

CHAPTER VII

ĀNANDABODHA'S PHILOSOPHY: A CRITIQUE

This chapter incorporates a critique of Ānandabodha's philosophy.

7.1 Prasthānatraya

Ānandabodha being an Advaita philosopher and a strict follower of Śaṅkara bases his advaitism on the tenets of the prasthānatraya, mainly the principal Upaniṣads which contain some germs of the Advaitism. Idealistic monism adumbrated in the principal Upaniṣads and considerably developed as a philosophical system by Śaṅkara was further elaborated by his eminent successors like Ānandabodha and others. The principal doctrines of the prasthānatraya discussed by Ānandabodha are as follows:

The Upaniṣads speak of parabrahman which is infinite, eternal,¹ omnipresent, omniscient and one² pure spirit as the Ultimate Reality. The Brahman is transcendent, non-phenomenal (niṣprapañca) and Being (sat), consciousness

1. Nityam vibhum Sarvagataṁ susūkṣmaṁ. Mund., up. I.1.6.

2. Chā. Up. vi. 2.1; Kath. Up. ii.1.11.

(cit), and Bliss (ānanda)³. The Brahman transcends the spatio-temporal order governed by causality. The Brahman is the Ātman⁴ pure universal consciousness, which is the foundation reality in the Individual selves and the ultimate ground of the universe. It is the pure self-luminous consciousness., the phenomenal world being illumined and manifested by its light. It is the supreme bliss⁵ which transcends all the empirical limitations, which are due to the intercourse of the senses and their respective objects. On the whole there is no difference of opinion regarding the nature of the Brahman in the texts of Bhagavadgītā and Brahmasūtra. According to both God is immanent and transcendental Reality which is the source of creation, preservation as well as dissolution of the universe and attaining which there is no return to this mortal world (BG. IV.9.V.17; VIII.15, BS IV.4.22, 1.1.19).

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3. Satyam jñānam anantaṁ brahma. Tai. Up., II.1.1
 4. Ayam ātmā brahma Sarvānubhuh. Brh. Up. II. 5.19.
 5. Ānandaṁ brahma. Tai. Up. ii.6.1. Vijñānam ānandaṁ brahma. Br. Up. iii.9.28; iii.7. Mund. III.2.8.

The Individual Soul (Jīvatman) :

The Individual soul (Jīvatman) is different from the body, the sense-organs, manas and buddhi (intellect). It is the knower (jñātā), enjoyer (bhoktā) and active agent (kartā)⁶ and experiences joys and sorrows which are the fruits of its actions. The Individual self with an uncontrolled and impure mind and devoid of discrimination enters into bondage, and as a result undergoes birth and death. When the Individual self knows it by meditative trance and purges off all its impurities and knows the supreme Reality it becomes itself Brahman.⁷

The Phenomenal World

The Brahman is the cause of names and forms of determinate objects. The world which existed in an unmanifest condition in Brahman before creation was made manifest by the latter. The world is permeated by the Brahman which is the divine spirit. All creatures⁸ come

6. Brh. Up. III. 1.28; Ghā. up. IV.II.23.

7. Muṇḍ. Up III. 2. 9

8. Sinha, Jadunatha, HIP. Vol. I. p. 11.

the Brahman as sparks come out from fire, as plants shoot forth on the earth, as hairs spring from a living body, or as threads come out from the body of a spider. The Brahman ejects the world out of itself and withdraws it into itself even as a spider ejects threads out of its own body and withdraws it.⁹ The temporal spatial and causality-bound world is the manifestation of this infinite and eternal spirit.

The sūtrakāra maintains¹⁰ that the Brahman alone with its intrinsic creative power is the material and instrumental cause of the universe. Even as milk turns into curds without any extraneous help so the Brahman transforms itself into manifold effects in the world. The universe thus created by him having transcendental reality is empirically real and not illusory or false like the one seen in a dream.¹¹ Mokṣa is freedom from bondage avidyā or māyā. It is intuitive realisation of one infinite, eternal and universal spirit is Brahman. Mokṣa is becoming

9. Sinha, Jadunatha, HIP. vol. I. p. 11.

10. BS. I.I.2, 18, II.1.9, II.1.24.

11. BG. II. 2.28, 29.

Brahman (brahmabhavana), a state of identity (sāmya or ekatva) of the individual self with the supreme self, Brahman, an state of eternal peace and indefinable supreme bliss.

Knowledge or Vidyā is the supreme means of liberation.¹² One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman¹³ and attains the supreme goal. The Ātman or Brahman should be seen, heard, reflected and meditated on, because it is the dearest of all and because by knowing it the whole world is known. The ontological, epistemological, soteriological and ethical views of the Prasthānatraya are duly and fully discussed in the works of Ānandabodha. Though the texts of the Prasthānatraya give scope to diverse philosophical doctrines like polytheism, henotheism, monotheism and monism and considered to be containing the germs of all the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy still Ānandabodha interprets these texts keeping in view the monistic idealism of Śaṅkara. Ānandabodha therefore maintains in his works that the Brahman is the only transcendental Reality which is one, non-dual, and having the nature of pure consciousness (visudha vijñāna) and

12. Īśa Up., 9-11; Br. Up., iv.4.10; Kath. Up., i.1.6., i.2.4, 5.

13. Brahavid āpnoti param. Tai. Up., ii.1. Sa yo brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati, Muṇḍ. Up. iii.2.9; Brh. Up. ii.4.5; i, 4.15; iv. 5.6.

positive supreme bliss (paramānanda). The Individual self (Jivātman) is not a real entity and hence it has no distinct existence because of being a reflection (pratibimba) of Brahman as that of moon in the water. Avidyā or māyā is the material cause of the world-illusion. The plurality of the individual selves is an illusion which vanishes after the true realisation of the essential nature of the Brahman, the supreme self. The world has phenomenal Reality only and hence from the point of the Brahman which has ultimate transcendental Reality, it is false (mithyā) as the appearance of the objects seen in the state of dream. Since avidyā which is indefinable and beginningless in nature is the cause of Jīva bhāva of the Brahman and the world-illusion, the absolute cessation of nescience (avidyānivṛtti) is the supreme goal (parama puruṣārtha) i.e. mokṣa. As mokṣa is the complete cessation of nescience (Avidyā) with its miraculous effects and consequently the intuitive realisation of pure supreme bliss which is Brahman. Intuitive knowledge is the only means to achieve this goal. Karma (ritualistic action) has utility in purifying the mind of an aspirant of mokṣa.¹⁴ Supreme realisation and thus karma is an indirect cause of the supreme beatitude.

14. Vide. chapter, V. p.241

These monistic tenets of Ānandabodha are at par with those of the thoughts of the Prasthānatraya. He is completely faithful to these texts of the Prasthānatraya in interpreting and analysing the monistic observations and expounding the philosophy of Advaita. From this point of view, Ānandabodha's discussion is quite faithful and reasonable.

Ānandabodha, however, in his Pramāṇamālā (p.20) identifies the God Viṣṇu with the Brahman, the Supreme Reality. This is a distinct feature in the philosophy of Ānandabodha who seems following the BG in this respect. Further, Ānandabodha adds some tenets to his philosophy which are completely new in his thought and not expounded by either the Upaniṣadic thinkers nor the Gītākāra nor the Brahmasūtrakāra, e.g. avidyā as the material cause of the world-illusion, the locus of avidyā, the doctrine of avidyānivṛtti. In addition to it Ānandabodha also does not discuss some of the important concepts like Jīvanmukti, Brahmaloka and the nature of enlightend soul.

7.2 Heterodox Systems

(A) Jaina School

The concepts of final liberation (mokṣa) and the popular dimension of the Ātman upheld by the Jainas are rightly set

aside, by Ānandabodha in his Nyāyamakaranda. Ānandabodha mentions that the dimension is not possible which is essentially not different from all pervasive Brahman, the Supreme Reality.¹⁵

Secondly, Ānandabodha presents as pūrvapakṣa the Jaina theory of mokṣa as the continuous upward movement of the Soul (Ātmanah satatordhvagati).¹⁶ But Ānandabodha does not present this view of Jaina school accurately and faithfully; it seems that perhaps for the purpose of refutation he has twisted and so misrepresented the original Jaina view. Ānandabodha puts forth the Jaina view that mukti consists in the everlasting upward movement of the Soul, which the Jainas have never said, and which is a misrepresentation of how the Jainas conceive of the condition of the Soul in the moments immediately following death in the final incarnation. Radhakrishnan also remarks: "The loka or the universe, is held in the middle of the āloka, in the form of the trunk of the man, with siddhaśīla at the top, the place where the head should be. This siddhaśīla

15. Vide, chapter, III.

16. Vide. chapter, V. p. 218

is the abode of the omniscient souls, and may be called the spiritual eye of the universe. So mokṣa is said to be eternal upward movement. On liberation the soul goes upward, because of the momentum due to its previous activity, the non-existence of the relation to the elements which kept it down, breaking of the bondage, and its natural tendency to go upwards.¹⁷

7.3 (B) Buddhist Schools

Ānandabodha in his Nyāyamakaranda refutes the viewpoints of the yogācāra and Mādhyamika schools. The Yogācāra school propounds that viññāna (consciousness) being transitory arises and perishes continuously. Ānandabodha criticises this tenet of yogācāra by saying that since viññāna (consciousness) is identical with the Brahman or the Ātman, it is eternal and not transitory.¹⁸

Secondly, Ānandabodha criticises the doctrine of mokṣa expounded by the yogācāra school i.e. mokṣa is the origination of the stream of pure cognition (suddha-citta-santānam) free from the dirt of object-forms (viṣayākārādiupaplava-sūnyoḥ) obtained by the intensity of emotion (bhāvanā prakarṣa).¹⁹

18. Vide. chapter. III. p.104

19. Vide. Chapter. V. p.222

According to Ānandabodha, this kind of mokṣa is not possible since the cessation of previous impure stream is presupposed in this view. Further, viññāna are produced by desire, which itself actually is destroyed by the contemplation of truth. If this real cognition does not destroy the desire then worldly life will continue to exist even in the state of mokṣa and this kind of mokṣa is not desired by anyone. Ānandabodha in presenting this view does not make any injustice to the school. His presentation goes in accordance with the original texts of the Buddhist school.

Ānandabodha has also refuted the theory of illusion, ātmakhyāti²⁰ of the yogācāra school, by arguing that even when the silver aspect is accepted as internal, the appearance of externality, though unreal, has to be accepted. Besides, if objects are accepted as internal then in the case of the superimposition of fire on a heap of Gunjas, there would be the possibility of perceiver's body being on flame. The acceptance of internal nature of objects is both unnecessary and also impossible to maintain. In presenting this view, Ānandabodha is also faithful to the original Buddhist texts.

Ānandabodha has refuted the Mādhyamika theory of illusion, asatkhyāti²¹ according to which, an asat (unreal object) is experienced in the cognition. Since this theory

20. Vide. chapter IV. p. 190

directly permits the cognition (khyāti) of an unreal object (asat), hence it is known as asatkhyāti. Ānandabodha criticises this theory on the ground that the sublative cognition does not indicate the non-existence or unreality of the object.

Ānandabodha also refutes the Mādhyamika view²² of mokṣa i.e. the cessation (viccheda) of the stream of cognitions (bodha-santati) pulled by the defects like kleśas etc., that continuously arise with difference intensity. He argues that since the cognitions that are momentary, perish of their own accord and then they would not have any relation with the effect (phala) like salvation. Again, this mokṣa is like the cessation of one's own self. In presenting the views of Mādhyamika Ānandabodha is very much faithful to the original Buddhist texts.

7.4 The Sāṃkhya School

Ānandabodha in his Nyāyamakaranda discusses two main theories of the classical sāṃkhya system expounded mainly by śvarakṛṣṇa, viz., the theory which advocates the plurality of puruṣa or Ātman and the theory of mokṣa. or kaivalya. In the Nyāyamakaranda (pp.18-19) Ānandabodha says that birth, and death etc. being related to the physical body cannot

22. Vide. chapter. V. p.220

prove plurality of the Atman²³ (Kimca jananaḍayah
kṣetrasamavāyinaḥ kṣetrajñasya bhedah prasādhataḥ iti kim
kena saṁgatam). Since Anandabodha has argued at length for
the refutation of the doctrine of plurality advocated by the
Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school, he simply says: etenedamapi parāstam
(by this Sāṁkhya view is refuted) still his argument is very
brief for the refutation of the Sāṁkhya view. According to
the Sāṁkhya school, the diversity of puruṣa (puruṣa nānātva)
is real, which is proved by the birth, death etc. But
Ānandabodha rejects this view by saying that these phenomena
like birth, death etc., belonging to the physical body and
not to the Ātman as rightly pointed out by the BG cannot
prove the plurality of the Ātman which is identified with the
Brahman.

It is true that Ānandabodha has faithfully presented
the Sāṁkhya notion of mokṣa which means puruṣa's isolation
(kaivalya) from Prakṛti. Describing the nature of kaivalya,
the SK 65 contends that Puruṣa perceives the Prakṛti which
has ceased to produce effects like intellect, ego and the rest
and stopped from assuming the seven forms like.

23. Vide. chapter, III. p. 83

Since Prakṛti has fulfilled both the purposes of bondage and release of the Puruṣa. On account of the destruction of all the previous impressions (saṁskāras) generated by dharma and the rest after obtaining the separation from body and the purpose being fulfilled the cessation of the Prakṛti being effected, the Puruṣa acquires liberation (kaivalya).²⁴ Secondly, Ānandabodha has argued²⁵ that the Sāṁkhya is wrong in advocating mokṣa as a state of puruṣa's remaining in his natural form or svarūpāvasthāna after vivekadarśana or realisation of true nature of prakṛti and puruṣa because of this kaivalya is bereft of direct manifestation of bliss (ānanda) since the Sāṁkhya system does not hold the manifestation of ānanda in the state of mokṣa nor puruṣa's nature as that of ānanda by which there could be direct experience of supreme bliss. Hence the sāṁkhyān conception of highest goal being devoid of ānanda cannot be taken into account since the highest puruṣārtha should be endowed with supreme bliss.

The Sāṁkhya denies puruṣa's blissful nature and hence there is no scope of experiencing ānanda in mokṣa. Thus, Ānandabodha has very rightly put forth the sāṁkhya view. The extant sāṁkhya texts neither expound the experience of ānanda in the state of mokṣa nor the blissful nature of the

24. Vide. chapter. V. p.223

25. Chapter, V. p.225

Ātman. According to the SK and SS, Puruṣa is neutral, witness pure and indifferent. Dasgupta rightly remarks: "the sāṃkhya view differs from the Vedānta, firstly in this that it does not consider the soul to be of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (ānanda). Bliss with sāṃkhya is but another name for pleasure and as such it belongs to Prakṛti and does not constitute the nature of soul."²⁶

From the above analysis, it is evidently clear that Ānandabodha's presentation and discussion of the Sāṃkhya view are very much faithful to the original sāṃkhya texts. But his arguments employed in discovering inconsistencies in the sāṃkhya view seem to be vague and illogical. The reason is that he imposes the view of Advaita on the sāṃkhya. As an ardent advocate of Advaita Ānandabodha holds that mokṣa should be equated with direct manifestation of ānanda. For Advaita Vedānta, is reasonable as this school considers mokṣa to be identical with the Brahman endowed with pure bliss. Thirdly, Ānandabodha's argument with reference to the notion of bondage is not tenable. He has argued that mokṣa should be absence of bondage of the one which is bound; bondage is

26. Dasgupta, S.N. A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. II, 203

caused by ajñāna and rāga which are the attributes of the buddhi. Hence Puruṣa should be neither bound nor released rather it is buddhi which should be bound and liberated. Ānandabodha has also quoted two kārikās 62 and 63 of Śvarakṛṣṇa to point out the flaw of the Sāṃkhya. It is right that Sāṃkhya views ajñāna and rāga as the attributes of tāmasika buddhi and the cause of bondage but SK also contends that Prakṛti binds herself by herself through the seven forms - dharma, vairāgya, aśvarya, adharma, ajñāna, avairāgya and anaśvarya but frees herself for the specific purpose, viz., release of the Puruṣa. Fourthly, Ānandabodha argues that bandha and mokṣa cannot be falsely attributed to puruṣa because of absence of nimittakāraṇa (occasioning cause). The relation between prakṛti and puruṣa as that of svasvāmibhāva cannot be nimitta for such figurative attribution as puruṣa, according to the Sāṃkhya, is udāsina. Buddhi cannot render any help to puruṣa a svabhāvanirmala entity.

The Sāṃkhya system figuratively attributes bondage and mokṣa to puruṣa and admits the relation of svasvāmibhāva between the Prakṛti and the puruṣa as nimittakāraṇa. Ānandabodha criticises that nimittābhāvāt upacārānupatti, due to absence of occasioning cause figurative attribution is not possible but the

Sāṃkhya holds that avivekonimittam (want of discrimination) is the cause of bondage and emancipation. Thus while according to the Sāṃkhya bandha and mokṣa of puruṣa are to be figuratively taken due to the aviveka Ānandabodha asserts that the relation of Svasvāmibhāva between puruṣa and Prakṛti is not possible, Secondly, the bandha and mokṣa of puruṣa is real, ipso facto, and not an attribution (upacāra).

Further, Ānandabodha denies the service of buddhi to puruṣa on account of his being Svabhāvanirmala or pure by nature. This goes against the Sāṃkhya view as the Sāṃkhya holds that buddhi accomplishes puruṣa's experiences, and discriminates the subtle difference between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Thus, the Sāṃkhya admits the upakāra (service) of buddhi to Puruṣa. Ānandabodha wrongly identifies buddhi with Prakṛti not found in the extant Sāṃkhya texts.

Fifthly, Ānandabodha argues that buddhi like a dancing lady, by means of her self-exposition cannot be a helper (upakāriṇī) of Puruṣa. This argument does not seem in accordance with the original text of the Sāṃkhya system as the extant texts advocate the service of Prakṛti and Puruṣa in spite of Puruṣa's neutral and pure nature.

Sixthly, Ānandabodha has argued that a dancing girl in the form of Prakṛti cannot show herself to an indifferent person, and hence cannot be dr̥śyopakārikā for puruṣa and the relation of svasvāmibhāva does not hold good. Thus the service of Prakṛti to puruṣa is not determinable. We have already seen that the Sāṃkhya system proves the authenticity of Svasvāmibhāva Sambandha. Hence it is not reasonable to speak of the indeterminability of the said relation, as pointed out by Ānandabodha.

7.5 The Nyāya School

In his works, Nyāyamakaranda and Pramāṇamātā Ānandabodha accurately puts forth some ontological, epistemological and soteriological doctrines of the Nyāya school. By means of pointing out logical defects inherent in the Nyāya tenets and duly exposing the logical validity of the Advaitic doctrines Ānandabodha has evidently proved the superiority of the Advaitic standpoints.

Ānandabodha refutes the Nyāya doctrine of diversity²⁷ of the Ātman by arguing that the diversity of the Individual souls is an erroneous conception created by avidyā because the Individual soul is essentially the same as the Brahman, one without a second.

27. Vide. chapter III. p. 84

Secondly, Ānandabodha criticises the Nyāya doctrine of extrinsic validity of the knowledge²⁸ (Parataḥ Prāmāṇyavāda). The Nyāya school advocates that the knowledge or cognition (jñāna) which is a special attribute of the Ātman is not self-luminous and it needs another type of cognition or knowledge for its manifestation otherwise there would not arise any doubt about the cognition of an object. Ānandabodha sets aside this Nyāya view by saying that the knowledge or consciousness (viññāna or saṃvid) is identical with the self-luminous supreme Reality called Brahman and hence it is self-luminous as it is said in the Upaniṣads.

Thirdly, Ānandabodha refutes the Nyāya doctrine which expounds the mental perception²⁹ (mānasapratyakṣa) of the Ātman. He argues that the Ātman being Brahman is self-evident and self-illuminating and the perception (pratyakṣa) which is valid only in the sphere of the phenomenal world cannot cognise the transcendental Reality Brahman.

Fourthly, Ānandabodha criticises the Nyāya view of mokṣa³⁰ i.e. acquirement of the natural state (svarūpāvasthānam) of the consciousness after the destruction of all special qualities

28. Vide. chapter. III. p. 98

29. Ibid.

30. Vide chapter. V. p. 230

(viśeṣaguna) like knowledge and others. He refutes this view by saying that in this salvation, which is nothing but the natural state, acquired after the destruction of all special qualities, happiness also would be destroyed, being a special quality. Ānandabodha seems to be very much faithful to the original Nyāya texts. Though he does not mention the name of the author or the Nyāya text which he criticises still these are clearly identified as those of the Nyāya school represented by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Śrīdhara.

The realism of the Nyāya and illusionism (mayāvāda) of the Advaita are diametrically opposite doctrine. While the Nyāya school advocates the diversity of the selves on the basis of perception (Pratyakṣa) Ānandabodha's Advaita negates it completely on the basis of Avidyā or Māyā. Taking into consideration these main points we can very well say that Ānandabodha, an Advaitin is justified in criticising duly the Nyāya views and has not made any undue textual misrepresentation in exposing their doctrines.

7.6 The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā School

Ānandabodha in his two works, Nyāyamakaranda and Pramāṇamālā devotes a considerable number of pages in discussing and refuting the principal viewpoints of the two prominent pūrva Mīmāṃsā schools i.e. Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. The main standpoints of the prābhākara Mīmāṃsā criticised by Ānandabodha are as follows:

The prābhākara school advocates that the Ātman (self) is distinct from the body, the sense-organs and the intellect or cognitions. It is eternal, ubiquitous and manifold as there is a distinct self in each body and manifested in all cognitions of objects.³¹ The Prābhākara school regards the self as a substance, which is not of the nature of consciousness, but a substrate of consciousness !

Ānandabodha in the Nyāyanakaranda criticises the doctrines of plurality of the Ātman advocated by the Prābhākaras. Keeping in view the monistic tenet of identity of the Absolute Brahman with the Individual Ātman ~~in view~~ Ānandabodha refutes this doctrine of prābhākara. Since the diversity what appears in the illusory world created by Māyā or Avidyā is an appearance and hence lacks reality, therefore there is no diversity of the Individual souls in the transmigratory world.³²

Secondly, the Prābhākara school does not regard the self as an object of 'I' consciousness or mental perception, because the same self cannot be the knower and the known. The knowing self can never be the known object. So the Prābhākara school maintains that the self is known as the subject of all

31. PP. p.141.

32. Vide. Chapter III. p.90

cognitions of objects; that there is no 'I' consciousness in addition to consciousness of objects. Cognition manifests themselves, their objects as objects (viṣaya) and the self as the knower (jñātā), or substrate (āśraya).³³

Ānandabodha severely criticises this doctrine of the prābhākara school which denies self-luminously nature of the Ātman. According to Ānandabodha, since the self-luminous Brahman, the transcendental Supreme Reality is the Ātman and there is no iota of difference, the Ātman like Brahman is self-illuminating and does not require any other worldly light for its manifestation rather the whole world is manifested by this supreme light of the Brahman.³⁴

Thirdly, the Prābhākara school advocates the theory of Akhyāti or Vivekakhyāti. In the illusion 'this is silver' 'this' is perceived, and 'silver' is remembered; there is non-discrimination (aviveka) of the two psychoses from each other. Non-discrimination is non-apprehension (akhyāti) of distinction (viveka). It is non-cognition of difference (bhedāgraha). The distinction between the perceived element 'this' and the remembered element 'silver' is not apprehended. Non-apprehension of the distinction leads to the illusion 'this is silver'.³⁵

33. PP. p.153.

34. NM. p.57.

35. PP. 208.

Ānandabodha criticises this akhyātivāda of the Prābhākaras and holds that the object of error is indescribable (anirvācya) and hence anirvalāṇyakhyāti is only logically sound.³⁶

Fourthly, the prābhākara school advocates that the kārya or niyoga is the urging factor to act (pravartakatva) in an injunctive sentence. ~~Like~~. The prābhākara school regards niyoga conveyed by the injunctive affix is the cause of activity. As action enjoys an important position in the Mīmāṃsā philosophy, the Prābhākaras accept kārya as the Pravartaka.³⁷

Ānandabodha refutes this view of the Prābhākaras and holds that the Pravartaka of an injunctive sentence consists in iṣṭasāadhanatā, the instrumentality with reference to desired object.³⁸

Ānandabodha also refutes the views of the Jarat-prābhākaras the elder followers - of the Prābhākara school who slightly differ from the modern Prābhākaras in their opinions about the nature of niyoga. They regard niyoga as the locus-(āśraya) of the Pravartanā, incentive to activity, which is defined as the opposition to the absence of activity - pravṛtyabhāvavirodha.

36. NM. 107

37. PP. p.431, 441.

38. NM. p.199.

This is produced by the liñ - injunctive affix. Niyoga is a special variety of meaning of the nature of kārya (NM. p.229).

Ānandabodha refutes³⁹ this by saying that Pravartanā which is defined as antagonistic to the absence of activity would be possible in the activity itself but activity is never seen to be a Pravartaka, Pravartanā is possible only in case of the absence of activity.

Ānandabodha also criticises the Prābhākara view of mokṣa. The Prābhākara school defines release (mokṣa) as the absolute cessation of merits and demerits and the consequent total destruction of the body.⁴⁰ It is absolute cessation of the sufferings of empirical life consequent on the complete destruction of the self's contact with the body and the sense-organs, which are destroyed by the complete disappearance of merits and demerits.⁴¹ Prābhākara school regards consciousness as an accidental quality set of the self, due to its conjunction with mind and a body. When mind, the body and the sense-organs are completely destroyed on the destruction of merits and demerits, the self is divested of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, and consciousness. Mokṣa is absolute cessation of merit and demerit and the

39. NM. p.235.

40. PP. p.156.

41. PP. p.156.

consequent pleasure and pain. It is negative in character, and consists in the complete destruction of the specific qualities of the self.

Ānandabodha criticises this view by saying that since there is no experience of pure, transcendental bliss in the state of mokṣa characterised above, no intelligent man would strive for the attainment of this kind of mokṣa.

Ānandabodha in his Nyāyamakaranda also criticises the theory of error known as anyathākhyātivāda⁴² of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas. According to the Bhaṭṭa school an error or illusion is a false perception or misperception of one object as another (anyathā or viparita). In the illusion 'this is silver' 'this' or the brightness of a hacre, which it has in common with silver is perceived owing to its contact with the visual organ then 'silver' is remembered owing to the revival of the impression (saṃskāra) of silver.

Ānandabodha criticises this anyathākhyātivāda of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and logically establishes the anirvacanīya khyāti propounded by the Advaitins.

These above mentioned view points of the Prābhākara and the Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā are critically evaluated by

42. Vide. chapter. IV. p.205

Ānandabodha in his works. He, by means of his ardent logical acumen has selected the weak viewpoints from the works of the above said schools and rebutted them in his works. As far as the presentation or exposition of the Mīmāṃsaka views are concerned Ānandabodha is very much faithful to the original Mīmāṃsa texts. He, for the purpose of refutation as an opponent view does not make any deliberate attempt like twisting or misrepresenting the viewpoints of the Mīmāṃsakas. Hence Ānandabodha's presentation does not bear any stamp of textual misrepresentation.

Secondly, Ānandabodha criticises all these from Advaitic point of view and pointing out exact lacune existing in their thoughts proves the logical validity of the Advaita Vedānta. Though the central points of his Advaita philosophy are not originally different from the views propounded by his predecessors still on some issues Ānandabodha is quite original and succeeds in expounding novel views like the fifth definition of mithyātvā (illusoriness) of the world, the theory of avidyānivṛtti (cessation of nescience) as Pañcamaprakāra (fifth kind). He also exhibits his unique originality in refuting the views of the outstanding Advaitins like Maṇḍana and Vācaspati. Ānandabodha does not agree with Maṇḍana and Vācaspati on the point of Jīvātman as the substratum of avidyā and 'śabdajñāna arising from the Upaniṣadic texts like Tat tvam asi etc. as an indirect means for the intuition of the Brahman.

According to Ānandabodha the Brahman is the locus of avidyā. He also does not make any categorical difference between the locus (āśraya) and object (viśaya) of avidyā as done by Maṇḍana in the Brahmasiddhi and later on followed by Vācaspati. He does not discuss at all on the object of avidyā and neglects the issue completely. However, from his discussion we may grasp, though not clearly, that he, like Sureśvara and Prakāśātma, holds Brahman as the object of avidyā also and does not recognise any difference between the āśraya and viśaya of avidyā. Ānandabodha also speaks śabdajñāna as the direct means of mokṣa. He also very correctly and faithfully puts forth their views in his work Nyāyamakaranda and does not make any textual misrepresentation. It is significant to note that Ānandabodha also favours some of the views of Maṇḍana like bliss as positive entity, and the doctrine of Sattādvaita (ens-monism)⁴³ etc. and respectfully quotes from their works. This reflects Ānandabodha's independence of thought, logical acumen, and indirectly proves that he neither simply a blind follower of the great Advaitins nor he simply refers to their concepts in his works. Ānandabodha's thorough and systematic discussion bears the stamp of his deep understanding of their prominent viewpoints.

43. Shastri, Kuppusvāmi, op.cit.