

CHAPTER II

FOREIGN POLICY OF SRI LANKA : **MOTIVATIONS, DETERMINANTS, OBJECTIVES** **AND STRATEGY**

This chapter analyses the foreign policy motivations, determinants and objectives and strategy of Sri Lanka. Like an individual's social behaviour, the international behaviour of a nation state is shaped by the interaction between its motivations and the society around it. This interaction between its motivations and determinants shapes its foreign policy objectives, strategy and behaviour.¹

Foreign Policy Motivations

Seen schematically, small states have three principal foreign policy motivations: security, stability and status.² Sri Lanka being a small state has these three motivations latently guiding its international interactions.

The security motivation has two dimensions: protection of territorial integrity and promotion of autonomy in decision-making. The first security dimension has military and strategic connotations. It calls for defence of the territory from internal and external threats. The second dimension requires mitigation of external pressures and influences on decision-making structure and processes.³

Likewise, the stability motivation has two dimensions. The first dimension is stability within the state apparatus. This requires cohesion and harmony between the forces managing political authority. The second dimension is stability at the level of the civil society, which requires the government to prevent the growth of forces challenging the legitimacy of the state, either its territoriality or its governance, or both. This involves using foreign policy for economic development in order to prevent alienation of citizens such that they begin to question the legitimacy of the government or the state system.

Concern of status refers to promotion of the independent identity of the state in the sovereign state system. This motivation has special salience in the case of small states because they perceive considerable constraints on their independent identity and role in international politics.

Although these three motivations are found in Sri Lanka's foreign policy, they are not of equal importance at all times. One or more motivations acquire great importance or precedence at a given time. The motivation acquiring prominence depends upon the determinants of the foreign policy. When the island faces threats to its integrity or autonomy, the security motivation assumes primacy. On the other hand, when Sri Lanka faces the danger of political instability, the stability motivation figures prominently in its foreign policy.

The three motivations interact with Sri Lanka's foreign policy determinants within the contours of its decision-making system, to shape its foreign policy objectives and strategy.

Foreign Policy Determinants

The identification of the determinants of foreign policy, especially the domestic determinants is not an easy task. Foreign policy theorists have listed numerous factors which potentially have a bearing on foreign policy.⁴ Should all these factors be analyzed in a systematic account of a country's foreign policy? If this task is undertaken, then the analysis will be caught up in the examination of the determinants and will provide little scope for the analysis of foreign policy interactions. It was precisely this problem which led Frankel to observe that 'theoretically the environment of foreign policy is limitless, it embraces the whole universe.' But in the same vein, he added that in practice, 'the environment is circumscribed by the range of interests and limitations of power of every single state.'⁵ Taking a clue from the reasoning of Frankel, we may say that the foreign policy environment of Sri Lanka is limited by its socio-economic capability and geopolitics. The factors which have significant bearing on the three motivations are geopolitical setting, socio-cultural milieu, political economy, nationalism, character of political regimes, and the international environment. These factors can be further categorized as those which have a permanent and stable character such as geo-political setting, socio-cultural milieu, and political economy, and those which are subject to variations and fluctuations like nationalism, political regimes and international milieu.⁶

STABLE DETERMINANTS

Geo-political Setting

Sri Lanka is a pearl shaped tropical island of about 25,000 square miles and 20.2 million people, situated off the southern tip of peninsular India with no other neighbour except the little Maldives which was administered as a dependency of Sri Lanka during British colonial rule. Located some 200 miles southwest of Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka, and comprising in the main of 12 coral islands with a total area of 175 square miles and a population in the vicinity of 0.4 million, Maldives offers no strategic advantage to Sri Lanka but also poses no threat to it.⁷ Sri Lanka is separated from India by a narrow defile of water called the Palk Strait, which at its narrowest is no more than 22 miles wide.

The close proximity of Sri Lanka to India had provided it easy access to a diversity of socio-cultural influences from the mainland of India.⁸ Most present day Sri Lankans have descended from one of the two ethno-cultural groups of India, namely the Aryans of northern India or the Dravidians of southern India. Although Sri Lanka shares cultural features with India, the intrusion of sea separating it from the mainland has ensured that civilizations and cultures which evolved in Sri Lanka were not mere replicas of their Indian counterparts but possessed features that harboured a distinct cultural consciousness and identity enabling the island to establish its political and socio-cultural autonomy with regard to India as well as its independent identity in the international system.

India imposes severe constraints on Sri Lanka's autonomy and independence because of the wide disparity in the size and capabilities of both the countries. India has an area of 1,261,567 square miles and a population of over a billion. It is bigger than Sri Lanka 50 times in size and nearly the same in population. India has a fast developing economy with its economic capability second only to the developed industrialized countries. India is a military power to be reckoned with in the Afro-Asian region. Its military capability is overwhelming compared to the small poorly equipped defence force of Sri Lanka.⁹ Thus, India is a colossus compared to small Sri Lanka, and it casts an overbearing shadow on the island, which not unnaturally, has generated fears and anxieties among the Sri Lankans.¹⁰

This fear is further compounded by the presence of a Tamil minority in the island who have close cultural and linguistic affinity and association with nearly 7.5 million Tamil speaking population centred in India's southern state of Tamil Nadu. This has made the Sinhalese, the dominant community in Sri Lanka to perceive themselves as a minority surrounded by a huge Tamil majority which would impair their survival as an independent autonomous community with Sri Lanka as their homeland.¹¹ These fears of the Sinhalese, acquired from their minority complex, have amplified in recent years with the growing sub-nationalist consciousness among Sri Lankan Tamils who want a separate state of Eelam for safe-guarding their culture, language

and common interests from encroachment by the Sinhalese because of their domination of the island's political power structure. The Tamils of Tamil Nadu have been consistently supportive of the sub-nationalist aspirations of their Sri Lankan co-ethnics.¹² The Sinhalese fear of the Pan-Tamil cultural group has led them to conjure up images of the Tamil population of Tamil Nadu influencing India to invade Sri Lanka. The Tamils of Tamil Nadu have been consistently supportive of the sub-nationalist aspirations of their Sri Lankan co-ethnics. The Sinhalese fear of the Pan-Tamil population in support of the sub-nationalist aspirations of Sri Lankan Tamils has acquired momentum in recent years.¹³

These fears have found sustenance in the invasions of the island by South Indian Tamil kings in the hoary as well as in the not-so-distant-past. During the 10th and 12th centuries, Sri Lanka had on several occasions been incorporated within the imperial orders of South Indian kings, and also these invasions had led to the rise and consolidation of a Tamil kingdom in northern Sri Lanka with its capital at Jaffna, which had endured for nearly four hundred years, that is, till the advent of the Portuguese in Sri Lanka in the 15th century. Buddhist monks who have chronicled these invasions have depicted them as attacks on Sinhala language, culture and Buddhism by the Tamils and also have convincingly argued that the Tamil speaking populations have designs on Sri Lanka. Thus, these writings have nurtured and sustained the Sinhalese fear of invasions from the Tamil population of South India.¹⁴

But this view of Sri Lanka history is contested by some contemporary Sri Lankan scholars. These scholars do not give much credibility to historical myths. They strongly refute the contention that Tamils and Sinhalese had cultural conflicts in the ancient and medieval periods. Instead economic clash of interests occurred between the two communities as a result of the rise of middle classes in both these communities. The protagonist of a pure Aryan Sinhala race, Anagarika Dharmapala, a Buddhist monk, is referred to indicate that there existed an economically based 'sons of soil' consciousness among the Sinhalese against Tamils, Muslims etc. as early as 1922.¹⁵

Kumari Jayawardene emphasizing the role of a weak Sinhale middle class in the communalization of the island's social and political life says:

There was no 'national bourgeoisie with basic contradictions with imperialism.This weak bourgeoisie was thus incapable of creating among the people a national consciousness based on rationalism and scientific outlook.... They were thus more susceptible to the traditional ideologies and superstitions that were dominant among the other classes. In this situation, where a Sri Lankan consciousness could not arise, the need of the new class for an identity... was met by a revival of older identities based on familiar traditional categories of religion, caste and ethnicity. Rather than being swept away by the winds of nationalism and national unity, the older forms of identity were given a new lease of life resulting in communalism, casteism, a distortion of history, a revival of myths of origin and neo-myths along with the creation of visions of a past golden age.¹⁶

The vulnerability of Sri Lanka to India also arises because of its location within the security perimeters of India.¹⁷ This imposes limitations on the foreign policy initiatives of Sri Lanka to balance the overbearing presence of India on the island. It is handicapped from promoting foreign policy interactions which in India's view might jeopardize the security of India. The recourse to such measures by Sri Lanka will give rise to tensions and conflicts in its relations with India, which in turn will not augur well for Sri Lanka's territorial security and autonomy.

This perception has been articulated by persons like Nehru, Menon and Panikkar on whom fell the early responsibility of defining India's security concerns in relations to its neighbours. In a way this perception is a continuation of the British Legacy in India's strategic thinking, since its roots and even the manner in which it has been articulated can be traced to the records of the East India Company and the British Colonial Office on the one hand and speeches of British Strategists like Lord Curzon and Olaf Caroe on the other.¹⁸

The geopolitical setting offers opportunities to Sri Lanka too. By virtue of its location in the periphery of India, Sri Lanka holds much strategic promise to the rivals and adversaries of India. Driven by the logic of power politics, these countries will make efforts to reduce India's influence on Sri Lanka as well as win Sri Lanka to their side to gain strategic advantages over India. This situation offers Sri Lanka leverage for generating power for itself to reduce its vulnerability from India and also overcome its fear psychosis. But it is equally true that it has to take particular care to ensure that its actions do not impair India's security or present it as a country hostile to India.

Sri Lanka can also look to India for support and assistance in its stability maintaining activities because political instability in the island is not in the interest of India's security and independence. Political instability in Sri Lanka will not augur well for India as it will provide room for external interference in the island. Such external interference in Sri Lanka will encroach on the autonomy and freedom of India especially when India thinks of Sri Lanka as part of its sphere of influence. Furthermore, the rise of separatist tendency among Sri Lankan Tamils can fuel such tendencies in Tamil Nadu. On the other hand, if India supports Sri Lankan Tamils, it would lend legitimacy to separatists in India. The plight of Sri Lankan Tamils has support only in Tamil Nadu. It is not a pan Indian issue. It has no support even in the remaining three states of South India. India's support for the maintenance of stability in Sri Lanka is clear from India's responses to the 1971 and post 1983 crises in Sri Lanka. In 1971, the Janata Vimukti Peramuna(JVP) staged an insurrection. India openly supported the Colombo government even to the extent of providing military aid to Sri Lanka. Although in the developments following 1983 anti-Tamil riots in Sri Lanka, Mrs. Gandhi was concerned about the safety and security of Tamils in Sri Lanka, she did not openly support the Sri Lankan Tamil separatists. Her concern about the plight of Tamils there was because she wanted to have good working relations with the ruling party in Tamil Nadu as there was popular fury in Tamil Nadu over the vicious attacks on Sri Lankan Tamils. Rajiv Gandhi, like his mother, was concerned about the plight of Sri Lankan Tamils but he too was not supportive of their separatist

movement. He was keen on finding a political solution to the problem of Sri Lankan Tamils within the framework of an united Sri Lanka.¹⁹

Sri Lanka is centrally located in Indian Ocean occupying a strategically important position with regard to the sea lanes connecting the West with the East. From time immemorial, trading nations had cultivated their presence in Sri Lanka to oversee the smooth and safe operation of their trading activities. The British had been enticed to Sri Lanka for the same very reason. The British did not want the French to establish control over Sri Lanka because this would have had an adverse effect on their activities in the East and also endangered their empire in India.²⁰ The strategic importance of Sri Lanka to trading nations had received some setback when Egypt had closed down Suez canal for international navigation.²¹ However, the closure was a short-lived affair. Sri Lanka also has the potential for attracting international capital for using it as a manufacturing base for exports – in the pattern of Singapore and Hong Kong.

During the Cold War period, Sri Lanka acquired importance in the global strategic calculations. Its natural harbor in Trincomalee on the east coast offered excellent shelter for war vessels and submarines; and strategic analysts found that submarines operating in the south of Sri Lanka would be ideally placed for launching nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union as well as on China. Consequently, at different times the Americans, the Soviets and the Chinese cast a covetous eye on Trincomalee and attempted to persuade Sri Lanka to permit them base facilities there. Furthermore, the strategic importance of the region had led to intense naval rivalry between the three major powers and their allies. The presence of naval rivalry in the surrounding seas and the interests of the rivals in gaining foothold in Trincomalee made Sri Lanka vulnerable to adverse developments in the region. Its vulnerability has required it to keep away from the rival powers as well as to promote peace in the Indian Ocean region.

Thus, Sri Lanka's geopolitical features such as location, size and capability impose constraints as well as provide opportunities to it. Its foreign policy initiatives are limited by its

vulnerability to pulls and pressures from India, and also the power rivalries in the Indian Ocean region. It also offered Sri Lanka opportunities to reduce, if not overcome, its vulnerability; but within the overall frameworks of India's security interests and avoidance of promoting power rivalry in Indian Ocean. In this sense, Sri Lanka suffers from what can be called geopolitical determinism because of its location, size and capability.²²

Topography and Climate

Sri Lanka's topography and climate too have important bearing on its foreign policy. Although Sri Lanka is small in size and compact, it exhibits wide climatic and topographic differences. The variations in its geographical features affected the historical processes and have produced regional imbalances in the social economy of Sri Lanka, which have proved detrimental to the economic growth and political stability in the island.²³ The removal of the regional imbalances is necessary from the economic and political perspectives but financial resources required for the purpose have to be sought from abroad since as a developing economy Sri Lanka suffers from shortage of capital.

The climate of Sri Lanka is controlled by its location within the tropics, its proximity to the Indian subcontinent, its insularity and the presence within it of a centrally located mountain mass.²⁴ The tropical location of Sri Lanka ensures a relatively high temperature but its surrounding seas free it from the extremes of great heat that is characteristic of sub-continental interiors. The temperature in the lowlands range between 78°F. and 85°F. with little seasonal variations. In the highlands, the temperature ranges between 55°F. and 70°F. In the absence of marked temperature differences within the region and between seasons, rainfall becomes the factor of climate variations spatially and seasonally.

In terms of rainfall patterns, Sri Lanka exhibits four zones.²⁵ The southeast part of the island, known as the wet zone, receives normally 100 to 200 inches of rain annually. It is recipient of both the southwest and northeast monsoons. Besides, it receives some amount of rainfall throughout the year. The south central mountain land mass too is favourably endowed in terms of rainfall. It is also a beneficiary of the southwest and the northeast monsoons, averaging around 100-150 inches of rain annually. The northern and eastern parts of the island receive around 75 inches of rainfall annually. The rainfall is mainly during the northeast monsoon season. In the northwestern plains, rainfall is below 50 inches annually. This region is referred to as the dry zone.

Topographically, the southcentral part is distinct from the remaining portions of the island. It is marked by series of mountains and high plateaus and is nearly 6000 feet above sea level. The rest of the island consists of relatively level coastal plains with rolling hills and a land mass that rises as one moves towards the centre of the island.²⁶ But varying rainfall patterns divide the coastal plains into four regions : the southwest plains, northern plains, eastern plains and northwestern – north central plains.

The south-central high lands host the tea plantations. The region has reached near saturation in use of land. Likewise, the southwest region which is the main rice producing area has reached saturation in land utilization. The region has a very high population density which has adversely affected agricultural productivity. The area also has high degree of agricultural landless labourers and unemployment which have provided the base for social tension and political conflicts. The situation is no better in the northern plains.²⁷ But the north-central and north-western parts have sparse population, and abundant unused land due to the lack of availability of water in the region.²⁸

Since the days of colonial rule, it has been recognized that the development of the dry zone holds prospects for easing of the twin problems of the island: population pressure in the

southwest and northern parts and deficiency in domestic food production. Efforts have been made from colonial days to develop irrigation facilities in the dry zone and settle landless population from the densely populated parts.²⁹ But these efforts were on a very modest scale.

The present political situation in the island has made it imperative to develop the dry zone by diverting to it the water of the Mahaweli and other wet zone rivers. The proposal for reaching the Mahaweli water to the dry zone has been found to be technically feasible but its implementation requires stupendous investment on the part of the Sri Lanka government.³⁰ It is beyond the means of the government to raise this sum from its revenue. Thus, there is the need for foreign assistance for the diversion of the Mahaweli to the dry zone.

The industrialization of the island is also considered as a panacea for its economic crisis and associated sociopolitical problems. In addition to its need for foreign capital and technology, the island has to depend upon other countries for mineral resources.³¹ The island is not well-endowed with mineral resources necessary for metallurgical industries like iron and steel, ferro-alloys, aluminum and copper. It is also not well endowed with mineral resources that could form the basis of agro-chemical industries. It does not have deposits of fuel minerals like petroleum and gas which could meet its energy requirements. Thus, Sri Lanka has to import most of the inputs for its manufacturing industries as well as for its regular needs. The export of manufactures is a must to avoid adverse balance of payment problems and crisis in foreign exchange, as well as to ensure continuous growth of the economy. This economic imperative predicated from geographic conditions is reflected in its foreign policy. It has to ensure good relationship with countries that supply it raw materials as well as provide markets for its export products. It has to ensure internal stability to ensure regular productive activity and free flow of trade and commerce.

Socio-Cultural Setting

Sri Lanka has a plural social structure which developed as a result of invasions and interference from abroad, especially India over a period of 2500 years. The society is divided by language, culture, religion and caste. The last is of very little consequence to Sri Lanka's foreign policy. The first three cleavages tend to reinforce each other. In the pluralist ethnic structure, individual Sri Lankans display strong allegiance to their respective ethnic groups.³² This has resulted in a great deal of competition and conflict among ethnic groups particularly between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. The conflict between these two ethnic groups has threatened the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. Of late, the Tamils have demanded an independent state of their own: the Eelam.³³ The competition and conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils have affected the conduct of politics and foreign policy in Sri Lanka.

The majority ethnic group in the island are the Sinhalese who comprise almost two-third of the total population. But the Sinhalese community is predominantly settled in the southwest and southcentral regions of the island. They are in a minority in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.

The Sinhalese trace their descent to the Aryans of northern India, and claim that they are the earliest civilized race to settle down in the island. They claim to have arrived some 2500 years ago. The Sinhalese speak Sinhala which belongs to the Indo-European linguistic family but they are the only people in the world to speak Sinhala. It is spoken nowhere else. Buddhism is the dominant religion among the Sinhalese. Buddhism was brought to the island from India around 3rd century B.C. Patronized by the various political authorities, it developed deep roots in the Sinhalese society. A significant number of Sinhalese adhere to Christianity which was introduced to the island during the colonial period.

Buddhism has played a significant role in the shaping of Sinhalese culture, literature and identity.³⁴ It has generated a very potent ideology among the Sinhalese based upon the fusion of nation and religion. This ideology which provides the Sinhalese their identity, claims that Sri

Lanka is the chosen land for Sinhala and Buddhism, that is Sri Lanka is the unity of Sinhadipa (island of the Sinhala) and Dhammadipa (island of Buddhism).³⁵ This national consciousness among the Sinhalese has given rise to the world view that Sri Lanka has to promote its unique identity in international politics, an identity which is distinct from the two major ideological alliances – the West and the East blocs led by the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union respectively as well as from India. It has influenced the state to pursue the policy of the middle path.³⁶

Some scholars have also argued that Buddhism has influenced Sri Lanka to maintain special relations with countries having predominantly Buddhist population and to champion the cause of the Buddhist people around the world.³⁷ While it is true that Buddhist leaders, both lay and bhikkhu, have from time to time attempted to mobilize domestic public opinion against the suppression of Buddhism under communism in Tibet and China, it is doubtful whether they have ever succeeded in generating public opinion of a magnitude significant enough as to influence the conduct of foreign policy. Sri Lanka's response to the crisis in Tibet gives evidence that its foreign policy move was shaped by political considerations rather than by sentiments of Buddhism, the dominant religion in the country. Another indication of limited influence of Buddhism on the day to day conduct of Sri Lanka's foreign policy is that barring Myanmar, Sri Lanka after attaining independence did not establish independent diplomatic missions with any of the Buddhist states of South East Asia.

The next largest ethnic community is the Sri Lankan Tamils. They trace their ancestry to South India and claim that their arrival in Sri Lanka was in the same period as that of the Sinhalese, an assertion that challenges the Sinhalese claim of being the first 'civilized' inhabitants of the island.³⁸ This claim also challenges the Sinhalese ideology of 'Sinhadipa' and 'Dhammadipa.' The Sri Lankan Tamils are related to the Tamils of India in terms of language, culture and religion. Most of the Sri Lankan Tamils practice Hinduism, though a significant number were converted to Christianity during the colonial period.

Although the Sri Lankan Tamils constitute about one-eighth of the total population, they are in absolute majority in the northern province. The Peninsula of Jaffna and the areas immediately to its south are populated exclusively by Sri Lankan Tamils. Barring Colombo, other region are marked by the absence of significant presence of Sri Lankan Tamils. This concentration of Sri Lankan Tamil population in the Jaffna Peninsula and the eastern region, and near contiguous location of these two parts, has contributed to the growth of the territorial dimension in Tamil sub-nationalism.³⁹

Tamil ethnicity in Sri Lanka surfaced in the political arena around the later part of the first quarter of the twentieth century when the Tamils demanded reservation of seats in the legislature and also the creation of separate Tamil electoral constituencies. These demands were made to protect the interests of the community.⁴⁰ The Sri Lankan Tamil sub-nationalism received a boost in 1956 when Sinhala was made the official language of the island. In response to this, the Tamils demanded parity of status between Sinhala and Tamil languages, and for federal political arrangement in the island.⁴¹ With the growing process of Sinhalization of the Sri Lankan state, a large section of the Sri Lankan Tamils have raised the demand for the creation of the separate Tamil state.⁴²

The Sri Lankan Tamil sub-nationalist aspiration in its successive stages, has received support from the Tamil population in India. The leaders of Tamil Nadu have attempted to mobilize public opinion in the Tamil Nadu province to influence the Indian state to take up the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils.⁴³ In recent years this linkage has significantly influenced Sri Lanka – India relations.⁴⁴

Closely affiliated to the Sri Lankan Tamils are the Indian Tamil population who are settled mainly in the tea plantations. The Indian Tamils are descendants of the Tamil indentured labour force which was brought from India by the British in the nineteenth and early twentieth century to develop the coffee and subsequently the tea plantations. While the Indian Tamils share

a common language, culture and religion with the Sinhala Tamils, they consider themselves distinct from the latter because of their recent origin, more humble socio-economic background, and problems attending their citizenship status in the island.

Soon after Sri Lanka gained independence, the government passed legislation that denied Sri Lankan citizenship to the Indian Tamils. The rationale behind this action was that the Indian Tamils, despite the fact that many of them were born in Sri Lanka, were regarded as 'mere birds of passage' who were in Sri Lanka only as temporary residents for economic reasons without any long-term ties with the island. The government then wanted to deport most of the Indian Tamils to India. The Indian Tamils as well as the Indian government resisted the move. The issue of the Indian Tamils became a problem area in Indo-Sri Lanka relations.⁴⁵ In 1964 an agreement was arrived at to solve this vexatious problem by Sri Lankan Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike and her Indian counterpart Lal Bahadur Shastri.⁴⁶ The Sirimavo-Shastri agreement arranged for the granting of Sri Lankan citizenship to 300,000 of the total 975,000 Indian Tamils in the island and deportation of 575,000 to India. The status of the remaining 150,000 was deferred to future negotiations. The agreement was to be implemented over a period of fifteen years. This agreement has been implemented very slowly and continues to surface in Indo-Sri Lanka relations but is not that major an irritant any more. There are 100,000 Indian Tamils who still remain stateless. With the lapse of 1964 agreement, India has declined to consider any more applications for grant of Indian citizenship, but Sri Lanka believes that the 1964 pact remains until the citizenship cases covered by the pact have been settled.

The third largest ethnic community is of the Moors who are subdivided further on the basis of the place of origin as Arab Moors, Indian Moors and Malay Moors. Across these distinctions, the Moors practice Islam and for most part speak Tamil. They are predominantly engaged in trading and are found in most urban areas. Those residing in the Sinhalese region also speak Sinhala. However, the Moors are particularly concentrated in the east coast where they are an important counterpoise to the Tamils and have a decisive say in electoral outcomes.⁴⁷ The Moors have strong identifications with co-religionists elsewhere and they have influenced Sri

Lanka's foreign policy toward a pro-Arab tilt. The Moors have been able to exercise this influence because of their importance in electoral politics. The ruling Sinhalese political parties have acceded to Moor sentiments in order to win their support at the polls.⁴⁸

In addition to the Moors, Sri Lanka has another small ethnic group – the Burghers who are of mixed European and Sinhalese descent. They are Christians and their mother tongue is English. The Burghers are economically well off and mostly settled in Colombo. During the colonial period they were prominently placed in the bureaucracy and educational service, but in years following independence they have lost their pre-eminence.⁴⁹ Moreover, the replacement of English as the language of administration by Sinhala has adversely affected the occupational prospects of the Burghers. In recent years, many Burghers have started to emigrate to the west for better socioeconomic prospects. The Burghers as an ethnic group exercise no influence in the conduct of the foreign policy.

Geographic diversity of the island and the varied patterns in the process of its colonization have contributed to the development of subcultures within the two main ethnic groups: the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils. The Sinhalese community is divided between low-country Sinhalese who were exposed to colonial rule quite early and as a result experienced much socio-economic transformation in their society; and the Kandyan Sinhalese, who for a long time resisted European rule and in the process developed a culture different from their kins living in the low-country. However, the divide between the low country and Kandyan Sinhalese has diminished in the recent years because of increasing interactions between people of the two cultures.⁵⁰ Likewise, the Sri Lankan Tamil community is divided between Jaffna Tamils and Tamils of east coast. The east coast Tamils are economically and educationally backward in comparison to the Jaffna Tamils. However, the intra-ethnic differences have little bearing on Sri Lanka's foreign policy.

The most important issue in the agenda generated by the pluralist social structure before Sri Lanka's foreign policy is the protection of the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and maintenance of harmony between the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils. The interaction between these two ethnic communities has become conflict-ridden in recent years following the demand for a separate Tamil state by the Sri Lankan Tamils. The Tamils have taken resort to extremist methods to achieve their separatist demand and have received support from Tamils across the Palk Strait. Sri Lanka's foreign policy has been called upon to defuse the Tamil secessionist challenge and maintain the territorial integrity of the island.

Political Economy

When J.R. Jayewardene assumed power in 1977, the economy of Sri Lanka was confronted with acute problems of growing pressure of population and unemployment of educated youth, backwardness in the agrarian sector, decreasing traditional exports, escalation of the expenditure in imports, adverse balance of payment, and paucity of capital to foster export-oriented industries.⁵¹ These problems had plague Sri Lankan economy for the past several decades, but what is significant is the policies of Jayewardene to cope with these problems. Boldly departing from the policies of previous governments he adopted a strategy based on structural adjustment programme such as economic liberalization, market reforms particularly reduction of the tax structure, deregulating financial markets for promoting foreign trade, reducing food subsidies and privatizing government owned industries. It was hoped that with the increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), there would be increase in the standard of living, decrease in unemployment and, in general, these market reforms would lead to a stable economy.⁵² However, the success of these policies depended upon the availability of foreign capital in the productive sector and hence, the policy of structural adjustment required tweaking the foreign policy in order to attract the foreign capital and technology for manufacturing and exporting the domestic products in the foreign markets.

The Sinhalese kingdom of Kandy had fallen to British colonial power in 1825, after having successfully resisted the two preceding European powers, the Portuguese and the Dutch. The British planters rushed to Kandy to develop coffee plantations because of the decline in profit in coffee plantation in the West Indies. The climate of Kandy being favourable to coffee cultivation, the colonial administration seized the opportunity of making land available to the planters at exceptionally nominal rates and encouraging the migration of Tamil labourers from India. The need for indentured Tamil labourers arose because, one, the Kandyan peasants, stiffly bound to their traditions, refused to become plantation workers, and, two the peasants of the low country could not be persuaded to move to Kandy. On the other hand, the situation in Tamil Nadu was different : Tamil landless peasants of Tamil Nadu were eager to work in the plantation in Sri Lanka and elsewhere.⁵³

Given the favourable climatic conditions, easy availability of land and abundant supply of cheap labour, the coffee plantations flourished in the Kandyan region for over a half century. But the fortunes of the coffee planters evaporated around 1880s when coffee plants suffered irreparable damages at the hands of ravaging pests against whom no effective remedy was yet available. Hence, tea plantation was chosen as an alternative to the coffee plantation. But, individual planters found it was difficult to manage tea plantation due to the employment of huge liquid capital and specialized labour force. Consequently, unable to generate the capital and the employment of specialized labour force, the individual entrepreneurs surrendered their plantations to the big companies based either in London or in Colombo.⁵⁴ It was mostly English capital that was employed, although some Sinhalese did invest in tea plantation. By 1930 the tea plantation had reached saturation point, and it accounted for 90 percent of Sri Lanka's export earnings at the time of independence.

How about the other two cash crops, rubber and coconut? Climatic and topographic considerations had dictated that rubber plantations were developed in the lower foothills, bordering the wet zone, and coconut in the southwest coastal plains. Both English and Sinhalese

capital were prominent in the rubber plantations while the Sinhalese alone owned the coconut plantations.⁵⁵ Statistically, rubber and coconut are of less importance in the Sri Lankan economy as compared with tea. It has been observed that the post-independent Sri Lanka economic structure was characterized by a dual economy in which the export oriented agro-products such as tea and rubber existed side by side a semi-subsistence rural sector rooted in the cultivation of rice and a few other food crops for domestic consumption. Not to talk of other food stuffs, the country was not self-sufficient even in rice.⁵⁶ The distortion of the economy was the product of the colonial system of exploitation.

The colonial administration did not take effective measures to develop the agricultural sector so that it could acquire self-sufficiency in domestic food production as this entailed depriving the plantation sector of land. Of course, around the 1930s, it tried to tackle the problem of the agricultural sector by attempting to develop irrigation facilities in the dry zone and establishing peasant colonization there but such efforts were on a very modest scale.⁵⁷ Given the existence of trade surplus mainly arising out of tea exports, the colonial administration found it expedient to meet the deficit in food requirement of the island by importing rice and other necessities.

On the other hand, Sri Lanka experienced rapid population growth between 1940 and 1970 on account of the introduction of modern medical facilities which eradicated the fatal malaria disease from the island, decreased infant mortality and old age death rates and extended average longevity.⁵⁸ As a result, the population galloped from a mere 6.6 million in 1946 to 12.7 million in 1971 to 15 million in 1985 (and, further, to 20.2 million in 2012). The rapid population growth has increased consumption demands on the economy. In the absence of self-sufficiency in domestic food production, the island has had to import food commodities, which has been burdensome on the economy. Food has accounted for over half of the total expenditure on imports. This problem was further complicated by the prevalence of the system of food subsidy which required huge amount of the state revenue, and deprived the state of capital to

promote economic expansion and growth and to create productive employment opportunities for the people.⁵⁹

The economy of Sri Lanka has faced the problem of rising unemployment since 1946.⁶⁰ The unemployment force at that point of time was around 56,000, which between 1963 and 1977 more than doubled with the coming of age of the population born after 1940s. Thereafter the unemployment figures have gone up. In 1981, they stood at 885,000. By 2009 data, 21.03% of the population between the age group of 15-24 years were unemployed.⁶¹ The unemployment problem of Sri Lanka is qualitatively different from that of other developing countries. It consists of educated as well as highly politicized youths due to the popular educational system that was put into operation during the Donoughmore era; but also because of the competitive nature of electoral politics. The unemployed labour force are predisposed towards white collar jobs in the government or industries as employment in these sectors carries job security, better remuneration and higher social status.⁶² The unemployed youth have demonstrated that they are a political force to be reckoned with in the island from as early as 1956, when they successfully mobilized support for their demand for the replacement of English by Sinhalese as the official language of the island so as to improve their employment opportunities. In 1971, the youth discontent with the slow pace of economic growth and creation of employments, rallied under the Janatha Vimuthi Peramuna (JVP) to stage a nearly successful insurrectionary movement. Likewise, the discontented Tamil youth have taken to secessionist politics to improve their socio-economic plight.

The lack of capital formation obstructed the economy of Sri Lanka forestalling any prospects of rapid expansion and growth. Earlier Sri Lanka enjoyed trade surplus and had huge foreign capital reserves at its disposal. But on account of huge unproductive expenditure on the welfare programme, Sri Lanka faced severe adverse balance of payment problem. The imports rapidly increased in volume and costs, draining the state of valuable investment. In 1956, Sri Lanka spent Rs.2,005 million on imports but in 1977 the import bill had increased to Rs.6,061 million. Collectively, the growth in population and expenditure on imports against exports

culminated in the rise in prices of imports such as food stuffs, finished manufactured goods and petroleum products.⁶³

Compounding the problem of Sri Lankan economy, the prices and demands of its traditional exports, tea and rubber did not experience a proportionate increase. The demand for rubber in the international market has declined due to the availability of synthetic rubber which proved to be cheaper than natural rubber. Similarly, tea did not experience significant rise in its price in international market because of abundant supply, and competition from other beverages. The glut in the tea market was caused by spurt in production in the traditional tea cultivating areas in Asia following modernization of production processes, including cultivation of high yielding tea plants and use of fertilizers and pesticides which boosted productivity. Besides, new tea producers also entered the world market, following the development of large tea estates in some of the East African countries, notably Tanzania and Kenya.⁶⁴ Despite this Sri Lanka held on to its positions of the second largest tea exporter after India, with a world share of 30-35 percent. As a matter of fact, Sri Lanka no longer sustained its economy exclusively out of tea exports as was the situation during the colonial period.

Since the attainment of independence the effort of successive government was to increase domestic food production so as to reduce dependence on import of food commodities. These measures involved three inter-related strategies: (i) reform of land holding and land tenure systems with a view to protecting the interests of the peasant farmers; (ii) modernization of agricultural practices such as providing irrigation facilities and encouraging peasant farmers to use high-yielding variety of seeds, fertilizers and modern equipments; and (iii) introduction of peasant colonization scheme in the dry zone for production of food commodities. These measures paid dividends. The island's production of rice and other subsidiary food commodities saw an increase; however, this still fell woefully short of self-sufficiency in food requirements making import of food items an imperative.

Under the circumstances, Sri Lanka faced several inter-related economic challenges that threatened its stability and well-being, namely, securing foreign capital assistance to promote rapid economic expansion and growth of the industrial and agricultural sectors to stem the increasingly volatile disaffected unemployed population; forging ways and means of greater self-sufficiency in essential needs of the population; and generating new sources as well as protecting and promoting existing exports so as to overcome the nagging balance of payment problem. However, these requirements were not easy to come by given the reality of the competitive and highly stratified international economic order. It was in this context that Sri Lanka forged its foreign policy, a task which proved to be extremely arduous.

In tackling these issues, the economic policies of the two dominant parties, the UNP and the SLFP differed. The pre-1977 socio-economic policies had the following features:

1. The state offered incentives to domestic agriculture and production of ancillary food stuffs for greater productivity through subsidized input programme, irrigation networks and settlement schemes, and guaranteed price for paddy.
2. The state established heavy industries while leaving manufacturing of small scale products in the hands of the private sector offering the latter incentives as well as tariff protection against import of foreign foods.
3. During the SLFP regimes, the state nationalized transportation, banking, insurance, oil, tea plantation, and many other sectors. Moreover, state corporations were set up for production and marketing of milk, textiles, steels, etc.
4. Sri Lankan economy was depended on foreign capital for its development and for overcoming the problems of balance of payments. Hence, Sri Lankan development inextricably came to be linked up with foreign trade, monetary as well as material assistance.⁶⁵

It is in the context of this socio-economic scenario that the post-1977 economic policies have been operated upon. The basic components of the economic policy package of the UNP government of Jayewardene can be summarized as follows:

- a. Formulation of free economy with accent on free enterprise based on free market forces and motives of profit maximization.
- b. Liberalization of economy by removing control over foreign exchange, import regulations and permitting production and trade to operate within a free market framework.
- c. Divesting import monopolies of the state excepting food items.
- d. Devaluation of the currency and providing attractive incentive packages for collaboration of foreign investors in public and private sectors.
- e. Abolition of the subsidies on rice and introducing the 'food stamp scheme' for those who earn less than Rs.500 a month with a view to cushioning the relatively depressed economic strata.⁶⁶

Thus, unlike the SLFP, developmental perspective of the UNP government of Jayewardene had as its focal point not import-substitution but export-oriented economy with a heavy inculcation of foreign aid and investment. While with the SLFP self-sufficiency in food-stuffs, particularly rice, was essential for diverting the expenditure on rice imports, the UNP decided to give it greater fillip by telescoping the multi-purpose Mahaweli project from 30 years to just 6 years.

The Mahaweli project, relating to largest river in Sri Lanka, envisages harnessing the irrigation and power potential of the river as well as diversion of its water to the dry zone. Though the initial cost of the project was estimated at about Rs.11,000 million, the revised estimate factoring in price escalation came to around Rs.25,000 million. About half of the financial outlay was provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Asian Aid Group also pledged a substantial amount and some western countries like the UK, Canada, West Germany and Norway gave outright grants for the project.

Along with the Mahaweli project, the other plank of the UNP activities focused on the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) that is geared to promoting export-oriented industrial production as per the pattern of Singapore. The FTZ operated under the authority of the Greater Colombo Economic Commission. During 1978-81, it approved 155 projects with a foreign investment component of Rs.4,268 million out of a total investment commitment of Rs.6,222 million. The employment potential in the FTZ was estimated to be about 75,000. There has also been provision for foreign collaboration outside the FTZ on the recommendation of the Foreign Investment Advisory Committee. Under the scheme, 217 projects were in operation with the foreign investment component being about Rs.2,152 million and with employment potential being about 25,000.

Along with the Mahaweli project and the FTZ, the government gave a fabulous fillip to the housing construction programme. Under its umbrella over 100,000 houses were constructed.⁶⁷ The thrust of the UNP's development is in the areas of irrigation, exports and housing which has led to increase in employment. Added to this was the factor of private remittances from Sri Lankans working especially in the Middle East which rose from 9 million in 1975 to an estimated \$ 229 million dollars (about Rs.4,500 million) in 1981. Foreign employment remittances became the second largest foreign exchange earner after traditional export of Tea (Rs.6,444 million).

As evident from the discussion above, the success of the developmental programme of Jayawardene, (no less than SLFP), depended upon Sri Lanka's foreign economic policy to acquire foreign capital and technology and secure markets for its new as well as traditional exports.

Variable Determinants

Nationalism

The phenomenon of nationalism as a potent political force is a major determinant of foreign policy. The ruling elites promote the values, outlooks and aspirations articulated by nationalism through foreign policy. They cannot afford to conduct foreign policy in opposition to nationalism because this will endanger the legitimacy of their own political authority. Thus foreign policy reflects the content and concerns of nationalism. The phenomenon of nationalism is not static in nature. It is a dynamic process which changes in responses to changes in its socio-cultural, economic and political contexts. The changes in the content and contour of nationalism have a bearing on the conduct of foreign policy.

Since independence, nationalism in Sri Lanka has passed through four successive phases. The first phase of nationalism which lasted till 1956, had only territorial and political dimensions. It was concerned with the preservation of the territorial integrity and political independence. It articulated perception of threat to the integrity and independence of the island from India and the international communist movement led by the Soviet Union. The threat perception from India arose as a response to geopolitical and historical considerations. The threat from communism was perceived because of the presence of a strong communist movement within the island. Another interesting feature of Sri Lanka's nationalism was that it was pro-West and espoused the aspiration of building a model parliamentary democracy in Sri Lanka. Nationalism was favourably disposed towards Britain which was its ideal for emulation in Sri Lanka. Finally, nationalism advocated a distinct international identity for Sri Lanka based upon the Buddhist notion of the middle path.⁶⁸ During this phase, nationalism did not have cultural, economic and social dimensions. There was no move to promote Sinhala and Buddhism within Sri Lanka nor was there the demand to nationalise foreign investment in, and ownership of Sri Lanka's resources. Likewise, nationalism did not see any conflict between the English language, and Sri Lankan languages, culture and traditions.

The second phase of nationalism began around 1956. It brought to the fore Sinhala ethno-cultural and religious concerns. To the territorial-political dimensions, ethno-cultural and religious dimensions were added. It claimed Sri Lanka as the land of the Sinhala Buddhists. Sri Lanka was seen as the 'Sinhadipa' and 'Dhammadipa.' Nationalism was ill-disposed towards the continuance of English language in the administration of the island; English as the official language was perceived as repressing the growth and development of Sinhala language and culture.⁶⁹ It prevented the vast majority of the Sinhalese who were educated in the vernacular medium from participating in the administration of the island. The growth of ethno-cultural nationalism adversely affected the perception of Sri Lanka towards Britain.⁷⁰ The presence of British military installation in the island was seen to be an infringement of the independence of Sri Lanka. This phase of nationalism also did not evince much fear of India or the international communist movement. Rather, it articulated more sharply the socio-cultural distinctiveness of Sri Lanka in international politics, especially highlighting the need for correction of the pro-western bias in its foreign policy. There was the desire to promote the identity of Sri Lanka in international politics as a nonaligned country championing the causes of global peace, decolonization and global social justice.⁷¹

Subsequently, economic dimensions were included in the Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-cultural nationalism. This meant nationalization of foreign investment and ownership of the resources in the island. Also, there was the demand to reduce dependence on imports, and attain domestic self-sufficiency. In this regard, the demand was raised for nationalization of domestic and foreign enterprises in the island. Furthermore, efforts were made to promote import substitution industrialization under the control of the state especially in the sector of heavy industries.⁷²

In turn, however, the emergence of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism enhanced ethnic consciousness among the Tamils, who feared danger to their language and culture and socio-economic interests because of the replacement of English by Sinhala as the official language. To protect their language, culture and socio-economic interests, the Sri Lankan Tamils demanded a

federal form of government and parity of status between Sinhala and Tamil languages. However, Tamil subnationalism during this period did not question the rationality of Sri Lanka as an all-island encompassing territorial unit nor did it claim any irreconcilable conflict between Tamil subnationalism and Sri Lankan nationalism.

The third phase of nationalism which began in the early 1970s and lasted for over a decade or more, was quite complex as it involved competing strands and discourses. The dominant strand consisted of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, which aspired greater Sinhalization of the state. In response to this force, the 1972 constitution of the island declared Sinhala as the official language and made Buddhism the state religion.⁷³ The second strand of nationalism was championed by the JVP. This nationalism combined Sinhala-Buddhist values and aspirations with the revolutionary philosophies of Marx, Lenin and Mao. It viewed India as an imperialist power which had designs on Sri Lanka. It espoused the overthrow of the present state power and subsequently the creation of a socialist state. Although the 1971 insurrection led by JVP failed, the organization was far from being eliminated in the island.⁷⁴ From mid-1980s there was resurgence in the activities of JVP. It was opposed to the UNP. government as well as the government designs to merge the Northern and Eastern Provinces. It also opposed the presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). During this phase its activities were both overt and covert. At the overt level it organized strikes and hartals against the UNP. government and also against the presence of the IPKF where it was quite successful. At the covert level it resorted to terrorism. It assassinated several UNP. leaders and others who were opposed to its politics. It looted banks and other institutions to finance its activities. It was a dominant force in the politics of Sri Lanka during this phase specially in the Southern Province threatening the political stability of the island. Eventually the army of Sri Lanka crushed the JVP between September 1989 and the end of January 1990. The army succeeded in eliminating all but one member of the JVP politbureau and killed most members of the district level leadership.⁷⁵ The third strand is that of Tamil subnationalism which had gained considerable momentum among the Tamil population. The demand of the Tamils had moved from autonomy for Tamil speaking areas within the framework of federalism to the creation of a separate Tamil state. All major Tamil political organizations had come together under a common front called the Tamil United

Liberation Front (TULF) to mobilize support for the separation of the Tamil speaking areas. Barring occasional violence, the TULF political strategy remained civil and constitutional.⁷⁶

The fourth and ongoing phase of nationalism is more or less a continuance of the trends of the previous decade, barring two major differences. Mainstream Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism continues to dominate the political arena, but it has shed off its economic content in so far as it is no longer averse to the presence of foreign capital in the island.⁷⁷ Tamil subnationalism had become extremist. Frustrated with the political constitutional tactics of their elders Tamil youth took recourse to extremist strategy to ‘liberate the Tamil region from the Sinhala state.’ Initially, several groups were engaged in political extremism. The relationship between these groups was competitive and fraught with conflict. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was able to eliminate most of the rival groups and emerge as the main organization engaged in armed struggle to establish the proposed Eelam state. The LTTE had established its control over several parts of the Jaffna peninsula, and had withstood the Sri Lankan military offensive,⁷⁸ but eventually the Sri Lankan army managed to crush the LTTE.

While the change in the economic outlook of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism led the state to invite foreign capital to Sri Lanka, the emergence of extremism among Tamils made it dependent on other countries for diplomatic and military support.

Political Regimes

The political regime is an important determinant of foreign policy. It directs the day to day conduct of external relations. Its decisions are guided by its perceptions of the goals of foreign policy in the context of the international and domestic settings. Its perceptions are in turn based upon its ideological predilections, world-views as well as its goal to remain in power.

Therefore, the role of the regime in the conduct of the foreign policy can be understood by analyzing its ideology and world-view, and also its actions to ward off political rivals.

Sri Lanka has experienced two trends in the sphere of regime formation. Between 1948 and 1956 and also from 1977 to 1988, it has had governments formed by one dominant party the United National Party (UNP). The UNP is right of the center in its ideological orientation and it is also pro-West. During the first phase, it was committed to promoting English as the official language of Sri Lanka, but subsequently it retracted on that commitment under pressure of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.⁷⁹

Between 1956 and 1977 the island saw governments formed alternately by the two dominant parties – the UNP and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). The SLFP is left of center in its ideological orientation, and more nationalist than the UNP. Each of these two parties in alliance with other parties successively formed the government. While the UNP allied itself with one or the other Tamil parties such as, the Federal Party (FP), Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), and Tamil Congress (TC), the SLFP formed coalitions with the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaj Party (LSSP) and Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CP).⁸⁰

Although the two dominant party system has given rise to a bipartisan approach in many areas, the two coalitions have not been wanting in divergences in several spheres. The UNP led governments had been pro-West but the SLFP led governments had favoured closer relations with the former Soviet Union and its allies as also with China. These two trends however, have been played out within the overall framework of nonalignment.

International Setting

The international setting has exercised a diverse range of influences on the shaping of the foreign policy of Sri Lanka. For the purpose of analysis, these influences can be divided into three groups : normative, politico-strategic, and economic. The normative influence refers to international principles and norms, international law and international organizations which collectively constitute the normative authority structure of the international society. The cardinal precept of the international normative authority structure is the principle of sovereign equality of states, that is regardless, of the obvious reality of uneven distribution in resources and disparity of capabilities, no state is subordinate to another state, or that small and weak states are not required to obey larger or powerful states. This precept provides legitimacy to the existence of small and weak states seeking to protect them from the designs of powerful states. Thus, the normative authority structure is an important source of power for the small and weak states.⁸¹

The most important institution of the normative authority structure is the United Nations which was created by the community of states after World War II to protect the international normative authority structure upon which it was founded as well as to preserve the comity of nations. The UN provides the legitimate forum to small and weak states not only to assert their independence and thereby gain for themselves material and emotional support from the more powerful states but also to act collectively for expanding the scope of the normative structure authority for promoting their socio-economic and political interests. Besides the UN there are other institutions such as the Commonwealth and the Nonaligned Movement which serve the same purpose. Consequently, the international normative authority structure acquires an important place in the foreign policy of Sri Lanka.

The important politico-strategic influences on Sri Lanka at the time of the attainment of its independence were the Cold War, decolonization movements, the emergence of China as the first communist state in Asia, and its relations with Britain and India. The Cold War had already spread its tentacles to Asia. The United States and Soviet Union were actively competing with each other to spread their influences in the West Asian region and had already contributed to the rise of military conflicts in East and Southeast Asia. The rivalry between these two superpowers

had burdened East and Southeast Asian regions with political instability, and violence. It had threatened the integrity of the peninsula of Korea, which was eventually bifurcated, and endangered the independence and autonomy of the political societies of Indo-China which had to experience bloody wars which went on for nearly three decades.⁸² The Cold War posed serious danger to Sri Lanka's security and independence not only because of its smallness but also because of its socio-cultural and political pluralism. Sri Lanka was extremely vulnerable to the Cold War because of the existence of a powerful communist movement alongside strong rightist political forces. While its socio-cultural and political pluralism carried potential for interference by the Cold War rivals, its strategic location in the Indian Ocean, already under British control till 1956, (the early Cold War years) attracted the two rivals.⁸³ The Cold War was thus not conducive to Sri Lanka's independence and security.

At this time there still were peoples in Asia and Africa under colonial subjugation. They were fighting for their political independence from colonial rule but the colonial powers were opposing the freedom struggles on politico-strategic grounds.⁸⁴ Sri Lanka as a former colony had not only emotive support for the national liberation movements in Asia and Africa and could not but associate with other newly decolonized countries who were mobilizing international political opinion in favour of the struggles for independence of the still subjugated peoples. It was, in more positive terms, in the interest of Sri Lanka to support these movements since the perpetuation of colonial rule on politico-strategic grounds would have undermined the effect of the normative authority structure of the international society which provided legitimacy to the existence of Sri Lanka as an independent political entity and protected it from domination by powerful states. If legitimization of colonial rule on politico-strategic considerations was permitted, it would have meant the availability of legitimacy to powerful states attempting to encroach on Sri Lanka's independence. Thus colonialism was not acceptable to Sri Lanka at any cost.⁸⁵

Sri Lanka had external relations with Britain and India. Its relationship with Britain was more than cordial. Britain had granted independence to Sri Lanka without a mass-based national

freedom struggle. The political leadership of Sri Lanka looked upon Britain as a friend and benefactor. They prized their association with Britain and its Commonwealth.⁸⁶ Sir Oliver Goonetilleke expressed this stance thus:

“We ask you to think of Ceylon as a little bit of England, to look to us with confidence because the collaboration between Britain and Ceylon will be so strong and because you are dealing with men whose word is their bond. If ever another war should break out, Ceylon will rival Australia as the first Dominion to rally to the side of the Mother Country.”⁸⁷

Sri Lanka's leadership nurtured fear of India because of the latter's gigantic size and also because of the trans-state Tamil equation. All the same, Sri Lanka did not inherit any major conflicts from the colonial period which would make it antagonistic towards India. Moreover, it could not afford to have adversarial relationship with it because this would have proved detrimental to its own security and independence. Nonetheless, the neutralization of its fear of India pushed Sri Lanka to seek some counterweight and, also, to promote peace and stability in the region for eliminating any possible pretext on part of India to encroach on Sri Lanka's independence for its strategic and defence imperatives.⁸⁸

In the economic sphere, Sri Lanka was dependent for tea export on London. Most of the tea of Sri Lanka was sold through London tea auction. This linkage with London also had its influence on Sri Lanka's relationship with Britain.

Prior to independence, Sri Lanka was acutely dependent on India for its basic imports. Sri Lankan nationalism had begun to initiate steps against the acute dependence on India. This was perceived as giving India an additional leverage over Sri Lanka, over and above to what nature and history had already bequeathed it.

The recent structural changes in the international society - characterized as the Post-Cold War International Order or, alternatively, the New International Order - will have wide-ranging and crucial bearing on Sri Lanka's foreign policy. The end of the Cold War has led to the recession of the interests of the United States, Russia and China to acquire niches in South Asian international politics. Russia and China are now pursuing inward-looking foreign policies geared toward rapidly overcoming their neglected state and economy building programmes, while the United States has shown an inclination to promote stability in South Asia in cooperation with India.⁸⁹ This changed scenario in the interaction of these powers, who had occupied dominant positions in the Cold War era, has diminished the efficacy of Sri Lanka's traditional policy of manipulating them to reduce its own vulnerability, in addition to availing generous economic aid and assistance from them. Notwithstanding the changes in the attitudes of these powers, Sri Lanka continues to be confronted by a vulnerability of sorts to its national security and autonomy because of the domestic as well as international challenges it experiences. It needs to find ways and means to tackle these challenges. Likewise, its need for foreign capital, technology and markets has not altered; in fact it has increased very acutely because of the multiple forms of crises faced by its civil society.

Furthermore, the Post-Cold War era has implied greater scope of autonomy and manoeuvrability for India in South Asia with the decline of interests of the United States, China, Russia and the likes in the region. India has not been able to take advantage of this situation because of its own preoccupations with its national integration and state-building problems and challenges. It is also constrained from pursuing assertive diplomacy with regard to its smaller neighbours by its policies of beneficial bilaterism based on confidence-building diplomacy to overcome their insecurity dilemma. Nevertheless this has not obviated the pressure on Sri Lanka to seek alternative mechanisms to mitigate India's over bearing presence and its concomitant implications and consequences.

The phenomenon of globalization which has attained near - hegemonic proportions in the realm of social development, through marginalization of competing theories and programmes is

of great consequence to the foreign policy of Sri Lanka.⁹⁰ It enjoys almost unanimous appeal in policy-making circles in Sri Lanka and is treated as virtually synonymous with social development itself. Its foreign policy, which until the recent changes in the international environment pressed for a state interventionist approach for promoting social development and a democratic polity (conceding the fact that the policy has proved to be much wanting in its operational efficacy in the island), has now to articulate the agenda set by globalization: namely, cultivation of global capital, global market and global productive forces, and also convincingly market the comparative advantages of Sri Lanka in the international division of labour and the global geo-politics and geo-economy.

The international setting has thus exercised a diverse range of influences on the foreign policy of Sri Lanka : it has required Sri Lanka to promote the international normative authority structure; reduce and refrain from the Cold War; support decolonization movement; maintain cordial relations with Britain and India, and yet balance out the overbearing presence of India and reduce economic dependence on it; foster economic diversification and interdependence; promote peace and stability in the South Asian region; and seek redressal of its domestic socio-economic predicaments through international assistance and opportunities.

Foreign Policy Objectives

The objectives of the foreign policy of Sri Lanka have, to some extent, been indicated in the analysis of the foreign policy determinants. What is now required for the purpose of conceptual and analytical clarity is to specifically highlight and explicate them.

I. Security Objective

Corresponding to the security motivation which includes both territorial integrity and political independence, Sri Lanka faced potential threats from three sources: (i) the Cold War – especially, the power rivalry in South and Southeast Asia, and Indian the Ocean region; (ii) India; and (iii) within the polity.

The two superpowers, that is, the United States and the former Soviet Union, individually did not pose any direct political threat to Sri Lanka. Both these powers were located away from Sri Lanka and as a result they had no direct conflict with Sri Lanka on issues of territorial claims, or direct territorial defence. However, Sri Lanka was susceptible to politico-strategic interference from them because of the Cold War, which had the potential of generating processes and forces which could have jeopardized the autonomy, stability and integrity of Sri Lanka.⁹¹

Although Sri Lanka did not inherit any major conflict with India from the colonial era, it was vulnerable to political interferences and military threats from the big neighbour. The presence of India in its immediate neighbourhood posed threats to Sri Lanka's identity and autonomy. Sri Lanka was susceptible to pressures from India because of the security and strategic imperatives of the latter. In fact, several prominent strategic thinkers and analysts of India, both past and present, have unambiguously advocated Indian naval presence in Sri Lanka for strengthening the defence of India.⁹² Drawing attention to this aspect, for example, Panikkar wrote:

“There has been an unfortunate tendency to overlook the sea in the discussion of India's defence problems. Until now, the discussion has proceeded on the assumption that security of India is a matter exclusively of North-East Frontier.... This is an entirely one-side(d) view of Indian history.... Ever since the sixteenth century... the future of India has been determined not on the land frontiers but on the oceanic expanse which washes the three sides of India.”⁹³

Since countries like Myanmar and Sri Lanka were then parts of the British Empire, he pleaded for close defence links with these countries. Other Indian defence analysts continued to demand such links between India and Sri Lanka even after their independence. The then Congress President Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramaya stated in 1949:

“India and Sri Lanka must have a common defence strength and common defence resources. It cannot be that Ceylon is in friendship with a group with which India is not in friendship, not that Ceylon has no right to make its own alignments and declare its own affiliation – but if there are two hostile groups in the world and Ceylon and India are with one or the other of them and not with the same group it will be a bad day for both.”⁹⁴

This led India to accept Sri Lanka’s defence arrangement with Britain as India did not have any conflicts with London.

Furthermore, India’s direct politico-military encroachment of the independence of Sri Lanka may arise from the compulsions of Indian federal society and polity. The Tamil sub-nationalist forces in Tamil Nadu may persuade the Indian state to intervene in Sri Lanka to support the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils.⁹⁵ Such threat perceptions are no longer deductions from the power politics and cultural politics perspectives; but are quite real with the rise to dominance of the culture-linguistic nationalism in Tamil Nadu since the mid-sixties.⁹⁶ Thus, Sri Lanka was required to defuse the Cold War as well as ensure its independence and integrity from India. Its foreign policy has had to promote such roles and interactions which would achieve these two objectives.

Besides, Sri Lanka had the potential to face threats emerging from its polity in the form of insurgency and secession. The island had to use its foreign policy to ameliorate the conditions which are conducive to the emergence of these political tendencies, and also to contain and resolve them when they surfaced on the political landscape of the island.

II. Stability and Economic Development

The stability motivation has led Sri Lanka to make economic development a major objective of its foreign policy. Through the conduct of its foreign policy, Sri Lanka has to promote markets for its traditional agricultural as well as new non-agricultural exports and obtain capital and technology to foster economic expansion and growth including promotion of industrialization and attainment of self-sufficiency in its basic sustenance needs.⁹⁷ This would enable the government to tackle challenges to its legitimacy and threats to the territorial structure of the state from within. The linkage between foreign policy and economy has been succinctly spelt out in a statement by the Foreign Minister of Jayewardene's cabinet:

“Our Foreign Policy, I must say is being given a new orientation. We are a poor country, we are struggling for survival. Long economic stagnation has made it impossible for the people of this country to have a full and square meal. From stagnation to rapid development, it is a difficult process. Therefore, I seek to make our foreign policy an effective instrument of economic advancement.”⁹⁸

III. World Peace

World Peace is an important objective of the foreign policy of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka's foreign policy commitment to world peace is not rhetorical. It arises from realistic considerations. The mobilization of international opinion for the cause of World Peace is necessary to delegitimize any form of international processes posing a threat to it. World Peace is enshrined in the Presidential Constitution. The Directive Principles of State Policy concerning International Affairs reads as follows:

“The state shall promote international peace, security and cooperation and the establishment of a just and equitable international economic and social order, and

shall endeavour to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in dealings among nations.”⁹⁹

IV. Anti-Colonialism, Anti-Imperialism and Racism

Closely related to the objectives of security and world peace is the foreign policy commitment of Sri Lanka to oppose colonialism, imperialism and racism in international society. The existence of these phenomena would provide legitimacy to the domination of powerful states and races over small and weak states and peoples, and the presence of these phenomena provide a sanction to rivalry and conflict between dominant powers, as much as to the practice of wanton military aggression and warfare. Besides, colonialism, imperialism and racism tend to contest the normative foundations of the post World War II international society and question the viability of the existence of small and weak states. Therefore, Sri Lanka’s commitment to anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-racism emanates from the imperatives of self-preservation, security and independence.¹⁰⁰ This was recognized by Sri Lanka from the early days of its independence. For instance during the visit of the Indonesian President, Soekarno, to Sri Lanka in January, 1958, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in a joint statement with him asserted:

“...the freedom and sovereignty regained by many countries in Asia and Africa should be perfected and safeguarded in the interest of all.”¹⁰¹

V. New International Economic Order

Related to the objective of economic development, is Sri Lanka’s commitment to the creation of a new international economic order. This objective of its foreign policy is meant to make the developed countries responsible for the economic progress of the less fortunate states by providing the latter economic assistance and market for their exports. The enshrinement of the

principle of new economic order thus will help Sri Lanka to acquire market for its exports and obtain capital and technological assistance for the growth and development of its economy.¹⁰² Successive governments of Sri Lanka have announced their support for creation of a new international economic order that will eliminate the poverty and backwardness of the Third World countries.

VI. Commonwealth

Britain and the British Commonwealth had special meaning to the leadership of Sri Lanka. They perceived the Commonwealth as a family to which they belong culturally and historically. They considered it their duty to foster good relations with Britain and other former British colonies and strengthen the Commonwealth. Of course, membership of the Commonwealth helped Sri Lanka to gain identity and confidence as well as feel secure, from India especially, when it was not the member of the UN. D.S. Senanayake, the first Prime Minister of Sri Lanka emphasized the importance of the Commonwealth connection. In one of his speeches, he reiterated that:

“My Government is keenly aware of significance and unity of the purpose of the Commonwealth in effort to preserve peace in the post-war world and will use its utmost endeavour to cherish and safeguard those valuable association.”¹⁰³

VII. Identification With Other Small And Weak States

The identification of Sri Lanka with other small and weak states is an essential prerequisite for achieving the foreign objectives of world peace, decolonization and anti-imperialism, and new economic order. It is only through identification with similarly placed countries that a common front can be formed; and a movement launched to remove the anomalies in international society which endanger the security and autonomy of the small and

weak states or impose constraints on their socio-economic development. In the Asian Relations Conference of 1947, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike who led a delegation remarked in the plenary session:

“I am sure that it is the hope of us all that this conference is only the beginning of something much greater – a federation of free and equal Asiatic countries working not merely for our advantage but for the progress and peace of all mankind.”¹⁰⁴

VIII. Strengthening the United Nations and the Nonaligned Movement (NAM)

To further the above objectives, Sri Lanka, like all other small and weak states, recognizes the importance of the UN which provides protection to small and weak states from aggression or domination by powerful states. Besides, the UN presents the small and weak states the forum to assert their group aspiration and identity as well as make their collective wisdom audible. It provides legitimacy and sanctions to their aspirations and demands. As a scholar in the context of the analysis of the foreign policy of another small state has aptly put it: “There only (the United Nations) it could plead the cause of world peace, and at the same time get recognition of its independence and sovereignty as also aid and assistance for its economic development.”¹⁰⁵ Therefore the strengthening of the United Nations is an important objective of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. All political parties have expressed their unqualified support for the UN. However, it must be mentioned that Sri Lanka was not admitted to the UN till 1955 because of the exercise of veto to its admission by the Soviet Union. It was only through the package deal that Sri Lanka gained membership of the UN.

And for the very same reason, Sri Lanka gives considerable importance to the nonaligned movement. Sri Lanka, a founding member of the NAM, has played a prominent role in strengthening the NAM and making it an effective force in international politics.

Foreign Policy Strategy

The actualization of these objectives required a comprehensive strategy. Theoretically speaking, three options were available to Sri Lanka in the post-World War II international relations : isolation, alignment and nonalignment.¹⁰⁶ The first two options were neither feasible nor efficacious for Sri Lanka. It was not possible for Sri Lanka to adopt the isolation strategy because of its dependence on the international society in security, political and economic matters. Its aspirations to play a prominent role in the movement for world peace, decolonization and anti-imperialism, group formation of small and developing states and strengthening the United Nations and the NAM also foreclosed its option for isolationism.

The domestic and international situation also dispelled the option of alignment. The nationalist resurgence in Asia as well as its own national aspiration would not have permitted it to join the American bloc with which the post-independent leadership had ideological affinity. Furthermore, such an alliance would have proved counter-productive as it would have provoked the Soviet Union into exploiting the socio-cultural and political cleavages within Sri Lanka to undermine the alliance. The communists within the island would have been too willing, if not to attempt the capture of political power, to attack the regime in Sri Lanka for aligning with the West. They would have found sympathetic supporters among the Sinhalese-Buddhist lay and bhikkhus who would have become alienated from the regime because of its preference for alignment with the West. Finally, the alliance option would have prevented Sri Lanka from pursuing the objectives of promotion of world peace, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-racism, making common cause with other developing and small states most of whom had rejected the alliance option and playing a constructive role within the United Nations system. In short, alignment would have isolated Sri Lanka from the emerging spirit of Afro-Asianism, compromised its independence and national pride and endangered its territorial integrity and political stability. Thus, Sri Lanka's domestic and international foreign policy determinants and its goals in international politics, predecided its foreign policy strategy to be nonaligned.¹⁰⁷

Sri Lanka's nonalignment strategy, however, was not clearly spelt out at the time of attainment of independence as had been the case with India. Unlike India, Sri Lanka's political leadership did not have the exposure to international relations prior to independence nor had they deliberated on the foreign policy of independent Sri Lanka. Consequently, Sri Lanka took some years to clearly spell out the perception and content of its nonaligned foreign policy orientation. Although the credit for this goes to S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who in 1956 clearly spelt out the content and connotation of Sri Lanka's nonalignment, his three predecessors namely D.S. Senanayake, Dudley Senanayake, and Sir John Kotelawala had presented the notion of nonalignment to Sri Lanka's foreign policy, though they were quite ambiguous about its conception and content.

D.S. Senanayake described his foreign policy as guided by the conception of 'middle path' but he never clearly defined what he meant by it. He allowed the western powers such as the United States, Britain and France to use refueling and base facilities in Sri Lanka for their operations against communist movements in Southeast Asia. Dudley Senanayake described his foreign policy to be guided by nonalignment but he too continued, of course with some moderation, to pursue the pro-west and anti-communist bias followed by his father. Sir John Kotelawala more emphatically averred that Sri Lanka was guided by nonalignment in the conduct of its international relations, but at the same time he was more avowedly anti-communist. On one occasion he was seriously considering Sri Lanka's membership in the South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), an idea which of course he refrained from executing because of opposition from his political opponents as well as well-wishers. Moreover, during the rule of these three leaders, Sri Lanka did not exchange diplomatic representatives with the Soviet Union and China, though it awarded the latter recognition. Thus, the early Sri Lanka leadership did not find any contradiction between Sri Lanka's nonalignment and its pro-west bias and its lack of diplomatic relations with the communist states. This contradictory and ambiguous trends in Sri Lanka's foreign policy only demonstrate the lack of conceptual clarity of international relations and also perceptual conflicts over Sri Lanka's international image of the early leadership.¹⁰⁸

These anomalies were, however, set right by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike who clarified Sri Lanka's nonalignment as (i) non-membership in power blocs; (ii) friendship with both the blocs; (iii) committed to preserve decency in dealings between nations; (iv) committed to the cause of justice; and (v) freedom for independent stand on international issues, and concerns as well as right to evaluate the actions of other states. Thus S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike clearly clarified what nonalignment meant to Sri Lanka and also that it was not a principle mechanically guiding the island's foreign policy but a dynamic strategy for actualizing the foreign policy goals of Sri Lanka.¹⁰⁹ The operationalisation of the strategy meant,

- (i) Maximization of the scope of manoeuvrability in international politics through dexterous exploitation of the mutual differences and competition among big and middle powers including regional actors.
- (ii) Neutralization and diffusion of threat sources through various balancing tactics, like diversification of dependence in all its manifestations.
- (iii) Escalation of the state's status in international arena through conscious image-building roles for acquiring alternate sources of support material as well as emotional.¹¹⁰

The operation of the nonaligned strategy to actualize the foreign policy objectives depended to a considerable extent on the decision-makers of foreign policy. The subsequent chapter deals with a descriptive analysis of the foreign policy making organization of Sri Lanka and processes therein.

NOTES

1. S. D. Muni, *Foreign Policy of Nepal*, (Delhi: National, 1973), p. 33.
2. George Liska, *Alliances and the Third World*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 27.
3. This has been developed in detail in Muni, no. 1, p. 34.
4. For example, see James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, (New York: Francis Pinter, 1980) and *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, (New York: Free Press, 1968).
5. See Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 3.
6. See Muni, no. 1, p. 35.
7. Maldives comprises of many islands but only a few islands are habitable. See Urmila Phadnis, "Political dynamics of Island States : A Comparative Study of Sri Lanka and Maldives," *IDSJ Journal*, Vol. 12, no. 3, 1980, pp. 305-322.
8. See M. D. Raghavan, *India in Ceylonese History, Society and Culture*, (New Delhi, Asia Publishing House, 1969, revised edition).
9. K. Vikram Simha Rao, "Militarization of Sri Lanka : A Tabular Study," *Strategic Analysis*, (March, 1987), pp.1447-1459.
10. The first three Prime Minister of Sri Lanka perceived this fear. For detail see S.U. Kodikara, *Indo-Ceylon Relations Since Independence*, (Colombo: The Ceylon Institute of World Affairs, 1965); Urmila Phadnis, India : A Critical Variable in Ceylon Politics," *Niti*, July-September, 1971; and D.M. Prasad, *Ceylon's Foreign Policy Under the Bandaranaiques*, (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1973) Chapter IV.

11. Phadnis, *ibid.*, p. 3.
12. For this aspect see Arooran K. Nambi, *Tamil Renaissance and Dravidian Nationalism*, (Colombo: Lake House, 1980).
13. Refer Kodikara, no. 10 and his recent book *Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka*, (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1982), pp. 21-26.
14. See Vijaya Samaraweera, "The Evolution of a Pluralist Society" in K.M. De Silva, ed., *Sri Lanka : A Survey*, (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977), pp. 86-87.
15. See S. D. Muni, *Pangs of Proximity : India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis*, (New Delhi: Sage, 1993), p. 41.
16. Cited *ibid.*, pp. 41-42.
17. W. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon : Dilemma of a New Nation*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 377 and Muni, no. 15, pp. 31-46.
18. Muni, no. 15, p.13.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-89.
20. K. M. De Silva, *A History of Sri Lanka*, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 210-219.
21. Vijaya Samaraveera, "Foreign Policy" in De Silva, no. 14, p. 334.
22. This point has been dealt by Kodikara, no. 13, p. 25.
23. This has been dealt by most books dealing with the history of Sri Lanka. For a concise treatment of the issue see K. M. De Silva, "Historical Survey" in De Silva, no. 14, pp. 63-76.
24. See Elsie K. Cook, *Ceylon – Its Geography, Its Resources and Its People*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951).
25. Gerald Peiris, "The Physical Environment" in De Silva, no. 14, pp.16-18.

26. Ibid.
27. N. Balakrishnan and H. M. Gunasekara, "A Review of Demographic Trends" in De Silva, no. 14, pp. 114-122.
28. Ibid.
29. See B. H. Farmer, *Pioneer Peasant Colonization in the Dry Zone of Ceylon*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957).
30. M.W.J.G. Mendis, *The Planning Implications of the Mahaweli Development Project in Sri Lanka*, (Colombo: Lake House, 1973).
31. Peiris, no. 25, pp. 25-29.
32. See Robert N. Kearney, *Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1972).
33. Robert N. Kearney, "Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, no. 9, 1985, pp. 878-899; Urmila Phadnis, "The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: An Overview," *Lanka Guardian*, Vol. 17, no. 20, February 5, 1985; and S. U. Kodikara, "The Separatist Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka : An Overview," *India Quarterly*, Vol. 37, no. 2, 1981, pp. 194-210.
34. Kitsiri Malatgoda, *Buddhism in Sinhalese Society – 1750-1900 : A Study of Religious Revival and Change*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
35. Samaraweera, no. 14, pp. 86-87. For a detailed account see Urmila Phadnis, *Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka*, (New Delhi: Manohar Books, 1976).
36. Phadnis, *ibid.*, pp. 277-298.
37. Ibid.
38. N. Shanmuganathan, "History and Ideology in Sri Lanka," *Lanka Guardian*, Vol. 17, no. 15, December 1, 1984.

39. Robert N. Kearney, "Territorial Elements of Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 60, no. 4, 1988.
40. De Silva, no. 20, pp. 426-429.
41. See A. J. Wilson, *Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-73*, (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 163-168.
42. Kearney, no. 33, Phadnis, no. 33; and Kodikara, no. 33.
43. A Sivarajah, "Indo-Sri Lanka Relations and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis : The Tamil Nadu Factor" in S. U. Kodikara, ed., *South Asian Strategic Issues : Sri Lankan Perspectives*, (New Delhi: Sage, 1990), pp. 135-159.
44. Ibid.; also see Partha S. Ghosh, *Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia*, (New Delhi: Manohar Books, 1990), pp. 154-213.
45. For in depth analysis of this problem see Kodikara, no. 9, and Lalit Kumar, *India – Sri Lanka : Sirimavo-Shastri Pact*, (New Delhi: Chetana Publications, 1977).
46. Kumar, *ibid.*
47. James Jupp, *Sri Lanka : Third World Democracy*, (London: Frank Cass, 1978), pp. 30-33.
48. Ibid., pp. 151-157.
49. Ibid., p. 34.
50. Ibid., pp. 38-43.
51. For good account of the political economy of Sri Lanka refer Pradeep Bhargava, *Political Economy of Sri Lanka*, (New Delhi: Navrang, 1987) and Satchi Ponnambalam, *Dependent Capitalism in Crisis : The Sri Lankan Economy 1948-80*, (London: Zed Press, 1981).
52. Neil De Votta "Sri Lanka's Structural Adjustment Program and Its Impact on Indo-Lanka Relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 38, no. 5, 1998, p. 458.
53. K. M. De Silva, no. 20, pp. 273-74.
54. For a graphic account see Ibid., pp. 286-88.

55. See Bhargava, no. 51, pp. 36-41.
56. Ibid., pp. 37-38.
57. De Silva, no. 20, pp. 402-416.
58. Bhargava, no. 51, p. 40.
59. Ibid., p. 42.
60. Ibid., p. 50.
61. www.theodara.com/wfbcurrent/Sri Lanka/People.
62. D.D. De Souza, "Education : An Era of Reform" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 13, no. 12, 1973, pp. 1169-70.
63. Bhargava, no. 51, p. 173.
64. H. M. Gunasekara, "Foreign Trade of Sri Lanka" in De Silva, no. 14, pp. 176-177.
65. Urmila Phadnis, *Sri Lanka : Issues and Prospects in the 1980*, (unpublished manuscript, 1983), pp. 68-69. Also see De Votta, no. 52, p. 461.
66. Ibid.
67. For a brief elucidation of the Mahaweli Project and the Greater Colombo Economic Commission, see N. Balakrishnan, "Economic Policies and Trends in Sri Lanka," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 20, no.9, 1980, pp. 894-897.
68. For an elaborate discussion see K. M. De Silva, "Politics and Political System" in K.M. De Silva, ed., *Sri Lanka : Problems of Governance*, (New Delhi: Konark, 1993), pp. 9-11.
69. Ibid., pp. 11-13.
70. Ibid.
71. Phadnis, no. 35.
72. See Satchi Ponnambalam, no. 51, pp. 31-43.

73. De Silva, no. 68.
74. See Gananath Obeyesekere, "Some Comments in the Social Background of the April 1971 Insurgency in Sri Lanka," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 33, no. 3, 1974, pp. 367-84; and Fred Halliday, "The Ceylonese Insurrection" in Robin Blackburn, ed., *Explosion in the Subcontinent*, (London: Penguin, 1975), pp. 152-183. For recent politics of the JVP see Bryan Pfaffenberger, "Sri Lanka in 1987 : Indian Intervention and Resurgence of the JVP," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, no. 2, 1988, pp. 137-147; and S. U. Kodikara, "The Continuing Crisis in Sri Lanka : The JVP, the Indian Troops and Tamil Politics," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 29, no. 7, 1989, pp. 716-724.
75. See De Silva, no. 68, pp. 67-78.
76. See Satchi Ponnambalam, *Sri Lanka : The National Question and the Tamil Liberation Struggle*, (London: Zed Books 1983).
77. See Satchi Ponnambalam, no. 51, pp. 142-170; and Girijesh Pant, "New Economic Policy of Sri Lanka : Conflicts and Contradictions" in Urmila Phadnis, et.al., eds., *Domestic Conflicts in South Asia II : Economic and Ethnic Dimensions*, (New Delhi: South Asia Books, 1986).
78. See Ponnambalam, no. 76.
79. For detailed discussion on electoral politics, party system and political regimes refer, Jupp, no. 47, Wilson, no. 41, and Wriggins, no. 17.
80. Ibid., and also refer Urmila Phadnis, "Politics of Coalition Governments in Sri Lanka" in K.P. Karunakaran, ed., *Coalition Government in India : Problems and Prospects*, (Dehradun: Institute of Advanced Studies, 1975), pp. 65-81.
81. For a good discussion of the international normative structure see Kjell Goldman, "The International Power Structure : Traditional Theory and New Reality" in Kjell Goldman, et.al., eds., *Power Capabilities and Interdependence : Problems in the Study of International Influence*, (London: Sage, 1979), pp. 7-36. Also refer Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

82. For details see D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins*, (New York: Doubleday, 1961); L.J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Chatto and Windus, 1967); Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics : 1945-2000* (New Delhi: Pearson Education, 2005); and A. Lukas, *A History of the Cold War* (New York: Doubleday, 1961).
83. Refer, H.S.S. Nissanka, *Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy : A Study in Non-alignment*, (New Delhi: Vikas, 1984), pp. 11-12.
84. See G.H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-alignment*, (London: Faber, 1966).
85. Nissanka, no. 83, pp. 49-82.
86. Ibid.
87. Cited by Lucy M. Jacob, *Sri Lanka : From Dominion to Republic*, (Delhi: National, 1973), p. 22.
88. See Kodikara, no. 10.
89. See Muni, no. 15, pp. 56-57; also see P.V. Rao, "Foreign Involvement in Sri Lanka," *The Round Table*, No. 309, 1989, pp. 88-100.
90. See J. A. Scholte, *Globalization : A Critical Introduction*, (London: Macmillan, 2005).
91. Nissanka, no. 83, pp. 49-82.
92. Most Sri Lankan analysts have hyper sensitively excepted such arguments in their analysis to support their contention that there is an opinion in India's foreign policy making which wants India to subordinate Sri Lanka's independence to India's national security. For example see Kodikara, no. 13, pp. 22-25.
93. Cited in Muni, no. 15, pp. 32-37.
94. Ibid.
95. This fear has been nurtured by Sri Lankan leadership ever since that island attained independence. See Phadnis, no. 10, and Sivarajah, no. 43.

96. Ibid., Sivarajah.
97. See election manifestos of various political parties of Sri Lanka.
98. *Sri Lanka Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 12, (7-12-1977) Cols. 2503-2507.
99. *The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka*, Article 27(15), p. 18.
100. This too is espoused in the election manifestos of all political parties.
101. See *The Foreign Policy of Ceylon : Extracts from Statements of the Late Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike*, (Colombo: Govt. Press, 1961), pp. 113-114.
102. This is articulated by all political parties.
103. See Jacob, no. 87, p. 31.
104. Cited in Prasad, no. 10, p. 148.
105. Muni, no. 1, p. 54.
106. For detailed discussion of foreign policy strategies refer, K.J. Holsti, *International Politics : A Framework for Analysis*, (Englewoodcliff: Prentice Hall, 1988).
107. See Urmila Phadnis and Sivananda Patnaik, "Non-alignment as a Foreign Policy Strategy : A Case Study of Sri Lanka," *International Studies*, Vol. 20, nos. 1-2, 1981; and also see Urmila Phadnis, "Ceylon : Domestic Compulsions" in K.P. Karunakaran, ed., *Outside the Contest*, (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1963).
108. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue see Nissanka, no. 83, pp. 49-82.
109. Ibid.
110. Adapted with modification from S. D. Muni, "The Dynamics of Foreign Policy" in S.D. Muni, ed., *Nepal : An Assertive Monarchy*, (New Delhi: Chetna Publications, 1977), p. 129.

