

# CHAPTER IV

## STUDY OF THE MEANINGS OF CASE SUFFIXES, NOMINAL STEMS, WORDS, COMPOUNDS AND NEGATIVE PARTICLES.

The present chapter incorporates a discussion on some essential topics of Grammar. It mainly emphasizes on the execution of the rules of Grammar. It narrates and discusses the general and exceptional rules. As the title is given, this chapter is divided into five sub-divisions pertaining to the five topics of discussion *viz.* Case Suffixes, Nominal stems, Compound-power, Word-power and Negative Particles.

### IV.1. Meanings of the Case Suffixes

The first section deals with the meanings of case suffixes. There are seven cases according to Sanskrit grammar. These seven cases simply present the seven-fold division of nouns (*Subantapada*) like Nominative (*Prathamā*)<sup>1</sup>, Accusative (*Dvitiyā*), Instrumental (*Tr̥tīyā*), Dative (*Caturthī*), Ablative (*Pañcamī*), Genitive (*Ṣaṣṭhī*) and Locative (*Saptamī*). It can be hypothesized that there are seven different types of expressions. When these seven cases get connected with the action, they are termed as *Kāraka*. The relation between the action and the word is of six types. So, *Kārakas* depending on the manner of expression are six in number.<sup>2</sup> These are the six different types of expression. It is believed that this classification is done on the basis of ‘desire of speaking’ technically known as *Vivakṣā* which becomes known from the followings -

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<sup>1</sup> Vocative case (सम्बोधन) is included in Nominative case; therefore it is not counted separately in the list.

<sup>2</sup> Genitive Case is not considered as the *Kāraka*, because it doesn't have any direct connecton with the action.

निष्पत्तिमात्रे कर्तृत्वं सर्वत्रैवास्ति कारके ।

व्यापारभेदापेक्षायां करणत्वादिसंभवः ॥ ३.७.१८ ॥

पुत्रस्य जन्मनि यथा पित्रोः कर्तृत्वमुच्यते ।

अयमस्यामियं त्वस्मादिति भेदो विवक्षया ॥ ३.७.१९ ॥<sup>3</sup>

Patañjali opines –

वृक्षस्य पर्णं पतति इत्यत्रापादानसंज्ञा प्राप्नोतीत्याक्षेप उक्तम् – यदा  
चापायो विवक्षितो भवति, तदापादानसंज्ञं, तद्यथा - वृक्षात्पर्णं  
पततीति ।<sup>4</sup>

Bhartṛhari explains this –

नित्याः षट् शक्तयोऽन्येषां भेदाभेदसमन्विताः ।

क्रियासंसिद्ध्येऽर्थेषु जातिवत्समस्थिताः ॥ ३.७.३५ ॥

निमित्तभेदादेकैव भिन्ना शक्तिः प्रतीयते ।

षोढा कर्तृत्वमेवाहुस्तत्प्रवृत्तेर्निबन्धनम् ॥ ३.७.३७ ॥<sup>5</sup>

*Kāraka* is defined differently by ancient and modern grammarians. The ancient grammarians define it as ‘that which is in association with the action’.<sup>6</sup> Hence, they do not accept *Kāratva* of *Brāhmaṇa* in the sentence *Brāhmaṇasya*

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<sup>3</sup> Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 292

<sup>4</sup> *MB* on *AA* 1.4.23, p. 303

<sup>5</sup> Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 297

<sup>6</sup> क्रियान्वयित्वं कारकत्वम् = करोति स्वसम्बन्धेन क्रियायां विशेषरूपतामापादयतीति कारकत्वम् ।

*Putraṁ Pṛcchati*. As *Brāhmaṇa* does not have any direct relation with the action and it doesn't bring any change in the form of the action.<sup>7</sup>

Modern grammarians take *Kāraka* as 'that which produces the action'.<sup>8</sup> They give two examples *Paṭaṁ Karoti* and *Ghaṭaṁ Smarati*. In the first example, the straping of the threads is the reason for the fabrication of cloth (*Paṭa*). In the second, the remembrance of the form of the pot is the reason for the production of the knowledge of the pot. Patañjali,<sup>9</sup> Kaiyaṭa,<sup>10</sup> Bhartṛhari<sup>11</sup> and Nāgeśabhaṭṭa<sup>12</sup> also accept the same view.

There are two types of case suffix (*Subanta*) viz. stem (*Prakṛti*) and suffix (*Pratyaya*). Amongst these two, suffix is more important than the stem. Hence Kaunḍabhaṭṭa has initiated the discussion with the suffix part. He has grouped six cases (except Nominative case) into four on the basis of their functional role in a spoken language. It is accepted that case suffixes generally render four different senses.

1. Substratum – (Accusative, Instrumetal, Locative cases)
2. Limit – (Ablative)
3. Subject – (Dative)
4. Relation or Potency – (Genetive)<sup>13</sup>

### Accusative Case (*Karma-kāraka*)

<sup>7</sup> ब्राह्मणस्य पुत्रं पन्थानं पृच्छतीत्यादौ ब्राह्मणस्य न कारकत्वम् । पुत्रेणान्यथासिद्ध्या तत्त्वाभावात् । Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, *LSS*, p. 320

<sup>8</sup> क्रियाजनकत्वं कारकत्वम्, भाष्ये करोति क्रियां निर्वर्तयतीति व्युत्पत्तिप्रदर्शनात् । Ibid, p. 325

<sup>9</sup> यदि तावद् गुणसमुदायः साधनं साधनमप्यनुमानगम्यम् । MB on AA 3.2.115, p. 89

<sup>10</sup> समुदायग्रहणं सर्वसां करणादिशक्तीनां क्रियासिद्धौ निमित्तत्वाविशेषात् । on MB 3.2.115, p. 94

<sup>11</sup> स्वाश्रये समवेतानां तद्वदेवाश्रयान्तरे । क्रियाणामभिनिष्पत्तौ सामर्थ्यं साधनं विदुः ॥९.७.१॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 285

<sup>12</sup> घटं करोति, स्मरतीत्यादौ बौद्धघटादेः पूर्वकालत्वेन स्मृत्यादिनिष्पादकत्वं बोध्यम् । Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, *LSS*, p. 345

<sup>13</sup> आश्रयोऽवधिरुद्देश्यः सम्बन्धः शक्तिरेव वा । यथायथं विभक्त्यर्थाः सुपां कर्मेति भाष्यतः ॥२४॥ *VBS*, p. 139

The meaning of Accusative, Instrumental and Locative is ‘substratum’. The *sūtra*, *Karmaṇi Dvitiyā* (II.3.2)<sup>14</sup> decrees that the Second Case has to be used when the object is intended. The object is that which is intensely desired by the agent of the action. Moreover, it is the substratum of result produced by the action. The *sūtra*, *Tathā Yuktam Cānīpsitam* (I.4.50)<sup>15</sup> emendates the rule that undesired object also governs the same case as the desired does. Such is a general discussion about the use of the Second Case.

In fact, both ‘desired object and undesired object’ are made for mere classification because both of these are not noticeable in verbal expression. They cannot be regarded as direct meaning. Some examples to show the ‘substratumness’ in the sense of Second case are -

1. *Odanam Pacati*. Here the word *odana* becomes an object since it is the substratum of the action of cooking.
2. *Ghaṭam Karoti*. The word *Ghaṭa* is an object as it is the substratum for the production of a pot.
3. In the sentence *Jānāti*, there is the fruit in the form of ‘removal of ignorance’, which is the root-sense (here *Result*). The substratum of this *Result* is object.

The opponent raises the question that in the sentence ‘*Caitro Grāmam Gacchati*’, *Caitra* like *Grāmam*, is the substratum of *Result* in the form of reaching the village which is altogether produced by the action. Then, *Caitra* would be the object. Then the following usages cannot be claimed as incorrect –

1. *Caitraḥ - Caitram Gacchati* (*Caitra* going to *Caitra*)
2. *Caitraḥ Prayāgam Kāśīm Gacchati* (*Caitra* is travelling to Benares to Allahabad)

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<sup>14</sup> Pāṇini, *op cit*, p. 15

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, p. 10

In the second example, the result produced by the action is present as ‘*reaching*’ in Benares and ‘*leaving*’ the Allahabad.

It is true that *Caitra* too is the substratum of *Result* like *Grāmam*, but being qualified as the doer, the term of object would not be applied to it. So, there cannot be any usage like *Caitraḥ - Caitram Gacchati*. The appellation of object determines the Accusative case only.

In order to get rid of the problem, the Naiyāyikas suggest that the fruit that delimits the state of root-sense and the action should be qualified as ‘inherent in others’. The fruit should be qualified as *Parasamaveta* and *Dhātvarthatāvacchedakaphala* in the first instance (*Caitraḥ - Caitram Gacchati*) and the problem in the second instance (*Prayāgam Gacchati*).

So, in the instance ‘*Caitraḥ Taṇḍulam Pacati*’ the ‘the rice-grains are the substratum of cooking which delimits the root-sense, being born from an activity inherent in other than the rice-grains’. Therefore, *Taṇḍula* becomes object.

The verbal cognition of the sentence will be –

‘*Caitra* is substratum of activity producing an action that is inherent in the grains and conducive to cooking, which delimits the root-sense inherent in the grains’.

The *Karma* (object) is mainly divided into desired and undesired. Again the former is of three types *Nivartya*, *Vikārya* and *Prāpya*. The latter is of four varieties viz.. *Udāsīna Karma* , *Dveṣya*, *Samjñāntara-anākhyā* and *Anyapūrvaka*. This is the view of Bhartṛhari.<sup>16</sup> But, Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa is of the

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<sup>16</sup> निर्वर्त्यञ्च विकार्यञ्च प्राप्यञ्चेति त्रिधा मतम् । तच्चेप्सिततमं कर्म, चतुर्धाऽन्यत् कल्पितम् ॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p.

opinion that there isn't any sagrification of object as desired or undesired in the spoken language since the intention of the speaker does not become visible.<sup>17</sup> This is Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's own stand-point on the two-fold divisions of object. It is observed that at this point of discussion he not only differs from the earlier grammarians like Patañjali, Bhartṛhari and Bhaṭṭojidīkṣīta but also from the later grammarians like Nāgeśabhaṭṭa and others.

1. **Nivartya** is that type of *Karma* which was not existent before its production, but comes into existence after particular operation. 'A potter is making a pot'. Pot is object of *Nivartya* type of *Karma* as it didn't exist before its production, but came into manifestation after the existence.
2. **Vikārya**: When something is made by the destruction of its cause or by change in the form, then, *Karma* is called the *Vikārya-karma*. 'He is burning the wood to ashes'. Here, 'ashes' is the object born from the destruction of wood. Or, 'He is making a bracelet of gold'. Here the bracelet is made of gold. The gold remains the same having a formal change.
3. **Prāpya**: When no effect of action is found in the object either by perception or inference, it is *Prāpyakarma*. 'He sees pot'. In this example, no effect is produced in the pot by the action of seeing. Hence, pot is *Prāpyakarma*.
4. **Udāsīna**: When the object is not desired by the agent while doing another action, it is *Udāsīna*. The agent is involved in another action and the object desired is different. Intermittently, something becomes

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यदसज्जायते सद्वा जन्मना यत्प्रकाशते । तन्निर्वृत्य विकार्यं तु द्वेधा कर्मव्यवस्थितम् ॥ *Ibid*, p. 300

प्रकृत्युच्छेदसम्भूतं किञ्चित् काष्ठादिसम्भवत् । किञ्चिद् गुणान्तरोत्पत्त्या सुवर्णादिविकारवत् ॥ *Ibid*

क्रियाकृतविशेषाणां सिद्धिर्यत्र न गम्यते । दर्शनादनुमानाद्वा तत्प्राप्यमिति कथ्यते ॥ *Ibid*

<sup>17</sup> ईप्सितानीप्सितत्वयोः शाब्दबोधेर्भावाभावेन संज्ञायामेव तदुपयोगः । *VBS*, p. 150

object without his desire e.g. he touches grass while going to village (*Grāmaṁ Gacchan Tṛṇaṁ Sprśati*). Here, touching of grass is not intended. Hence, grass is *Udāsīna* type of *Karma*.

5. ***Dveṣya***: When the object is not desired and intended to be avoided, it is *Dveṣyakarma* e.g. he consumes poison with milk (*Payasā Viṣaṁ Bhuṅkte*). Here, consuming poison is not desired but needs to be avoided. Hence, poison is *Dveṣya* type of *Karma*.
6. ***Samjñāntara-anākhyā***: When the object is not intended to be stated with the names as '*Apādāna*' etc., the object is '*Samjñāntaraiḥ-anākhyā*' type of *Karma* e.g. '*Gāṁ Dogdhi Payaḥ*'. Here the word *gāṁ* is in *Apādāna* but not intended by the speaker to be mentioned as *Apādāna*. The speaker desires to use it as *Karma*. Hence it is in second case.
7. ***Anyapūrvaka***: When a *Karma*, different from the *Karma-kāraka*, on account of any particular element like prefix, it is called '*Anyapūrvaka*'.

The *sūtra*, *Krudha-druha-īrṣyā-asūyānām Yam Prati Kopah* (I.4.37)<sup>18</sup> ordains that the object of the actions, indicated by these roots in the given senses, becomes *Sampradāna* as *Sevakāya Krudhyati*, etc. The *sūtra* *Krudhadruhorupasṛṣṭayoḥ Karma* (I.4.38) is an exception to the above rule. This *sūtra* states that the object of the actions denoted by the root *Krudha* and *Druha* (with prefix) becomes *Karma* (not *Sampradāna*) when these roots are used along with prefixes e.g. *Sevakam Abhikrudhyati* (He gets angry with the servant).

### **Instrumental case (*Karaṇa-kāraka*)**

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<sup>18</sup> Pāṇini, *op cit*, p. 7

The aphorism of Pāṇini – *Kartṛkaraṇostrīyā* states that Instrumental case can be used in the sense of doer (*Kartṛ*) and instrument (*Karaṇa*). Kaundabhaṭṭa has taken the meaning of Instrumental case as substratum (*Āśraya*) when used in the sense of an agent e.g. *Hariḥ Sevyate*. In this example, Hari is the substratum of action of worshiping and not of *Process*.<sup>19</sup> This *Kartṛtrīyā* takes place when the agent of the action is not declared (*Anabhihita*)<sup>20</sup>.

According to Kaundabhaṭṭa, *Karaṇatrīyā* contains both substratum and *Process*.<sup>21</sup> Its example is *Kuṭhāreṇa Vṛkṣam Chinatti*. In this example the substratum of the action is axe and process of cutting is also located in the axe.<sup>22</sup>

An example of *Karaṇatrīyā* is *Rāmeṇa Bāṇena Hato Vālī*. In this example, both Rāma and Vālī are in Instrumental case.

*Karaṇa-kāraka* is defined by Pāṇini as ‘a *Kāraka* which is sufficiently helpful in the accomplishment of an action, is by the aphorism - *Sādhakatamam Karaṇam* (I.4.42)’ Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita explains this aphorism as – *Kriyāsiddhau Prakṣṭopakāraṇam Kārakaṇ Karaṇasamjñam Syāt*. It means all *Kārakas* are necessary for the accomplishment of the action, but the *Kāraka* which is intensely required for the performance of action and without which the action cannot be accomplished is *Karaṇa-kāraka*. Its example is *Rāmeṇa Bāṇena Hato Vālī*. In this instance, both *Rāmeṇa* and *Bāṇena* are in Instrumental Case, but both are not *Karaṇa-kāraka*. Only *Bāṇa* will have *Karaṇa-kāraka*, because *Bāṇa* is the main instrument for the killing of Vālī. It is explicated as वालिसंयोगानुकूलव्यापारः. Kaundabhaṭṭa holds the same view as he says - तमबर्थः प्रकर्षः स चाव्यवधानेन फलजनकव्यापारवत्ता ।

Bhartrhari admits the same in his work VP –

<sup>19</sup> मदभिन्नाश्रयनिष्ठ-हर्षभिन्नाश्रयसेवाऽनुकूलो व्यापारः । VBS, p. 156

<sup>20</sup> अनभिहिते ॥ २.३.१ ॥ Pāṇini, *op cit*, p. 12

<sup>21</sup> करणतृतीयायास्त्वाश्रयव्यापारो वाच्यौ । VBS, p. 158

<sup>22</sup> कुठाराभिन्नाश्रयवृत्ति-व्यापारजन्यवृक्षच्छेदनानुकूलो व्यापारः । *Ibid*



क्रियायाः परिनिष्पत्तिर्यद्वापारादनन्तरम्।

विवक्ष्यते यदा तत्र करणत्वं तदा स्मृतम् ॥ ३.७.९० ॥<sup>23</sup>

The same rule is observed in the following usages:

1. स्थाली पचति. (The Vessel cooks)
2. अग्निः पचति (The fire cooks)
3. एधांसि पचन्ति (The fueles cook)
4. तण्डुलः पच्यते स्वयमेव (The rice cooks itself)

These are the examples of *Karaṇa-kāraka* since all work as an instrumenat for the action of cooking. As said by Bhartṛhari, the speaker's intention is the main factor for terming cases as *kāraḥ*.

वस्तुतस्तदनिर्देश्यं न हि वस्तु व्यवस्थितम् ।

स्थाल्या पच्यत इत्येषा विवक्षा दृश्यते यतः॥ ३.७.९१ ॥<sup>24</sup>

The opponent argues that if speaker's intention is determinant of *Kāraka* then how the theory of Bhagavān Vyāsa that the object can never become the agent is justified? This theory of Vyāsa is explained in the *Brahmasūtra - Karmakarṭṛvyapadeśācca* (1-2-4). It means that 'on account of the mention of object as agent too'. The psychological person is of the form of vital breath. If it is regarded as the individual self then there would be contradiction with the statement of object as agent obtaining itself as 'having gone from here I shall attain this self'

Kaundabhaṭṭa replies that if the individual soul is understood as the one to be known, then that should be stated as the object of the action of obtaining too.

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<sup>23</sup> Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 317

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*

Since the appellation of agent sets aside that of *Karma*, two appellations are not possible in one at one time. Thus, there would not be the usage ‘*Etam*’ and if *Karmakartṛprayoga* is accepted then the suffixes *Yak* etc., would be employed. By the contradiction in words, it becomes the cause of difference between the individual and the supreme.

Again the theory of Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa is questioned by the opponent. It is argued that the definition of agent - ‘the activating element of all *kāraka*’ and ‘the substratum of effort’ suffer from the defect of less-application. In the sentence *Daṇḍaḥ Karoti*, what will be the *Kāraka* of staff? Is it a doer or an instrument or an object?

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa replies that *Daṇḍaḥ Karoti* is an example of *Karmakartā*. At this point of discussion, he mentions the three varieties of doer. The agent is of three types –*Śuddhakartā*, *Prayojā-hetu-kāraṇatā* and *Karmakartā*.

1. The example of *Śuddhakartā* is *Mayā Hariḥ Sevyate* (Hari is being worshipped by me). In this, the sentence-meaning is – an activity in me which is conducive to the worship having Hari as its object. Here the word *Mayā* denotes *Śuddhakartā*, i.e. an agent who is the substratum of action, the principal meaning of root.
2. *Prayojā-hetu-kāraṇatā* means Causal agent who makes others to involve in action.e.g. *Kāryate Hariṇā* (Hari makes ‘the devotee’ to do). The devotee is being caused by Hari to do their work. An activity lies in Hari which is conducive to production.
3. *Karmakartā* means object functioning as subject or an agent. e.g. *Kṛṣṇaṁ Gokulaṁ Gamayati* (He sends Hari to *Gokula*). It means an activity which is conducive to another activity in Kṛṣṇa to movement of journey having *Gokula* as its object.

## Locative Case (*Adhikaraṇa-kāraka*)

The Locative case is generally used in the sense of locus and time. As it is evident in the spoken language – *Khagaḥ Nīde Tiṣṭhati* and *Grīṣme Sūryasya Prakāścaṇḍo Bhavati*. When it is used in the sense of substratum, it becomes *Adhikaraṇa-kāraka* by the strength of the aphorism of Pāṇini *Saptamyadhikaraṇe Ca* (II.2.36). Here, the seventh case is in the sense of substratum. The substratum means base as per the *sūtra* - *Ādhāro 'dhikaraṇam* (I.4.45). The base and the substratum are therefore one and the same. The portion of substratum is the direct meaning and the characteristic of substratum is the delimiting factor of the status of direct meaning.

Mīmāṃsakas have also accepted Locative Case in the sense *Adhikaraṇa*. Khaṇḍadeva mentions in his *Bhāṭṭarahasya* –

अतोऽधिकरणत्वमेव सप्तम्यर्थः।<sup>25</sup>

Unlike grammarians and Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas take *Ādheyatva* as the meaning of the Locative case. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya in his *Vyutpattivāda* mentions –

आधारसप्तम्या, आधेयत्वम्।<sup>26</sup>

It is not that object, agent, instrument too would get the appellation of 'substratum' on account of their being 'base'. The appellation would be possible if it has no contradiction with their respective appellations. Though the sense of seventh case ordained by the governing rule *Kārake* (I.4.23), is 'substratum of action' only, still here the state of being substratum is through agent and object.

There would not be admixture (of agent, object & substratum). All these can be made different on the basis of their determinant.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Khaṇḍadeva, *BR*, p. 158

<sup>26</sup> Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, *op cit*, p. 311

The sense of second case as substratum is determined by fruit and third case as substratum is determined by action. Similarly, the sense of seventh case as substratum is determined by the action of agent and fruit of the object, as seen in the words like *Sthālī*, *Bhūtala*, *Kaṭa*, etc. when used as *Sthālyām Pacati*, *Bhūtale Vasati*, *Kaṭe Śete* respectively.

It is clear from the statement of Bhartṛhari –

It is called ‘*Adhikaraṇa*’ or substratum which possesses indirectly the action that is distant due to agent and object and which corroborates to the accomplishment of fruit.<sup>28</sup>

*Adhikaraṇa* has three varieties viz.. pervasive (*Vyāpaka*), immediately connected (*Aupaśleṣika*) and topical (*Vaiṣayika*). Their examples are:

1. Pervasive (*Vyāpaka*): This variety of *Adhikaraṇa* can be understood by the example of *Tileṣu Tailam* (oil pervades the sesamum). Both oil and sesamum have the relation of *Samavāya* since it is difficult to separate oil from sesamum completely.
2. Immediately connected (*Aupaśleṣika*): Its example is *Kaṭe Śete* (He sits on the mat). Here the relation between the doer and *Adhikaraṇa* has *Samyoga*. The *Adhikaraṇa* has not covered the doer completely.
3. Topical (*Vaiṣayika*): It can be illustrated as *Khe Śakunayaḥ* (Birds are in the sky). Sky and birds are not bound with the relation of either *Samavāya* or *Samyoga*. The negation of both the relation is found here. Therefore the relation is topical.

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<sup>27</sup> Ancient and modern grammarians have different of opinion regarding the form of *Adhikaraṇa-kāraka*. Modern grammarians accept relation of *Adhikaraṇa* in agent and object. Kaiyaṭa and other ancient grammarians accept the relation of *Adhikaraṇa* in action and through action this relation is established in agent and object.

<sup>28</sup> कर्तृकर्मव्यवहितामसाक्षाद्धारयक्रियाम् । उपकुर्वत् क्रियासिद्धौ शास्त्रेऽधिकरणं स्मृतम् ॥ ३.७.१४८॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 339

## Ablative Case (*Apādāna-kāraka*)

The Ablative case is mostly used when the separation is intended to show e.g. *Vṛkṣāt Parṇam Patati* (a leaf falls from the tree). In this, the separation of the leaf from the tree is expressed by the Ablative case. This separation is technically termed as *Apādāna*<sup>29</sup>. The aphorism of Pāṇini *Apādāne Pañcamī* (II.3.28) mentions the use of Ablative case in the sense of *Apādāna*. There isn't any difference of opinion amongst the scholars regarding the use of Ablative Case. Some name it *Avadhiḥ*. The word *Avadhiḥ* also means division<sup>30</sup>. Kaunḍabhaṭṭa explains it as *Avadhiḥ Pañcamyarthah* while Nāgeśabhaṭṭa describes it as *Pañcamyartho'vadhiḥ*

Kaunḍabhaṭṭa has quoted four verses of VP. But among the four, only two are available today. The rest two are not found in the edition of VP. The first two are –

During separation, the component which is either moving or not moving is 'stationery (*Dhruva*)' and not being the substratum of such action it is called *Apādāna*.

When somebody falls from the horse, the horse is definitely fixed because he is falling from the horse. When that horse too falls, the wall etc., is called *Dhruva*.<sup>31</sup>

The verses available are -

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<sup>29</sup> ध्रुवमपायेऽपादानम् ॥ १.४.२४॥, Pāṇini, *op cit*, p. 7

<sup>30</sup> There are seven different meaning of the word अवधि: like application, duration, limit, appointment, an engagement, a hole and a division. Among these seven meanings, Kaunḍabhaṭṭa and Nāgeśabhaṭṭa have used it in the sense of division.

<sup>31</sup> The unavailable two verses are अपाये यदुदासीनं चलं वा यदि वाऽचलम् । ध्रुवमेवातदावेशात्तदपादानमुच्यते ॥ and

पततो ध्रुव एवाश्वो यस्मादश्वात् पतत्यसौ । तस्याप्यश्वस्य पतने कुड्यादिध्रुवमुच्यते ॥

Sometimes, it is caused by action in both as in two fighting goats. When separation is distinct, the action in both of them is intended to be mentioned. Each goat will be the limit or point of separation in relation to the action of other goat separately. Thus, each goat is the agent (of such action) on the basis of action separately. (Each will be *Dhruva* in relation with action of the other).<sup>32</sup>

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa takes *Apādana* as *Dhruvatva*. *Dhruva* is the substratum of separation although not being the substratum of action which causes such separation (प्रकृतधात्वर्थप्रधानीभूतव्यापारानाश्रयत्वे सति तज्जन्यविभागाश्रयत्वं ध्रुवत्वम्).

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa opines that there are two types of substratum of separation (*Dhruva*) viz.. substratum of separation with motion (*Sakriyadhruva*) and substratum of separation without motion (*Niṣkriyadhruva*). The example of *Sakriyadhruva* is *Dhāvato 'śvāt Patati* (he falls from the running horse). The example of *Niṣkriyadhruva* is *Vṛkṣāt Patrāṇi Patanti* (leaves fall from the tree). In the first example, the substratum of separation is a horse which is in motion when the rider falls from it. So, it is termed as substratum of separation with motion – *Sakriyadhruva*. In the second illustration, the substratum of separation is a tree which is steady. No motion is observed in tree when leaves fall from it. That is why the tree is substratum of separation without any motion - *Niṣkriyadhruva*.

In the example, *Kuḍyāy Patato 'śvāt Patati* (he falls from the horse who is also falling from the wall) – the wall and the horse both are substratums of separation. The uniqueness of this example is - it has both *Sakriyadhruva* and *Niṣkriyadhruva* varieties of *Dhruvatva*. The wall is *Niṣkriyadhruva* while the

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<sup>32</sup> उभावप्यध्रुवौ मेपौ यद्यप्युभयकर्मके । विभागे प्रविभक्ते तु क्रिये तत्र व्यवस्थिते ॥३.७.१४०॥ and

मेपान्तरक्रियापेक्षमवधित्वं पृथक् पृथक् । मेपयोः स्वक्रियापेक्षं कर्तृत्वं च पृथक् पृथक् ॥३.७.१४१॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 334

horse is *Sakriyadhruva*. The words ‘*Tasyāpi*’, etc. in the explanation suggests the same thing according to Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa.<sup>33</sup>

To this, the question is raised that this rule would not become applicable in the case of *Parasparānmeṣāvapasarataḥ* (two sheep start from each other). Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa replies that in this example the action of going is same but its substratum i.e. the doer of the action is different. Motion is found in both the sheep. Therefore it is an example of *Sakriyadhruva*. Here the act of separation is found in both the sheep.<sup>34</sup>

Patañjali also takes it as one action of two different doers –

न तिङन्तान्येकशेषारम्भं प्रयोजयन्ति । किं कारणम् एका हि  
क्रिया ।<sup>35</sup>

Bhartrhari,<sup>36</sup> Bhaṭṭojidīkṣīta,<sup>37</sup> Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa<sup>38</sup> and Nāgeśabhaṭṭa<sup>39</sup> take it as two different actions of two different doers. In the instance where both are moving away from each other though there is single separation, due to difference of action, each can be *Dhruva* in relation to the action of the other. The action intended here is the root-sense and not mere trembling or movement.

<sup>33</sup> “कुड्यात् पततोऽश्वात् पतति” इत्यत्राश्वस्य विश्लेषजनकक्रियाश्रयत्वेऽपि तन्न विरुद्धमित्याहयस्मा- दश्वादिति । तद्विश्लेषहेतुक्रियानाश्रयत्वे सतीति विशेषणीयमिति भावः । एवमश्वनिष्ठक्रियानाश्रयत्वात् कुड्यादेरपि ध्रुवत्वमित्याह-तस्यापीति ।

<sup>34</sup> उभावपि अधुवौ मेषौ मेषान्तरक्रियापेक्षम् अवधित्वं पृथक् पृथक् ... मेषयोः स्वक्रियापेक्षं कर्तृत्वं च पृथक् पृथक् । VBS, p. 210

<sup>35</sup> MB on 1.2.64, p. 229

<sup>36</sup> मेषान्तरक्रियापेक्षमवधित्वं पृथक् पृथक् । मेषयोः स्वक्रियापेक्षं कर्तृत्वं च पृथक् पृथक् ॥ ३.७.१४१ ॥ Bhartrhari, *op cit*, p. 336

<sup>37</sup> परस्परान्मेषावपसरतः इत्यत्र तु सृधातुना गतिद्वयस्याप्युपादानादेकनिष्ठां गतिं प्रतीतरस्यापादानत्वं न विरुध्येत् । Bhaṭṭojidīkṣīta, *op cit*, p. 191

<sup>38</sup> यथा निश्चलमेषादपसरद्वितीयमेषस्थले निश्चलमेषस्यापसरन्मेषक्रियामादाय परस्य ध्रुवत्वमिति । VBS, p. 212

<sup>39</sup> किञ्च मेषपदवाच्योः पशुविशेषयोः क्रियाश्रयत्वविवक्षा, परस्परपदवाच्ययोस्तयोस्तु विभागाश्रयत्व-विवक्षेत्यौपाधिकस्तयोर्भेदः । शब्दस्वरूपोपाधिकृतभेदोऽप्यर्थे गृह्यते । यथात्मानमात्मना वेत्ति इत्यादौ शरीरावच्छिन्नं कर्तृ, अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नं करणं, निरवच्छिन्नं निरीहं कर्म, एकस्यैव शब्दभेदाद् भेदः, शब्दालिङ्गितस्यैव सर्वत्र भानात् । Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, *PLM*, p. 260

It is argued that there can be the sentence like *Vṛkṣād Vastram Patati*. (The cloth falls from the tree) when the cloth has separation caused by the action of the tree like shaking etc. Kaunḍabhaṭṭa counters back in a strong manner. He suggests that all these are not the direct sense of fifth case. Since the overapplication of usage is not possible on the lines of the explanation and since it cannot be included in the category of direct sense due to congruity.

On the basis of the above discussion, a very interesting question is raised by the opponent. If the substratum of separation is the meaning of *Apādana*, then there can be an expression like *Vṛkṣāt Tyajati*. In this, the separation from the tree is evident. Hence, this is grammatically proved.

Kaunḍabhaṭṭa brushes aside the doubt of the opponent. He says that from the perspective of grammar also, this expression is not valid. Even by understanding that the substratum of separation caused by motion which is roote-sense, the usage *Vṛkṣāt Tyajati* is not unavoidable, because the *Karmasajñā* of *Vṛkṣa* would set aside the *Apādanasajñā*. Hence there won't be *Apādana-kāraka*. Moreover, the sense is not appropriate from the logical point of view. The literal sense of the sentence is 'something is being abandoned from the tree'. The root *Tyaj* is used in the case of the thing which is possessed by someone or something. The question is who possesses the tree and how a sentient being can be the part of an insentient thing like tree. Therefore, in place of *Vṛkṣat Tyajati*, *Vṛkṣat Patati* is the better expression.

In the example, *Rūpaṁ Rasāt Pṛthag*, the *Apādanasajñā* of the word *Rasa* is just an imagined one or it is by virtue of the rule *Pṛthag-vinā-nānābhistrīyā'nyatarasyām* (II.3.32). It means that the fifth case is optionally used along with the words *Pṛthag*, *Vinā* and *Nānā*, etc.

Kaunḍabhaṭṭa has given three varieties of *Apādana-kāraka*. They are:

1. *Nirdiṣṭaviṣayam*



## 2. *Upāttaviṣayam*

## 3. *Apekṣitakriyam*

The three-fold classification of *Apādāna-kāraka* is based on the VP of Bhartṛhari.<sup>40</sup>

The *Nirdiṣṭaviṣayam Apādāna* is that in which the sense of separation is clearly indicated by the root<sup>41</sup> e.g. *Aśvāt Patati* (he falls from the horse). Here the root *Pat* directly indicates the activity of falling. Hence the word *Aśva* which is the limit of point is in Ablative case.

*Upāttaviṣayam Apādāna* is that when the root implies its sense as secondary to another root-sense<sup>42</sup> e.g. *Balāhakād Vidyotate* (The lightning shines from the cloud) Here the root-sense of *Dyuti* is secondary to the root-sense ‘coming out’ i.e. *Nissaraṇa* which is supplied extra.

*Apekṣitakriyam Apādāna* is that when the action is not mentioned but inferred e.g. *Kuto Bhavān? Pāṭaliputrāt.* (Where are you from? From the city called Pataliputra) Here the sentence should be understood by adding the sense of coming. It becomes clear as *Kutaḥ Āgacchati Bhavān? Pāṭaliputrād-āgataḥ.*

## **Dative Case (*Sampradāna-kāraka*)**

Scholars unanimously accept that Dative case should be used in the sense of ‘donation or offering’ (*Sampradāna*). *Sampradāna* is used for the Dative case when someone gives something to another person without asking for its return. Pāṇini’s aphorism *Karmaṇā yamabhipraiti Sa Sampradānam* (I.4.32)<sup>43</sup> also supports the same thought. Therefore *Sampradāna* can be used in *Viprāya Gām Dadāti* (He offers cows to the brahmin) and not for *Rajakāya Vastram Dadāti*

<sup>40</sup> निर्दिष्टविषयं किञ्चिदुपात्तविषयं तथा । अपेक्षितक्रियञ्चेति त्रिधाऽपादानमुच्यते ॥ ३.७.१३६॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 335

<sup>41</sup> यत्र साक्षाद् धातुना गतिर्निदिश्यते तन्निर्दिष्टविषयम् । VBS, p. 238

<sup>42</sup> यत्र धात्वन्तरार्थाङ्गं स्वार्थं धातुराह, तदुपात्तविषयम् । *Ibid*

<sup>43</sup> Pāṇini, *op cit*, p. 9

(He gives cloth to the washerman).<sup>44</sup> When a person is donating a cow to a Brahmin, he doesn't want its return. In the *Rajakāya Vastram Dadāti*, a person is not giving cloth to the washerman as donation. After the completion of washing and ironing the washerman will return the cloth for which he will be paid. Therefore, this act of giving doesn't govern Dative case. Bhartṛhari in his excellent work on the philosophy of grammar elaborates this idea in the following manner –

अनिरकारणात्कर्तुस्त्यागाङ्गं कर्मणेप्सितम् ।

प्रेरणानुमतिभ्यां वा लभते सम्प्रदानम्॥ ३.७.१२९॥<sup>45</sup>

But Kaunḍabhaṭṭa takes *Sampradāna* in the sense of purpose or intention (*Uddeśya*). He defines the aphorism of AA I.4.32 as –

तच्च कर्मणा यमभिप्रैति स सम्प्रदानम् इति सूत्रात् कर्मणा कारणभूतेन  
तत्कारकं सम्प्रदानत्वं, यमभिप्रैतीप्सतिम् ।

According to Kaunḍabhaṭṭa *Rajakāya Vastram Dadāti* (He gives cloth to the washerman) is correct. He doesn't accept *Sampradāna* in the sense of 'giving away one's possession (स्वस्वत्वनिवृत्तिपूर्वकपरस्वत्वत्वोत्पादन-).' Nāgeśabhaṭṭa's view is also similar to Kaunḍabhaṭṭa.

Here the question arises that which view should be accepted? This doubt is very nicely cleared by *Darpaṇakāra* -

उक्तभाष्यप्रामाण्यादन्वर्थत्वमेवासिद्धम् । महासंज्ञाकरणं प्राचामनुरोधादेव  
सर्वनामस्थानसंज्ञावद् ।

<sup>44</sup> In रजकस्य, Genitive is used by the aphorism शेषे षष्ठी it is an example of सम्बन्धषष्ठी.

<sup>45</sup> Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 332

Moreover, there is a famous maxim in Sanskrit grammar which accepts the authority of the latter grammarians (उत्तरोत्तरमुनीनां प्रामाण्यम्). Hence, the view of Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa and Nāgeśabhaṭṭa is more acceptable.

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa gives three-fold classification of *Sampradāna-kāraka* on the basis of VP.<sup>46</sup> They are – *Anirākartṛsampradānam*, *Preyayitr̥sampradānam* and *Anumantr̥sampradānam*

*Anirākartṛsampradānam* is that in which neither request nor acceptance nor avoidance is seen e.g. *Saḥ Sūryāya Arghyam Dadāti* (He offers oblation to the Sun). Here the Sun does not request, nor accept nor avoid the oblation made by the doer.

*Preyayitr̥sampradānam* is that in which a kind of encouragement or inspiration is noticed e.g. *Viprāya Gaṁ Dadāti* (He donates a cow to the Brahmin) Here the Brahmin encourages somebody to donate him a cow.

*Anumantr̥sampradānam* is that in which acceptance of receiver is seen e.g. *Upādhyāyāya Gaṁ Dadāti* (He donates a cow to the teacher). Here the teacher does not request or encourage. But he doesn't avoid it also. He accepts the offering.

## Genitive case

Ancient and modern grammarians hold relation as the meaning of the Genitive case. So there isn't any question regarding the meaning of the sixth case, but the problem is about the meaning of relation. The question is whether it should be taken in general sense (*Sambandhasāmānya*) or particular sense (*Sambandhaviśeṣaṇa*)? Ancient grammarians opine that *Sambandhasāmānya*

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<sup>46</sup> अनिराकरणात् कर्तृस्त्यागाङ्गं कर्मणेप्सितम् । प्रेरणानुमतिभ्यां च लभते सम्प्रदानताम् ॥ ३.७.१२९॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 332

has to be accepted as the power of expression for sixth case. It is because the relation is not confined to any particular *Kāraka*. It is commonly found in all the *Kārakas*. The rule of Pāṇini *Śeṣe Śaṣṭhi* suggests the same thing. But modern grammarians find the fault of prolixity in the view of ancient grammarians. They accept relation in the particular sense.

Genitive case is never accepted as a *Kāraka* since it does not have any direct relation with the production of an action.<sup>47</sup> Naiyāyikas' view is similar to grammarians with regard to sixth case. Jagadīśa in his SsP mentions the same thing –

षष्ठ्यर्थस्तु सम्बन्धो न धात्वर्थे प्रकारिभूय भासते ,तण्डुलस्य  
पचतीत्याद्यप्रयोगात्,अतः सम्बन्धो न कारकम्।<sup>48</sup>

In all these instances, there is the relation of identity between the base and the suffix, because the case-suffixes give the sense of *Dharmi* (the thing possessing property). Otherwise if the case-suffixes are taken to give the sense of *Dharma* (property) alone, then the Pāṇini 's *sūtras* would become meaningless. The secondary suffixes used in the sense of object too give the sense of *Dharmi*.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa has covered almost all the aspects of the *Kārakas*. The use and significance of case suffixes and *Kārakas* in the spoken language is nicely dealt with by him.

## IV.2. Meaning of Nominal Stem

Nominal stem stands for crude form of the word. Crude form is that which is not suffixed by any kind of suffix like case suffixes (*Subanta*), primary

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<sup>47</sup> सम्बन्धस्य कारकत्वं नास्ति क्रियायोगाभावात्, इति शाब्दिकाः । Puruṣottamadeva, *Kārakacakra*, p. 4-5

<sup>48</sup> Tarkālaṅkāra, Jagadīśa, Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā with Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvāgīśa's *Kṛṣṇakānti* and Rāmabhadra Siddhātavāgīśa's *Prabodhinī* commentaries, p. 67

derivative suffixes (*Kṛdanta*), secondary derivative suffixes (*Taddhita*) or verbal ending-suffix (*Ṭiṇanta*). There are two types of crude forms in Sanskrit. They are root (*Dhātu*) and nominal stem (*Prātipadika*). These two are the basis of the verb and noun respectively. The root is already discussed in the first section of the third chapter. Now, this section presents the discussion on the nature, scope and limitations of nominal stems. Grammarians hold the opinion that even the word possesses the power to express meaning. This power of expression is commonly found in all words of all the languages. The power of word is nicely eulogized by Bhartṛhari in the following manner-

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।

अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥ १.१३१ ॥<sup>49</sup>

Different intellectuals of Sanskrit *Śāstras* have tried to define the meaning of Nominal stem (*Nāma*). Mīmāṃsakas take it as *Jātī* (class), Naiyāyikas take it as *Vyakti* (individual), *Ākṛti* (form) and *Jātī*. Vaiyākaraṇas take it as *Jātīviśiṣṭa-dravya* (substance which is special characteristic of the class). Mahimabhaṭṭa, the author of *Vyaktiviveka* describes it as *Pravṛtti-nimitta* (the process of making as an instrumental cause). Apart from these three, *Liṅga* (gender), *Samkhyā* (number) and *Kāraka* are also expressed as *Nāmārthas*. The last three are commonly found in the descriptions of ancient and modern grammarians, but they are not accepted as the only sense of Nominal stem by any branch of philosophy. Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa has mentioned five Nominal stems and has presented his thesis in very abridged manner. He says –

एकं द्विकं त्रिकं चाथ चतुष्कं पञ्चकं तथा ।

नामार्थ इति सर्वेऽपि पक्षाः शास्त्रे निरूपिताः ॥ २५ ॥<sup>५०</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 50

Mīmāṃsakas hold the opinion that *Jātī* (class) is the only meaning of nominal stem. They strongly advocate the view that only class expresses the meaning of nominal stem and not individual. Class represents all individuals of its kind. Cowness (*Gotva*) is a class which represents the entire community of cow and cowness itself. It stands for the individual member of the community, too. Therefore, the power of expression lies in the class and not in the individual. They opine that if power be taken as expressive of individual only then it will lead to the fault of prolixity. For, there maybe endless individuals and the power expressed by them will be infinite. This will create the confusion regarding the form of the power of expression.

The individuals are understood as not different from the class by the strength of *Nirūḍha-Lakṣaṇā* (unintentional purpose).<sup>51</sup> It means individual is implicit in the class by the power of *Nirūḍha-Lakṣaṇā* just as a horse is understood in ‘white is running (*Śveto Dhāvati*)’. In this instance, there is no need to mention horse separately but by the power of unintentional purpose; the meaning of white horse is running is understood from ‘white is running’. It can be like the relation of the pot and the sky. The sky always remains present in the pot, but is not spoken out differently.

Naiyāyikas accept *Jātyākṛti-viśiṣṭa-vyakti* (i.e. individual having the same power as the class does) as the meaning of nominal stem. According to their view only individual possesses the power of the expression of the nominal stem. They find fault of conciseness (*Lāghava*) in the view of Mīmāṃsakas who hold *Jātī* (class) as the only meaning of nominal stem. When every individual is taken as the class and the prowess to render the meaning of individual lies in the

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<sup>50</sup> The Nominal stem-sense is taken as being one, two-fold, three-fold, four-fold and five-fold (by different branches of philosophy). All these views are well discussed in the science of grammar.

<sup>51</sup> एवं च गौरस्ति इत्यादावन्वयानुपपत्त्यभावेऽपि न दोषः, निरूढलक्षणायां तदनपेक्षणात् । VBS, p. 278

class only, then, it ultimately destroys the significance of the individual. So, the class maybe used in place of individual or individual maybe used in place of class. Due to this, the importance of class and individual will be demolished. Such type of relation between the class and the individual also creates the fault of conciseness. Therefore the thought of Mīmāṃsakas is full of ambiguity and does not have any logical substance.

Naiyāyikas justify their stand on individual aspect (*Vyakti-pakṣa*). The fault of prolixity arises when it is imagined that the power of nominal stem is located in each individual separately and not in class. It is true that each individual has the power but they all present the same power as class does. It means that their power is not separate from the class. The power expressed by the individual is common in others too. So, in the absence of one individual, another individual will represent the same power and this will not go against the power expressed by the group. It does not create any problem for the *Anvaya* of the word. Moreover, there won't be any need of the use of Indication (*Lakṣaṇā*) for getting the meaning. This theory is illustrated by the example of 'cow'. When a grandfather asks his son to bring the cow, the son brings the cow. This action is noticed by the grandson who doesn't know what a cow is? From the behavior of the elder the child learns about the cow. In this instance, the knowledge of the cow is learnt by the child from the behavior of the individual.<sup>52</sup> This is proved by the valid means of *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna* and *Arhātāpatti*.

Mahimabhaṭṭa in his *Vyaktiviveka* describes *Pravṛtti-nimitta* (the process of making as an instrumental cause) as the only meaning of the nominal stem. According to him, only class cannot be taken as the meaning of nominal stem.

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<sup>52</sup> शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानकोशाप्तवाक्याद् व्यवहारतश्च । वाक्यस्य शेषाद् विवृत्तेर्वदन्ति सान्निध्यतः

सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः ॥ Nyāyapañcanan, Viśvanātha, *NSM*, p. 68

Mamṭa describes the same thing in his KP as *Anvitābhidhāna* –

शब्दवृद्धाभिधेयाँश्च प्रत्यक्षेणात्र पश्यति । श्रोताश्च प्रतिपन्नत्वमनुमानेन चेष्टया ॥ ५.६९.१॥

अन्यथानुपपत्त्या तु बोधेच्छाशक्तिं द्वायात्मिकाम् । अर्थापत्त्यावबोधेत सम्बन्धं त्रिप्रमाणकम् ॥ ५.६९.२॥

Mamṭa, *op cit*, p. 156

The process of making the pot (*Ghaṭana*) in pot is the real meaning of the nominal stem. Unless the *Ghaṭa* (pot) or *Paṭa* (cloth) gets its final shape, nobody can name them as *Ghaṭa* or *Paṭa*. In the absence of *Ghaṭa*, *Ghaṭatva* (potness) cannot be assumed or indicated. Likewise, before the origination of the product, the *Ghaṭa* can be misled as *Paṭa* or vice versa. Therefore, the process of making is the real and only meaning of the nominal stem.<sup>53</sup>

This view of Mahimabhaṭṭa is not acceptable completely. The process of making is required for the manufacturing of any object. But, the view that *Ghaṭa* can be misled as *Paṭa* is erroneous since the elements required for the production of the pot and cloth are different. So, pot can never be taken as cloth even before the final production.

Grammarians neither accept class nor individual as the nominal stem-meaning, but they accept the sense of *Jātīviśiṣṭa-dravya* or *Dravyaviśiṣṭa-Vyakti*. Patañjali, in his MB, presents detailed discussion on it by referring the aphorism of Pāṇini – *Sarūpānāmekaśeṣa Ekavibhaktau* (I.2.64). He explains it as *Dravyapadārthakasya Vākṛtirna Padārthaḥ*. It means, a form is not the real meaning of the *Pada*, but the substance, is the real *Padārtha*. That is why he accepts *Dravyatva* (substance) which is commonly found in class and individual. Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa has followed the path of Patañjali while dealing with the nominal stem. He says –

वस्तुतस्तु न ह्याकृतिपदार्थकस्य द्रव्यं न पदार्थः - इति भाष्याद् विशिष्टं  
वाच्यम् ।

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa has deliberated the same thing in his PLM –

वस्तुतस्तु न ह्याकृतिपदार्थकस्य द्रव्यं न पदार्थः इति सरूपसूत्रभाष्याद्  
विशिष्टमेव वाच्यं तथैवानुभवात् । अनुभवसिद्धस्यापलापानर्हत्वाच्च ।

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<sup>53</sup> Nageśbhaṭṭa, *op cit*, p. 30



Words are divided into three genders viz. masculine, feminine and neuter. They are divided into *Śāstrīya* and *Laukika*.<sup>54</sup> Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa has discussed the nature of *Śāstrīya* words. He opines that the gender of the insentient objects like *Khaṭvā*, *Vṛkṣa*, etc. can be decided by the preponderance of the three qualities viz. *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. The word also has three stages depending upon the level of these three qualities. The three stages are *Upacaya*, *Apacaya* and *Sāmānya*. The word, in which these three qualities are found in highest degree (*Upacaya*), is termed as masculine. The word in which they are found with lowest degree (*Apacaya*) is termed as feminine and when these qualities are found in balanced form (*Sāmānya*) in word, it is termed as neuter. Both ancient grammarians like Patañjali,<sup>55</sup> Kaiyaṭa<sup>56</sup> and modern grammarians like Nāgeśabhaṭṭa<sup>57</sup> are of the same view.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa suggests that the fixation of gender depends on two things - *Liṅgānuśāsana* (treatise on the science of gender) and *Vṛddhavyavahāra* (activities of the learned man). The *Upacaya*, *Apacaya* and *Sāmānya* are found in all words with difference in their degree. The words presenting two stages at a time become *Dviliṅgiśabda* (word having two genders) e.g. *Avāraḥ* (m), *Avāram* (n). Both these words mean 'a bank of river'. Those representing all the three stages at a time are termed as *Triliṅgiśabda* or *Sarvaliṅgiśabda* (words having all the three genders) e.g. *Taṭaḥ* (m), *Taṭī* (n) and *Taṭam* (n). All the three words mean 'a bank of river'. The rest are termed as *Niyataliṅgiśabda* (word having fixed gender).

<sup>54</sup> *Śāstrīya* stands for those words which are used in the *Śāstras*; while *Laukika* for those which are found in the literature and in the spoken language. The text of VBS has mainly described and discussed *Śāstrīya*.

<sup>55</sup> संस्त्यानप्रसवौ लिङ्गमास्थेयो स्वकृतान्ततः । MB on AA, 4.1.3, p. 560

<sup>56</sup> संस्त्यानमिति तिरोभावः, प्रवृत्तिराविर्भावः, साम्यावस्थास्थितिः । PM on MB 4.1.3, p. 310

<sup>57</sup> अचेतनखट्वावृक्षादिसाधारणं लिङ्गन्तु सत्त्वादीनां गुणानामुपचयापचयस्थितिरूपं क्रमेण पुंस्त्रीनपुंसकाख्यम् । Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, LSS, p. 68

The doubt arises: some words like *Ātmā*, *Brahman*, etc. do not have the qualities of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. Then how they can be termed as masculine or feminine or neuter? Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa replies that the qualities have been superimposed on these words for the sake of worldly usage.<sup>58</sup>

This view of Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa gets its support from the aphorisms of Pāṇini where he mentions the gender of the words like *Tasmācchaso Naḥ Puṁsi*, *Svamornapuṁsakāt*, *Hrasvo Napuṁsake Prātipadikasya*, etc. That is why we find a word having three different synonyms in three different genders e.g. the word constellation has three synonyms: *Puṣyaḥ* (m), *Tārakā* (f) and *Nakṣatram* (n). The word *Kuṭī* is in feminine and *Kuṭīraḥ* is in masculine. Therefore, we may conclude that *Liṅga* depends upon the inherent quality of a word.

Bhaṭṭoji<sup>59</sup> and other grammarians have accepted *Prātipadika* for *Niyataliṅgaśabdaḥ* and not for *Aniyataliṅgaśabdaḥ*. Nāgeśabhaṭṭa<sup>60</sup> makes it clear that the knowledge of gender in any word is possible when the word has given a particular gender.

This view is challenged by the opponent by quoting the word like *Paśu* which is used in the Veda and the word *Vyakti* which is found in feminine gender. Can the word *Paśu* be taken in feminine gender? If it be taken in feminine then, it will go against the rules of the sacrifice. To this question, the reply given is - it should be understood that the injunction as *Paśunā* etc., doesn't involve the female *Chāgī* (she-goat). No similarity should be doubted between the gender of word like *Vyakti* and that of the word *Paśu* because –

The word *Vyakti* is always in feminine gender. So, it can refer to any word of any gender.

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<sup>58</sup> सत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणानां साम्यावस्था नपुंसकत्वम्, आधिक्यं पुंस्त्वमपचयः स्त्रीत्वम् । VBS, p. 290

<sup>59</sup> लिङ्गग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् नियतोपस्थितिकः प्रातिपदिकार्थः । *Ibid*

<sup>60</sup> अलिङ्गाः नियतलिङ्गाश्च प्रातिपदिकार्थमात्र इत्यस्योदाहरणम् यथा – उच्चैः, नीचैः, कृष्णः, श्रीः ज्ञानम् । Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, *PLM*, p. 123

In the Ṛgveda 1.12.65, 1.3.26, the word *Paśu* is seen as used in feminine gender.<sup>61</sup> But, the explanation given by *Mīmāṃsāśāstra* brushes aside the doubt regarding the use of the word *Paśu*. The fourth chapter of the *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra* makes it clear that the word *Paśunā* refers to a single, male *Paśu* only when used for sacrificial injunction. Therefore, there cannot be a sacrifice either involving so many animals (more than one) or a female animal.

In the *Vedabhāṣya*, it has been made clear that there is no *Nā* substitute for the Vedic words by the rule *Jasādiṣu Chandasi Vā Vacanam*. All this leads to the conclusion that the word *Paśu* is always in masculine gender.

In the present context, the conclusion is derived on the strength of the principle *Chāgo Vā Mantravarṇāt* (MS VI.8.31) in which it is heard *Chāgasya Vapāyāḥ Medasaḥ*. The word *Chāgasya* bars the possibility of female *Chāga*. Thus, the word *Paśu* is decided as *Niyataliṅgaśabdaḥ*.

*Samkhyā* is also taken as the meaning of the Nominal stem. Here Number is identified with the case suffix (*Vibhakti*). In *Rāmaḥ*, suffix *Su* (=S) of Nominative singular represents singularity of the doer; in *Rāmau*, suffix *Au* of Nominative dual shows duality and in *Rāmāḥ*, suffix *Jas* (=As) of Nominative Plural indicates plurality.<sup>62</sup> Hence, the number along with the case suffix signifies the meaning of the nominal stem.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa has accepted number as nominal stem. The words like *Rāma*, etc. (not having any case suffix) do not suggest the sense of masculine; the same is understood in *Jñāna* as neuter, and *Mālā* as feminine.

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<sup>61</sup> पश्वाऽनतायुं गुहाचरन्तम् । पशवे नृभ्योयथा गवे ।

<sup>62</sup> सङ्ख्यापि नामार्थः, विभक्तीनां द्योतकत्वात् । अत एव 'आदिर्जिटुडवः' इति सूत्र आदिरिति बहुत्व-एकवचनम् । वाच्यत्वेऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां जसं विना नामार्थबहुत्वप्रतीत्यभावापत्तेः। Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, *PLM*, p. 150

The exceptions to the above given rule are found in the language e.g. *Madhu Paśya* (see the honey) and *Dadhi Ānaya* (bring the curd). In these examples, the case suffixes are dropped.<sup>63</sup> There is verbal comprehension even to a person who doesn't know the suffix. So, the base alone is stated as the denotative factor of these senses.

Apart from the five meanings of nominal stem, syntax (*Kāraka*) is also treated as one of them. Nāgeśabhaṭṭa explains it as –

कारकमपि प्रातिपदिकार्थ इति पञ्चकं प्रातिपदिकार्थः।<sup>64</sup>

Pāṇini while stating *Anabhihite* accepts both number and *Kāraka* as nominal stem. Patañjali in his MB explains this in the following manner-

यद्येकत्वादयो विभक्त्यर्था अथ हि कर्मादयो विभक्त्यर्थाः  
नार्थोऽनभिहिताधिकारेण।<sup>65</sup>

Bharṭṛhari has accepted neither stem (*Prātipadika*) nor suffix (*Vibhaktipratyaya*) as nominal stem. According to him, the word *Ghaṭaḥ* represents both stem and suffix which are equally important –

वाचिका द्योतिका वा स्युर्द्वित्वादीनां विभक्तयः ।

यद्वा सङ्ख्यावतोऽर्थस्य समुदायोऽभिधायकः ॥ २.१६४॥<sup>66</sup>

Bharṭṛhari opines that there cannot be any cognition in this world without the word. All kinds of knowledge, verbal cognition and worldly parlance take place through power of word. The relation of the word with its meaning is eternal. This word and meaning covers the entire world. This type of cognition is known

<sup>63</sup> 'वस्तुतस्तु एकत्वादयो विभक्त्यर्थाः' इत्यस्य सूत्रे प्राधान्येन विभक्तिद्योत्यत्वेन बोधिताः इत्यर्थः। एवं कर्मादयो विभक्त्यर्था इत्यस्यापि । Udyota on MB 2.3.1, p. 84

<sup>64</sup> Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, *PLM*, p. 213

<sup>65</sup> MB on 2.3.1, p. 202

<sup>66</sup> Bharṭṛhari, *op cit*, p. 116

as *Śābdabodha*. Grammarians elucidate this by presenting the example of *Viṣṇumuccāraya*. When someone asks to recite the name of Lord Viṣṇu, the listener remembers Lord Viṣṇu. At the time of remembrance, a particular kind of image is created in the mind of the listener. This happens by the power of word. Therefore, the image too is the sense of the Nominal Stem.

This is challenged by the opponent. He raises the question that some words do not create any image. The *Pratyāhārasūtras* of Pāṇini *Ja-ba-ga-ḍa-da-ś* (XI) do not have any image in them. When someone utters them, they do not bring any meaning to the listener. When it is said ‘utter the letters *Ja-ba-ga-ḍa-da-ś* there is no secondary word-function in the form of relation with primary meaning, as the primary meaning is not comprehend. The uncomprehended word-function is of no use.

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa has placed two conditions to explain the rule.

If both imitation and the imitated are different, then the imitated object not present by the word, word-power needs to be accepted for it.

If both are non-different, then it can produce verbal cognition by direct perception by ears. For, in case of direct perception the object is necessary.

As a matter of fact, the comprehension of word produced by the word-power is the cause of verbal cognition. The word possesses the expressive power through the relation of substratumness. Hence, that alone shall be termed as verbal cognition which possesses the word-power either as determinant or as substratum.<sup>67</sup> It is also corroborated by Bhartṛhari in his VP –

“Like light, the words too possess the potency of illuminationg others and illuminating themselves separately. Without

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<sup>67</sup> शब्दोऽपि यदि भेदेन विवक्षा स्यात् तदा तथा । नोचेच्छ्रोत्रादिभिः सिद्धोऽप्यसावर्थो व भासते ॥२६॥ VBS, p. 298

becoming the content themselves, the words do not express their senses.”<sup>68</sup>

#### IV. 3. Meaning of Word-Power

Any sentient or insentient object has the natural quality to generate a particular sound. The different sounds put in the form of letters and the combination of different letters ultimately form a word. These natural sounds are articulated by the word in a systematic and well-structured manner and through the expressive power of word the meaning of sounds are understood. The word has the power to express the meaning in four different ways e.g. *Gauḥ* (a cow). This word ‘a cow’ can be understood in four different senses pertaining to the context and the intention of the speaker. When someone says ‘this is a cow’, it simply means an animal. It is primary and direct meaning (*Abhidhā*) of the word cow. When the same word is used for a person, it means the person who has the qualities similar to cow. It may present the two-fold aspects of the character of a person i.e. positive and negative; positive like straight-forward and simple nature and negative like dullness and sluggishness. Here one additional meaning is taken up along with the primary meaning. This is known as Indication (*Lakṣaṇā*). The same can be interpreted differently when it is used for a person not having any similar qualities to that of cow. In this case, the primary and indicative meanings are given up and a complete new or sometimes opposite meaning is taken up. This is known as Suggested sense (*Vyañjanā*). When the meaning of the same sentence is taken up by the intention of the speaker, it is Purport (*Tatparya*). It is important to note that the voice modulation in spoken form and the writing style in the written form are the main aids which help to express the meaning with more certainty and clarity. Scholars of different schools like grammar, poetics, logic and Vedic hermeneutics have accepted the power of

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<sup>68</sup> ग्राह्यत्वं ग्राहकत्वं च द्वे शक्ती तेजसो यथा । तथैव सर्वशब्दानामेते पृथगवस्थिते ॥ *Ibid*

words. Any human emotion, formal as well as informal talk can be expressed in these four ways. This section will present the discussion on Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa's stand-point on the power of word in the light of its applicability.

### ***Abhidhā* (Primary Sense)**

The essential nature of word lies in its power of expressing meaning. This power is known as *Śakti* or *Abhidhā*. It is defined as the relation that exists between the word and its meaning, by which the meaning is cognized whenever the word is heard. Speculations about the nature of this relation of meaning with word have been made by different schools of philosophy. The three main schools viz. Grammar, Vedic Hermeneutics, and Logic discuss the theories about natural and conventional origin of this relation.

According to the Vedic Hermeneutics, the significative power is inherent in the words themselves. They were not concerned with the ultimate origin of the relationship between words and meanings. We learn our language from our parents and elders; they in their turn learn it from their forefathers. Thus, the way of learning the meanings could be traced back to any conceivable period of human society. It is quite impossible to trace the exact origin of the establishment of relation with the word and meaning and their use by human beings. The grammarians also agree with the Vedic Hermeneutics to some extent, that the permanent nature of the relation between words and meaning is to be understood from popular usage itself.<sup>69</sup> They also admit that the relation between the word and its meaning is eternal.<sup>70</sup>

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa explains this view by presenting the relation between the organ of perception and its object. Just as the organ of perception has a natural power to

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<sup>69</sup> शिष्टेभ्य आगमात्सिद्धाः साधवो धर्मसाधनम् । अर्थप्रत्यायनाभेदे विपरीतास्त्वसाधवः ॥१.२७॥  
Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 15

<sup>70</sup> नित्याः शब्दार्थसम्बन्धास्तत्राम्नाता महर्षिभिः । सूत्राणां सानुतन्त्राणां भाष्याणाञ्च प्रणेतृभिः ॥१.२३॥  
*Ibid*, p. 12

perceive what comes into its purview similarly words has a natural capacity for conveying the ideas. This natural connection between words and meanings has also been explained in terms of the innate capacity or *Yogyatā* of the words.<sup>71</sup>

The theory of natural relationship between words and meanings is rejected by the logicians. They advocate the conventional origin of relationship. According to them, the meaning of a word is understood by convention.<sup>72</sup> There is no direct natural relationship between word and object denoted. If there were any natural relationship between a word and its meaning as between fire and burning, then, the word should have co-existence with the object signified; but we do not perceive any such relation. A word does not co-exist with the object it denotes. The word 'fire' does not burn the mouth and 'blade' does not cut it; or 'honey' does not sweeten it.

Another substantial argument brought against the natural relationship between words and their meanings is that if words had a natural relation with the objects, the same words should denote the same thing everywhere. The variation in the meanings of words cannot be explained satisfactorily on such a hypothesis. The use of different words for the same object is also against the theory of natural relation between words and their meanings.<sup>73</sup>

Answer to the above argument is - speech is the natural means of communication. Thus, any word has the natural capacity to express its meaning. But it should be noted that any word cannot express any meaning or a word cannot be the expressive of all meanings. This power is restricted by convention.

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<sup>71</sup> cf इन्द्रियाणां स्वविषयेष्वनादिर्योग्यता तथा । अनादिरर्थैः शब्दानां सम्बन्धो योग्यता तथा ॥ ३.३.२९॥  
Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 243

<sup>72</sup> Jaimini, *NS* II.1.55 सामयिकत्वाच्छब्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययस्य । p. 156

<sup>73</sup> *NS*. II.1.56, p. 169



According to the ancient Logicians the connection between words and objects is not natural, but conventional. It is established by the will of God. In the *Tarkasaṃgraha*, *Śakti* is defined as a convention made by the will of God that such and such a meaning should be understood from such and such a word—

अस्मात्पदात्तदयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरसङ्केतशक्तिः ।<sup>74</sup>

Later logicians accept *Śakti* in the word fixed by a man too. The relation need not always be established by the will of God. When the relation is permanent, it is called *Abhidhā* or *Śakti*. When it is established by the will of a man and is temporal, it is known as *paribhāṣā*.<sup>75</sup>

Logicians don't accept the eternality as the cause of comprehension. Such is not found in modern words like Devadatta etc. There would be the problem of comprehension of the relation in the absence of *Samketa* when a father gives a name to his child. There would not be the defect of over application of the definition in the implying words. Therefore, the knowledge of *Samketa* is the only cause and so it should be regarded as power. Such a *Samketa* is equally present in modern words given by a father and in the words like *Minal*, *Tinal*, *Rajal*, etc.

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa eradicates the view of logicians by presenting the following arguments —

1. *Samketa* cannot be the cause.
2. There would be the defect of inconsistency in accepting *Samketa* as the cause. The *Samketa* of *Īśvara* etc. is present in the words like cow etc., There is verbal cognition which is known to the common folk. They have knowledge that such and such word causes the verbal cognition even though they do not know about *Samketa*.

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<sup>74</sup> Annambhaṭṭa, *op cit*, p. 29

<sup>75</sup> Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa, *op cit*, p. 122

Logicians strongly advocate that there is no inconsistency as there is verbal comprehension from mere knowledge of *Samketa* in the words like Devadatta. The nature of causing the knowledge of such sense is observed in the word, when there is the knowledge of desire as ‘let this word denote this sense’.

### ***Lakṣaṇā* (Indication)**

When the relation is only indirect, being based on the similarity or contiguity of the actual intended sense with the primary sense, the relation is called *Lakṣaṇā* or *Upacāra*. Such metaphoric usage is common in all languages. If we take the word as denoting its normal primary meaning, then the sentence may become nonsensical in the context. This produces a mental resistance in the mind of the listener and there is a sort of break in the flow. It excites attention and requires preparation for understanding the purport. The actual referent of the word has to be taken as different from its normal one, but in some way connected with it either through similarity or through some other relation. There are two conditions necessary for *Lakṣaṇā*. They are –

- a) The irrelevance of the primary sense.
- b) Some relation between the primary and the actual referent meaning of the word.

The famous example of *Lakṣaṇā* is ‘*Gaṅgāyām Ghoṣaḥ*’ (the village is on the Gaṅgā). Here the primary meaning of the word *Gaṅgāyām* is ‘on the river Gaṅgā’. This is not suitable to the context, because the village cannot actually be located on the stream of a river. Hence the actual primary meaning of the river Gaṅgā is forsaken and secondary meaning of the word is understood from proximity (*sāmīpya*). When a word is heard, our mind takes up the normal meaning first and when it is found incompatible with the context, we resort to *Lakṣaṇā* and get the actual sense which is related to the normal one and that removes the incompatibility of the meaning.

*Lakṣaṇā* has two varieties viz. *Śuddhā* and *Gauṇī*. In *Śuddhā*, indication has a relation of cause and effect with the *Śākya* e.g. *Āyurghṛtam. Ghṛtam* (purified butter) is the cause for the long and healthy life which is the effect. The long and healthy life is not clearly mentioned in the word, it is inferred through Indication. In this variety, the Indicated sense does not give up the primary sense.

The word *Gauṇī* is derived from the word *Guṇa* i.e. quality. When the similarities of qualities are intended to present, it can be expressed through the *Gauṇī*. Its well-known example is *Gaurvāhīkaḥ* (a person of the *Vāhīka* country is like a bull). Here the primary meaning of a bull is forsaken completely and the qualities of a bull like sluggishness, dullness, etc. are taken. These qualities of a bull are similar to the person of *Vāhīka* country. The relation between *Śākya* and *Lakṣaṇā* is based on the similarity. Therefore it is known as *Sādrśya-sambandha*.

It seems that Bhartṛhari and Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa are not in favour of Indication. Bhartṛhari has mentioned the views of other scholars on the meaning of the word. He states that the imagination of primary and secondary meaning is useless. The word renders the composite sense. The relation between the word and meaning is based on truth and is eternal. Hence the thought that secondary sense is derived through the similarity with primary meaning is cumbersome.<sup>76</sup>

*Lakṣaṇā* is divided into three viz. *Jahallakṣaṇā*, *Ajahallakṣaṇā* and *Jahadajahallakṣaṇā*.

***Jahallakṣaṇā* or *Jahatsvārthā-lakṣaṇā*:** The word *Jahat* literary means abandoning. *Sva+artha* means one's own meaning. *Jahat* is that which abandons the primary sense. In '*Gaṅgāyām Ghoṣaḥ*', the primary sense of the

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<sup>76</sup> वाक्यस्यार्थात्पदार्थानामपोद्धारे प्रकल्पिते । शब्दान्तरेण सम्बन्धः कस्यैकस्योपपद्यते ॥२.२६९॥  
Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 143

word *Gaṅgā* is abandoned and the secondary sense ‘the bank of river *Gaṅgā*’ is taken. In this type Indication there will be the non-intelligibility of the syntactical relation between the words, when the primary meaning of the word is taken up. Hence the primary meaning has to be rejected to a great extent and other meaning connected with it has to be accepted to suit the context.

***Ajahallakṣaṇā* or *Ajahatsvārthā-lakṣaṇā*:** – *Ajahat* is that which does not give up the primary sense. In this type of Indication, the indicated sense does not give up the primary sense completely. Sometimes the primary sense is neither modified nor specific by context. It is not restricted by its syntactical function and not extended by the inclusion of another sense. In all such cases the secondary sense includes the primary sense also. In the example *Kuntāḥ praviśanti* (spears enter), the word *Kuntāḥ* indicates the spears and the men who hold them.

***Jahadajahallakṣaṇā* or *Jahadajahasvārthā-lakṣaṇā*:** The third type of Indication is accepted by Vedantins. It is used in the cases where only a part or an aspect of the primary meaning is accepted, while the rest is rejected. Its well-known examples are - *Tat Tvam Asi* (Thou art That)<sup>77</sup> and *Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi* (I am Brahman).<sup>78</sup> In the sentence *Tat Tvam Asi*, *Tvam* as part of the sentence does not mean ‘Śvetaketu as a son of Uddālaka’, but it refers to all individuals who are attributed with limited intelligence, etc. *Tat* means the Universal Soul having all qualities like omniscience, omnipresence, etc. It is only the pure Consciousness existing in the individual soul that is identified with that of the Universal soul. Here a word signifying entity gives up one part of its primary meaning and retains another part.

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<sup>77</sup> *Chāndogyopaniṣad* VI.8.7, p. 155

<sup>78</sup> *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* I.4.10, p. 131

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa argues that in spite of knowing that a particular word does not give a particular sense, if a person knows that another person has got such sense out of mistake, then such comprehension would not take place. Otherwise, there would be the problem that a person, knowing something wrongly out of illusion would also become illuded.

Thus Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa has tried to uproot the theory of Indication by presenting the arguments such as “the remembrance born from secondary word-function dependent on the word-power alone is the cause of verbal cognition, Therefore, there is no need of separate relation of cause and effect in the comprehension of secondary word function”. Bhartṛhari has illustrated the same by the example of a cow. When someone utters ‘a cow’, its relation with the bell, etc. does not understood differently through the secondary sense but as an integral part of the word.

यथा संयोगिभिर्द्रव्यैर्वक्षितेऽर्थे प्रयुज्यते ।

गो शब्दो न त्वसौ तेषां विशेषाणां प्रकाशकः ॥२.१५३॥

आकारवर्णवियवैः संसृष्टेषु गवादिषु ।

शब्दः प्रवर्तमानोऽपि न तानङ्गीकरोत्यसौ ॥२.१५४॥<sup>79</sup>

### **Correctness of word (*Sādhutā*)**

The Mīmāṃsakas raise the doubt that let there be a comprehension from the dialects (*Apabhraṃśa*). If such word-power is accepted, then we have to accept correctness (*Sādhutā*) of *Apabhraṃśa* words.

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<sup>79</sup> Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 114

Some opine that the incorrect words also produce the comprehension. That is due to the remembrance of the correct word by the way of inference which produces meaning. There is no difference between the correct and incorrect words in causing the understanding.

असाधुरनुमानेन वाचकः कैश्चिदिष्यते ।

वाचकत्वाविशेषे वा नियमः पुण्यपापयोः ॥३८॥

Kaunḍabhaṭṭa has presented certain arguments for the non-acceptance of incorrect words.

- The use of the incorrect words like *Gāvī*, *Gotā* and *Goṇī* happen through the power of inference. The incorrect words are the cause of verbal cognition by way of inference of the correct words. They express the word-sense as if by attaining identity with the correct words.
- The *Apabhraṁśa* are not direct cause of the word-sense since they are not considered as correct analogous words either by the intellectuals or by the Grammar.
- When a child is taught by parents and others elders, he is initiated with the incorrect form like the use of libials *bamba*, etc. for the correct word *Ambā* (mother). Similarly, when an incorrect word is being used in the place of a correct word, some sense is conveyed through the remembrance of the correct word.<sup>80</sup>

The incorrect words cannot be linked with their synonyms. For, the synonyms of a word will be same in all places. In the absence of controlling factor for proving power in any particular synonym, power is postulated in all the

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<sup>80</sup> ते साधुञ्चनुमानेन प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिहेतवः । तादात्म्यमुपगम्येव शब्दार्थस्य प्रकाशकाः ॥१.१७७॥

न शिष्टैरनुगम्यन्ते पर्याया इव साधवः । न यतः स्मृतिमात्रेण तस्मात् साक्षादवाचकाः ॥१.१७८॥

अम्बाम्बेति यदा बालः शिक्ष्यमाणः प्रभाषते । अव्यक्तं तद्विदां तेन व्यक्तौ भवति निर्णयः ॥१.१७९॥

एवं साधौ प्रयोक्तव्ये योऽपभ्रंशः प्रयुज्यते । तेन साधुव्यवहितः कश्चिदर्थोऽभिधीयते ॥ १.१८०॥Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 63-64

synonyms. But, such is not observed in the case of *Apabhramśa* words. Otherwise, the incorrect words would be considered as synonyms.

The *Apabhramśas* are not completely without any power at all. So, there may be comprehension from them. The *apabhramśa* words do not cause the remembrance of the correct words. It is seen that there is comprehension from incorrect words by the common folk, who do not know the correct words. They have no knowledge of the right words. It cannot be argued that the common folk get the sense from *apabhramśa* words out of misunderstanding of power. So their comprehension is not questionable.

There is another view that *apabhramśa* words also used as correct words due to their maximum use in the spoken language. Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa replies that incorrects words are found in the spoken languages, but the rule set by the genius should be considered as more authentic and applicable. He further explains his stand-point by saying that the correct words produce merit. There is the injunction as ‘one should speak correctly’ and to make it known that the incorrect words produce demerit. Thus, correctness produces merit and incorrectness means the ability to produce demerit. The lexicons, grammar etc., are the tools for checking correctness.

It has been stated in the VP that due to various defects of the speakers, the *apabhramśa* words have become popular through tradition of imitation of the incorrect words. In those sense, the correct word is not expressive of the right sense. The divine speech has been commingled with the *apabhramśa* by uneducated speakers. There is misapprehension in this theory of word-power to those alone who perceive the speech as non-eternal.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> पारम्पर्यादपभ्रंशा विगुणेष्वभिधातृषु । प्रसिद्धिमागता येन तेषां साधुरवाचकः ॥१.१८१॥

दैवी वाग्व्यतिकीर्णयमशक्तैरभिधातृभिः । अनित्यदर्शिनां त्वस्मिन्वादे बुद्धिविपर्ययः ॥१.१८२॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 64

Though the correct and incorrect words are equally expressive of sense, it is only the use of correct ones that gives religious felicity. Moreover, grammar is the only instrument whereby correct words are distinguished from corrupt forms, and the correct meanings of words are ascertained.

Thus, each word possesses the power of expression and it denotes only one logical sense at a time. The grammarians hold the relation between the word and its meaning as permanent. They strongly opine that the word denotes only one primary meaning. Its classification into Indication, Suggestion and Purport are factually wrong. They consider word as *Akhaṇḍa-pada* and this *Akhaṇḍatā* is observed in the relation of word-meaning. Hence its classification is denied by grammarian-philosophers. Therefore, Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa has not even mentioned the other two i.e. Suggestion and the Purport. It is a striking and unique aspect of the philosophy of grammar which is not found in other schools of philosophy. It seems that they have not denied these various expressions completely, but they have examined the word and its meaning from the perspective of correctness (*Sādhutā*) which cannot be diluted for the sake of easy learning of the language.

#### **IV.4. Meanings of the Compound-Power**

*Samāsa* is a composite form of words which is found in almost all the well structured languages and even in the language of communication to some extent. In Sanskrit, there is a scope for the combination of different words like substantives, adjectives, verbs, prefixes and indeclinables. This compact combination of different words is *Samāsa*. It literary means compact composition. In *Samāsa*, the two or more words are placed together to express the composite sense<sup>82</sup> which are technically known as *Pūrvapada* and

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<sup>82</sup> पृथगर्थानामेकार्थीभावः समासः । VBS, p. 310



*Uttarapada* respectively. Any word having composite sense cannot be termed as *Samāsa*; otherwise there may be infinite composite compositions which devalue the significance compound.

### ***Padasāmarthya***

The *Samāsa* is that which has the *Padasāmarthya* as stated by the aphorism *Samarthaḥ Padavidhiḥ* (2.1.1) *Samarthaḥ* means having an identical sense of mutually connected words. It is elucidated by *Kāśikā* in the following manner –

समर्थः शक्तः। विग्रहवाक्यार्थाभिधाने यः शक्तः स समर्थो  
वेदितव्यः। अथवा समर्थपदाश्रयत्वसमर्थः । समर्थानां पदानां  
सम्बद्धानां संसृष्टार्थानां विधिर्वेदितव्यः।<sup>83</sup>

The *Padasāmarthya* is judged by means of verbal comprehension. There are three means of verbal comprehension - *Āsattiḥ*, *Yogyatā* and *Ākāṅṣā*. *Āsattiḥ* means phonetic contiguity. It means the apprehension without any intervention of the meanings of words and one of which must be connected with the other to complete the sense. The series of words like *Gauḥ*, *Devadattaḥ*, *Ghaṭaḥ*, etc. do not have any contiguity of meanings. Therefore, do not convey the meaning *Yogyatā* means logical consistency. The appropriate connectivity between the meanings of words is logical consistency e.g. *Agninā Siñcati* (he sprinkles with fire). This sentence does not have any grammatical fault. But, the meaning of the sentence is neither appropriate nor logical since one cannot sprinkle the fire in reality. There is lack of the concomitance between the meanings of two words. *Ākāṅṣā* means syntactical expectancy. A word has particular expectancy with regard to another word without which it cannot convey any idea of syntactical connection e.g. *Rājapuruṣa*. It has two words *Rāja* and *Puruṣa*. It is

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<sup>83</sup> *Kāśikā* on AA II.1.1, p. 87

understood as *Rājñah Puruṣa*. There is expectancy between both the words for getting the proper knowledge of compound.

These three means of verbal compression are essential for examining the validity of word and sentence. Viśvanāthakavirāja, the author of *Sāhityadarpaṇa* discusses the same topic in the context of a sentence<sup>84</sup>; while Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānan in his *Bhāṣā-Pariccheda*, refers the same in the context of a word<sup>85</sup>. Thus, it can be concluded that these three unanimously necessary for *Padasāmarthya* of a word and a sentence.

### ***Vṛttiḥ***

*Samāsa* is one of five varieties of *Vṛtti*. The word *Vṛtti* is derived from the root *vṛt* with the suffix *ktin*. It denotes the sense of action in general.<sup>86</sup> But, in Sanskrit grammar, it is taken in the sense of integration. It is defined in MB as *Parārthābhīdhānam*<sup>87</sup> *Vṛttiḥ*. It means that the integration which expresses a different meaning. The five types of *Vṛtti* are - *Kṛt* (primary derivated), *Taddhita* (secondary derivated), *Samāsa* (compound), *Ekaśeṣa* (a species of Copulative compound in which one of two or more words is retained) and *Sanādyantadhātu* (desiderative and others).<sup>88</sup>

<sup>84</sup> वाक्यं स्याद्योग्यताकाङ्क्षासत्तियुक्तः पदोच्चयः । परि. २ । Viśvanāthakavirāja, *op cit*, P.7

<sup>85</sup> आसत्तियोग्यताकाङ्क्षातात्पर्यज्ञानमिष्यते॥ कारणं सन्निधानं तु पदस्यासत्तिरुच्यते । पदार्थे तत्र तद्वत्ता योग्यता परिकीर्तिता ॥ यत्पदेन विना यस्याननुभावकता भवेत् । Nyāyapañcānan, Viśvanātha, *op cit*, pp. 166 & 170

<sup>86</sup> का पुनर्वृत्तिः। वृत्तिः शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिः। *Vṛttiḥ* is a mode or treatment followed by scientific treatise. Patañjali, *op cit*, p. 45

<sup>87</sup> P.C. Chakravarti defines this term as ‘*Samāsa* is grammatically inadmissible in those cases where *padas* are so related to each other that they cannot give rise to any special signification (*parārthābhīdhānā*).’ *op cit*, p. 298

<sup>88</sup> 1) *Kṛt* is the process by which a primary noun is derived from a verbal root e.g. Kumbhakārah; 2) *Taddhita* is the operation by which a secondary noun is formed from a primitive noun e.g. Dāśarathīḥ; 3) *Samāsa* is the process by which two or more nouns are connected to form one noun e.g. Rājapuruṣaḥ; 4) *Ekaśeṣa* is the process by which one is retained to the exclusion of other nouns, and the noun which is retained, denotes the sense of all the nouns excluded e.g. Pitarau and 5) *Sanādyantadhātu* is that by which a verb is formed from a noun and a derivative verb from a primitive verb. It contains the desiderative, the

Grammarians divide *Vṛtti* into two parts on the basis of their power of denotation of meaning. The two varieties are *Jahatsvārthā* or *Jahallakṣṇā* and *Ajahatsvārthā* or *Ajahallakṣṇā*.

*Jahatsvārthā*<sup>89</sup> is that which represents the meaning of another by forsaking its own meaning. In this, the subordinate member does not give up its meaning completely but remains as a qualifier due to its association with the principal member to bring composite meaning e.g. *Śuśrūṣā* (attendance<sup>90</sup>). This word is made of root *Śu* (1. P.) (to listen) with the desiderative suffix *San*. Here both the root and suffix give up their primary sense in order to bring a new sense. *Ajahatsvārthā Vṛtti*<sup>91</sup> renders another meaning without forsaking its own meaning. In this, all the members hold their primary sense and also render the new sense simultaneously e.g. *Rājapuruṣaḥ*. In *Rājapuruṣa* etc., the word does not give the sense entirely. The word *Rāja* is taken as *Rājñāḥ* (i.e. pertaining to king). Extra potency is taken here in addition for the proper conveyance of the meaning of compound. Thus, it is understood as *Rājasambandhipuruṣaḥ*. So, the particular sense is comprehended from the potency on the strength of expectancy.

### ***Ekārthībhāva and Vyapekṣābhāva***

The scholars have difference of opinion regarding the power of expression in compound. The potency of expression of compound is mainly dealt with from

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causative, the intensive and the denominative verbs. It contains the list of twelve suffixes. They are *Jugupsate* (*San*), *Putrīyati* (*Kyac*), *Putrakāmyati* (*Kāmyac*), *Śyenāyate* (*Kyañ*), *Lohitāyate* (*Kyaṣ*), *Kṛṣṇti* (*Kvip*), *Pāṭhayati* (*Ñic*), *Bobhūyate* (*Yañ*), *Kaṇḍūyati* (*Yak*), *Gopāyati* (*Āya*), *Rtīyate* (*Īyañ*) and *Kāmayate* (*Ñin*).

<sup>89</sup> जहाति पदानि स्वार्थं या सा जहत्स्वार्था । VBS p. 308

<sup>90</sup> The literary meaning of this word is ‘desire to hear’, but by the power of *Rūḍha* is popular in the sense of ‘attendance or service’ in the spoken languages. Its literal meaning is found in the poetic compositions – अत एव शुश्रूषा मां मुखरयति । *Mudraraksasam*, Ed. Kale. M.R., p. 18

<sup>91</sup> न जहाति पदानि स्वार्थं या सा अजहत्स्वार्था । VBS, 308

two different perspectives viz. *Ekārthībhāva* and *Vyapekṣābhāva*. Grammarians strongly believe that the power of expression lies in the group alone which they term as *Ekārthībhāva*. Patañjali<sup>92</sup>, Kaiyaṭa<sup>93</sup>, Bhartṛhari<sup>94</sup>, Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa<sup>95</sup> and Nāgeśabhaṭṭa<sup>96</sup> have advocated the *Ekārthībhāva*. Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas hold the opinion that this power of expression resides separately in all the members of a compound. This view is known as *Vyapekṣābhāva*.

According to *Ekārthībhāva*, the members of a compound have individual power of expression but when they are joined together, they give up their individuality for the sake of rendering a new sense. The words give up their meanings in order to bring uniformity of sense. It is similar to *Jahatsvārthā Vṛtti*.

*Vyapekṣābhāva* means a sense of compound with mutual expectancy (*Ākāṅkṣā*). Two different words having different meanings are contrasted with compositeness of sense and join into a compound. All the members of compound do not leave their individuality. The desired meaning of the compound is understood by the power of Indication. Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas illustrate that the words of a sentence having their own individual meanings work with mutual expectancy (*Apekṣā*) to bring coherent and complete meaning of the sentence. In case of *Vyapekṣābhāva*, the individuality is more important than the evenness of the words. In compounds too, different members bear their original meanings and bring the composite sense through expectancy. In *Rājapuruṣa*, *Rāja* and *Puruṣa* have their own sense; they do not forsake their

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<sup>92</sup> तद्यदा तावदेकार्थीभावः सामर्थ्यं तदा एवं विग्रहः करिष्यते-संगतार्थः समर्थः, संसृष्टार्थः समर्थः इति । MB on AA 2.2.1, p. 75

<sup>93</sup> यत्र पदान्युपसर्जनीयभूतस्वार्थानि-निवृत्तस्वार्थानि, प्राधानार्थोपपादनाद्व्यर्थानि-अर्थान्तराभिधायिनो वा स एकार्थीभावः । *Ibid*

<sup>94</sup> अर्थस्य विनिवृत्तत्वाल्लुगादि न विरुध्यते । एकार्थीभाव एवातः समासाख्या विधीयते ॥ १.१४४५ ॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 474

<sup>95</sup> व्यपेक्षारूपयोः पर्यवसानं लभ्यते । VBS, p. 308

<sup>96</sup> समासादिपञ्चसु विशिष्ट एव शक्तिर्न तु व्यपेक्षाभावः । Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, *PLM*, p. 312.

meanings. *Rājapurusa* substitutes the *Rājñah Puruṣa*. It is similar to *Ajahatsvārthā Vṛtti*.

The view of Patañjali is worth mentioning -

व्यपेक्षावादिनस्तु परस्पराकाङ्क्षारूपा व्यपेक्षैवात्र सामर्थ्यं न तु  
एकार्थीभावः।

According to some, there is no difference between *Ekārthībhāva* and *Vyapekṣā*. When this *Padasāmarthya* is found in a compound, it is called *Ekārthībhāva* and when it found in a sentence, it is *Vyapekṣā*. Bhartṛhari has clearly explained it in his VP -

वाक्येऽपि नियता धर्माः केचिद् वृत्तौ द्वयोस्तथा ।

ते त्वभेदेन सामर्थ्यमात्र एवोपवर्णिताः॥ ३.१४.३७॥

सामर्थ्यमविशेषोक्तिमपि लोकव्यवस्थया ।

वृत्त्यवृत्त्योः प्रयोगज्ञैर्विभक्तं प्रतिपत्तुभिः॥ ३.१४.४४॥

अर्थस्य विनिवृत्तत्वाल्लुगादि न विरुध्यते ।

एकार्थीभाव एवातः समासाख्या विधीयते॥ ३.१४.४६॥

व्यवस्थितविभाषा च सामान्ये कैश्चिदिष्यते ।

तथा वाक्यं व्यपेक्षायां समासोऽन्यत्र शिष्यते ॥ ३.१४.४७॥<sup>97</sup>

Kaundabhaṭṭa has discussed faults lieus with the view of *Vyapekṣābhāva*.

*Dhava-khadirao* and *Niṣkauśābiḥ* are the examples of Copulative and Determinative compounds respectively. They can be split up as *Dhavaśca-khadiraśca* and *Niṣkrāntaḥ Kauśāmbiāḥ*. The words *ca* and *krāntaḥ* are not

<sup>97</sup> Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, pp. 470-474.

present in the compound. In their absence how the meaning will be understood? The senses cannot be generated by accepting the power in individual words. *Vyapekṣāvādins* need to take the support of the aphorisms of AA: *Cārthe Dvandva* and *Nirādayaḥ Krāntādvarthe Pañcamyāḥ*. This will lead to the fault of proximity.

Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas believe that the special meaning of the compound can be supposed through the power of Indication e.g. *Rājapuruṣa*. In this, the meaning of the compound ‘king’s man’ is easily known through the use of Indication. Therefore *Ṛddhasya* (which is an adjective of *Rājan*) will never get connected with the *Rājan* since in a compound the adjectives are never related with the members.<sup>98</sup> This rule of Indication solves the problem of adjective. It will be disproved in case of the compounds like *Niṣkauśāmbiḥ*, *Ghanaśyāmaḥ* and *Gorathaḥ*. If the words *Krānta*, *Eva* and *Yukta* are understood in the compound through power of Indication, then it will go against the rule of *Uktārthānāmaprayogaḥ*. According to this rule, the understood meaning is never used in *Vigraha-vākya*. Secondly, the aphorism of Pāṇini *Vibhāṣā* which allowed the exceptional usages of these words will also be futile. Therefore, they need to adopt multiple methods for assuming the power of Indication in compound i.e. one for compound and another for explanatory sentence (*Vigraha-vākya*).

The meaning of the words *Citraguḥ* and *Prāptodakaḥ* is also understood through Indication. Here the power lies in the individual, but not in the group. To this view of opponent, Kaunḍabhaṭṭa says that if power is believed in the individual, then, in the absence of the competent meaning, the group won’t have the Nominal declinations. If it be accepted that by the strength of the aphorism (*Kṛtaddhitasamāsāśca*) the compound termed as crude form and then gets Nominal declensions, then it is not welcomed since rule of *Ekārthībhāva* is

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<sup>98</sup> सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्न वृत्तस्य वा विशेषणयोगो न ।VBS, p. 310

not observed. To this again, the opponent argues that by the power of Indication, these compounds will be treated as crude form. But it is not possible until the power is accepted in the group. Naiyāyikas accept Indication only when it has direct relation with the *Abhidhā* (*śkyasambandho Lakṣaṇā*). For its application they should accept special power of *Abhidhā* in group, but they never accept power in group. Hence, in the absence of *Abhidhā*, *Lakṣaṇā* cannot be applied, and in the absence of *Lakṣaṇā* there won't be any Indicated sense (*Lakṣyārtha*) and in the absence of *Lakṣyārtha* there won't be any crude form or nominal declension. Therefore, this view of *Vyapekṣābhāva* is inappropriate.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa has quoted several sentences of MS and has questioned the view of Indication. He says if power is interpreted through Indication then the entire *Aruṇādhikaraṇa* will be useless. It states - '*Ekahāyanyā Aruṇayā Piṇākṣyā Krīṇāti*'<sup>99</sup> i.e. he purchases a year old cow of a red colour and yellow eyes'. In this example, the qualities of cow are connected with act of purchasing. But, the qualities which are non-substance can never be connected with the verb. The same is doubted in the examples of *Vaṣaṭkartuḥ Prathamabhakṣaḥ*<sup>100</sup> (the invoker of *Vaṣaṭ* should have the meal first) and *Tryaṅgaiḥ Sviṣṭakṛtaṁ Yajati*<sup>101</sup> (he performs the *Sviṣṭa*-sacrifice in three parts). *Vaṣaṭkartuḥ Prathamabhakṣaḥ* in this *Prathamabhakṣaḥ* is a compound word which becomes clear by the power of *Ekārthībhāva*. *Sviṣṭakṛtaṁ* is a kind of sacrifice which has eleven parts but here it is understood in three parts. In this example also the meaning of compound *Tryaṅgaiḥ* becomes clear through *Ekārthībhāva*.

The opponent puts forward another argument. There should be an aphorism '*Aprātipadikam*' in place of '*Arthavadadhāturapratyayaḥ Prātipadikam*' and after this, the aphorism *Kṛtaddhitasamāsāśca* should be stated. So, all *Tiṅ* and *Sup* can be termed as crude forms and ultimately a compound can be treated as

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<sup>99</sup> *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 6.4.7.3 Vol. 8, p. 4119

<sup>100</sup> Jaimini, *MS* 3, p. 41

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*, p. 54

crude form. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa replies that the word *Arthavad*, in the aphorism, is very significant for forming any word as a crude form. If this word is removed from the aphorism or substituted with any other word, it will lead to chaos and confusion. Any word (like *Vana-dhana*) without any meaning will become a *Pada* and a crude form. This leads to the fault of prolixity.

The crude form is in the form of result and the compound (with the potency of group) is the cause. The configuration of compound as a crude form suggests the meaning lies with the potentiality of the group (*Samudāya-śakti*). The rules of *Padārthaḥ Padārthenānveti* and *Saviśeṣaṇānām Vṛttirna Vṛttasya Vā Viśeṣaṇayogo Na* will not be broken if the power is accepted in *Ekārthībhāva-sāmarthyā*, because in *Rājapuruṣa*, the word *Rāja* will not hold its individual meaning and in the absence of its individuality the *Rāja* will not have any adjective like *Ṛddhasya*. So, there won't arise any fault of adjective in *Ekārthībhāva-sāmarthyā*.

The view *Vyapekṣā* is not appropriate. According to this view, the individuals possess the power and not the group. But, the meaning of the compound is not rendered by the individuals but by the group.

The *Rūḍha* word plays an important role in getting the exact meaning of the compound. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa explains this with the example of '*Varṣāsu Rathakāraḥ Agnimādadhīta*' (the *Rathakāraḥ* should instal sacrificial fire in the rainy season). It is an example of *Jahatsvārthā*. The word *Rathakāraḥ* can be split up as *Ratham Kārayati*. Its literal meaning is 'a person who makes chariot.' but the use of the word *Agnimādadhīta* suggests a brahmin. The *Yoga* sense denotes brahmin and explains it as 'a brahmin should also have the knowledge of the art of making a chariot'. Therefore, in this Vedic sentence the word *Rathakāraḥ* can never be used in the context of a *Śūdra*. But the *Rūḍha* word *Rathakāraḥ* suggests a person of *Śūdra* caste or a woman. It leads to the



assumption that *Śūdras* were allowed to study Vedas and perform the rituals of the sacrifice. In this case the *Rūḍha* meaning becomes stronger than the *Yoga*. It also gets support of the maxim - *Rūḍhi yogāt balīyasī*. The power of *Rūḍhi* is found in some compound words.

The opponent raises the question. If the power of expression is taken in group only, then the compound *Pañkaja* will lose its relation with its etymological meaning. It is not acceptable, because when someone says *Pañkaja*, its relation with the mud, etc. is understood. Therefore it is not proper to say that the power of expression lies in the group only.

To this argument, Kaunḍabhaṭṭa replies audaciously that the power of expression lies only in the group but at the same time the members of the compound do possess some substance which ultimately renders the sense of the group. When someone says *Pañkaja*, it is understood as a lotus without thinking about its relation with the mud, etc. Secondly, it is observed that the *Rūḍha* sense is more popular than the *Yoga* sense in languages. The literal meaning of the *Pañkaja* is ‘that which is produced in the mud’. This word can be used for any thing which is produced in the mud e.g. lotus, moss (a kind of aquatic plant), bacteria, etc. However, the word *Pañkaja* was so popular in the sense of lotus that nobody bothers to go into its etymological meaning or it sounds harsh if it is used for either moss or bacteria. Kaunḍabhaṭṭa has quoted the view of Bhartṛhari on this –

समासे खलु भिन्नैव शक्तिः पङ्कजशब्दवत् ।

बहूनां वृत्तिधर्माणां वचनैरेव साधने ॥<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> These verses are not found in the available editions of VP, but Kaunḍabhaṭṭa quoted them. It leads to assumption that either the modern editions of VP differ to the ancient or Kaunḍabhaṭṭa has not taken care to check the authenticity of verses. It is hypothesized by Dr. Deshpande in his article.

## IV. 5. Classification of Compound

Ancient and modern grammarians have made classification of compound. The ancient grammarians present four varieties while Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa<sup>103</sup> and other modern grammarians<sup>104</sup> classify them into six. The six-fold classification of compound are -

1. Compound between nominal stems, e.g. *Rājapuruṣa* (a king's man). It can be split as *Rājñah Puruṣa*. In this, both the members of the compound end with nominal stem. It is an example of *Ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa*.
2. Compound between prefix and the root, e.g. *Paryabhūṣat* (to wait upon), *Anuvyacalat* (to follow in changing the place), etc. *Pari* and *Anu+Vi* are prefixes which are compounded with the roots *Bhūṣ* (1P) (to adorn) and *Cal* (1P) (to walk).<sup>105</sup>
3. A word ending with nominal stem gets compounded with a noun, e.g. *Kumbhakāraḥ* (a potter). *Kumbhaḥ* is a noun which means a pot, the word *Kāra* is made from the root *Kṛ* (8U) (to do) with the suffix *Aṇ*. It means a person who makes the pot i.e. potter.
4. Combination of nominal stem and root, e.g. *Kaṭapṛūḥ* (Śiva, a goblin, a worm) and *Āyatastūḥ* (a panegyrist, bard). *Kaṭa* and *Āyata* are the nominal stems joined to roots *Prūḥ* (1A) and *Stūḥ* (2U) respectively.<sup>106</sup>
5. A root gets compounded with another root e.g. *Pibatakhādatā*, *Pacatabhrjātā*. In the first example there is a combination of two verbs viz. *Pib* (1P) (to drink) and *Khād* (1P) (to eat). In the second example, there are two roots *Pac* (1P) (to cook) and *Bhraj* (6 P & A)

<sup>103</sup> सुपां सुपा तिडा नाम्ना धातुनाऽथ तिडां तिडा । सुबन्तेनेति च ज्ञेयः समासः षड्विधो बुधैः ॥२८॥ VBS, p. 315

<sup>104</sup> Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, *op cit*, p. 310

<sup>105</sup> गतिमता उदात्तवता तिडाऽपि समासः । VBS, p. 315

<sup>106</sup> क्विप् वचि-प्रच्छयायतस्तु काटपू-जुश्रीणां दीर्घश्च । *Ibid*

(to fry, to roast). It falls under the category of *Mayūravvyansaka* compound.<sup>107</sup>

6. A verb gets compounded with a noun e.g. *Jahistambaḥ* (a man is constantly striking against a post). It is a verb compounded with a nominal word. The previous component is a verb which is an imperative of the root *Han* and the next is a nominal stem as suggested by the sūtra ‘*Jahi Karmaṇā Bahulamābhikṣṇye Kartāraṁ Cābhidadhāti*’. It also falls in the category of *Mayūravvyansaka* compound.

The ancient grammarians have classified compound into four principal classes.

1. Adverbial compound
2. Determinative Compound
3. Copulative Compound
4. Attributive Compound

Compound is a combination of words known as members or components. The position and importance of these members are the deciding factor for their classification. The fixation of a compound too, depends upon the meaning and predominance of either the first member (*Pūrvapada*) or the second member (*Uttarapada*). If the first member is the predominating one, it is Adverbial compound. If the second member is the principal one, it is Determinative compound. If both the members are equally important, it is Copulative compound. If word other than the members of compound, is principal (*Anyapadapradhāna*) it is Attributive compound.

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<sup>107</sup> The aphorism II.1.72 of AA explains this variety of compound. It is one of the classes of compounds which are some what irregular formations and hence mentioned as they are found in use. The compound are called simple Determinative compound.

Any ambiguous definition may have the fault of either unwarranted extension (*Ativyāptiḥ*) or inadequate extension (*Avyāptiḥ*) or improbability (*Asambhavaḥ*).<sup>108</sup> These three are also found in compounds. That is why the opponent has raised the question regarding the applicability of the above given rules of compound.

On the basis of these three faults some examples of compound are questioned by the opponent. They are - *Unmattagaṅgam*, *Sūpapрати*, *Ardhapippalī*, *Dvitrāḥ*, *Śaśakuśapalāśam*, etc.

*Unmattagaṅgam* – It means the country where river Gaṅga roars furiously (*Unmattā Gaṅgā Yasmin Deśe*). This is an example of Adverbial compound with the predominance of sense of other word (*Anyapadaprādhānya*). In adverbial compound, the first member is important than the second. But, in this example, the first member has not given any importance. So it has the fault of inadequate extension or less application. Moreover, other sense has been given more weightage. So there is unwanted extension or over application of Attributive compound.

*Sūpapрати* – It means a portion of *Sūpa* (*Sūpasya Leśaḥ*). This is an example of Adverbial compound but with the predominance of the second member. This predominance suggests the Determinative compound as the latter component is principal, by the *sūtra Suppratinā Mātrārthe* (II.1.9). This is unwarranted extension. Due this fault the Adverbial compound does not become applicable. This paucity shows the fault of inadequate extension.

*Ardhapippalī* – It means a half of long pepper (*Pippalyāḥ Ardham*). Though this is an example of Determinative, the first member is important. So the definition of Adverbial can apply to it. This is unwarranted extension. The Determinative

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<sup>108</sup> अतिव्याप्ति means over application. अव्याप्ति means less application. असम्भव mean impossibility.

would not become applicable. This suggests the fault of inadequate extension. This compound is stated by the *sūtra Ardham Napuṃsakam* (II.2.2). Similarly the examples like *Pūrvakāya* etc. should be understood.

*Dvitrāḥ* - It means two of three (*Dvau Vā Trayo Vā*). This is an example of Attributive compound. But, both the members are equally important as in the case of the Copulative. So, Copulative is over applied on Attributive. This is unwarranted extension. The definition of Attributive does not become applicable. Hence it is inadequate extension.

*Śasakuśapalāśam* – It means (a group of) a Lodhra tree,<sup>109</sup> a *Kuśa* grass and a *Palāśa* tree. This example of copulative has the preponderance of the meaning of the other word. If the definition of Attributive will become applicable, then it is unwarranted extension. The definition of Copulative will not be applicable. It is inadequate extension.

The rules for compound stated above are the general rules. They provide information about the compounds in general. They cannot be accepted as the only fixed rules for *Samāsa*. It is like *Rekhācitranīṣṭhagavayapṛcchaḥ* i.e. a tail of a cow presented in a picture. The picture can never be like a real tail of a cow. But at the same time it cannot be denied that the tail in the picture does not represent cow's tail. The rules of *Samāsa* should be treated accordingly.

There is another argument regarding applicability of the *Nañ* compound. *Asūryam Paśyā* (= *Sūryam Na Paśyanti*) can never be a compound because *Sūrya* does not have any relation with *Nañ*. To this argument Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa says that it is a very unique example of *Nañ* compound. Here both the members are connected through the action and have the *Ekārthībhāva*. The aphorism of AA – *Asūrya-lalāṭayordṛśi-tapoḥ* (III.2.36) also authenticates the use of such kind of

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<sup>109</sup> The word *Śasaḥ* is popular in the sense of a hare, but here it is taken in the sense of a *Lodhra* tree.

compound. The same can be understood in *Śaśaśṛṅga* (horn of hare). Hare has no horn in reality, but when someone utters this sentence, horn is imagined in the mind of the listener for a moment. This imagination takes place in reality. Therefore, this type of compound is not inappropriate.

Another doubt raised by the opponent is: ‘when there is possibility of more than one compound, which compound should be taken into consideration?’ The word *Niṣādashapatiḥ* is quoted as an example. This word has seven different meanings.<sup>110</sup> This compound can be split up in three different ways -

- 1) *Niṣādaścāsao sthapatih Niṣādashapatiḥ*. It means a *Niṣāda* (a man belongs to the wild aboriginal tribe) who is a king. It is an example of Appositional compound.
- 2) *Niṣādānām sthapatih Niṣādashapatiḥ*. It means the king of *Niṣāda* community. It is an example of Determinative compound.
- 3) *Niṣādaḥ Sthapatiḥ Yasya Saḥ* i.e. a person whose master is *Niṣāda*. It is an example of Attributive compound.

If the Appositional compound is taken, then *Niṣāda* will get the right of studying Vedas. But *Niṣāda* are not allowed to study Vedas.

If Attributive compound be accepted then it may mean a master of *Niṣāda* or also refer to a brahmin through Indication. Use of Indication leads to the fault of prolixity as there may be many interpretations.

To this problem, Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa says that in this case the ‘desire to speak (*Vivakṣā*) and the purport (*Tatparya*)<sup>111</sup>, are helpful in understanding the meaning. Therefore it can be interpreted in all the three ways and all will be grammatically correct.

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<sup>110</sup> The seven meanings are 1) a king, 2) an architect, 3) a charioteer, 4) one who offers sacrifice to god Bṛhaspati, 5) a carpenter, 6) an attendant at sarelio, 7) a name of Kubera.

<sup>111</sup> नानार्थे तात्पर्यात् विशेषावगतिः । VBS, p. 320

## IV.6. Meaning of the Negative Particle

This section of the chapter presents a concise discussion on the power of negative particle. Negative particle is defined as having six senses.

सादृश्यं तदभावश्च तदन्यत्वं तदल्पता ।

अप्राशस्त्यं विरोधश्च नञ्ार्थाः षट् प्रकीर्तिताः ॥<sup>112</sup>

*Sādr̥śyam* means similarity e.g. *Anikṣuḥ śaraḥ* (that which is not like a sugar cane is an arrow. The similarity between the stick of sugar cane and an arrow is meant here). *Tadabhāvaḥ* means the absence of the thing mentioned. Its example is *Bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti* (the pot is not present on the ground). *Tadanyatvam* means when something else is referred e.g. *Aghaṭaḥ paṭaḥ* (the cloth is different from the pot). *Tadalpatā* means less amount of the thing e.g. *Anudaramudaram Tarunyāḥ* (the belly of young girl is so thin that it doesn't come to sight. Therefore the belly is as good as nothing). *Aprāśastyam* means disrespect or disregard e.g. *Abrāhmaṇa vārdhuṣikaḥ* (a usurer does not belong to a Brahmin caste. It means a person who lends money at excessive rates can never be a brahmin). *Virodha* means opposite sense e.g. *Asuraḥ daityaḥ* (he who is not a deity, is a demon. Here the word *Asuraḥ* is explained as opposite of deity).

*Nañ* is found as a sub-division of the Determinative compound and the Attributive compound. It is also classified into an indeclinable (*Nipāta*). When it is used in the compound, it is substituted by either *A* (अ- when followed by a consonant) or *An* (अन् – when followed by a vowel). When it is used as an indeclinable, it remains as *Na* (न). The significance of the negative particle in

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<sup>112</sup> VBS, p. 444, *A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar* Ed. by Abhayaṅkara, K.V & Śukla, J.M., p. 213 and *Laghusiddhāntakaumudī* (Vol. IV), Ed. Śāstrī, Bhīmasena, p.126. This verse has been quoted by many scholars while discussing the nature of negative particle, but its original source is not mentioned by them.

*Nañ-samāsa* is dealt by Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa by presenting an entire chapter on negative particle in *VBS*. He has mainly discussed the similarity and the absence of negative particles. He opines that superimposition and direct negation are the principal meanings of *Nañ*.

नञ्समासे चापरस्य प्राधान्यात् सर्वनामता ।

आरोपितत्वं नञ्द्योत्यं न ह्यसोऽप्यतिसर्ववत् ॥४०॥

Without accepting superimposition, the other varieties cannot be assumed as the meaning of *Nañ*. In *Nañ*, the latter member is important and the negation always is understood for the thing superimposed. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa has mentioned *Asarva* as the example of *Nañ*. It is an example of *Nañ*–Determinative compound. It is made of *A* and *Sarva*. The last member is important. In this, the negation is not intended but it is superimposed in counter positive of difference (*Pratiyogī*). Hence, its position as a pronoun is secured; it is not disturbed by the use of *Nañ*. Unlike *Asarva*, in *Atisarva* the status of pronoun is not secured. It is a combination of the prefix *Ati* with the pronoun *Sarva*. In this, the latter member is not treated as an important one. If the superimposition is not accepted in *Asarva*, then, it will be like *Atisarva*. Moreover, it will not have the nominal declensions.

If the latter member is important then in *Abrāhmaṇamānaya* (bring the person who is not a *brāhmaṇa*), there is a possibility of bringing *brāhmaṇa*. But such is not the case. *Abrāhmaṇamānaya* should be understood as a person who is not a *brāhmaṇa* - *Nañviśiṣṭabrāhmaṇaḥ*. In the present context, *Nañ* stands for the sense of cessation (*Nivṛttapadārthakaḥ*) as it clearly suggests that a *brāhmaṇa* should not be brought in. The use of suffix *Kta* by the aphorism *Napuṁsake bhāveктаḥ* (III. 1.114) suggests an individual other than a *brāhmaṇaḥ* (*brāhmaṇabhinnavyaktiḥ*).



This is again doubted that in case of the word *Abrāhmaṇa*, the meaning may refer to a stone also since it is a *Abrāhmaṇa*.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa clears this doubt of opponent by quoting the statement of MB – *Na hi Abrāhmaṇamānaya Iti Ukte Loṣṭhamānaya Kṛtī Bhavati* (3.1.12). It means the meaning should be taken from the context. Therefore, *Kṣatriya* is meant here by the word *Abrāhmaṇa*. Moreover, if we observe the caste order (*brāhmaṇa- kṣatriya-vaiśya-śūdra*) carefully, then it also suggests *Kṣatriya*. The same is explained by Kaiyaṭa while explaining the word *Nivṛttapadārthakaḥ - Nivṛttaḥ Padārthaḥ Mukhyaṁ Brāhmaṇyaṁ Yasmin Nivṛttapadārthakaḥ*.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa does not agree with Kaiyaṭa. He says that the view of Kaiyaṭa has the fault of prolixity. For, it can be understood as *Brāhmaṇasadrśa Abrāhmaṇamānaya*. In this, similarity is taken as the meaning of negative particle. He opines that the six-fold meaning of negative particle takes place after the functioning of superimposition (*Āropa*) is over. In *Abrāhmaṇa*, first the negation of counter positive of difference is superimposed and then its similarity is understood. At this point, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa differs from Bhartṛhari also. Bhartṛhari advocates the absence in the example *Abrāhmaṇamānaya* –

एकार्थविषयौ शब्दौ तस्मिन्नन्यार्थवर्तिनौ ।

असतेव तु भेदानां सर्वेषामुपसंग्रहः ॥ ३.३१४॥

ते क्षत्रियादिभिर्वाच्या वाच्या वा सर्वनामभिः ।

यान्तीवान्यपदार्थत्वं नञो रूपाविकल्पनात् ॥ ३.३१५॥<sup>113</sup>

In support of the view of superimposition, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa gives the example of *Aneka* and *Ananekaya* (Megha 4.42). The word *Aneka* means *Ana+Eka* i.e.

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<sup>113</sup> Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 586

many. Here the latter member *Eka* is important, first its negation is superimposed and then its meaning ‘many’ is taken. In this example, the superimposition plays an important role. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa cites the statement of MB in favour of his view - *Idaṁ Khalvapi Bhūyaḥ Uttarapadārthaprādhānye Sati Saṅgrhītaṁ Bhavati* (if the latter word is considered important, then, the singular number for *Anekam* will also be achieved). On this basis, he quotes the examples of *Atvaṁ Bhavasi* and *Anaḥam Bhavāmi*.

It is argued that if the sense of negative particle is taken as an adjective of *Ghaṭaḥ* in *Aghaṭaḥ*, then, its counter positive resides in *Ghaṭaḥ*, etc. when someone says *Aghaṭamānaya* (bring that thing which is not a pot), the *Ghaṭaḥ* will be brought. To avoid this fault, another argument is given. According to it, if the sense of *Nañ* is taken as qualified, then in *Abrāhmaṇa*, the comprehension would be *brāhmaṇabhinnah* i.e. *Kṣatriya*; *Asarvaḥ* would be *Sarvabhinna* and *Asaḥ* would be *Tadbhinnah*.

To this, another argument is made that if *Nañ* becomes qualified, then it does not come under the purview of the rule of *Yuṣmadyupapade*° (IV.1.105) and then the rule of *Śeṣe Prathamah* (I.4.108) comes into force. As a result, third person would be used for *Atvaṁ* and *Anaḥam*.

The above problem can be solved by the expression *Anañ Samāse* in the aphorism of *Etattadoho*° (VI.1.132) which indicates the operation due to a pronoun that takes place even if the meanings of the pronoun is secondary.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa illustrates the sense of absence in negative apticles. In the examples like *Ghaṭo Nāsti* and *Abrāhmaṇa* are not in the sense of superimposition as mentioned above. It can be used to denote the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*.

अभावो वा तदर्थोऽस्तु भाष्यस्य हि तदाशयात् ।

## विशेषणं विशेष्यो वा न्यायतस्त्ववधार्यताम् ॥४१॥

The opponent argues that the sense of *Nañ* should be taken as an adjective in *Anekaḥ*. Due to this, the counter position of its difference will reside in *Ekaḥ*. It will take singular. The latter member would be the chief one. Thus, it solves the problem of *Anekaḥ*. If it be taken as qualified, then the word *Anekaḥ* can be used for dual and plural number. It can never be used in singular number. But it is seen that the word *Anekaḥ* has singular forms also. Moreover, the statement of Māgha – *Patantyeneke Jaladherivormayaḥ* will go against the rule.

The reply is – the singular form of *Anekaḥ* is proved on the strength of the popular usage. The *Sup* (=su) is the qualified and the word *Anekaḥ* is the qualifier. If we take only the dual form of it, then the use of plural will be excluded. If the plural only is taken, then the singular and dual will be excluded. But, in popular usage and even in compound like Attributive, *Aneka* is used in singular and dual. Therefore, though the word *Aneka* does not mean ‘one’, its singular form is given optionally. In *Sevyate Anekayā Yoṣayā* (served by every girl) *Aneka* is used as a qualifier which stands for every young girl who served Kṛṣṇa. The same is observed in *Aneko Janāḥ* (many people) and *Naikastiṣṭhati janāḥ* (not even a single man stands). In these examples, the word *Aneka* stands for many. In the first example it is used as an adjective of plural word; while in the second it is used for singular. The same has to be understood in the example of Māgha - *Patantyeneke Jaladherivormayaḥ*.

The meaning of *Atvam Bhavasi* is *Aham* (I) and of *Anaḥam Bhavāmi* is *Tvam* (you). Both these sentences render the sense of *Yuṣmad* (you) and *Asmad* (I) respectively. Logicians opine that the sense rendered by *Nañ* is secondary. But Kaṇḍabhāṭṭa argues that the sense is rendered by negative particle. Therefore *Yuṣmad* and *Asmad* cannot be considered as secondary.

The rule of ‘the latter member is important’ is a probability. In the examples *Ardhapippalī* and *Pūrvakāya*, the earlier members *Ardha* and *Pūrva* are important yet the rule is not violated.

The opponent argues that in *Na Tvam Pacasi* (you are not cooking), if the *Nañ* is taken with *Yuṣmad*, the second person cannot be fixed. Here the *Na* goes with the action of cooking. If it is taken with *Yuṣmad*, then the use of *Nañ* will be of no sense. Moreover, the purport of *Abhāva* won’t be applicable in this example.

To this, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa replies that such is not the case. Here the use of *Nañ* gives the meaning of complete negation. There are four types of negation – *Prāgabhāva*, *Pradhvaṃsābhāva*, *Anyonyābhāva* and *Atyantābhāva*. The comprehension is possible in all these four ways.

This chapter presented overall viewpoints, arguments and counter-arguments with regard to linguistic problems regarding the meaning of *Samāsa*, adjective, particle, etc. that are dealt with by Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa in his work VBS. In some cases, he has successfully explicated the problems and has solved the issues. In some cases, he has just diluted and played with the arguments which are not completely acceptable. We notice that on some issues, the opponents also argue properly and their views do not seem to be illogical. However, these are common linguistic problems. The insights and depth of the subject of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa are appreciable.