

CHAPTER V

SOTOREOLOGICAL VIEWS

(Mokṣa)

This chapter embodies comprehensive and critical analysis of Ānandabodha's sotoreological views i.e. nature of mokṣa (emancipation) and means of mokṣa expounded in his works, viz. Pramānamālā and Nyāyamakaranda.

In the Nyāyamakaranda apart from the Advaita Vedānta theory Ānandabodha sets forth other seven theories as his Pūrvapakṣa. These are propounded by the heterodox and orthodox philosophical schools of the Jaina, Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Prābhākara of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. Ānandabodha repudiates all these aforementioned theories adducing counter arguments and finally proves logical validity of the Advaita view espoused by the Prasthānatraya and the Advaitic texts of his predecessors. However, no direct reference to this above said schools has been given by Ānandabodha but Ġitsukhācārya in his commentary on Nyāyamakaranda identifies most of them. In the other works of Ānandabodha no such refutation of the antagonistic theories on the nature of final beatitude has been made.

5.1 THE HETERODOX SCHOOLS :

(A) The Jaina Theory

According to the heterodox Jaina school mokṣa is the continuous rising up of the self being devoid of all limiting adjuncts, like the body, the senses and their activities (pratiṇa nikhilopādheḥ kṣetrajñasya satatordhvagati.

NM. p.270).

In the Tattvārthasūtra¹ Umāsvati gives the account of mokṣa viz. when the actions (karma) eight in number are destroyed, pure knowledge (kevalajñāna) appears and the Jiva becomes pure (suddha), conscious (buddha), free from all defects (nirāmaya), omniscient (sarvajña), all perceiving (sarvadarsin) endowed with pure knowledge (kevalin) and self-restraint (jina). Thus stage of mokṣa is called jīvanmukti (emancipation in embodied state). The liberated (kevalin) at this stage acquires four infinities - infinite knowledge (ananta jñāna), infinite perception (ananta darsana), infinite power (ananta virya), and infinite bliss (ananta sukha). After this stage, the seeker of mokṣa gets rid of the remaining four kinds of actions (karmas viz. āyusya (vital power), nāma gotra (race) and antarāya (obstacle) and he gets completely liberated. When all these actions are destroyed the soul (Ātman) goes upwards.

1. Tadanantaramūrdhvam gachatyālokāntāt. Tattvārthasūtra, X.1 and 2. Sarva-Darśana Saṅgraha of Mādhavāchārya, p.77.

In the liberated state, the body, senses and mind remain absent since there does not remain any adjunct (upadhi) in the form of actions (karma). Hence the liberated soul enjoys an eternal un-obstructed and transcendental bliss. Madhavācārya explains² the Jaina view by saying that at the time of the attainment of mokṣa all future actions get dissolved since all the causes of bondage like false perception etc., are destroyed and all past actions get abolished in the presence of the causes of nirjara, there arises the absolute release from all actions and the soul rises upward not returning to his mortal world afterwards. So mokṣa is said to be eternal upward movement. On liberation the soul goes upward, because of the momentum due to its previous activity, the non-existence of the relation to the elements which kept it down, breaking of the bondage, and its natural tendency to go upwards.

Ānandabodha very briefly sets aside the Jaina view. The constant upward going of Jīva is impossible since the Jīva is, in reality, all-pervasive (vibhu) and omnipresent. Because of the eternal and all-pervasive nature of Brahman the characterisation of the upward going or movement does not hold good. This theory simply causes labour or striving (āyāsa) and hence does not stand to reason, says Ānandabodha (NM. p.281).

2. Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha of Mādhavācārya, p.77.

(B) The Mādhyamika Theory

Ānandabodha criticises the theory of mokṣa postulated by the Mādhyamika, a Buddhist heterodox idealistic school propounded by Nāgarjuna (200 A.D.) and his followers like Candrakīrti and others. This school propogates mokṣa (emancipation) as the annihilation of uninterrupted stream of cognitions (vijñāna) defiled by the defects like the incessant birth and afflictions like passion, malice and delusion (Uttarādhārabhāvena nirantarautpadakleśādidōṣadusitabodha santativicchedalakṣṇa mokṣa NM. p.270)

Quoting from the Buddhist text Prasannapādavyākhyā on Mādhyamikasāstram of Nāgarjuna, Ānandabodha explains that according to Mādhyamika, mokṣa is the absolute annihilation of the stream of cognitions like the extinction of a lamp (pradīpa).

In the Mādhyamika literature such as Madhyamikasāstra, also called Mūlamādhyamikakarikā, and the commentary thereon called Prasannapādavyākhyā mokṣa³ is termed nirvāṇa. It consists in the annihilation of all cognitions of the flow of the stream of kleśa, karma, janma etc. As long as the

3. Tatra niravasesasyāvidyārāgādikasya klesagaṇasya prahānātsopadhiseṣam nirbāṇamiṣyate. prasannapāda Commentary on MK, p.519.

stream of viññānas continues, nirvāṇa is unattainable, since it results after the cessation of all cognitions (NM. p.270).

Ānandabodha refutes this view by arguing that the annihilation of the stream of cognitions as mokṣa cannot be the highest goal of human beings. If it is supposed to be the highest goal (paramapurusaṛtha) then it is with reference to whom? asks Ānandabodha. Only two alternatives are possible. Either it may be in case of men who have the stream of cognitions or in case of the stream of cognitions themselves (santāninām pūruṣaṛtha kimvā Santānasya). The first alternative is unsound since those who have the stream of cognitions (bodhasantati) are, according to Mādhyamika school, momentary selves continuously perishing and arising, and hence there cannot be any relation between these fleeting selves and nirvana (na tāvat santāninam, teṣāṃ svarasaparini-rvānena mokṣaphala sambandhābhavād). Neither second alternative is correct, for the stream of cognitions (viññānasantati or bodhasantati), according to this school, is of the nature of self. Thus, the annihilation of the stream of cognitions will amount to the destruction of the dearest self (Ātman). And one's own destruction or self-destruction cannot be one's highest goal. It is not proper to accept the stream of cognitions other than the persons,

having the stream of cognition to whom bandha and mokṣa can be attributed. Secondly, in that case there does not remain any enjoyer of the fruit i.e. mokṣa. Without him there cannot be any reward i.e. mokṣa at all, says Ānandabodha (NM. pp.271-274).

(C) The Yogācāra Theory

The Yogācāra school of Buddhism propounded by Āśvaghōṣa and his followers maintain that mokṣa or nirvāṇa is the origination of the stream of pure cognitions devoid of the obstacles in the form of objects and acquired by the intensity of concentration (NM. p.270). The intrinsic viññāna which is said as the absolute reality becomes impure by the dispositions of actions (anādikarmavāśanā) and appears in the form of external objects that have no real existence; when the anādikarmavāśanās cease by the intensity of concentration (bhāvanāprakarṣa), the pure cognition (visudha viññāna) arises and the appearances of externality (bāhyarūpa) disappear. This origination of pure cognition, according to the Yogācāra system, is mokṣa otherwise called nirvāṇa. The Yogacara account of mokṣa is unacceptable according to Anandabodha. For viññāna (consciousness) according to this school, is not eternal since the cognitions or

consciousness (pūrvapara vijñānas) arise and perish, the transitoriness of the vijñanas is proved. Hence it cannot be the highest goal of human beings. Secondly, the stream of pure consciousness cannot be itself the human goal (puruṣārtha) as it amounts to the denial of puruṣārtha for a man who endeavours to achieve it. If the stream of cognitions (cittasantati) would be said to be puruṣārtha (highest goal) and also existent at the time of mokṣa then the existence of miseries (duḥkha) is to be accepted in the state of mokṣa since misery originates because of the dispositions of attachment (rāgādivāsanā) caused by the impressions of the transmigratory world (saṁsāravāsanā). As long as the transmigratory impression, (saṁsāravāsanā) does not cease in entirety there cannot be absolute annihilation of the rāgādivāsanā (dispositions of attachment) etc. As a result of the presence of saṁsāravāsanā, rāgādivāsanā will continue and it will further lead to the transmigratory world (saṁsāra), and consequently, mokṣa would be impossible, contends Ānandabodha (NM. p.274).

5.2 Orthodox schools

A) The Sāṁkhya Theory

The classical sāṁkhya a system expounds the theory of mokṣa as the existence of puruṣa in its Pure form after the

discrimination. NM. p.270. According to this system, mokṣa is only phenomenal, since bondage does not belong to puruṣa. Bondage and release refer to the conjunction and the disjunction of puruṣa and Prakṛti resulting from non-discrimination and discrimination (viveka). Prakṛti does not bind the puruṣa but itself in various ways (SK. 62). Puruṣa is entirely free from the oppositions of merit and demerit. While bondage is the activity of Prakṛti towards one not possessing discrimination, mokṣa is its inactivity towards one possessing discrimination (SK.61) on release the puruṣa unmoved and self-collected as a spectator contemplates prakṛti. But viparyaya is said to be dharma or buddhi attribute of intellect, the first evolute of Prakṛti (Primordial nature) which has two forms, viz., sāttvika and tāmasika; the former consists of dharma, jñāna, vairāgya and aiśvarya, the latter comprises of adharma, ajñāna or viparyaya, rāga, and anaiśvarya.

The sāṅkhya view is not tenable asserts Ānandabodha for the following reasons:-

This view of the Sāṅkhya is not logical. For mokṣa should be the cessation of the bondage of a person who is bound by viparyaya etc. A person who has no bondage and

is totally free cannot attain mokṣa for other puruṣa who is in bondage. If it would happen it would lead to contradiction which is found in the Sāṅkhya theory of mokṣa. The sāṅkhya holds viparyaya or ajñāna as the cause of bondage which is a dharma of buddhi, not dharma of Puruṣa (NM. p.282).

The existence of puruṣa in its pure nature is bereft of the experience of the supreme bliss (Paramānandānubhūti). There cannot be manifestation of the supreme bliss in the state of mokṣa since puruṣa has been characterised as witness indifferent and neutral. The final beatitude being devoid of the experience of bliss cannot be the highest goal of human beings (NM. p.282).

According to the Sāṅkhya, viparyaya (false knowledge or non-discrimination between Purusa and Prakṛti) is the cause of bondage. Īsvarkaṛṣṇa in his Sāṅkhyakārikā quoted by Anandabodha, contends that Viparyayat iṣyate bandhaḥ (one undergoes bandha because of viparyaya). Viparyaya is said be dharma of buddhi (attributes of intellect), the first evolute of Prakṛti (Primordial nature) which has two forms- Sāttvika and tāmsika, the former consists of dharma, jñāna, vairagya and aiśvarya, the latter comprises of adharma, ajñāna or viparyaya, rāga, and anaiśvarya (NM. pp.282-283).

It is illogical, for mokṣa should be the cessation of the bondage of a person who is bound by avidyā etc. A person who has no bondage is totally free cannot get mokṣa for other puruṣa who is in bondage. If it would happen, it will lead to contradiction which is found in the Sāṅkhya account of mokṣa. The Sāṅkhya holds Viparyaya, or ajñāna, cause of bondage, which is a dharma of buddhi, since it is pure by nature. Hence puruṣa cannot have bandha and mokṣa by viparyaya, on the contrary, buddhi should have bandha and mokṣa. To advocate puruṣa's bandha because of viparyaya considering it as dharma of buddhi is contradictory, since it amounts to imprisonment of a saint corresponding to puruṣa for the fault of a thief corresponding to buddhi and release of a thief i.e. buddhi for the merit of a saint i.e. puruṣa.

The Sāṅkhya system upholds that bandha and mokṣa are attributed to puruṣa figuratively (upacārāt) but these two in reality belong to prakṛti. The puruṣa does not undergo bondage and mokṣa but it is Prakṛti which is bound and gets liberated.

Ānandabodha quotes the Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa who advocates aupacārika bandha and mokṣa of puruṣa, and

rejects this view of the Sāṅkhya by arguing that false attribution of bandha and mokṣa is illogical since there is no occasioning reason (nimittakāraṇa) for this upacāra. The relation between puruṣa and Prakṛti called svasvānibhāva (puruṣa being the lord of Prakṛti) cannot be the cause (nimitta) of this false attribution since puruṣa has been characterised by the Sāṅkhya indifferent (udāsina). No such example is available wherein a thoroughly indifferent person becomes the lord, (svāmi), on the otherhand, it is found that kings who are the lords of their servants are not udāsina but quite active and interested in controlling their subordinates. The Puruṣa in the Samkhya being indifferent cannot be the lord of Prakṛti who renders her services as a servant for the experience of joy and sorrow of puruṣa and causes to act for puruṣa in mokṣa. And in case of the relation of master and servant (svasvāmibhāva), the servants become helpful, but according to the Sāṅkhya system buddhi cannot render any help to puruṣa who is intrinsically pure (nirmala) by nature. (NM. p.289).

Moreover, the Sāṅkhya system compares Prakṛti with a dancer (nartakī). This comparison of Prakṛti with nartakī is not logical, says Ānandabodha. For a dancer exhibits her

performances on the stage in dramatic representations and makes her performance attractive by display of love and other passions and in this way creates pleasure in the minds of spectators. But buddhi i.e. Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya does not do any such kind of things for puruṣa since the latter does not need any such thing (anupakāryatvāt) (NM. p.284). A dancer also cannot give happiness to a person who does not take interest to see her performance (adīrṅkṣu). On the other hand those who are in need of happiness look at dancer and do all possible efforts for happiness, and hence are not udāsina (indifferent) like the Puruṣa of the Samkhya system.

Further, Prakṛti is not fit (yogyā) to be seen by Puruṣa because if seen by the latter then he must see it perennially. (NM. p.285). It cannot be argued that only the puruṣa in the saṁsāra (migratory state) sees the Prakṛti while the liberated ones do not, since the same blue object cannot be said to be fit to be seen by some persons and unfit for being seen by others. Moreover, without accepting some sort of difference in the puruṣa the difference in their fitness (yogyatā) cannot be granted. Above all yogyatā (fitness) is the power of action. In case of the Sāṅkhya puruṣa who is intrinsically pure is incapable of any

addition (anādyatisya), even the action of observing something is impossible in his case (NM. p.286).

Thus, Prakṛti cannot be the object and fit for observation of the Puruṣa. Hence Prakṛti cannot be compared with the nartakī who performs on the stage and is perceived by spectators. It is therefore, reasonable to say that Prakṛti is in no way helpful (upakāriṇī) to puruṣa and the relation of a master and a servant cannot exist between the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa. (NM. p.286).

Ānandabodha further asks if there would be any relation existing between Prakṛti and puruṣa then whether it is different from these two i.e. Puruṣa and Prakṛti, or identical with them? It cannot be said to be different from them since the Sāṅkhya accepts only two basic eternal principles, Prakṛti and Puruṣa and this relation would be a third principle. If the relation between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is said to be identical, it would exist as long as both the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa would exist and as a result, mokṣa would be impossible. The Sāṅkhya view, viz., Prakṛti acts for the enjoyment (upabhoga) and emancipation (apavarga) of the Puruṣa is absurd since there are only two positions possible; either the Prakṛti would act only once, supply the objects of sense organs like sound and the like to the puruṣa and afterwards

it would be inactive. If it goes on acting, there would be no end for her activity. In both the cases mokṣa cannot take place. Hence it cannot be said that the activity of the Prakṛti has for its purpose only the enjoyment as well as mokṣa of puruṣa.

The Sāṅkhya further says that as grass and water consumed by the cow become transformed into milk and nourish the calf and as these cease to function after the nourishment of the calf so does the Prakṛti function for the mokṣa of the Puruṣa (SK 57; NM. p.287). Ānandabodha like Bādarayāṇa counteracts this view by saying that Prakṛti being insentient (jaḍa) cannot make any distinction between a liberated person and others; nor can she supply objects for the enjoyment to the Puruṣa or secure mokṣa for the Puruṣa (NM. pp.287-288).

(B) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theory

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school mokṣa consists in the existence of the individual self (Ātman) in its essential nature after the cessation of all special qualities⁴

4. Navānām ātmaguṇānām buddhisukhaduhkṣecchādveṣapraya-
tnadharmā dharnasaṁskārāṇām nirmūlocchedo' Pavargah .
NM. p.508; VS. V.2.18.

like consciousness (buddhi), sukha (pleasure) etc. (NM. p.270). Gautama (400 A.D.) expounds the nature of mokṣa in his sūtra tadatyanta vimokṣaḥ apavargaḥ (NS. 1.1.22), (mokṣa is absolute cessation of misery). While commenting on the sūtra Vātsyayāna (600 A.D.) defines mokṣa as the condition of immortality, free from fear and imperishable. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa referring to the above said sūtra in his Nyāyamañjarī opines that Pronous 'tat' (that) in the sūtra denotes pain as well as all the nine special qualities of the soul and the adverb atyanta (absolute) conveys the sense of absolute cessation of these qualities. In the statement of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa one can, see the synthesis of the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika view about the nature of mokṣa.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is not reasonable, asserts Anandabodha, for in the state of mokṣa, the absolute annihilation of all the special qualities like buddhi (consciousness) etc. is advocated by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school. Because of the annihilation of all the qualities of the Ātman, sukha (delight), which is a quality of the Ātman also gets destroyed. This is actually not the real highest goal since every person strives for the attainment highest sukha (joy) only in the attainment of mokṣa. (NM. pp.275-276).

Secondly, since the fruit of mokṣa is not the experience of supreme bliss and one experiences misery in its achievement Nyāya-vaiśeṣika concept of mokṣa cannot be the object of endeavour of human beings. An intelligent person, says Ānandabodha, should not endeavour to achieve such a goal which ends with unhappiness. No person acts for the cessation of misery but for the experience of bliss, for example, the action for the removal of the pain with regard to the Piercing of thorn is for the experience of the delight of relief from pain (NM. p.276).

Thirdly, the cessation of misery cannot be cognised because of the annihilation of buddhi, attribute of Ātman. Hence the state of mokṣa not being cognised is identical with unconscious state (murcchāvasthā) (NM. p.277).

It is unsound to hold the view that duḥkabhāva (absence of misery), not being cognised, can be mokṣa like the duḥkabhāva at the time of dreamless sleep (susupti), for there is no means of knowledge (pramāṇa) to cognise the absence of cognition in the time of dreamless sleep. The absence of anything is cognised by cognition, but the absence of cognition cannot be cognised by cognition itself. If the absence of cognition (samvedanābhāva) is said to be cognised by cognition, then it cannot be said that there is the absence of all cognitions. Further, the connection

or relation of the Proban (liṅga) with the absence of all cognitions cannot be cognised. Therefore in the time of dreamless sleep the absence of all cognitions cannot be determined by inference (anumāna). Moreover, the recollection (smṛati) in the form of 'I had a sound sleep' (sukhamaham asvāpsam) determines the cognition of happiness in the dreamless state (NM. p.277-278).

Thus, the Nyāya concept of mokṣa viz. absence of the experience of delight (ānanda) is like the annihilation of one's own self. Hence Nyāya-vaīśeṣika account of mokṣa does not stand to reason.

(C) The Vaiṣṇava Theory

Ānandabodha sets forth the Vaiṣṇava theory of mokṣa. According to this theory, mokṣa is the acquisition of an imperishable body (akṣayaśarīralābha) (NM. p.271).

Ānandabodha sets aside this view by arguing that the ultimate goal of human being has been characterised as a non-eternal state (anitya avasthā). The acquisition of imperishable body (akṣaya śarīra) is non-eternal and would be destroyed for being an effect (kārya) as that of Physical bodies of human beings. And, no alternative means can be adopted to save the unavoidable destruction of the physical

body. Hence this kind of mokṣa cannot be the highest goal of life as it is perishable by nature (NM. p.281).

(D) The Prābhākara Theory

According to the Prābhākara school, mokṣa consists in the disappearance of all merit and demerit resulting from actions. It is on account of merit and demerit accruing to the soul, it is born in the physical body; consequently when all merit and demerit disappear, there remains nothing that could lead the soul to be born again in a body; and when the soul ceases to have connection with bodies, and hence also with the sense-organs, etc. all its metempsychic troubles end and it is free and liberated.⁵ As to how all this comes about, the following explanation has been provided; First of all, the man becomes disgusted with the troubles that he has had to undergo during his life on the earth; finding the pleasures of the world also to be invariably accompanied by some sort of pain, he comes to lose all interest in and longing for, pleasures also; he thereupon

5. Ātyantikastu dehocchedo niḥsesadharmādharma Parikṣayani-bandhano mokṣaḥ. Tayorekāntocchede pyapagatadehendriyasambandhaḥ Samutkhātanikhilasāṁsārikaduḥkhabandhano mukta ityucyate. PP.156.

turns his attention towards mokṣa; he ceases to perform such acts which are prohibited and which lead to trouble and also those that are prescribed only as leading to some sort of happiness here or hereafter, he attenuates all previously acquired merit and demerit by undergoing the experiences resulting from them; he destroys the sole receptacle or abode of his experiences by the knowledge of the soul, as aided by such qualities as contentment, self-control and so forth, all of which are laid down in the scriptures as tending to put a stop to the further return of the soul into this mortal world; it is only when all this has come to an end the soul becomes liberated.

Ānandabodha sets aside this view by saying that absolute destruction of the physical body is not possible unless avidyā completely ceases with its effects. The complete destruction of body cannot take place after the absolute annihilation of merit and demerit (dharmā - adharma) which is impossible without the realisation of non-dual Ātman. Unless there is complete destruction of the storage of the actions (karmāṅsaya) the cycle of birth and death would not come to an end since the karmas will be effective in the future in the relevant time. The cessation of the cycle of birth and death is impossible because while a person is

enjoying the fruit of the past karmas the other actions will be performed by him and thus it has no end i.e. reduct ad absurdum. Moreover, even if a person desirous of mokṣa (mumuksu) will not perform the kāmyakarmas (obligatory works) still these actions are unavoidable and when these actions will be destroyed by the enjoyment of their fruits other actions would rise up at that time. As a result, the process will continue infinitely. Thus involves the fault of infinite regress (anavasthā) (NM. p.307).

Ānandabodha's Theory

Ānandabodha in his two works, viz., Pramāṇamālā and Nyā-yamakaranda (pp.288-289), after making a thorough criticism and refutation of the opponents' views as discussed above, denies the essential nature of mokṣa, the Supreme ideal of life (Paramapurūṣartha). Like Sankara⁶ and his successors⁷ he puts forth the view that mokṣa (emancipation) is the manifestation of eternal, supreme, unsurpassed noumenon bliss and the elimination of all pains along with complete cessation of effects of Avidya⁸.

-
6. Brahmabhāvasca mokṣaḥ, BSSB I.1.4; Phalam ca mokṣovidyā nivṛttirvā, Brh. UpSB on I.1.7.
 7. Br.Up.BV I.4.303, II.1.1., II.4.88; Naiskarmyasiddhi, I.7. ekātmyapratipattiryā svātmanubhavasamsrayā sāvidya samṛtebijam tannāso muktirātmaḥ.
 8. Nityaniratisāyasukhābhivyaktirniseṣa duḥkhācchedalaksano mokṣaḥ sa avidyāstamayāḥ, NM. p.288, 289, PM. p.20.

When the Jīvātman realises his real blissful nature, the manifestation of the eternal, pure and Supreme Bliss takes place and three kinds of sorrows, (PM. p.20) viz. ādhyātmika, ādhibhautika, and adhidāivika, completely perish. The Jīvātman (individual soul) becomes the Brahman and remains in his true nature i.e. the nature of transempirical bliss as stated in the Upanisadic texts.⁹ Hence Ānandabodha maintains that mokṣa consists of the realisation of the non-dual Brahman, or the intuition of one supreme intelligence that is beyond all duality and misery.

Quoting from the Brahmasiddhi¹⁰ of Maṇḍana Miśra Ānandabodha aptly points out that mokṣa (emancipation) in the Advaita philosophy is nothing but the absolute removal of nescience or ignorance (avidyanivṛtti) (aśeṣa avidyānivṛtti-rnisreyasamiti) NM. p.289. As one, non-dual, without a second Brahman whose essential nature is self-luminous (svayamprakasa) and unsurpassed supreme bliss (anatisayānanda) appears as dual (sadvitīyamiva), individuated, and contained by worldly

-
9. Brahma Veda Brahmaiva bhavati.Mun.Up.III.2.9; Isa Up.7
BS.V.20; XIII.30; ānando Brahmeti vyajānāt, Tai, Up.3.6.
10. Avidyāstamayo mokṣaḥ sa samsārā udāhṛtā / vidyaiva
cādvayāśāntā tadastamaya ucyate // Brahmasiddhi,
Niyogakāṇḍa, Verse, 106, p.119; NM.p.271, 289; PM.p.20,21.

objects (samsārikadharmakalusitamiva) with the appellation of Jīva (individual soul) through the agency of the beginningless nescience (NM. p.288). Thus, the beginningless nescience or ignorance is itself mundane existence (samsāra) and mokṣa (release) is the extinction of avidyā brought out by the dawn of highest knowledge of the Supreme self called Paramātmān or Brahman (NM. p.289).

Ānandabodha explaining the point more clearly says that the sorrows or misery (duḥkhas) are not natural to the Ātman (PM. p.20), but the effects (kāryas) of avidyā, the material cause of the world-illusion. Unless and until the cause of misery i.e. avidyā is not completely dispelled, there cannot be annihilation of misery and the manifestation of eternal supreme bliss. Hence the cessation of nescience (avidyānivṛtti) is the manifestation of the highest bliss, (tasmāt avidyānivṛttirevanatisayasukhābhivyakti rasesanarthanirvṛttisceti giyate PM. p.20).

Thus, Ānandabodha repudiates the prima facie theories of mokṣa put forward by the heterodox and orthodox schools, Jaina, Buddhist Mādhyamika, Yogācara and Sāṅkhya, Nyayā-Vaiśeṣika, Vaiṣṇava, and the Prābhākara of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.

He establishes the Advaita theory of mokṣa as Postulated by the renowned Advaita Preceptors like Maṇḍana with the help of scriptural statements and valid logical reasoning.

5.3 The Means of Mokṣa

Like Śaṅkara¹¹ and his followers¹² Ānandabodha in his Pramāṇamālā and Nyāyamakaranda upholds the view that the path to mokṣa lies in and through knowledge, (jñāna) i.e. the final immediate intuition of the non-difference of the individual soul from the Supreme soul, Brahman. Since mokṣa has been stated as a state of avidyānivṛtti (cessation of nescience), only way to the attainment of his highest goal (Parama-puraṣārtha) is the Brahman intuition (PM. p.20, NM.pp.288-89) as the avidyā (ignorance) which is the root of all the imperfections and ills of the world can be destroyed only by knowledge (jñāna), not by any other means.

11. Iśvara svarūpāparijñānād bandhastatsvarūpāparijñānāttu mokṣaḥ/ tatha ca srutiḥ - jñātva deve sarvapasapahaniḥ...

(BS ŚB III.2.5; III.4.1, Brh. Up.SB OIv 1417.

12. Bhāmati, III.3.34; III.4.6

Ānandabodha further maintains that, mokṣa, which is the goal to be reached by the ātmavidyā or ātmajñāna is not directly or indirectly connected with karma or kriyā. The fruit of karma (action) is dharma which could be secured by following faithfully the injunctions of the sastras and by avoiding adharmā (demerit) as described in the scriptures. The fruit of karma (action) admits of increase, decrease or excess. The fruit of ātmajñāna is only the removal of obstacles in the way of the acquisition of mokṣa which is always the same, partless and changeless etc. There is no question about excess, refinement, special form of worship in the case of mokṣa which is just the jiva's own nature when the screen put up by avidyā is removed with its effects.

Thus, mokṣa being the cessation of nescience (avidyā-nivṛtti) karma has no role to play directly in its achievement.¹³ Ānandabodha proves this fact by the following example. As in the worldly state the perception of the reality of a piece of shell does not dispel the illusion of silver in its substratum and in dispelling illusions requires

13. avidyāstamayo mokṣa iti tāvat samarthitam/ tena
mokṣabhyupā yatvam vidyayā na tu karmaṇām//

NM. p.336; PM. p.21.

the help of some other thing similarly without the intuition of the ultimate reality nescience or illusory notions existing in the minds of individual souls regarding the nature of the Brahman, the Supreme self, is not destroyed by karmas (actions). Thus, following the worldly occurrences it is proper to say, according to Ānandabodha, Brahman intuition (brahmāvagati) is the cause of the removal of the avidyā which is beginningless (anādi) and indefinable (anirvacanīya). Ānandabodha quotes numerous texts¹⁴ from the Upaniṣada and smṛti texts for proving the validity of his view, i.e. knowledge (jñāna) as the sole means to final beatitude. Ānandabodha further maintains that the Smṛti texts which apparently go against the assertions made by the scriptural statements should somehow be interpreted in accordance with the scriptural texts. If these texts are unable to be interpreted accordingly they are not to be considered as authoritative because they cannot be opposed to the scripture. (NM. pp.351-352). Thus Ānandabodha proves by the scripture and logical reasoning that intuition of non-duality is the only means to release and not again and iota of action (tasmāt jñānamevaikam mokṣasādhanaṃ, na punaḥ karma leśopiti siḍdham (NM. p.352).

14. na karmaṇā na prajaya dhanena/ etavadare khaluamṛtatvam/
kaivalyopaniṣad, p.3; Iśa, 9.10.

Ānandabodha refuting the validity of karma as a means to mokṣa in the way mentioned above proceeds to set aside the doctrine of Jñāna-karma samuccaya (combination of knowledge with action). In the history of philosophical literature the doctrine of Samuccaya (combination of knowledge and action as a means) is famous and accepted by some outstanding pre-Śaṅkara Advaita philosophers like Brahmadaṭṭa¹⁵, Bhartṛprapañca¹⁶ and Maṇḍana Miśra¹⁷ respectively.

Śaṅkara was the strongest opponent to this doctrine of Samuccaya and in his commentaries on the Prasthānatraya succinctly repudiates this philosophical tenet by means of tenable logical arguments. Like Śaṅkara Ānandabodha does not favour this doctrine of Samuccaya and hence attempts in its refutation in his works, by presenting the Pūrvapakṣa view as follows:

Though in the śruti and smṛti texts action (karma) as the means of mokṣa has been refuted still the samuccaya (conjunction) of jñāna (knowledge) and karma (action) has been favoured or sanctioned. For example, the text of the

15. Pandeya Muralidhara, 'Śrī Śaṅkarātpṛāgadvaitavāda, p.279.

16. Ibid. p.165.

17. Brahmasiddhi, p.245, 248.

Iśāvāsyapaniṣad i.e. Jñānādeva ca kaivalyam prāpyate yena mucyate/ karmaṇā badhyate janturvidyaya ca vimucyate, says that action in conjunction with knowledge is the cause of mokṣa (NM. p.338). The other texts of the Upaniṣads also support the said text,¹⁸ i.e. both knowledge and action on account of their differing effects are useful for mokṣa. As mokṣa is the cessation of transmigration and the attainment Brahman, there is utility of karma (action) for the cessation of transmigration and the utility of knowledge lies in the removal of avidyā. As Brahman being jīvatman is always attained but it is hidden by avidyā alone like the ornament round the neck (NM. p.339). There are other texts which clearly advocate this view. Thus, scriptural statements which refute validity of action refer to action alone, not action without collaboration of knowledge). And the sentences mentioning conjunction mean that: one of them is the direct cause and the other indirect like the plough and the food for the satisfaction i.e. food is the direct cause of satisfaction and the plough is the indirect cause. In the same way knowledge is the direct cause of mokṣa and karma is indirect cause for the acquisition of knowledge through the removal of sins (NM. p.341).

Ānandabodha refutes this by saying that if mokṣa is to be achieved by action, it would be non-eternal like any

18. BG. V.II; 10; Manusmṛti XII, 104.

other worldly object. The collaboration between the knower of Brahman and the doer of virtuous actions is only on the path of attainment. Ānandabodha quotes the Brahmasūtra¹⁹ to substantiate his view that the individual souls are led to saguna Brahman for it occupies a place to which souls may go but not to nirguna Brahman since it is all-pervading. With the highest Brahman the ideas of one who goes or the object of going or act of going cannot be connected for that Brahman is present everywhere and is the inner-self of all. This view has been expounded by Bādari, a pre-Saṅkara Advaitin. Thus Ānandabodha proves that karma is useful only on the way of preparation for the attainment of the Supreme beatitude, but the efficacy of ritualistic actions is not for the removal of nescience which is the highest goal of a human being. It is only highest intuition (brahmāṇvagati or brahmasākṣātkāra which is able to eradicate the binding and blinding avidyā and by the way illuminating the essential nature of noumenal Reality called Brahman.

19. Kāryam Bādharirasya gatyupapatteḥ/ BS. IV.3.7.