

CHAPTER III

PROBLEMS OF THE MEANINGS OF VERBAL ROOTS AND TENSES

The present chapter of the dissertation is entitled as '*The Meanings of Verbal Roots and Tenses*'. As the title suggests, the chapter embodies a coherent and critical discussion on the meanings of the Roots and the Tenses. This discussion, on the basis of the theme, is divided in two parts. The first part incorporates the discussion on the meanings of the Roots only and the second part contains the meanings of the Tenses. The first part mainly deals with the meanings of Roots, the concepts related to the root like i.e. *Process* and *Result*, classification of Roots into Transitive and Intransitive, significance of Root, use of the Roots with different suffixes and compound, its difference from the verb and the relation existing between the roots and the verbs. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa has also alluded the views of other renowned schools of philosophy especially the views of Mīmāṃsakas and Nyāyikas.

The next division deals with the problem of Ten *Lakāras*. It primarily categorized the ten *Lakāras* into two sects viz. टित् (letters ending in ट्) and डित् (letters ending in ड्). The meaning of all the *Lakāras* are conversed about in the light of the aphorisms of Pāṇini. Their uses with necessary examples are given in this section.

III.1. Meanings of Roots:

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa begins his treatise with the discussion of the meanings of Roots. It means that he gives prime importance to the Roots which play important role

in the sentence. In Sanskrit language, all verbs have roots as their base. Root along with the verbal suffix forms a verb. That is why they are named as *Dhātu* in Sanskrit and Root in English. There is a view of the Nairuktas that not only verbs but all the words are derived from the roots¹. Though without a verb a sentence can be framed in Sanskrit and in many cases we observe that sentences, not having a verb, conveys the meaning still a sentence with the proper use of the verb becomes more meaningful and it helps the listener to understand the complete meaning of the sentence with ease. In many times only a verb can shape a sentence which altogether presents a complete and a coherent meaning intended by the speaker. That is what the great communicators of any language of the world emphasis on the proper use of a verb. In the language like English a sentence cannot be framed without a verb. Thus, a verb is inevitable for proper communication. As it is mentioned above that verb has root as its base, we start with the discussion on the nature and scope of the root in the light of the philosophy of grammar.

Dhātu is not particularly defined by either Pāṇini or his predecessors. An aphorism of Pāṇini *Bhūvādayo Dhātavaḥ* (I.3.1) defines root by stating that *Bhū*, etc are roots. But, what exactly a root means is not cleared by Pāṇini. Patañjali, in his MB tries to define it as *Kriyāvacano Dhātuḥ*.² Its literal meaning is given by Monier Williams as ‘element of words, i.e. grammatical or verbal root or stem’.³ It is assumed that the word *Dhātu* is derived from the root *Dhā-Dadhāti* (3.U.), (to place, to put on). So, Root is that which carries the meaning of an action. *Process* and *Result* are the meanings of Root. This is the view of the ancient grammarians especially Bhartṛhari and Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa.⁴

¹ तत्र नामाख्यातजानीति शाकटायनो नैरुक्तसमयश्च । १.४.१२१, Yāska, *op cit*, p. 21

² Abhayaṅkara, K.V. & Śukla, J.M., *op cit*, p. 207

³ Williams, Monier, *A Sanskrit English Dictionary*, p. 513.

⁴ The modern grammarians i.e. Nāgeśabhaṭṭa takes फलविशिष्टव्यापार and व्यापारविशिष्टफल as the meanings of the root.

Bhartṛhari also mentions that the meaning of root is sometimes taken in the sense of a *Bhāva*.⁵ It seems that he follows Patañjali while dealing with the meanings of the root. Any root has two components *viz. Process* and *Result* which express a meaning of the Root.

The second verse contains the longest discussion on the meaning of Root. It also mentions four imperative doctrines of the Vyākaraṇa System.⁶ They are:

- i. The word the *Dhātu* denotes both the *Result* (फलम्) and the *Process* (व्यापारः).
- ii. The Tense (तिङ्) denotes both the Object (कर्म) and the Doer (कर्ता).
- iii. The *Process* (व्यापारः) is considered to be superior to the *Result* (फलम्). *Process* and *Result* are connected with the relation of principal and subordinate.
- iv. The Tense-meaning (तिङर्थ) takes the subordinate position to Root-meaning (धात्वर्थ); as both Root and Tense are connected with the relation of principal and subordinate.

The first two points given above are based on the two aphorisms of Pāṇini *viz. Bhūvādayo Dhātavaḥ* (I.3.1) and *Laḥ Karmaṇi Ca Bhāve Cā'karmakebhyaḥ* (III.4.69).⁷

The words *Process* and *Result* are both technical terms of Grammar. The knowledge of the *Process* and the *Result* is very important for knowing the meanings of the Root⁸. *Process* denotes the sense of an action. It is named as *Vyāpāra* in Grammar; while Mīmāṃsakas call it *Bhāvanā*. It can be illustrated

⁵ अन्त्ये वात्मनि या सत्ता सा क्रिया कैश्चिदिष्यते । भाव एव हि धात्वर्थ इत्यविच्छिन्न आगमः ॥३.८.२४॥
Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 358

⁶ फलव्यापारयोर्धातुराश्रये तु तिङः स्मृताः। फले प्रधानं व्यापारस्तिङ्गर्थस्तु विशेषणम् ॥२॥ VBS, p.11

⁷ Pāṇin, AA, p. 6 & 34

⁸ I have used the word 'root' for the sanskriti word Dhatu and not for the word verb. Because in Sanskrit गम् is *Dhātu* and while गच्छति is verb.

with the example of ‘*Pacati*’. ‘*Pacati*’ (cooking) signifies many small actions like placing the vessel on the fire, adding water in the vessel, getting it warmed waiting for some time, washing the rice and putting it in the container, stirring with definite intervals, checking whether the rice is cooked or not from time to time and finally putting off the vessel from the fire and closing the process at the end of stopping the gas. All these actions which are conducive to ‘cooking’ are technically known as *Process*. Cooking is the principal action but it contains many small actions. This group of actions has particular sequence and significance. We cannot exclude even a single action if we wish to complete cooking. Thus, *Vyāpāra* is not different from an action, but it is a part of an action. Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa has defined *Process* as an action which is in the process of execution:

व्यापारस्तु भावनाभिधा साध्यत्वेनाभिधीयमाना क्रिया ।

The view of Maṇḍan Mīśra is different. He takes *Process* as the meaning of the *Pratyayārtha* and *Result* as the meaning of the root.⁹

Here we observe that these actions do not take place simultaneously, but in a proper sequence which leads to completion of a particular work undertaken by the person concerned with the cooking. Therefore, these small actions are noticed particularly and hence they are not taken differently from the main action of ‘cooking’. Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa rightly observes in his SV –

“All actions are recognized as complete in themselves, and any subtle differences among the actions themselves are never recognized”.¹⁰

⁹ विक्रित्यादिरूपं फलमेव धात्वर्थः, तदनुकूलफूत्कारादिरूपो व्यापारसंघस्तु सर्वोऽपिव्यापारत्वेन प्रत्ययार्थः, फलस्य च तं प्रति प्रकारत्वमित्याहुः ॥ Khaṇḍadeva, *op cit*, p. 59.

¹⁰ निष्पन्ना एव दृश्यन्ते व्यापाराः सर्व एव हि । सूक्ष्मा व्यापारभेदास्तु दृश्यन्ते न कदाचन ॥ १२.७६॥ Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa, SV, p. 704

Bhartṛhari has given the following definition of an action.

यावत् सिद्धमसिद्धं वा साध्यत्वेनाऽभिधीयते ।

आश्रित-क्रम-रूपत्वात् सा क्रियेत्यभिधीयते ॥३.८.१॥¹¹

The multiple actions collectively form an action which is termed as *Kriyā* - “the action is in the form of either completed or continued. It is always perceived after its execution. It contains a series of different definite sequences as a part and parcel”.

There isn't any difference of opinion amongst the scholar with regard to action. This entire procedure is collectively termed as *Kriyā*. The group of different *Process* produces the *Result* of the action. This result of an action is termed as *Phala*. Therefore, in the Bhaimī commentary, it is mentioned that *Process* is that which causes the *Result* and which altogether represents the root-meaning -

तद्धात्वर्थफलजनकत्वे सति तद्धातुवाच्यत्वं व्यापारत्वम्¹².

The term *Result* is not used here in its general sense, but in the sense of the completion of an action, e.g. *Devadattaḥ Oḍanam Pacati* (Devadatta cooks rice). In this example, the *Result* of √Pac - *Pacati* (1.P) (to cook) does not stand for the satisfaction of hunger, but the cooked form of the rice (*Oḍanasya Vikṛitiḥ*)¹³. So the *Result* is that which is produced from the root and which conveys the same meaning as root does. As mentioned in the Bhaimī commentary –

तद्धात्वर्थजन्यत्वे सति तद्धात्वर्थत्वं फलत्वम्।¹⁴

¹¹ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 349

¹² VBS with commentary *Bhaimī*, p. 18

¹³ यस्यार्थस्य प्रसिद्ध्यर्थमारभन्ते पचादयः । तत्प्रधानं फलं तेषां न यागादिः प्रयोजनम् ॥३.१२.१८॥
Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 433

¹⁴ *Ibid*, P. 17

Here it is to be noted that the roots do not function in the same way always. Their meanings and functions change with the addition of a particular suffix. When a root gets tense suffix, it also gets the quality of non-substance. As said in the Nirukta a verb has becoming as its fundamental notion¹⁵. When a root gets case suffix, it gets substance too – as said ‘the nouns have being as their fundamental notion¹⁶’. It can be explained with the examples of *Pacati* and *Pākaḥ*. Both the words are derived from the same root i.e. *Pac* - *Pacati* (1.P. to cook) but the function of two is different. *Pacati* is an action derived from the root *Pac*. When some one says *Pacati*, it is understood as an act of cooking having a group of different small actions. *Pacati* is related with other *Kāraḥ* like *Kartā*, *Karma*, *Karaṇa*, etc. This is known as *Sādhyāvasthā*. *Pākaḥ* is also derived from the same root i.e. *Pac*. It is made up by addition of the suffix *Ghañ* to the root. Both *Pacati* and *Pākaḥ* have *Ṣaḍbhāvaṅkārāḥ*.¹⁷ Therefore, the question in the form of the action is asked that whether it exists or destroyed? In *Pacati*, the *Process* is not interrupt by any intervention, while in *Pākaḥ* it (root) has the suffix *Ghañ* (=A). Moreover, *Pākaḥ* has the Nominal declensions like *Pākaḥ*, *Pākau*, *Pākāḥ*, etc which are never found in *Pacati*. So when *Pākaḥ* is uttered, it leads to many questions and assumptions to the listener. It is because it has some substantive (*Dravyatva*) in it. In *Sādhyāvasthā*, the *Process* does not have any substance (*Dravyatva*). Hence, it does not have any nominal declension and so no further question arises in the mind of the listener. Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa has followed Bhartṛhari completely while dealing with this topic. It is evident from the discussion given in the 3.8 of *VP*.¹⁸

¹⁵ भावप्रधानमाख्यातम् । Yāska, *op cit*, p. 1

¹⁶ सत्त्वप्रधानानि नामानि । *Ibid*

¹⁷ जायतेऽस्ति विपरिणमते वर्धतेऽपक्षीयते विनश्यतीति । *Ibid*, p. 3

¹⁸ सिद्धस्यार्थस्य पाकादेः कथं साधनयोगिता । साध्यत्वे वा तिङन्तेन कृतां भेदो न कश्चन ॥३.८.४३॥, आख्यातशब्दे भागाभ्यां साध्यसाधनवर्तिता । प्रकल्पिता यथा शास्त्रे स घञादिष्वपि क्रमः ॥३.८.४७॥, साध्यत्वेन क्रिया तत्र धातुरूपनिबन्धना । सत्त्वभावस्तु यस्तस्याः स घञादिनिबन्धनः ॥३.८.४८॥, तत्र यं प्रति

An opponent doubts that if the root ‘*Pac*’ represents all these actions, then one root would give many meanings. For, the act of stirring with definite intervals would also mean *Pacati* or the act of adding water would also mean *Pacati*. But such is not the case. All these actions starting from placing the vessel upto the putting off of the vessel represent the same $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$. This action is called *Pac* because the cooked form (*Vikliti*) of the rice is the last act before the production of the *Result*.¹⁹ When we talk of an action we only take it as whole of the acts. When one says *Pacati*, the listener imagines only one action of cooking even though it is made of many different small acts. This happens because we are use to takes it as one.²⁰ It is like different pearls woven in one thread. Actually nobody is capable to behold all these actions at a time. When one action is destroyed the other is generated. All these actions are momentary and perishable. They form an image of a complete, harmonious, coherent and whole meaning of an action in human mind. Bhartṛhari avers -

“This is called Action because it has different components of the same nature; these components have been generated one by one in a respective and collective manner and they have been grasped in human mind as a whole and not in various parts”.²¹

It is like the *vyāṣṭi-samaṣṭi* concept of the *Advaita*, we can explain it with the analogy of forest and tree.

साध्यत्वमसिद्धा तं प्रति क्रिया । सिद्धा तु यस्मिन्साध्यत्वं न तमेव पुनः प्रति ॥ ३.८.५० ॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, pp. 364-365

¹⁹ अनन्तरं फलं यस्याः कल्पते तां क्रियां विदुः । प्रधानभूतां तादर्थ्यादन्यासां तु तदाख्यता ॥ ३.८.५० ॥ *Ibid*, p.355

²⁰ गुणभूतैरवयवैः समूहः क्रमजन्मनाम् । बुद्ध्या प्रकल्पिताभेदः क्रियेति व्यपदिश्यते ॥ ३.८.४८ ॥ *Ibid*, p.352

²¹ cf एकदेशे समूहे वा व्यापाराणां पञ्चादयः । स्वभावतः प्रवर्तन्ते तुल्यरूपं समाश्रिताः ॥ ३.७.५८ ॥ *Ibid*, p. 303

III.2. Meanings of Tenses:

The Tense is regarded as the sense of the Substratum (*Āśraya*) of *Result* and *Process*. The substratum of *Result* is object and the substratum of *Process* is the Agent. Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa suggests that this is inferred by *Pratyāsattinyāya*. According to *Pratyāsattinyāya* the nearest word or sense is taken to understand a sentence. It is mentioned in the earlier pages that *Result* and the *Process* are the denoted sense of the Root. Thus, Tense cannot express the sense of either *Process* or *Result*. The maxim अनन्यलभ्यो हि शब्दार्थः also suggests that only that should be the meaning of the word which is not rendered by any other word. For this reason, it is clear that the Object and the Doer are the expressed meanings of the Tense.

In the text of VBS this simple doctrine is presented in a twisted manner. This type of writing is a variety of *Nyāya* and specially *Navya-nyāya* style of writing. It is believed that the direct statement mostly generates the fault of either prolixity or conciseness. The direct statement, ‘Tense expresses the Substratum of the *Result* and *Process*’, has the fault of conciseness. So in order to avoid these faults, the whole thing is presented in a twisted form.

Kāśikā commentary states the views of Mīmāṃsists and Naiyāyikas on this -

“कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमन्यायेनैतयोरेव कर्मादिपदेन ग्रहणं युक्तमिति भावः।” ²²

‘कृत्यर्थककृधातुसमभिव्याहारे आश्रयपरत्व’मिति नैयायिकाः।

...भावनानांशस्याक्षेपलभ्यत्वात् ‘आश्रयमात्रमर्थ’ इति मीमांसकाः। ²³

Now, the objector argues that on the basis of *Pratyāsattinyāya* one cannot come to the conclusion that Tense expresses both the Object and the Agent.

²² VBS with the commentaries of *Kāśikā* and *Darpaṇa*, p. 22

²³ *Ibid*, p. 23

This is the view of the Mīmāṃsakas that through *Pratyāsattinyāya* one cannot prove that the Object and the Agent are the expressed sense of the Tense, but it can be proved by other means -

1. लक्षणा – means Indication. As per e.g. गङ्गायां घोषः (A hamlet on the river Ganga). Here the word गङ्गायां (Loc. Sing.) is taken in the sense of ‘on the bank of the river Ganga’ (गङ्गायाः तटे घोषः) and not on the waves of the Ganga. In the same way by the force of Indication, it seems that Tense indicates Object and Doer. Hence, there is no need of *Pratyāsattinyāya*.
2. आक्षेप – The another reason is *Ākṣepa* or *Arthāpatti* (i.e. Assumption). The famous example of this is - पीनोज्यं देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते (this healthy boy Devadatta does not eat anything during the day). If the boy does not eat anything during the day time still he is healthy, then he might be having something at night. Otherwise his healthiness would not come into sight. Hence, Object and Doer are assumed on the basis of *Arthāpatti Pramāṇa*.
3. प्रथमान्तपदः – देवदत्तः पचति. Here देवदत्तः is in Nominative Singular and so it is understood as the Doer. Hence there is no need to claim that Tense indicates Object and the rest.

Vaiyākaraṇas firmly say that the Object and the Doer are represented by the Tense only. The aphorism of AA has been presented to support their view. The aphorism *Laḥ Karmaṇi Ca Bhāve Cā'karmakebhyaḥ* (III.4.69) [Tense - *Laḥ* should be understood as the transitive in passive construction (*Karmaṇi*), and intransitive in impersonal form (*Bhāveprayoga*)]. The twice use of *Ca* and *Kartari* (through Anuvṛtti) in the aphorism suggests that Object and Agent have to taken in the sense of *Kartari*. *Lakāra* stands for Tense, just as *N* of *Rāmān*

indicates object; it (*N*) is imagined in *Śas* (*As=N*) and the form of *Rāmān* is framed thereof. Similar is the *Visarga* of *Bhis* (*Bhi*), it indicates Instrumental. Actually it is not a valid method to be followed but is framed to develop a method for easy understanding and learning. It has been stated in the VP of Bhartṛhari.²⁴

Mīmāṃsakas hold the view that the Root denotes the *Result* and the Tense denotes the *Process*. So there is no conflict with the maxim of अनन्यलभ्यो हि शब्दार्थः. Therefore, *Process* can be understood by Tense and the *Result* from the Root.

Vaiyākaraṇas counter argue ‘if doership is taken as *Process* then why not object be taken as *Result*?’ Mīmāṃsakas take the word *Kartari* in the sense of the Action and Doer with regard to Primary derivatives; but they take *Kartari* in the sense of *Process* with regard to Tense. This seems inappropriate. For, the word *Kartari* has its Succession (*Anuvṛttiḥ*) from the aphorism *Karttari Kṛd* (III.4.67). The same *Anuvṛttiḥ* is found in *Laḥ Karmaṇi Ca Bhāve Cā’karmakebhyaḥ* (III.4.69). In this aphorism also the word *Kartari* is used in the sense of the Object and Doer. Therefore, on the strength of the Succession also कर्तरि should be taken as the Object and Doer and not as Action and Doer.

The opponent replies that in *Paktā Devadattaḥ* – doer is clearly reflected and so the sentence has the preponderance of an agent (*Dharmipradhāna*) and not of the action (*Bhāvapradhāna*). Otherwise if it be treated as *Bhāvapradhāna*, the doer would become subordinate.

Kaundabhaṭṭa questions the view of the opponent. He asks that same practice is not followed in *Ghaṭamānaya*. Here *Ghaṭam* is *Ghaṭatvam* (i.e. *Jāti*) and not

²⁴ उपायाः शिक्षमाणानां बालानामुपलालनाः। असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ॥ २.२३८॥
Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 136

Vyakti (or substance) but is implicated as *Vyakti*.²⁵ *Vyakti* is inferred here. So it becomes subordinate which again occupies the main position on the strength of *Bhāvaprādhānyam*. Then why the same rule does not become applicable in Tense?

Mīmāṃsakas take the support of *Vivaraṇaśakti*²⁶ and make another argument by giving the example *Pākaṁ Karoti*. In *Pākaṁ Karoti*, *Pākaṁ* represents the Root and *Karoti* represents the *Process*. Hence, through *Vivaraṇaśakti* also, it is confirmed that the Doer has nothing to do with the Tense.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa refutes this argument by saying that the *Vivaraṇa* of tense gives the meaning of the doer e.g. ‘*Devadattaḥ Pacati*’ would be *Devadattaika-kartṛkā Pacikriyā*. ‘*Ti*’ of *Pacati*’ suggests a single doer of the action i.e. Devadatta. Therefore the tense gives the meaning of the doer and not of the *Process*.

Mīmāṃsakas again put forward an argument that this meaning is based on power of Intention (*Tātparyānusārīvivaraṇam*) and not on the Verbal meaning (*śabdānusārīvivaraṇam*). They give two examples in favour of their argument -

- i. *Pākaṁ Karoti* – This is an explanatory form of *Pacati*. In this, *Pākaṁ* does not denote the meaning of action but of the root. The *Pākaṁ* seems to be the form of the Accusative Singular because of *Tātparyānusārīvivaraṇam*. Mīmāṃsakas hold the view that Root denotes the sense of the *Result* and the Tense denotes the sense of the *Process*. So object and doer are supported neither by the Root nor by the Tense, but

²⁵ According to grammarians the Power (शक्ति) lies in the व्यक्ति, not in जाति. As e.g. घट is व्यक्ति while घटत्वम् is जाति. But the theory of Naiyayikas is just contrary to this.

²⁶ There are Eight varieties of विवरणशक्ति –

शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानकोषाप्तवाक्याद् व्यवहारतश्च ।

वाक्यस्य शेषाद् विवृतेर्वदन्ति सान्निध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः॥ Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa, *op cit*, p. 54

they are supposed as part of the Tense. This happens due to the power of *Tātparyānusārīvivaraṇam*.

- ii. *Dhavaśca Khadiraśca* (=Dhavakhadirao) – It is an example of *Itaretara-Dvandva-Tatpuruṣa*. Here the assumption of two words is also based on *Tātparyānusārīvivaraṇam*.

The counter-argument of the Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa is - ‘*Abhedānvayaḥ* is seen in *Pacati Devadattaḥ*. So ‘*Ti*’ of *Pacati* signifies *Devadattaḥ* only’²⁷. To this, Mīmāṃsakas argue that there isn’t any *Abhedānvayaḥ*²⁸ between the two as they do not have similar case ending.

Now the Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa questions that if it be the problem, the same problem will arise in *Somena Yajeta*, *Stokam Pacati* and *Rājapurusaḥ*. In all these examples, the relation of *Abhedānvayaḥ* is not seen.

These three are very famous examples of Mīmāṃsā system. The Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa refutes the argument of Mīmāṃsists by placing the famous examples of Mīmāṃsā where both the member of the sentence do not have same case ending.

- i. *Somena Yajeta* – the verb *Yajeta* means *Yāgena Iṣṭam Bhāvayet*. So *Yāga* is an instrument for the achievement of the desired fruit. Hence *Soma* has nothing to do with the instrument, but later on it is explained differently as *Somavatā Yāgena Iṣṭam Bhāvayet*. It is done by the power of Indication.

²⁷ देवदत्ताऽभिन्नकर्तृको वर्तमानो विकल्पतनुकूलो व्यापारः ।

²⁸ It is an example of जल्प. जल्प means विजिगीषोः स्वपक्षसिद्धये छलजातिनिग्रहादिपरिग्रहो जल्पः. जल्प is a kind of Logical argument. According to the *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* of Rājaśekhara there are types of arguments viz. वाद, जल्प & वितंडा. Here we find the incorporation of the techniques and method of Navyanyaya system by grammarians. Rājaśekhara, *op cit*, p. 9

- ii. *Stokam Pacati* – *Stokam* is an adverb. According to the rule the adverb governs the Accusative case. Both adverb and verb do not have same case ending. Adverb has no relation with the fruit of the Action. Still it is considered to be related with the Action and the fruit as well. Here too, the rule is not followed.
- iii. *Rājapuruṣaḥ* – It is an example of *Ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa* compound. It can be split as *Rājapuruṣaḥ* or *Rājasvastavān* (the asset of the king) by the strength of Indication. But here also the *Abhedānvayaḥ* has been accepted.²⁹

The Mīmāṃsakas argue that in *Pacati Devadattaḥ*, the Tense is not *Karṭṛvācakaḥ*, but is assumed here by the power of Indication and *Samānādhikaraṇa*.³⁰ They take the support of the Vedic statement to prove their point. In the *Jyotiṣṭomaprakaraṇam* of the *Taittirīyaśamhitā* there is a statement ‘*Ekahāyanyā Aruṇayā Piṇākṣyā Krīṇāti*’³¹ i.e. He purchases a year old cow of a red colour and yellow eyes). The first Section of the third Chapter of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* is *Aruṇyādhikaraṇa*.³² It explains the above given statement of *Taittirīyaśamhitā*. *Piṇākṣyā* and *Vaiśvadevī* are *Yogic* words (a kind of word based on derivation or etymology³³) represent relation and not-substance

²⁹ This is an example of वितंडा as Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa has quoted the examples of the opponent’s book. He has not explained his own stand on this point. The only aim of the author is to refute the view of the opponent. This is known as वितंडा – स्वपक्षस्यापरिग्रहीत्री परपक्षस्य दूषयित्री वितण्डा. *Ibid*, p. 9

³⁰ *Sāmānādhikaraṇa* is a technical term which is used when two different words denote one meaning cf तत्पुरुषः समानाधिकरणः॥ पा०१.२.४२॥ Bhaimi commentary defines it as - समानम् अधिकरणं (वाच्यम्) ययोस्ते समानाधिकरणे पदे । तयोर्भावः सामानाधिकरणम्। पदयोरेकार्थाभिधायित्वम् इत्यर्थः।

³¹ *Taittirīya Śamhitā* 6.4.7.3 Vol. 8, p. 4119

³² Jaimini, *MS*, Vol. I, P. XLVIII, p. 667

³³ Abhayaṅkara, K.V. & Śukla, J.M., *op cit*, p. 319

(*Adravyatva*). It is supported by the aphorisms of Pāṇini.³⁴ These words are examples of *Bahuvrīhi* compound.

Now by quoting the above examples of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa questions that if these *Śruti* passages will be assessed on the basis of the parameter set by the *Mīmāṃsā* then the whole *Aruṇyādhikaraṇa* would be useless. In this example the redness of the cow is *Amūrta* (insentient object). Hence it would not be an instrument of purchasing the object. For, it is a quality of the cow and so one cannot purchase anything on the basis of an insentient thing. According to Grammarians, Substance is necessary and inevitable for this kind of Process.³⁵ The view of *Mīmāṃsā* is not logical. They say that *Aruṇayā* and *Pinākṣyā* both show the relation with the Substance i.e. cow. Hence *Krīṇāti*, a verb represents the Doer by the power of Indication. Here the *Samānādhikaraṇa* is done on the basis of Indication. For this reason the whole *Aruṇyādhikaraṇa* of *Jaiminīsūtras* seems futile. Unlike the *Mīmāṃsakas*, *Vaiyākaraṇas* hold the view that both *Ekahāyanyā* and *Pinākṣyā* indicate Substance which is a cow. The relation between the Substance (a cow) and the verb (to purchase) is evident by *Samānādhikaraṇa*. There is no need to suppose Indication for the meaning. It is because the Tense represents doer and not the *Process*. Thus, the interpretation of the Grammarian is appropriate as it is also supported by the *Śruti* passage. The meaning of the Vedic statement becomes clear by the power *Samānādhikaraṇa* which is found in the Tense as it denotes the sense of doer and object.³⁶

³⁴ अनेकमन्यपदार्थे (२.२.२४) & साऽस्य देवता (४.२.२४) Pāṇini, *op cit*, pp. 14 & 41

³⁵ अमूर्त्तत्वाद् गुणो नैव क्रियां साधयितुं क्षमः। तस्मात् क्रीणातिना नास्य सम्भवत्येकवाक्यता ॥ this verse has been quoted by almost all the commentators, but its original source is not known.

³⁶ The same thing is seen in the aphorism of Pāṇini लः कर्मणि च भावे चाऽकर्मकेभ्यः ॥ पा. ३.४.६९॥ in this, लः means तिङ्. The formation of कर्तरि, कर्मणि & भावे sentences (i.e. Active and Passive Voice) depend on it.

III.3. Meanings of the Verb

The meaning of verb is very nicely delt by Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa in his work. He presents the discussion on the significance of a verb in a sentence and its relation with other words. Here we find the citations of the views of Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas on verb. In grammar, the word *Ākhyāta* is taken in the sense of a verb as it is said in the *Gaṇasūtra*, *Nirukta*, *Rkprātiśākhya* and *Vājasaneyaprātiśākhya*.³⁷ The scholars of grammar and Nyāya have difference of opinion regarding the expressed sense of the verb. Grammarians take doer and object as the expressed sense of the verb; while Naiyāyikas take activity (*Kṛti*) as the expressed sense.³⁸

There is another theory which states in *VBS* that *Tiñ* renders four meanings viz. Doer, Object, Number and Time. Its examples are -

- The example of Doer is - *Devadattaḥ Pacati* (Devadatta cooks), *Pacati* is an action which has relation with the agent. The third person singular form of the action *Pacati* shows that the agent is singular in number and it belongs to the present time only. It is understood in the traditional grammar as ‘it is a process which relies on singular doer i.e. Devadatta and it is condusive to the production of the result’ (*Devadattaniṣṭho Viklityanukūlavyāpāraḥ*). In this example, the doer of the action is Devadatta and it has direct relation with the verb.

³⁷ आख्यातमाख्यातेन क्रियासातत्ये । गणसूत्र २.७२।, क्रियावाचकमाख्यातम् । वाजसनेयप्रातिशाख्यम् ५.१। तन्नाम येनाभिदधाति सत्त्वं, तदाख्यातं येन भावं स धातुः । *Rkprātiśākhya* 12. 5

³⁸ In the Bhaimī commentary (P. 49), the views of Mīmāṃsists and Naiyāyikās are stated. According to Mīmāṃsists कर्म & कर्ता are not the expressed sense of तिङ् but they are supposed by लक्षणा. While Naiyāyikās state that कृति is the denoted sense of तिङ् and प्रथमान्तपद is required for the application of संख्या. Both these theories have the fault of गौरव which will lead to the confusion.

- The example of Object is *Taṇḍulāḥ Pacyante*. This is an example of the passive construction. Here the verb *Pacyante* has the relation with the object of an action.
- The example of Number is two-fold. It has a relation with the doer and object. The first is - *Bālaḥ Pacati* (a boy is cooking), *Bālo Pacataḥ* (two boys are cooking). The first example shows that there is only one doer of the action which is known through the singular form of the doer (*Ekatvaviśiṣṭabālakarṭṛkaṁ Pacanam*). In the second example, there are two doers of the same action which becomes evident through the use of dual form (*Dvitvaviśiṣṭabālakarṭṛkaṁ Pacanam*). The example of Number in object is *Taṇḍulāḥ Pacyante*. Here, the object *Taṇḍulāḥ* is in singular.
- Time, one of the four meanings of Tense, is subordinate to verb. Time always depends upon the different stages of the action. There are mainly three stages viz., past, present and future. It is supported by the aphorism of Pāṇini – *Varttamāne Laṭ* (III.2.124) and which says that the Present Tense should be used when action is continued. The same should be understood in the case of the past and future.³⁹

The question arises that why can't the Time be taken as connected with the doer and object as the Number does? If it be treated like a Number, the use of *Apākṣīta* (has cooked) and *Pakṣyati* (will cook) would no longer be used. Even when the doer has completed cooking, then also one cannot say that he has cooked (*Apākṣīta*). For, the doer belongs to the present tense and the action of cooking goes with the past. Thus instead of 'he has cooked', only 'he is cooking' can be used. Similar is the case of the Future Tense; as one

³⁹ This aphorism has been read under the domain (*Adhikāra*) of the aphorism 'धातोः' (३.१.११). It indirectly suggests the expressed senses of the root (i.e. *Process & Result*). Among the two, *Process* is important than the *Result* with regard to *Root*. Thus, it is proved that Time is subordinate to *Process*.

cannot use the Future Tense in ‘he will cook (*Pakṣyati*)’ when the person is about to cook something. Such kinds of usages are not seen in the spoken languages. Grammar regulates only those usages which are in practice. Therefore, Time cannot be treated as the Number.

The doubt arises that the use of the phrase ‘he is getting up or standing up’ should not be used for a person suffering from the disease of *Āmavāta*. The reply to above doubt is – a person, suffering from *Āmavāta*, tries to get up from the place but because of the stiffness of body he couldn’t do it. His efforts won’t be visible to the observer and so he could not notice any movement in the body. In this case instead of the verb ‘*Uttiṣṭhati* (he gets up)’, the phrase ‘he tries to stand up but could not’ seems better.

Naiyāyikas do not agree with the above discussion. They say that the realization of Number of the verb (*Ākhāyārthasamkhyā*) is done only through the Nominal case ending (*Prathamāntapada*) and not by the *Ākhāyārtha* (i.e. doer and object). The presence of *Prathamāntapada* is the cause of *Ākhāyārthasamkhyā*. e.g. *Devadattaḥ Odanam Pacati*, *Devadattena Odanam Pacyate*; in both these examples the *Ākhāyārtha* is represented by the *Prathamāntapada* viz. *Devadattaḥ* and *Odanam* respectively.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa argues that if the Nominal case ending is the only factor for knowing the number of the verb, then why in *Candra Iva Mukhaṁ Dṛśyate* and *Devadatto Bhuktā Vrajati*, the words *Candra* and *Bhuktā* are not taken as the representatives of *Ākhāyārthasamkhyābodha* when both have Nominal case ending. It has to be mentioned additionally that it (i.e. *Prathamāntapada*) should not be subordinate to any word. Otherwise it leads to the fault of prolixity. On the contrary if they accept the view of Vaiyākaraṇas that both doer and object as the expressed sense of a verb, then there neither arises any fault nor the need to affix any additional statement. For, in both the sentences the

Ākhāyārtha is understood through doer and object. Thus it is proved that only doer and object signify *Ākhyātārtha*.

III. 4. Theory of one verb in a sentence (एकतिङ्-वाक्यम्)

There is a general rule that the sentence should have only one verb. But its exception is also seen in the popular language. In *Mahābhāṣya*, Patañjali raised the same issue when he says ‘का एषा वाचो युक्तिर्भवति पचति, भवति पश्यति, भवत्यपाक्षीत्? एषैषा वाचो युक्तिः पच्यादयः क्रिया भवति क्रियायाः कर्त्र्यो भवन्ति’ – (a *Paribhāṣā* on the aphorism भूवादयो धातवः ॥१.३.१॥ of AA). Patañjali says that the action too, can function like the doer, object, instrument, etc. of the other actions. Bhartṛhari also says that there maybe many verbs in a sentence, but only one will be the main verb and the rest will function as the subordinates.⁴⁰

Naiyāyikās do not accept it wholeheartedly. They take the *Prathamāntapada* as the substratum of the verb and also say that verb depends on Activity (*Kṛti*). So, there must one verb in a sentence. *Prathamāntapada* and its *Prathamāntārtha* (i.e. agent) are the central idea of their theory. If the theory of Naiyāyikās be accepted, the uniformity of the sentence would be disturbed. In order to prove their theory, they need *Abhedānvaya* between the doer and the verb but somehow it does not seem applicable e.g. *Paśya Mṛgo Dhāvati* (see, the deer is running). Here both *Paśya* and *Dhāvati* are verbs. The verb *Dhāvati* is connected with the *Prathamāntapada* i.e. *Mṛgaḥ*. There isn’t any problem in *Mṛgo Dhāvati* as both the doer and the verb are connected with the relation of principal and subordinate. But *Paśya* is also a verb and it is a part of a sentence. The theory of Naiyāyikās does not accept two verbs in a sentence. If it be treated as a different verb then there should be another agent for *Paśya*. In this case two different sentences will appear which is not intended.

⁴⁰ यथानेकमपि क्त्वान्तं तिङन्तस्य विशेषकम् । तथा तिङन्तं तत्राहुस्तिङन्तस्य विशेषकम् ॥२.६॥
Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 68

If we take the verb *Paśya* as the subordinate in the sentence, then two faults arise. *Mṛgaḥ* governs Accusative case. This breaks the uniformity of the sentence, as *Mṛgaḥ* would no more remain *Prathamāntapada* in spite the fact that the deer is the doer of the verb *Dhāvati*. So it governs Nominative and not the Accusative.

Secondly, the intention of the speaker does not become clear. Here the fast running of the deer is pointed by the speaker and not the deer itself. Otherwise these sentences need to be treated as two individual sentences like *Paśya* and *Mṛgo Dhāvati*. Bhartṛhari says that the act of running should be looked at from two perpectives 1) from the point of view of two stages of root viz. *Sādhyāvasthā* and *Sāadhanāvasthā* and 2) the differnerce of subject.⁴¹

Naiyāyikās again make counter argument that *Dhāvati* can be understood as an example of शतृप्रत्यय as in धावन् मृगः (a running deer). If it be accepted, then also *Mṛgaḥ* will govern Accusative Case and the problem will remain the same.

Thus, this theory of Naiyāyikas is confusing one which may not lead to the proper conclusion regarding the verb and the doer of the sentence. Hence Naiyāyikas have to accept the view of Vaiyākaraṇas. According to Kaunḍabhaṭṭa, the knowledge of the verb and the doer depends on the realization of the *Process* but not on the *Prathamāntapada*. In *Paśya Mṛgo Dhāvati*, the running of the deer is intended to show and it is the object of the sentence. Since *Dhāvati* is not a crude form (प्रातिपदिकान्त)⁴² it cannot be declined as the Accusatice Case. At the same time there isn't any need to bar the use of Accusative in the sentence. So, *Dhāvati* will take the position of the main verb while the act of running will take the subordinate position. Hence, there won't be any confusion regarding the position of two verbs in a sentence.

⁴¹ मृगो धावति पश्येति साध्यसाधनरूपता । तथा विषयभेदेन सरणस्योपपद्यते ॥३.८.५२॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 366

⁴² According to Pāṇini's aphorism अर्थवदधातुरप्रत्ययः प्रातिपदिकम्॥१.२.४५॥

Naiyāyikas take the support of the relation of cause and effect (*Kāryakāraṇasambandhaḥ*) to make their argument. According to them, the presence of the doer is the cause while knowledge of *Process* (*Bhāvanāprakāraṇabodha*)⁴³ is the effect; e.g. *Devadattaḥ Pacati*. Here *Devadattaḥ* is the *Prathamāntapada* which denotes the sense of the verb ‘*Pacati*’. *Process* which is the component of *Pacati*, becomes known through doer (= *Devadattaḥ*). Hence, *Prathamāntapada* is required for the knowledge of *Process* (*Bhāvanāprakāraṇabodha*). But this view does not seem appropriate and suitable.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa answers by stating that the *Process*, expressed through the Root, is the cause while the knowledge of the Doer (*Ākhyātārthakarṭṛprakāraṇabodha*) is the effect.⁴⁴ It is true that in *Devadattaḥ Pacati*, *Devadattaḥ* is principal and *Pacati* is subordinate. Here the rule of Tense remains the same. But, in *Paśya Mṛgo Dhāvati*, the rule of Tense should be treated like *Kṛdanta*. It is understood as ‘beholding the deer as the agent and the act of running of the deer as the object’ (*Mṛgakarṭṛka-dhāvanakarmatvakarṭṛka-darśana*). So running (*Dhāvana*) becomes the subordinate and the act of beholding ($\sqrt{\text{Dṛś}}$) becomes the principal. Thus, in some cases, the rule of *Bhāvanāprakāraṇabodha* would be applicable for the sake of uniformity of the sentence. The same is observed in the *Paramalaghumañjuṣā* of Nāgeśabhaṭṭa.⁴⁵

⁴³ भावनाप्रकारकबोध means the meaning is realized through the presence of the Process in the verb. This is the view of Naiyāyikās.

⁴⁴ Here we see स्थुणाखननन्याय as Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa is trying to establish his view firmly.

⁴⁵ सुबन्तं हि यथाऽनेकं तिङन्तस्य विशेषणम्। तथा तिङन्तमप्याहुस्तिङन्तस्य विशेषणम्॥ Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, *PLM*, p. 162

The theory of the Vaiyākaraṇas that *Process* and *Result* are the expressed senses of the root is challenged by Naiyāyikas. They argue that such cannot be accepted as it is not seen in the roots like √*Naś* - *Naśyati* (4.P) to perish, √*Jñā* - *Jānāti* (9.U) to know and √*Iṣ* - *Ichhati* (1.P) to wish. For, we cannot observe any particular *Process* of destruction in *Naś* - *Naśyati*. Moreover, ‘to wish’ and ‘to know’ are the qualities of the Soul which are minute. Hence their *Process* cannot be seen.

To this argument, Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa replies that it is true that one cannot imagine the *Process* of destruction till the object is destroyed completely. The example of *Ghato Naśyati* is given to illustrate the theory. In this example, the *Process* is not visible but at the same time it is observed that an instrument is required for the destruction of a pot. A stick is an instrument which is required to hit the pot. When someone hits the pot with the stick, the pot breaks down into pieces. The hitting and breaking of the pot are the *Processes* which are inevitable and visible. Hence, ‘*Naśtaḥ*’ is used for the thing which is already destroyed and ‘*Naṅkṣati*’ for the thing which will be destroyed in future.

To wish and to know are the mental actions which too, require a substratum. As there must be some doer of these actions for e.g. *Devadattaḥ Ichhati* (Devadatta wishes), *Devadattaḥ Jānāti* (Devadatta knows). These are the qualities of the soul, but they happen when the soul becomes connected with the mind. Here also a particular kind of *Process* is required. Hence, it becomes clear that both *Process* and *Result* are the components or rather the expressed senses of the root and this theory cannot be denied.

The opponent puts an argument. If the verb represents both the doer and the object, why *Pacati* cannot represent doer and object simultaneously? Or it can represent object only?

It is replied that if the affix *Yak* or *Ciṇ* is implied with the verb then it represents the action only e.g. *Pacyate Taṇḍulaḥ*, *Paṭhyate Granthaḥ*, *Apāci Odanaḥ*, etc. Similarly when *Śap*, *Śnam*, *Śnā*, *Śyan* or *Śā* is used with the verb, then it represents the doer e.g. *Devadattaḥ Paṭhati*, *Bhojanam Abhavat*, *Saḥ Dīvyati*, etc.⁴⁶

For this, the opponent quotes an example from the literary work where this rule has been broken. In the *Śiśupālavadham* of Māgha⁴⁷, the verb *Abodhi* is found. Here *Ciṇ* is used with the verb still it does not give the sense of the object. The same is the case of *Pacyate* in *Pacyate Odanaḥ Svayameva*.

Abodhi is an example of *Karmakartṛprakriyā*. It is the form of the *Lṛṇlakāra* first person singular of the root *Budh* – *Bodhati* (1.P) to know or to understand. In this, *Cli* is substituted by *Ciṇ* by the power of the aphorism *Dīpajanabudhapūri-tāyipyābho'nyatarasyām* (III.1.68). Again, *Ta* is dropped by the *sūtra* *Ciṇo Luk* (VI.4.104). In *Pacyate*, *Yak* is added to the root *Pac* - *Pacati* (1.P) (to cook) by the strength of the rule *Karmavat Karmanā Tulyakriyaḥ* (III.1.87). Therefore, in both the examples Doer is suggested by *Ciṇ* and *Yak* but not the object.

Kaunḍabhaṭṭa says this is the general rule regarding the object and the doer. The provision of *Karmakartṛprakriyā* is an exceptional rule. Therefore the interpretations should be understood as per the statement of the *Āgamas*.⁴⁸

In *Pacyate Odanaḥ Svayameva*, *Pacyate* should be understood as 'Ekodanābhinnāśrayakaḥ Pākānukūlo Vyāpāraḥ' i.e. the *Process* which is conducive for the cooking of rice and which is different from the rice. It is an

⁴⁶ फलव्यापारयोस्तत्र फले तङ्-यक्-चिणादयः। व्यापारे शप्शानमाद्यास्तु द्योतयन्त्याश्रयान्वयम् ॥३॥ [*Taṇ*, *Yak*, *Ciṇ* and other affixes suggest the *Phalāśraya* (the substratum of the *Result*) i.e. Object. Similarly the *Śap*, *Śnam* and other affixes suggest the *Vyāpārāśraya* (the support of the *Process*) i.e. Doer].

⁴⁷ 'क्रमादमुं नारद इत्यबोधि सः...॥ १.३॥ Māgha, *op cit*, p.4

⁴⁸ उत्सर्गोऽयं कर्मकर्तृविषयादौ विपर्ययात् । तस्माद् यथोचितं ज्ञेयं द्योतकत्वं यथागमम् ॥४॥

example of Passive but due to *Karmakarṭṛ*, doer is suggested by the verb. *Pacyate* is transitive root but it becomes intransitive when the object acts as a doer of the action by the force of the rule of *Karmakarṭṛ*. In the case of *Abodhi* too, the doer is intended by verb. Nārada is the object of realization but instead of Kṛṣṇa, he is appeared to be the doer because of *Karmakarṭṛprakriyā*.

Here the maxim of *Sūcīkaṭāha*⁴⁹ is observed. This maxim is generally used when one takes up comparatively smaller task than the bigger one. It is used by the author to explain why he has discussed the verb prior to root inspite the fact that root is mentioned prior to verb in the beginning of the theory. It is because the establishment of the theory of verb takes less time and effort than the root.

The followers of Prabhākaras are of the opinion that *Laḍādyantaḥ* suggests that the root does not represent the *Process*. This point is discussed under the light of the rule of *Vivriyamāṇaḥ* and *Vivaraṇam*.

The relation between *Vivriyamāṇaḥ* and *Vivaraṇam* is shown by giving the example of $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$ - *Pacati*. $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$ is *Vivriyamāṇaḥ* and *Process* (*Pākam Utpādayati*) is the *Vivaraṇam*. *Vivriyamāṇaḥ* means the object of explanation and *Vivaraṇam* means the explanatory sentence. *Pacati* (he cooks) literary means *Pākam Utpādayati* which shows that cooking is continued. The meaning of $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$ does not mean an effort only. When someone says ‘he cooks’, it is understood as the combination of different small actions like placing the utensil on the fire, adding water and rice, the act of stirring with definite intervals, blowing the air, testing whether the rice is cooked or not and finally putting off

⁴⁹ The word सूची means a pin and कटाह means a pan. When blacksmith is busy in making the iron pan and someone asks to make an iron-pin, at that time he puts aside his work of preparing the pan and makes the pin. The preparation of pin takes less time than the pan. Sometime a huge work is kept aside for a short time for the sake of some small and simple work. This is known as सूचीकटाहन्यायः.

the vessel. So the doubt does not arise regarding any action mentioned above.⁵⁰ So it is not just an effort but it is a *Process* to execute some task which requires a series of different actions. This series is called *Process*.

The Naiyāyikas argue that if $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$, etc. ultimately presents one direct meaning (*Śakyatāvacchedaka*), then this may suffer from the fault of prolixity. If the effort be taken as the sense of the root then it will confine to the *Result* only.

Kaundabhaṭṭa counter argues by giving the examples of '*Ratho Gacchati*' and '*Cakṣurjānāti*'. A chariot and an eye both are insentient objects. Therefore they cannot be the doer of the action according to the rule of Nyāya. Naiyāyikas try to solve the problem by suggesting that the Indicated sense has to be incorporated in these examples to get the meaning of the sentence. But this leads to the fault of prolixity as the sense of 'to effort' is supposed here⁵¹. To this, Kaundabhaṭṭa says that this problem can be solved if logicians accept the view of grammarians. Moreover, the view of logicians is not coherent. It is seen that whatever is convenient to the speaker has given more preference without caring for the rule.

Kaundabhaṭṭa gives the examples of the $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$, $\sqrt{\text{Kr}}$, etc. to refute the view of Naiyāyikas. In *Pacati – Pākaṁ Karoti*, the explanation does not render the meaning of 'to effort'. Moreover in the examples *Ratho Gamanam Karoti*, *Bijādināṅkura Kṛtaḥ*, etc. the meaning of $\sqrt{\text{Kr}}$ in the sense of 'an effort' is not proved. In the first example $\sqrt{\text{Kr}}$ denotes the sense of motion and in the second it gives the sense of growth. In both the examples, $\sqrt{\text{Kr}}$ cannot be taken in the sense of 'an effort' as 'to effort' is a quality of the soul. Therefore,

⁵⁰ Modern Naiyāyikas believe that the meaning of the root means कृति = यत्न. Thus according to them, the mention of व्यापार in the *Kārikā* shows the non-acceptance of the view.

⁵¹ Such is the view of Khaṇḍadeva. He says – वस्तुतस्तु तत्फलभेदेन तत्तद्व्यापारभेदेन चानुगतैकलघुभूतशक्यतावच्छेदकाभावात् पचति पाके यतते पाकं करोति-इत्यादिविवरणाख्यातस्य यत्नत्वमेव शक्यतावच्छेदकम् । Khaṇḍadeva, *op cit*, p. 59

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa concludes the discussion by presenting the example of $\sqrt{\text{Kṛṇ}}$ in the following manner –

“If the meaning of the root is taken as *Result* and not the *Process*⁵², then the meaning of $\sqrt{\text{Kṛṇ}}$ would be an effort only and as a result of this the $\sqrt{\text{Kṛṇ}}$ becomes intransitive which is not desired.”⁵³

In continuation of the earlier discussion, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa gives the example of *Ghaṭam Bhāvayati* and *Ghaṭo Bhavati*. If the *Process* is not taken as the meaning of the root, then not only in *Ghaṭam Bhāvayati* but in *Ghaṭo Bhavati* also the Accusative would become applicable. In the first example, the *Ghaṭam* is object which governs the Accusative Case. While in the second, *Ghaṭaḥ* is doer and it governs the Nominative Case. *Ghaṭaḥ* is an insentient object. So it can never be the agent according to Naiyāyikas.⁵⁴ *Ghaṭaḥ* would no longer be framed in the Nominative case. Moreover being the object of the action, it will always govern Accusative case. Thus, *Ghaṭo Bhavati* will not be the right form; and *Ghaṭam Bhavati* will prove as the only right form.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa has given the view of Mīmāṃsakas and then he refutes it in very strong manner. The Mīmāṃsakas define agent as supportive faculty to the root and the generative cause of the action⁵⁵. The definition of the agent given by Mīmāṃsā is not welcomed by Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa. He argues that all the *Kārakas* are contributory and productive to the action and so all will become *Kartākāraka*.

⁵² The *Process* is also known by the name of Bhāvanā or Kriyā or Utpādanā.

⁵³ व्यापारो भावना सैवोत्पादना सैव च क्रिया । कृञोऽकर्मकताऽपत्तेर्न हि यत्प्रोऽर्थ इष्यते ॥५॥ VBS, p. 48

⁵⁴ This is the view of Gadādharaḥaṭṭācārya -अथ द्रव्यत्वादौ धर्मितावच्छेदकतासंसर्गेण प्रसिद्धस्य शुद्धघटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नप्रकारक-अभेदान्वयबोधस्य घटत्वादापत्तिसंभवात् । न च तत्र आपादकाभावः । तात्पर्यज्ञानविशेषादिघटिताया धर्मितावच्छेदकतया द्रव्यत्वादौ तदुत्पादनियामक-सामग्र्या एव आपादकत्वात् । Gadādharaḥaṭṭācārya, VV, p. 237

⁵⁵ This statement of Mīmāṃsists needs to be amended. The aphorism of Pāṇini स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता (पा०१.४.५४) clearly states that ‘though all the *Kāraka* bespeak the action but the one who works independently is the कर्ताकारक’.

Therefore, the view of Mīmāṃsakas is inappropriate and the problem of Accusative remains unsolved by their theory. The *Bhaimī* commentary has stated the view of MB, VP and PLM for more clarification.⁵⁶

III.5. The problem of transitive and intransitive roots

If the root is not conveyed by *Process*, then its division as transitive and intransitive would be worthless. When both *Result* and *Process* have common substratum, it is intransitive; but when they have different substratum for the application of the action, it is transitive. There is a subtle difference between transitive and intransitive roots. The difference depends upon the sameness or distinctiveness of the substratum of the two components of the root i.e. *Result* and *Process*. It is usually believed that when these components of root rely on common thing (i.e. doer), it is intransitive and when they rely on different substratums, it is transitive. Although, having same substratum for functioning is not the only condition for intransitive root. Such is a wrong belief regarding intransitiveness of the root as this view has been eradicated by Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa. He says that this belief leads to the fault of *Ativyāpti*. The example of the $\sqrt{\text{Gam}}$ – *Gacchati* (1.P., to go) has been presented to explicate the theory of transitive and intransitive root. In case of $\sqrt{\text{Gam}}$, the action of ‘going’ depends upon the doer; but its *Result* depends upon the reaching of the destinal point (*Uttaradeśasamyoga*). This maybe misunderstood that here *Result* too depends on doer, because the *Result* of *Uttaradeśasamyoga* is seen in the doer and not at the destinal point. To avoid this false apprehension,

⁵⁶ VBS with the *Bhaimī* commentary. pp. 83

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa has used the word ‘*Matra*’ in the commentary. He has quoted the view of Bhartṛhari on this-

“आत्मानमात्मना बिभ्रदस्तीति व्यपदिश्यते।

अन्तर्भावाच्च तेनासौ कर्मणा न सकर्मकः”⁵⁷

The √*As* - *Asti* (1.P., to be) is used in the sense of ‘sustaining itself’. It means ‘the activity helpful for one’s own sustenance. This root has two parts viz. *Phalānśa* and *Vyāpārānśa*. *Phalānśa* is sustenance and *Vyāpārānśa* is the act of sustenance. Both are found in the doer of the action and hence √*As* is intransitive. *Bhaimī* commentary has given four varieties for intransitive roots by quoting the verse of Bhartṛhari.⁵⁸

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa has not explained all the four varieties of the intransitive root. But he has indirectly supported the second variety of the intransitive root.

The question regarding √*Jñā* (9.U.) as the intransitive root is raised. In √*Jñā* (9.U.) (*Jānāti*), both *Result* and *Process* rely on the same substratum. Hence it might be treated as intransitive root. But, in the usage we find *Devadatta*

⁵⁷ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p.250

⁵⁸ cf VBS with *Bhaimī* commentery, pp. 144-145

There are four conditions when the transitive root would become intransitive.

1. When the meaning of the root changes. As e.g. दासो भारं वहति। (a servant bears the burden). In this example the √वह् is transitive, because it has independent object (=भारम्). Here both *Result* and *Process* have different support. But the same root would become intransitive when it is said – नदी वहति (a river flows).
2. When the object becomes the integral part of the meaning of the root e.g. √जीव् - जीवति (1.P.) (to live) here the vital force (प्राण) is the object (कर्म). Both *Result* and *Process* are seen in the same person so this root is intransitive. Some other examples are √भू, √नृत्, etc.
3. By the strength of popular usage or conversion e.g. मेघो वर्षति here water is the object even though the usage of this root is accepted as intransitive root.
4. When the object is not desired to be spoken out clearly e.g. हिताद् न यः संश्रुते स किंप्रभुः. In this verse, ‘the word of ministers or wellwishers’ is the object. But it is dropped intentionally by the speaker himself.

Ātmānam Jānāti (Devadatta knows the self), here *Ātmānam* is Accusative Singular of *Ātman*. So, the $\sqrt{\text{Jñā}}$ cannot be treated as intransitive. If it is intransitive then how does it has the object?

The word *Ātmā* bears two different meanings - 1) inner self i.e. soul and 2) physical self i.e. body. Through the action of inner self, the body experiences pain and pleasure. So the body is the substratum of *Process* while the inner self is the substratum of the *Result*. This is known as *Upādhibheda*. The soul is one but due to *Upādhibheda* it is taken as many.⁵⁹ The soul is defined as ‘different from body’ and the body is defined as ‘different from *Antaḥ Karaṇam*’. Thus, the root does not change into intransitive root, it is purely transitive.

Transitive roots are defined as: स्वार्थ-फल-व्यधिकरण-व्यापार-वाचित्वं सकर्मकत्वम् or स्वार्थ-व्यापार-व्यधिकरण-फल-वाचकत्वं सकर्मकत्वम्. Both the definitions show that there are two parts of the root viz. *Process* and *Result*. When both these parts have different substratums, the root is termed as transitive and when they have common substratum, it is termed as intransitive. e.g. *Devadattaḥ Taṇḍulān Pacati* (Devadatta cooks rice). Here the *Result* (*Vikliti*) of $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$ remains in the rice while the *Process* depends on the person (*Devadattaḥ*). So it is transitive. The example of intransitive is *Devadattaḥ Śete*. The *Result* and the *Process* of $\sqrt{\text{Śīn}}$ lay in the agent *Devadattaḥ* only. So it is intransitive root. The same is presented by Bhartṛhari but in a different manner.⁶⁰ Thus, this classification of the root cannot be done without accepting *Process* and *Result* as the attributed sense of the root.

⁵⁹ Cf द्वौ इमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षरमेव च । क्षरःसर्वाणि भूतानि कूटास्थाक्षरमुच्यते ॥ & द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते । तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति ॥ Mu. Ups. ३.१.॥ p. 137

⁶⁰ धातोरर्थान्तरे वृत्तेर्धात्वर्थेनोपसंग्रहात् । प्रसिद्धेरविवक्षातः कर्मणोऽकर्मिका क्रिया ॥ ३.७.८८॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit* , p. 315

The argument that a list should be made of the transitive roots; and the rest roots should be named as intransitive is not appropriate. Since, there is no definite fixation to categorise the roots as either transitive or intransitive. Any root can work as transitive and intransitive. As in the case of $\sqrt{\text{Vah}}$ – *Vahati* (1.P.) (to flow, to bear) in ‘*Sevako Bhāram Vahati*’ the root is transitive while in ‘*Nadī Vahati*’ the root is intransitive. Therefore, both *Process* and *Result* are needed for the expression of the root.

Moreover, if *Result* only is considered as the expressed sense of the root, the root $\sqrt{\text{Kr}}$ – *Karoti* (8.U., to do) has to be treated like $\sqrt{\text{Yat}}$ – *Yatate* (1.A., to strive). As a *Result* of this $\sqrt{\text{Kr}}$ will become intransitive which is against the popular usage. If the statement is made that ‘all roots bespeaking result are intransitive or vica versa’, then all roots which show the *Result* would become intransitive or vice versa. Thus, for the proper functioning of the root, two-fold classifications is needed and for this classification both *Process* and *Result* have to be accepted as the expressed sense of the root.

Another argument that ‘only *Process* is the expressed sense of the root⁶¹’ is again strongly refuted by Vaiyākaraṇas.

According to Naiyāyikas, the $\sqrt{\text{Jñā}}$ and $\sqrt{\text{Kr}}$ denote the sense of ‘knowledge’ and ‘effort’ respectively. If these roots be treated as per the theory of Naiyāyikas, the *Process* will be the only expressed sense of the root. In the absence of the *Result* there will be no source of motivation for any action. Without stating the *Result*, no *Process* can be proceeded. Secondly, *Result* is essential for the transitive root. Otherwise the aphorism like *Lakṣṇa Karmanī*• (III.4.69) which denotes Tense (*Lakāra*), will be useless.

Another argument has been presented that through the power of Indication, Tense can be supposed. But, Indication does not work in worldly parlance. In

⁶¹ व्यापारमात्रस्य धात्वर्थत् । Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, *op cit*, p. 184

Gaṅgāyām Ghōṣaḥ, the Indicated sense is acceptable but when some one is thirsty, he needs water. The Indicated sense would not satisfy his thrust. Therefore, $\sqrt{\text{Kṛ}}$, etc must be taken as having both *Process* and *Result* as their expressed sense or attributed elements.⁶²

The $\sqrt{\text{Kṛ}}$, like other roots, have both *Result* and *Process* as its components. So it cannot be taken in the sense of ‘to effort’ only. If it be considered as ‘effort’ only, the rule of *Karmavat* would not be applicable in the expression like *Kriyate Ghāṭaḥ Svyameva* (a pot is made automatically). For, the motion can never be associated with the insentient object like pot, etc. But this is not the desired one. Hence this view is not acceptable.

The rule of *Karmavat* becomes applicable when *Result* is found in object, as per e.g. *Pacyate Odaṇaḥ Svayameva* and *Bhidyate Kāṣṭhaḥ Svayameva*. In the first example, the *Result* of the cooking (*Vikliti*) is seen in the object (i.e. in the rice). In the second example, the act of cutting of the wood takes place in the wood itself which is the object. In both these examples, the objects appeared as a doer. So here object substitutes the doer. But the same cannot be seen in *Dṛśyate Ghāṭaḥ Svyameva*. For, the act of seeing does not make any change in the object. Whether the pot is seen or not by someone, it does not bring any modification in the form of the pot. On the contrary it remains same in both the situations. It is because the *Result* (i.e. seeing) remains in the doer and not in the object. So here the rule of *Karmavat* cannot be applicable.

Thus, the expression *Kriyate Ghāṭaḥ Svyameva* (a pot is made automatically) will be wrong until the *Result* is not accepted as the expressed sense of the root.

Only *Result* is the expressed sense of the root and not the *Process*. Such is the view of the Mīmāṃsakas. So, they raised the question, ‘if the *Result* is also

⁶² According to *Darpaṇa* commentary, the intransitive root does not have फलान्श. Ancient Naiyāyikas think that only transitive roots have both the components (i.e. *Process* & *Result*). Some roots like इष्-इच्छति, ज्ञा-ज्ञायते, कृ-करोति, etc denote Processal sense and not the *Result*.

taken as the meaning of the verb, the rule of *Karmakartṛprakriyā* will not be applicable to the roots like $\sqrt{\text{Jñā}}$, $\sqrt{\text{Gam}}$, etc'. But such type of use is not seen in the popular language. A rule is set for the use of *Karmakartṛprakriyā*. Kaunḍabhaṭṭa tries to answer by presenting the discussion on the varieties of an object and what is their role in the spoken language. There are three varieties of Object viz. *Nirvartyakarma*, *Vikāryakarma* and *Prāpyakarma*⁶³. The first two varieties of an object also have doer by rule of *Karmavadbhāva*, but the third one doesn't have it.

- The example of *Nirvartyakarma* is *Ghaṭam Karoti* (he makes a pot). When the potter is making a pot with the help of a stick, the change in the form of a pot takes place continuously till the pot is made completely. It is called *Nirvartyakarma*, because here the object becomes perceptible after the completion of the action.⁶⁴
- The example of *Vikāryakarma* is *Somam Sunoti* (he extracts the Soma juice). In this variety also, the change in the form of the object is found. Here the change is somehow similar to the malforming (*Vikṛti*) of the object. That is why it is called *Vikāryakarma*.⁶⁵
- When some action is performed but no modification is found in the object, is called *Prāpya*,⁶⁶ e.g. *Ghaṭam Paśyati*. The act of observing the pot does not bring any change in the form of the pot. The pot would remain the same. The same is case with *Grāmo'yaṁ Kenacit Gataḥ*. When somebody goes to a village, his action of going does not bring change in the form of an object.

⁶³ निवर्त्य च विकार्य च प्राप्यं चेति त्रिधा मतम् । तत्रेप्सिततमं कर्म चतुर्धान्यत्तु कल्पितम् ॥ ३.७.४५ ॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit.* p. 299

⁶⁴ सती वा विद्यमाना वा प्रकृतिः परिणामिनी । यस्य नाश्रीयते तस्य निवर्त्यत्वं प्रचक्षते ॥ ३.७.४७ ॥ *Ibid*

⁶⁵ प्रकृतेस्तु विवक्षायां विकार्यं कैश्चिदन्यथा । निवर्त्यं च विकार्यं च कर्म शास्त्रे प्रदर्शितम् ॥ ३.७.४८ ॥ *Ibid*

⁶⁶ क्रियाकृतविशेषाणां सिद्धिर्यत्र न गम्यते । दर्शनादनुमानाद् वा तत् प्राप्यमिति कथ्यते ॥ ३.७.५१ ॥ *Ibid*, p. 300

Therefore, the modification in the object is seen in the examples of *Ghaṭam Karoti* and *Somaṁ Sunoti*. So, they are not termed as *Prāpyakarma*. Similarly *Karmavadbhāva* is not possible in the case of $\sqrt{\text{Drś}}$.

$\sqrt{\text{Tyaj}}$ & $\sqrt{\text{Gam}}$ are different roots. Both of them possess different meanings. This differentiation is possible when *Process* and *Result* are accepted as the meanings of the root. Otherwise, it leads to the fault that $\sqrt{\text{Tyaj}}$ and $\sqrt{\text{Gam}}$ would be treated as synonyms. Both the roots have same *Process*. They render likeness of action. In both $\sqrt{\text{Tyaj}}$ and $\sqrt{\text{Gam}}$, the act of separation either from the person or thing is suggested. In that case the sentences *Grāmaṁ Tyajati* can be used in place of *Grāmaṁ Gacchati* and *Vṛkṣaṁ Tyajati* can be used in place of *Vṛkṣaṁ Gacchati*. This would create confusion in getting the proper meaning of the sentence.

The opponent tries to pave the way of this problem by stating that a special rule has to be made in the case of these roots.⁶⁷ The meaning of the $\sqrt{\text{Tyaj}}$ means ‘separation from the thing’ and $\sqrt{\text{Gam}}$ means ‘attainment of the other place’. But making of special rule will not solve the problem. Since the act of going is common in both the examples. Hence, *Result* has to be accepted as the expressed sense of the root especially in the case of the transitive roots. In intransitive roots, the meaning is clearly given as भू सत्तायम्. So there isn’t any problem of expression in intransitive roots. In MB, Patañjali has said ‘*Dvyarthakaḥ Pacih*’ ($\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$ should be understood as having two parts). Here two parts of the root are suggested i.e. *Process* and *Result*.

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa has presented three arguments to rebut Mīmāṃsakas’ theory -

⁶⁷ कर्मप्रत्ययासमभिव्याहृतत्यागगमनादिपदस्य तत्तत्फलावच्छिन्नव्यापारेऽनादितात्पर्यं कल्प्यते, न तु केवलव्यापारे । अनादितात्पर्यमेव च स्वारसिकप्रयोगनियामकमिति एकार्थतात्पर्येण प्रामाणिकानां स्वारसिको न त्यागगमनादिप्रयोगः । Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa, *op cit*, p. 186

- If the meaning of the root is confined to the *Result* only, the forms like *Grāmo Gamanavān*, etc. will appear which is not desired. Moreover, the meaning of the $\sqrt{\text{Gam}}$ will be taken as ‘union’ (*Samyoga*) only. The same meaning will be understood in *Gamana*. *Gamana* is the form of *Lyuṭ* made from the $\sqrt{\text{Gam}}$ with Impersonal form (*Bhāve*). But such kind of expression is not seen in the popular usage.
- Another reason is that one cannot use the root until it bears any definite *Result* of the action. As in the case of the $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$, one cannot not use the sentence ‘cooking is going on’ (*Pāko Bhavati*) when something is being cooked. Therefore, the root cannot be limited to the *Result* only.
- Another problem will be created when *Process* is discarded as the expressed meaning of the root. In the absence of the cause, *Result* cannot be produced. This is the general and all applicable rule. If the expression ‘*Pāko Vidyate*’ (Meal is being cooked) is studied with this point of view then such expression can never be used in usage as it indicates the *Process* of the action and not the *Result*. So without mentioning the *Process* there won’t be any *Result*.

The word *Gamana* is made from the $\sqrt{\text{Gam}}$ by adding the *Ghañ* suffix of abstract noun. It denotes the same sense as expressed by the *Result*. If it be accepted as the synonym for the use of *Process*, the aphorism of Pāṇini *Bhāve* would be futile. Hence this suffix should not be taken as a substitute of the *Process*.

Mīmāṃsakas argue that if the *Process* is taken as the sense of the root, then the verb cannot be considered as having *Process* as its expressed sense. Otherwise, there occurs the fault called prolixity. Since a word cannot be the representative of two different senses at a time. The Mīmāṃsists argues that *Pacati* can be explained as *Pākam Karoti*; here $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$ suggests the sense of *Pākam* and ‘*Ti*’ of *Karoti*.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa replies that 'Ti' does not represent *Karoti*. On the contrary, *Pākam* and $\sqrt{\text{Kṛ}}$ both signify the sense of $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$. 'Ti' has its different stand in the sentence. It suggests the Tense and the Number of the verb and the doer, which is altogether a different thing.

If the view of Mīmāṃsakas too, is accepted then also it indirectly supports the view of Vaiyākaraṇas. Mīmāṃsakas have accepted three meanings of the verb viz. Time, Number and Process. The verb *Karoti* gives the meaning of all the three. 'ति' suggests Present Tense and Singular Number. The $\sqrt{\text{Kṛ}}$ suggests the *Process*. Thus, indirectly the view of Grammarians is presented which is evident from the statement of the *Mahābhāṣyam*.

In case of *Pakvavān*, the verb is completely absent. So there cannot be any *Process*. To this Mīmāṃsakas argues that in *Pakvavān*, *Pāka* is the object and suffix *Vat* is doer. On this basis the relation of cause and effect and principal and subordinate (by the strength of *Arunyādhikaraṇa*) is applied to *Pakvavān*. But Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa puts a counter argument that if the *Process* is the expressed sense of the verb, then in the absence of verb can the *Process* be imagined? Moreover in the absence of the verb the division of the sentence into doer and object cannot take place as doer depends upon the *Process*. Hence the view of Mīmāṃsakas is unacceptable. Therefore they have to accept the rule of Vaiyākaraṇas that *Result* and *Process* both simultaneously expressed the sense of the root.

Mīmāṃsakas give another example. They have cited a verse of Kumārilabhaṭṭa for explaining the meaning of *Yajeta* in '*Vājapeyena Yajeta*'. They say that Vedas have already established the relation between the *Process* and the *Result*. The other components of the sentence like object, instrument, etc need not be explained by the Vedas as their relation too can be inferred through Root and Process. The *Yajeta* can be understood as the $\sqrt{\text{Yaj}}$ having relation with

Process necessary to perform the sacrifice. So it should not be taken in the sense of *Yāgakarāṇikā Bhāvanā* but as *Yāgasambandhi Bhāvanā*. In the same way *Pakvavān* can be understood as having object (*Pāka*) and doer (from affix *Ktavatu*). So *Pakvavān* means ‘he (i.e. the agent of the action) has cooked’.

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa questions that the syntactical relation cannot be inferred in this way. For, a verb is required to establish the relation between these syntaxes. In the absence of verb there cannot be any *Kāraka* and so in the absence the synchronization, no meaning would be rendered. In the case of *Pakvavān* both object and doer are inevitable. The *Process* depends upon the doer. Hence *Process* has to be accepted as a part of root and not of the verb.

There is a general rule in Grammar that between stem and suffix, suffix is more important than stem as it is seen the usages like *Kārakaḥ*, *Dāśarathiḥ*, etc. these are the examples of *Kṛdanta* and *Taddhita* respectively. But this rule does not be applicable in the case of the Tense. It has been stated in the *Nirukta* by Yāska – भावप्रधानमाख्यातम्, सत्त्वप्रधानानि नामानि. In case of आख्यात, action is treated as the predominant factor.

The Mīmāṃsakas put an argument that there is a common rule that the suffix is more important than the stem. But at the same time it doesn’t mean that what is important suggests the meaning of suffix only and vice-versa. Otherwise in the case of the words like *Ajā* (she-goat), *Aśvā* (mare), *Chāgī* (she-sheep), etc. the suffix has to be treated as it were important than the meaning of the stem. But such is not seen in the popular usage. Here the feminine suffix is sub-ordinate while the meaning of the stem (*Prakṛti*) is the principal one. Therefore, this rule has to be understood as the general rule with some exceptions. Moreover, the aphorism of Pāṇini प्रधानप्रत्ययार्थवचनमर्थस्यान्यप्रमाणत्वात् (I.2.56), itself states that the significance of the suffix and stem solely depends on the context of the particular *Śāstras*. As the Naiyāyikas judge the word on the basis of

Prathamāntapada (i.e. word ending in Nominative case); Poeticians take *Lakṣaṇā* (Indicated sense). Navya-Naiyāyikas take *Kṛti* (Activity). Hence, that which is important for one may be subordinate to the other.

There must be one controlling agency to avoid the chaos regarding the use of this rule. That is why Yāska has rightly stated in his *Nirukta* ‘भावप्रधानम् आख्यातम्’ (I.1). Here the word आख्यातम् represents the sense of the root and not of the verb. That is supported by the Patañjali as ‘नाम च धातुजमाह निरुक्ते’.⁶⁸ It means all words are derived from roots.

The Mīmāṃsakas always give more preference to the suffix than the stem. In ‘*Kim Kṛtam? Pakvam*’; *Kṛtam* expresses the meaning of the verb but it itself is not a verb. In this case they have to accept *Process* as the expressed sense of the suffix, too. Otherwise suffix won’t render the meaning of the *Process* since *Process* can be expressed only through the verb. Moreover, here the question is action oriented and not the suffix oriented. Thus the primary suffixes should be treated as the verb. For, according to the view of the Mīmāṃsists, a verb is a prerequisite for *Process*. But in the present example this theory of Mīmāṃsakas seems to be rejected.

In case of the Primary derivatives (*Kṛt*) like *Kāryam* (*Ṇyat*), *Pacanīyam* (*Anīyar*), etc. which denote the sense of the *Karmakāraka* suggest that *Bhāvanā* (or *Vyāpāra*) acts as a fractional component of the root. For, any word cannot be termed as root until it represents action.⁶⁹

In *Kāryam*, *Ṇyat* is applied by the aphorism *R̥halorṇyat* (III.1.124). It enjoins the *Ṇyat* suffix to the $\sqrt{\text{Kṛ}}$. In *Pacanīyam*, *Anīyar* suffix is used to the $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$ according to the aphorism *Tavyattavyānīyarah* (III.1.16). Both these suffixes are

⁶⁸ Yāska, *op cit*, p. 69

⁶⁹ The aphorism of Pāṇini भूवादयो धातवः॥१.३.१॥ would become futile if the relation between the Process and the root is not accepted.

used in the sense of *Karmakāraka* by the force of the aphorism *Tayoreva Kṛtyaktakhalarthāḥ* (III.4.70). The word *Ādi*, in the *Kārikā*,⁷⁰ suggests use of the Instrumental Case in the examples like *Jyotiṣṭomayājī*. Here *Karaṇa* is *Upapada* by the strength of the *sūtra Karaṇe Yajah* (III.2.85). The *Ṇini* (=In) is applied to the $\sqrt{\text{Yaj}}$ in the sense of doer.

All these primary suffixes *Ṇyat*, *Anīyar* and *Ṇini* are applied in the sense of Object, Instrument and Agent. They are ascertained on the basis of their relation with the action. Unlike the Grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas do not accept *Process* as the expressed sense of the root. Hence, the functioning of these primary suffixes will be rebutted.

Another argument is made that like in *Dadhyodanaḥ* and *Guḍadhānāḥ*, the relation between the two members is understood through suppositional inference (*Adyāhāra*), and so the same could be understood in other examples of compounds. To this argument, the reply given by Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa is – the examples of *Dadhyodanaḥ* and *Guḍadhānāḥ* are the rare ones and hence aphorisms *Annena Vyjñanam* (II.1.33) and *Bhakṣyeṇa Miśrīkaraṇam* (II.1.34) are specially made for them. It is done on the strength of *Vidhānasāmarthyāt*.⁷¹ But the examples of *Harikṛtam*, *Nakhabhinnaḥ* and *Haritrātaḥ* are frequently seen in the usages. Henceforth there is no need to use the rule of *Vidhānasāmarthyāt* or the suppositional inference (*Adyāhāra*) regarding these usages. It is possible directly by accepting the *Process* as the suggested sense of the root.

⁷⁰ किं कार्यं पचनीयञ्चेत्यादि दृष्टं हि कृत्स्वपि ।

किञ्च क्रियावाचकतां विना धातुत्वमेव न ॥९॥

⁷¹ विधानसामर्थ्य is a kind of rule which is used for those words whose other similar examples are not found or rather the exceptional cases. ‘अन्नेन व्यञ्जनम्’ (२.१.३३) ‘भक्ष्येण मिश्रीकरणम्’ (२.१.३४) are such examples wherein the action of effusing and mixing are understood and then the rules of compound would become applicable.

In this discussion the potentiality of the *Pada* in the compound is shown. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the potentiality of the *Pada* is that which denotes the same sense as the verb did. So, *Asūryampaśyā* is a compounded word though there isn't any competency of compounded words in it. This can be done on the strength of the *sūtra Saha Supā* (II.1.4). But according to the Vaiyākaraṇas, it is not an example of *Samartha-samāsa*. In the MB, Patañjali states that *Asūryampaśyā* is an example of *incompetent compound*, because the action *Dṛś* has no direct relation with the *Sūrya*. It is an example of *Prasajya-pratiṣedha-nañ* compound.⁷² Otherwise *Kṛtaḥ Sarvamṛttikaḥ* can be termed as compounded word by splitting it as *Kṛtaḥ Sarvo Mṛttikayā* which is not seen in the popular usage. The word *Mṛttikaḥ* is in *Karaṇakāraka* while *Sarva* is in *Karmakāraka*. Both are connected as it were rendering the same sense of the action, but such parameter cannot be set for fixing the certainty of compound. Otherside there would be many compounds without having any specific rule to prove it. If all the compounds are proved by the aphorism *Saha Supā* (II.1.4), then the rest aphorisms will be useless.

In *Ghaṭaḥ Bhāvayati*, *Ghaṭaḥ* is the agent, the support of the *Process*. But it will change into *Ghaṭam Bhāvayati* according to the rule of Mīmāṃsā. Kaundabhaṭṭa argues that *Ghaṭam Bhāvayati* (he is making the pot) is an example of the causal of the $\sqrt{\text{Bhū}}$ with the *Ṇic* (*Ṇic*) suffix and *Tip* (*Tip=Ti*). The use of the causal denotes the sense of the agent, the substratum of the

⁷² Two varieties of नञ्समास –

पर्युदासप्रतिषेध	प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध
In this, विधि is more important than निषेध e.g. अब्राह्मणमानय, bring a non- Brahmin person. In this, a person is called who is not a Brahmin.	In this variety निषेध has given more importance than विधि e.g. अनृतं न वक्तव्यम्. One should not tell a lie. Here emphasis is given to 'not to tell a lie'.
In this negation of उत्तरपद is found but at the same time action is not denied.	In this, action is denied.
In this, negation is found but at the same time the similarity is accepted.	In this, complete negation is seen.

Process. The Karma, the substratum of the *Result*, is understood through the *Process*. The question arises: ‘why not the same rule can be applied to the *Ghaṭaḥ Bhavati* by changing it to *Ghaṭam Bhavati*?’ Since in both the examples, *Tip* represents the *Process* only.

In the above given example, the *Ākhyātārtha* is *Process* and its *Āśraya* is doer which is *Ghaṭaḥ*. Hence it will govern *Kartṛsañjñā*. So there is no question of object as it has been doubted by the Vaiyākaraṇas in *Ghaṭaḥ Bhavati* and *Ghaṭam Bhavati*.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa puts counter-arguments:

1. This rule cannot be applied to the examples of Causal (*Ṇijanta*) – *Pācayati Devadatto Viṣṇumitreṇa* (Devadatta makes Viṣṇumitra to cook). In this example, the verb *Pācayati* is an example of *Ṇijanta* and the *Āśraya* of the *Process* is Devadatta. Hence it is used in Nominative. But at the same time, Viṣṇumitra too is an undeclared doer of the verb. According to the aphorism *Kartṛkaraṇostrīyā* (II.3.18), it governs Instrumental case. Here the rule is not broken. Moreover Devadatta is *Kartṛprayojaka* who inspires Viṣṇumitra for cooking.
2. If the point of Mīmāṃsakas be accepted then in *Grāmam Gamayati Devadatto Viṣṇumitram* (Devadatta sends Viṣṇumitra to the village), Viṣṇumitra cannot be treated as doer and *Grāmam*, the desired object of Viṣṇumitra, would not govern Accusative. So the aphorism *Karturīpsitatamam Karma* (I.4.49) will be seless. If object is absent in the sentence then Dative Case which can be used as an optional usage for *Grāmam* will also cease to exist.
3. The argument of the Mīmāṃsakas that ‘in *Pācayati* both the *Prayojya* and *Prayojaka* express *Ākhyāta*’ cannot solve the problem. For the reason that in *Pācayati Devadatto Viṣṇumitreṇa* – both *Devadatto* and

Viṣṇumitreṇa may either govern Nominative or Instrument. It creates confusion. It also bars the aphorism *Hetumati Ca* (III.1.26), and hence two varieties of the *Process* cannot be accepted as the expressed sense of the verb with regard to *Nijanta* form.

4. *Process* is considered to be substratum of doer and this *Process* is also an expressed sense of the verb. Such is the theory of the *Mīmāṃsā*. If it is accepted as verbatim, then it may create problem in the use of Primary Derivates e.g. *Devadattaḥ Paktā* (he who is cooking is Devadatta). Here verb is completely absent in the sentence, the doer cannot be decided without a verb. In *Devadattaḥ Paktā*, *Tṛc* is suffixed by aphorisms *Kartari Kṛta* (III.4.67) and *Ṇvrltrcau* (III.1.133). If *Asti* is supposed to get the meaning of the sentence, then also *Asti* does not represent doer. *Tip* is used with the root $\sqrt{\text{As}}$ (*Asti*) and not with $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$. Therefore, they have to accept *Result* and *Process* as the expressed sense of the root.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa firmly states that the argument of the opponent has the fault of *Anyonyāśraya* and therefore he suggests that whenever there is dilemma, it is better to follow MB. When the meaning of the root is taken as an action and the meaning of the action is taken as a root, then it generates the fault of *Anyonyāśraya*. If the meaning of the root is taken as an action and the meaning of the action is taken as a root, the knowledge of the *Dhātvarthaḥ* would be inevitable for the knowledge of the action or vice versa as both of them are assumed to have inseparable relationship. The realization of both the things depends on each other. This idea of the opponent seems inappropriate, as both the things have their own identity and are different from each other. Likewise, both of them are not bound with the relation of cause and effect.⁷³

⁷³ Different commentators have given different examples to elucidate this fault. Darpaṇa commentary quotes the illustration of the two defferent horns of a bull. The growth and appearance of the one horn does not depend on the other. But when they are said to be

The opponent tries to avoid the fault of *Anyonyāśraya* by saying that let the word belongs to *Bhvādi* and other conjugation, be accepted as the root. So root can be defined as ‘that which is one of the ten conjugations and which shows the sense of action’. If this be accepted as the definition of the root, the aphorism *Bhūvādayo*° (I.3.1) would no longer sustain. Therefore, the root must be accepted in its conventional meaning as stipulated by MB. Thus root can be simply defined as the representative of an action. Here the action is taken in the sense of ‘the collection of different small actions’.

One more time the opponent tries to shield his view by suggesting the fixation of the rule that the word having the particular meaning and read under the domain of a conjugation be termed as root. The example of the $\sqrt{\text{Bhū}}$ has been presented here. $\sqrt{\text{Bhū}}$ could be termed as a root only when it belongs to the first conjugation and used in the sense of ‘to be or to become’. But this cannot be the criteria for deciding the root. For, the adverb वा will also become a root as it has unique meaning of ‘option’ and it is very popular in the usage. Moreover, it belongs to the Adverbial conjugation (*Avyaya-Gaṇa*). So as per the definition of the opponent, this would also become root. This will lead to the fault of *अतिव्याप्ति* as this definition covers very broad area and may affect many words. Thus, in order to avoid this doubt it is better to accept the view of the Grammarians.

Opponent raises the question that the view of grammarians that both *Process* and *Result* are the meanings of the root is not proved in the $\sqrt{\text{As}}$. In $\sqrt{\text{As}}$ no Process is seen, hence in the absence of the *Process* how *Asti* can be termed as a root?

interrelated, then it shows the fault of *Anyonyāśraya*. Bhaimī commentary has presented the examples of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* by quoting two aphorisms viz. *हलन्त्यम्* & *आदिरन्त्येन सहेता*.

Kaunḍabhaṭṭa replies “The *Process* always lies in the roots like *As*, etc; it becomes unnoticeable when the *Process* and the *Result* have same support”⁷⁴.

The meaning of the verb *Asti* is ‘*Asa Bhuvi*’ i.e. that which exists in the world. The qualities of the adjective are always found in the noun and noun is supposed to reflect the qualities denoted by the adjective. The same thing is found in the case of $\sqrt{\text{As}}$. It has two components viz. Processal part and Resulting part. The qualities or the essence of the *Result* always remain present in the Processal part. Sometime it becomes visible and sometimes it remains invisible. Moreover, the meaning of the root depends upon the Processal part. As in the case of $\sqrt{\text{As}}$, the sense of existence is revealed through the *Process* not through the *Result*. An example to make it clearer is – *Sa Tato Gato Na Vā?* (Whether he has gone from there or not?). The answer to this is *Mahatā Yatnenasti/Tiṣṭhati* (He is still present there). Both the roots $\sqrt{\text{As}}$ & $\sqrt{\text{Sthā}}$ suggest the sense of ‘existence’. Here existence of a person suggests the Processal part though it is not noticeable. Thus, it is clear that *Process* is a part of a root whether it remains noticeable or not.

The roots *As* and *Bhū* when used in the sense of origin denote the sense of *Process* undoubtedly. The example is taken from the *Rāmāyaṇa* - ‘*Rohito Lohitād Āsīt Dhundhustasya Sutobhavaḥ*’ (Rohit was born from Lohit and he had a son named Dhundhu). In this example, the verb *Āsīt* shows two things viz. Past Tense and existence of a human being. ‘To exist’ or ‘to be’ is an action. It denotes *Process*. Moreover, there cannot be any tense without *Process*. For, *Process* always remains in Tense. That is why Bhartṛhari has said in his VP -

“Tense is the adjective of the action while Number can be the adjective of anyone”⁷⁵,

⁷⁴ अस्त्यादावपि धर्म्यंशे भाव्येऽस्त्येव हि भावना। अन्यत्राऽशेषभावात्तु सा तथा न प्रकाशते ॥१२॥ VBS, p. 78

But in the case of verbs like *Asti* and *Bhavati*, the *Process* cannot be identified separately. It is because; in these types of verbs *Process* and *Result* seem identical with each other. This identification creates confusion and misapprehension in getting the knowledge of the *Process* separately.

Now the opponent doubts that the questions like ‘*Kim Karoti*’ (what is he doing?) can be answered as *Pacati* (he is cooking). But the same cannot be done with *Asti*.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa replies that the same question can be answered in the form of *Asti*. If someone has the intention to ask that whether the person is alive or not, as seen in the expression ‘*Kim Karoti?*’ this can be replied as *Asti* (yes, he is alive). When someone is sure about the existence of a person, then only the question regarding the activity of a person is asked. The same is seen in the case of *Pacati*. When the questioner knows that the person is alive, he may further inquire about his deeds or work in the form of *Karoti*. But it cannot be asked until the existence of a person is uncertain. Now it is proved that there cannot be any doubt regarding the verbs like *Asti* and *Bhavati*.

The opponent raised the doubt that if the *Kriyā* is the sense of the root then the same would be apprehended in the words like ‘*Pākaḥ*’. But it cannot be accepted as the desirable one as it contradicts the statement of the MB - *Kṛdabhihito bhāvo dravyavat prakāśate*, which states that roots like $\sqrt{Kṛ}$, etc will be taken as having substance.

It is answered that – “in the system of Grammar, the two-fold divisions of a verb as the state of being *Sādhya* and *Sādhana* have been presumed. The same is observed in the case of the primary suffix *Ghañ* (in *Pākaḥ*) and others”.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ क्रियाभेदाय कालस्तु संख्या सर्वस्य भेदिका । VBS, p. 81

⁷⁶ आख्यातशब्दे भागाभ्यां साध्यसाधनरूपता। प्रकल्पिता यथा शास्त्रे स घञादिष्वपि क्रमः॥३.८.४७॥Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 365

Paśya Mṛgo Dhāvati is understood as *Dhāvanakarma-anukulavyāpāra-karṭṛtvamṛgaṃ Paśya*. This sentence has two verbs *Paśya* and *Dhāvati*. The person is telling to see the ‘running’ of a deer. So, the act of running is the object. A deer is not intended to be observed that is why it doesn’t govern the Accusative Case. ‘Running’ is also a verb. So it cannot be declined as word by the strength of the aphorism अर्थवदधातुरप्रत्ययः प्रातिपदिकम् (I.2.45). But the rule of *Ekavākyatā* suggests that *Paśya* must be considered as the main verb of the sentence.

The same rule of Pāṇini has to be understood in the case of suffix like *Ghañ*. In the expression *Paśya Mṛgo Dhāvati*, *Paśya* is *Sādhyāvsthā* and *Dhāvati* is *Sāadhanāvasthā*. *Paśya* is the main action while *Dhāvati* is the object of the verb *Paśya*. It is an integral part of the main verb.⁷⁷

The same is the case with *Pākaḥ*. *Pākaḥ* means *Pākam Bhavati* ‘The cooking is going on’. The *Pākaḥ* is in *Sādhyāvsthā* which gives further scope for questioning in the form of *Bhavati*, *Asti*, *Jāyate*, *Vidyate* or *Naśyati*. *Pacati* is in *Sāadhanāvasthā*. Hence no further question arises in the mind of a listener. This *Sāadhanāvasthā* is said to be produced from the root and *Sādhyāvsthā* is produced from the suffix *Ghañ*.

The *Sādhana* part of a root has its connection with the *Sādhyā* part of the root. Otherwise in *Odanasya Pākaḥ*, the object rice would lose its connection with the verb. As a result of this, Genitive case cannot be used in *Odana* by the *sūtra* ‘कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति’ (II.3.65).

Kaunḍabhaṭṭa says that *Odana* cannot be changed into Genitive when it has relation with the verb *Bhavati*. *Bhavati* is a form of *Lakāra*. Agent and object

⁷⁷ This point has been discussed in the passages dealing with the topic एकतिङ् वाक्यम् on p. 18.

can be changed to Genitive when they have relation with *Kṛt*. But here instead of *Kṛt*, *Lakāra* has been presented. Thus by the aphorism ‘न लोकाव्ययनिष्ठाखलर्थतृनाम्’ (पा० २.३.६९) it is proved that the use of Genitive cannot be accepted until it has connection with the root of *Sādhyāvasthā*.

In the same way ‘*Kāṣṭhaiḥ Pākaḥ*’ should be understood. ‘*Kāṣṭhaiḥ*’ is Instrumental Plural and ‘*Pākaḥ*’ is in *Sāadhanāvasthā* which again has co-relation with the main verb. Therefore the instrument (*Kāṣṭham*) has relation with the root of *Sādhyāvasthā*. Hence, even though the ‘*Pākaḥ*’ is an example of Primary derivative (*Kṛt*), the rule of ‘कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति’ would not be applicable to this. The same rule is not applicable to ‘*Stokam Pacati*’ or ‘*Stokam Pākaḥ*’. Here the word *Stokam* is an adverb. It is a part of *Pāka* which is the object of the verb.

The question is that why the object is not changed to Genitive when the *sūtra* कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति’ clearly supports it? According to this aphorism the object and the agent changed to Genitive in *Kṛt*.

This argument is not acceptable because –

- i. According to Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, there must be *Bhedānvayasambandha* between the object and the agent. Here *Stokam* is not different from the object. Hence it cannot be termed as Genitive.
- ii. In the MB, an example of *Dāruṇādhyāpakaḥ* is given to illustrate the rule. This word is explained as *Dāruṇām Yathā Bhavati Tathā Adhyāpakaḥ*. The *m* of *Dāruṇām* is dropped which clearly suggests

object. This is an example of *Karmadhāraya* and not of *Ṣaṣthītatpuruṣa*. Otherwise Patañjali would not have taken care to explain it.⁷⁸

Hence, it is proved that both the examples of *Stokam Pacati* and *Stokam Pākaḥ* are appropriate.

Another thing is that in *Sādhyāvasthā*, the sense of the action is taken from the root. While in *Siddhāvasthā*, it is supposed from the affixes like *Ghañ* and others.⁷⁹ There are two reasons to discriminate *Sādhyāvasthā* and *Siddhāvasthā*-

- i. When the action of the *Sādhyāvasthā* (e.g. *Pacati*) is spoken of, there is no scope of further questioning regarding the action. But when the action of the *Siddhāvasthā* is presented to the listener, many questions regarding the action come to his mind.
- ii. When the action belongs to *Siddhāvasthā*, it possesses adjectives. And as per the rule, the adjective takes the Number and Gender of the noun or action. Like *Stokam Pākaḥ*. *Pākaḥ* is in Masculine gender and a Singular form. Unlike this when an adjective is used with the action belonged to *Sādhyāvasthā*, it always governs Neuter Gender and Singular form as in *Stokam Pacati*.

This also throws light on the thought that the action of *Siddhāvasthā* has some potential in it. Otherwise the change in the form of the adjective would not take place. The view of modern Logicians (Navya-Naiyāyikas) is also somehow refuted by the above explanation. Modern Logicians hold the view that suffix *Ghañ*, etc do not have any potential in themselves. They are made for common

⁷⁸ Bhaimī commentary has quoted the view that according to some scholars, कर्मसंज्ञा cannot be enjoined by the strength of the Pāṇini's aphorisms - 4.4.27 & 4.4.28. Hence, there isn't any possibility of substituting object by Genitive.

⁷⁹ साध्यत्वेन क्रिया तत्र धातुरूपनिबन्धना। सिद्धभावस्तु यस्तस्याः स घञादिनिबन्धनः॥३.८.४८॥
Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 365

usage. According to them the potentiality lies in the words ending in *Ghañ* (*Ghañśabda*) and not in the affix *Ghañ* itself (suffix *Ghañ*).

Kaunḍabhaṭṭa opinines that it has the fault of *Gaurava* as the potentiality to express the sense (*Śaktatāvacchedaka*) would be many. It is steted by Pāṇini (in the भावे ३.३.१८) and Patañjali (कृदभिहितो भावो द्रव्यवत् प्रकाशते ।) that the potentiality to express lies in the primary affix *Ghañ* itself and not in the word ending in *Ghañ*.

This question arises because in the aphorism कर्मवत् कर्मणा तुल्यक्रियः (पा० ३.१.८७), the object works as an agent. According to grammarians the *Vyāpārānśa* is agent and *Phalānśa* is object. But it is seen that at many times object acts like an agent or vice versa. Kaunḍabhaṭṭa says that it happens by *Rūḍhi*. Further he gives the example of the aphorism of भूवादयो धातवः. The gloss of this aphorism is - क्रियावाचिनो भूवादयः स्युः. Kaunḍabhaṭṭa says that the word *Kriyā* represents the *Process* and so the agent who is *Vyāpārānśa* is meant here. This meaning is taken by the force of *Rūḍhi*⁸⁰. In *Yaugika* usage, the word *Kriyā* is used as *Phalānśa*, but never as *Vyāpārānśa*. *Rūḍha* is considered to be stronger than *Yaugika* as it does not need stem and suffix for explanation. In *Rūḍha*, there is no need of any grammatical justification to prove the meaning of the word. Hence, it is better to accept the word *Kriyā* in its *Rūḍha* sense. That is what meant by grammarians when they define *Kāraka* as क्रियाजनकत्वं कारकत्वम् (that which produces the action) and Naiyāyikas as क्रियान्वितं कारकत्वम् (that which is associated with the action). *Kāraka* has direct connection with the action and the action is a group of small actions known as *Process*. Hence, the relation between the *Process* and *Kāraka* is proved.

⁸⁰ There are two types of meanings viz. *Yaugika* and *Rūḍha*. यौगिक means grammatically or etymologically proved words. रूढ means that meaning of the word which is highly accepted in the spoken language and in due course of time it appear to be the only meaning of the word whether grammatically proved or not.

Kaunḍabhaṭṭa has quoted some of example from the Mīmāṃsā. In the ninth chapter of *Mīmāṃsādarśana*, the word *Uttarā* is used in *Rūḍha* sense. *Uttarā* means the latter portion. But in the present context *Uttarā* stands for *Uttarā* text.⁸¹

In case of the syntax, all the *Kāraḥas* are the adjective of the *Process*. To support this view, Kaunḍabhaṭṭa has quoted a maxim of *Mīmāṃsādarśana*. In 3.1.20 of *Mīmāṃsādarśana*, it is stated – ‘गुणानां च परार्थत्वाद् असम्बन्धः समत्वात् स्यात्’ i.e. all the qualities, although not having any relation with each other, work unanimously for the sake of *Para* i.e. *Viśeṣya*. Another expression is – a begger does not approach another begger for alms.

In the first example, Kaunḍabhaṭṭa wants to say that all the *Kāraḥas* though do not have any mutual realation, work to give a complete meaning of a sentence. They all have connections with the main verb and so they all function for the same verb. The second example shows the importance of the verb in the sentence. All *Kāraḥas* do not deal with each other until there remains a verb in a sentence.

Mīmāṃsakas have accepted both these maxims as they seem logical. Thus, it becomes clear that there is a relation of cause and effect between verb and *Kāraḥa*. Verb is the *Viśeṣya* for which *Kāraḥa* renders the sense of *Process*. Similar is the case of Primary derivative like *Paktā* (*Trjanta*) and *Pācakaḥ* (*Ṇvulanta*). The *Kāraḥa* suggests *Process*, though it gets secondary position in the meaning.

The affix *Vati* (=Vat) is used when there is similarity of action. But Naiyāyikas have used it in *Parvato Vahnimān Mahānasavat*. Here *Mahānasavat* is used in the context of *Parvata* which is *Pakṣa*. According to Naiyāyikas, *Parvata* is not

⁸¹ *Uttarā* is a text which states the rules of singing of the Mantras.

an action. ‘Smoking’ is the action still *Mahānasavat* goes with *Pakṣa*. Such kind of usage is non-grammatical.

Another example is of the relation between *Kāraka* and *Nañ*. In *Bhūtale Na Ghaṭaḥ*, *Bhūtale* is in *Adhikaraṇakāraka* while *Na* (= *Nañ*) shows negation. The *Adhikaraṇakāraka* is taken as having relation with *Ghaṭaḥ* (which is *Kartākāraka*). Thus, *Bhūtale* is understood with *Ghaṭaḥ* and not with *Na*⁸². This breaks the rule of Pāṇini that all the *Kārakas* have relation with the verb and not with each other independently. So Kaunḍabhaṭṭa has raised a question that here Naiyāyikas have broken the rule of Pāṇini but in case of $\sqrt{\text{Sprh}}$ they follow the instructions of Pāṇini⁸³. This shows the inconsistency of the Naiyāyikas regarding the application of grammatical rules. They use it when they find it suitable. Such type of act is known as *Ardhajaratīnyāya*.⁸⁴

The action of going is connected with the object village, etc (in *Grāmam Gataḥ*) the same relation of the action with the object is understood in the *Kṛtapūrvā* (in *Kṛtapūrvī Kaṭam*), etc.

When the root is used with suffixes, how its meaning and function undergo change is explained by Kaunḍabhaṭṭa. This relation between secondary action and object is explained by placing two examples of suffix क्त and इनि with the roots *Gam* and *Kṛ* respectively. Both these suffixes denote the sense of the agent. According to the *Paribhāṣā - Prakṛti-Pratyayārthayoḥ Pratyayārthasya Prādhānyam*, the suffix would become the chief one and the rest (i.e. action) will become the subordinate e.g. *Grāmam Gataḥ* (he went to village). *Grāmam*

⁸² In भूतले घटः न, अस्ति is understood and in पर्वतो वह्निमान्, भवितुमर्हति is understood. In both the examples verb is supposed because with out it the meaning would remain incomplete.

⁸³ यदि पक्षेऽपि वत्यर्थः कारकञ्च नञादिषु। अन्वेति त्यज्यतां तर्हि चतुर्थ्याः स्पृहिकल्पना ॥१८॥ (If you want to use *Vati* with *Pakṣa* and *Kāraka* with *Nañ* which is against the rule, then leave a desire to use $\sqrt{\text{Sprh}}$ in Dative Case.)

⁸⁴ It is a famous maxim. It means ‘a half portion of a body of a lady has the symptoms of old age and other half has the tenderness of youth’. This maxim is used when any rule is accepted partially and not completely.

is the object and is in *Karma-Kāraka*. *Gataḥ* is made from $\sqrt{\text{Gam}} + \text{Kta}$ (=Ta). The suffix *Kta* (=Ta) indicates the agent. $\sqrt{\text{Gam}}$ suggests the action and it is subordinate to the suffix. In this example, the root along with the suffix represents the sense of an action. *Gataḥ* is the form of the primary derivative and not of the verb still it renders the meaning of the action.

In *Ini* (=In), the rule of the *Kta* (i.e. the relation between the action and the agent) is emphasized e.g. *Kṛtapūrvī Kaṭam*, here *Kaṭam* is the object. *Ini* suffix indicates the relation of action with the agent. In this example also, the action is presented by the suffix but not the root.⁸⁵

Kaunḍabhaṭṭa further argues that there are some words which are called *Nityasapekṣa-śabdāḥ*. *Nityasapekṣa-śabdāḥ* means those words on hearing which some other related words are expected to be heard e.g. *Devadattasya Gurukulam*. It means Family of Devdatta's priest. In this, Devadatta is related with the priest first and then to his family. This is an example of *Ṣaṣṭhi Tatpuruṣasamāsa*. In this Devadatta is subordinate (*Viśeṣaṇa*) and *Gurukulam* is main (*Viśeṣya*).⁸⁶

Another example is *Caitrasya Naptā* i.e. a grand son of Chaitra. Here Caitra has relation with his son first and then with his grandson. Caitra cannot be connected directly to his grandson. These types of words are called *Nityasapekṣa-śabdāḥ*. They are found in all five types of gloss. All commentators have quoted the view of Bhartṛhari at this point of discussion –

सम्बन्धिशब्दः सापेक्षो नित्यं सर्वः प्रयुज्यते ।

⁸⁵ In Bhaimi commentary the same rule is explained by stating five sutras of Panini, p.176-177

⁸⁶ Cf Bhaimī Commentry, p. 209

स्वार्थवत्सा व्यपेक्षास्य वृत्तावपि न हीयते॥३.१४.४७॥⁸⁷

The words which are related with each other though *sapekṣa* by nature, are always used as compound words.

The same has to be understood in the case of *Bhoktum Pākaḥ* (example of *Tumun*) and *Bhuktvā Pākaḥ* (example of *Ktvā*). According to the *sūtra* तुमुन्वुलौ क्रियायां क्रियार्थायाम् (पा०३.३.१०) when the action becomes subordinate, the *Tumun* and *Ṇvula* suffixes are enjoined to the roots. *Pākaḥ* has two divisions viz. the *Siddhāvasthā* due to the use of suffix *Ghañ* and another *Sādhyāvasthā* due to the action which is yet to be executed. The *Ghañ* part is the chief one and the *Dhātūpasthāpya* is the subordinate. The *Tumun* has relation with the subordinate part of the action.

Another example is *Bhuktvā Pākaḥ*. The aphorism समानकर्तृकयोः पूर्वकाले (पा०३.४.२१) (when two different actions are done by the same doer, the earlier action gets the suffix *Ktvā*) is applied to the $\sqrt{\text{Bhu}}$. In *Bhuktvā Pākaḥ*, $\sqrt{\text{Bhu}}$ is earlier to $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$. In this example also, *Ktvā* has a relation with the subordinate part of $\sqrt{\text{Pac}}$.

In *Grāmaṁ Gataḥ* and *Kṛtapūrvī Kaṭam*, action which is subordinate has relation with the object. Similar is *Bhoktum Pākaḥ* and *Bhuktvā Pākaḥ*; where *Tumun* and *Ktvā* affixes have a relation with the subordinate action.

Kaundabhaṭṭa has explained why the rule of *Bhoktum Pākaḥ* (by the strength of the *sūtra* तुमुन्वुलौ क्रियायां क्रियार्थायाम्) and *Bhoktum Pākaḥ* (by the strength of the *sūtra* समानकर्तृकयोः पूर्वकाले) do not be applicable to other suffixes. In *Bhoktum Pākaḥ*, *Tumun* is used and *Bhuktvā Pākaḥ*, *Ktvā* is used. Both these suffixes have relation with the subordinate action. Now, the question is – ‘is this rule is

⁸⁷ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 475

applicable in other affixes like *Kṛtvasuc* (= *Kṛtva*)'. If it is so, then one can make sentence like एकः पाकः द्वौ पाकौ, त्रयः चत्वारः वा पाकाः or पञ्चकृत् पाकाः.

In the same way *Sakṛt Pākaḥ* in place of *Ekaḥ Pākaḥ* can also be framed; similarly *Dvistriścatuḥ Pākaḥ* and so on. Actually the use of *Suc* with *Dvi* neither creates any problem nor breaks any rule. On the contrary such kind of usage is seen in the work of Patañjali. It has relation with subordinate action. Though grammatically proved, these usages have no place in the spoken language.

According to some, there is no need to place the word *Kriyā* in the aphorism संख्यायाः क्रियाभ्यावृत्तिगणने कृत्वसुच् (पा० ५.४.१७). It is because the action can be repeated and not the objects. The use of the word *Kriyā* in the aphorism makes it clear that the affix *Kṛtvasuc* does not have any relation with the subordinate action. On the contrary, it has connection with the action which is in *Sādhyāvasthā*. There can be no use of *Kṛtvasuc* in *Sakṛt Pākaḥ*, *Dviḥ Pākaḥ*, etc, because when the action is taken as *Dhātūpasthāpyakriyā*, it becomes subordinate and in that position it is not confined to *Sādhyāvasthā*. The forms of *Dvirvacanam*, *Dviḥ Prahogaḥ*, etc are not appropriate still they are used by Pāṇini, Katyāyana and Patañjali by the strength of the *Progasāmarthyāt*.

The propriety of words depends upon the relation of noun and adjective. But it cannot be said that the words not having propriety, won't be able to render the meaning. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa says -

“The word *Bhedyā* means *Viśeṣya* (noun) and *Bhedaka* means *Viśeṣaṇa* (adjective). *Sādhutā* means Propriety of word.”⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Bhami commentary has explained by giving the example of अ is understood as अश्व and अस्व. अश्व means a horse and अस्व means a poor man. When the अश्व is understood in its real sense, then it shows the propriety of the word. This propriety of a word depends upon the relation of main and subordinate.

This propriety has the power to deliver the proper meaning of a word. Such is the view of Mīmāṃsakas. So Propriety should be considered as the expressed sense of the word. Thus, all the roots possessing this power of propriety can be treated as *Sādhūśabda*. But this is not accepted by the grammarians.

There are many words which do not have *Sādhutā* in themselves still they render meaning. Thus, it is argued that all the words having power of expression do not have the power of Propriety. So *Sādhutva* and *Śaktatva* are both different things.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa suggests that in deciding the power of words, the authority of Grammar has to be accepted. Here he uses the technique of *Jalpa* to refute the view of opponent. It is seen that at the time of the performance of the rituals, the rules of grammar are strictly followed e.g. if someone uses Instrumental (*Agninā Svāhā*) in place of Dative (*Agnaye Svāhā*), it is considered as a mistake. The speaker has to perform the expiation for his mistake as per the rule of sacrifice – *Nāṇṛtaṃ Vadet*. This rule of *Nāṇṛtaṃ Vadet* makes it clear that the Propriety of the word can be decided by the authority of the Grammar only.

Mīmāṃsakas questioned the authority of Grammar. They want to prove the authority of the Veda. They say, “according to grammar verb has a relation with the agent, object, etc and with the *Process* too”. In *Nāṇṛtaṃ Vadet*, the use of *Liñ-lakāra* indicates its relation with the agent. In this case, the sentence would suggest human effort and not the sacrifice. Otherwise it may lose its connection with the sacrifice. Moreover, it cannot be argued that this statement is a part of a sacrificial rite performed at the time of *Darśapūrṇamāsayajña* and it is not a main statement. But such is not acceptable as ultimately it refers to the sacrifice.⁸⁹.

⁸⁹ Jaimini, *op cit*, p. 312

Vaiyākaraṇas reply that the verb has relation with agent, object, etc. but it is an adjective too. *Process* is the chief one (*Viśeṣya*) and verb is the subordinate (*Viśeṣaṇa*). So agent, object, etc. would also be subordinate as compared to *Process*. The Vedic statement *Nānṛtaṁ Vadet* and the use of *Vidhi-liṅ* suggests *Process* and not the agent. It doesn't refer in the sense of either agent or human effort or the sacrifice. Moreover, this sentence shows its connectivity with the Veda as it is read under *Darśapūrṇamāsayajña* section. Likewise there is no difference between कृत्वर्थता and पुरुषार्थता. If the agent is taken as the chief one, there won't raise any confusion. To prove this point, Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa has quoted a sentence of the *Mīmāṃsādarśana* (3.4.20) - जञ्जभ्यमानोऽनुब्रूयान्मयि दक्षकृत्. It means 'if the priest yawns at the time of sacrifice, he has to recite the *Mantra* 'मयि दक्षकृत्'. In this *Mantra*, use of *Śānac* refers to both कृत्वर्थ (sacrificial rite) and पुरुषार्थ (human effort). Muttering of मयि दक्षकृत् *Mantra* is a Vedic injunction but it is performed by a man. This injunction is stated as an Atonement or Expiation (प्रायश्चित्त). So, a human effort is required for the fulfillment of the rite. The whole process of Expiation is not different from the main sacrifice.

The same rule is applied in the case of *Nānṛtaṁ Vadet*. It can be referred to both sacrificial rite and the human effort. This point is elaborated with length by Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa in the VB.

If the verb does not refer to *Process*, it would never render the right meaning of the *Process*. Moreover, the knowledge of any word doesn't depend on the Propriety of the word. For, the words, not pronounced with Propriety, do render the meaning of the word as it is seen in vernacular languages. Propriety is not the parameter to decide the meaning of the word.

III.6. Problems of the Meanings of Lakāras

This section deals with the Tense known as *Lakāra*. According to Pāṇini, there are two types of *Pada* viz. verbal form (*Ṭiṇ*) and Case-affix (*Sup*).⁹⁰ Verbal form (*Ṭiṇ*) is defined by Pāṇini *Laḥ Karmaṇi Ca Bhāve Cākarmakebhyaḥ* (I.4.69) Verbal form (*Ṭiṇ*) is called *Lakāra*. In Sanskrit, there are six Tenses and four Moods. They unanimously frame ten *Lakāras*. Again they have been classified as the *Ṭit* and *Ṇit*. *Ṭit* means having an indicatory *Ṭ* as the last letter of a word; *Ṇit* while having *Ṇ* as the last letter of a word. They are -

1. लट् - लकार – Present tense
2. लिट् - लकार – Perfect Past
3. लुट् - लकार – First Future
4. लृट् - लकार – Second Future
5. लेट् - लकार – Subjunctive
6. लोट् - लकार – Imperative
7. लङ् - लकार – Imperfect tense
8. लिङ् - लकार – Potential Mood
9. लुङ् - लकार – Immediate Past
10. लृङ् - लकार – Conditional

In the text of VBS, the sequence of the *Lakāras* is not changed by Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa. We can notice that Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa has briefly discussed the meaning and usages of all the ten *Lakāras*. Not only meaning but the *sūtras* of *Aṣṭādhyāyī* which state the rule of these *Lakāras* have been referred in his discussion. It is a very brief discussion on *Lakāras*. We hardly find the refutation or argumentation on *Lakāras*. The style of writing is unambiguous and strait. He directly mentions *Lakāras* in the following manner –

वर्तमाने परोऽक्षे श्वो भाविन्यथ भविष्यति ।

⁹⁰ सुप्तिङन्तं पदम् ॥ १.४.१४॥

विध्यादौ प्रार्थनादौ च क्रमाज्ज्ञेया लडादयाः ॥२२॥

“The लट् etc., should be understood in the senses of वर्तमान, परोक्ष, श्वो भावि, भविष्यत्, विधि, प्रार्थना, etc respectively.”

The term *Lakāra* refers to Doer, Object, Verbal activity (*Bhāva*), Number and Time. It is used in the sense of the Object and Doer in transitive roots and for the Doer and Verbal activity (*Bhāva*) in intransitive roots. The *Lakāra* is divided into three Numbers depending upon the intention of the speaker (*Vivakṣā*). The three Numbers are singular, dual and plural. The aphorisms of Pāṇini state that *Lakāras* are used to show present, past and future Time and their subdivisions.⁹¹ Bhartṛhari also accepts the view of verbal activity and relates it with the sense of the root –

तस्याभिन्नस्य कालस्य व्यवहारे क्रियाकृताः ।

भेदा इव त्रयः सिद्धा याल्लोको नातिवर्तते ॥३.९.४८॥⁹²

Naiyāyikas do not accept doer and object as the meaning of verb. They take activity as sense of verb. They find the fault of *Gaurava* in the view of grammarians while admit that their own view has the quality of *Lāghava*. All these have been discussed in the earlier section in the problem concerning with the verb. Patañjali and Bhartṛhari opine that action has a connection with the Time. Time is the main factor for the differentiation of actions. Different actions occur at different time and place. So, they have been divided by the power of Time.⁹³ This power of Time resides in the form of the logos which brings the six-fold modifications in the form of the sentient and insentients objects such as the *Vikāra* of birth, existence, change, growth, decay and destruction.

⁹¹ वर्तमाने लट्, परोक्षे भूत, अनद्यतने लुट्, लिङ्गर्थे लेट्, अनद्यतने लङ्, लिङ्गिनमित्ते लृङ् क्रियातिपत्तौ, etc.

⁹² Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 383

⁹³ मूर्तिनां तेन भिन्नानां आचयापचयाः पृथक् । लक्ष्यते परिणामेन सर्वासां भेदयोगिना ॥३.९.१३॥ *Ibid*, p. 374

अध्याहितकलां यस्य कालशक्तिमुपाश्रिताः ।

जन्मादयो विकाराः षड्भावभेदस्य योनयः॥ १.३॥⁹⁴

Time is taken as the stage-holder of the entire universe and the three-fold activity viz. origination, sustenance and destruction happen due to power of Time.⁹⁵

The six *Lakāras* ending with *ṭ* (ट्) have been demonstrated hereafter. They should be understood in the following manner -

Present Tense (*Laṭ-lakāra*)

The *Laṭ-lakāra* is used to show the action pertaining to present time. It has been stated by the *sūtra* वर्तमाने लट् ॥ ३.२.१ २३॥⁹⁶. It means the action which is already started but yet not finished. It is different from past and future. Verbs like *Pacati*, etc. show the continuity of the actions like placing the vessel on the stove and putting it down after completion of work. Thus, *Laṭ-lakāra* is used to denote the sense of the action of the present. The *Vārtika* on the same aphorism of AA illustrates present tense with the example of a student whose study is not completed yet he is doing other actions like sleeping, eating, etc. at the same time. In this example, the action of studying is the main and is continued. Hence it is in the present tense. It is true that this action of study has many interventions and intervals still it is continuing in the same form for some years. Therefore it must be used in the present tense only. The same rule is accepted by Patañjali and Kaiyaṭa.⁹⁷ Bhartṛhari has given the example of eating to

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 1

⁹⁵ उत्पत्तौ च स्थितौ चैव विनाशे चापि तद्वताम् । निमित्तं कालमेवाहुर्विभक्तेनात्मना स्थितम् ॥ १.३॥
तमस्य लोकयन्त्रस्य सूत्रधारं प्रचक्षते । प्रतिबन्धाभ्युज्ञाभ्यां तेन विश्वं विभज्यते ॥ १.४॥ *Ibid*, p. 372

⁹⁶ Pāṇini, *op cit*, p. 27

⁹⁷ प्रवृत्तस्याविरामे शिष्या भवन्त्यवर्तमानत्वात् । *MB*, p. 22 इहाधीमह इत्यध्ययनं प्रवृत्तं प्रारब्धं न च तद्विरतम् । यदा च भोजनादिकं कुर्वन्तो नाधीयते, तदाऽधीमह इति प्रयोगो न प्राप्नोति । Kaiyaṭa, *op cit*, p. 32

explicit the present tense. It is discussed earlier that any action is a unit of small different actions. According to Bhartṛhari, the main action is eating and the other actions i.e. drinking, talking, laughing, etc. are subordinate. Hence the other actions should be taken as the part of the main action and not different from the action of the present tense.⁹⁸

The view of the opponent is that - present tense should not be understood in the sentence like आत्मा अस्ति, पर्वताः सन्ति etc. as the actions of the soul and the mountain cannot be confined to any particular time period. For, soul neither produces nor destroys. The same is the case of the mountain. Mountains are still, the change in their form is hardly seen with regarding to the present, past and future. So, it is not proper to confine them to the particular time.

To the above argument, Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa answers – it is true that the soul is immortal but it is also true that it needs body as the substratum. The nature of body is perishable. Hence the soul, even though imperishable is supposed to be perishable. Mountains are also classified into the group of present, past and future by the power of supposition.

Patañjali has cleverly answered that all the three tenses viz. present, past and future are seen in आत्मा अस्ति, पर्वताः सन्ति, because their position (स्थिति) and existence (सत्ता) are beyond the sphere of any particular time.

Kaiyaṭa's view regarding the present tense is – ‘in the absence of present, past and future cannot be inferred.’⁹⁹

The same has been stated in the VP-

⁹⁸ व्यवधानमिवोपैति निवृत्त इव दृश्यते । क्रियासमूहो भुज्यादिरन्तरालप्रवृत्तिभिः ॥ ३.९.८२ ॥

न च विच्छिन्नरूपोऽपि सोऽविरामान्निवर्तते । सर्वैव हि क्रियान्येन सङ्कीर्णवोपलभ्यते ॥ ३.९.८३ ॥

तदन्तरालदृष्टा वा सर्वैवावयवक्रिया । सादृश्यात्सति भेदे तु तदङ्गत्वेन गृह्यते ॥ ३.९.८४ ॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, pp. 393-394

⁹⁹ वर्तमानत्वाभावे च भूतभविष्यतोरप्यभावप्रसङ्गः, वर्तमानो हि भूतत्वं भविष्यत्वं च प्रतिपद्यते । on MB 3.2.123, p. 82

परतो भिद्यते सर्वमात्मा तु न विकम्पते ।

पर्वतादिस्थितिस्तस्मात् पररूपेण भिद्यते ॥^{१००}

There is another argument regarding the use of the present tense that the scriptural statements like – *Tamaḥ Āsīt* (There was darkness), *Tucchenābhyapihitam Yadāsīt* (That was concealed by ignorance), *Ahamekaḥ Prathamamāsam* (In the beginning I alone was there), I am, I shall be etc., need to be justified in the same way.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa says that *Laṭ*, etc suggest Present Tense, etc. If a root which denotes *Process* in general, is taken as being identical with the qualified one (*Viśeṣya*) and the *Laṭ* etc., will be useful as being conducive to the purport. On the basis of *Anvaya-vyatireka*, the act of present tense, etc. ought to be spoken of as the direct meaning of *Laṭ* etc., Otherwise the denotative nature of affixes would be disturbed.

Pāṇini states one special usage for present tense. He says that present tense can be used for action similar to the present tense. It is technically called as वर्तमानसामीप्य.¹⁰¹ Bhartṛhari defines it as ‘the residual portion of the present and the beginning of the present is termed as वर्तमानसामीप्य in the system of grammar’.¹⁰²

Perfect Past (लिट्)

Now *Liṭ-Lakāra* and its connection with the word ‘*Parokṣe*’ are being discussed on the basis of the *sūtra* परोक्षे लिट् (पा° ३.२.११५). The division of Time is

¹⁰⁰ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 391

¹⁰¹ वर्तमानसामीप्ये वर्तमानवद्वा ॥ ३.३.१३१ ॥ Pāṇini, *op cit*, p. 32

¹⁰² अध्वनो वर्तमानस्य यः शेषो य उपक्रमः । तद् वर्तमानसामीप्यं शास्त्रे भेदेन दर्शितम् ॥ ३.९.१०२ ॥ Bhartṛhari, *op cit*, p. 402

supposed to be two-fold viz. 1) Time pertaining to today (*Adyatana*)¹⁰³ and 2) not pertaining to today (*Anadyatana*). Each of these is again of two types as past and future. Between these, the *Liṭ-Lakāra* is in the sense of past not pertaining to today. This type of tense is called ‘*Parokṣe-bhūta*’ (Perfect past). It means *Liṭ-Lakāra* ought to be used to denote the action pertaining to times of yore and the action not witnessed by the speaker. From this, it should be understood that *Liṭ* cannot not be used for events of today or for those which about to happen in near future or rather in near past. Indirect (past) means that which is imperceptible and which does not have the expression like ‘I witness’.

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa takes it as an action beyond the reach of the sense organs. It means that which is not the subject of sense organs of the speaker or listener.¹⁰⁴ Kaiyaṭa also explains it as इन्द्रिय+अविषयः (not the subject of sense organ). Patañjali has presented four different views on ‘*Parokṣe-bhūta*’ (Perfect past) –

1. The action took place before hundred years – केचित्तावदाहुः – वर्षशतवृत्तं परोक्षमिति ।
2. The action took place before thousand years – अपर आहुः – वर्षसहस्रवृत्तं परोक्षमिति ।
3. A conversation which is not direct or having some veil – अपर आहुः – कुट्यकुटान्तरितं परोक्षमिति ।

¹⁰³ There is little difference of opinion amongst the scholars with regards to the time pertaining to today. The views of Kaiyaṭa and Jinendrabuddhi are – रात्रेश्चतुर्थो यमो दिवसश्च सर्वो द्वितीयारात्रेश्च प्रथमोऽद्यतन इत्याहुः on MB ३.२.११०, p. 76

दिवसः सकलोऽतिक्रान्ताया, रात्रेश्चतुर्थो याम आगामिन्याश्च प्रथमो याम इत्येषोऽद्यतनः कालः। *Nyāsa* on AA, ३.२.११०, p. 74

The view of Bhaṭṭoji is अतीतायाः रात्रेः पश्चाद्धर्नागामिन्याश्च पूर्वोद्धेन च सहितो दिवसो दिवसोऽद्यतनः। on AA ३.२.११०, p. 89. So, on all all the commentators have taken the period of approximately 24 hours. Today also we take this night 12.00 am to next night 12.00 am – the duration of 24 hours for fixing present tense in general. Therefore it can be said that *Liṭ* cannot be used for the action which took place before 24 hours from the present time.

¹⁰⁴ वृत्तिविषये त्वक्षिशब्दः सर्वेन्द्रियवचनो न चक्षुपर्यायः । *Udyota* on MB 3.2.115, p. 85

4. The action took place before 2 – 3 days – अपर आहुः – द्रहवृत्तं त्र्यहवृत्तं चेति ।¹⁰⁵

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa has followed Kaiyaṭa. He says that the action which is not witnessed by the doer belongs to the *Parokṣebhūta*.

परोक्षत्वं च साक्षात्करोमीत्येतादृशविषयाशालिज्ञानाविषयत्वम् ।

The opponent raises the question by quoting the passage from the MB. It is asked that the action is beyond the perception of senses as it has been stated in the *Bhāṣya* (1-3-1) “the action is indeed absolutely beyond perception therefore it cannot be shown as a whole as its components occur in succession.”¹⁰⁶ Therefore the word *Parokṣe* cannot discern it.

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa says that this argument is redundant. The action though not shown as a whole can become an object of knowledge as ‘I perceive it in units’. Otherwise, it appears that the activity of fast running in the expression ‘*Paśya Mṛgo Dhāvati*’ cannot be the object of observation.

The indirectness of the past (*Parokṣatva*) is not imprecise since it is intimated by the components of *Process* (series of actions) which are conducive to the action. According to some, the usages like ‘this person had cooked’ (*Ayam Papāca*) etc., show the indirectness of past (*Parokṣatva*) of the *Process*; because, even though the doer of the action belongs to present, the doership of the respective action indicates past only.

Then how the expression ‘व्यातेने किरणावलीमुदयनः’, (as one’s own action is directly perceivable to oneself) is justified?

To this doubt, Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa replies that this expression is erroneous. Again, another argument is made that many times person seems distinct to his own actions due to the absence of mind. But such is not the case since the making of

¹⁰⁵ Patañjali, *op cit*, p. 65

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 67

a great treatise needs concentration of mind and hence the use of *Anadyatana* and *Bhūta* in the above stated expression is not proper. It seems that Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa has not given any satisfactory answer to the question raised by the opponent.

First Future (लुट्)

Now the meaning of *Luṭ - Lakāra* is explained by quoting the sentence *Śvo Bhāvinī*. The *Luṭ - Lakāra* should be employed in the sense of ‘future action which will be executed after 24 hours’ by the aphorism अनद्यतने लुट् ॥३.३.१५॥¹⁰⁷ That is why it is called indirect future. The example is - *Śvo Bhāvinī* (it is going to happen tomorrow). Patañjali calls it अनुशोचन and भविष्यत्सामान्य. Kaiyaṭa explains the same in an elaborative manner:

श्वस्तनीति लुटः संज्ञा भविष्यन्त्यर्थे लृडर्थे भविष्यत्सामान्ये इत्यर्थः। यथा
इयं कदा नु गन्ता, या एवं पादौ निदधाति ‘इति’ इयं बालिका यद्येवं पादौ
निदधाति ।¹⁰⁸

Second Future (लृट्)

The next *Lakāra* is *Lṛṭ - Lakāra*. It is explicated by stating the word *Bhaviṣyati*. This *Lakāra* is applied in the sense of future time in general without any specific condition. It is enjoined by the *sūtra* शेषे च ॥३.३.१३॥¹⁰⁹ as in the

¹⁰⁷ Pāṇini, *op cit*, p. 29

¹⁰⁸ PRD on MB 3.3.15, p. 92

¹⁰⁹ Pāṇini, *op cit*, p. 29

example ‘the pot will be made’ etc. It states the antecedent negation¹¹⁰ of an action and the absence of the present time.¹¹¹

Subjunctive (लेट्)

The *Leṭ* - *Lakāra* is used in the sense of injunction etc, as per the *sūtra* लिङर्थे लेट् ॥३.४.७॥¹¹² which ordains that in the Vedas *Leṭ* can be used as *Liṅ* (लिङ्). The *Liṅ* is used in the sense of ‘injunction etc.’ e.g. स देवाँ इह वक्षति (ऋ. 1.1.2) (he brings the gods here)¹¹³

Imperative (लोट्)

The *Loṭ* - *Lakāra* is used in the sense of request, order, prayer, etc. By the word ‘etc’, the senses of injunction, invitation, wish etc., are understood. As stated by the rules आशिषि लिङ् लोटौ ॥३.३.१७३॥ and लोट् च ॥३.३.१६२॥. Its example is – *Bhavatu Te Śivaprasādaḥ* (May you obtain Śiva’s grace) etc. The sense of *Loṭ* - *Lakāra* is same as *Leṭ* and *Liṅ*. So, more or less the three *Lakāras* render the same sense. That’s why, the ascertainment of sense of *Liṅ* is in fact that of the other two *Lakāra* i.e. *Leṭ* and *Loṭ*.

The discussion on *Laṅ* and the rest four *Lakāra*:

7. *Laṅ Lakāra* - Imperfect Tense (the past before yesterday)
8. *Liṅ Lakāra* - Potential Mood (in the sense of instigation, etc)
9. *Luṅ Lakāra* - Immediate Past (general past)
10. *Lṛṅ Lakāra* - Conditional (non-occurrence of action in past and future)

¹¹⁰ प्रागभाव is explained in the Tarka-Saṁgrahaḥ as – अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः। उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यस्य ॥९.२०॥, p. 146

¹¹¹ भविष्यत्त्वञ्च वर्तमानप्रागभावप्रतियोगिसमयोत्पत्तिमत्त्वम् तद्यथा – घटो भविष्यति । VBS, p. 120

¹¹² Pāṇini, *op cit*, p. 33

¹¹³ Some other examples are जोषिषत् (ऋ. 2.35.1), तारिषत् (ऋ. 1.25.12), पताति दिद्युत् (ऋ. 7.2.51), जीवाति शरदः शतम् (ऋ. 10.85.39)

Imperfect (लङ्)

The author states the meaning of *Lañ Lakāra* as ‘the action of past executed before the present day’ by the *sūtra* अनद्यतने लङ् ॥३.२.१११॥¹¹⁴ e.g. *Asya Putrobhavat* (He got a son). Patañjali opines that it should be used for near past-

एष च नाम न्याय्यो भूतकालो यत्र किञ्चिदपवृत्तं दृश्यते ।¹¹⁵

Potential Mood (लिङ्)

The author now states the sense of *Liñ Lakāra* as ‘in the sense of injunction etc’, by the *sūtra* विधिनिमन्त्रणामन्त्रणाधीष्टसंप्रश्नार्थनेषु लिङ् ॥३.३.१६१॥¹¹⁶ which ordains *Liñ Lakāra* in the senses of injunction, invitation, order, provability, speaking of a duty, asking a question and prayer.

1. *Vidhi* means injunction. Its example is - *Br̥tyādernikṛṣṭsya Pravarttanam* i.e. employing the servant-like person in his duty. It is used when someone orders comparatively to a younger person to do some task e.g. bring the water (जलमानय).
2. *Nimantraṇa* – Invitation in necessary things like inviting a grandson, etc for dinner in obsequial ceremonies e.g. the performer requests his grandson to have meal (इह भवान् भुञ्जीत). Here the performance of an action incurs either merit or sin.
3. *Āmantraṇa* – Open invitation without oppression or doing any action wishfully e.g. you please come for dinner (भोजनाय आगच्छ). This doesn’t have any compulsion of performance and it does not incur sin or merit.

¹¹⁴ Pāṇini, *op cit*, p. 27

¹¹⁵ *MB* on AA 3.2.101, p. 93

¹¹⁶ Pāṇini, *op cit*, p. 32

4. *Adhīṣṭa* – Have a high opinion of i.e. in the sense of rendering respect. When someone asks the revered one to do something in a respectful manner e.g. you please teach my son (पुत्रमध्यापयेद् भवान्).
5. *Sampraśṇa* – Deliberation e.g. when someone asks that whether I should study Veda or Tarka? (किं भो वेदमधीयीय उत तर्कम्?). In this example, the question is asked with deliberation.
6. *Prārthanā* – Request. When someone requests to somebody e.g. Please let me have a meal (भो भोजनं लभेय).

The argument of Naiyāyikas is that the Injunction is based on the *Iṣṭasādhana*tā. But here Injunction is understood as the cause of knowledge as well as indifferent from the object of knowledge. This characteristic is present in the means of obtaining desired one. Therefore, that itself is the sense of *Vidhi-Liṅ*.

Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa replies that in fact, this condition of being the cause of knowledge as well as indifferent from the object of knowledge is present in *Kṛtisādhya*tva as its knowledge too engages one in action. In the performance of sacrifice etc., its knowledge is received from society only. So, since it is obtained from other source, it cannot be the direct meaning of *Liṅ*.

Another view is - the knowledge that a particular action which is not associated with a strong undesirable result, too, is not a cause of action because it is volatile due to absence of abhorrence. Moreover it has inconsistency. For example, when a theist, driven by strong sexual urge, indulges in an action, in spite of the knowledge that it leads to hell, there is indulgence in action due to absence of hatred for such act, but not the cause in the form of knowledge that it is associated with strong undesirable result. Therefore, *Pravartanā* is no other than the knowledge which leads to desired result. This is stated by Maṇḍaṇa Miśra too.

“The attainment of the desired result is the only inspiring thing for engaging one’s own self in the action. Therefore, the scholars term it as the cause of indulgence in action and *dharma* as *Pravartanā*”.¹¹⁷

Immediate Past (लृङ्)

Luṅ - Lakāra denotes the sense of ‘past in general’ by the strength of the aphorism लृङ् ॥३.२.११०॥¹¹⁸. Past in general means ‘the opposite state of the destruction of present thing’. It is present in action without having any obstracle. Therefore, there can be a statement like ‘a pot was made’ for an existing pot. This sentence means ‘the activity present in pot which is contrary to the destruction of pot is conducive to show the action of the past’. Even though the action of production of a pot is mentioned in the sentence but the verb indicates the existence of a pot in the past and not in the present.

Conditional (लृङ्)

The meaning of *Lṛṇ* is discussed in the sense of ‘being’ etc. It is illustrated by the word क्रियातिपत्ति. It is a compound word. The compound क्रियातिपत्ति can be split up like क्रियायाः अतिपत्तिः. Here the word अतिपत्ति means ‘non-performance’ of an action. When such non-performance of an action is implied and both the antecedent and its consequence of past and future remain present, the *Lṛṇ* should be used, as per the *sūtra* लिङ्निमित्ते लृङ् क्रियातिपत्तौ ॥३.३.१३९॥¹¹⁹. In this *sūtra* the word लिङ्निमित्ते means ‘the antecedent and consequence’ as they are the aspects of *Liṅ*. It is evident from the following examples –

1. सुवृष्टिश्चेत् अभविष्यत् सुभिक्षम् अभविष्यत् ।

¹¹⁷ पुंसा नेष्टाभ्युपायत्वात् क्रियास्वन्यः प्रवर्तकः । प्रवृत्तिहेतुं धर्मं प्रवदन्ति प्रवर्तनाम् ॥ VBS, p. 112

¹¹⁸ Pāṇini, *op cit*, p. 27

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 32

(If it had rained sufficiently, there would have been sufficient food)

2. वस्तिश्चेत् प्राज्वलिष्यत् ओदनम् अपक्ष्यत् ।

(If the fire had burnt properly, the rice would have been cooked well.)

Both the examples put forward the condition for the completion of the action. In the first example the action of raining which is insufficient is intended; while in the second example the action of burning which was not done in a proper way is meant. The cognitive knowledge presented here is ‘the absence of activity in rice conducive to cooking is caused by the absence of activity in fire conducive to burning’. Thus, it can be said that *Lṛñ-Lakāra* generally follows the relation of cause and effect.

Thus, the discussion on the *Lakāras* can be summarized as: Time is of two types viz.. ‘of today and not of today’. The first is of three types viz. ‘past, future and present’. The later is of two types viz. past and future.

1. *Laṭ* is used for present time. e.g., ***Bhavati***.
2. *Liṭ* (Perfect) is used when the remote past (indirect) is intended, e.g., ***Babhūva***.
3. *Luṭ* (First Future) is used when indirect future is intended, e.g., ***Bhavitā***.
4. *Lṛṭ* (Second Future) is used for simple future. e.g., ***Bhaviṣyati***.
5. *Leṭ* (Subjunctive) is mostly used in the Vedas by placing personal-endings of a person or number different from what is actually found¹²⁰ e.g. ***Bhaviṣati***. Its famous example is ‘he brings the gods here’ (स देवाँ इह वक्षति).
6. *Loṭ* (Imperative) is used in the sense of command and request e.g. ***Bhavatu***.
7. *Lañ* (Imperfect) is used when the past, not of today, is intended, e.g. ***Abhavat***.

¹²⁰ Abhayaṅkara, K.V. & Śukla, J.M., *op cit*, p. 336

8. *Liñ* (optative) is two-fold viz. potential and conditional. Its usage has been explained in the discussion on *Liñ* e.g. ***Bhavet*** (potential) and ***Bhūyata*** (conditional)
9. *Luñ* (Aorist) is used in general past e.g., ***Abhūt***.
10. *Lṛñ* (Conditional) is used when the relation of cause and effect is intended in past or future, e.g. ***Abhaviṣyat***.

This mention of meaning of *Lakāras* etc, is an indication, because these Lakāras have been ordained in other senses also. It can be stated that the usages of the Lakāras in the senses mentioned above are based on their popular practices. These rules should not be considered as the final verbatim of grammar.