to be cutting across and beyond national borders and applying to individuals of all nation states, what is the role and play of nations and nationalism in such a world? Much of the liberal theorising on justice has simply assumed the existence of a single national community within which liberal principles of justice are to apply and so it has become more of an open question as to whether these principles do in fact apply outside the context of the nation. Obviously the argument is not that cosmopolitan theories ought to be compatible with all forms of nationalist and patriotic demands. Illiberal forms of nationalism like Nazism, to take an extreme case, will certainly be ruled out by cosmopolitan justice. However, is the cosmopolitan account of justice which regards the individual as its foundation compatible with the claims of nationalism, which are so central to the international political world?

Tan offers an argument which demonstrates that cosmopolitanism is not in conflict with or antagonistic to nationalist sentiments. According to Tan, “liberalism and nationalism, far from being contradictory ideals as once commonly thought, are not only compatible but indeed mutually reinforcing ideals. As nationalism needs liberalism to tame it and to guide it along more democratic directions, so liberalism needs nationalism in order to achieve its ends.”<sup>38</sup> According to him, “cosmopolitan principles should govern global institutional structures that ensure people are treated as equals in their entitlements: when this is the case there can be a legitimate role for patriotism that operates within such constraints. Partiality to co-nationals need not conflict with cosmopolitan obligations.”<sup>39</sup> In other words, for Tan, once the goals and content of cosmopolitan global justice, on the one hand, and the parameters of



liberal nationalism, on the other, are properly defined and identified, the perceived conflict between liberal nationalism and cosmopolitanism disappears.

In a similar vein, Tamir argues that there is a compatibility between nationalism and cosmopolitan justice. In his words, “one of the most important implications of a theory of liberal nationalism” is that it supports some account of global distributive justice. Tamir refers to this understanding as cosmopolitan nationalism or liberal nationalism.<sup>40</sup> Likewise, Kai Nielsen argues that to ensure that the liberal nationalist's defence of national self-determination as a universal right does "not become a hollow mockery", there must be global redistribution of resources so that the basic material conditions for the realisation of self-determination are secured for all nations.<sup>41</sup>

An equally compelling argument and position on cosmopolitanism and justice is that we cannot achieve justice at a national and/or societal level unless we attend and respond to justice at a global level. Put differently, justice at the domestic level cannot be sufficiently achieved in the absence of justice at the global and international level. This argument would hold that we have at least partial and perhaps deeply instrumental reasons to achieve an internationally just setup, as it is a prerequisite for the realization of an internally just setup.<sup>42</sup> This impartiality with respect to nationality and citizenship applies also to distributive justice in that a person's legitimate material entitlements are to be determined independently of her national and state membership.<sup>43</sup>

Interestingly, the reverse argument also holds for cosmopolitanism. Given its focus on the individual, cosmopolitan justice requires more than distributive equality between societies; it also calls for distributive equality within societies. A cosmopolitan view would hold that our

social institutions are to maximize the life prospects of the globally worst-off individuals no matter where they reside. This means that a cosmopolitan theory of global justice has to go beyond regulating the relationship between societies, and has to impose certain egalitarian demands within societies as well.

Discussion of cosmopolitan accounts of global justice often advocate a concern for human rights. In fact, for all their differences, both nationalists and cosmopolitans frequently agree that a good way to think about some of our duties to one another is via human rights. Human rights can and does therefore serve as an important discourse for furthering discussion about our global responsibilities. Recognizing and respecting human rights are therefore important requirements for global justice. In fact much of international law does depend on the respect of human rights and related claims. Also, any attempt to evaluate the legitimacy of governments is often based on the respect and guarantee of human rights.

A cosmopolitan account of justice is understood to have guided the constitution and implementation of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a highly influential account of all human beings' basic entitlements and this document often plays an important role in real world debates about justice matters. According to Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 'Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.' The underlying idea and essence of this article is that the structure and objective of all social institutions should be geared towards the realization of the pre-eminent goal that the human rights of all human beings must be respected, realized and achieved. If this goal cannot be fully achieved, we should come as close as possible. In the words of Thomas Pogge, "the principal imperative

governing all institutional design is that of minimizing avoidable human rights deficits – with human rights deficits possibly weighted differentially on the basis of their causal genesis, giving greater weight to any deficits that social institutions require or authorize than to deficits these social institutions merely engender or fail to prevent.”<sup>44</sup>

Perhaps a more viable and effective cosmopolitan account of justice, would in addition to the guarantee of effective conditions of the realization of human rights, also include a condition for the socio-economic redistribution of goods among human beings across nation state borders. In addition to the guarantee of human rights, which respects each individual as a human being and respects the humanness of each person, it would be imperative for a cosmopolitan account of justice also to advocate a notion of justice which would aim at correction whereby social and economic goods are redistributed in order to correct historical instances of maldistribution.

Establishing such a relationship between human rights and socio-economic justice is often considered imperative as both these values are intertwined and dependent on each other. The world we live in is deeply unjust and inhuman as well as very far from realizing human rights, as billions of people, mostly in the poorer countries, lack secure access to basic foodstuffs and safe water, to minimal clothing and shelter, to physical safety, basic education and healthcare, and to vital civil and political freedoms. And these gross socio-economic injustices continue and persist even as the world continues to reinforce and claim to strengthen its commitment to human rights and humanness. This is indeed ironical. Any cosmopolitan account of justice, in order to be valid and effective, would necessarily have to develop and regard as firm the relationship between human rights and socio-economic justice. Living a human life characterized by the guarantee and respect for human rights

would inevitably entail the guarantee of principles of socio-economic justice and the distribution of goods in accordance with such principles.

It is for this reason that Thomas Pogge suggests a linking between the idea of human rights and the principles of socio-economic justice. Pogge puts his account of social justice cosmopolitanism in the following way:

Social institutions are unjust insofar as they foreseeably contribute to an avoidable human rights deficit. Many present institutional arrangements do so contribute. The organization of the North Korean economy foreseeably contributes to avoidable food insecurity in that country, for instance. Similarly, the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime foreseeably contribute to the massive persistence of avoidable severe poverty in the world's poorer regions – by permitting affluent countries to 'protect' their markets through tariffs, quotas, anti-dumping duties, and huge subsidies and export credits to domestic producers, for example, and by enforcing costly intellectual property rights (IPRs) in seeds and essential medicines. In the affluent countries, we typically see unfulfilled human rights abroad as an occasion for aid and assistance. We wonder whether we ought to do more to help and protect the poor and oppressed abroad and more also to enable their societies to govern themselves better. Social justice cosmopolitanism can relate us to the poor and oppressed abroad in a different way. Our failure is not merely that of helping too little, but that of designing and imposing transnational institutional arrangements that foreseeably produce and perpetuate avoidable human rights deficits on a massive scale.<sup>45</sup>

I have above offered an account, sketchy though, of the understanding and idea of justice from a cosmopolitan perspective. The cosmopolitan understanding of justice is indeed at once, convincing as well as contentious. It is convincing because it follows from the moral standpoint that all individuals, across national borders and barriers should be considered as equal, and justice should be applicable and effective for all such individuals. Justice, according to the cosmopolitan ideal, is then clearly the ‘first virtue’ which cannot be overridden even by nationalist considerations. And this argument does appeal and sound convincing in a world which is characterized by gross inequalities and deep injustices.

However, the cosmopolitan understanding of justice is also rather contentious as it does not offer a convincing conceptual basis for overriding nationalist considerations. Even if one goes with the arguments of Tan and Tamir, on the supposed compatibility between cosmopolitanism and nationalism, it does not suggest the limit to which intervention by one nation state in the *internal* matters of another nation state ought to be drawn. When does one state reserve the right to stop another state from intervening in its internal matters, even if such intervention is guised in the form of justice? Do states, when understood from the perspective of cosmopolitan justice, have such rights? Can a state interfere in the domestic matters of other states, on the grounds of social justice, without the consent of this state? Is consent a requirement for cosmopolitan justice? And when can individual equality and justness override a nation state’s consent? Put differently, can a state intervene in the internal matters of another state on grounds that it such intervention is for individual justice, without the consent of the state?

It may perhaps be helpful to remember that colonialism – the intervention of dominant states in the internal matters of governance, economy and society – of supposedly weaker states, was justified on grounds of a civilizing mission or as ‘the burden of the white man’. Does cosmopolitan justice leave room for another equally potent possibility of colonialism? If not, the consent of the state would have to be a consideration.

But a more important consideration, and one that informs the objective of this study, is what is the conception of the self and its relationship with the other that underlies the cosmopolitan perspective on international justice? Does the cosmopolitan account of international justice offer a valid starting place – a credible conception of the self, which can provide the basis for an effective theory of justice for states? What is the understanding of the self and what is his relationship with the other in a cosmopolitan perspective of international justice? Put differently, what underlies the political in a cosmopolitan account of international justice? In the section below, I make an attempt to answer to some of these questions. I do so by clarifying the conception of the self and its relationship with the other from a cosmopolitan perspective of justice among states.

### **3.3 The Cosmopolitan Conception of the Self/Other**

Cosmopolitanism as a normative idea takes the individual to be the ultimate unit of moral concern and to be entitled to equal consideration regardless of nationality and citizenship.

The individual is a moral entity whose worthiness stands above and/or are compatible with the claims of nationalism and statehood. Cosmopolitan global justice then focuses on the importance of the individual as opposed to the state, community or culture. Cosmopolitans take the individual as their starting point because they believe that all human beings have equal moral worth and therefore have the right to equal moral consideration. In this sense, even if cosmopolitans disagree on how to ensure that individuals are the subject of equal moral concern, the focus of these differing approaches is the value of the individual. The cosmopolitan idea of justice therefore holds that distributive principles are not to be constrained or limited by state or national boundaries. As stated by Tan, “from the cosmopolitan perspective, principles of justice ought to transcend nationality and citizenship and ought to apply equally to all individuals of the world as a whole. In short, cosmopolitan justice is justice without borders”.<sup>46</sup>

The question that is relevant and that constitutes the main concern of this study is: what is the starting place of the cosmopolitan conception of global justice? Who is the self and what is his relationship with the other? Is there a credible conception of the other in a cosmopolitan account of international justice? What is the understanding of the political from a cosmopolitan reading of justice for states? In this section, I make an attempt to address these questions. In doing so, I in no way claim to be making a comprehensive statement on the idea of cosmopolitanism. In fact, as mentioned above, cosmopolitanism has its roots in ancient Greek philosophy, and any attempt to offer a comprehensive statement on it, would require a far more rigorous and focused study on its historical trajectory and political efficacy. My concern in this section, and in this study, is only to discern the validity of contending accounts of international justice by assessing their understandings of the conception of the

self and its relationship with the other – an understanding which I believe, is central to the project of discerning and working of justice.

Cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan accounts of international justice, both regard the individual as their starting place and focus of attention. While a conservative reading of international relations or even international politics would regard the state as the major and central player in the international realm, cosmopolitanism sees the individual as the main actor and initiator of politics. As mentioned above, cosmopolitanism regards all individuals as ‘citizens of the world’. The world is therefore not constituted and made up of states; rather it is constituted by individuals. Such individuals, in spite of being divided by the borders of nation states, do share a common humanness and humanitarian affinity which enables them to demonstrate a sense of care and justice for their fellow human beings, and therefore which provides a supposedly fertile ground for the determination and effective application of international justice. For the cosmopolitan account of international justice, therefore, the individual is the conception of the self. The self, in other words, is the individual who is devoid of any historical understanding, cultural markers and nationalist sentiments.

Such an individualized reading of the citizen is indeed a rather potent tool in questioning and breaking the structure of traditional hierarchies which have been the basis for gross unjust inequalities. Aristocracy or even slavery for instance, were based on traditional notions of hierarchy and collective political life, which denied many people the right and freedom to live decent and respectable lives free of the injustices that were regarded as essentially and extremely violent. Such collectivises and communities, as argued by Charles Taylor, were worked out and legitimized on the basis of the ‘politics of honour’ which denied equal dignity and respect to all its members.<sup>47</sup> For instance, the use of the terms ‘Lord’ and



‘honourable’ were clearly intended to work out a separate class of people who were considered different if not higher than others.

Among the many contributions and political imaginations of the modernizing imperative, particularly in its liberal avatar, was to question the basis of such unjust and unequal hierarchies and argue for a politics of equality and equal dignity. One of the main differences between a society guided by a traditional ethos and one influenced by a modernizing politics is that while the former legitimizes and structures itself on the basis of unequal collectivises such as caste, gender, race and class among several others, the latter regards all people to be equal and equally free and holding equal dignity. However, such an imperative for equality, freedom and dignity is not possible if society continues to be characterized by collectives as its starting point. Put differently, a society which regards its conception of the self to be a collective or a community may find it somewhat difficult to transcend the politics of honour and guarantee the politics of dignity. It is for this reason that modernity and in particular liberal modernity worked out an alternative conception of the self, namely the individual. In Chapter 4 below, while making an assessment of the communitarian perspective on international justice, I will again discuss the individualist reading of the self.

The individual is a self who is devoid of ends, attachments and identities. The individual is one who stands at a distance from all conceptions of the good and is considered free to choose his/her ends and revise them in accordance with his/her interests. It is this replacement of the category of community with the idea of the individual which allows the western society to move from the usage of terms such as ‘Lord’ and ‘Lady’ to ‘Mr’ and ‘Miss/Mrs’. Undoubtedly, individualism has contributed immensely to the project and promise of an equal and just social setup.

However, this understanding of individualism has been questioned, mainly by theorists who concern themselves with working out a theory or principles of justice. For such theorists, the problem with individualism is not its radicalizing or equalizing ethos; the problem rather is that the idea of individualism cannot be regarded as a credible and/or valid understanding of the self as it does not carry or give space to a valid account of the other.<sup>48</sup> In the first chapter of this study, I have explained the reasons why justice does depend on a valid understanding of the self and its relationship with the other.

Cosmopolitanism is then influenced by liberal individualism when it holds that all *individuals* as citizens of the world. Also, by placing the individual above cultural and nationalist considerations, cosmopolitanism does suggest that it understands the self to be distanced if not devoid of all attachments and conceptions of the good. The question then is: does a cosmopolitan account of international justice hold a valid conception of the self and the other.

From the above analysis, it is somewhat evident that few, if any cosmopolitan thinker has attended to working out or beginning their understanding from a conception of the self/other. Almost all, if not all, cosmopolitan thinkers begin with the assumption, somewhat unsubstantiated, that all individuals are citizens of the world. However, if *all* individuals are citizens of the world, who constitutes the other? Who is the claimant of justice in a setup where everyone is an *equal individual*? In fact, why does the imperative of justice arise in such a setting where everyone is treated alike, similarly and without any sort of discrimination or disadvantage?

In fact, most cosmopolitan thinkers have acknowledged that they are not concerned with the question of the starting place. Kok-Chor Tan, for instance, while working out a compatible

relationship between cosmopolitanism and nationalism states, “different conceptions of justice will offer us different accounts of equality, or what equality entails. So depending on the conception of justice with which we begin, we will have different conceptions of cosmopolitan justice. But my goal is not to argue for a particular starting point, i.e., a particular conception of justice as such. Rather, beginning from a liberal conception of justice, I want to show why that conception has to apply globally as well. The theory of justice I assume here is that of egalitarian liberalism which holds that treating persons with equal respect and concern involves going beyond respecting their basic liberties, but includes also ensuring that they have equal access to resources or goods with which to exercise these liberties.”<sup>49</sup> In fact, the idea of the self is completely disregarded by Tan, when he says “we want a cosmopolitan justice made for humanity, not humanity for cosmopolitan justice.”<sup>50</sup> Similarly, David Held claims that in a world of cosmopolitan individuals, “there would be little space for the politics of disadvantage and global poverty”.<sup>51</sup>

One of the many problems with the cosmopolitan account of justice and international justice, both, is that it assumes an inherent and essential link between equality and need.<sup>52</sup> By regarding all persons as individuals and all individuals as equals, it assumes that the concern of need (as different from want) is sufficiently addressed. Justice, however, is premised not so much on the politics of equality as it is on the politics of need and the distribution of goods to equally satisfy everyone’s need. Since cosmopolitanism identifies equality with need, it does not conceptualize the necessity or imperative to work out a conception of the other. This perhaps, I believe, is the weakest part of the cosmopolitan argument.

In the real realm of international politics, the cosmopolitan account has received its most formidable challenge from the rise of nationalist aspirations. While the process of

globalization in recent decades seems to lend some credence to the cosmopolitan ideal, the last decade has witnessed the rise of nationalism and group-based identity politics which seems to contradict the aspirations of cosmopolitan justice. Thus Samuel Scheffler observes that “both the particularist and globalist ideas have become increasingly influential in contemporary politics, and one of the most important tasks of contemporary liberal theory is to address the twin challenges posed by particularist and globalist thinking.”<sup>53</sup> Similarly Andrew Vincent concludes his study on nationalism wondering whether the universalist aspiration of contemporary political philosophy can properly account for the particularistic attachments that are basic to any meaningful human life.<sup>54</sup> While Vincent advises due vigilance against nationalism and other forms of group-based allegiances, which have and continue to be the major cause of violence, violation, denial and disrespect, which in turn contributes to injustice, he also rightly worries that universalist political philosophies tend to quickly “dismiss groups and group-based claims as irrelevant or incoherent.”<sup>55</sup>

One central challenge to the cosmopolitan idea of distributive justice is that it is unable to accommodate and appreciate the special ties and commitments that characterize the lives of ordinary individuals and that are of value to them. Contemporary accounts of cosmopolitan justice have been criticized for failing to take seriously the ties and commitments of nationalism and patriotism. As suggested by Tan, “the criticism can be put in the form of a dilemma: either we reject the cosmopolitan idea of global equality or we deny that nationalist and patriotic commitments are admissible.” Even if we argue with cosmopolitan justice that illiberal forms of nationalism cannot be accommodated, what is challenging is that there are supposedly liberal forms of nationalism and patriotism that have come to receive growing support, and that can be reasonably endorsed and expressed by individuals. As argued by Tan, “the problem for cosmopolitan justice is that it seems to also rule out the more

reasonable levels of nationalism and patriotism, and hence seem to be an idea of justice that is morally rigoristic and out of touch with what is of value to ordinary human beings.”<sup>56</sup>

An equally central limitation of the cosmopolitan project is its failure to offer a structure or system of enforceability. Even if we all agree to the idea that we all are citizens of the world and that we share a common humanity and humanness, who is responsible for enforcing this idea. Politics is often incomplete without mechanisms of enforceability and implementation. The regime of human rights, which is also advocated by cosmopolitanism, has been sufficiently criticized for the lack of measures and systems of enforceability, which render it somewhat toothless. A cosmopolitan account of the self, in the absence of a well-thought structure and system of enforcement would appear almost if not entirely like a paper tiger.

The main limitation of the cosmopolitan perspective is its failure to conceptualize a sufficiently political conception of the self and establish a similarly political relationship between the self and the other. Justice, as mentioned above, often starts from the other. Here, the other is created through the process of othering which is often carried out and sustained by the self. According to the cosmopolitan conception of justice, we are all individuals, and therefore similarly constituted. There is no politically relevant difference between us. As pointed out by Brown, “cosmopolitanism is compatible with a rejection of politics.”<sup>57</sup> This would obviously raise the question: who is the subject of justice in a cosmopolitan conception of justice? I must state that I do understand the individualizing initiative of liberalism to be a rather radical one. However, it fails to offer a plausible understanding of justice.

More importantly, little attention has been paid by cosmopolitan thinkers to the notion of agency, choice and consent of such cosmopolitan individuals. For any understanding of

justice, the role of authorship is politically central as well as morally relevant. Each person has to author the claims and considerations of justice in order that they be politically correct as well as morally enforceable. The cosmopolitan perspective assumes, somewhat problematically, that the world is made up of altruistic persons, all willing to care and correct the injustices and inequalities experienced by others – a rather unclear category in cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism also strangely assumes that individuals on whom such justice and care would be meted out upon have agreed *a priori* to the circumstances and principles of justice. No space is given to the agency, choice and consent of individuals, both who are bearing the burdens of justice and those who receive the benefits of justice. It is perhaps to work out appropriately and effectively the notion of agency, consent and choice that Rawls conceptualizes the original position - a hypothetical position where all individuals are situated and wherein they deliberate and arrive at principles of justice.

While the cosmopolitan account of international justice does indeed have a convincing account of the self – the individual as a citizen of the world, this account fails to hold for want of a sufficiently credible conception of the other. It is for this reason perhaps, that Kant, in his work *Perpetual Peace*, and while he offered an understanding of the transcendental citizen – the citizen transcending the borders of the states, did poignantly offer an understanding of the refugee – the other. In Kant's understanding, which is also somewhat cosmopolitan in nature, the political is clearly apparent. Although Kant was working out a model of peace across nations, he was perhaps conscious of the need to theorize the other. It is for this reason that Kant situates the refugee against the idea of the citizen, outside the location of the state, and yet not entirely alien to the concerns of international justice. However, in the cosmopolitan framework as understood today, there is no conceptual room

for the refugee. This leaves the cosmopolitan space largely homogenous, apolitical and sanitized – sanitized of the imperative of justice.

In this section, I have analysed the cosmopolitan conception of the self and its relationship with the other. I now move on to the last section where I offer some concluding remarks.

### **3.4 Some Concluding Remarks**

In the sections above, I have discussed the logic of cosmopolitanism as well as examined the cosmopolitan account of international justice. Cosmopolitanism, as mentioned above, may be traced back to ancient Greek philosophy, some strands of which advocated the idea of a citizen across and beyond the state. Cosmopolitanism is then a political idea that holds that persons are citizens of the world, and not limited and constrained by the idea of the nation state or the premise of nationalism. Cosmopolitanism has been characterized by a diversity of positions, and yet they all hold this understanding of a common personhood across national boundaries.

This, apparently, may be considered to inform the possibility of a viable theory of international justice. In fact, many thinkers who agree with the cosmopolitan perspective argue that this perspective offers the most viable conceptual premise on which to work out and agree upon a global principle of justice for states. Cosmopolitan thinkers such as Kok-Chor Tan, David Held, Gillian Brock, Yael Tamir, Martha Nussbaum, David Miller, David Moellendorf and Henry Shue all offer different understandings of cosmopolitan justice.

A major concern of all these different understandings of justice is the relationship between the cosmopolitan idea of the global citizen and the nationalist claims of nation states. In other words, what is the relationship between a person's cosmopolitan belonging and her nationalistic aspirations? Almost all cosmopolitans argue that cosmopolitanism and nationalism are inherently compatible. That there is no conflict between a person's cosmopolitan identity as a citizen of the world and her belonging to a particular national community.

Cosmopolitanism often gets mistaken or misunderstood for a project arguing in favour of world government. This however, is not entirely true. Cosmopolitanism does not favour a world government *per se*. As noted by Brown, "cosmopolitanism has no necessary connection with the desire for some kind of world government.... What is crucial to a cosmopolitan attitude is the refusal to regard existing political structures as the source of ultimate value. Second, cosmopolitanism is a universalist principle but all universalist principles are cosmopolitan. In the classical period the Greek cities were universally a source of value, but the values were differentiated."<sup>58</sup>

The main problem with the cosmopolitan account of international justice is then as follows: first, what is the status of a person's nationalist aspiration vis-à-vis her cosmopolitan self? Does the cosmopolitan identity always and inevitably trump over the nationalist aspiration and identity? In a world divided by nation states, this seems somewhat impractical as well as undesirable. Secondly, in a world constitutive of cosmopolitan individual citizens, what constitutes and represents our agency, choice and consensus? Which of us would be responsible for working out the appropriate understanding of justice and its applicability? Thirdly, what is the mechanism of enforcement and implementation in a cosmopolitan world?



By merely labelling all individuals as citizens of the world, it does not offer an adequate or compelling account of the mechanisms of enforceability? And finally, and perhaps most importantly, who is the other in a cosmopolitan world? Who is the receiver of justice in a world made up of equal similarly situated individuals? Perhaps more stridently, what is the requirement of justice in such a world?

While the cosmopolitan account does offer a convincing moral perspective, it fails almost entirely in offering a compelling political narrative. The cosmopolitan world is clearly and categorically an apolitical world – a world rid of the conflicts and contestations that constitute the heart of the political, and which in turn invoke the imperative and *raison d'être* of justice. Kant does offer a credible conception of the other in terms of the refugee, however this understanding is perhaps applicable only for the establishment and sustenance of peace. When invoked for a sense and guarantee of justice, this would certainly fall short.

To assume that the refugee is the other in an understanding of justice among states is flawed for two main reasons. First, regarding the refugee as the other in a perspective on international justice would involve ignoring the claims of all those citizens who although located politically and nationally within state borders but are victims of gross and deep social and economic unjust inequalities. Refugees are obviously victims of violence and injustice and their plight ought to be corrected. However, regarding only refugees as the other for working out a theory of international justice is to deny the otherness of citizens who also hold valid and verifiable claims to justice.

The second reason is that by regarding only refugees as others in the international realm is to accept the closure and finality of state borders. When Kant was working out *Perpetual Peace*,

the borders of states were not as closed and final as they are today. And it was for this reason perhaps that Kant worked out a concept of the outsider in terms of the refugee. The refugee's position is not a normal one only because she stands outside the territorial closure of the state. The correction would then be her inclusion within the territorial sovereign existence of the state. When working out principles of international justice, any attempt to close or finalize state borders would only cause impediments in arriving at and implementing justice. If state borders are closed, and citizens are located and locked within such borders, what would explain the affect and affinity that citizens of one state would have or demonstrate for citizens of other states? The refugee is clearly not a satisfactory other for a credible theory of international social justice.

The cosmopolitan perspective is clearly an apolitical perspective with no room for the other. By regarding all persons as citizens of the world, cosmopolitanism moulds us all into a homogenous entity, with little or no difference to reckon with. When all persons are considered similarly situated, with no differences, it is difficult to justify claims of justice. What would justify the claims of justice or the circumstances of justice among similarly situated persons? Who is the other in such a setup? In fact, why would someone understand herself as the other, and how would she justify such a perception? From a cosmopolitan account of politics, therefore, the claims of justice appear rather weak and unconvincing. The other is certainly a non-existent and invalid category. It is difficult if not impossible to raise the claims of justice and attempt to respond to it, in the absence of an other.

Among the most forceful criticisms of the individualist reading of the self is the communitarian perspective. The communitarian perspective criticizes the liberal individualist perspective for being flawed, false and asocial, thereby apolitical. In the next chapter, I

examine the communitarian perspective as well as discuss its conception of justice in the international realm.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup>For a detailed discussion on the idea of citizenship, see T H Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class*. Also see Gershon Shafir (ed.) *The Citizenship Debates: A Reader*; Ronald Beiner (ed.) *Theorizing Citizenship*; and Derek Heater, *What is Citizenship*.

<sup>2</sup>See Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*

<sup>3</sup>Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory*, p. 23

<sup>4</sup>Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism" in Goodin Robert, Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge, *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, p.312

<sup>5</sup>Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism" in Goodin Robert, Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge, *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, p.312

<sup>6</sup>Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, p.63

<sup>7</sup>"Cosmopolitanism", *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, p. 2

<sup>8</sup>Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, pp. 93-96

<sup>9</sup>Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory*, p. 35

<sup>10</sup>Mervyn Frost, *Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations*, p.121

<sup>11</sup>See Immanuel Kant, *Towards Perpetual Peace*

<sup>12</sup>Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, p. 98

<sup>13</sup>Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory*, p.36

<sup>14</sup>Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, p. 106

<sup>15</sup>See Martin Wight, "International Theory". Also see, Martin Wight, "Why is there no International Theory?"

<sup>16</sup>In the realm of economics this commitment is referred to as the Anonymity Condition, according to which a certain number of included individuals experience a certain fate or treatment in the same way, regardless of who these individuals are, and should therefore enter into the assessment in the same way.

<sup>17</sup>Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism" in Goodin Robert, Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge, *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, p.312

<sup>18</sup>Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism" in Goodin Robert, Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge, *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, pp.312-313

<sup>19</sup>John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, p.36

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<sup>20</sup> Cited Thomas Pogge, “Just World Order”, p. 200

<sup>21</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, p.105

<sup>22</sup> Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism” in Goodin Robert , Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge, *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, pp.314

<sup>23</sup> See David Miller, *On Nationality*. Also see, John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*.

<sup>24</sup> John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, pp.2-3

<sup>25</sup> Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism” in in Goodin Robert , Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge, *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, p.317

<sup>26</sup> See Richard Miller, *Globalizing Justice*. Also see Michael Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion and Autonomy”.

<sup>27</sup> See Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”.

<sup>28</sup> See Robert E Goodin, “Social Welfare as a Collective Social Responsibility”. Also see Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The Idea of Poverty* and Martha Nussbaum, “Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion”

<sup>29</sup> Martha Nussbaum, “Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion”, p. p. 27-28

<sup>30</sup> Thomas Pogge, “Concluding Reflections” in Gillian Brock (ed.) *Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism*, p.298

<sup>31</sup> Thomas Pogge, *Reading Rawls*, p.247

<sup>32</sup> Kok-Chor Tan, “Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice”, p. 431

<sup>33</sup> See Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism”, Henry Shue, *Basic Rights*; David Moellendorf, *Cosmopolitan Justice* and Charles Beitz, “Social and Liberal Cosmopolitanism”.

<sup>34</sup> Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism”, p. 133

<sup>35</sup> See Brian Barry, *Theories of Justice*, pp. 184-189

<sup>36</sup> See Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular*.

<sup>37</sup> See Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*; David Miller, *On Nationality*; and Kai Nielsen, “Cosmopolitan Nationalism”

<sup>38</sup> Kok-Chor Tan, “Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice”, p. 432

<sup>39</sup> Kok-Chor Tan, *Justice without Borders*, p.120

<sup>40</sup> Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, p. 161

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<sup>41</sup>Kai Nielsen, “Cosmopolitan Nationalism”, p. 449

<sup>42</sup>See A Banai, M Ronzoni and C Schemmel (eds.) *Social Justice, Global Dynamics*. Also see M Ronzoni, “For (Some) Political and Instrumental Cosmopolitanism (Even if) Against Moral Cosmopolitanism” in G. Brock (ed.) *Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism*.

<sup>43</sup> See Thomas Pogge, *Realizing Rawls*. Also see Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*.

<sup>44</sup>Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism” in in Goodin Robert , Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge, *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, p.318

<sup>45</sup>Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism” in in Goodin Robert , Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge, *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, pp.318-319

<sup>46</sup> Kok-Chor Tan, *Justice without Borders*, p. 1

<sup>47</sup>See Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”

<sup>48</sup>See Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*

<sup>49</sup>Kok-Chor Tan, “Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice”, p. 434

<sup>50</sup> Kok-Chor Tan, *Justice without Borders*, p.2

<sup>51</sup>David Held, *Cosmopolitanism*, p. 110

<sup>52</sup>Geoffrey Cupit, “Review of ‘Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account’ by Gillian Brock”, pp. 602-605

<sup>53</sup> Samuel Scheffler, *Boundaries and Allegiances*, p.67

<sup>54</sup> See Andrew Vincent, *Nationalism and Particularity*, pp. 240-241

<sup>55</sup> Andrew Vincent, *Nationalism and Particularity*, p.2

<sup>56</sup> Kok-Chor Tan, *Justice without Borders*, p. 2

<sup>57</sup>Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory*, p.24

<sup>58</sup>Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory*, p. 24